Copyright by Andrew Dale Straw 2017
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Copyright by Andrew Dale Straw 2017 The Dissertation Committee for Andrew Dale Straw certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: Resisting Ethnic Cleansing: Crimean Tatars, Crimea, and the Soviet Union, 1941-1991 Committee: ____________________________________ Charters Wynn, Supervisor ____________________________________ Joan Neuberger ____________________________________ Jeremi Suri ____________________________________ Mary Neuburger ____________________________________ Robert Moser Resisting Ethnic Cleansing: Crimean Tatars, Crimea, and the Soviet Union, 1941-1991 by Andrew Dale Straw Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Texas at Austin August 2017 Resisting Ethnic Cleansing: Crimean Tatars, Crimea, and the Soviet Union, 1941-1991 by Andrew Dale Straw, Ph.D The University of Texas at Austin, 2017 SUPERVISOR: Charters Wynn “Resisting Ethnic Cleansing: Crimean Tatars Against and Within the Soviet Union, 1944-1991,” examines Stalin’s multifaceted ethnic cleansing of the Crimean Peninsula and how the region’s largest ethnic group, Crimean Tatars, created a decades- long protest movement to resist each aspect of Stalin’s policy. First, I argue that Stalin’s deportation and exile of Crimean Tatars amounted to a bureaucratic genocide: a Soviet iteration on state violence that used inefficiency, irresponsibility, confusion, and loyalty to the system to destroy the national and class “enemies” of the Soviet Union. Second, this study emphasizes how ethnic cleansing in Crimea was extraordinary in the way Soviet power transformed Crimea after the deportations. From 1944 to 1954, this transformation created a “new Russian Crimea” through policies of mass settlement, land redistribution, and renaming geographic locations and rewriting history. Third, having revealed the full extent Stalin’s project, I explore how Crimean Tatars created the largest protest movement in the postwar Soviet Union. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Crimean Tatar activists and everyday citizens established contacts with Soviet dissidents and Western human rights activists to create a transnational protest movement. Through this network, a small, repressed nation demanded specific changes from what was one of the world’s most complex state bureaucracies and framed their arguments within the international language of protest and human rights. They accomplished their main goal, and returned to Crimea as the Soviet Union collapsed. Overall, this project highlights how activists can incorporate the ideas and language of post-Nuremburg human rights into practical actions and how ordinary citizens can work simultaneously within and outside of a system to resist a repressive police state. iv Table of Contents Introduction……………………………………………………………….1 Chapter 1: Exposing Stalin’s Lie…………………………………….….35 Chapter 2: The Bureaucratic Genocide of Crimean Tatars……….….69 Chapter 3: Kabanov’s Crimea…………………………………………113 Chapter 4: The New Crimean Narrative, 1944-1954……..………..…150 Chapter 5: Rehabilitation, Resistance and Exile………………….…..188 Chapter 6: De-Stalinization and Crimean Tatar Resistance……...….225 Chapter 7: Dissidents, Repression and a Second Return……………..269 Chapter 8: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing, 1987-1991……………….......307 Conclusion………………………………………………………………..348 Bibliography……………………………………………………………..367 v Introduction Resisting ethnic cleansing in the Soviet Union was a difficult task. In April of 1974, Crimean police denied Halich Diliara residency registration in Crimea. Diliara was a Soviet citizen, a “mother-hero,” and a Crimean Tatar. Crimean authorities violated her rights for the lone reason that she was Crimean Tatar. Without registering her internal passport, she could not legally own her house or work, and Crimean officials “banned” her children from school. Crimean police deported her and thousands of other Crimean Tatars from Crimea in the 1960s and 1970s.1 Per Leninist internationalism and the Soviet brotherhood of nations, Crimean Tatars or any Soviet minority should never have had to fight ethnic discrimination. However, Joseph Stalin gave Crimean Tatars no choice. From 1944 to 1953, the Soviet Union committed one of the most extreme examples of ethnic cleansing of the twentieth century.2 This study reveals the full extent of Stalin’s ethnic cleansing in Crimea, and how Crimean Tatars resisted this ethnic cleansing from 1944 to 1991. By doing so, this is the first work to detail how Soviet ethnic cleansing under Stalin’s regime translated into systemic ethnic discrimination in the post-Stalin Soviet Union. This study also argues that during World War II Stalin divided Soviet nationalities into two groups, those that retained their place in Soviet 1 Halich Enanovna Dilyara, letter to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, ca. 1976, Radio Free Europe- Russian Language Broadcast Archive: Azeri Language Service (hereafter RFE-RLBA: ALS), box 270, folder 2, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, CA (hereafter HIA). 2 While small in scale, the scope of the ethnic cleansing was astonishing. As chapter 2 discuses, within a week, the Soviet Union removed all Crimean Tatars remaining in Crimea (around 180,000 people). However, what really distinguishes the Crimean example from other Soviet example are the long-term policies to maintain the demographic annihilation of non-Slavs on the peninsula and create an ethnic homeland for Russians as discussed in chapters 3 and 4. 1 republics and autonomous regions, and those that Stalin intentionally sought to destroy. In fact, by 1944 the only radical or revolutionary aspect of Soviet nationalities policy concerning Crimean Tatars and Crimea was the Soviet capacity and willingness to commit ethnic cleansing and its own version of genocide. Stalin justified Crimean ethnic cleansing in the short-term by forcing some Crimean partisans to lie about World War II. Together, they fabricated a charge of mass treason against Crimean Tatars. Activists easily disproved and the Soviet government later denounced these allegations, but the myth has endured among some Russian nationalists.3 Instead of “mass-treason,” many Crimean Tatars undertook “mass” service in the Soviet armed forces during World War II.4 In reality, Stalin acted on the geopolitical impulses of creating ethnic homogeny in strategic regions. His lieutenants understood the lie and geopolitical rationale, and supported policies that were anathema to official Marxism-Leninism and the policies of “affirmative action” for Soviet minorities.5 As the next sections explains, the totality of Stalin’s plan to expel minorities and transform Crimea was an intense variant of Soviet ethnic cleansing, and the intentional mass-death of Crimean Tatars is best described as a “bureaucratic genocide” that was part of the larger ethnic cleansing process. 3 Lying about wartime treason to justify genocide and ethnic cleansing is not unique to Stalin. For example, Ronald Suny argues that the Young Turks and Turkish state implemented the Armenian genocide and controlled information about the atrocities with “deliberate, sustained falsification” of facts and general narrative surrounding the event. This included lying about “Armenian treachery” during the First World War: see Ronald Grigor Suny, They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else: A History of the Armenian Genocide (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), xvii, xix. 4 Chapter 1 argues that around 40,000 Crimean Tatars served in combat and around 20,000 more worked in Soviet industry during the war. In comparison, evidence suggests that no more than around 6,000 Crimean Tatars fought for Nazi units or volunteered with the occupation authorities. This was in spite of Nazi plans for a much more robust collaboration numbers. 5 As discussed below, this study concurs with Terry Martin’s argument about Soviet nationalities policy. Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), 2. 2 Meanwhile in Crimea, Soviet authorities created a “new Russian Crimea” through policies of mass settlement and land redistribution.6 Crimean administrators redistributed land and homes and renamed Tatar villages after Lenin, Marx and ordinary Russian words such as “Sunny.” To repopulate the peninsula, Stalin forced over a hundred thousand Slavic farmers to move to Crimea. While this repopulation included both ethnic Ukrainians and Russians, around three-fourths of the new settlers were Russian and the Crimean government and party expected and encouraged the Russification of all new Crimeans. Moreover, Stalin ordered Soviet historians to engineer a new historical narrative for Crimea that justified policies antithetical to Leninist internationalism. This “new Crimean narrative” argued that all non-Slavs were occupiers of Crimea and that their deportation was liberating Slavic populations. In short, the Soviet state created an “alternate Russia” that championed a chauvinist and imperialistic strain of Russian nationalism in an official capacity that was not possible in central Russian regions from 1917 to 1991.7 As the transformation of Crimea neared completion, Stalin died. Khrushchev then “gifted” Crimea to the Ukraine SSR. However, this transfer did not originate with Khrushchev. Stalin realized that Crimean economic growth and stability required water and electricity. As early