Israel and the Middle East News Update

Thursday, August 4

Headlines:  , US Say Progress Made in Military Aid Talks, Deal Expected Soon  Hamas ‘Infiltrated Gazan Aid Group’, Stole Tens of Millions of Dollars  Knesset Votes to Postpone Launch of New Public Broadcasting Corp.  Ahead of Elections, Fatah Brags of Killing 11,000 Israelis  Israel’s Arabs Want More Industrial Zones  Cabinet to Vote on Giving Gaza a Port  ISIS in Sinai Threatens to Turn Israel into a Graveyard  IDF Destroys Homes of Sarona Terrorists

Commentary:  Project Syndicate: “Israel’s Government Hawks and Military Doves”  By Daniel Kurtzer, Former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt and Israel  Middle East Institute: “Israeli-Russian Relations: Respect and Suspect”  By Eran Etzion, Former-Head of Policy Planning, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs

S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace 633 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, 5th Floor, Washington, DC 20004 www.centerpeace.org ● Yoni Komorov, Editor ● David Abreu, Associate Editor

News Excerpts August 4, 2016

Ha’aretz Israel, US Say Progress Made in Aid Talks, Deal Expected Soon Following three days of intensive discussions in Washington, D.C. progress has been made in talks between Israel and the U.S. on the military agreement aid, but the two sides have yet to reach a deal. Senior American and Israeli officials expressed their optimism, telling Ha’aretz that most of the remaining gaps are technical, and that they believe that an agreement could soon be reached.

Jerusalem Post Hamas ‘Infiltrated Gazan Aid Group’, Stole Tens of Millions Hamas infiltrated a large international aid organization operating in Gaza and redirected tens of millions of dollars - 60 percent - of the organization's budget to its military wing, the Shin Bet announced on Thursday, following an investigation that lasted almost two months. The World Vision organization, which operates in 100 countries and employs 46,000 people, fell victim to a complex, pre-planned Hamas takeover scheme, a senior Shin Bet source said, adding that Hamas's military wing stole 7.2 million dollars a year from the budget, aimed at food, humanitarian assistance, and aid programs for disabled children, and channeling the funds to weapons acquisitions, tunnel building, and other preparations for war with Israel. See also, “Top Official in Christian Aid Group Charged with Funneling Funds to Hamas” (Ha'aretz)

Israel Radio News Knesset Votes to Postpone Launch of New Public Broadcasting The Knesset plenum last night approved, in second and third readings, the amendment to the law enabling the start of operation of the new public broadcasting corporation to be postponed to April 30, 2017. 41 MKs voted in favor, three were opposed and three abstained. The communications minister and the finance minister will be empowered to move up the start of operations as of January 1, 2017 if the corporation’s council announces that it is ready. See also, “Knesset Passes Controversial Delay for New Public Broadcaster” (Times of Israel)

Ha’aretz Ahead of Elections, Fatah Brags of Killing Over 11,000 Israelis In a Facebook post Tuesday, the Palestinian Fatah group listed a number of its achievements. At the top: the killing of 11,000 Israelis. The post was carried by Fatah’s official page. It was translated by the watchdog group Palestinian Media Watch. In its boast, Fatah also notes other achievements, such as losing 170,000 “martyrs,” being the first to carry out attacks in the First Intifada, which began in 1987, as well as in the second that launched in the fall of 2000. It also takes credit for leading the Palestinian campaign against Israel in the UN. See also, “Fatah, Hamas Accuse Each Other of Sabotaging Elections” (Times of Israel)

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Ynet News Israel's Arabs Want More Industrial Zones Moded Yunis, the mayor of the Arab Israeli town of Arara in northern Israel, recently offered 20 jobs in nursery schools in the town. Although not particularly well-paying, more than 250 women in the town of 23,000 in northern Israel applied. “Because of the lack of jobs, some women leave their homes at 5am and travel hours to southern Israel to work,” said Yunis. “It is very frustrating for anyone who graduated college and then can’t find a job.” The Mossawa Center, the Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens in Israel, says that about 60% of Israel’s Arabs are poor, and 65% live below the poverty line. Mossawa invited Yunis and other mayors to a conference at the Knesset, also hosted by long-time Arab parliamentarian Ahmed Tibi, focusing on the need for more industrial zones in the Arab sector. While Arabs constitute 20% of Israel’s populations, just 3.5% of all areas designated for light and heavy industry are in Arab towns, industrial zones that typically bring both money and jobs.

Jerusalem Post Cabinet to Vote on Giving Gaza a Port The cabinet is to vote in the coming weeks on a proposal by Transportation Minister Israel Katz to facilitate the creation of a Gazan seaport, to be built on an artificial island off the Strip. For the past several years, Katz has been promoting the idea of constructing a seaport for Gaza on a man-made island. His proposal has recently gained the support of the defense establishment, which is concerned by the prospect of an economic collapse in Gaza triggering another war. “The world perceives Israel as having responsibility for Gaza,” Katz said during an interview, arguing that enabling the creation of the port will both help ordinary Gazans to make a living and improve Israel’s international diplomatic standing. “It won’t change Hamas’s ideology,” Katz said, but opening up Gaza to trade with the world certainly has the potential of acting as a restraining factor for Hamas.

BICOM ISIS in Sinai Threatens to Turn Israel into a Graveyard An ISIS affiliate in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula yesterday released a video in which it threatened Israel by saying it would pay a “heavy price”. Sinai Province, which has pledged loyalty to ISIS, released a 35- minute video which shows footage of the terror group’s attacks on Egyptian troops. The narration includes direct threats towards Israel, addressing the Jewish state saying “your account with us has become weighty and you will soon pay a heavy price”. The video continues, pledging that “Jews will not remain in Palestine, we will turn it into a graveyard for Jews”. See also, “Rome, Jews, Israel Threatened by Islamic State in the Sinai Peninsula” (International Business Times)

Arutz Sheva IDF Destroys Homes of Sarona Terrorists IDF forces demolished the homes the terrorist responsible for the deadly attack in Sarona Market in early Thursday morning, in a joint operation between Border Police and units of the Civil Administration’s enforcement division. In June, the two terrorists, Khalid and Mahmoud Mehamara, opened fire in the Sarona Market in Tel Aviv, killing four and wounding six. Operating early Thursday morning, Israeli security forces destroyed Khalid Mehmara’s home in Yatta, south of Hebron, along with the home of his cousin, Mahmoud Mehamara in Khirbet Raka'a, also in the Hebron area.

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Project Syndicate – August 3, 2016 Israel’s Government Hawks and Military Doves By Daniel Kurtzer  Those who lead Israel’s defense establishment often come to consider peace with the Palestinians a necessary condition for the country’s security. Being tasked with maintaining the territories Israel has occupied since the Six-Day War in 1967 evidently causes the military and security brass to support political measures that would end the occupation. And yet the government shows no interest in pursuing a permanent settlement.  To appreciate this divide, consider the late Meir Dagan, who served as Major General of the (IDF) and then as Director of Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency. Several years ago, I sat on a panel at a conference in Jerusalem convened by then-Israeli President Shimon Peres. To my right sat Dagan, who had just completed eight years as head of Mossad; to my left sat Dore Gold, a former academic and former Israeli ambassador.  The two men held very different views about how best to guarantee Israel’s security, and it is worth recapitulating their respective arguments.  Gold argued that returning to pre-1967 armistice lines would leave Israel without “defensible borders.” He insisted that Israel could guard against threats from the east only if it maintained a military presence in the West Bank and controlled the Jordan River – which runs along the border separating Jordan from Israel and the West Bank.  Dagan countered that the military’s role is to safeguard Israel’s borders, regardless of where those borders are drawn. While the IDF would certainly prefer to operate with the strategic advantages that holding more territory can confer, it would fulfill its mission under whatever conditions the Israeli government set for it.  But Dagan went further, describing the principle of “defensible borders” as a canard that ignores the intentions and capabilities of the party on the other side of the border. With an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, the burden of defending the border would be vastly reduced, because Israel would have a serious cross-border partner with a mutual interest in avoiding armed conflict. A Palestinian security force would by default provide a significant measure of security for Israel as well.  Dagan’s dovish position has a long tradition in Israel’s defense establishment. Peace Now, a nongovernmental organization that represents Israelis who support a political resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, was founded in 1978 when 348 IDF reservists sent a letter to then- Prime Minister Menachem Begin urging him to conclude the peace process with Egypt.  Similarly, in the aftermath of the first Intifada, the Palestinian uprising that lasted from 1987 to 1993, the defense establishment led the effort for peace. In 1991 Yitzhak Rabin – a former IDF chief of staff, prime minister, and defense minister who at the time served on the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee of the Knesset, Israel’s legislature – argued for a comprehensive regional peace effort. Like Dagan, Rabin considered the Arab-Israeli conflict to be a burden on Israel’s security, and both active and retired military officers have since then led or participated in negotiations with the Palestinians and with Syria.

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 Most recently, many prominent former defense figures supported the deal reached between Iran and the so-called P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus ) over Iran’s nuclear program – an agreement that Israel’s government bitterly opposed. Indeed, the divide between the security establishment and the politicians now governing Israel seems wider than ever. Most former senior defense officials echo Dagan’s argument, while government officials sound more like Gold. A number of advocacy organizations have emerged to push for peace. The Peace and Security Association, which includes hundreds of veterans of the IDF, Mossad, Shin Bet (Israel’s domestic security agency), and the National Police Force, says its mission is, “to promote a sustainable political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a critical component of Israel’s national security and social resilience.”  The nongovernmental organization Commanders for Israel’s Security (CIS), with more than 200 members from Israel’s security elite, just published a paper titled “Security First” with a comprehensive set of proposals to revitalize efforts to share peacefully the land west of the Jordan River. CIS maintains that terror against Israel cannot be defeated by military means alone, and that any peace process must improve Palestinians’ quality of life. Senior former Israeli security officials also participated actively in a study undertaken by the Center for a New American Strategy that produced a detailed security plan for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Some former officials have gone even further: Former Mossad Director Efraim Halevy argues that Israel should accept “the political reality of Hamas” and open a dialogue with the organization that governs the Gaza Strip. Likewise, in the 2012 documentary The Gatekeepers, six former heads of Shin Bet reflect on the lessons of the past few decades and issue a call for peace with the Palestinians.  Remarkably, Israel’s political leadership has not suffered electorally for ignoring the views of the defense establishment. There was no public reaction when, after The Gatekeepers was released, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s office issued a statement saying he had not seen the documentary and had no intention of doing so. Given the public’s high regard for the Israeli defense establishment, particularly relative to the government, voters’ indifference is a mystery. In a 2015 survey conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics, 93% of Israeli Jews expressed trust in the army, compared to only 40% in the government, and only 22% in Israeli political parties.  One answer is that, after so many failed efforts, the Israeli public is disillusioned with the peace process. Moreover, acts of incitement and terrorism emanating from the occupied territories have intensified. This allows the current governing coalition to justify policies – such as enabling expanded settlement activity in the West Bank – that further deepen the conflict.  Against this backdrop, Netanyahu has portrayed himself as Israel’s protector, appropriating the esteem afforded to the defense establishment. Those calling for a renewed peace process will now have to make their case to the public and reclaim that title. Whether they can do that in a context of regional turmoil and domestic insecurity remains uncertain, to say the least. Daniel Kurtzer, a former United States ambassador to Israel and Egypt, is a visiting professor of Middle East policy studies at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. 5

Middle East Institute – August 3, 2016 Israeli-Russian Relations: Respect and Suspect By Eran Etzion  Israeli-Russian relations have attracted unusual levels of interest in recent months, against the backdrop of Russia’s military intervention in Syria and the unprecedented creation of a ‘de- confliction’ mechanism between the IDF and the Russian forces. As is so often the case in today’s hyper-connected media and political environment, this small nucleus of reality was blown out of proportion and portrayed as nothing short of a strategic love affair. In fact, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are walking a tight rope of joint and conflicting interests in Syria, in the region and vis-a-vis the United States and the European Union.  In Syria, Russia’s close alliance with Iran and Hezbollah positions it, seemingly, at the opposite corner from Israel. While some Russia-apologists are quick to point out the differences between Russia and Iran’s interests in this arena, their primary goals in Syria are completely aligned. Both nations seek to maintain and enhance their respective influence in Syria and Lebanon, while denying the United States and its allies a sustainable foothold in post-conflict Syria. From Israel’s perspective, Iran’s current role in Syria is already a major cause of concern, but a certain Russian role is perceived as beneficial. Russia is believed to have more influence on the regional spoilers—Iran, Hezbollah and other non-state actors— than the United States and any other external actor. Some in Israel see Russia as a moderating factor in that sense.  From an operational perspective, Russia’s military presence is also a complicating factor for Israel, given its intelligence-gathering capabilities and its disregard for conventional rules of engagement, already demonstrated by Turkey shooting down a Russian fighter jet in November 2015, as well as by infringements of Israeli airspace. Furthermore, it is quite clear that once the fighting in Syria subsides and Hezbollah is able to re-focus its attention on Lebanon, tensions with Israel will rise. The kind of relations and ‘quid pro quo’ that is taking place between Russia and Hezbollah in the course of the last five years will have a significant impact on Russia’s position toward future clashes between Israel and the Lebanese Shiite militant group. Armed with some of the best Russian-made missiles, rockets and intelligence capabilities, Hezbollah is considered by the I.D.F. as Israel’s primary enemy. Exactly 10 years after the Second Lebanon War, a third Lebanon war is frequently discussed in Israel as a fait accompli. The one external power who may actually be able to prevent such a war is Russia. Will it have an interest to do so?  Looking more broadly at Israel and Russia’s interests in the region and beyond, it appears that the age-old Hebrew saying “kabdehu vechashdehu,” or “respect him and suspect him,” has always been at the foundation of Israel’s attitude toward Russia, and will continue to guide it. It resembles President Barack Obama’s paraphrase of Ronald Reagan’s famous saying, “don’t trust, and verify.” The critical difference, of course, emanates from the vast asymmetries between the regional power, Israel, and the global power, Russia. Israel’s capacity to distrust is unlimited, but its ability to ‘verify’ is very much limited. The recent Putin-Netanyahu photo ops, celebrated by the Israeli press and enhanced by strategic messaging from the Kremlin and Netanyahu’s inner circle, are therefore largely a façade. 6

 Russia seeks to weaken the U.S. hold on the Middle East as part of its global strategy to that effect. Israel’s defense and foreign policy establishment—despite the significant erosion of the Netanyahu era, who has recklessly damaged the fabric of bilateral strategic relations—still considers the United States its primary ally and protector. Russia has developed a flexible diplomacy and branded itself ‘the only actor capable of engaging with all other actors.’ In post- elections America, when it becomes clear that the next administration’s Middle East posture will not be significantly altered, Russia might be faced with the limits of its own power and influence. It will not be able to take the traditional American leadership role, nor will it seek to do so. Come the next major Israel-related crisis, be it in Gaza, the West Bank, in Syria-Lebanon or directly involving Iran, Russia and Israel will be faced with serious dilemmas. The previous modus operandi of U.S. involvement might be less relevant—in fact the U.S. role has already been quite marginal in Israel’s recent clashes with Hamas in Gaza—but there is no track record of Russian active diplomacy in such conflicts in recent decades.  The two fundamental Russian policy instruments in the Middle East—exporting arms and fossil fuels—are also squarely at odds with Israel’s interests. Both historically and more recently, Russian-made weapon systems and munitions have formed the bulk of Israel’s enemy’s arsenals. Furthermore, Israel’s ability to influence Russian arms sales to the region is extremely limited, as demonstrated by recent major deals signed between Russia and Iran.  On the energy front, Gazprom’s attempts over the years to enter the Eastern Mediterranean basin have been thwarted, presumably at least partly by Israel. The recent signing of the Israel- Turkey agreement, allegedly incentivized by a mega-project of natural gas export from Israel to Turkey and Europe, which would reduce Turkish and European dependency on Russian products, is yet another manifestation of orthogonal Israeli-Russian interests.  On the global scene, Israel has been extremely careful regarding Russia’s core interests and various disruptive strategies. Israel’s U.N. ambassador was instructed to vacate the scene of the vote to condemn Russia’s invasion of Crimea in mid-2014, enraging the U.S. administration. Russia’s global cyber-attacks, as well as its harboring of Edward Snowden, haven’t prompted any Israeli official reaction. Putin’s brutal domestic policies have also gone unnoticed as far as Israel’s government is concerned. Russia’s record in terms of Israel- related votes at the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly have been consistently negative, but was treated by successive Israeli governments as a ‘force of nature.’  Another unique feature of Israeli-Russian relations is embodied by the more than 1 million Israeli-Russians—out of Israel’s total population of 8 million—mostly immigrants from the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s. In every meeting with his Israeli counterparts over the years, Putin would, according to Israeli diplomats present in the meetings, mention the fact that Russia had more than one million subjects in Israel, and that he would not do anything to harm them, adding “do you think I would ever do anything to harm them?” Over the years, allegations of domestic political subversion under Putin’s guidance have been made in the Israeli press, often mentioning Avigdor Lieberman’s name. Similar allegations—of cultivating political right-wing proxies—are often made in Europe, including by politicians, and in recent days, that allegation has stretched to the United States in regards to Putin’s alleged support for Donald Trump.

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 Adding a partisan element to the complex web of Israeli-Russian interests, and providing a local political power base for Putin and right-wing Israeli politicians, helps shape Israel’s overall ‘respectful’ approach to Russia.  The future trajectory of the relations looks familiar. Both sides will have an ongoing interest to keep up the appearance of friendly and mutually beneficial engagement. However, since the Middle East will continue to provide multiple crises, Russia and Israel will undoubtedly find themselves on opposite sides. Their ability to ‘contain and maintain’ these conflicting interests will be constantly tested. Tense U.S.-Russia and E.U.-Russia relations will further exacerbate pressures and policy dilemmas for Israel, forcing it to continuously adjust and recalibrate its relations with the ever-challenging Putin regime. Eran Etzion is a diplomat and strategist with more than 20 years of experience in senior government positions. He was Head of Policy Planning at Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Deputy Head of the National Security Council in the Prime Minister's office. In 2015, he founded ICSF, Israel Center for Strategic Futures, a Think-Do NGO dedicated to introducing innovative foresight into the Israeli decision-making process and public discourse.

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