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Folder Title: Postwar Institutional Development in Lebanon - Assessment for Foreign Assistance - February 1992

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Dates: 2/1/1992

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© International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / International Development Association or The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org C H54t2.4- ' ' .. ------.... IIIIIIII IIIIIIIII IIIIIIII IIII III IIIII III H54724 R1997-210 Other#.· 160 124773B Postwar Institutional Development in Lebanon - Assessment for Foreign Assistance - . February 1992 -· •' . -~ ... . I •

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I :s... • IL ... - . ..- ! Ii ~ "'I' .. ~ ""•!lil· ~. . r·: . i - 1' '~ ,. "' I' ,_ ·-. I ~...,lit"'"....) ~- ....- ~--....:~··J,l 1 ~J· af' ' I ~-- ..,. • - -.__,et.:..... - . . .,= -. .. :. f /\. ' • • -.:~. Ir 1·~- . ,. ... ,- -- ...... - .. 1· • ' .. ' POSTWAR INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN LEBANON: ASSESSMENT FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Prepared by· ·

Allerica Mideast Educational and Training Services AKI:DBAST

and

The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies I.CPS

for

The Hear East Bureau of the United States Agency for International Development

February 1992 l •

Table of Contents

I. Introduction A. Preface, 1 B. Method, 2 C. Executive Summary, 3

Il. Political and Economic Background

A. The Political-Institutional System

1. History a. The Emirate: 1590-1842, 7 b. The Double Qaimmaqamiyyah System: 1845-1860, 8 c. The Mutasarrifiyyah: 1861-WWI, 9 d. The French ~date: 1920-1943, 10 e. From Independence to Civil War: 1943-1975, 11 f. The Road to Taif: 1975-1990, 13

2. Current Political-Institutional System a. The Spread of Statal Institutions, 18 b. The Structure of the State, 19 c. The Social Structure, 20 d. Power and the State, 23

3. Main Elements of Stability and Instability, 24

B. Economic Development L History, 26 2. The War Years, 27

III. Institutional Sector Survey

A. Outline Strategy by Sector, 32

B. Public Administration 1. History, 40 2. Problems, 43 3. Recommendations, 45

C. Representative Institutions 1. Parliament, 4 7 2. Municipalities, 50 3. Political Parties, 51 4. PVOs and NGOs, 55

i ' I

D. The Judicial System 1. Structure, 58 2. Problems and Recommendations, 60

E. The Media 1. The Print Media a. History, 62 b. Problems, 63 c. Recommendations, 65

2. The Audio-Visual Media a. History, 65 b. Problems and Recommendations, 67

F. Conclusion, 68

ID. Appendices A. List of Interviewees, 69 B. Bibliography, 71 C. Summary of Field Survey, 73 D. Glossary, 74

ii ' .

I.A. Preface

Over the past two years, Lebanon has moved from a condition of civil and proxy war to one of relative peace and stability. This was made possible by the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement among Lebanese Parliamentarians in the Fall of 1989 and strong Arab and international support for ending the war. Today the militias have been disbanded, there is a broad-based government in power, and the process of laying the foundations for stability and development has begun. In light of this, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) sponsored a study to reexamine developmental problems in Lebanon within its Governance and Democracy Program (GDP). The study was conducted by America Mideast Educational and Training Services (AMIDEASn in coopera­ tion with the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS). In accordance with the GDP program's general framework, the study laid special emphasis on social and political institution-building. However, the study approaches Lebanon's current developmental needs from a broad perspective, and it was felt that the present as­ sessment would be of interest to a broad spectrum of donor countries and agen­ cies. The paper begins with background analysis of the Lebanese polity and econo­ my. It stresses both the problems and promise held out by Lebanon's _political past and underlines the steady private sector growth sustained by the economy until the war in 1975. This is followed by an outline strategy for foreign assistance leading into the four main sector assessments that are at the center of this study: Public Administration, Representative Institutions, the Judiciary, and the Media. Assis­ tance to the various sectors are prioritized in terms of urgency and importance, with the needs of the Public Administration placed at center stage. In the outline strategy it is made clear that the main objective of foreign assis­ tance to Lebanon should be to rapidly increase the capacity of the state to govern in order to enable it to keep the fragile peace that has been established and provide the security and legal framework for broad-based and sustainable socio-economic development. The report is based on interviews, field surveys, and data analysis, and on the input of key political and economic consultants. It was conducted be­ tween December 1991 and February 1992.

1 • •

I.B. Method

The research team was made up of Dr. Paul Salem, Director of LCPS and Assistant Professor of Political Studies at the Amencan University of Beirut; Dr. Ahmad Beydoun, Professor of Sociology at the Lebanese University; and Dr. Jo­ seph Muawad, Attorney and author of several books and articles on Lebanese law and history. Dr. P. Salem acted as team leader. Secondary consultants included Mr. Yusuf al-Khalil of the Central Bank of Lebanon; Mr. George Bitar, lecturer in public administration at the American University of Beirut; Dr. Sarni Abi Tayeh, Professor of Politics at the Lebanese University; and Mr. Naoum Farah, Member of the Board of Directors of the Leb­ anese Television Co. Mrs. Phyllis Salem._Director of AMIDEAST/Lebanon, acted as overall ad­ ministrator of the project, participated in the seminars and focus group sessions, and contributed to the writing of this repon. The main methods of research were the following: Interviews were conducted by the three main consultants with key individu­ als in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government and in busi­ ness, banking, academia, and the media (see appendix A). A Field .Survey of .a randomly chosen sample of 150 individuals was con­ ducted based on a 5-page questionnaire to assess popular attitudes and beliefs (sec appendix C). Four Seminars were held at LCPS offices in which several experts and pro­ fessionals presented papers for debate and discussion. Three Focus Group Sessions were also held at LCPS offices in which ex­ perts, professionals, and LCPS and Al\.11DEAST staff members outlined and ana­ lyzed important issue areas. Documentary Research was conducted by the consultants and LCPS staff research assistants focusing on data accumulation and analysis (see appendix B). Use was made of LCPS' own database, scholarly books ·on Lebanon, reports pre­ pared by individual government agencies, and studies prepared by the Central Bank and the Council for Development and Reconstruction.

2 . .

I.C. Executive Summary

The goals of the study were (a) to evaluate the current and future dynamics of the political and institutional system; (b) to evaluate the prospects for broad­ based and sustainable economic development; (c) to review the conditions of de­ mocracy and representative institutions; (d) to examine the conditions of the judi­ cial branch; (e) to study the public administration and its problems; and (f) to re­ view the role and effectiveness of the media with the view of recommending specific projects that would strengthen democratic institutions and enhance eco­ nomic development. The main findings of the study were the following:

Polity The Taif Agreement has provided a basis for the resumption of constitutional life in Lebanon. In 1991, the main militias were disarmed, the Army deployed over 1/3 of Lebanese territory, and new Deputies were appointed to Parliament to render Christian/Muslim representation equal. These were all steps toward in­ creased stability. However, several problems remain. (a) The government lacks strong internal cohesion; (b) the state's security and administrative organs are still dangerously weak; (c) the absence of elections for 20 years has widened the gap between rulers and ruled contributing to low levels of popular legitimacy and po­ litical control; (d) the polity is still deeply divided along confession:il lines; (e) the former militia leaders are in positions of power and could resume their previous functions if the state stumbles; and (f) foreign influence within the country is still very high.

Economy The rate of GNP growth for 1991 was a healthy 15-20%, but most of this · was due to the normal resumption of economic activity after a long war and par­ ticularly after two years of continuous battles (1989-90). The rate of growth for 1992 is expected to be considerably lower. The economy, with an estimated GNP of $3.5 billion, is still heavily weighted toward the tertiary service sector, with industry and agriculture lagging in distant second and third places. Remittances (l from abroad make up a significant portion of the GNP. Inflation and unemploy­

\1 ment are both at around 40%, with underemployment still higher. The Lebanese Pound held its value to the US Dollar throughout 1991 but is likely to drop in val­ ue as the government continues to run massive budget deficits. The main problems facing the private sector arc the following: (a) A poor infrastructure of electricity, roads, and communications; this in­ troduces obstacles and costs to the efficient operation of industrial, commercial, and agricultural enterprises. This infrastructure was ravaged by the war, and the government has secured only a modest amount of foreign aid to begin repairing it. The government itself has not enough funds to undertake the repairs on its

3 • •

own, and the process is estimated to take 3-5 ye3I'S depending on foreign assis­ tance. (b) Low compatibility between skills needed and skills available in the work force; despite a relatively educated work force. there is much greater demand than supply of specific skills needed in the primary, secondary, and tertiary sec­ tors. (c) Low confidence in the stability of the current political order; many pri­ vate investors inside and outside the country are still skeptical about the strength and cohesion of the state and about the stability of the country's regional environ­ ment. The government is plagued by internal in-fighting and external opposition, large-scale corruption, low popular legitimacy, and massive debts and deficits. With regard to the region, there are fears that a failure of Arab-Israeli peace talks and renewed friction between Israel and Syria could destabilize Lebanon's alliance with Syria. These fears discourage large private investment.

Public Administration The public administration suffers from a number of problems. (a) Destruc­ tion or theft of material resources during the war; (b) drain of qualified personnel to the private sector or abroad; (c) decline in replacement investment since 1975; (d) increased meddling of political and militia leaders in administrative structure and affairs; (e) very low wages since 1985; (0 over 50% understaffing in mid­ and top-level management posts and overstaffing .in low-level offices; (g) wide­ spread absenteeism; (h) widespread corruption; (i) outdated management practic­ es; G) priority of confessional over merit criteria in appointments and promo­ tions; (k) chronic budget deficits with accumulating national debt; (1) usurpation of government prerogatives and functions by militia and foreign armies during the war. · The areas where assistance for public administration should be focused are: (a) the iv"l Service_c uncil and the National Institute for Public Administration; the · · 1 servants w 1 e NIPA

Representative Institutions The main categories of representative institutions are Parliament, Municipal Councils, . political parties, syndicates, and private associations and advocacy groups. While political parties, syndicates, and advocacy groups have, in some

4 • I

cases, grown in influence, the first two types of institutions have grown gradually weaker with the absence of parliamentary or municipal elections. With the last elections held in 1972, the majority of today's population has not participated in elections of any kind. Government officials have discussed the possibility of hold­ ing elections in 1992 or 1993, but this seems highly unlikely. The paralysis of the electoral process has widened the gulf between ruler and ruled and contributed to low levels of political consent and high levels of destabilizing radical opposition. Nevertheless, Parliament still represents a large cross-section of Lebanese so­ ciety and plays an important supervisory role with regard to the executive branch. As an institution, it is vastly understaffed and under-equipped. Deputies operate on an individual ad hoc basis, without the benefit of staff assistance, documents, or computerized data bases. The institution could make good use of training for new staff and modem office and computer equipment. At the other end of the spectrum are a number of small associations and ad­ vocacy groups. These include environmental, human rights, women's, and handi­ capped rights groups who arc in continuous need of training, equipment. and en­ couragement They represent the first building blocs of a civic society on which any stable future for Lebanon would partially have to be built

The Judicial Branch Because of the presence of several strong law schools in the country -- most · notably, St Joseph University - and the continued importance of real estate and inheritance litigation during the war, the judicial branch of government has fared better than other branches. The quality of judges is fairly high and corruption is relatively low. Bec:iuse of the absence of growth during the war and the depletion of part of the judiciary's physical and human resources, the congestion of cases in the coun system has become a serious problem. More importantly, however, the judicial branch suffers from insecurity vis-a­ vis political and militia leaders. This renders the judicial branch unable to per­ form its full function as a third autonomous branch of government In crucial test cases, the judiciary has to back down in the face of executive pressure. The main areas of assistance should include training programs for key judges domestically or abroad and support for the computerization of legal data and the building up of the central law library.

The Media Print media have a well-established history in Lebanon dating back to the tum of the century. The audio-visual media are more recent, but new radio and television stations mushroomed dramatically during the war. Whereas before the war there were only 2 television stations and I radio station, there are now over 40 television stations and 185 radio stations. Most of these new stations are backed by particular militia or political groups. The media enjoy a wide margin of free­ dom in Lebanon, but there have been questions recently about the future of press

5 . .

freedom in Lebanon. Most media outlets exercise self-censorship on several sensi­ tive topics; nevertheless,. they maintain energetic critical campaigns against gov­ ernment policies and practices with which they disagree. In that sense. they per­ form some of the functions of a Fourth Estate. Among the problems of the media arc the following: (a) overbearing militia or political influences; (b) a general atmosphere of insecurity. and hence fcar to publish freely; (c) chronic budgetary problems which invite foreign financing and influence; and (d) a weak tradition of investigative reporting. Assistance to the media should be in the form of training and support for in­ vestigative reporting and support and encouragement for the various unions and syndicates of the media which serve lo protect the rights and liberties of publish­ ers and broadcasters.

Conclusion Of all the sectors surveyed, the public administration is in most urgent need of help and is a key sector in bringing the country back to normalcy. The judici­ ary and the media are faring reasonably well, and the representative institutions cannot be effectively revived without holding elections. The public administration, however, contains the central nervous system of the state and can be affected posi­ tively through non-political aid programs. This would include providing training and equipment for key departments and offices within the administration. Aid to the public administration. however. does not preclude aid to other sectors.

6 . .

II. Political and Economic Background A. The Political-Institutional System

1. History a- The Emirate: 1590-1842 The history of the lands and populations that make up present-day Lebanon can be divided into several branches: the history of the Maronite and Droze · Mount Lebanon region, the history of the (until recently) predominantly Sunni coastal cities, and the history of the confessionally-mixed inner regions of Akkar, the Biqa'. and the South. The coastal cities and inner regions were under the di­ rect rule of the Ottoman-Turkish state like most other areas of the Arab East; Mount Lebanon had a more complex political past Between the 16th and 19th centuries Mount Lebanon was an effectively au­ tonomous Emirate within the Ottoman Empire ruled by a succession of native Emirs. The main political institutional structure was feudal, based on Droze and Maronite feudal privi- leges dating back sever­ al centuries. Droze pre­ Socio-Political Str'Uchlrc of the Eminle dominance in the 17th The Emir's and 18th centuries. gave Coun way to Maronite pre­ dominance in the 19th century. In the mid-19th century the principality was torn asunder when an ambitious Maronite prince. Bashir II. tried to consolidate his power by forming an alliance with the Maronite church to undermine feudal power. This brought the church into politics. angered Druze and Maronite feudal leaders. and precipitated Maronite­ Druze hostilities. It marked the beginning of confessionally-based conflict; previ­ ous conflicts had been along non-confessional tribal or feudal lines. Unfortunate­ ly, the crisis coincided with a period of increased foreign penetration of the Otto­ man regions. A resurgent. Egyptian army that occupied the area of Lebanon and Syria in the 1830's supported Bashir Il, while the British, French and Russians were also getting more involved. The emirate fell apart and was officially abo­ lished in 1842. The relevant points in this seminal period of Lebanese history are the follow­ ing: (a) the mountain Lebanese were accustomed to be governed by a native not

7 . .

an outsider; (b) Mount Lebanon enjoyed a continuous measure of political au­ tonomy from its immediate surroundings; (c) the ruler was traditionally chosen through consultation and consensus-building between the main feudal fami­ lies; (d) the structure of feudal power emphasized the centrality of the Za'im, or feudal overlord; and (e) unlike in other Ono man provinces, and alongside the feu­ dal system, limited private property was recognized and protected in the Leba­ nese Principality. This helped lay the foundations for private initiative that flou­ rished later. The way in which the Emirate fell apart, however, also introduced a number of imponant elements into the Lebanese political and institutional system of today: (a) as the feudal order collapsed it was replaced by confessional political struc­ tures in which confessional identity and religious organizations and leaders played a central role; (b) when the feudally-based emirate fell apart, the emerging con­ fessional leaderships relied on outside support to promote their local interests; (c) confessional violence entered into the toolbox of Lebanese politics.

b. The Double Qaimmaqamiyyah (DQ) System: 1845-1860 After consultations between the Ottoman State and the Powers of Europe, the former Mount Lebanon principality was divided into two administrative districts: one south of the Beirut-Damascus line, and one north of it The northern district, or Qaimmaqamiyyah, was predominantly Maronite, while the southern one Socio-Political SU\1Cmn: of the DQ Sys&cm was predominantly Druze. Governors were appointed by the central Ottoman authorities for the two districts; each governor (Qaimmaqam) was assisted by an admin­ istrative council of twelve individuals selected by the local religious author­ Aamt (Wakil) of Minority ities. The Christian or Druze minorities of each district were represented by an Agent, or Wakil, who was popularly elected and who represented the inter­ ests of that confessional minority within the district The attempt to draw political boundaries according to confessional lines proved problematic, as neither district was fully homogeneous. A peasant revolt -­ led by a Maronite peasant, Tanius Shaheen -- against feudal privileges in 1859 only exacerbated tensions in areas where Druze feudal families presided over Maronite peasant populations. Tensions broke out into open massacres in 1860, with the Druzc gaining the upper hand and overrunning several Christian towns

8 . .

and villages. Several European Powers protested against the bloodshed. the French landed troops in the Maronite pon town of Jounieh, and the Ottoman au­ thorities moved to abolish the Double Qaimmaqamiyyah system and stop the bloodshed. Several elements of the 1845-1860 experience are of relevance to understand­ ing modem Lebanese politics: (a) The DQ system institutionalized the idea of confessionally-identified territory and boundaries; (b) it confirmed the pri­ macy of confessional identities and reliaious leaderships in the political system; (c) it introduced the precedent of having semi-elected consultative bodies medi­ ate between the ruler and the ruled; (d) it bolstered the role-of reliaious author­ ities in the nascent representative structure by granting them the authority to se­ lect representatives to the consultative .council. (e) The abortive Tanius Shaheen peasant uprising demonstrated that social and class conflicts could easily be dis­ toned into confessional conflicts. (f) The massacres of 1860 traumatized the Lebanese Christians and determined that Lebanese politics would henceforth be partially motivated by fear, insecurity, and an inclination for interconfessional vendetta.

c. The Mutasarrifiyyah: 1861-WWI Another agreement between the Ottoman authorities and the European Pow­ ers established the autonomous province of Mount Lebanon in 1861 (see Map). The province, or Mutasarrifiyyah, unified the areas of the two previous Qaim­ maqamiyyahs un- der the authority of a non-native Otto­ man Christian gov­ ernor appointed by the Ottoman au­ thorities after con­ sultation with the European Powers. The Governor was assisted by an Ad­ ministrative Coun­ cil of 12 members elected by popular ballot. The Council was composed of 6 Christians and 6 Muslims and repre­ sented the 6 main confessional com­ I munities in the r \

9 province: among the Christians, 2 Maronites, 2 Greek Orthodox, 2 Greek Catho­ lics; among the Muslims, 2 Druzes, 2 Sunnis, and 2 Shi'is. During the more than 50 years of its existence, the Mutasarrifiyyah proved fairly successful in providing political stability and a degree of freedom unfamil­ iar in the Ottoman imperial system. As tensions between the Ottoman and Western powers heightened, however, the province's economic isolation increased. With­ out adequate seaports or fertile plain areas, and with a rapidly growing popula­ tion, economic conditions in Mount Lebanon deteriorated, and large numbers of mountain residents began to emigrate -- mainly to the Americas. Economic condi­ tions worsened sharply during WWI when the Ottoman authorities confiscated wheat and grain stores for the war effort and the Allied Powers imposed a sea blockade on the eastern Mediterran~. This led to a famine and the death of about one quarter of the population of the Mountain. Western forces occupied Lebanon and in time introduced a new constitutional order. Several elements of the 1861-WWJ. experience are of relevance to under­ standing modern Lebanese politics: (a) the political stability of the system reaf­ firmed the superiority of the unified multiconfessional model over the segre­ gated uniconfessional model for the political organization of Lebanon; (b) the system also further institutionalized foreign influence in the country; (c) the ec­ onomic problems of the province introduced demands for incorporating more seaports and plains into its boundaries; (d) the famine of 1915-16, like the mas­ sacres of 1860, increased the clements of fear and suspicion in the political culture of the country.

d- The French Mandate: 1920-1943 In the post-WWI settlement, France was given Mandate authority over the territories of present-day Lebanon and Syria. Acquiescing to Maronite demands to expand the boundaries of the Mount Lebanon district to include seapons and plains and wishing to weaken Arab nationalist forces based in the Syrian interior, the French government declared the establishment of Greater Lebanon on Septem­ ber l, 1920 (see map next page). The country's new boundaries -- today's boundaries -- added the coastal cities of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre and the plains of Akkar and the Biqa' to the territories of the old Mount Lebanon. The new territories were predominantly Sunni Muslim and had only weak historical links with the political system and his­ tory of the predominantly Christian Mount Lebanon. They had been part of the Sunni Ottoman socio-political order and bad had close links with the towns and villages of the Syrian interior although at times they did fall under the authority of the Emirs that governed mount Lebanon. The establishment·of the new bounda­ ries was not welcomed by the majority of the newly incorporated populations and introduced a host of social, political, and cultural contradictions. The new state was declared a Republic in 1926 on the basis of a constitution drafted by Lebanese deputies assisted by French jurists and inspired by the consti-

10 . .

•. •• ··•·· SYRIA •• • . . -. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •••• • . ; , . ••• • • . . . .• • •• • •• • • . .. • •. • • •. • ..• . .• • • • • • • • O O;aalbc:c:l. • • • • • •• • • • • • • .. • •• • • •• • •• • • • •• • • • • • .• • ••• .• • • • • • SYRIA .••. • • • •. .. .. • • . •• I . . I •• ____ ra\•cr •• ••• • ••••• • ••••• r,r~c:nt intcrn:llil,n:11 Ii • • • • : .. hound:ary nr Lc:h:innn • •• • • houn,fary of lhc: Autono:nm:s • I : 'V .. ~ Prn\'incc: or l.c:h:i n,,n I Xft i - ICJ!~ ., . . • • •...... \S~ ..... ~ i 'I • • • •• ~ I ~ 'I Sm:11ler :md Grc:itcr Lcb:mon. The A~1tonomous Province 1R6 I - I 915 :md Lch:mon ~incc I CJ:?O. Reprinted from lt:imar Rahinovich: Thr War for Lc-lmnm:. l9i0-J9S5. Cnpyri~ht ,0 ICJS-L 1985 hy Cornell University Press. Used h:; pcm1ission of the publisher. 10 a . .

tution of the Socio-Political SD'\am'C of Mandai.c Pc:riod French Third Republic. The constitution of 1926 has been in continuous force since that date, except for two periods of suspension by order of the French High Commissioner during the Man- . date period. It was amended several times. n The most im­ Public portant amend­ ments were in 1943 on the eve of independence and in 1989 in the wake of the Taif Agreement that ended the Lebanese war. It is the oldest continuously functioning constitution in the Middle East. The constitu­ tion established a system based on the separation of powers: the executive branch was headed by the President; the legislative branch was represented by the elected Parliament; and the judicial branch had its own hierarchy topped by a High Court. The main outlines of the institutional structure of the modem state were set up during this period. Police and Army units were established, as were courts and modem public administration and service facilities. The Lebanese thus served their apprenticeship for modem state-building Vrith the French . . Demands for independence from French authority unified Christian and Mus­ lim groups and provided consensus on the eve of Independence in 1943. Several elements of the 1920-43 experience are of relevance to understanding modem Lebanese politics: (a) the existence and administration of modem Leba­ non was closely linked to France; (b) parliamentary democracy was insti­ tutionalized as the main political framework of the new polity; (c) Lebanon's very existence and its relations with its Arab neighbors would be a source of in­ terconfessional contention; (d) interconfessional unity was possible toward common goals such as independence.

e- From Independence to Civil War: 1943-1975 The politics of the independence era were shaped in the so-called National Pact agreed between Maronite leader Bisbara al-Khoury and Sunni leader Riad

11 . .

al-Solh on the eve of independence. In the Pact, the Maronites agreed to forgo French protection in return for a Sunni corrunitment to forgo demands for Arab or Islamic unity: moreover, powers were distributed as follows: the Presidency of the Republic is assigned to a Maronite, the Premiership to a Sunni, and the Speak­ ership of the Parliament to a Shi'i. Representation in Parliament would be shared according to a ratio of 6:5 slightly favoring the Christians. Lebanon was agreed to be an independent sovereign state "with an Arab face." Khoury and Solh were the first President and Prime Minister of the indepen­ dent republic. Khoury renewed his 6-year mandate in 1949 but resigned under pressure in 1952. In their years in office, Khoury and Solh together set the terms of the republic's new politics. These were pol- Soc:io-Polilical Stnicrure of Independence Period itics of modera- tion and inter- confessional compromise in which coalition­ building and the distribution of government privileges were

the tools of the Rciigiow trade. The role lmuu&iaas of religious au­ thorities dimi­ nished some­ what as new n political. eco­ Public nomic, and gov­ ernment leaders came to the fore within the framework of the republic. On the negative side, building an efficient and effective state were goals that were given secondary importance to maintain­ ing interconfessional balance and distributing perquisites and privileges evenly across confessional lines. Corruption became an important problem within the government, and deal-making preceded policy-making in higher offices of the state. Camille Chamoun was elected to the presidency in 1952 on a platform of modernization and reform. His attempts to expand and modernize the state were panially successful with important advances in various ministries and the streng­ thening of the Army and internal security forces. His presidency, however, was dogged by worsening social conditions corrunon to most developing countries, ex­ acerbated by growing confessional tensions linked to domestic disputes as well as to regional struggles between Egyptian President Abd al-Nasir and the United

12 • I

States. Chamoun's presidency ended in a rebellion launched by pro-Nasirist forc­ es: this deteriorated into a brief interconfessional civil conflict in 1958 in which several thousand people lost their lives. Toward the end of the conflict, U.S. Ma­ rines were landed on the shores of Beirut upon the request of Chamoun who was cooperating with the U.S. against the Nasirist current in the region. Chamoun was succeeded in the presidency by Army Commander, General Fuad Shihab. Shihab was elected as a centrist candidate acceptable to both Chris­ tian and Muslim conununities. Once in office, he pursued a rigorous program of reform and refurbishment of the state based on the principle that political stability could be enhanced by improving the services of the state and promoting equitable socio-economic development. On the political level he established good relations with both Nasir and the West and maintained important alliances in both wings of the Lebanese body politic. His policies can be described as statist, for he tried to develop the state into a modern institution capable of managing development, poli­ tics, and the provision of equality and justice in a rapidly modernizing society. He undertook important administrative reforms and encouraged the growth of a bu­ reaucratic-military elite within the state. His protege and successor. Charles Helou (1964-70), lacked Shihab's cha­ risma and power. Although continuing along Shihab's general policy line, Helou faced growing opposition from traditional politicians who had been disenfran­ chised by Shihab and who saw an opportunity to regain the position they had en­ joyed under Khoury and Chamoun. Moreover, the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 had polarized Lebanon's regional environment and politicized the 300,000-400,000 Palestinian refugees within the country. Shihab's policies were slowly watered down or abandoned. The presidential elections of 1970 were a turning point. The traditional polit­ ical elites were united about the need to undo Shihab's statist power structure, but they were divided about how to deal with the Palestinians. In a very close ballot, a right-wing strong-arm leader from the North, Sulayman Franjiyyeh, narrowly beat the centrist candidate favored by the Muslims and Syria, EHas Sarkis. Fran­ jiyyeh sought both to break up Shihab's bureaucratic-military elite and to deal forcefully with the Palestinians. He succeeded partially in the first objective, but not at all in the second. With the state declining and the polity divided about the Palestinian presence, a major breakdown was inevitable. The coup de grace came in the Spring of 1975 when clashes between militant Christian and Palestinian groups met with no response from the state or the Army. With no force to keep the peace, armed groups took to the streets and the country erupted into full-scale civil war.

f The Road to Taif: 1975-1990 The war that erupted in 1975 came to a halt only in 1990, one year after the signing of a political accord in Taif, Saudi Arabia, under Arab and international auspices. The war took a heavy toll. Out of a population of 3 million, approxi­ mately 150,000 were killed, 200,000 wounded, 700,000 displaced, and 400,000

13 ..

emigrated. The society grew increasingly divided confessionally, with local mili­ tias and foreign armies holding political and military sway. The country's once vi­ brant economy was also ravaged, with heavy losses in the tourism, banking, man­ ufacturing, and agricultural sectors. In addition, the infrastructure of elecuicity, roads, and telecommunications was devastated. In the first phase of the war (April 1975-June 1976), the capital divided into rival Christian and Muslim sectors, the paralysis of the state was confirmed, the Army split in two, and the Muslim­ leftist-Palestinian Socio-Political SlrUCt~ Durin& the War militia alliance gradually gained the upper hand over the Christian right-wing militias Judicial (see maps on fol­ Bnldt lowing pages). In June, the Syrian army intervened to put an end to the fighting and pre­ vent a victory by one side over the other. The Syrian military presence in Lebanon was ap­ proved by the League of Arab States and given le- gitimacy by the League as part of a larger Arab Deterrent Force. Elias Sarkis was elected to_ succeed Sulayman Franjiyyeh in 1976. Sarkis was a centrist candidate with a long and respected history in the civil service. He tried to maintain an uneasy peace, but the state had already lost most of its control over its land and people. Attempts to find a negotiated end to the war led by inter­ national and Arab representatives all failed, and neither was Syria able to find a durable solution to the Lebanese problem. Relations between Syria and the Christian militias deteriorated between 1976 and 1978 as the latter developed close relations with Israel. Israel itself intervened directly in 1978 and occupied half of south Lebanon leaving behind a surrogate militia along a strip of land north of the Israeli-Lebanese border. The Lebanese conflict had become thoroughly regionalized, with heavy Palestinian, Syrian, and Israeli components. Other states, through their intelligence agencies, were also in­ volved:e.g. Iraq, Libya, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Within the Christian community the Kata'ib Party's military wing, the Leba-

14 . -

I N

J

Maronite Greek Onhodox Greek Catholic Mixed Maronite and Greek Catholic Shia Muslim Sunni Muslim Druze Mixed Druze and Greek Orthodox

Population shifts eau:od by the June 1982 Israeli inwsion •re not depicted. Bounoary rcprescntar,on nor nec:cssarily aurnorit:Jhve ------

Distribution of Religious Sects, 1983

Source:: l..Lbanon: A Country Srudy, c:d. by Thomas Collelo. Washington. DC: US Govern­ ment, 1989. 14 a ..

.· y:.. :. .·.. .•

. :. ··:. - :. ·_...... ~ ·::· ·. =. ·:· , ·. . ..

• .., • •• • , . • • ., I

...... ~ . .·.... : ; :. . .. \ • ' ., ..... _. .. , .. ...:• ... .,. . • t. . : :, .,. , ·. ~ ..... :::/':-~.-: : . · SYRIA

l':'.l'TU> NATIOSS OISF.NCACF.A1F..NT OllSER\'l:lt FORCE ZONE

lntcrnation;il bound;iry Armi~ticc line. 1949 Beirut-Damascus highway EEJ South Lebanon Army enclave § United Nations Interim Force · in Lebanon oporational area Palestine Liberation Organization stronghold Christian forces ISRAEL Syrian-dominated areas o 5 10 15 Kilometers o s 10 1s Miles

Lebanon on the Eve ol the 1982 Israeli Invasion Source: Based on inform:ition from Leb:inese Center for Documentation and Research, Mufawa.:at al Lubnaniy;·ah al Jsra 'iliy;YJh, Antily:i.s, Lebanon, 1984.

Source:: Lebanon: A Counrry Swdy, ed . by Thorri:is Collelo. W:ishington, DC: US Govern­ ment, 1989.

1 4 b . .

Groups, Parties, and Militias in Wartime Lebanon

Groups Political Party Militia Christian (Mainly Maronitc) KataibPany Lebanese Forces (csL National Liberal Pany 1980 out of Kataib, Guardians of the Cedars NLP, and GOC militias) National Bloc al-Tanzim Pany Christian Social Democrats Franjiyyeh Can Marada militia Armenian Tashnag Pany Tashnag militia Muslim Druze Progressive Socialist Pany PSP militia Shi'i Movement of the Deprived Amal militia Islamic Amal Islamic Amal militia Hizballah Hizballah militia Islamic Jihad Islamic Jihad Sunni Nasiritc Popular Organization Popular Liberation Army lndep. Nasiritc Movement Murabitoun militia Islamic Tawhid I.T. militia Alawi Arab Democratic Army Red Knights Mixed SSNP SSNP militia SSNP-Revolutionary Command SSNP-RC militia Pro-Syrian Ba'th Pany Pro-Syrian Ba'th militia Pro-Iraqi Ba'th Pany Pro-Iraqi Ba'th militia Lebanese Communist Pany LCPmilitia Foreign Palestinian Fatch (Arafat) Fateh (Arafat) militia Fatch (Abu Musa) Fatch (Abu Musa) militia Fatch-Revolutionary Council Fatch-RC militia Fatch-Intifada Fatch-Intifada militia PFLP PFLP militia PDFLP PDFLP militia PFLP-General Command PFLP-GC militia Hizballah-Palcstine H-P militia Palestine Liberation Front PLFmilitia Saiqa Saiqa

Syrian Syrian Army Iranian Iranian Rev. Guards United Nations UNIFIL Israeli Israeli Army Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army ..

nese Forces, emerged to play a dominant role. Within the Druze conununity, Ka­ mal Junblat's Progressive Socialist Party gained sway. Within the Shi'ite conunu­ nity, the Movement of the Deprived established by Imam Musa al-Sadr had spawned a military wing, Amal, which rose to dominance. Within the Sunni com­ munity several pro-Palestinian and pro-Nasirist groups vied for power. In any case, regardless of the community, as the state collapsed, political parties and their newly-established militias moved into the power vacuum usurping the state's coer­ cive and revenue-collection prerogatives. The Israeli invasion of 1982, which reached all the way to Beirut, was anoth­ er turning point in the war. It had tremendous human and economic costs and led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of villagers -- mostly Shi'ite -- from the .South to Beirut. The armed Palestinian presence in the South and Beirut was eradicated, thus changing the internal alliance system established at the begjnning of the war. The leader of the Lebanese Forces militia, Bashir Gemayel, was elected to succeed Elias Sarkis, but he was assassinated before assuming office. The Parliament met again and elected his older brother, Amine Gemayel, to the presidency. The United States had deployed Marines to Lebanon in the late Summer of 1982 as part of a negotiated deal in which a multinational force would guarantee the evacuation of Palestinian fighters from the Israeli-besieged Beirut. Develop­ ments related to the assassination of President-elect Bashir Gemayel and the infa­ mous massacres at the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps led to the rede­ ployment of multinational and U.S. Marine troops. President Amine Gemayel made it his first task to seek the withdrawal of Is­ raeli forces from Lebanon. This led to the conclusion, on May 17, 1983, of an Is­ raeli-Lebanese Withdrawal Agreement, negotiated under American auspices. Syr­ ia declared its opposition to the Agreement, and it was never ratified by the Lebanese Parliament. Militant Islamic groups, with support from Iran, also op­ posed the Agreement and the Western military presence in Lebanon. They led a campaign against the multinational presence which included the bombing of the American Embassy twice, the US Marines barracks, and several other Western in­ stallations. Meanwhile, they were also conducting a guerrilla campaign against Is­ raeli forces in the South. Gemayel's attempt to chart a new course for the country domestically and in­ ternationally collapsed in February of 1984 when the Anny split once again and the cabinet was forced to resign. A new cabinet, led by Rashid Karami, and in­ cluding leading politicians and militia heads, attempted to find a new compromise solution to the crisis, but failed. An agreement reached under Syrian auspices in December 1985 among the three principal Christian, Druze, and Shi'ite militias collapsed when a coup within the Christian militia unseated its leader. The state drifted once again into paralysis, and economic circumstances wor­ sened. The national currency, which had held fairly steady throughout the war, began rapidly to lose its value leading to massive economic imbalances and an in­ flation rate that skyrocketed above 400%.

15 ..

In 1987 Prime Minister Karami was assassinated, thus plunging the state into a new crisis. The cabinet failed to meet after that date and urgent government business of administrative character was attended to by President Gemayel and acting Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss by passing official documents back and forth across the dividing line of the capital city. In 1988, for the first time since independence, a President's term ended with­ out the election of a successor. When Gemayel's term ended in September 1988, earlier attempts to arrange for presidential elections in Parliament had failed. As a last minute resort, Gemayel appointed Army Commander, General Michel Aoun, Prime Minister at the head of a military cabinet composed of the six­ member confessionally-balanced Higher Military Council. Although technically constitutional, Aoun's appoinunent ran against the tacit agreement since 1943 that the Prime Minister would be a Sunni Muslim. The Muslim members of the Military Council promptly resigned and Prime Minister Hoss rejected the constitutionality of Aoun's cabinet and insisted that his cabinet was the only constitutional one. For the first time, the state had literally split into two separate parts. As tension heightened between the two camps, Aoun moved to close off all militia-run sea ports. This sparked further tension and soon led to an open clash between units of the Army loyal to Aoun and militia loyal to Syria. Full scale battles, involving the Syrian Anny, developed that left many thousands dead and created massive material damage. The battles attracted regional and international attention. Finally, the Arab League, with international backing, succeeded in bringing about "an agreement which was hoped to bring an end to the Lebanese conflict once and for all. The agreement was signed by the Lebanese Deputies in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in October 1989. The Agreement included important reforms to the Lebanese political system. Most importantly, representation between Christians and Muslims would be equal­ ized, and executive authority would be shifted from the Maronite President to the Council of Ministers as a whole. The President would retain a largely ceremonial role with only marginal executive power. The Council of Ministers, a confession­ ally-balanced body, would hold collective executive sway under the stewardship of the Sunni Muslim Prime Minister, although the President could chair the meetings of the Council of Ministers, without the right to vote, when he wished. The Shi'ite Speaker of Parliament. would have his power increased by extending his term of office from one year to four. Furthermore, he would play a central role in desig­ nating a Prime Minister. The role of Parliament as a whole would also be streng­ thened by closing an important loophole in the old system in which the executive branch could pass important legislation without Parliament's approval during per­ iods when Parliament was not in session. Parliament itself would be expanded from 99 to 108, to accommodate 9 new Muslim deputies, making Christian/ Muslim representation in Parliament equal. Indeed, the confessional nature of the political system was reinforced in Taif, although the agreement insists that a com­ mittee must be formed and work must begin on a gradual plan to eliminate con­ fessionalism from the system altogether.

16 ..

Other parts of the agreement called for militias to be disbanded and the Anny to regain control of all Lebanese territory with the assistance of the Syrian Army. Syria was to assist

the Lebanese au­ Socio-Political S~ Alta Taif thorities in imple­ menting the agreement for a period of two years, after which its forces were to redeploy ·in the Biqa" Valley. Parliament Further Syrian withdrawals were . . to be subject to further negotia­ tions between the • \.• governments of . Lebanon and Syr- ia. \ .. ~ Aoun reject- ed the Taif Agreement, claiming that it gave too much away to Syria. Parliament ignored his opposition and went ahead with the election of a new President to implement the agreement. Deputy Rene Muawad was elected in November 1989 but was assassinated two weeks later. Parliament met again and elected Deputy Elias Hrawi. President Hrawi assumed office with Salim al-Hoss as his Prime Minister, but the stand off with General Aoun's cabinet in East Beirut continued. In late January of 1990, severe battles erupted between General Aoun's anny units and the Lebanese Forces militia. The battles dragged on for months, left many thousands dead. and devastated large areas. By the summer, both sides had fought each other to exhaustion. In October, the Hrawi government asked for and received Syrian military backing to move against Aoun and his supporters. Syrian and Lebanese Army units loyal to the Hrawi-Hoss government moved in and de­ feated Aoun's forces on October 13. Aoun sought asylum at the French Embassy and later left for France. Meanwhile, the institutions of the state and the armed forces were reunified and the government moved to implement the Taif Agreement. The constitution was amended to reflect the changes in power, prerogative, and procedure agreed upon in Taif. Moreover, a new cabinet was appointed, described as a Cabinet of National Unity, under the premiership of Omar Karami, the brother of assassi­ nated PM Rashid Karami. The cabinet. following the provisions of Taif, declared the dissolution of militias, began the deployment of the Army over large parts of Lebanese territory and appointed 40 new Deputies to Parliament in order to fill

17 ..

seats that had fallen vacant since the last elections in 1972 and also to fill the 9 new seats decreed by Taif. Relations with Syria were finned up with the signing of a Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination between the two countries and the conclusion of a Pact of Defense and Security. Indeed, 1991 was the first year of peace for most of Lebanon since 1975, al~ though clashes between Israeli and anti-Israeli forces continued in the South. For the first time since the beginning of the war, there is an internal basis for peace, based on the Taif Agreement, and a regional and international climate for that peace, based on the end of the superpower Cold War and the beginning of peace talks between Arabs and Israelis. Lebanon enters 1992 with the heavy burden of 15 years of war but with the makings of a new and more stable future.

2. Current Political-Institutional Situation a- The Spread of Statal Institutions There are a number of separate quasi-statal political-military institutions vy­ ing for authority in various parts of Lebanon. At the center is the official Leba­ nese state. The state is based in the capital, Beirut; its Anny is deployed over about 1/3 of the nation's territory, and its institutions employ about 200,000 peo­ ple. In the area where the Anny is not deployed, the state has a nominal presence through administrative and service-oriented offices attached to the various mini­ stries. The Anny's deployment over this relatively large portion of the country is only about one year old. For the preceding 15 years, most of the regions were governed, semi-autonomously, by militias. Most of the militias began as military wings of political parties and gained recruits in the early part of the war. In the absence of the state, they gradually assumed statal functions such as levying taxes, imposing import duties, and maintaining an "army." They openly challenged the sovereignty and authority of the state and promoted their own organizations as sovereign. Most of these militias, as of last year, were officially disbanded and disarmed. However, in their years in power, the militia leaders built up financial, military, and political power bases to rival those of the state; these cannot be dis­ solved overnight, and the latent power of the militia leaders in all sectors of the society will remain a force to contend with in the foreseeable future. Alongside the state and the militias are armies of other states. In the extreme South, Israel has held a strip of Lebanese territory since 1978 which has grown increasingly isolated from the rest of the country. It arms and trains a surrogate militia, the South Lebanon Army, which holds sway there. Until June of last year, the PLO also had its own semi-sovereign enclave in the South in and around the city of Sidon. Hizballah, with support from Iran, has small enclaves where it holds almost full sway in southern Beirut, the South, and the Biqa' Valley. In the major­ ity of the country, however, the Syrian Army -- with its force of around 40,000

18 ..

troops -- commands authority. In most of these areas, the Syrian Army coexists peacefully and cooperatively with the local population and with Lebanese state se­ curity and administrative institutions. In some areas, however, for example in the predominantly Christian districts of Metn, Kisirwan, and Jubayl, there has been serious friction with the Syrian Anny in the past

b- The Structure of the State The Lebanese state is a Parliamentary Republic with a clear separation be­ tween the three branches of government Before Taif, the executive branch was headed by the President of the Republic; now it is headed by the Council of Mini­ sters as a collective body. Legislative functions are vested in the Parliament, and judicial functions are vested in an autonomous judiciary. Sovereignty is vested in the people; they elect Parliament; Parliament elects a President; President and Parliament designate a Prime Minister; the Prime Minister forms a Cabinet in cooperation with the President; the Cabinet, or Council of Ministers, is the highest executive authority in the system; it sets and oversees the execution of all policies, subject to the confidence of Parliament; both the Council of Ministers and Parlia­ ment can suggest legislation, but only Parliament can enact it. The judicial branch is headed by the Higher Judicial Council whose members are high-ranking judges within the judicial branch selected to join the Council by decree of the Council of Ministers. The political system is thor­ oughly confessional. Seats in Par­ Confessional Representation in liament are distributed according to Parliament a strict confessional quota. In the post-Taif Parliament of 108 mem­ Catholi<..Armenian bers there are 54 seats reserved for Christians and 54 for Muslims. Orthodox Among the Muslims there are 22 for the Sunni, 22 Shi'a, 8 Druze, 2 Alawi; among the Christians there are 30 Maronite, 11 Greek Ortho­ Shi'i dox, 6 Greek Catholic, 4 Armenian Orthodox, 1 Armenian Catholic, 1 Armenian Protestant, and 1 for other Christian minorities (Latin, Syriac, Protestant, Chaldaen, etc.). The President is always a Maronite Christian; the Prime Minister, Sunni Mus­ lim; and the Speaker of Parliament, Shi'ite. The distribution of government posts and jobs on a confessional basis is respected throughout the system. In almost all government departments and subdepartments one will find virtually the same dis­ tribution based on a core balance between the six main confessional groups (Sun­ ni, Shi'i, Druze, Maronite, Orthodox, Catholic). According to the newly amended Constitution, only Grade One posts in the bureaucracy are to be on a strictly half-

19 ..

Christian half-Muslim basis -- lower grades are to be open; but in practice, con­ fessional balance is generally maintained throughout the system. The electoral map for Parliamentary elections is divided into 26 districts, . most of them coinciding with the boundaries of administrative Cazas(see map next page). Most of the districts are relatively homogeneous confessionally, although several are not. The Taif Agreement has stipulated that the electoral map be re­ drawn so that electoral districts coincide with the larger boundaries of the Muha­ f aza. There are currently six Muhafazas in Lebanon (North, South, Biqa', Mount Lebanon, Beirut, and Nabatiyyeh), but the Nabatiyyeh Muhafaza is expected to be cancelled soon, to leave only five. All the Muhafazas are thoroughly heterogene­ ous in confessional terms. The reform has been ordered in the hope that the mixed electoral districts will encourage the candidacy of moderate politicians who would have to gain the votes of people from various confessional communities to gain election. The last parliamentary elections were held in 1972. Alongside Parliamentary elections, the Lebanese system also allows Municipal elections. Lebanon has over 600 Municipalities with local responsibility in towns and villages for some basic services. Municipal elections have not been held since 1963. In the executive branch, there are 17 Ministries and a number of public agen­ cies and mixed companies (see chart on page after next). Each ministry is man­ aged by a Director General (the highest post in the civil service) under the direc­ tion of the Minister, who is usually a non-technocratic political figure. The nexus between the political and bureaucratic systems talces place at this juncture. There are a number of agencies with responsibility for monitoring and improving the public administratirm. These are the Civil Service Council which screens and trains civil servants; the Central Inspection Commission which investigates cor­ ruption; the Directorate of Research and Guidance which is supposed to study and suggest improvements in public management; and the Bureau of Accounts which audits all government contracts and expenditures. The Council for Development and Reconstruction is also an intermediate body in charge of development plan- ~ing and the oversight of large reconstruction projects. . The coun system is composed of three levels: (a) local couns, (b) courts 01 appeal, and (c) a Higher Court (Cour de Cassation). The law is secular and drawn mainly from French sources. Alongside the secular state courts are religious laws and couns with narrow prerogatives in personal status affairs (marriage, divorce,) inheritance, etc.).

c- Social Structure The hierarchy of social bonds begins with the family which became even stronger during the war because of the collapse of other social institutions. This is fallowed by attachment to confessional group. Some social scientists observed a slow melting of confessional attachments in mixed areas of Lebanon (e.g. Ras Bei­ rut) before the war, but the experience of the war and the organization of war and politics along confessional lines have driven people back into their confessional

20 • l .,,. y A

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--/f1y/'IWJy; _,,,,,,,~-11,.. ,,, ''""' r:z;a,,,,""_' .,,,,_" .,,,;,,,,; c:::::..·~··:,,r,,,,,,,._.., ''-~'''

'.)

1Vlap of Lebanon

20 a ..

Council of Ministers

Direct. for Civil Central Bureau Research­ Service .,._ ____....,. ____""" Inspection -- of and Council Commision Accounts Guidance

Council for Development ----- and Recon­ struction

Indepcndc;nt Public Agencies

Water WelfareSocial - SecuritySocial - Transpon...... ,Public _____.,______. Works __ Railways ,..... Electricty

Ministries

Hydraulic ~-FAff~-Jusn·cc~~ t------+------4 Fimancc --- Edcan·o--~u n Electrical Resources

Post and Economy Infi . A . 1 Health Labor _ Telecom------and ... onnanon""'" gncu rure - munications Commerce

Public Industry Tourism ~ Housing .,_____ ...... ____-1 Works and and ,...... Interior Transpon Oil

21 ..

identities. Within many confessional groups, however, deep splits have emerged, usually as a result of political struggles among competing confessional elites (e.g. a split between followers of Amal and Hizballah among the Shi' a; and a split be­ tween followers of Aoun and Ja'ja' among the Christians, etc.). Confessional identities are reinforced by the confessional militias that grew in strength during the war and by more traditional religious institutions ·whose role also expanded after the collapse of the state. The militias grew not only in military power, but they became powerful financial and business institutions by virtue of their elaborate tax and duty systems, their involvement in the drug trade, and for­ eign backing. In many cases they opened their own television and radio stations, bought out newspapers, and developed effective networks within schools and uni­ versities. In some cases, they also produced their own history and civic textbooks for use in local schools. In short, they came to play a dominant role in reinforcing confessional identities through the media and other vehicles for the shaping of opinion and culture. Traditional religious institutions have also grown in imponance. With the de­ cline of the state, religious leaders regained some of the political dominance they had lost to deputies and government officials with the establishment of the modem state. They played central roles alongside the militia leaders during the war; how­ ever, in most cases they were voices for moderation and compromise rather than confessional strife. Nevertheless, their very prominence helped reinforce confes­ sional identities and the tensions they engendered. Both the church and the Muslim clerical organizations have much to draw on in terms of financial and human re­ sources. Both have large networks of churches or mosques through which to reach people; and both have fairly cohesive cadres of trained and active clerics. Among the Shi'a, especially, foreign suppon (in this case from Iran) has also been a key factor in the rise of clerical power. · Economic class has never been a strong determinant of social identity or co­ hesion in Lebanon, overpowered as it is by confessional identity. Yet, a rough pic­ ture of the current income groups in Lebanon might be useful. At the bottom of the economic pyramid lies a large class made up of various groups including the displaced, the unemployed or underemployed, the handicapped, and large portions of the peasant/agricultural labor class (income<$2,000/yr.). Slightly above them are unskilled workers and day laborers in various sectors ($2,000-4,000). The sal­ aried class in both the public and private sectors used to enjoy a comfortable mid­ dle class position, but since the decline of the national currency in 1985-6 this class has occupied a position just slightly above -- or in some cases equal to -- the position of unskilled labor ($3,000-$6,000). The upper middle class is made up of non-salaried professionals (doctors, lawyers, engineers) and small businessmen in the various sectors ($7 ,000-$30,000). The lower upper class is made up of big merchants and businessmen whose business is limited to Lebanon ($30,000-$130,000) while the upper upper class is made up of big businessmen with interests around the world (Arab Gulf, Africa, Europe, the Americas), a handful of militia leaders, and a small group comprising the key operators of the drug industry and trade (over $130,000). The vast in-

22 .. ..

come inequalities apparent from the above are not ameliorated by a progressive tax system, because although the tax exists as law, it is levied almost exclusively on the salaried class whose income can be easily monitored. The small percentage of the population that makes the bulk of the country's income is, on the whole, not taxed. In Marxist terms of the relations of classes to the means of production, sever­ al tentative generalizations can be made. The industrial sector makes up only about 15% of GDP and is dominated by light manufacturing industries; thus, both the industrial capitalist and industrial labor classes are relatively weak. The agri­ cultural sector is even smaller, accounting for under 10% of GDP; thus, the peas­ ant class as well is relatively small and dispersed. The tertiary sector makes up the overwhelming bulk of the economy. This includes construction, banking and insu­ rance, tourism, and remittances from abroad. The first uses large numbers of for­ eign labor, the second (banking and insurance) is fairly specialized. the third has been in serious remission since the war. and the last has no domestic economic class component. In other words, this sector does not provide the framework for sizable horizontal class formations. Indeed. among the largest single economic groups in the country are the employees of the state. both in the civil and military services. These number around 150,000 out of a total labor force of nearly 600,000. and often act cohesively in demanding wage rises and other benefits. A roughly estimated breakdown of the labor force would find about 150,000 em­ ployed in the public sector, 250,000 employed in the private sector, and 200,000 unemployed or seriously underemployed.

d- Power and the State The structure of power in Lebanon after the war can best be described as oli­ garchic, with a heavy dose of foreign influence. The main holders of power with­ in the country are the main confessional militia leaders and the key officials of government. This would include the leaders of the three main Christian, Shi' a, and Druze militias -- Samir Ja'ja', Nabih Birri. and Walid Junblat -- and the three "presidents" of the state -- the President of the Republic Elias Hrawi, the President of the Parliament Husayn Husayni, and the President of the Council of Ministers Omar Karami. In the second tier of power holders come a host of political, relig­ ious, and militia leaders around the country, and big businessmen. The main mili­ tia leaders are today all represented in the Council of Ministers. so there has been a marriage -- perhaps temporary -- of state and non-state powerholders.There is an important absence of intermediate powerholders because of the levelling and socially disruptive effects of the war and because of the absence of elections for 20 years. Above this domestic structure of power is a more powerful foreign presence. Relations between ruling and ruled groups have deteriorated during the war. The militias developed without constitutions or legal guidelines and never submit­ ted to democratic or electoral tests. Although they began as popular militias, they gradually developed into autonomous political, military, and financial institutions

23 .. •

whose relations with their supposed constituencies were often coercive, extortion­ ist, or racketecrish. Meanwhile the state had declined and was failing to provide any of the basic goods and services that were expected of it. With the decline of the economy during the war and the devaluation of the national currency, the po­ litical distance between ruler and ruled was exacerbated by widening economic disparities. In the absence of elections, and with the continued poor performance of the government bureaucracy, the level of popular legitimacy of the state and of the ruling elite as a whole remains very low.

3. Main Elements of Stability and Instability There are three main factors that underlie the current stability of the Leba­ nese political system. Domestically, the Taif Agreement has settled many of the political disputes that led to the polarization of the Lebanese body politic and the paralysis and subsequent collapse of the state. Regionally, Syria is enjoying wide consensus on its presence and role in Lebanon. This consensus came about largely as a result of the Gulf War and the defeat of Iraq. Internationally, the end of the Cold War also reduced Lebanese tensions and helped set the stage for peace. It is no coincidence that the end of the Cold War and the Taif Agreement took place in the same year. Of these three factors, the third appears to be longlasting. The second, how­ ever, may not be. Even now, there are widespread fears that the breakdown of Arab-Israeli peace talks could lead to rising tensions between Israel and Syria. If a cold or hot war develops between Syria and Israel, Lebanon will be one of the main arenas of direct or proxy war, and the stabilizing role played by Syria will be shattered. This v,ill shake the young and precarious peace recently arrived at in Lebanon. The first factor is also not altogether firm. Although Taif resolved many dis­ putes and satisfied many demands, there is still considerable political and socio­ economic discontent. A large portion of the Christian population that had suppon­ ed Aoun feels that the Taif Agreement and the government it spawned are illegiti­ mate and were forced on the Lebanese by external pressure. Many Shi' a feel that Taif transferred power from the Maronite President to the Sunni Prime Minister, but without the Shi'a -- who are probably the largest confessional community in the country -- getting much of it. Other Islamic fundamentalists in the Shi'a and Sunni camps remain in the opposition, favoring more Islamization of the political system. Leftists and secularists of all stripes criticize the Taif Agreement for deepening the confessional nature of the Lebanese political system. This is to say nothing of the host of socio-economic grievances that have accumulated over 15 years of war and that generate frustration and political instability, especially in the face of the ostentatious wealth and corruption of many among the ruling elite. The key player in the long term stability of the country is, of course, the state. At the moment the state does not have the financial, military, or political re­ sources to ensure stability. It is politically divided and weak, the military is rela­ tively small, and financially, it is running an annual budget deficit of 70% and has

24 .. ..

accumulated a public debt of' over $4 billion. Until the state regains its health and its power, the stability of the Lebanese political system will have to depend on foreign support, precarious domestic understanding, and good luck.

25 .. ...

B. Economic Development

1. History n The Lebanese economy is marked by its ample liberalism and the absence of centralized planning or control. Indeed, modem Lebanon never had a tightly con­ trolled economy. The feudal order which might have developed into some form of central economic control collapsed in the mid-19th century, and in the hundred years that followed no centralized state was put in place to tty and take advantage of dispersed economic resources. Moreover, Mount Lebanon was never an ordi­ nary Ottoman Province, and hence did not accumulate the same tradition of levy­ ing state taxes, officially organizing trade and other economic practices that were in place in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, the main silk indus­ try of Mount Lebanon collapsed in the second half of the 19th century, and peas­ ants reverted to subsistence agriculture along narrow mountain terraces. In the plains of the North, the Biqa', and the South which were joined to Mount Lebanon in 1920, patterns of large landholding were common. Indeed, a landowning elite did dominate the economies and politics of these regions well into the 1960s, but their power waned with accelerating social and political change. As economic relations between Europe and the Middle East developed, Leba­ nese found themselves at a considerable advantage to act as middle-men and go­ betweens by virtue of their multi-cultural outlook, their multilingualism, their relative_!y high level of education, and their intermediate phySical location between the West and the Arab world. This role was encouraged by France and other Western Powers. Hence, a certain commercial elite developed in the country, spe- / ci~lki_I)g in regional trade and financial services, and this_elit~ thrived on open b9_~d_e_!s an~ free trade. The Constitution drafted in 1926 was inspired largely by ·the liberal French model, and one of its main Lebanese architects, Michel Chi ha, was a banker by profession. However, one of the principal reasons for the uninterrupted liberalism of the Lebanese economic system is the makeup of the Lebanese polity itself. Indeed, most of the economic systems in the Arab world in the 1920s and 1930s were lib­ eral; the key to Lebanon's continued liberalism is the political -- and consequently economic - standoff that developed between the various religious communities of Greater Lebanon. Because of confessional pluralism, no one group -- whether po- . litically or economically defined -- could monopolize power and impose strong central controls on the society or economy. In other words, laissez faire econom­ ~ was not the product of deliberate policy so much as it was the result of the ina­ bility of an elite to impose any one faire economic policy. In the first three decades of independence, Lebanon was able to take good ad­ vantage of political and economic developments in the region, and despite the ab­ sence of even minimal government planning, the private sector grew at a healthy and steady 6%. The occupation of Palestine, the closure of the Suez Canal, the na­ tionalization and socialization of economies in many Arab countries, led to a transfer of large amounts of human and material capital as well as trade routes to

26 .. ...

Lebanon. Lebanon played host not only to the disenfranchised business and land­ owning classes of many Arab states, but it also served as headquarters for many Western firms that began to develop interests in the Arab world. As a repository of capital and know-how, Lebanon became an important banking center as well as an important center for education, hospitalization, and tourism. Lebanon's economy received an additional boost with the oil boom of 1973. Arab capital flowing into the country increased dramatically and remittances from thousands of Lebanese travelling to the Gulf to work also rose sharply. The prewar growth of the Lebanese economy, however, was skewed toward the _tertiary service sector consisting mainly of banking and tourism. The industri­ al and agricultural sec- tors remained fairly small (See chart). The % Share of GDP by Sector problem with this was that the tertiary sector 100 was extremely depen­ 80 dent on external re­ B Tertiary Sector sources which could be 60 m Secondary Se(:lOr withdrawn quickly, for 40 example, through the • Primary Sector shifting of Arab bank­ 20 ing to London or the 0 suspension of tourism -­ 195019571964197019771987 as happened immediate­ Year ly upon the outbreak of war in 1975.

2. The War Years Obviously, the war had a debilitating effect on the economy. The tourism sec­ tor was the first to go, but it was soon accompanied by ~ flight of capital and bu­ -man resources that affected all sectors. Communications and transport with the West and the Arab world deteriorated and the country grew economically isolated and marginal. Toe war resulted in the destruction of considerable human and ma- terial capital, and a drastic drop in the rate of new and replacement investment. Domestic production and income declined as domestic markets fragmented and foreign markets became more cut off. The brain drain and the outmigration of /( skilled and semi-skilled labor depleted the work force; the work force that re­ mained was of a much reduced quality. As the GNP contracted, the ratio of public sector expenditures to GNP in- creased. Today the public sector expends a sum greater than 1/2 of GNP -- a situ- ation unheard of outside of the defunct socialist systems of past years. To finance its budgets, the government resorted to deficit financing. This meant large-scale borrowing from the private banking sector, the printing of money, and the accu­ / mulation of debt (see chart). As annual budget deficits widened, the state accumu-

27 .. •

lated a public debt of over $4 billion -- a sum greater Government Deficits and Public Debt in Billion L.L. than the country's GNP - C?xpanded the money SUPQly 1000 many hundreds of times 800 over, and contributed to the • Government devaluation of the Lebanese 600 Deficit Pound from around 400 B Domestic Public LP3=$1 to LP 1,000=$1. Debt Inflation, meanwhile, sky­ rocketed to over 400% ( see charts next page). 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 Year However, this econom­ ic decline did not take place immediately upon the outbreak of war. Indeed, between 1975 and 1982, the Leb­ anese economy held up quite well. The Lebanese currency held its value to the dollar; GNP -- after a drastic decline in 1975-76 -- showed signs of positive growth, and the country's balance of payments remained positive. Some of the reasons for this robustness were: (a) remittances from Lebanese working in the Gulf remained high; (b) the PLO was building a large bureaucratic and military infrastructure in Lebanon and hence pumping money into the system; and (c) the drug industry began to flourish and bring in valuable foreign exchange. In addi­ tion, although the economy's human and material resources and its infrastructure had been hit hard, they had still not been exhausted. The Israeli invasion of 1982 was as much an economic turning point as it was political. In terms of human and material resources, the invasion that swept through all of South Lebanon and ended in a three month siege of Beirut resulted in massive losses. The agricultural sector in the South came to an almost complete halt and the siege and bombardment of Beirut hit the industrial sector hard and contributed to a second wave of emigration and brain drain. In addition, the de­ struction of the PLO infrastructure eliminated a large source of income to the Lebanese economy. Unfortunately, the invasion coincided with a period of reces­ sion in the Gulf and the beginning of a preference for Asian over Arab labor in the Gulf countries; remittances from Lebanese working in the Gulf declined as many were forced to return home or accept reduced incomes. The economic effects of 1982 were temporarily counterbalanced by the opti­ mism that accompanied the first two years of President Amine Gemayel's term, when American support was high and hopes for a resolution to the Lebanese crisis were entertained. The optimism encouraged the return of material and human capital and generated a positive balance of payments despite negative levels of growth. The decisive shock came in February 1984, when the Army split along confessional lines, the state lost control of the capital to the militias, and the Americans announced their withdrawal from Lebanon. The positive expectations that had reversed the outmigration of labor and encouraged investment collapsed, and the country's internal market fragmented once again as it also drew farther

28 .. •

Real GNP In Current S Million Balance of Payments in S Million (inaudes remittances) 6000------­ 5000 SOOO+------.pa- ---41----- '4000 4000+------"4----+-- 3000 _,,,··· 3000+--~~~~~~~,,__~~-+-~-: 2000 2000P------1-----T-"#' 1000 • 1000~~~1r----:---+------t--1- o~-..----lr-r-~_;::~~------.J,J-- 1988 1989 1990 -1000------Year 79 80 81 82 83 84 8S 86 87 88 89 90 Year

Public Sectcr Revenues and Expenses in S Millioo Current Prices Minimum Salary in $ 1000 250 .. soo 200 ,. 0 -SOO -1000 150 "· -1SOO 100 '· • -2000 50 ...... _.-.-•__... -2500...______0 • 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 Year Year

Money Supply M1 in U Millions CPI wllll 111, • 100

1000 350000 1000 300000 7000 250000 1000 200000 5000 150000 4000 100000 ,000 50000 IOOO 0 ~----.-.s:-=e::zsic:::z:::;zlL,l~~~ 1000 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 0 7'J----=-=-=-=-==-======:::.---- 75 11 11 11 71 10 11 12 n " as 11 11 u u y.., Year

29 .. •

away from its foreign markets. The amalgamation of these economic losses coupled with high expenditures on arms in 1983 of around $900 million led to a monela!)'. collapse in 1985-86. The LP/$ exchange rate soared from LP6/$1 in 1984 to LP225/$1 in 1987 with attendant hyperinflation. The monetary collapse caused great imbalances. A large portion of the active popu- lation who held its savings in the national currency Average Exchange Rate LL/$ saw its consumption and investment capabilities dis­ ._. appear and was reduced to 800+--~~~~~~~~/'-- economic marginality. La­ bor management relations 600 +------.,._- deteriorated as wages fell 400 ~--- below subsistence levels. " Government services also. 200 .1.1·~~- almost came to a standstill 0•-•-•-•-.-•-•-•-•-·-·-.. -· I I I I I as civil servants' wages 747576777879808182838485868788899091 dwindled to insignificance. Year Domestic markets faltered II as prices fluctuated wildly, often changing more than once in a single day. All this ' led to a dollarization of most of the~vate sector economy and increased reliance !~ -n deficit financing and printing money in the public sector. In 1987-88 the economy actually recovered somewhat as some political calm was restored, and the private sector took advantage of low wages to encourage ex­ ports. However, the battles between Aoun's forces and the Syrians in 1989 and then with the Lebanese Forces in 1990 set the Lebanese economy far back once again. As the battle with the Syrians started as a battle over seaports, import/ export activity was paralyzed for months, and the heavy shelling that affected all of Beirut took a heavy material and human toll. The war with the Lebanese Forc­ es was even more destructive as it involved pitched land battles in heavily residen­ tial and industrial areas of the Eastern sector. Emigration reached an all-time high, industrial capacity was cut by almost half. and the electric and teleconununi­ cations infrastructure was devastated. No reliable data are available on GNP for these two difficult years. 1991 was a year of optimism similar to 1982-83. The war had apparently'/ come to an end, an outside power -- this ti~e Syria -- was rovidin olitical and military stability, and there was Arab and international support for a rev1va o ' Lebanon. Surularly, there was a considerable inflow of material and human capi-J' tal during the year which resulted in a positive balance of payments and a steady LP/$ exchange rate despite continued government deficit financing. The opening of previously fragmented domestic markets and the resumption of a semblance of normal economic life led to considerable growth (approx. 15% ). The economic outlook at the beginning of 1992, however, looks mixed. The private sector has a strong potential for growth but two obstacles stand in the way.

30 .. ..

The first is the ravaged infrastructure; without an adequate network of roads, electricity, and telecommunications factories and other commercial enterprises will be able to function at only a fraction of their capacity. A Bechtel and Dar al­ Handasah study approved by the government estimated reconstruction and reha­ bilitation needs for the first five years at $4.5 billion. The state is already deeply in debt and is relying totally on foreign aid to secure this sum. Foreign aid, how­ ever, has been very small, not exceeding $200 million for all of 1991. The second obstacle is a lack of sufficient confidence in the future stability of the country; the mild optimism of 1991 has faded and is being replaced by skepti­ cism about the domestic and regional foundations of the current stability. Domes­ tically, many fear a break up of the_divided ruling coalition; regionally, they fear escalating tension between Israel andSyria. These doubts are dampening invest­ ment and slowing the return of labor and capital. In addition there are \Vornes about the state's massive deficit financin , and hence, its abili to ovide macro­ economic stability. ers complain about e apparently high levels of corrup­ tion and mismanagement within government.

31 . ..

III. Institutional Sector Survey A. Outline Strategy by Sector

Given that the main objectives of most Western donor countries and agencies is to promote political and institutional liberalization in the interest of free market socio-economic growth, the country of Lebanon presents a special case. First, the Lebanese state was set up and remains a fully-fledged open and liberal political­ institutional system. It is so not only on paper but in fact as the middle-ground meeting place of diverse community and political groups. The Lebanese state is liberal both de jure and de facto. Second, tom by 15 years of civil and proxy wars, the Lebanese state is in a condition of near total collapse. Unlike in many other Tltj_rd World countries, the roblem in Lebanon is not the overbearing pow- er of the state. but rather. its weakness. Taking these two actors toge er, 1t e­ comes apparent that proIJ.!.e>ling liberal political development in Lebanon is synon- fl ymous with strengthening the central institutions of the state. · In Lebanon, it was the state that protected freedoms and provided a fram~­ work_ _for liberal political and economic development in the three decades between independence and the outbreak of war, 1943- 1975. ~en the state collapsed, so cffaTheframework of political and economic liberties th~t it provided. During the war, illegal militia emerged, usurping the authority of the state and imposing their will on their captive populations. In addition, foreign forces occupied various sec­ tors of the country, imposing their own will and authority. In the absence of the s~te, there is no basis for the rule of law or for the protection of basic rights and freedoms. In the absence of the state, Lebanon is in an almost Hobbesian state of nature which has become all too familiar to the outside world. The road to liberal political and economic development in Lebanon runs '/ .. through the reinforcement of the state's ability to govern and provide the basic j~ 1./° framework for order, liberty, and growth. In most Third World countries, the problem of liberalism is addressed by strengthening organs of accountabili~ that monitor and check the excesses of gov­ ernment; in Lebanon, however, the problem is more basic: it requires strengthen­ ing the capacity of the government to govern in order to provide a basis for com­ munity, law, and freedom in an otherwise dangerously anarchic society. As John Locke and other philosophers of liberal government pointed out, natural righ~ require the man-made institution of the state to be ensur~-~d protected. There is no better time to work toward strengthening the Lebanese state than now. After fifteen years of war, the Lebanese arrived at a sweeping resolution of their differences in the pocument of National Reconciliation negotiated in Taif, Saudi Arabia in September 1989. The document addressed virtually all the issues of contention among the Lebanese and arrived ·at mutually satisfactory reforms. The reforms were put into place in 1990 and 1991 and the country began to emerge from war into peace. Since then, the principal political elites in the country, represented in the of­ fices of the President, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of Parliament, as well

32 .. ..

as in the Council of Ministers and Parliament, have been working to strengthen the institutions and organs of the central state. They recognize that the war is over and that their future strength and prominence depends on the strength and promi­ nence of the state or which theY-ai-e stewards. They are working, however, against large obstacles. Like any state after a decade and a half of civil and proxy wars, the Lebanese state is in a dangerously dilapidated condition. It is running an annual budget defi­ cit of arou_!ld 65% and has acquired a public debt of $4 billion, which is equal to the country's GDP. Its physical infrastructure of offices and equipment has been devastated by destruction, theft, and neglect. Its human infrastructure has been ravaged by war-related resignation, emigration, death, absenteeism, etc. In many sectors, the functions and offices of the state were taken over by militia, while in others the mere division of the country into hostile cantons prevented the state from operating in a normal fashion. At the moment, the state imposes a tenuous authority and provides a bare minimum of govemmeni"services:--· ·· ------Nevertheless, the_sta~~. as2 uch, enjoys wide legitimacy and supE_ort. Within the country, the overwhelming majority of the population learned what the high price of anarchy was through the long and difficult years of the war. They had first hand experience of militia-rule and the lifting of state law and order, and they developed a new awareness and consensus about the need to reestablish state authority. In the region, the Arab states also came to appreciate the dangers to the area generated by continuing anarchy in Lebanon, and intervened vigorously in 1989 to forge a resolution to the crisis. The suppon of the Ar~b states and Syria is .fllll!.. and remains an important clement of the likely success of the current peace. All this is capped by the end of the Cold War and a consensus among leading in­ dustrial nations tha! regional and proxy conflicts, like those of Lebanon, should be brought to an end. This consensus was expressed in repeated statements from the UN's Security Council and General Assembly. Much of the work of rehabilitation and revival will depend on the energy and resources of the Lebanese themselves, but like Germany, Japan, France, and other countries devastated by war, Lebanon will need outside help to recover. If such help is withheld and the Lebanese cauldron of anarchy is left to simmer, new forces could emerge outside the authority of the state to foster a new period of domestic and regional unrest and instability. There is an important window of op­ portunity in Lebanon today to calm the winds of war and sow the seeds of stable and lasting peace. The central guarantor of that peace will be the Lebanese state and its capacity to provide the basic framework for community, liberty, and or­ -aer. Strategy by Sector From the above analysis, we have reached the conclusion that foreign assis­ tance strategy in Lebanon should aim primarily at strengthening the feeble capaci­ Jy of the state. Since the state is set up as a liberal democracy and has functioned as such since independence, a revival of the state will bring about a revival of po-

33 ... ..

litical and economic liberties. It is important to note that in this case, strengthen­ ing the capacity of the state even takes precedence over reinforcing the organs of accountabilicy, for where an executive branch does not have sufficient human or capital resources to act, it is of little use whether that branch is monitored, checked, or censured. Where there is no capacity for action, accountability be­ comes a secondary issue. To put it in other words, what Lebanon needs is more government, not more limits on overnment. In the pages below we have listed pnmary an secondary needs. The former are areas that require urgent and im­ mediate attention; the latter can be phased in in a more gradual fashion.

Primary Needs Public Administration Among the sectors surveyed, the public administration, Parliament, Munici- . palities, and the Judicial branch fit well into the above strategy. The public admin­ istration _(PA} is the meat and bones of any state and if it is weak or atrophied so i~-- ~-~ state. _Th~.£~pacity of the state to act in any sector is only commensurate with the ability_of its PA to formulate, delegate, and execute policy. Any AID strategy should follow a gradual and integrated plan to reform, revive, and strengthen the PA. Accoroing to our assessment, what is needed first and foremost is the bringing together of a team of American. European, and Lebanese expens !l and consultants to draw up a unified and integrated plan for the reform and revi­ l val of the Lebanese PA. Without such a plan, efforts by AID, the Lebanese gov­ ernment, and other foreign donors will be operating at cross purposes and might be wasted. Leading officials including the President of the Republic Elias Hrawi and the Minister of State for Administrative Reform Zahir al-Khatib have publicly and privately expressed the need for such a plan. The plan would also probably enjoy the support of Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The drawing up of such a plan should be the first step in addressing the problems of administrative reform and rehabilitation. From our general assessment, it is clear that any PA plan would focus atten­ tion on two groups of institutions within the state: (a) the agencies for personnel­ selection. training, and internal monitoring, and (b) the departments and agencies that are involved in revenue collection. In the first category are the Civil Service Council (CSC). the National Institute for Public Administration (NIPA), the Cen­ tral Inspection Commission (CIC), the Directorate for Research and Guidance (DRG), and the Bureau of Accounts (BOA). The CSC sets the standards for entry into the civil service and promotion within it. It administers entrance and promo­ tion examinations and approves appointments and transfers. Furthermore, it runs NIP A which is the government's own school for giving ~ntry-level and mid­ career training for mid- and high-level civil servants. The CSC and NIPA are · both functioning instituoons but their needs in terms of housing, equipment. staff­ ing, and training are great. The quality and capacity of the CSC and NIP A reflect directly on the quality and capacity of the government, for it is their graduates

34 .. ..

that fill key posts in the PA. The DRG comes second in importance in this category for it was established to review structures and methods within the PA and recommend continuous ada_E: _!?tions and changes. It is supposed to be the P A's planning department, and with­ out it the bureaucracy is without balance and direction. The ORO is currently non- operational. Its chief passed away a decade ago; no replacement has been ap­ pointed and the department is without offices or organized staff. The ac and BOA are both functioning departments within the PA. The CIC plays the role of an Inspector General in monitoring the proper functionin f all departments within the civil service and t e It~; t e is responsible for internal audit and for approving contracts between the state and outside parties. These are organs of accountability, and as such may be perceived as secondary in our strategy of strengthening the state's capacity; however, inasmuch as these or- Ir' gans can encourage efficiency and proper management and discourage waste, cor­ ruption, and mismanagement, they have a direct and positive impact on overall ca­ pacity. In the second category of organs and institutions, as discussed above, are those involved in revenue collection. The drastic drop of revenues to the state Ir during the war is the central cause of the state's present weakness; unless those / revenues are regained, the state will remain in a condition of chronic disability. Expenditures currently outstrip revenues by a margin of 3 to 1. This hides the fact, however, that over the past year revenues climbed steeply from around $10 million to $50 million per month. This shows that the government has shown the will and capacity to go a considerable distance along this path, and promises fur­ ther increases in revenue in the near future. However, the state is running a cur­ rent deficit of 65%, and given Lebano·n·s budgetary and reconstruction needs, these revenues must climb to around $200 million/month for true fiscal stability to return. To enhance this imponant revenue-enhancement process assistance should fo- . cus on the central player in the fiscal management of the state -- the Ministry of ! Finance. This Ministry represents the state's central nervous system. It sets tax policy, manages the state's resources, and draws up the government's annual bud­ get Without it, the state's finances would be in total disarray. The Ministry today is sorely in need of modern equipment, able staff and analysts, and expert advice on key issues of modern taxation, fiscal, and budgetary policy. An able Ministry of Finance could gradually brin_g the state's current financial crisis under control. The Central Bank also plays an imponant role in the state' fiscal control process; however, relative to other state mstltutions it is in an almost satisfactory condi- _tion. Attention should also be paid to the health of those organs of the state that are involved in revenue collection. These include the collection departments of the(f state Electricity Company, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, the Wa- ./ ter Works, and the customs posts of Beirut Airport and the Ports of Beirut, Trip- oli, Jounieh, Sidon, and Tyr.

35 ... ..

Representative Institutions Parliament The relevance of Parliament to enhancing the capacity of the state is great. Aside from acting as a check and monitor on the executive branch, Parliament is also involved in the crucial business of producing consensus. political legitimacy, and stability, as well as producing legislation. If the Parliament is weak or inca­ pacitated, so too will be the state's political and legal potency. The state exercises its authority through the intermediaries of law and politics, and it is in Parliament which those tools of the state are forged. Furthermore, unlike in other Third World countries, Parliament in Lebanon is not a rubber-stamp institution domi­ nated by the executive branch; it is rather the central body of the state where po­ litical forces meet. compete, and build consensus for government. This is the role that it played historically in the decades after independence and it is the role that it is beginning to play once again. The Lebanese Parliament today is in a dangerous condition of dilapidation al­ though its members have displayed an impressive solidarity and esprit de corps throughout the difficult years of the war. After all, it was on the shoulders of Par­ liament that the Document of National Reconciliation was carried through and the war was brought to an end. The membership and President of the current Cham­ ber have repeatedly voiced the need for assistance and guidance in reorganizing the institution of Parliament and providing it v.ith the proper staff and equipment to shoulder the responsibilities of any Parliament in a modem republic.

Municipalities In addition to rarliament, in this category the hundreds of municipalities dis­ tributed around the country could play a crucial role in increasing the capacity of the state. Currently municipalities suffer from a long absence of elections and ex­ cessively centralized administrative laws. In the Taif Agreement. the conferees agreed that a large measure of administrative decentralization was a necessary re­ form. However, in the case of postwar Lebanon, strengthening the municipalities should not be seen as decentralization so much as it is one aspect of strengthening the capacity of the state. For in strengthening municipalities, power is not being transferred from a strong central government to the periphery, but rather munici­ palities will be gaining power at the expense of other local but non-governmental · organizations like the militia. The power that the municipalities gain in outlying areas will accrue to the credit of the central state and enhance its legitimacy. au­ thority, and penetration. H the municipalities are left powerless. goods and servic­ es that the feeble central government is not able to provide will be provided by non-governmental or even anti-governmental organizations; this would be a source of instability and decline. The first step to take in the direction of strengthening municipalities would be to sponsor a detailed study by Western legal and administrative experts -- in coop­ eration with key Lebanese legislators -- leading to a list of recommendations for amending the currently outdated administrative laws. Freeing up municipalities

36 ...

from overly centralized restriction would bring life back to many of them. Another approach to the problem could rely on the demonstrative effect of improving one municipality and trying to get other municipalities to learn from and emulate it. The most important municipality to improve in this way would be the Municipality of Beirut. This Municipality employs over 5,000 people and is responsible for close to half of the country's population. An improvement in Bei­ rut would have a radiating effect to other municipalities.

Secondary Needs The Judicial Branch The link between this branch and the capacity of the state is not unimportant. It is through this branch that the state's protections and safeguards are provided. If the judicial branch is active and effective, the liberties and rights of the public · will be increasingly provided for. Furthermore, if the public can gain justice through recourse to the state's judicial branch this will weaken the appeal of alter­ native political institutions and increase adherence to and support for the state. Therefore, strong and stable government and one that provides a framework for liberal political and economic development is not possible without a vigorous and effective judicial branch. As mentioned in the body of our assessment, the judicial branch fared better than other branches during the war. The quality of judges has remained accepta­ bly high and levels of corruption are relatively low. Nevertheless, this branch is plagued by several problems including court congestion, low pay, and inadequate resources in terms of legal reference equipment and material. The Institute for Ju­ dicial Studies whiclJ trains judges could benefit from support and training in order to produce more judges and thus reduce the problem of court congestion. Assis­ tance is also needed to help establish a computerized legal reference database for use by judges and lawyers; this will speed up and improve the process of litiga­ tion. Other support could come in the form of providing reference works or training to key judges in some elements of Common Law -- especially commercial and business elements of the law. This exposure to Common Law is sorely needed in the Lebanese judicial branch and would have an important positive impact on encouraging regional and international business investment, both of which operate within the largely Common-Law legal framework of international trade.

The Media The role of the media in any democracy is crucial. Their function is to help formulate the public voice and express the general will; furthermore, they moni­ tor the state and hold it accountable before public opinion. In addition, they may help in pointing out policy issues and options and debating government actions. Their main function is in increasing the accountability of the state; they do play a role, however, in increasing the capacity of the state through investigating policy issues and options.

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In Lebanon, the media are in relatively good condition. The print media has a history over a century old and currently there are over 80 newspapers and maga­ zines published in Lebanon. During the war, the audio-visual media also flou­ rished, and now there are around 42 television stations and 186 radio stations. The Constitution guarantees press freedoms, and these freedoms have generally been respected in Lebanon's modem history. Within our proposed strategy of increasing the capacity of the state in sectors that need urgent attention, the media take second place to other priorities. Howev­ er, from our assessment, it became apparent that assistance to the media, if of­ fered, would best be oriented toward increasing the capacity of the media to do meaningful and in-depth investigative reporting on policy issues of significance to the society and economy. Such assistan_ce would be in the form of entry-level and mid-career training for both young and established journalists. Lebanese journal­ ists could benefit from the experience of fellow journalists in North America and Europe.

Education Although our assessment did not address the educational sector, as such, it be­ came clear during the life of the study that attention to the educational sector was of critical long-term importance. In all the sectors discussed above, the people that populate these sectors and on whom success - or failure -- depends, are trained and recruited from the schools and universities of the country. In the final analy­ sis, these sectors will function only as well as the people populating them are · trained and equipped to function. The educational system in Lebanon is strong but has suffered greatly during the war. Lebanese, in general, put a high premium on education as a means of ad­ vancement and invest large resources in educating themselves and their children. Public sector schools and universities are of mixed quality -- comparable to others in the Arab world -- but Lebanon has the special advantage of having a large net­ work of Western schools and universities. Most of these were established by Euro­ pean or American missionaries in the 19th century and have grown significantly since then. Through the American University of Beirut, the Beirut University College, the International College, and other English-language educational institutions, Leb­ anese are particularly open to American modes of education. Assistance to the edu­ cational sector in the form of exchange of materials, expertise, or general support, would have a profound and lasting effect. It fits into our strategy, however, only within a long-term view, and an assessment of the educational sector is not includ- ed in the body of this repon. ·

Conclusion The above recommendations are a carefully selected subset of a broader range of recommendations dispersed throughout our assessment. They are selected for

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their central importance, and for their immediate relevance to strengthening the capacity of the state and enabling it to provide the basis. for community, liberty, and order as discussed above. It is this emphasis on strengthening the capacity of the state that distinguishes the Lebanese case from other cases in the Third World. For, as mentioned above, in Lebanon the objectives of political and economic lib­ eralization are best served by strengthening the basic foundations of the liberal Lebanese state rather than by putting limits and constraints on its growth. Until such time that tlie Lebanese state regains a minimal amount of strength and vigor, we recommend that foreign assistance operate according to this philosophy. After that point, another assessment could be made regarding the need for putting checks and balances in the way of overbearing government power.

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B. Public Administration

1. History The origins of the culture of public administration in Lebanon lie partially in the four centuries of Ottoman suzerainty between the 16th and 19th centuries. In the second half of the 19th century, the Ottoman State adopted many French legal and administrative codes and procedures as laid down in the French Basic Laws of 1875. The French influence was especially strong in the Lebanese Mutasarrifiyyah because of the activity of French mission schools and universities and because of the special protections accorded by the French -- within the Capitulations system - - to the Maronite Christian community in Lebanon. French influence became complete during the Mandate period between 1920 and 1943. The French esta­ blished the Lebanese Republic along the lines of the French Third Republic and imported a full host of French legal and administrative structures and practices. Throughout the Mandate Period, the French High Commissioner and his Counsel­ lors occupied all the key posts in the administration. During the Mandate period, however, the administration remained fairly small. It was concerned primarily with keeping order and security and regulating political conflicts, rather than pub­ lic service, the provision of public goods, or development. In a sense, it was a laissez faire administration, intervening only when necessary to resolve conflicts and avoid disorder. The newly independent state in 1943 inherited a gendarmerie, a small border defense force, a ministry of interior, and a ministry of public works. The whole structure employed no more than 5,600 people. The first administration of post-independence Lebanon, Bishara Khoury (1943-52), was more concerned with maintaining internal political coalitions and external alliances than developing the bureaucracy. Corruption among the new Lebanese ruling coalition was widespread. Indeed, the public administration was viewed more as an arena for reaping political spoils rather than as a tool for so­ cial service. A number of French administrators remained in key government posts, and many of these administrators were involved in corruption themselves. The issue of public administration development and reform only became rec­ ognized as a public issue that needed action in the later years of Khoury's adminis­ tration. In the end, it was complaints about corruption and mismanagement in the Khoury administration, and demands for more goods and services from the state that brought down Khoury's government. President Camille Chamoun (1952-58) came to the presidency with a clear mandate to reform and improve the administration. He enlisted the support of the Ford Foundation to conduct a number of preliminary studies. The studies con­ firmed the need for fundamental reform and criticized the overly legalistic ap- , proach to public management. During Chamoun's term, the public administration expanded considerably to employ over 16,000 people; new ministries were creat­ ed, and a crude administrative chart was developed. Chamoun's presidency, how­ ever, ran into profound external and internal political crises before important progress could be made on reform.

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Fuad Shihab (1958-64), came to the presidency in the wake of a severe politi­ cal and social upheaval. The political aunosphere was alive with awareness of the need for change and reform, and Shih ab himself -- the first president to come from within the state and not from the traditional political class -- was detennined _!o strengthen the state and distinguish himself from his predecessors. He enlisted the support of a French consulting organization (IRFED) that conducted an exten­ sive study of the country and the state. In cooperation between IRFED and a net­ work of ministerial and administrative conunittees, a number of recommendations were arrived at. These revolved around the revision of outdated legal and admin­ istrative codes and the establishment of a handful of key administrative institu­ tions. These were: i - The Civil Service Council (CSC). The idea for a CSC had been floated in 1954 but was established only under Shihab. Its function was to screen and select entrants into the civil service; provide 2-year training courses for entrants into Grade 3 and 4 posts; and provide in-service mid-career training for civil servants. The training would be held under the auspices of the CSC at the National Institute for Public Administration (NIPA, est. 1960). ii - The Central Inspection Commission (CIC). The function of the CIC was to act as an autonomous investigative agency within the bureaucracy and to uncov­ er corruption and mismanagement. It had authority within all ministries, public agencies, and the security forces, and enjoyed strong backing from the President's office. ~ General Disciplinary Council (GDC) was established to punish mis­ creants. iii - The Directorate for Research and Guidance (DRG). The function of the DRG was to continuously review management systems and procedures within the bureaucracy and re::ommend changes and reforms. . iv - The Bureau of Accounts (BOA). The function of the BOA was to act as a /{; central auditing body over all government departments and ministries and to mon- 1 itor the expenditure of the annual budget. Shihab' s ambition was to build "the state of independence," and to build an administrative and bureaucratic structure ·that carried its own internal autonomy and authority and that could act independently from the political class which he regarded as corrupt. The period of the Shihab reforms still represents the high point of administrative reform and progress in Lebanon. Shihab's successor, Charles Helou (1964-70), oversaw the continued function­ ing of the new institutions put in place by Shihab. He undertook no new reforms but laid emphasis on purging the civil service from "bad elements." A six-member committee composed of representatives of the CSC and CIC made sweeping dis­ missals of civil servants charged with corru tion or mismanagement. The dismis­ sals demonstrated the --owei ofihe state and the autonomy an authority of Shi­ hab' s new bureaucratic elite. t e en o 1s term, owever, Helou was una e to ensure the election of a successor sympathetic to this program and to this elite. The presidency went to Sulayman Franjiyyeh, a traditional political Za 'im par excellence, with backing from a broad coalition of traditional political leaders. By

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this time, the idea that each new president would present a package of new admin­ istrative reforms had become custom; but Franjiyyeh's reforms went contrary to Shihab's in that their general objective was to rcassen the authority of the political class -- represented in the Presidency, the Council of Ministers. and Parliament - over the rising bureaucratic elite. The modernizing bureaucratic elite had relied on presidential backing and suppon throughout the terms of Shihab and Helou. With a hostile president and with new legislation allowing increased executive- ( branch interference in public administrative affairs -- including the promotion and demotion of high civil servants -- morale within the bureaucracy declined and the autonomy and internal integrity of the administrative structure was shaken. Not surprisingly, the war brought about a grave deterioration of the public administration. The division of the capital split key ministries and agencies; many top managers and administrators left their jobs, left the country, or were killed; the violence of the war damaged or destroyed many government buildings while the war's anarchy allowed the theft of much valuable equipment; revenues de­ clined as militia took over key installations; in addition, absenteeism grew as a se­ rious problem, and the ability of administrative superiors or the central control agencies like the CIC, CSC, GDC, or BOA to investigate and punish corruption and mismanagement declined sharply as prosecutors could not count on the pro­ tection of the state. President Sarkis (1976-82) was a veteran public administrator, but was over­ whelmed during his term with the urgent tasks of political and military crisis­ management. In addition, the social effects of the war underlined the necessity of expanding the government's welfare services -- an area in which Sarkis expended considerable innovative energy. Sarkis also established the Council for Develop­ ment and Reconstruction (CDR). During his term, the bureaucracy continued to expand, but its revenue base was declining and the central planning, reform, and control mechanisms were deteriorating. President Amine Gemayel (1982-88) inherited a seriously ailing bureaucracy but made things worse by overspending, especially on the Army. This led to wide deficits and a monetary collapse in 1985-86 which, ever since, has become the central problem of the public sector. Gemayel undenook some purges of the civil service, on the model of Helou, in the summer of 1983, and floated the idea for a comprehensive study of civil service reform, on the model of the IRFED study; however, his administration -- like all other wartime administrations -- was soon ovenaken by political and military crises. Between most of 1984 and 1990, the government was in a state of near total paralysis. This began with tensions be­ tween President Gemaycl and Prime MinisterR.ashid Karami; continued in ten­ sions between Gemayel and Karami's successor, Salim al-Hoss; and ended in the period of two governments between 1988 and 1990. Indeed, virtually nothing was done in terms of reform~ change, or even promotions during that period. Mean­ while, the problems introduced by the war continued to tear at public sector insti­ tutions. President Hrawi's government consolidated its power in the Fall of 1990. The first reforms it undenook were those to the Constitution agreed upon in the Taif

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Agreement. The main change of relevance to the bureaucracy was the shift of ex­ ecutive power from the President to the Council of Ministers. Thus initiatives for reform, and backing for bureaucratic modernizers, would now have to come from the Council of Ministers. A Minister of State for Administrative Reform, Zahir al-Khatib, was appointed, and he presented a proposal for each ministry to conduct an internal review of its operations and prepare a list of recommendations ll for refonn. Indeed, the Council of Ministers held several meetings under the title of Administrative Reform in 1991; but discussions were more focused on wide­ / ranging appoinunents to Grade 1, 2, and 3 civil service posts than on true reform. :( The Hrawi administration has failed to enunciate a clear policy on refonn, while l reports of new levels of corruption and mismanagement abound.

2. Problems !he Public Administration is in a grave state of disarray. In its present condi- Y tion it is unable to serve as the anchor for stability and the engine for reconstruc- J· tion and development that it is supposed to. Among its problems are the follow­ ing. (a) Overstaffing. Between the civil service and the security forces, the state now employs about 150,000 people. This represents about 1/3 of the country's work force. Neither the state nor the country's narrow tax base can suppon such a public sector. The overstaffing is in the lower Grade 4 and 5 posts, as political leaders use -these Grades as remedies for unemployment among their constituen­ cies. (b) Understaffing. The war and the state's financial decline have sapped the bureaucracy of hundreds of key employees in Grade 1, 2, and 3 posts. At these levels, staffing is at 50-30%. Thus the state is without key planners and adminis­ trators. In addition, the state has lost key technical experts in all ministries who have either left the country or left to the private sector for higher pay. (c) Low Wages. The monetary collapse of 1985-86 and continuing deficit fi­ nancing have driven government wages in a downward spiral that sometimes dipped below subsistence income levels. While the private sector has dollarized most of its finances and wages, the public sector, of course, still deals in the na­ tional currency. The decline in wages has shattered civil service morale, slowed efficiency and performance drastically, encouraged - and in some cases, necessi­ tated -- corruption, and contributed to widespread absenteeism. (d) .Interference. Intervention from the traditional political class, as well as from the newly emerging political-military elite of the militia and the officials of foreign armies or intelligence services, in administrative appointments, transfers, and general affairs has become overwhelming. The bureaucracy has lost vinually all of the autonomy it once enjoyed in the 1960s. It is now almost fully penetrated by political influences. (e) Loss of Resources. The war has left the state bereft of key installations, equipment, and offices. Many of these were either damaged, destroyed, or robbed.

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(f) Outdated. The war also precluded replacement investment in key areas and prevented updating of procedures, equipment, information, and even person­ nel. The administration today is functioning with a withered fraction of what had been set up in the early 1970s. These problems are added on to more traditional problems of the Lebanese public administration not specifically introduced by the war, such as: (g) Sectarianism, Nepotism, Favoritism, Patronage and the Spoils System. To be sure, Lebanon's political culture is at the heart of many of the state's problems. Sectarianism is deeply entrenched in the administrative system and governs ap­ pointments, promotions, transfers, and compensation. Also, Lebanon's culture of personalistic politics brings the problems of nepotism, favoritism, and patronage as principles of appointment and promotion within the civil service. Indeed, in­ creasingly since 1970, the public administration is viewed as a pie to be shared by the ruling coalition of the time. Each new administration introduces a wave of new appointees. The flip side of this is that appointments and promotions are not made on the basis of merit or probity. (h) Legalism. The bureaucracy is imbued with a passive legalistic juridical es­ prit inherited fror_n the Ottoman and French systems. Emphasis is placed on pro- - cedure and prerogative, rather than on function and performance. Indeed, the civ­ il servant himself is viewed not as a civil servant but as a state function . He regards his role not as to serve the pu 1c ut rather as to exercise his authori!}'. From this he derives prestige and money. (i) Corruption. This has been a problem in Lebanon throughout the country's modem history. A civic sense among the population is vinually non-existen~ and there is little conce ti.on of public ro , ublic service, or ublic ood. More­ over, unlike in the judic1 or even military branches of government, the attempt to build a certain esprit de corps and code of honor on the basis of which to coun­ terbalance corrupt tendencies has failed. The problem has been made much worse by the collapse in wages. While corruption used to be a minority problem in the administratibn, and corrupt officials used to devise elaborate ruses to accept bribes, corruption today is the norm and officials openly request private payments to complete transactions for citizens: (j) Generalist Qualifications. The legalistic nature of the system has encour­ aged the population of the administration by graduates of law schools. An educa­ tion in law is considered a prerequisite for government employment, and most government entrance examinations emphasize public and administrative law. Con­ sequently, the bulk of the public work force is without specialist education or ex­ pertise in their area of responsibility. A graduate of a law school may serve equal­ ly well as the Director of Agricultural Cooperatives or Deputy Director of the State Pharmaceuticals Board. (k) Centralization. Both the Ottoman and French systems placed a high prior­ ity on centralized command and contrqb This required an extensive hierarchy of authoriD', wherein all matters had to, at one point, be referred to the central au­ thority for approval. With the gargantuan growth of the modem state -- even in

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Lebanon -- and the diversification of its activities and responsibilities, this central­ ization has become a major obstacle to the smooth operation of the state's various organs. The problem is exacerbated when the central authority today is not on~ individual - the Presiqent -- but a diverse and often divided collective body -- the Council of Ministers. (j) Absence of Information. No largescale organization can operate without a l sound data base of information about its finances, its employees, and the areas over which it has responsibility. At a minimum9 the state should have access to I 4-­ comprehensive basic data about the economy and society of the country; the ex- I · penses, revenues, and debts of the state; the number, status, and income of its em- ployees; etc. Needless to say, in the 1990s, this information should be computer- ized. Because of the political sensitivity of conducting a national census, the Lebanese government has never had a strong data base; however, the suspension of information gathering during the war, the abolishment of the Ministry of Plan- ning in the early 1970s, the collapse of the Directorate of Statistics (legally subor- dinate to the Council of Ministers), and the non-computerization of basic functions in the 1980s have left the state with no reliable data neither about itself nor about the country. (1) Low Planning. Overarching all these problems is the absence for many years of reform- or development-oriented planning at almost any level of govern­ ment. Part of the reason for this are the political divisions among decision­ makers; but part of it also is due to the depletion of the higher administrative echelons of the bureaucracy.

3. Recommendations The public administration needs assistance at all levels. First and foremost is the need for a comprehensive management study of the administration similar to the one carried out by IRFED in the late 1950s. The study would examine all the problems mentioned above and would aim at arriving at a concened plan of action for administrative reform; otherwise, unplanned efforts may not have the desired overall effecL In any case, the keys to improving the administration would include the fol­ lowing: (a) helping in the equipment and staffing of NIP A which plays a central role in training civil servants before and after appoinnnent. (b) Strengthening the central administrative review and reform agencies: CSC, CIC, DRG, and BOA. (c) Among the ministries and agencies, concentrating on those that have a revenue-collection or reconstruction role, such as: the ministries of Finance, Tele­ communications, Housing, and Public Works, as well the Lebanese Electricity Company, the Directorate of Car Registration, the Water Works, and the Social Security Authority. (c) Helping reequip and revive the Directorate of Statistics (and the Ministry

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of Planning if it is reestablished). . (d) He.!ping computerize the central accounting and management processes of the administranon.

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C. Representative Institutions

Representative institutions in Lebanon run the gamut from large formal insti­ tutions such as Parliament to small informal clubs and associations. In between are municipalities, political parties, syndicates, and PVOs and NGOs.

1. Parliament The practice of formal representation in government began in the mid-19th century during the Double Qaimmaqamiyyah system. Under that arrangement, the appointed governor of each district was to rule in consultation with an Adminis­ trative Council of 12 individuals. The Council did not have legislative or over­ sight prerogatives but assisted the governor in formulating and executing policy. The Council was confessionally balanced (6 Christians: 2 Maronites, 2 Greek Or­ thodox, and 2 Greek Catholics; 6 Muslims: 2 Sunnis, 2 Shi'a, 2 Druze), and the formal representation and balancing of confessions in government dates back to this time. The members of the Council were not elected but rather appointed by the spiritual leaders of the various confessional communities. Indeed, the Ottoman Pone and the European Powers had reached an agreement in which the spiritual head of each community would also be considered its political responsible. This marked the break with the feudal order and the establishment of a thoroughly confessional political order. For each minority within each district, elections were held to choose an agent to represent their interests before the district governor. · These elections were the first of their kind in Lebanon. Under the Mutasarrifiyyah system the Administrative Council gained increas­ ing power. It served both to represent interests and groups and to participate in the formulation and execution of policy. Elections to the Council were held based on wide male suffrage. In the absence of political parties or high literacy levels, people generally voted according to the wishes of their tribal, religious, or feudal Za 'im (leader). During the mutasarrifiyyah period, the Council was expanded from 12 to 17 with the five additional seats distributed to the Maronites (3), Druze (1), and Greek Orthodox (1). After the establishment of Greater Lebanon by the French in 1920, the Con­ stitution of 1926 established a Chamber of Deputies, or Parliament. The Chamber was modelled after the Administrative Council but its functions were specified as legislation and monitoring the executive branch. Elections to Parliament were to be held every four years and electoral districts would coincide with the five main administrative Muhafazas. The French, however, introduced the provision that the French High Commissioner would appoint a full 1/3 of the Deputies to Parlia­ ment. The Constitution also called for the establishment of a Senate of 16 mem­ bers, but the Senate was cancelled in 1927 and its members joined the lower house. On the eve of independence, the practice of appointing Deputies was dropped, and the ratio of Christian/Muslim representation in Parliament was fixed at 6/5. In 1953 a number of imponant electoral reforms were introduced by Presi-

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dent Chamoun's administration: (a) the open election chamber was replaced by the secret ballot system; (b) the electoral district was reduced from the Muhafaza to the administrative sub-unit of the Caza; and (c) suffrage was extended to women. The first two reforms were especially designed to break the hold of political boss­ es over their constituencies and over the large Muhafazas. After independence the Parliament grew from 55 members in 1943 to 99 in 1960, although it dipped to 44 in 1953. (The 6/5 ratio always required a multiple of 11) The last elections were held in 1972. Elections were generally free and fair, although only candidates with ample financial resources or strong political backing stood a chance of success. Within Parliament, Deputies clustered into blocs, or kutal, around a handful of rival political Za 'ims. Parliament played an important role during this period in representing varied interests, mediating con­ flicts, legitimating governments, and building consensus. It also served as a plat­ form to vent social concerns and demands and to express criticisms against the government. During the war, the Parliament lost much of its autonomy and security as Deputies -- without the protection of the state -- fell prey to militia and foreign pressure. Moreover, as elections under conditions of civil war were deemed im­ possible, Parliament extended its own mandate year after year. Over time, the representative authority and legitimacy of Parliament declined drastically. Despite the polarization that took place during the war, however, the Chamber of Depu­ ties, unlike the Army or the Council of Ministers, never split in two. It continue

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state can ensure free and fair elections. Moreover, the voter registration lists are ~j_ldly out of date and r;9.uire virtually total redrawing. This falls within the re­ sponsibilities of the Mimstry of the Interior which has promised to begin work on the lists. Little work has begun, and even if it does begin, unless modern tech:. ~gues and technologies are used, the process could take over one year. In the current political situation, the Parliament is playing an active legisla­ tive and monitoring role. It passed the host of constitutional reforms agreed upon in Taif and has been busily grafting and amending statutory laws to bring them in line with the new Constitution and to catch up with fundamental changes and transformations brought about by the war. Under the leadership of the Speaker of ?_~liameot, the Chamber has also been active in questioning the policies of the S _o_uncil of Ministers, calling Ministers to Parliamentary hearings, and venting public discontent and gnevances. However, the Parliament has major weaknesses. Most importantly, it has no access to organized information and expertise in such a way that its efforts in leg­ islation and monitoring are informed by objective data and expert analysis. Depu­ ties are forced to act on an imprecise ad hoc basis, relying on their own slim knowledge, or on information and views culled from the media and/or acquain­ tances. All those we interviewed stressed the need for a working library and database within the institution of Parliament containing comprehensive information and do­ cumentation on legislative affairs and the financial affairs of the state. Intervie­ wees also stressed the need for a network of in-house or contracted experts to give informed advice to Deputies and Parliamentary committees on basic legislative, budgetary, socio-economic, and administrative matters. The examination and pass­ ing of the government's annual budget is the single most important act undertaken by Parliament; yet the Committee of Money and Budget has no fiscal database, computerized or otherwise, and no qualified experts to inform its debate and amendment of government budgets. The debate remains at a shallow procedural level, and changes that are suggested are made for coincidental political or per­ sonal reasons rather than for sound economic reasons. In a situation where the 1 government budget deficit is well over 70% and the national debt is over $4 bil- ) lion -- both of which threaten the macro-stability of the economy and the polity -­ urgent attention to the informational and analytical needs of Parliament is a neces­ sity. A Directorate for Research and Documentation within the Office of Speaker of Parliament does exist on paper; Speaker Husayn al-Husayni has recently been making efforts to turn it into a reality. So far, he has provided it with office space on the top floor of the Parliament building and selected some of its staff. He needs help, however, in acquiring the pro.£_er computer and modem information storage _equipment ~or this Directorate and the proper training for its staff to operate it. It is important to note that the School of Law at the Lebanese_ University has been pursuing a computer documentanon program in cooperation with France in which all laws and relevant jurisprudence is being put into a computerized, easily

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retrievable, database. Inputting to that system is expected to be completed within 6 months. It is of great importance that, as a first step, Parliament be able to hook up to that system and draw on its information. As a first step, Speaker Husayni and key" members of his staff might be invit­ ed on a working visit to the U.S. Congress. This would provide them with a first­ hand impression of modem methods of legislative staffing and computerization and would provide important momentum for modernizing Parliament, both in its information management techniques and in its general mode of operation.

2. Municipalities Municipalities are the second official form of democratic representation in the Lebanese political system. Over 60<:r municipalities exist in the .JQwns and vil- l!ges of the country. They consist of a Municipal Council elected by the residents of the town or village; the Council then elects its President, Vice President, Secre­ tary, etc. According to the law, municipal elections are to be held every six years. The last elections were held as far back as 1963, Elections scheduled for the Sum­ mer of 1967 were cancelled because of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Other complications encouraged the repeated postponement of municipal elections in lat­ er years. Indeed, the problems surrounding municipal elections in the late 1960s and early 1970s presaged the more general political crisis that would engulf the country in the mid-1970s. Municipalities receive local_revenue from taxes on shops, houses, construc­ tion work, and real estate transactions; they also receive money through the cen­ tral authorities from profits made by the state-run Casino Du Liban and the Leba­ nese State Lottery. As municipalities ran into debt during the war and profits from the Casino and Lottery declined, municipalities were granted increasingly larger cash advances out of the government budget. This has imposed an addition­ al strain on the state's budget. The Municipalities' responsibilities include garbage collection, traffic organi­ zation, upkeep of local roads, urban planning, and zoning. Larger municipalities also have small police detachments. In administrative terms, the municipalities have little real autonomy. Although they generally run their own affairs, they are subordinate in all matters to an administrative hierarchy which begins with the Governor of the Caza (the Qaimmaqam) and proceeds upwards through the Gov­ ernor of the Muhafazas (the Muhafiz), the Directorate of Municipal and Village Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior, and finally the Minister of the Interior. The Municipality has no authority to hire, fire, or tax as it wishes, but must fol­ low the guidelines and directives of the Ministry of Interior. Furthermore, the Minister of the Interior can order the dissolution of a Munici ality for a lar e num r o reasons me u g alleged mismanagement, non-performance o uties, internal d1v1s1on, or "threatening public order") in which case the Qaimmaqam automatically becomes the municipal authority. As a result of this excessive cen­ tral power, most Municipal Councils have grown weak, atrophied, and reluctant to take initiative. They have failed to function as autonomous locii of decentral-

50 .. .. t

ized administrative activity and authority. The pattern of municipal elections generally differed from that of parliamen­ tary elections in that municipal elections usually encouraged the formation of one broad coalition of candidates running together for election. This was to avoid splits within villages and usually reflected solidarity and cooperation between the leading families of the village or town community. Parliamentary elections were more bitterly contested and usually involved heated competition between two, or more, opposing electoral lists. During the war, the number of municipalities increased as outlying towns and villages that had not yet set up municipalities felt the need for self-organization ({ and self-reliance. However, the central controls on municipalities continued to hamper their autonomous growth and operation. Moreover, the central authorities -- i.e. the Ministry of Interior -- have not undertaken any substantial planning or _c:_oo_:r_:din~ifng activities to iil~~st murifcipalities. Unable to improvise new taxes and new modes of operation to deal with changing monetary and socio-economic con­ ditions, most municipalities simply fell into arrears and approached de facto bank­ ruptcy. Cu_rrentl_y, most municipalities are either non-operational or weakly propped up by advances from ilie central govern~ent. ---- Most interviewees agreed on the need to revive the role of municipalities as one of the important means for encouraging broad-based development -- especial­ ly in outlying regions -- and for increasing the level of political participation in government as an important means to spread consensus, legitimacy, and political stability. Changes in the laws and administrative hierarchies g~verning municipal­ ities would have to be attended to first, as the municipalities have too ff ttle room for maneuverancf development arid aresubject to the unpredictable and virtually unlimited interventionist authority of a long hierarchy of central government su­ periors. Suggestions were made that Western experts on decentralization and local _g~vernment affairs could be solicited to provide advice to Lebanese government planners, officials, and legislators on the reform and restructuring of the Leba­ nese municipal system. Another suggestion was the encouragement of establishing "sister-city" rela­ tionships between Lebanese villages or towns and others in the West. This has al­ ready been done with several towns in France. This establishes a long-term link, encourages the exchange of visits and advice, and usually leads to a modest aid ef­ fort from the Western to the Lebanese town. As in many other areas, interviewees stressed the importance of modernizing municipal info~~tion storag~~d management equipment through computeriza­ .tion. This is -especially important for the larger municipalities that have several thousand employees but still manage their affairs and records in an archaic and ad hoc manner. ·- ·-

3. Political Parties Lebanon has been an open multi-party system since independence. Even dur­ ing the French Mandate period, political parties were allowed and in some cases

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encouraged. From the late 1930's onward, parties played an imponant political role in mobilizing the population, pressuring government, and bringing politicians to power. The model and momentum for establishing modern political parties came, as did many other things, from the West. A number of political groupings and un­ ions had been established in the late Ottoman period among Lebanese and other Arab intellectuals, politicians, and government officials, but it was only after WWI that attempts at building mass-based parties were made. The first to try were a motley collection of Armenian, Jewish, and Lebanese communists who set about to organize labor and peasant unions and to establish an official Lebanese Communist Party in 1924. The attempt was small-scale; it failed when Soviet sup­ port faded and French opposition to it mounted. The next attempt was made by Antoun Saadeh in the early 1930s. Saadeh was a Greek Orthodox Lebanese immigrant who had grown up in Egypt and Brazil and had been impressed by the Fascism that was beginning to sweep Europe and Latin America. He returned to Lebanon and established the Syrian Nationalist Pany (later the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, SSNP). The SSNP called for the unity of Greater Syria (present-day Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, and even Cyprus), the establishment of a centralized and militant state, the abolishment of confessionalism, and the embarkation on a path of state-led development. The SSNP was openly fascist in its methods and symbols and adopted a modified swas­ tika as its emblem. The SSNP made great and rapid inroads among intellectuals and youth. In a chain reaction, the success of the SSNP triggered the establishment of the Kata'ib Party by Pierre Gemayel in 1936. Gemayel was a Maronite pharmacist who had visited tht! 1936 Berlin Olympics and was impressed by the organization of Nazi Germany and particularly by the effectiveness of Hitler's youth move­ ments. Alarmed by the success of Saadeh's SSNP which called for Syrian unity and rejected Lebanese independence, Gemayel established the Lebanese Kata'ib (or Phalanges) as a political youth movement (later a full-fledged political party) committed to the promotion of Lebanese nationalism. Concerned about the rapid political organization among the Christians, a Sunni group formed the Najjadah Party which played an imponant role in the last days of the Mandate and the early years of Independence. This was followed in 1947 by the establishment by the Druze leader Kamal Junblat of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). The rival Maronite leaders, Bishara al-Khoury and Emile Eddeh, also established their own political groupings: the Constitutional Bloc and the National Bloc, respectively -­ although not in the form of full-fledged modem political parties. These early beginnings opened the way for a multiplication of political par­ ties in the 1950s and 1960s. The pace of political party organization in Lebanon increased as other Arab states succumbed to coups d'etat, and new repressive gov­ ernments drove Arab political panics underground or into exile. Many of these party leaders sought refuge in the last remaining open political system -- that of Lebanon. Similarly, panics that seized power in Arab states -- the Ba'th Pany, for example -- opened branch offices in Lebanon, and even these parties grew local

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roots. By the early 1970s there were a surfeit of political parties in Lebanon. On the right there were a number of mainly Christian Maronite parties including the Kata'ib Party, the National Liberal Party of Camille Chamoun, the National Bloc of Raymond Eddeh, and the Guardians of the Cedars (an ultra-nationalist group). On the left were Kamal Junblat's Progressive Socialist Party, Imam Musa al­ Sadr's predominantly Shi'ite Movement of the Deprived (harakat al-mahrumin), the Communist Party, rival branches of the Socialist Ba'th Pany, the Organization of Communist Action, and the Nasirist Murabitoun Pany. In addition, .there was the ultra-secularist SSNP and a number of Muslim religious groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The Palestinians had their own parties which were outgrowths of their armed guerrilla groups, such as Y asir Arafat's Fateh, George Habash's Popular Fr

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tory, defend it, and ensure an income through revenue sources usually reserved for the state. This affected the membership of the militia. Whereas most members of the prewar political panics were ideologically motivated, the membership of the wartime militia became increasingly non-ideological and interest-based. Young men joined to make a steady income, or to wield status and authority. or to benefit from occasional looting and corruption. Moreover, as militiamen arrogated more and more power to themselves, the style of politics within the party and within each confessional group became in­ creasingly militaristic and coercive. Dialogue within the party was replaced by in­ fighting which often erupted into street battles, and within each community or al­ liance group, differences were quickly translated into turf battles. The Christian militia had bloody confrontations among each other between 1978 and 1980. The Shi'ite Amal and Hizballah militia held ongoing battles between 1989 and 1991. Among._ihe initially allied PSP, Amal, and Murabitoun, militia battles erupted in 1985 and again in 1987. As the state collapsed, the parties grew to replace it; however, unlike the state, they were not established according to a constitution nor were they subject to any democratic or electoral constraints at any time. They developed as de facto powers, exploiting popularity where they found it, and imposing their will by force when that popularity was lacking. Thus, although in the early years of the war many of the parties and their militia were on good terms with their consti­ tuencies, over the years, the relationship between the parties and militia on one hand and the public on the other, soured. The relationship became increasingly one of coercion and naked use of force. From being representatives of the people, many of the parties and their militia came to be perceived as coercive and exPloi- -~~_ve ruling groups. · · In addition, when the state collapsed, the political arena -- and especially am­ bitious small militia -- became increasingly open to foreign influence. Militias rushed to secure foreign support which could be received in political, financial, or military forms. This encouraged already interested regional powers to intervene. The Palestinians had already been present in Lebanon before the war, but by the mid-1980s Lebanon had accumulated a heavy Syrian. Iranian, and Israeli military presence as well. In 1991, in accordance with the Taif Agreemen~ the government announced the dissolution of all militia. Most of the militia complied ( except Hizballah and · the Palestinian militia), and the government proceeded to gather the militia's heavy weapons and integrate some of their members into the state's security forc­ es. The militia still have their light weapons as well as some caches of heavy weapons stowed away in undisclosed locations. Their leaders also have access to vast financial and economic resources through foreign bank accounts and front companies established in virtually all .sectors of the economy. By developing into militia, the political parties lost much of their democratic representative authority. Also, because of their frequent abuse of power during the war, a large gulf developed between the militia and the public. Although the

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militia leaders today represent powerful -- and hence important -- political and economic interests, on the whole they do not represent the will of large ponions of the public. Without Parliamentary and municipal elections, and with the transformation of political panics into militia, the public finds few institutional avenues for its representation. This has built up dangerous layers of alienation, frustration, and tension. The dangerous results of these frustrations and tensions were apparent, for example, in the explosion of support among the Christian population for Gen­ eral Michel Aoun which was translated into a destructive force against Parliamen­ tary Deputies, militia leaders, and the ruling elite as a whole. Among the institu­ tions that freely -- although feebly -- still represent public views and will are private voluntary organizations and associations.

4. PVOs, NGOs, Syndicates, and Other Associations There is a large network of voluntary associations in Lebanon ranging from the s~all village-bas~oodwill grou_I> to large_-~~on~~ humanitaria!} __ ~ -c!_!_~lief organizations. Their interests range from development, to health, education, cul­ ture, religion, sports, and humanitarian aid. In addition, there are a number of foreign NGOs such as Save the Children Federation (U.S.), Save the Children Federation (U.K.), Oxfam, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Caritas, Catholic Relief Services, YMCA, YWCA, and others. The number of associations has increased dramatically during the war. Pan of the reason for this was that the need for cooperation and mutual aid increased; part of it, however, is that as for­ eign relief aid began to enter the country, there was a need for population groups to form legally-recognized associations to receive that aid. In addition, with the militarization of the political sphere and the monopolization of politics by the mi­ litia, those young adults who felt a desire to involve themselves in social life but opposed the use of violence found natural outlets for their desire to to get in­ volved in socially- or culturally-oriented associations. The humanitarian PVOs played an imponant role during the war in provid­ ing emergency first aid, distributing food and clothing, and helping to provide shelter. They also helped in public health efforts and medical care. Groups for the handicapped played -- and continue to play -- an important role in promoting the rights of the main victims of the war, the handicapped, and finding housing and employment for them. Among the cultural organizations, some -- like the Cultural Movement, served to maintain a moderate dialogue among intellectuals and opin­ ion-makers throughout the war years. A number of private think tanks and re­ search centers also emerged to analyze the causes and effects of the war and sug­ gest means for the establishment of ·peace and the .promotion of development There are a number of women's groups in the country as well as three main hu­ man rights groups that speak out against offenses and maintain relations with Am­ nesty International, World Watch, and other international human rights organiza­ tions. These associations and advocacy groups grew especially strong after 1985

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when the national currency collapsed and the public found itself in a desperate so­ cio-economic situation. The economic crisis coincided with a period in the history of the war when the militia had already lost much of their legitimacy in public eyes, and hence people were beginning to look for other institutions and associa­ tions to represent them. A sign of their appeal was given in October 1987, when a number of these groups held a peaceful demonstration against the war in Beirut. Approximately 100,000 people participated in the event. It was the largest demon­ stration of public protest since the beginning of the war. To be sure, however, most of these groups and associations are small and in­ formally organized. Many of their members work on an ad hoc, part-time basis. Communications and relations among the groups are undeveloped, and the re­ sources open to them to mobilize support and undertake projects is extremely lim­ ited. Yet these associations bring together some of the best-qualified and well in­ tentioned citizens in the country; therefore, assistance to them would be assistance to a social sector that is already preselected and that has already proven its moral and social worth. The history of syndicates, dates back to the post-WWI period when commu­ nist activists began organizing 'tobacco and factory laborers. The unionizing movement spread quickly throughout the country's various economic sectors; af­ ter the initial examples, most of the unions sprung up indigenously without any communist influence. Unions were especially active in the last years of the Man­ date period in agitating for independence. After independence, the unions focused on the task of bringing about fair labor legislation which was achieved in 1946. The General Confederation of Labor (GCL) was established in 1946 as a compre­ hensive syndical body, but political differences and interventions kept the new Confederation from consolidating and unifying power. Indeed, the labor union leadership remained split at the top -- largely by virtue of clever government ma­ neuvering -- until the early 1970s when all syndicates declared their membership in the GCL. The GCL, and labor unions in general, played an important role in the early 1970s in articulating public grievances and pressuring the government. Strikes were frequent and effective. After the war broke out, however, political-parties­ cum-militia monopolized the political sphere and hijacked the strike as a means of protest. During the war, militia took the lead in calling strikes and organizing protests. Typically, strikes would take place in one region and not another. In oth­ er words, strikes and protests lost their class and economic referents and became - - like the war -- confessionally based. In addition, militia gained increasing pow­ ers within syndicates and unions and interfered in internal elections and the for­ mation of syndical policy. However, throughout the war, the majority of unions, and the GCL itself, re­ sisted centripetal forces and maintained their institutional and organizational uni­ ty. Like Parliament, although they suffered a fair amount of immobility, syndi­ cates and unions succeeded in preserving horizontal links within the war-tom society and thus preserving an important aspect of national unity.

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Like other popular associations, the syndicates and unions grew suddenly more active in the wake of the monetary collapse of1985. The collapse hit wage­ earners first and f orcmost, and syndicates - led by the GCL -- moved into action to secure higher pay. After a number of strikes, a pattern of trilateral negotiations was established between labor, management, and the government to avoid fmther / strikes and peg wages to inflation and currency devaluation. Nevertheless, wages / plummeted throughout die second half of the 1980s. The minimum wage dropped I\ ft:.om $243 in 1982, to a low of $19 in 1987, to climb back up to $83 in 1991~ I During the period of two governments, 1988-90, syndicates grew less active as the source of government authority was not clear. In 1991, although union de­ mands have been on the increase, the government has been taking a tougher stance toward syndicates and strike action .

•

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D. The Judicial System

1. Structure The Lebanese judicial system -- like the political and economic systems -- is thoroughly liberal. It is based on the French model and respects virtually all Western standards of equality before the law, protection of liberties, the right to a fair trial, the right to counsel, etc. The judicial system is fairly autonomous from outside pressures and judges enjoy a relatively high degree of skill and probity. The main problems within the system are the congestion of couns and consequent delays in process, and the paucity of technical and documentary resources availa­ ble to key courts and judges. The modernization of the legal system in Lebanon dates back to the 19th cen­ tury when the Ottoman State adopted French modes of judicial and legal organiza­ tion. This included the establishment of a code of civil procedure, a criminal code, a code of commerce, and a maritime code. In 1913, the French University of St. Joseph in Beirut established a School of Law in association with the University of Lyon. The School was the only one in the country until the 1950s and graduated the first generations of Lebanese lawyers, judges, and jurists. It still dominates the legal and judicial professions. During the mandate period, the French oversaw the establishment of a judicial system in the country and administered tribunals in cooperation with their Lebanese counterparts. Both the Constitution of 1926 and laws enacted before independence were largely written by French jurists. In the years after independence, the Lebanese University, the Arab University, and the Universite de la Sagesse all opened schools of law. The country's strongest univer­ sity, the American University of Beirut, did not. The law in Lebanon is divided into two branches: Public law and private law. Public law encompasses constitutional law and issues relating to the government administration; private law is compartmentalized into civil, criminal, commercial, labor, maritime, and aviation law. Within public law, the main tribunal is the Council of State which rules in matters of transgression within the public institu­ tions or in cases between a private body and the state. Until the Taif Agreement, there was no constitutional review process. In Taif, the Deputies stipulated the es­ tablishment of a Constitutional Council with authority to review statutory laws and reject them if they contradict the constitution. The bill for the establishment of that Council is presently being considered for enactment in Parliament. The ju­ dicial branch also had no mechanism within public law to try Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Ministers. After Taif, a Supreme Council has been established with just such a function. Cases are submitted to the Supreme Council after Parliament, by a two-thirds majority vote, formally charges an official. With the Constitution­ al and Supreme Councils, the judicial branch will begin to play an important su­ pervisory role over the legislative and executive operations of parliament and the executive branch, respectively. The private law court system is of three tiers. At the lowest tier are a pletho­ ra of trial courts covering virtually all regions of the country. Above them are

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courts of appeal based in the six administrative Muhafazas. Overarching all is a Higher Court (Cour de Cassation), or court of highest appeal, based in Beirut Unlike in the U.S. and contemporary France, Lebanon does not employ the jury system in criminal matters; trials are held before a tribunal consisting of three judges. Cases can be brought to court by private parties or by the public prosecutor. Public prosecution offices are based in each Muhafaza. The procedure for public prosecution is precise, and is practised with due respect for the rights of the citizen to privacy and to protection against unlawful search and seizure. The prosecutor, with the aid of the police, may hold a suspect in administrative detention for 24 hours only. Within that time, the suspect must be granted a hear­ ing by an investigating magistrate and has the right to have his attorney present (although the attorney may not interfere in the hearing except over procedural matters). If within the deadline he is not interrogated, he must be released. If he is indicted, the accused has a right to a public trial with the aid of an attorney; if he cannot afford an attorney, he has the right to ask the court to appoint one for him. The accused must be informed of the charge against him and must have the oppor­ tunity to confront his accuser and bring witnesses before the court. The sources of the law include, in order of priority: the constitution, statuto­ ry laws passed by Parliament, decrees issued by the executive branch, judicial precedents, and legal treatises by eminent jurists. The bulk of the law is French in virtually all aspects. As most legal systems in North Africa and the Arab East are French in origin, Lebanese jurists also benefit from interaction with their coun­ terparts in other Arab countries. Legal education begins in the four-year law programs of the law universities. Some of the graduates pursue higher law degrees in France or elsewhere. To be­ come practicing attorneys, graduates must apply to one of the two recognized bar associations, serve a three-year apprenticeship at a law office, and attend a certain number of trials. There are no bar examinations, but applicants must fulfill the above-mentioned requirements. There are currently about 3,000 registered attor­ neys in Lebanon. Graduates who aim to become judges apply to the Institute of Judicial Studies at the Ministry of Justice. After sitting for a rigorous screening exam, applicants undergo a three-year course involving theoretical and practical work. They also graduate subject to a final examination. Successful graduates are then given court appointments by the Higher Judicial Council, a body made up of leading judges and heads of key tribunals. Indeed, the Council plays the leading role in administration of the court sys­ tem, as it has the sole authority to appoint, transfer, dismiss, or question the per­ formance of judges. It has traditionally been a well-staffed and respected body. Its members are appointed from within the judicial branch by the Council of Mini­ sters in consultation with the Minister of Justice. There are approximately 400 practicing judges in Lebanon. The Institute for Judicial Studies, established in the early 1960s, also trains Notary Publics. The Institute has a good reputation and at­ tracts applicants from as far away as Morocco.

59 Alongside the legal system of the state are a small but important number of religious laws and courts. These are recognized by the state and have authority in matters related to personal status (marriage, divorce, adoption, etc.) and inheri­ tance. They are governed by the religious authorities of their respective confes­ sional communities. The presence of these couns introduces a significant confes­ sional element into the Lebanese legal system. Most importantly, it maintains obstacles in the path of intermarriage across confessional lines. A revealing anach­ ronism is that Lebanon, despite the general modernity of its legal system, does not, for example, have provisions for civil marriage.

2. Problems and Recommendations According to our research and interviews, the main problems that affect the judicial system are the following: (a) Court congestion. Because of the backlog of cases after 15 years of war, because of the propensity of Lebanese to litigate, and because of the inadequate number of courts and judges, the Lebanese court system today is congested. Most criminal cases are given priority and rushed through within one or two months; but civil cases -- especially real estate cases -- might take from 5 to 10 years to complete. "Justice delayed is justice denied," and indeed, the long delays often force unsatisfactory out-of-court settlements on litigants. The number of cases might level off or decline slightly in the near future, because legal fees are contin­ uing to climb while the average income of the public has dropped over the past five years. Nevertheless, the proposed solution for the important -- often crip­ pling -- problem of court congestion is the provision of more courts per district and the production of more judges. (b) Low wages. Judges have experienced a drastic decline in wages over the past seven years. Top judges today, after the monetary collapse of 1985-86, arc making no more than $400-$500/month. This is often not enough to support a family, and many judges are forced to look for other part-time work. This is to say nothing of the decline in morale and the _temptation of conuption that accom­ panies such a decline in income. (c) Corruption. The problem of corruption exists and has gotten worse in re­ cent years; however, it is still limited to a minority of judges and has not at all become the norm as in some other branches of the state. Judges still enjoy consid­ erable esprit de corps and morale remains reasonably high. Conuption is best fought by raising wages, dismissing corrupt judges, and maintaining stricter re­ views by the Higher Judicial Council over judges in this area. ( d) Coercion. As is normal in situations of anarchy and civil war, judges, like other citizens, have become subject to militia and other groups. Hence, in many cases involving powerful and armed leaders or individuals, the judge is simply too afraid to act. Normally, he tries to postpone the case indefinitely to avoid a ver­ dict; in a very few cases, however, he is obliged to give a verdict in favor of the armed party, even if that verdict is not correct. (e) Modernization of Information and Management. Judges in their daily op-

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erations suffer first and foremost from an absence of adequate reference material for their work and adequate means to look up legislation and precedents and expe­ dite their work. Judges used to rely on their own income to purchase works of law and jurisprudence; however, after the drop in wages, this is no longer possi­ ble. In addition, several of the libraries in the main district courts have been de­ stroyed, damaged, or looted, or have grown outdated and in urgent need of updat­ ing. Judges today find themselves in increasingly desperate need of up-to-date reference material.· This is especially true in courts in outlying regions, where lo­ cal judges have no recourse to reference material for miles around. Aid could be provided in the form of a small budget to restock old libraries and stock new ones. Even donations of some relevant English-language law books would be useful to enrich the exclusively French and Arabic collections in present libraries. Moreover, since the introduction of computers into the judicial profes­ sion around the world, Lebanon has remained lagging far behind. The Ministry of Justice had started a project to input laws and key works of jurisprudence into a central computer. The project was commenced in the mid-1980s in cooperation with the Lebanese University. However, the computers and documents at the Min­ istry of Justice project location were destroyed in the battles of 1990. The work at the Lebanese University was not damaged; however, its counterpart at the Mini­ stry needs to be recreated. (f) Training. Suppon for training programs, especially in the Institute for Ju­ dicial Studies, is of crucial importance to maintain and improve the quality of newly graduating judges. A number of judges we interviewed stressed their inter­ est in seeing more English-language training at the Institute, and more access to American law books and case histories. Especially in commercial law, they recog­ nize the predominance of the English language and American business practices. They feel a need to develop a proficiency in English and a working knowledge of some aspects of Common Law and American Judicial practice. This could be achieved by in-country language training and by orientation visits from key judg­ es to the U.S. Other interviewees stressed the imponance of increasing awareness among judges of human rights legislation of all kinds. Again, this is an area in which Lebanese jurists can learn a considerable amount from their Western coun­ terparts. The same can also be said for modern environmental law.

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E. The Media

A free press and audio-visual media sector serves as a Fourth Estate in any democratic system. The functions of the media are to transmit information to the public; explain and analyze issues; monitor and censure government when neces­ sary; and suggest policies and solutions when possible. Without active and intelli­ gent media, the public would not have the requisite information and understanding to participate effectively in the democratic process. In Lebanon, the media have played a strong and important role in building public awareness and formulating issues; however, in the war they have experienced a deterioration in resources and freedoms that have left them in a fragmented and dilapidated state.

1. The Print Media a-History The Lebanese press has been essentially political in orientation since its early beginnings. It emerged in the 19th Century among predominantly Christian Mar­ onite writers with close links to the French mission schools. The early news jour­ nals, like al-Bashir and Lisan ul-Hal were heavily imbued with French slogans de­ rived from the French Revolution. They championed liberal values and called for independence from Turkish rule. A clampdown on this burgeoning journalistic activity by the Turks drove Lebanese writers to Egypt and the Americas. In Egypt, these Lebanese played a central role in establishing Egyptian journalism (al-Ahram, for example, was founded by Lebanese); in the Americas they esta­ blished newspapers for the expatriate community. In the Mandate; period, as press liberties were guaranteed in the Constitution, a number of newspapers were founded, most notably, al-Nahar in the 1920s. It was followed by al-Sayyad, al-'Zaman, Sada Lubnan, al-Diyar, al-Jumhuriyyah, and others. Virtually all were political in focus and eventually joined the political campaign to gain independence from the French. A small number of newspapers, like al-Dabbur, focused on social issues or government scandals. Until the late 1940s, Egypt led the Arab world in press activity, and Lebanon also faced able competition from Damascus and Baghdad. In the 1950s, however, as authoritarian governments took over in these and other Arab countries, Lebanon became the only free press haven. Many journalists, newspapers, and magazines moved to Lebanon, and the Lebanese press became the leading press in the Arab world. Both governments and their oppositions used press outlets in Lebanon to get their views across. The Arabization of the Lebanese press only confirmed its political orientation. Nevertheless, this growth in the press allowed for some branching out into specialized areas. In the 1950s and 1960s specialized magazines in business, bank­ ing, sports, arts, entertainment, and women's interests were founded. In addition, a number of scholarly journals took root analyzing Arab social, political, and eco­ nomic affairs.

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The war had a debilitating effect on the Lebanese press. The destruction of materials, the obstructions to travel and communications, the rising costs and risks of operation, the collapse of the security that backed press freedoms, and the pres­ sure from militia all hit newspapers hard. In addition, the Lebanese public's de­ mand for newspapers declined with its purchasing power, while Arab readers were not particularly interested in detai1ed dai1y bul1etins about the Lebanese se­ curity situation with which the Lebanese papers had become full. Moreover, many of the Arab countries, especially in the Gulf which had become an important mar­ ket, had begun to develop their own press and were discouraging the import of outside newspapers. Many dailies closed down in the first year of the war; others that survived cut down the size of their staff and their papers, focused on local se­ curity news, and relied increasingly on commercial news agencies (e.g. Reuters, AFP) for their regional and international news. A large number of weeklies also closed, while others moved to Cyprus, Paris, or London. In addition, the print media faced rising competition during the war from television and radio broad­ casting which grew dramatically during the war (see next section). Nevertheless, during the war, Lebanon remained a useful platform for Arab governments and movements, and the PLO, which had grown into a ministate in Lebanon, poured its own resources into Lebanese press organs. Moreover, the burgeoning militia started their own weeklies and bought -- or extorted -- room for themselves in the daily press. Thus, on a small Lebanese market and lingering Arab interest, the Lebanese press rode out the war, although in a reduced and rather traumatized state. A number of prominent journalists were assassinated (e.g. Salim al-Lawzi, Riad Taha), while others learned quickly to practice self­ censorship. 1breats from militia or foreign intelligence agencies became common place, and the once outspoken Lebanese press learned to weigh its words very carefully. Today there are approximately 12 dailies based in the country and about 120 weeklies and monthlies. The press draw their new recruits from a number of university institutions. The Lebanese University has a School of Information and Documentation, Beirut University College has a program in Communication Arts, the University of Saint Joseph has a Film program, Notre Dame University of Luwayzeh has a small Mass Communications program, and the ALBA (Academic Libanaise des Beaux Arts) has a program in Audio-Visual Sciences. The AUB runs a small communi­ cations program. The largest program and the one with most relevance to the Lebanese Arabic-language press is that of the Lebanese University. Unfortunately, however, among the sociologists, political scientists, economists, and others that teach there, there are no professors of journalism.

b- Problems Like many other commercial concerns after the war, the Lebanese press suf­ fers from the economic constraints of material and human losses, rising costs, small or fragmented markets, poor communications, tight credit, etc. In addition,

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they suffer from the occupational hazard of having Jo produce news stories within narrow political red lines. Without protection from the state, they arc subject to a multitude of threats and pressures. Among the individuals we interviewed, a num­ ber of problems were identified. (a) Orientation. The Lebanese press' traditional political orientation was rein­ forced during the war. While in the 1950s and 1960s some newspapers and maga­ zines had begun to take up social issues and act as an engine for focusing attention on developmental issues outside of the political mainstream, with the advent of the war these orientations were dropped in favor of pure political reporting. In addi­ tion, the press' political reporting has almost never gone beyond the shallow ap­ proach of reporting the activities of politicians. Rarely do papers go beyond the daily news to investigate hidden causes and effects. Thus they serve to inform, but rarely to explain, criticize, or suggest. This shallowness has grown into the tradi­ tion of current Lebanese journalism. Part of the reason for this shallowness is fear about probing deeper, part of it is the absence of a tradition of investigative re­ poning; and part of it is the quantitative predominance of reporters over analysts in the press. (b) Staffing. The problem of staffing is not unrelated to the problem men­ tioned above. The war brought about the departure or death of many top journal­ ists. Others left because of declining pay . .Moreover, academic and professional standards declined during the war, and new recruits to the press generally proved inferior to their predecessors. The university system does not produce an adequate number of capable journalists. The Lebanese University program is large but un­ focused, while the programs of other universities either focus on mass communi­ cations and audio-visual techniques which are most important in the field of ad­ vertising, or do not have strong enough Arabic language training. (c) Financing. Rising costs and declining sales and advertising revenues have squeezed all press institutions. This has caused a general decline in equipment and staffing. More importantly, it has increased the reliance of publishers and field re­ porters on outside sources of income. Publishers now regularly solicit from pri­ vate or government sources; this obviously complicates the political agenda of the publication. At the same time, many reporters now feel driven to supplement their meager salaries from other sources; in the majority of cases, the reporter ends up receiving income both from his employer and from the subject he is sent out to cover. In other words, it is not uncommon, for example, for the reporter to a particular ministry to be paid regularly by the Minister in question. The arrange­ ment works both ways: the reporter gets news and income, and the Minister can disseminate the news he chooses at a low cost However, the journalistic process is almost completely violated. The main audience is no longer the public but the rul­ ing elite; the objective of publishers and reporters is no longer to satisfy public in­ terests and demands, but rather to please the elite that is paying. The reporter who is to fulfil the role of a member of the Fourth Estate, monitoring and investigat­ ing the governmen~ develops almost into an undeclared government spokesman. This is one of the main structural defects of the current press system. (d) Freedoms. One of the reasons the press has grown increasingly dependent

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on elite sources of income is that the freedom to speak out boldly on issues that would galvanize public interest and hence increase sales has been largely lost. On paper, the Lebanese press enjoys a wide range of legal liberties and protections; in fact, however, the press is menaced by domestic and foreign armed groups with­ out the adequate protection of the state. Government officials themselves have re­ cently lashed out at press freedoms when they felt that their political reputations or interests were being challenged. The persistence of this situation for 16 years has tamed, or domesticated, the press to the point where reporting and editorializ­ ing is unpalatably bland and predictable. An improvement in the protection of basic press freedoms would encourage the press to rediscover its "public voice" and reestablish wider markets and broader rappon with the general population.

c- Recommendations Any assistance to the press sector should focus on improving training and en- . couraging feature or investigative reporting. As discussed above, journalistic edu­ cation is almost non-existent in Lebanon. The logical place to breathe life into it is within the Lebanese University's School of !~formation and Documentation. As­ sistance could include the setting up of a reorientation program for professors and support for purchasing books and other materials for the journalism program. A more long-term approach would be to sponsor promising Lebanese University graduate students to pursue journalism degrees in the United States on condition that they return as journalism professors to the Lebanese University. The other wing of an assistance program should focus on ways to encourage in-depth reporting. There is no tradition of investigative or feature reporting in Lebanon. This should include focused and comprehensive reports on social, hu­ manitarian, economic, political, environmental, criminal, health and related is­ sues. In this type of reporting, the press would act more as a think tank than as a simple news agency. An emphasis on this type of reporting should definitely be part of any university program. In addition, however, a mid-career training pro­ gram could be set up for promising or proven journalists. This could include an annual award program, along the lines of the Pulitzer Prize and such, to recognize achievement in this area. Coordination should also be encouraged between press institutions and related institutions within society like universities and think tanks. The press and the pub­ lic it reaches can benefit from the information, expertise, and viewpoints devel­ oped in these related institutions. A program could be developed to encourage in­ terchange between these two sectors.

2. The Audio-Visual Media a-History Lebanon acquired its first radio station, Radio de !'Orient, in 1937. It was es­ tablished by the French principally to counter German propaganda. The station broadcast in French and Arabic and employed members of the Lebanese Franco-

65 •'

phone intelligentsia. With independence, the station was rechristened Radio Leba­ non and the news department was taken over by the state. Support from the Leba­ nese expatriate community allowed the transmission of short wave broadcasts to the Americas. Radio Lebanon enjoyed a legal monopoly on all short wave, medi­ um wave (AM), and frequency modulation (FM) broadcasting. In the crisis aunos­ phere of 1958, the Kata'ib Party tried to violate this government monopoly by starting AM broadcasts from what they called the Voice of Lebanon station (Sawt Lubnan). The Shihab government forced them to close down. In the early 1970s, the leader of the leftist opposition, Kamal Junblat, complained that the voice of the opposition was not being heard and threatened to open his own radio station. In 1973, another government critic, Farid Salman, initiated broadcasts to Lebanon from Cyprus, but the state jammed the broadcasts and forced him out of business. The war completely shattered the government's monopoly. To begin with, the Ministry of Information's news department split along confessional lines, with one group taking over the station headquarters in West Beirut and the other taking up shop in one of the main relay stations in Amshit north of the Christian town of Ju­ bayl. In 1976, The Kata'ib Party successfully relaunched the Voice of Lebanon. This started a chain reaction. Within a few years most of the militia (Murabitoun, PSP, Lebanese Forces, Marada, South Lebanon Army, Fateh, Amal, Hizballah, Communist Party, etc.) had established their own radio stations on AM and FM frequencies. In the FM band, tens of commercial music stations also sprang up. Whereas before the war there was only one domestic radio station, today there are .more than 180. The history of television in Lebanon dates back to 1957. At that date the Min­ istry of Information granted a joint French-Lebanese company, Compagnie Liba­ naise du Television (CLT), rights to broadcast two programs over channels 7 and 9 VHF. In 1959, another company, TeleOrient, was granted rights to broadcast one program over channels 5 and 11. News broadcasts over all channels were overseen directly by the National News Agency of the Ministry of Information es­ tablished in 1966. In the early 1970s, CL T and TeleOrient merged. The war hit the television company as hard as it hit other companies. In 1979, in the wake of serious fman­ cial crisis, the government stepped in to form a mixed company in which CL T would hold 25% of shares, TeleOrient would hold 25%, and the state would be represented by 50%. The law gave the new company, TeleLiban, monopoly rights over all television broadcasting in Lebanon until the year 2012. The commercial performance of the company continued to decline, however, the situation was only made worse by a split in the news department iri 1984 which gave rise to rival government broadcasts from East and West Beirut. The first to break the government monopoly was the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) established by the Lebanese Forces militia in 1985. The LBC began operation without legal sanction, but soon acquired the lion's share of view­ ers and advertisers through innovative programming and modem equipment. As happened in Radio, the Lebanese Forces station was soon followed by stations es­ tablished by the PSP, Marada, SSNP, Hizballah, South Lebanon Army, and others.

66 ..

Whereas before the war there was only one television company, there are now over 40 stations broadcasting on VHF and UHF. In recent months the government has been struggling to impose a certain or­ der over the plethora of radio and television stations, none of which are operating under a government license. Minister of Information Alben Mansour has orga­ nized more than one broad conference on the subject. Although no final decisions have been taken yet, the outlines of future government policy are that stations will not be forced to close down, but they will have to purchase permits from the state or from the mixed television company and they will have to pay annual taxes for permits and profits. Furthennore, the government recently floated a decision to prohibit news broadcasts on all television stations except TeleLiban. This decision caused a hue and cry among the media and militia community but has been neither confirmed nor denied.

b- Problems and Recommendations The audio-visual media are in a trajectory of rapid growth. They are among the highest growth sectors in the economy. The problems that exist in this sector revolve around the government's radio and television stations. A strong broad­ casting capacity of the state is an imponant element of strengthening the state and allowing it to provide political stability. Both the television and radio stations of the state are in a condition of extensive dilapidation and disrepair. The radio sta­ tion has vinually ceased broadcasting altogether. The television station is likely to get considerable revenues from permit duties collected from other private sta­ tions; but the radio station is not in a similar position. Assistance in the audio-visual media sector should focus on helping the state's media outlets. This could be in the form of technical training and equipment, or training in modern programming and news reporting. The needs of the state's ra­ dio station are especially urgent. The Directorate of Radio Broadcasting in the Ministry of Information also presides over the nation's radio archives. These are a treasure trove of political and musical recordings of immense historical and cultural imponance. The ar­ chives are in a dilapidated state, and already about 20% of the recordings have been damaged -- by humidity and heat -- beyond repair. It is important that the remaining 80% be salvaged for posterity.

67 F. Conclusion

After a decade and a half of civil and proxy wars, a window of opportunity has opened up in Lebanon to establish peace and push the long-stalled processes of socio-economic and political development forward. The time to act is now. The Document of National Reconciliation signed in Taif, Saudi Arabia in October 1989 has provided a foundation for domestic consensus while the end of the Cold War and the launching of the Arab-Israeli peace process has provided the founda­ tions for regional and international understanding on Lebanon. However, after fifteen years of conflict, Lebanon finds itself badly in need of assistance. Most importantly, the state that must provide the foundations for politi­ cal and economic stability is in a dangerously atrophied condition. Struggling to provide basic services throughout the war with a shrinking revenue base, the state ran up large annual deficits and accumulated a crippling domestic public debt which equals the country's entire GDP. If the state is to establish political and eco­ nomic order, pay off its debts, and lead the process of rehabilitation and recon­ struction that is crucial to development, it will not be able to do so on the coun­ try's own postwar resources. Like other countries emerging from war, the country's current tax base is too narrow to make up alone for the losses of the war. Foreign assistance is a necessity. What foreign governments and donors inust keep in mind is that what exists in Lebanon is a window of opportunity that may be shut if advantage is not taken of it. The socio-economic problems that resulted from the war are massive, and the ability of the state to cope with them are limited. The danger is that if assis­ tance is not forthcoming, the progress that has been made in establishing peace since 1989 may begin to unravel. The state has made great strides in disbanding militias and reasserting its authority; however, the process is far from complete, and the state is operating under serious financial and administrative constraints. If the state is not provided with the necessary support to succeed, the momentum for peace and stability could be lost. Of course, the consequences of failure would be disastrous for Lebanon; more broadly, however, the anarchy that would ensue would pose a threat to regional stability and would reflect negatively on the secur­ ity of international interests in the Arab world. For the first time since the early 1970s there is a framework for peace and stability in place in Lebanon. If it is supported, this framework will become stronger and Lebanon will come to play the positive role it played previously in regional politics and economics; if it is not supported, the framework may weaken and collapse. The cost of support is not low; but the price of failure is higher. We hope that our assessment has helped clarify areas in which aid and sup­ port can be usefully provided.

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Appendix A List or Interviewees

Fuad Abi-Saleh Head of the Lebanese Syndicate of Industrialists. Samir Abi-Tayeb Professor of Political Science, Lebanese University. Muhammad Yusif Beydoun Minister of Hydraulic and Elccuical Resources. George Bitar Lecturer on Public Administration at the American University of Beirut Mikhail Dahir Deputy from Akkar, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Finance and Budget. Richard Fabri Inspector at the Central Inspection Commission. Naoum Farah Member, Board of Directors, Tele-Liban. Major Samir Franjiyyeb Deputy Commander of Internal Security Forces in Mount Lebanon. George Frem Indusuialist Fonner Minister of Post and Telecommunications and Industry and Oil. Alfred Haj Fonner Head of the Coun of Appeal for North Lebanon. Fuad Hamdan Former Director of Radio Lebanon. Marguerite Helou Professor of Political Science, Lebanese and American Universities. Farouk Jabre Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Islamic Orphanage. Nawar Kabarah President of the Friends of the Handicapped. Simon Karam Governor of the Muhafazah of the Biqa' and Acting Governor of Beirut Yusif al-Khalil Deputy Director of the Credit Department, Central Bank of Lebanon. Lecturer in Agricultural

69 •

Economics at AUB. Wa'il Kheir Secretary General of the Fow1

70 Appendix B Bibliography

Reports: - Central Bank Annual Reports (1984-1989). - Central Bank Quancrly Bulletins (1983-1991). - International Bechtel Inc. and Dar al-Handasah, Recovery Planning for the Recon- struction and Development ofLebanon. Prepared for the Council for Development and Reconsttuction, October 1991. - World Banlc Development Report, 1991. - "Lebanon on the Eve of Recovery," Middle East Economic Consultants, 1991. ·· - "Lebanon: Country Profile." Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report sl980- 1990.

Books and Articles: - "Lebanon: A Conflict of Minorities." The Minority Rights Group, no.61, 1983 . . - ABI-TA YEH, Sami. ''Democracy through the Electoral Phenomenon in Lebanon." Panorama of Even.ts, vol.IO, no. 42 (Spring 1986) 11-23. - ABU-IZZEDDIN, Halim Said. Lebanon and its Provinces. A Study by the Govern­ ors of the Five Provinces. Beirut, Lebanon: Khayat Publishing House, 1963. - AWAD, Fuad. ''The Economics of Coincidence and Disaster in Lebanon." The Beirut Review, vol.I, no. 2 (Fall 1991) 82-95. - AZAR, Edward, ed. The Emergence ofa New Lebanon: Fantasy or Reality? New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1984. 292pp. - AZAR, Samih Antoine. "The Dwindling Public Surplus, 1977-1985." Panorama of Events, vol.11, no.46 (Spring 1987) 41-48. ------. "Income Redistribution and Speculation in Lebanon." Panora­ ma of Events, vol.11, no.45 (Winter 1987) 21-36. ------. "Pegged and Market Interest Rates in Lebanon." Panorama of Events, vollO, no.43 (Summer 1986) 51-59. ------. "'The Theory and Practice of International Currency Diversifi­ cation: The Lebanese Experience." Panorama of Events, vol.9, no.39 (Summer 1985) 29-43. - BARAKAT, Halim. Toward a Viable Lebanon. London & Sydney: Croom Helm in association with The Center For Contemporary Arab Studies, 1988. - BAS~ Islcandar. Planned Administrative change in Lebanon . . - DEEB, Marius. The Lebanese Civil War. New York: Praegcr Publishers. 1980. -GORIA, Wade R. Sovereignty and Leadership in Lebanon, 1943-1976. London, UK: Ithaca Press, 1986. 286pp. - ISKANDAR, Adnan G. Bureaucracy in Lebanon. Beirut, Lebanon: American Uni­ versity of Beirut, 1964.

71 ' Appendix C Summary of Field Survey

A field survey of 150 individuals was carried out in Tripoli, Mount Lebanon, Beiru4 Sidon, and the Biqa'. The sample included people from all religious com­ munities and various socio-economic strata. Below is a brief description of the sample group and a summary of some of the results. '9 Sex Religion

36-55

Orthodox Shii

Maronite

Education Employment Marital Status

Vocational Illiterate Barely Literate University Elementary Single Married Private Self· Sector Employed Employee

YES NO Have you been displaced during the war? 26% 74% Have you thought of emigrating? 62% 38% Have you ever left the country? 22% 78% Do you consider Lebanon was democratic before 1975? 65% 35% Do you have contact with your Deputy ? 29% 71% Would you resort to·bribery in dealing with public officials? 80% 20% Do you have a private lawyer? 25% 75% Have you solved a problem through the judicial system? 11% 89% Have you ever voted? 40% 60% Do you think democracy would promote stability? 82% 18% Do you feel represented iri government? 29% 71% Do you find your views represented in any of the media? 41% 59% Do you feel freedom is protected in Lebanon? 14% 86%

73 I -

Appendix D Glossary of Acronyms

BOA Bureau of Accounts CDR Council for Development and Reconstruction CIC Central Inspcction Commission csc Qvil Service Council :cQ Double Qaimmaqamiyyah DRG Directorate of Research and Guidance GO.. General Confederation of Labor GDC General Disciplinary Council NIPA National Institute of Public Administration PSP Progressive Socialist Pany SSNP Syrian Social Nationalist Pany

74