National Defense Industrial A ssociation Insensitive M unitions European Manufacturers G roup 2006 Insensitive Munitions & Energetic Materials Technology Symposium Study on Interest and Cost of the Muratisation of Ammunitions of the April 24-28, 2006 Thistle Hotel, Bristol, United Kingdom

Barioz Florent, Longuet Baptiste, Vaillant Thierry, Riehl Nicolas, Aussillou Frédéric, Yodo Alain 1

1 Etablissement Technique de BourgeS - Echangeur de Guerry – Rocade Est – 18 021 Bourges Cedex

Introduction

This paper presents the methodology used in a technical and operational study about the « Interest and Cost of the Muratisation of Ammunitions of the French Army ». A systematic approach has been applied on four ammunitions : 120 mm OFL F1, 120 mm OECC, ERYX and 155 mm LU211. The tool used to complete this study is a software provided by the MSIAC : CBAM “Cost Benefit Analysis Model”. The most important part of the work is certainly the collect of several data for each case and their validation. One part of the data is linked to the lifecycle where numerous situations must be considered. For each situation, different events must be identified, probability of occurrences of these events must be determined and effects of this events must be estimated in term of financial cost. A support to estimate damages is the French decree 79-846 (1979). Other requirements are the estimation of IM signature of considered ammunitions and knowledge of the IM state of the art in order to estimate signature, performance and cost associated to IM version of these ammunitions. Data have been estimated by experts of the domain and a part of the validation has been made by the steering committee of the study. The sensibility of the final result to the data has been studied in order to increase confidence in the results and to propose a simplified methodology. The aim of this study is to contribute to build a future national strategy of acquisition of IM ammunition.

State of the art

The determination of the state of the art of IM technology is of primary importance in the determination of cost and performance of reference (non IM) and projected version (IM) of ammunition and as a consequence is an input data of the Cost Benefit Analysis. A state of the art of IM technology has been completed [1] with support of Club MURAT (association of French industrial companies) and MSIAC [2,3,4]. For a large number of applications, technological tools are available (from energetic materials to design technologies).

Attention has been paid to formulation of hypothesis associated with this state of the art concerning reduction of vulnerability of the system, cost and performance. For each ammunition, a document (see annex, example of OECC ammunition) has been built with different information [5] :

Vaillant Thierry – DGA/ETBS – [email protected] 1 - a general description of the ammunition and its components (case and energetic material) ; - an estimation of IM signature of the ammunition ; - hypothesis of IM amelioration carried out by analysis of the state the art ; - an estimation of the IM signature of the projected version ; - an estimation of performance and cost associated to the fabrication of the projected version. Documents have been built for the following ammunitions : 39 calibre (OE 155 F2, OGRE 155, BONUS 155), 52 calibre (LU 211, LU 211 M, OGRE, BONUS, M2PA), OFL 120 F1, OECC 120 F1, POLYNEGE, GPR 40 mm, 25 mm OEIT, ERYX, HOT, MILAN, , MLRS, AT4CS, 81 mm and 120 mm mortar, mine dispersible F1, mine HPD F2, F3 and F4.

Lifecycle

This cost benefit analysis is run by the detailed description of the lifecycle of the ammunition from the production to the demolition. For each phase of the lifecycle, risks seen by the ammunition (accident or attack with a probability of occurrence associated to this risk) and financial consequences caused by the reaction of the ammunition are described (probability of reaction of the ammunition, material and people damaged or killed if reaction occurs, cost of destroyed material …). Consequences are studied for the reference and the projected version of ammunition. In order to have all information required by the simulation, some hypothesis have been formulated concerning the probability of aggression or accident during each phase of the lifecycle [6].

The different phases of the lifecycle are listed below : - development phase ; - production phase ; - transport from the plant to the principal storage area ; - principal storage area phase ; - change of storage area phase ; - training phase in ; - training phase during overseas period ; - engagement phase ; - destruction phase.

During those phases, the ammunition can see situations where aggression or accident probabilities are different. Those situations are listed below : - handling of ammunition conditioned on transport pallet or container ; - logistic transport of ammunition by train, ship or vehicle ; - storage of ammunition in building, on vehicle or in a harbour ; - intervention on the material ; - use of ammunition ; - tactical transport of ammunition to the firing field.

Assessing the consequences related to an aggression against munitions

In order to estimate the extent of the disaster resulting from an aggression on munitions, various scenarios had to be defined at each step of the lifecycle in terms of :

Vaillant Thierry – DGA/ETBS – [email protected] 2 - scenario : arrangement of munitions and military means on the field as well as the position of the crew ; - danger zones associated to the reaction of munitions for the different types of aggressions which are relevant for the considered at this step ; - induced damages such as destruction of military means, injuries or even death of crew.

Identification of the relevant aggressions

For each step of the life cycle, the relevant aggressions which have to be considered were identified among the following list :

- rapid heating ; - slow heating ; - bullet impact ; - fragment impact ; - jet impact ; - sympathetic reaction.

Sympathetic reaction was considered as an aggression related to the terrorist threat for several storage conditions : munitions onboard wheeled vehicles or stored on quay or during external operations.

Risk divisions of the munitions

For each type of munitions, the risk division has been established on the basis of the rules which are stipulated by the French Decree 79-846 [7].

For the ammunitions which do not meet the MURAT requirements, the quantity of reactive explosive is assumed to be the total of explosive contained in all the munitions even if only one of them has been aggressed.

Referring to the French decree 79-846, the risk divisions are :

- kinetic effect ammunitions : Risk division 1.2 - Shaped charges ammunitions : Risk division 1.1 - Artillery ammunitions : Risk division 1.1

In case of « MURAT » ammunitions, the risk division is 1.2 « Risque unitaire » was considered. This allows limiting the explosive quantity which has to be taken into account for calculating the danger zones to the explosive contained in the single aggressed ammunition.

Danger zones

In accordance with the French decree 79-846, the danger zones are defined through various designations Z1, Z2,…associated to specific levels of damage.

Vaillant Thierry – DGA/ETBS – [email protected] 3 Zone Z Z Z Z Z designation 1 2 3 4 5 Foreseeable Severe injuries Injuries (potentialy Injuries Slight injury Mortality > 50 % mortal) Potential injuries (low probability) Severe Foreseeable Moderate Slight damages Very slight damages Equipment Important damages damages Damages damages

The calculation of the danger zones associated to the reaction of munitions – for instance in case of risk division 1.1 – is based on the following table :

Zone Z Z Z Z Z designation 1 2 3 4 5 Radius of the zone around the 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 quantity Q of 0 < R 1 ≤ 5 Q < R 2 ≤ 8 Q < R 3 ≤ 15 Q < R 4 ≤ 22 Q < R 5 ≤ 44 Q reacting explosive

Description of the scenario

For a better understanding of the subject, the case of an artillery battery will be taken hereafter as an example. The considered step will be the firing of an artillery battery on the field, that is to say : the artillery gun the artillery crew the trailer the carried munitions

During the firing phase, the crew takes the munitions off the trailer and puts them in a line on the ground being equipped with the fuse. Munitions are then loaded in the gun and fired. However the artillery guns are arranged within batteries and are therefore in the vicinity of other guns, munitions, trailers and associated crews.

Assessing the consequences of an aggression

This analysis will be of course dependant on the vulnerability of the munitions.

Vaillant Thierry – DGA/ETBS – [email protected] 4 1/ Munitions which do not meet the « MURAT » requirements

If an aggression occurs on munitions which do not meet the MURAT requirements, the quantity of explosive Q will be obtained by summing the quantities of explosive contained in all the munitions. In this example, Q = 393,6 kg.

The danger zones are therefore calculated as following :

Zone Z Z Z Z Z designation 1 2 3 4 5 Radius of the zone around the 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 quantity Q of 0 < R 1 ≤ 5 Q < R 2 ≤ 8 Q < R 3 ≤ 15 Q < R 4 ≤ 22 Q < R 5 ≤ 44 Q reacting explosive

Q = 393,6 kg 37 m 59 m 110 m 162 m 323 m

A second calculation of the danger zones is then run for RD 1.2 objects :

Zone Z Z Z Z Z designation 1 2 3 4 5 Radius of the zone around the quantity Q of 0 < R 1 ≤ 25 < R 2 ≤ 135 < R 3 ≤ 300 < R 4 ≤ 400 < R 5 ≤ 800 reacting explosive Q = 393,6 kg 25 m 135 m 300 m 400 m 800 m

The final danger zones have been obtained by considering the maximum values of the two former calculations :

Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 37 m 135 m 300 m 400 m 800 m

Assessing the consequences of the aggression consists in an analysis of the Z2 position of the equipment and crew personals in the various danger zones.

Therefore, the consequences will be :

Z1 destruction of the 5 artillery guns ; destruction of the 5 trailers ; death of the crew members in the Z1 zones ; injuries for the crew members of the four other guns ; destruction of the munitions associated to the central gun

Vaillant Thierry – DGA/ETBS – [email protected] 5 Furthermore, it has to be verified that there will be no transmission of reaction to the munitions of the two other guns.

The maximum ranges which could lead to a reaction are calculated in the two cases :

- transmission through blast effect :

R = 0,5 Q 1/3

In this example : R = 4 m

- transmission due to fragments :

R = 2,4 Q 1/3

For our example : R = 18 m

It appears there is no transmission to the munitions associated to the other guns.

2/ Low vulnerability Munitions « MURAT »

In that case, the danger zones which had been calculated for the DR 1.1 will be reduced in comparison to the former example as the quantity of explosives will be limited to the one contained in a single ammunition.

Zone Z Z Z Z Z designation 1 2 3 4 5 Radius of the zone around the 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 quantity Q of 0 < R 1 ≤ 5 Q < R 2 ≤ 8 Q < R 3 ≤ 15 Q < R 4 ≤ 22 Q < R 5 ≤ 44 Q reacting explosive Q = 11,4 kg 12 m 18 m 34 m 50 m 100 m

In the same manner, the danger zones which had been calculated for the DR 1.2 will be reduced in comparison to the former example as the quantity of explosives will be limited to the one contained in a single ammunition.

Zone Z Z Z Z Z designation 1 2 3 4 5 Radius of the zone around the quantity Q of 0 < R 1 ≤ 25 < R 2 ≤ 135 < R 3 ≤ 300 < R 4 ≤ 400 < R 5 ≤ 800 reacting explosive Q = 11,4 kg 17 m 90 m 200 m 267 m 534 m

The danger zones associated to the RD 1.3 objects are calculated by considering the whole mass of active material :

Vaillant Thierry – DGA/ETBS – [email protected] 6 Zone designation Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Radius of the zone around the quantity 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 < R ≤ 1,5 Q < R ≤ 2 Q < R ≤ 2,5 Q < R ≤ 3,25 Q Q of reacting 1 2 3 4 explosive Q = 393,6 kg 11 m 15 m 19 m 24 m

The final danger zones will correspond to the maximum range among all of them :

Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 17 m 90 m 200 m 267 m 534 m

Assessing the consequences of the aggression consists in an analysis of the position of the equipment and crew personals in the various danger zones.

Z2 In this example, the consequences will be :

- destruction of 3 artillery guns, - destruction of 3 trailers, Z1 - death of the crew members inside the Z1 zone, - injuries for the crew members associated to the 2 other artillery guns, - destruction of munitions of the battery guns beeing aggressed.

This example illustrates the significant reduction of the consequences after an aggression on « MURAT » munitions.

Simulation

The simulation have been completed with the help of CBAM software (Cost and benefit Analysis Model) of the MSIAC [8]. Once the lifecycle has been implemented in CBAM and all frames filled up with the important number of data resulting from our collect of information and our preliminary calculations, the principle is to complete calculations for both reference (no IM) and projected ammunition (IM) and to compare them.

Vaillant Thierry – DGA/ETBS – [email protected] 7 It rapidly appears that production and engagement phases run the result of the cost / benefit simulation. This result is illustrated by figure 1 and has been verified for 120 OFL, 120 OECC, 155 LU 211 and ERYX anti tank . Costs

Non IM IM

Entire Production Engagement lifecycle phase phase Figure 1 : cost benefit general tendencies

This result carried out, we decided to study in detail those two phases and the impact of input data on the simulation result.

Zoom on production phase :

The cost generated by the production phase is directly run by the cost of the munitions. So to appreciate the impact of this input on the simulation result, we completed different simulation with overcost of IM ammunition from 5 to 100% for the propulsive system and for the explosive charge. This kind of simulation is necessary since price of munitions depends on production volume. Results on the OECC ammunition are presented in figure 2a and 2b.

Différence Total - Engagement OECC Graphe 1-4 : Engagement + Total + Différence (Total - Engagement) pour l'OECC Engagement Total 61 000 000

54 352 065 non-IM 2 350 € 51 000 000

50 % on explosive 2 644 € 46 158 000

50% on explosive + 5% on powder1 2 658 € 43 016 000

50% on explosive + 15% on powder1 2 687 € 41 000 000 552 059 41 38 917 888 917 38 38 306 632 306 38 37 952 052 952 37 37 959 024 959 37

50% on explosive + 50% on powder1 2 789 € 145 471 36 35 819 888 819 35 35 817 067 817 35 35 394 908 394 35 35 210 632 210 35 35 205 250 205 35 35 089 400 089 35 34 941 049 941 34 34 864 024 864 34 33 383 145 383 33 100 % on explosive 2 938 € 406 370 33 32 732 067 732 32 32 311 908 311 32 32 293 911 293 32 32 123 250 123 32 32 007 400 007 32 31 987 985 987 31 31 860 049 860 31 31 840 220 840 31

31 000 000 406 295 30

100% on explosive + 5% on powder1 2 952 € 000 300 29 29 223 911 223 29 28 919 385 919 28 28 772 220 772 28 50% on explosive + 5% on powder2 2 963 € 25 052 065 052 25 100% on explosive + 15% on powder1 2 981 € 50% on explosive + 15% on powder2 3 021 € 21 000 000 100% on explosive + 50% on powder 3 083 € 50% on explosive + 50% on powder2 3 224 € 100% on explosive + 5% on powder2 3 257 € 11 000 000 100% on explosive+ 15% on powder2 3 315 € 3 142 000 142 3 3 107 500 107 3 3 075 000 075 3 000 081 3 000 082 3 000 082 3 000 083 3 000 085 3 000 088 3 000 095 3 000 096 3 000 098 3 100% on explosive + 50% on powder2 3 518 € 000 068 3 600 068 3 000 070 3 1 000 000 2 350 € 2 644 € 2 658 € 2 687 € 2 789 € 2 938 € 2 952 € 2 963 € 2 981 € 3 021 € 3 083 € 3 224 € 3 257 € 3 315 € 3 518 € 4 000

Figure 2 : a) different hypothesis of cost of the IM version of OECC b) impact on cost for the engagement phase and on the entire lifecycle

Vaillant Thierry – DGA/ETBS – [email protected] 8 We have to notice that whatever the cost of the ammunition is, the engagement cost will not be influenced by the price of the ammunition, this observation has been verified on other ammunition even those that are more expensive like anti tank missile (ERYX) because the cost of this phase is essentially supported by the cost of destructed materials around the ammunition.

Zoom on engagement phase :

Cost generated by this phase is directly influenced by the risk probability affected to each aggression or accident in each situation. We completed a parametric study in order to appreciate the effect of those probabilities on the simulation result for different situations. Figure 3 presents the result for the entire engagement phase of ammunition ERYX (all situations) for probabilities of occurrence of aggressions multiplied by 1 to 1000.

Munition non murat Graphe 2-1 : Coûts des munitions Murat et non Murat pour différentes probabilités d'agression (en P+M P+C) Munition murat

100 000 000 000 27 27 867 904 000 20 20 931 793 000

10 000 000 000 10 383 363 000 2 2 807 641 000 2 2 119 029 000 Coûts (€) Coûts 1 1 109 636 000 1 1 040 472 000 970 970 948 000

1 000 000 000 816 677 000 761 761 952 000 548 548 143 000 428 428 591 000 301 301 606 000 237 237 713 000 236 236 158 000 153 153 745 000 127 127 500 000 107 107 219 000 106 106 185 000 99 99 038 000 100 000 000 98 380 000 78 78 017 000 64 64 055 000 59 59 693 000 58 58 161 000 57 57 769 000 57 860 000 54 54 220 000 53 53 437 000 51 51 675 000 51 51 067 000 48 48 515 000 34 34 443 000 30 30 787 000 26 26 650 000 20 20 860 000 20 20 562 000 19 19 530 000 19 541 000 15 15 933 000 14 14 260 000 13 13 428 000 12 12 819 000 12 12 165 000 10 000 000

E 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 S 0 *1 *1 0 0 00 *1 *1 0 0 0 0 00 0 *1 e *100 *1 *1 s 0 0 1 *1 0 0 s IB t L r *1 *1 s *1 BA IB C E e e r s urds*10 ndi rio JCC*10 C g IB*1000 C EL* L*1 r o urd e riot*10 J ge E e l o chariot*10 ha lé JC ndi é s Inc c ts e l lég Incendie*100 a ts s lourds*1000die e cha l Inc lats l t n di e c la ts Eclat c E a E cla ce ndi Ec E In e Ecl Incen Inc

Figure 3 : impact of the risk probability on cost of the engagement phase for the ERYX anti tank missile

The strong dependence of simulation results with value of the probability of occurrence shows it is necessary to consolidate this input. On the example, a multiplication by a factor 10 of this probability for the shaped jet charge aggression has the consequence to multiply the cost of the engagement phase by seven. The particular attention paid on the shaped jet charge aggression is legitimate if we consider that this aggression proliferates today.

Figure 4 provides the relative influence of each situation on the entire cost of the engagement phase for the ERYX missile. The two main sources of cost are the tactical transport and the storage.

Vaillant Thierry – DGA/ETBS – [email protected] 9 Graphe 4-1 : Importance des sous-phases en Engagement munition murat munition non murat différence

100 000 000 28 198 000 198 28 17 553 000

15 671 000 671 15 15 214 000 10 645 000 645 10 10 000 000

1 000 000 457 000 457

289 000 289 270 000 Coûts (€) Coûts

100 000 19 000 19 16 000 16 10 000 10 10 000 6 000

5 000 5 5 000 0 1 000 Transport opérationnel Manutention Transport logistique Transport tactique Stockage

Figure 4 : influence of each situation on engagement cost for the ERYX anti tank missile

Figure 5 presents the relative part of each risk on the engagement cost for the ERYX missile.

Munition murat Graphe 5-1 : Importance des différentes agressions en Engagement Munition non murat Différence

35 000 000 30 221 569 30 000 000 Coûts

25 000 000

19 850 668 20 000 000

17 368 252 16 543 641

15 000 000 10 370 901 370 10 10 000 000

5 000 000

625 454 1 005 092 791 959 824 611 824 274 276 8 184 014 700 91 945 497 700

379 638 379 11 223 424 223 18 502 6 622 0 318 10 611 6 Incendie chariot Incendie (ER) EL IB IF léger IF lourd JCC

Figure 5 : relative part of the different aggressions or accident on the engagement cost for the ERYX missile For the reference version of ERYX (non IM), the light fragment and slow heating aggression are responsible of a large part of the total cost of the engagement phase. For the projected version (IM), it is only the slow heating which is responsible of the overall cost of the engagement phase. Those results can be explained and are direct

Vaillant Thierry – DGA/ETBS – [email protected] 10 consequences of IM signature estimation of the ERYX and hypothesis of amelioration of this signature formulated for each ammunition at the beginning of the study.

Several interesting results can be extracted from the CBAM simulation. Nevertheless, the data collection in CBAM is quite dull. The different parametric results presented at the end of the paper show the necessity to consolidate some data (risk probabilities, operational scenario, hypothesis on cost of IM version depending on production volume) which have an important influence on simulation results.

Conclusions

A complete cost-benefice analysis was conducted on four French Ammunitions. Based on the CBAM tool developed by MSIAC, this work has allowed to identify strong tendencies concerning cost reductions associated to the use of « MURAT » ammunitions.

This analysis has also emphasised the great amount of data which have to be available to run such calculations, especially related to the engagement phase. If many of them – especially for the operational aspects – have to be assumed through data bases which have still to be consolidated, it appears that significant conclusions may be drawn.

From this detailed approach, a parametric study is suggesting that a simplified analysis could be profitable for being applied to a larger panel of ammunitions from mines to anti tanks and from small to large calibre ammunitions

Finally, it has to be pointed out that this work is part of a more general effort taking into account the cost-benefice analysis but also media or political considerations to propose orientations for a future doctrine for « Muratisation » of the French Army ammunitions.

References :

[1] : B.Longuet, A. Yodo, JP. Brauge, Internal report ETBS n° 2351 « Etat de l’art des technologies MURAT » (2005) [2] : Technical report of Club MURAT n°04/053/CM/ET O/S/DB/N du 09/06/04 « Bilan sur les acquis en matière de muratisation » [3] : Technical report of Club MURAT n°04/076/CM/ET O/S/DB/L du 20/10/04 « Signature MURAT de différentes familles de munitions » [4] : L101 document, 02/04 « report on the state of the art of IM design technology », Powell, Marchandin, Peugeot, MSIAC, (2003) [5] : B. Longuet, A Yodo, Internal report ETBS n°26 26 “Compilation fiche munitions : version de référence/version projetée” (2005) [6] : CBAM Threat and Probability Database [7] French decree n°79-846 du 28/09/79 « Règles gén érales d’hygiène et de sécurité dans les établissements pyrotechniques » [8] : L-104 guide, 01/04/04 « THE NIMIC COST AND BENEFIT ANALYSIS MODEL : USER GUIDE AND INPUT DATA COMPILATION » [9] : N. Riehl, rapport de fin d’études ENSIETA « Etude Coût / Bénéfice de la muratisation des munitions du combat terrestre », (2005) [10] : F. Barioz, technical report ETBS « Etude paramétrique sur les données d’entrée de CBAM » (2005)

Vaillant Thierry – DGA/ETBS – [email protected] 11 Annex

Short presentation of the 120 mm OECC ammunition.

The ammunition is constituted of : - a combustible based of nitrocellulose - B 19T (1,6) gun powder - an igniter with black powder - a warhead charged with a RDX/TNT based explosive

Presentation of the logistic and tactic case

The logistic case is a GIAT 21 model. The individual case is composed of a part in high density polyethylene (PEHD-THP M) and a part in rigid moss.

The wrapped ammunition are then stocked on wooden pallet.

Estimation of the IM signature

ER EL IB RI FL FL CC léger lourd

NR V IV III II I X X X X X X

Vaillant Thierry – DGA/ETBS – [email protected] 12 The warhead signature runs the total signature.

IM technology available

Changing the explosive is necessary to improve the IM signature of the ammunition. A solution could consist on changing the RDX/TNT based explosive composition (hexolite 62/38) by a composition less sensitive type V350-B3014. The performance could be of the same range. An effort on the propulsive system could also improve the signature but there is not really something available looking the state of the art.

Description of the IM version Replacement of hexolite 62/38 by V 350- B 3014

IM signature of the IM version

ER EL IB RI FL FL CC léger lourd

NR V X X IV X III X II I X X

The remaining problem (the sympathetic reaction level) is due to the vulnerability of the propulsive system. B-powder adapted to this calibre are known to fail the sympathetic reaction test. In logistic case, the reaction level of the sympathetic reaction aggression can be improved depending on its properties. In tactical configuration, a work on the configuration of the pallet storage could also allow to pass this aggression. The amelioration of the intrinsic sensibility of the gun powder should be very expensive because there aren’t any gun powders available for this calibre which pass through the sympathetic reaction test. Gun powder like YH family have good IM properties but present problem of ignitiability and erosivity.

Outlook on performance and cost Performance of this ammunition can be conserved because there are lots of explosive composition available on shelves. Cost of this modification depend really of the scale of production. TATB explosive are nevertheless intrinsically more expensive than other granular explosive. If the objective is an ammunition fully IM compliant, the cost will not be the same regard to the lack of ideal gun powder on shelves. YH gun powder are still expensive because of their process of fabrication (re crystallisation of RDX) and have still problems of ignitiability. Progress in ignition system (ITLX or ETC) could be solutions to ignite those gun powders.

Vaillant Thierry – DGA/ETBS – [email protected] 13