The Democratic Paradox The Democratic Paradox Dutch Revolutionary Struggles over Democratisation and Centralisation (1780-1813) De democratische paradox De Nederlandse revolutionaire strijd over democratisering en centralisatie (1780-1813) (met een samenvatting in het Nederlands) Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit Utrecht op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. dr. W.H. Gispen, ingevolge het besluit van het college van promoties in het openbaar te verdedigen op donderdag 6 september 2007 des middags te 2.30 uur door Thomas Poell geboren op 7 februari 1973, te Haarlem Promotoren: Prof. dr. M. Prak Prof. dr. I. de Haan Image on the cover: fragment of Nauwkeurige afbeelding van de Nationale Vergadering in Den Haag (Accurate Portrayal of the National Assembly in The Hague) signed by George Kockers in Middelburg 1797. Private collection of Rutger Schimmelpenninck. Contents Preface 7 1 Introduction 11 Current Explanations 13 The Debate on the Dutch Revolution 15 Historical Puzzles 17 The Political-Process Perspective 19 Democratisation and Centralisation 22 Operationalisation 24 Local Actors, Identities, and Coalitions 25 Central State Actors, Identities, and Coalitions 27 Focusing on Amsterdam 29 Research 31 Limitations 33 Organisation 34 2 The Patriot Revolt (1780-1787) 37 Elite Conflict 38 An Appeal to the Ideal of Popular Sovereignty 40 Popular Reactions 43 Liberal Ideas 45 Coalitions 48 The Construction of the Patriot Coalition 51 The Patriot Revolt in Amsterdam 53 The Patriot Coup 54 Consequences 57 Conclusion 59 3 The Unitary Democratic Revolution (1795-1798) 61 The Introduction of the Unitary Democratic State Model 62 Revolution 65 New Identities and Actors 66 The Creation of a Sovereign Provincial Government 68 Motives 69 The Revolutionary Committee and the French 71 The Partial Subordination of the Amsterdam Municipality 74 The Creation of the National Assembly 77 Local Democracy 80 The Coup in Friesland 83 A New Constitution 85 A Democratic Compromise? 87 A Network of Revolutionary Clubs 91 The Coup of 1798 96 Conclusion 99 6 Contents 4 The Federalist Reversal (1798-1805) 101 The Breakdown of the Unitary Democratic Alliance 102 The Restoration of the Democratic Process 104 The Clubs and the French 106 The Federalist Reversal 108 Time Consuming Procedures 110 Lack of Resources 113 Change of Opinion 115 A National Coalition? 117 The Coup 119 Local Autonomy 122 The Restoration of the Local Corporate Alliance 123 The Decentralisation of the State 126 Conclusion 128 5 From Collaboration to Oppression (1805-1813) 131 A New Coalition? 132 Financial Concerns 134 The Schimmelpenninck Government 135 Amsterdam’s Resistance against Financial Unification 139 The Consolidation of the Financial Coalition 142 The Battle against the Local Corporate System 146 From Indirect to Direct Rule 149 Local Resistance Continued 151 Financial Subordination 154 Oppression 156 Intensified Local Resistance 159 Conclusion 161 6 Conclusion 163 The Democratic Paradox 163 Coalitions 165 Democratisation & Centralisation 167 The Debate 168 Samenvatting 171 De democratische paradox 172 Coalities 173 Democratisering en centralisatie 174 Consulted Archives 177 Bibliography 181 Curriculum Vitae 190 Preface Like the Dutch Revolution, this research project has been characterized by various breakthroughs, but also by many setbacks. As the late eighteenth-century revolutionaries, I have frequently changed objectives and alliances. Consequently, the final result is very different from what was originally intended. In the beginning, the aim was to investigate the development of national states in the urban regions of Europe, such as the Low Countries, Switzerland, and Northern Italy. I expected this development to be particularly problematic because the cities in these regions had, throughout the early modern period, been politically more or less autonomous. From the late eighteenth-century revolutions onwards, these cities and their elites suddenly became subordinated to central states. To find out how the political rulers of such previously autonomous cities reacted to the centralisation of authority, I decided to focus my research on the Amsterdam elite. This elite had not only enjoyed substantial political autonomy in the early modern period, it had also wielded a lot of influence on the politics of the Dutch Republic as a whole. All this started to change in the revolutionary period. Hence, I planned on writing a book, which would show how the Amsterdam elite strongly resisted the centralisation process. However, once I began to investigate, I discovered that the historical reality was much more complex, complicated and confusing, than my theoretical scheme suggested. First, no continuous centralisation process could be observed. During the 1780s, no attempts were even made to create more centralized state structures. In these years, the revolutionaries were primarily focussed on the democratisation of local government. The centralisation process did take off after the revolution of 1795, but was again reversed in 1801. A similar reversal occurred in the process of democratisation. Second, a perhaps even more confusing phenomenon caught my eye: the Amsterdam elite did not at all act according to my theoretical expectations. Although I did find Amsterdam politicians who tried to protect the political autonomy of the city, there were many others who strongly supported the centralisation of the state. Moreover, I found a substantial number of Amsterdam politicians who occupied an in-between position: they favoured financial unification, but at the same time wanted to maintain the political autonomy of the provincial and local governments. And, to make matters more complicated, the position of the Amsterdam politicians on other crucial issues, such as the democratisation of government, did not always logically cluster with their view on the centralisation of the state. For example, many politicians who supported a unified state were also in favour of a far-reaching democratisation of government, but, at the same time, there were too many exceptions to make this a rule. Finally, to complicate the political landscape even further, throughout the revolutionary period, Amsterdam politicians repeatedly changed their mind on how the state should be reformed. Taken together, these various and also shifting positions could not be fitted within the state-formation perspective which was my original frame of reference. In fact, the results of my research seemed to defy all classifications which had so far been made to analyse the Dutch Revolution. Categories such as “unitarist” and “federalist”, “democrat” and “aristocrat”, or “radical”, “moderate”, and “conservative” are all based on the assumption that the interests of the revolutionaries remained more or less stable over time. 8 Preface Moreover, it assumes that the revolutionaries formed large clusters, which shared identical interests on a number of crucial issues. My research suggested a much more fragmented and unstable situation, in which the political interests of Amsterdam politicians not only seemed to shift frequently, but their political alliances and identities appeared to be subject to change as well. After having made several failed attempts to analyze this constantly shifting political landscape through the state-formation perspective, I decided to change my approach. Instead of investigating how the political organization of the early modern Republic determined the revolution and the subsequent struggle over the transformation of the state, I abandoned all such preconceptions and focussed on the chaotic process of revolutionary interaction itself. This shift in perspective proved to be fruitful. Once I no longer had to fit the actions and statements of the Amsterdam politicians within a particular mold, I could freely investigate how at times they clashed and then again cooperated with each other. Now I could use the shifting identities, interests, and coalitions to explain why and how the processes of centralisation and democratisation frequently broke down, and were even reversed in the course of the revolutionary period. Thus, my confrontation with the chaotic and rapidly shifting character of the Dutch revolution not only impelled me to change my theoretical perspective, it also forced me to change my explanatory objectives. As I observed the many reversals in the centralisation and democratisation of the Dutch state, and obviously of other European states, I became fascinated by the problematic character of political modernization. Hence, instead of trying to explain how and why the Dutch national state had been established, I decided to focus on the sudden advances and reversals in the political modernization process during the revolutionary era. Inevitably, my theoretical twists and turns have impelled me to change my scientific alliances as well. Originally, I primarily found myself in the company of socio-economic historians, which in the Netherlands have been the main adepts of the state-formation perspective. As I moved towards a process approach, I increasingly entered the domain of political historians. Nevertheless, throughout this project I have been supported by my supervisor Maarten Prak. Although a socio-economic historian in heart and soul, Maarten has fully encouraged and assisted my efforts to develop a political-process perspective on the revolutionary period. I would very much like to thank him for his ongoing support, his intelligent advice,