REVIEWING DISASTER MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES in BIHAR I N D I a Facilitating Humanitarianism

REVIEWING DISASTER MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES IN BIHAR I N D I A Facilitating Humanitarianism

This report has been compiled by Sheena Arora, Nishant Buragohain, Kaustubh Devale , Praveen Pawar and Aahna Srikanth of RedR India in March-April 2013, as a part of the review of Bihar’s Disaster Management capacities for the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

RedR India is a member of the RedR International federation, providing training, recruitment and advisory services for emergencies. A humanitarian and non-proﬁt organization, RedR India maintains a register of experienced humanitarian professionals who are available to assist governments and external support agencies working in the humanitarian sector. The RedRs have a global reputation for the development and presentation of high quality training for the humanitarian aid sector and have ofﬁces in Australia, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Sri Lanka and the United Kingdom. For more details on RedR India please visit www.redr.org.in

Cover Photo:

People in Khagaria district, Bihar, crossing the Bagmati River to reach Chheda Khera Panchayat.

Layout: Ashok Nirgulkar

Photo credits: RedR India

October 2013 REVIEWING DISASTER MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES IN BIHAR

Responding to emergencies effectively and efficiently over eight percent prone to floods, and 2.25 percent of requires strong national and local disaster management India’s Gross Domestic Product has been swept away by systems and emergency responders with the knowledge disasters. The numbers are stark. Constrained and information about the risks and hazards that they resources demand innovative thinking and risk-informed potentially face, the existing capacities of all actors; and planning so as to preemptively avert huge losses. the roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders in a time of disaster. The Emergency Response team at Within India, the State of Bihar is highly prone to multi- the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation funded this study in hazards including floods, earthquakes, drought, an effort to support and assess emergency response monsoons, high wind velocity, cold waves and recurrent capacity at State, District and local levels in the disaster fires during summer months. In this context, we believe prone State of Bihar, India. Our aim is to share this that all actors in the region, both development and report with stakeholders to ensure that disaster humanitarian, should have access to knowledge and preparedness, response and management is efficient, concrete recommendations that will serve to increase effective and sustainable – ultimately resulting in a capacity to mitigate, prepare for and respond to various reduction of loss of lives and assets. threats and disasters across all levels.

There is a mounting body of evidence that the frequency We hope that all stakeholders in Bihar will consider the and severity of disasters is increasing and leaving information in this report to ensure that planning efforts greater numbers of people vulnerable to their effects. In are risk-informed- properly addressing and 2012, the estimated economic losses from natural contextualizing emergency risks, integrating prevention, I disasters was USD $ 157 billion and surpassed the mitigation, preparedness, and response and recovery annual average damages from 2001 to 2010 by almost strategies into programming from the outset. ten percent (USD $ 143 billion) according to the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED).

CRED also reports that when assessing geographical distribution of disasters, Asia was the continent most Valerie Nkamgang Bemo often hit by natural disasters in 2012 - accounting for Senior Program Officer, Emergency Response 40.7 percent. According to UNDP’s vulnerability profile Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation of India, over 70 percent of the nearly 7,500-kilometre Amanda Lanzarone long coastline is prone to cyclones, 70 percent of the Associate Program Officer, Emergency Response land under cultivation is prone to drought, 60 percent of Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation India’s landmass is susceptible to earthquakes,

FOREWORD

We would like to thank the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation for commissioning the review of Bihar state’s disaster management capacities and for publishing this review report.

This document has evolved due to the immense help and kind support extended by many individuals, organisations and communities in Bihar.

We would like to extend our sincere gratitude to Mr. Vyasji Mishra, Principal Secretary DMD and Mr Anil K Sinha, Vice Chairperson BSDMA for their support and inputs towards the process. Dr. Gagan (OSD, Principal Secretary Health and formerly OSD in the DMD), Mr Sanjay Pandey (Convener, BIAG) and Mr Banku Bihari Sarkar (Senior State Coordinator- DRR, UNICEF Bihar) need special mention for their willingness to engage with our never ending questions and provide crucial insights. We would also like to thank Dr. D.K Mishra for taking time out of his busy schedule to share his invaluable experiences and counter perspective.

Interactions with members of the BIAG were crucial at both the formative as well as ﬁnal stages of the review, helping us understand their individual organisations as well as the disaster management community. Additionally, we would like to thank the entire range of stakeholders (government departments, quasi-government institutions, INGOs, NGOs, Civil Society and individuals) at the state, district and block levels who willingly engaged with us and whose insights were key in informing the report. iii Dr. ELSN Bala Prasad (Director General, BIPARD), Mr. Vishal Vaswani (BSDMA) and Mr. Sarbjit Singh Sahota (Emergency Specialist, DRR Section, UNICEF India) need special mention for their continued support and critical inputs.

Th ‘Ananya’ teams in Delhi and Bihar helped us understand the project better, especially Indrajit Chaudhary in Patna and Sharad Chaturvedi and his team in Saharsa.

We are grateful to the many communities and individuals in Begusarai, Darbhanga, Gaya, Gopalganj, Khagaria, Patna, Saharsa, Samastipur, Supaul, and West Champaran districts for their bottomless cups of chai (tea), their warm hospitality as well as their generous and honest sharing of experiences.

Finally, we are grateful to the entire RedR India team for not only critically appreciating this review process but also for the logistics support and camaraderie throughout the nine months of this review.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

FOREWORD I TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii 0 CONTENTS v LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES vi ACRONYMS vii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ix

INTRODUCTION 1

BACKGROUND 2 1 THE REVIEW DESIGN 2 OVERVIEW OF THE STATE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PROFILE 7

STATE PROFILE 8 2 DISASTER RISK CONTEXT 10 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 13

POLICY ENVIRONMENT 16 3 ANALYSIS OF POLICY ENVIRONMENT 18 PEOPLE – THE DM ECOSYSTEM 25 ANALYSIS OF DM ECOSYSTEM 27 PROGRAMMES 30 ANALYSIS OF PROGRAMMES IN THE DM ECO-SYSTEM 32 PERFORMANCE 34 CRITICAL ANALYSIS - CATALYSTS AND BARRIERS 40 4 RECOMMENDATIONS 43 Figure 1: Framework of Analysis 3 Figure 2: Sample Selection Criteria 4 Figure 3: Key-informants for the review 5 Figure 4: Multi-hazard zones in Bihar 10 Figure 5: Disaster Management Context Timeline 15 Figure 6: The DM Ecosystem 26 Figure 7: On-going DM Programmes in Bihar 31 Figure 8: Performance Analysis 37

Table 1: Key Demographic Indicators of Bihar 8 Table 2: Status of Policy Instruments in Bihar 18

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES AWC Anganwadi Centre (Nutrition & early education related service provision centre at the community level as part of Integrated Child Development Scheme of Government of India) AWW Anganwadi Worker (Nutrition related service provider at the community level as part of the Integrated Child Development Scheme of Government of India) ANM Auxiliary Nurse Mid-Wife (Community level trained health service provider) ASHA Accredited Social Health Activist (Community level health animator) APHC Additional Primary Health Centre (health facility at a cluster of villages) BSDMA Bihar State Disaster Management Authority B-IAG Bihar Inter Agency Group BIPARD Bihar Institute for Public Administration and Rural Development (Government of Bihar, administrative training institute) BUDA Bihar Urban Development Agency BAPEPS Bihar Aapda (Disaster) Punarvasan (Rehabilitation) Evam (And) Punarvikas (Reconstruction) Society (An organization formed by the State government for the recovery work following the August 2008 'Kosi disaster') BDO Block Development Officer CBDRR Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction CO Circle Officer CDPO Child Development Project Officer (Block level official of the Social Welfare Department, Responsible for managing the ICDS programme in the block) vii CMG Crisis Management Group CP Contingency Plan CS Civil Surgeon (District level official of the Health Department) DAO District Agriculture Officer DAHO District Animal Husbandry Officer DDMA District Disaster Management Authority DDMP District Disaster Management Plan DHM District Health Manager DM Act Disaster Management Act 2005 DM Disaster Management DMD Disaster Management Department DPO District Project Officer DRR Disaster Risk Reduction

ACRONYMS EOC Emergency Operations Centre EWS Early Warning System FMIS Flood Management Information System FMP Flood Management Plan GIS Geographic Information System GOB Government of Bihar GOI Government of India GP Gram Panchayat (decentralized governance unit of PRI at the village level) HSC Health Sub-Centre ICDS Integrated Child Development Scheme of Government of India (Flagship initiative of GOI since 1975 to ensure nutrition, health and pre-school education related rights of children as well as health and nutrition support to the mother) ICS Incident Command System IDSP Integrated Disease Surveillance Project IFHI Integrated Family Health Initiative IMD Indian Meteorological Department INGO International Non-Government Organization MOIC Medical Ofﬁcer In-Charge (of the Primary Health Centre, block level health facility) MIS Management of Information System MNREGA Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (Flagship initiative of GOI since 2005 to enhance livelihood security of citizens through guaranteed 100 days of work per family in rural areas) NDRF National Disaster Response Force NGO Non-Government Organization NPE Non Plan Expenditure NRHM National Rural Health Mission OSD Ofﬁcer on Special Duty PHC Primary Health Centre PHED Public Health Engineering Department PRI Panchayati Raj Institutions (3-tier decentralized governance system in India functioning within each state at village level as GP, block level as PS and district level as ZP) PS Panchayat Samiti (block level governance unit of PRI) SDMP State Disaster Management Plan SEC State Executive Committee SOP Standard Operating Procedure SSA Sarva Shikshya Abhiyan (Government of India, Universal Primary Education Scheme) ULB Urban Local Bodies ZP Zilla Parishad (district level governance unit of PRI) ix

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The National Disaster Management Act of 2005 has resulted in several initiatives on disaster management (DM) in Bihar, however, how this has translated into disaster management capacities, is yet to be analyzed. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation commissioned RedR India to undertake this review of Bihar state’s disaster management capacities.

Review design: This review, focused on assessing the DM-related policy environment, the DM ecosystem’s capacities as well as examining the critical catalysts and barriers in the efﬁcacy of the ecosystem’s functioning. Adopting the appreciative enquiry approach, this review was guided by a “PPPPP” framework wherein enquiry and analysis traced the DM landscape in Bihar from Policy to People to Programmes to Performance and Projected recommendations for the DM ecosystem. The review was conducted through constructive engagement with DM ecosystem actors at the state level and across 10 districts, which were selected based on their disaster proneness, event history, disaster risk reduction initiatives, areas where the ‘Ananya’ programme is being implemented and feasibility of access.

Key ﬁndings:

Policy environment: A clear progression of the disaster management framework in the state is discernible in line with evolution of the national DM discourse, socio-political changes in the state, and the changing natural x environment. The evolution of the policy landscape in Bihar and the concomitant actions in the last 5 years (development of policy instruments and establishment of DM institutions) are indicative of a conducive policy environment for programs and partnerships for DM. Yet, the policy focus is primarily on preparedness for response, is mono-hazard focussed and hardly addresses the prevalent signiﬁcant urban disaster risks. Further, convergence amongst related policies appears to be minimal, including the absence of a clear roadmap for mainstreaming and a shared vision for capacity building for DM.

People: An ecosystem approach was adopted in this review to understand the role and presence of different actors in order to account for their multiplicity, interconnectedness and dynamism. It was found that several actors are operational at different stages of the DM cycle, with varying spheres of inﬂuence and many successful partnerships; yet a collective envisioning of shared goalposts has not been done. Further, there is a need for enhancement of technical capacities for disaster risk analysis, risk-informed planning and management of programs especially within the government systems wherein the ethos of DM continues to be that of an ‘additional charge’.

Programmes: An analysis of the programmes carried out by the ecosystem at different stages of the DM cycle, also highlighted the primary focus on preparedness for response and an approach of mono-hazard focus in programming and implementation as well. Further, it was found that the programme design for both government and non- government programmes addresses principle risks but is yet to carry out differential planning that accounts for contextual risks. This is highlighted in the review through an analysis of the ﬂood control policy and it’s intended and realized outcomes and implications for future programming. Performance: Analysis of the policy and programmatic performance against the expected outcomes as laid out in the national and state policy framework point out the positive impact of the various policy instruments, a committed political leadership and civil-society-government partnerships; while at the same time, delineating the need for demand creation for disaster risk reduction (especially mitigation, prevention and mainstreaming), collective envisioning, dynamic and differential risk analysis, data management and systematic capacity building.

Core recommendations:

It is recommended that the DM ecosystem engages in a collective envisioning exercise and set consensus-based goalposts, identifying a role for every actor at different stages of the DM cycle. Further, this should be informed by a multi-hazard approach, cognizance of urban risks and spaces for mainstreaming DM into existing frameworks. Finally, it is recommended that technical capacity be enhanced through a number of suggested actions.

xi 1 INTRODUCTION Background

his document has evolved from a study conducted by RedR India for the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, reviewing the Disaster Management capacities in the state of Bihar. The review was conceptualized in the Tcontext of on-going developments for Disaster Management in Bihar, especially since the passing of the National Disaster Management Act of 2005. Given the number of activities being carried out by the government and various other stakeholders, it was thought important to analyse the impact these have had on the preparedness levels of the state to respond to a disaster situation. Towards this end, the review was carried out with the following key objectives:

• To research the existing and newly formed government institutions for disaster management at state and district level in Bihar, their roles and responsibilities, and assess current levels of functioning

• To analyse the gaps and trends in capacities of the various stakeholders (Government, NGOs, Red Cross, UN and communities) with regards to disaster management

• To identify the catalysts and barriers for effective functioning of the stakeholders, and recommend actions for strengthening the stakeholders 2 In addition to the above-mentioned objectives, the review also explored the disaster risks to on-going programs of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in the state. These ﬁndings, while not included in this document, are available in the detailed report.

This document presents the key findings and recommendations emerging from the review process. This chapter provides a background of the review, including details about the design, process and coverage. This is followed by an overview of the disaster management profile of Bihar state. Thereafter, findings of this review are presented in four sections viz. policy environment, people (DM ecosystem), programmes, and performance. Recommendations emanating from these findings have been shared in the next chapter titled, ‘Recommendations’, and these have been arranged in two sections viz. policy environment, and the DM ecosystem.

The Review Design

Approach: The review followed an approach of appreciative enquiry, consolidating a cohesive narrative of disaster management capacities in Bihar through the shared experiences, opinions and perspectives of different stakeholders in the state.

Framework of Analysis: Information collection and analysis were guided by a framework of analysis that traced the Disaster Management scenario in Bihar from Policy, People, Programmes and Practices, Performance and ﬁnally towards Projection of Recommendations. The matrix below provides indicative areas of enquiry and analysis under each theme. Figure 1: Framework of Analysis

Framework of Analysis

POLICY PEOPLE PROGRAMMES & PRACTICES PERFORMANCE PROJECTION

Stakeholders / Legal On-going and completed projects, Parameters Catalysts and duty-bearers / Framework schemes, activities of review Barriers institutions

Mapping of DM actors at different levels Analysis of policy Analysis of status of Review of capacities Identifying in Bihar, and provisions for DM capacities for DM against credible catalysts Recommendations their roles and at all levels benchmarks and barriers responsibilities

DM Act, National DM Institutions, Knowledge Skills Attitude Measured against - As emerging National Policy, Govt. Depts., legally mandated from the review State Disaster NGOs, Resources: provisions and analysis E.g. Infrastructure, (DM Act, NDMA 3 Management State CBOs, Policy / Plan community Financial and Guidelines, members Human Resources state SOPs) efﬁciency and District Systems: effectiveness of E.g. Coordination, past responses, EWS, EOC, current levels Village/ Data Management, of preparedness Planning

DRM Activities across GP the DM Cycle: E.g. Response, Risk Assessment, Preparedness, Family Mitigation, Traditional Practices Application

The team perceives the state’s capacities as its ability to cope with disasters, emerging from a conﬂuence of capacities of all stakeholders, including communities, civil society and the government (administration and people’s representatives) at all levels. At the same time, given that the government is the primary and largest actor for disaster management, this review mainly focusses on the systems and processes within the government while reviewing the actions and initiatives of other actors where possible. Coverage: This review was conducted through engagement with actors at the state level, 10 districts (out of total 38 in Bihar), 14 development blocks, 10 villages and 3 urban wards. Selection criteria for the districts, blocks and villages/ wards included disaster proneness (including hazard exposure and socio-economic vulnerabilities), past experience of disaster, disaster risk reduction actions undertaken (especially since 2007), areas with ongoing ‘Ananya’1 programme activities and feasibility of access (geographic, informants, time constraints). Selection of villages in north Bihar was such that settlements both within and outside the embankments were explored. One of the villages was selected for having experienced a recent ﬁre incident for a better understanding of the ensuing relief and response activities. The list of districts and rationale for their selection is presented in below: Figure 2: Sample Selection Criteria

West Samastipur Darbhanga Champaran Flood prone; On-going Multi-hazard prone district in north Multi-hazard prone DDMP formulation pilot; Bihar; second largest urban centre in district in western ‘Ananya’ Priority district high risk zone; presence of socio- boundary of state; On- economically vulnerable groups like Supaul going DDMP Musahar; ongoing CBDRR and Kosi recovery programs Multi-hazard formulation pilot; prone district in ‘Ananya’ priority district north Bihar; site of Kosi embankment breach of 2008; 4 on-going recovery project Gopalganj

Multi-hazard prone district in north-west Bihar; large scale Saharsa disaster-induced displacement; ‘Ananya’ Multi-hazard prone priority district B I H A R district in north Bihar; on-going Kosi recovery project; on-going ‘Ananya’ innovation on Patna real-time data monitoring Dense urban area; multi- hazard proﬁle; ‘Ananya’ Khagaria priority district Flood prone, site of conﬂuence of seven Gaya Begusarai rivers; planned ‘Ananya’ Drought prone district in south Multi hazard prone; innovation on referral Bihar; affected by left wing ‘Ananya’ Priority district systems for remote / extremism inaccessible areas The Process: This review was conducted in three phases. Phase one included:

• Desk-Review - analysis of available secondary sources including national and state government documents, data from line departments, program documentation and publications from non-governmental organizations, academic articles on Bihar and its disaster context, print and web-based media reports;

 Scoping Phase - Preliminary consultations and key informant interviews with key state government officials, including the Principle Secretary of the Disaster Management Department and the Vice Chairperson of BSDMA, UN agencies, INGOs, select quasi-government institutions and media agencies. These interviews helped in understanding the policy framework, state level DM institutions, their roles and responsibilities and the current levels of functioning of both state and humanitarian organizations. To understand the district level DM processes and capacities, three districts namely Samastipur, Begusarai and Patna were selected for visits in the first leg and key stakeholders at the district, block and village level were interviewed. Field visits to the communities were organized with support from local NGOs and focus group discussions were conducted with community groups. Patna district was selected to understand the urban risk context and disaster management capacities. This scoping phase one concluded with the finalization of the review design

 Detailed Review- In this phase, an additional 8 districts were visited. Overall, the team interacted with 145 5 stakeholders through key informant interviews, focus group discussions, structured interactions, and group discussions at four levels - state, district, block and community (village and urban wards). Government ofﬁcials from the administration and key line departments (Disaster Management, Health, Agriculture, Public Health Engineering, Water Resource Department, Animal Husbandry, and Social Welfare) were interviewed.

In addition to meetings, the team participated in the development of Figure 3: Key-informants for the review two SOPs - Mass Casualty Management (MCM) and Drought; visited the Kosi Barrage (Birpur) and the August 2008 embankment breach site located in Nepal; and visited key DM structures like 15 newly-constructed EOC buildings, warehouses and flood shelters. 2 Upon the completion of the field visits, a consultation meeting with B-IAG members and Government representatives was done to share the impressions, corroborate factual aspects and to seek 20 their opinions on the emerging findings. 50 Focussed interactions with key representatives of Bill & Melinda 6 9 22 21 Gates Foundation India office and stakeholders of Ananya programme were held in phase one as well as after completion of Government UN & Civil Society the field visits. The adjacent graph depicts the key informants Quasi-Government Communities interacted with as part of the review: Block / Villages District State In August 2013, the team revisited Patna and one of the 10 selected districts, Saharsa, to carry out a real-time analysis of the situation in the monsoon season. This included interactions with key government and non- government stakeholders while they were dealing with the evolving flood situation in areas along the Ganga river as well as visits to the settlements inside the Kosi embankments in Saharsa.

Principle of optimal ignorance and proportional accuracy: In order to meet the objectives of this review, in the given time-frame the team sought key stakeholders and informants and collected only that data and information which was relevant for the review. Thus, the ﬁndings and analysis are primarily based on the information shared by these stakeholders as well as that available from secondary sources.

Challenges / limitations: During the process of the review, all the stakeholders shared their views, thoughts and concerns generously. At the same time, the team encountered the following challenges and limitations:

• The government engineers from PHED and WRD were on strike and in most cases the team was unable to meet them at office. Even though the team managed to meet most of these officials out of office, this limited access to relevant documents and plans.

• The timing of the review coincided with the ﬁnancial year end and the budget session of the state assembly, impacting the availability of quality time from key government ofﬁcials. 6

• The team could not visit few communities in Gaya district which is affected with Left Wing Extremism.

Chapter Endnotes

1: In May 2010, the Government of Bihar and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation signed a Memorandum of Cooperation to accelerate improvements in health, nutrition and sanitation in Bihar linked to MDGs 4, 5 and 6. The foundation is providing technical, management and program design support towards this partnership via a program called ‘Ananya’. Most of the Ananya projects have initially been implemented in eight innovation districts chosen by the GoB and the Foundation. OVERVIEW OF THE STATE 2 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PROFILE State Proﬁle

he state of Bihar is situated in the northern part of the country sharing a long international boundary with Nepal. It is the 12th largest state in the country with an area of 94,163 square kilometres2 and has the highest Tpopulation density at 1,102 persons per square kilometre. Bihar has a total of seven river basins with perennial rivers, originating from the Himalayas, like the Saryu (Ghagrah), Gandak, Kosi, Burhi-Gandak, Bagmati, Kamala- Balan and Mahananda ﬂowing through the state to merge with the river Ganga, which divides the plains into two parts. Other rivers of the state are Sone, Punpun, Phalgu, Kiul and Sakri that descend down the Chota-Nagpur Plateau south of Bihar. The state is subject to the summer monsoons during the months of June to September.

Socio-economic proﬁle

Human Development 3: Although Bihar is one of the fastest growing states of India (GDP growth rate of 9.56 percent while the national rate is 8 percent), it faces immense development challenges. Key demographic indicators of the state are presented in the following table:

Table 1: Key Demographic Indicators of Bihar 4

Particulars Census, 2011 Remarks 8 Population 10,38,04,637 3rd highest among states; Male 5,41,85,347 Population has increased from 829.99 Lakh in 2001 Female 4,96,19,920 to 1038.05 Lakh in 2011. Child Population (0-6 yrs.) 1,85,82,229 Male child 96,15,280 Female Child 89,66,949 Sex Ratio (females per 1000 males) 916 5th lowest in India (national sex ratio 940) Literacy Rate 63.82 percent Lowest among the states Density (population per sq. Km.) 1,102 Most densely populated state of the country Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) 48 (as of 2010) Reduced from 60 in 2003

The state has high levels of intra-state disparity with north Bihar lagging behind due to low agricultural productivity, poor irrigation facilities and high vulnerability to floods. The state is also often referred to as one of the most under- developed state in the country5. According to the Tendulkar Committee Report 2009, nearly 54.4 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, which is much higher than the national average of 37.2 percent. However, if factors beyond income are considered (Multi-dimensional Poverty Index), about 79.3 percent of the state’s population lives below the poverty line. In fact, the poverty ratio of the state is the second highest in the country. Rural poverty at 55.7 percent is also much higher than the urban poverty at 43.7 percent. Poverty in Bihar is a function of low per capita land holding, very low industrialization base and limited opportunities in the service sector. Low Bihar has the human endowment and poor infrastructure compound the problem. Due to limited opportunities in the state, there is second highest large scale out migration from the state both in lean and peak agriculture seasons of the country. poverty ratio in Land and its people: Predominantly an agrarian society where 88.70 percent of the population belongs to the rural areas, Bihar’s soil conditions are conducive for agricultural practices. The average land holding size in the state is the country 0.58 hectare, which is half the all-India average of 1.57 hectare. Over 80 percent farms are very small (average size despite being 0.30 hectare), whereas small and marginal farms together constitute 91 percent of the total land holdings. The uncertainty of the monsoons, the impact of floods and droughts on agriculture clubbed with the low investments rates one of the brings about low crop productivity in the state. fastest growing Migration: “The incidence of out migration from rural Bihar is probably greater than anywhere else in India” (ODI, states in India London, 2006). Seasonal and long term migration has been the trend of the workforce of the state. The workforce, (Tendulkar Committee especially from poorer households and relatively from poorer regions migrates in search of better employment Report 2009/ UNDP - opportunities and to access better labour markets. Of a sample survey conducted, it was found that around 80 Bihar Economic and percent of migrant people are male and between 15 and 40 years6 . Human Development Indicators) 9 Rural Urban Composition: The total area of the state is 94,163.00 Sq.km. out of which 92,257.51 Sq.km (97.98 percent) are rural areas and 1,095.41.Sq.km. (2.02 percent) are urban areas7. There are 14 urban agglomerations and 199 towns in Bihar with 11.30 percent people live in urban regions. This has increased drastically by 35.11 percent8 in the last 10 years. This significant increase has been mainly due to the development of towns such as Patna and Muzaffarpur as commercial hubs and Darbhanga emerging as an educational hub in the state. Disaster Risk Context

Multiple hazards and related zones: The geographical composition of Bihar, its boundary, land, water bodies, climate and above all its location makes it vulnerable to multiple hazards. Almost all the districts are prone to most of the major hazards viz. earthquake, ﬂoods, cyclone, drought, ﬁre and heat and cold wave. The following map9 depicts the multi-hazard zones in Bihar:

Figure 4: Multi-hazard zones in Bihar

10 Earthquakes: Bihar is located in the high seismic zone that falls on the boundary of the tectonic plate joining the Himalayan tectonic plate near the Bihar-Nepal Border and has six sub-surface fault lines moving towards the A large part of Gangetic planes in four directions. Of the 38 districts, 11 districts fall in seismic zone V of which 2 districts (Madhubani Bihar is located and Supaul) fall entirely in seismic zone V while 30 districts fall in seismic zone IV and 13 districts in seismic zone III with most districts falling under multiple seismic zones (i.e. either seismic zone V & IV or seismic zone IV & III). The in the high state has in the past experienced major earthquakes; the worst was the 1934 earthquake in which more than 25,000 seismic zone people lost their lives. Recent earthquake was the Sikkim earthquake in September 2011. and 28 districts Earthquakes are a major threat to cities, especially the new and growing urban centres in the state where building codes and control mechanisms are not strictly enforced. This could result in social infrastructures such as schools experience and hospitals that are not built to be earthquake resistant could lead to severe damage and loss of lives as well. flooding every Floods: Bihar’s topography is marked by a number of perennial and non-perennial rivers of which, those originating year (National from Nepal are known to carry high sediment loads that are then deposited on the plains of Bihar. A majority of the Consortium of Civil rainfall in this region is concentrated in the 3 months of monsoon during which the flow of rivers increases up to 50 Society Organizations on times causing floods in Bihar. According to the Bihar Government’s Flood Management Information Systems Cell, MGNREGA, 2001) floods of Bihar can be divided into 4 categories10 namely:

11 1. Class I: Flash floods– floods occurring due to rainfall in Nepal, lead time is short (8 hours) in Kamla-Balan, receding of flood waters is fast;

2. Class II: River ﬂoods– lead time 24 hours, receding of ﬂood waters is 1 week or more;

3. Class III: Drainage congestion in river conﬂuence- lead time more than 24 hours, lasting full monsoon season (i.e. receding of ﬂood waters takes 3 months), and no Kharif season agriculture;

4. Class IV: Permanent water logging- shrinkage in area only in February, local rainfall, micro-relief aspects.

As such, 73.63 percent of the geographical area of North Bihar is considered to be flood prone. Every year, 28 districts get flooded (of which 15 districts are worst affected) causing huge loss of property, lives, farmlands and infrastructure. During the 2008 Kosi floods, over 350,000 acres of paddy, 18,000 acres of maize and 240,000 acres of other crops were adversely affected, impacting close to 500,000 farmers11.

According to an IGC report12, Bihar has had four major flood events in 1954, 1974, 1987, and 2004. In addition, in the years 1978, 1987, 1998, 2004, 2007 and 2008 Bihar witnessed high magnitudes of floods. The total area affected by floods has also increased during these years. Bihar’s strategy to tackle these floods over the years has been to construct embankments so as to control the flow of rivers. Even though there has been significant increase in the funds allocated to the building of embankments through the 5 year plans of the state, frequency and intensity of floods has not reduced13. Drought: Bihar also faces drought situations primarily in South and South-West parts of Bihar however increasingly even North Bihar, which has a high concentration of rivers and receives ample rainfall, has also started experiencing Bihar is droughts. Districts of Munger, Nawada, Rohtas, Bhojpur, Aurangabad and Gaya are the known drought prone areas increasingly of the state. In just the last decade, drought was declared in 2004, 2006, 2009, 2010 and 2013. witnessing Conflict: It is evident that there is a growing extremism situation in Bihar. The fatalities in the Naxal (left wing adverse impacts extremism) violence in Bihar were 586 victims between 2004 and 2013 out of which 271 were civilians14. One of the worst Naxal affected districts is Gaya in South Bihar. of drought, Other Hazards: Apart from the above hazards, the state is also prone to cold and heat waves, Cyclonic storms (high climate change, speed winds) and other human-induced hazards like fire, epidemics, industrial and road / boat accidents. Incidences human-induced of fire are mainly local in nature but have a severe impact on villages. Since a majority of Kucha houses have thatch roofs and wooden structures, in the summer months when winds are high, fires from the traditional stoves spreads hazards and the damage to the entire village. conflicts Climate change: Uncertain weather patterns, changes in temperature and precipitation15, and an increase in extreme weather events is increasingly a reality in Bihar, as with the rest of the country. It has been seen that these changes have led to alterations in agricultural produce16 as well as increased incidents of localised drought and floods within the same year in the region. 12

Chapter Endnotes

2: Source: 2011 Census of India 3: UNDP - Bihar Economic and Human Development Indicators (Factsheet) 4: Source: 2011 census of India 5: GoI (2013) Report of the committee for evolving a composite development index of states 6: Journal of Social and Economic studies, A N Sinha Institute for Social Studies, Patna 7: GOB site: http://www.brandbihar.com/english/geography_of_bihar.html 8: Extracted from the census 2011 (Bihar) 9: Department of Disaster Management, Government of Bihar, http://disastermgmt.bih.nic.in/Map/Maps.htm 10: NFMISC , “Flood Report 2009” 11: National Consortium of Civil Society Organizations on MGNREGA, 2001, “Leveraging MNREGA for Flood Control: A case study for Policy Reform in Bihar”ational Consortium of Civil Society Organizations on MGNREGA, 2001, “Leveraging MNREGA for Flood Control: A case study for Policy Reform in Bihar” 12: International Growth Centre, 2012, “Strengthening the Institutional Framework for Flood and Water Resources Management in Bihar: Developing a Strategy for Reform (Phase One)” 13: ibid 14: Fatalities in the left wing extremist violence in Bihar. SATP, as accessed on 12/07/13 (http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/bihar/data_sheets/annual_casualties.asp) 15: Effect of climate change on River Kosi and its basin, Rama Mani, India Water Portal, as accessed on 20/09/13 (http://www.indiawaterportal.org/articles/effect-climate-change-river-kosi-and-its-basin) 16: Impact of climate change on wheat and winter maize over a sub-humid climatic environment, A.V.A Haris et al., Current Science, Volume104, NO. 2, January 2013 3 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 14 he disaster management context in Bihar has been shaped by a history of frequent small-scale and key large- scale disasters spread across the state. While communities facing these disasters have continued to respond Tand adapt to these risks, the institutional origins of disaster management have been reactive, and in some ways, continue to be so. Yet, a clear progression of the disaster management framework in the state is discernible in line with evolution of the national DM discourse, socio-political changes in the state, and the changing natural environment. This progression, as represented in the timeline (Figure 2) below, provides a good starting point for reviewing the state’s disaster management capacities and enables an analysis of the contributing factors to the same.

This section (in accordance with the framework of analysis) explores the different elements of the disaster management context and its progression – policy, people, programmes and their performance. At the outset, the policy context and its progression are presented with an analysis of the existing framework and its implications on disaster management in Bihar. This is followed by an analysis of the DM ecosystem, its constituent actors and the linkages between them. The programmatic activities and initiatives being undertaken within the DM ecosystem are then analysed for their focus and intended impact. Finally, the performance of the policies and programmes is examined on the basis of responses of the key informants, observations of the team, parameters existing in the international and national DM discourse, and the real-time monsoon analysis undertaken in the month of August 2013. Figure 5: DM Context Timeline

Norms of assistance passed SOP for Flood Disaster Management approved Bihar State Disaster International attention Directives regarding ﬁre, cold wave, hail storm and Management Act; towards the disaster lightening related losses issued Dept. of DM constituted scenario in Bihar

First Joint National DM Act Assessment SOPs for MCM Separate Department IAG Informally FMISC BSDMA adopted by between IAG and Drought for Disaster Relief Constituted Constituted Constituted Bihar state and Govt. being formulated

Change in SDRF state government Constituted

1934 1978 1987/88 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Large-scale ﬂoods in Munger Earthquake Large-Scale Floods Drought Large-Scale Kosi Breach Drought Drought 18 districts, & Earthquake Floods drought in 20

Large-Scale Floods 434 houses were Unmanageable by destroyed in fire Single Actors incidences across the state The evolution of Policy Environment the DM The Disaster Management Department (DMD) is the nodal department for DM in Bihar. The DM institutions in the state have evolved from a relief-oriented set-up wherein disaster relief was as an additional charge with the framework in Department of Revenue and Land Development. In 1977-78, a separate Department of Relief and Rehabilitation was established for better management of relief operations and distribution of relief packages received from the Bihar has been central government. In 2004, the name and focus of this department changed from relief and rehabilitation to disaster management based on recommendations from a High Powered Committee. This department is currently headed by influenced by a Principle Secretary on additional charge and comprises Secretary, Additional Secretary, three Officers on Special changes in the Duty (Finance, SDRF and Administration), support staff and with no personnel (rank and file) at the sub-state level. Bihar passed its state DM Act in 2004, even prior to the national DM Act of 2005. In 2007, the state Act was repealed national DM and the National DM Act was adopted. In line with the DM Act, the state DM Policy was developed with the stated goal of making a shift from the traditional relief-centric approach towards developing a ‘Culture of DRR’ in Bihar17. In discourse, the last six years, DM institutions have been established and policy instruments developed towards the fulfilment of socio-political the objectives set out by this policy. These are discussed below, followed by an analysis of the policy framework for DM in Bihar. changes in the 16 Policy-mandated institutions and status: The DM policy environment in Bihar has evolved through the state as well as establishment and strengthening of institutions for implementation and action. In 2007, Bihar State Disaster Management Authority (BSDMA) was constituted as the strategic institution for informing and shaping DM policy. the intensified BSDMA is headed by the Chief Minister as the Chairperson, with a senior retired IAS official in-charge of operational leadership as the Vice-Chairperson. The DMD is the nodal government department responsible for DM while disaster events BSDMA is mandated to inform policy and focus on DRR. In practice, the DMD focuses on preparedness and response aspects while BSDMA focuses on planning, knowledge-building and DRR measures. Operationally, the in recent history BSDMA functions independently, while its budget is routed through the DMD.

In addition to the BSDMA, the Crisis Management Group (CMG), State Executive Committee (SEC), State Disaster Response Force and State Disaster Response Fund have been speciﬁcally constituted for DM at the state-level, while the District Disaster Management Authorities have been created at district-level. The CMG is the apex state government institution, headed by the Chief Secretary and comprising representatives (Principal Secretaries) from 21 DM-related Departments, which is mandated to direct the management of any crisis in the state.

Typically, the CMG approves and recommends ﬁnancial measures for preparedness and mitigation as well as inter- departmental coordination; and in case of an event, meets on a weekly basis for taking stock of the severity of the crisis. Constituted in 2008, the SEC is the highest level body which monitors disasters, plans and sanctions guidelines, sanctions expending of funds (non plan expenditure of DMD), reviews progress and is empowered to authorize DMD to withdraw funds from State Disaster Response Fund for preparedness and mitigation actions under different heads of Non Plan Expenditure. The SEC is headed by Chief Secretary with Principal Secretaries of DMD, WRD, Finance and Development Commissioner as members and special invitees from related Departments In Bihar, as per the nature of event (for e.g. in case of drought, representatives from Agriculture and Animal Husbandry the DM policy departments are invited). Typically, the SEC meets on a monthly basis with the Chief Secretary chairing the proceedings. mandated

In accordance with NDRF (fund) mandated by the DM Act, Bihar has created a State Disaster Relief Fund in 2010 for institutional providing relief and compensation in case of natural hazards. Guidelines for the same have been developed; the architecture is DMD is the nodal Department in the state government that manages the SDRF through its Non Plan Expenditure, and the same is sanctioned by SEC. A decision has been taken to create the State Disaster Mitigation Fund with an in place with initial corpus of INR 10 Crore in the BSDMA, directives for which are still under formulation. In line with NDRF (force) clarity in its mandated by the DM Act, Bihar has constituted the State Disaster Response Force in 2010 for search and rescue operations. Operational norms and functioning guidelines for this force have been developed and approved by the objectives and State Cabinet. Selection of State Disaster Response Force personnel has started since 2011 from amongst the State Police Cadre as well as from the armed forces and civilians. A battalion has been created, which is being commanded operations by an OSD from within the DMD with plans to recruit a commander from the Police Services of the rank of Inspector General. Training of recruited State Disaster Response Force personnel has commenced with experienced NDRF personnel acting as trainers. District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMA) have been constituted at the district 17 level across all 38 districts, as mandated by the DM Act. DDMA is chaired by the District Magistrate, with the president of the ZP as co-chair and the SP, Civil Surgeon, Chief Engineer of WRD and Executive Engineer-PHED being the members. DDMA is mandated to sanction measures for preparedness and relief / response as well as to assess and monitor the disaster events. The DDMA is also mandated to plan for and undertake DM related planning and mitigation actions.

Policy Instruments and Operational Tools: The shift in focus of the state machinery towards strengthening preparedness for response has been accompanied by the development of norms, procedures, guidelines and directives for operational clarity at multiple levels, especially since 2008. In early 2012, Norms of Assistance18 were approved for relief and response through the national and state disaster response funds in Bihar. Two19 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) have been developed and four are under development for aiding consistent and swift action before, during, and after disasters. Typically, SOPs are developed in a consultative process led by the DMD with inputs from related Departments and members of the civil society (through the B-IAG), UN agencies and NDMA. After approval from the Cabinet, these are shared with the districts for implementation and are mandatory for implementation by the concerned officials. In addition to these, the DMD sends Directives to guide DM processes at district and block / circle levels, for e.g. in January 2012, a directive was sent regarding the actions to be taken by districts in response to the cold wave. A similar process is facilitated by the DMD for other departments like Health Department. Apart from the operational tools developed by the DMD, Technical Guidelines20 are developed by BSDMA, for e.g. the recently released guidelines for earthquake resilient construction. The following table depicts the status of the various policy instruments in Bihar as of April 2013: The Table 2: Status of Policy Instruments in Bihar development of Instrument Status (as of April 2013) State Disaster Relief Fund Norms Approved and issued in 2012 instruments and Approved and operational – used for preparedness planning at Flood SOP district level operational Earthquake SOP At preparatory stage tools to Mass Casualty Management SOP Process of draft finalization Hospital and Fire Safety SOP Awaiting cabinet approval translate the Drought SOP Process of draft finalization DM policy into Drinking Water Scarcity SOP Approved Cold Wave/ Fire/ Hail Storm Directives Issued by DMD in 2012 practice has Health Department Directives Issued pre-floods since 2007-08 gained traction Retrofitting Guidelines Released in 2012 Earthquake Resilient Construction Released in 2012 and momentum Guidelines and Circular 18 State Flood Management Plan Draft awaiting approval since 2012 Daily Reporting Form/ Weekly Daily/ weekly reporting during disaster-annual form consolidated Reporting Form IX at district level and shared with DMD by October

Analysis of Policy Environment

o Conducive policy environment: The evolution of the policy landscape in Bihar and the concomitant actions in the last 5 years are indicative of a conducive policy environment for programs and partnerships (both between the government and civil society; and intra-government) for DM. This can be attributed in a large part to the frequency and scale of damage by disaster events in the state, especially floods. It has been argued elsewhere21 that a ‘focusing event’ (disaster of a significant scale) leads to policy and programmatic initiatives pertaining to DM by the State. In line with this argument, it can be said that Bihar witnessed a ‘focusing event’ (Kosi 2008) at least from the governmental perspective leading to policy reform and capacity building in the state. This was evident from the multi-hazard risk perception and orientation towards DM found in discussions with state level officials who reflected upon the state’s increasing focus on strengthening preparedness and response. Many highlighted the role of the current centralized political leadership in the state in pushing the DM agenda in accordance with the national discourse. The state’s commitment has been articulated in the Approach Paper to the 12th Five Year Plan which recognizes the shift in national priorities towards DM and highlights the intended goal of “Safer Development in Bihar” through DM. o Policy focus: A conducive o Primary focus on preparedness for response: It is evident from the nature of policy instruments being developed and budgetary allocation by the government that the current focus for DM is primarily on policy preparedness for response. The SOPs and directives are geared towards strengthening response capacities environment for at different levels of the government. Further, all the planned expenditure22 of the DMD in 2012-13 had been proposed for preparedness activities. This includes the budget head for awareness generation and capacity DM has evolved building, under which, search and rescue training was conducted with communities, divers and boat drivers. over the past 95.3 percent of the non plan expenditure23 was for relief and response, while 3.9 percent was for preparedness. Only 0.7 percent was, then, proposed towards mitigation and prevention activities as the few years in amount allotted to BSDMA. Bihar primarily o Mono-hazard approach: In line with Bihar’s DM policy, which seeks to bring about ‘a culture of safety’, most due to policy documents including the State Disaster Management Plan and Approach Paper to 12th Five Year Plan recognize the multi-hazard nature of risks and event history in the state. However, this does not get translated increasing into a multi-hazard approach in policy and programmatic actions. Almost 14 districts in Northern-Bihar are in disaster events, seismic zone IV or V, are at high risk of flooding, and are at medium to high risk of high wind, cyclones and fire events. Yet, there is no policy document developed for this region addressing all the risks (across all stages of heightened 19 the DM cycle) in a collective manner. Different line departments, during the summer months, take sensitivity of preparedness related actions towards flooding but there is negligible focus on preparedness for earthquake or secondary hazards like fire. This lack of multi-hazard approach is also evident in policies and programs of officials and the the non-governmental actors. political leadership

A large part of DM expenditure in the state is currently on preparedness measures. Photo: Newly constructed warehouse for DM in West Champaran district. o Urban risks: With 35.11 percent rate of urbanisation (decadal growth for 2011-2001), Bihar currently has 7 Currently, urban Municipal Corporations, 42 Nagar Parishads, and 75 Nagar Panchayats24 of which several urban areas lie in high multi-hazard risk zones. Yet, there is marginal recognition of urban disaster risks in the DM policy framework risks feature apart from risks identified to the capital city, Patna. The state policy takes peripheral cognisance of the risks and measures to reduce them, which is further reflected in the absence of urban analysis and planning in the District only marginally Disaster Management Plans. While there are on-going efforts for reviewing and adapting the building bye-laws in the DM policy with a DM focus, this has not been incorporated in town planning yet and no roles have been defined for Urban Local Bodies in DM. For e.g., one of the biggest municipal corporations in the state, Darbhanga, doesn’t have a framework town planning department. This results in not only unplanned and unregulated growth of private housing without any audits of structures, but also in congestion, sewage mismanagement and ultimately in worsening the dynamic risk factors to the town. Even in the case of Patna, disaster management actions are limited to prevention of water from entering the city in the monsoon season, as was seen in 2013. Due to heavy rainfall in Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh, the River Ganga was flowing above the danger mark this season, threatening floods in the city after 38 years. Several blocks, including Danapur, Bakhtiyarpur, Maner, Fatuha, Patna Sadar, Barh, Athmalgola and Mokama, along the banks of the Ganga in Patna district were flooded for over a month. While actions were taken to ensure the safety of the of the 24 km long protection wall, which was created along the right bank of the Ganga river after the flooding of the city in 1975, risk reduction actions have not been planned 20 for or implemented in this regard. This is evident by the fact that unregulated construction of private and public infrastructure has been allowed inside the protection wall.

• Policy Convergence: As in other contexts, disasters impact different facets of life in Bihar as well. Therefore, in addition to the DM policy, the policies developed by various Departments, including but not limited to Agriculture, Health and Water Resources have implications for DM. However, a comprehensive and collective envisioning on DM is yet to be undertaken in the state, resulting in a lack of convergence between different policies and resultant actions. For e.g., the State is in the second phase of implementing its Agricultural Roadmap25, yet this roadmap is still not informed by the differential disaster risks across the state. This lack of analysis also translates into sub- optimal strategies proposed by the roadmap; for e.g. despite 15 districts of north Bihar being in a high ﬂood-risk zone, efforts for developing ﬂood-resistant crops have not been included in this roadmap. Further, despite the expanse and diversity of river systems in Bihar, the state’s high dependence on water bodies26, prevalent hydrological disaster risks, and the state’s changing patterns of water usage and availability27, Bihar does not have a comprehensive Water Management Policy. Different departments have drafted water management policies for the state, but none of these have been approved yet. Such a policy will not only have implications for management of disaster risks, but also prevent the creation of future risks. Similarly, the Flood Control Policy of the state (as explained below) does not have convergence with the various DM related policies. Bihar’s Flood Control Policy

Since the mid-1950s, structural measures for managing the flow of rivers (in particular, construction of embankments), have been the primary flood control strategy in Bihar and the rest of India. This flood control policy has translated in the creation of dams, barrages, canals and embankments for managing the direction and volume of flow of the seven major rivers in the state. Two barrages have been constructed on the Kosi and Gandak rivers; an embankment and canal system has been established in linkage with these barrages; and embankments constructed on the remaining five major rivers flowing through north Bihar. Till date, the policy focus is on creating and strengthening embankments for flood control; 3,629 km of embankments having been constructed so far (out of which 3179 km lie in north Bihar), with plans afoot for further construction so as to ultimately manage the flow of all 7 major rivers before they drain in river Ganga.

The current policy stance is to prevent ﬂoods through:

• Construction of embankments on the rivers that haven’t been fully embanked, like the river Bagmati • Anti-erosion works on the embankments in the pre-flood period • Deployment of home-guards for protecting the embankments against breach due to sabotage and natural riverine action 21 • Flood-fighting works on embankment during flood season

However, there is lack of clarity about the minor rivers, tributaries and distributaries of the major rivers whose ﬂow has been restricted from draining into the major rivers.

Given the perils of too narrow a restriction of river flow and the perils of narrowing down the river bed thus restricting its flow and making it prone to overflow, the embankments were so constructed that the average width between the eastern and western embankment is around 10 Km. (for Kosi River embankments). This thus created a large amount of area (viz. 120 Km length of embankments * 10 Km average width = 1200 sq. Km.) suitable for agriculture and habitation during the non-flooding months. Along with the construction of the embankments, the rehabilitation process was initiated in the 1960's but this rehabilitation is still incomplete due to communities either choosing not to avail their rehabilitation package, not receiving the package or accepting the package but still choosing to return to their villages inside the embankments. It is estimated28 that “380 revenue villages spread over four districts and 13 blocks” are still inside the Kosi embankments alone, with a population of 9.88 lakh.Since government policy doesn’t recognise the legitimate existence of these villages, they also continue to be far removed from government entitlements as all the official infrastructure is located outside. This also impacts the declaration of floods and subsequent relief distribution even though the area within the embankments gets inundated annually for 2-3 months causing flooding of varying intensities. The Birpur Barrage (in the picture) was constructed in 1962, followed by embankments along the Kosi riverbed. • Role of PRIs: The disaster management policies and policy instruments envision a minimal role for people’s representatives at the village, GP and district levels. The flood SOP highlights the role of GP members and The DM policy Mukhiya at the village level in a few preparedness measures (identification of safe spaces, shelter sites, framework vulnerable groups, mapping, early warning communication) and in response measures (deployment of boats, damage assessment and reporting, provision of relief material; activation of Anna Kalash Yojana, identification of currently does households for compensation). However, PRIs have no role in declaration of a disaster event and in DM per se, apart from that of monitoring of relief measures and recommending priority areas for relief measures. This was not clearly also witnessed during the floods of 2013 which affected 20 districts in the state; the PRIs had no role in declaration of these floods and initiating the relief measures. Discussions with ZP representatives revealed that define a role for 100,000 INR is allotted to the ZP for DM, but these are almost always unspent because of lack of guidance on the same. Despite the emphasis on decentralized governance in India after the 73rd and 74th Amendments, the role PRIs in disaster for PRIs has not been clearly defined in the DM policy framework. management, • DM cycle approach: The state DM policy of 2007 emphasises on bringing in a ‘DRR culture’, policy and nor does it programmatic initiatives are yet, to be designed taking into consideration the cyclical nature of DM. The two principal government institutions mandated for DM, viz. DMD and BSDMA, do not design and implement provide a plan programmes for all the stages of the DM cycle and have specific roles wherein DMD is responsible for 23 preparedness and response while BSDMA is responsible for knowledge building and DRR. Recovery and for DRR reconstruction measures are undertaken by the Planning Department. It was noticed that the absence of a cycle approach in practice results in non-synergistic priorities amongst the principal actors, and translates to mainstreaming differential prioritization of investment in different stages, primarily skewed towards preparedness and response.

• Mainstreaming: Bihar state’s Approach Paper to the 12th Five Year Plan recognises the need for mainstreaming DRR and identifies four key priority areas (housing, infrastructure, health and education) for doing the same. However, this policy document neither provides guidance towards a strategy for policy convergence nor a vision, road-map or perspective plan for mainstreaming. While initiatives have begun to emerge towards translating this policy into action, for e.g. BSDMA has initiated the process of reviewing and modifying the building bye-laws and has reviewed the Bihar Urban Development Act with a DM lens, these remain piecemeal so far. As reported by the DMD, 21 DM-related departments in the state have been identified and have appointed nodal officers for DM, however, the mechanisms for these officials to plan and review actions collectively are yet to be put in place. Further, the approach paper mentions that related departments should have DM plans on the basis of which they should have 10 percent budgetary allocation for DM, but this is not followed in practice. The 600-odd GoI and GoB schemes currently being implemented in Bihar present many avenues for mainstreaming DM, an opportunity that has not been systematically explored so far. • Capacity Building for DM: All the policy documents related to DM recognise the need for capacity building at Key many levels and a large number of people have been trained since the early 2000’s under different programs and stakeholders by multiple agencies. This includes training of community emergency response teams on early warning, search and rescue, first-aid, relief camp management, household-level preparedness; specialist training for divers; and recognise the orientation of government officials at the block levels, amongst others. However, a clear vision for capacity importance of building is not evident in the policy framework for DM and has, thus, not translated in a capacity building plan. Capacity building is currently perceived as training only, without a wider learning cycle approach or a plan for capacity building ensuring the application of acquired knowledge and skills. There hasn’t been an evaluation of the learning for DM but a outcomes or existing learning needs till now, and follow up or regular engagement with trained individuals is not comprehensive strategically incorporated in training programs. The principal capacity building institution for the state is BIPARD, which has a Centre for Disaster Management, yet, DM forms a small part of the courses conducted by BIPARD. understanding Mainstreaming of capacity building for DM in on-going administrative training for officials at different levels has and vision for not been conceptualized on the basis of learning need for e.g. newly recruited district level officials expressed the need to be equipped with knowledge and skills on the state’s norms and provisions for DM to be able to the same is yet implement them without delays during a disaster. However, this is not included in their training program so far. to evolve in the state 24 People – The DM Ecosystem The DM ecosystem of Bihar An exercise in mapping the actors involved in DM in Bihar reveals that an actor-centric approach does not quite capture the multiplicity and complex interactions that guide DM comprises a multitude of actions in the state. An ecosystem approach is better suited to understand and actors with varying spheres conceptualize the diversity of actors and processes that influence DM actions. Such an approach has been used extensively29 to understand complex adaptive systems that of influences and having involve the interaction of social, economic and environmental elements, and has been recently proposed30 for urban policy development and management. In essence, such an forged successful formal- approach recognizes that the interplay between natural processes and human activities influences and determines the DM functions carried out by constituent actors of the informal connections; yet, ecosystem. Further, the conceptualization of the DM ecosystem in Bihar is derived from its following qualities: this ecosystem lacks

• Multiplicity: DM actions are currently undertaken by several actors with varied collective envisioning and mandates, identities, and roles; through diverse programmes; and in different shared goals geographies. These include Government actors, Quasi-Government actors, Civil 25 Society actors, UN agencies, Corporates, Academia, and the affected communities themselves. The levels of action vary from the hamlets31 to village, block, district (town/city in urban areas) and state.

• Interconnectedness: DM actions taken by many actors are interrelated and often dependant on those of other actors for effectiveness, for instance, timely release of information about the water discharge from the barrages by WRD can enable early warning regarding floods to government officials and community members. Similarly, for the Health Department to ensure the safety of hospitals in urban centres like Patna Figure 6 represents the different actors in the DM ecosystem or Darbhanga, coordination and partnerships would be required between departments according to their stage of functionality (response, early for urban development, building construction, disaster management and urban local recovery, rehabilitation/ reconstruction, mitigation/ bodies. What makes this interconnectedness an inherent quality of the ecosystem is prevention and preparedness) and levels of action (state, that the achievement of DM outcomes is dependent on collective action and synergy. district/ towns, block, and village/urban ward). Additionally, their identity is represented through the colour of the circles • Dynamism: Tracing the historical evolution of the DM context (see Figure 6 below) (government- maroon, quasi-government- purple, UN- pink, reveals that the ecosystem has also evolved along with disaster and socio-political civil society- orange and communities- blue) and their ‘sphere of influence32’ indicated through size of the circle events, as indicated by the emergence of new actors in close progression with these (small, medium and large). The reporting lines between events. Additionally, the actions taken by the ecosystem influence the levels of disaster these actors (where existing) are also indicated in the risks in return. These factors make the ecosystem an inherently dynamic entity. illustration with directional arrows. Figure 6: The DM Ecosystem

Response Risk Reduction

Mainstreaming

Prevention

Mitigation &

Recovery

Preparedness Early

Reconstruction Rehabilitation/

CMG World Health Red Health Bank Cross Media WRD BIPARD Red Agriculture WRD Cross Agriculture WRD DMD SEC UN BSDMA UN BIAG FMISC States Line Agencies Line Agencies BAPEPS BIAG BIAG Social Corp. Social PHED PHED Research NDRF/ Welfare Welfare FMISC INGOs DMD Institutes SDRF Other Media INGOs INGO Other Depts. Depts. Depts. INGOs

Media DDMA Health DDMA Health CS CS DM DM Kosi ULBs Recovery ADM Agriculture WRD ADM Agriculture WRD Project Sr. DC EE. EE. Sr. DC EE. EE. Districts WRD PHED Line Agencies NGOs WRD PHED Line Agencies NGOs ZP ZP Social Social President PHED President PHED District Welfare Welfare Activists SP ZP SP ZP Admin Other Other Depts. Depts.

Health Health BDO Agriculture Agriculture Block/ WRD WRD Line Agencies Line Agencies PS Panchayat CO ULBs PS CO PS Social Social PHED PHED Welfare Welfare Other Other Depts. Depts.

CBOs VDMCs ANM/ ANM/ ASHA GP ASHA GP Village/ CERTS Urban AWW Teachers AWW Teachers GP Ward FBOs Communities Communities Communities Communities Service Providers Service Providers

Identity of actors Government Civil Society Communities UN Quasi-government Sphere of inﬂuence

High to low Analysis of DM Ecosystem

In many ways, the DM eco-system in Bihar is a nascent one despite the long history of disaster events in the state. A few actors like the Water Resources Department, DMD (earlier, as Department of Relief and Rehabilitation) and some non-governmental organisations have been traditionally involved in disaster response; yet, the evolution of many actors, increased engagement of pre-existing actors, and expansion of their functionality in different stages is fairly recent and still on-going.

It is evident from Figure 6 above, that a large majority of actors are still operational in response and preparedness stages, and very few actors are engaging in other aspects of disaster risk reduction. While a quasi-government body has been established for rehabilitation and reconstruction (BAPEPS), none of the government actors have a specified role in early recovery. This may, however, also be because separate actions for early recovery (other than immediate response actions) have not been envisioned in the policy33 framework itself. INGOs have carried out early recovery actions post the floods in 2008, including livelihood restoration through cash-for-work programmes, seed provision etc. Further, it should be noted that no single actor is functional across all stages of the DM cycle apart from the affected communities themselves. In their case also, the involvement is minimal in mitigation, 27 prevention and mainstreaming. Other actors who are depicted under mitigation, prevention and mainstreaming (like research institutes - BIPARD, WALMI, FMIS) have very limited roles currently contributing towards these goals. ULBs and people’s representatives have a very small sphere of influence on both policy and implementation at all stages, except the PRIs at the village and GP levels who are involved in beneficiary identification and monitoring of response / rehabilitation work. The role of corporates is also very limited so far with agencies like Mahindra Foundation and ICICI Foundation stepping in to support the rehabilitation and reconstruction activities after the 2008 Kosi floods. This DM ecosystem also has a limited role in influencing the declaration of a disaster event in the state, as evidenced during the declaration of 2013 floods in Bihar.

Collective Envisioning: Despite the interconnectedness of the actors in the ecosystem, a shared vision for disaster management which takes into account the multiple aspirations, capacities and linkages between the actors is yet to be realized. Evolving a shared vision and goalposts, which are lacking at present, would enable inclusive strategies for DM whereby every actor has a defined role, there exists collective leadership, and a well-defined roadmap for implementation. The WRD has been traditionally involved in DM through flood protection work. Picture: Anti- erosion work on river Gandak in West Champaran district. Connectors: The functional dependence between actors in the ecosystem is operational through both formal and The DM informal connectors. Mandatory instruments like the flood SOP and official directives on preparedness and response enable consistent actions across different administrative levels; information-sharing protocols like the Form IX ecosystem has enable data collection; partnership arrangements between state-level and district-level NGOs further aid action and information collection. In the current scenario, strong relationships between DMD and civil society actors (through B- a multitude of IAG) also act as informal connectors, enabling collaborative efforts between government and civil society. The impact of weak / absent connectors in the eco-system, then, also impacts its effective functioning for e.g. the actors but is reporting lines from the DMD at the state-level extend through the district administration and circle officers but are not connected to GP or village level actors, impacting the outreach of DM actions. constrained by

Capacities of the Ecosystem: the lack of

 Quantum: The DMD at state level is headed by a Principal Secretary with an additional charge for the Health sufficient and Department and has other officials either on special duty or on deputation with significant number of posts vacant. There is no rank and file for the department at the district, block and community levels thus the functioning of the technically department is dependent on officials from other departments (Revenue, Health and such) to function on additional charge. These officials are already burdened with, what is considered, their primary responsibilities and often take capable human 29 up DM as a seasonal responsibility. In other departments, 21 Officers have been appointed as nodal officers for resources for disaster management. BSDMA is also currently understaffed with only 3 out of 8 nominated members and no technical experts or implementing staff and also doesn’t have any staff other than at the state level. – It is notable, disaster however, that the process for recruitment of technical experts under five divisions - Natural Disaster Division, Environment and Climate Change Adaptation Division, Human Resource Development and Capacity Building management Division, Human Induced Disasters Division and Administration & Finance Division is on-going in the BSDMA. The training institutes responsible for DM also face a major human resource gap, currently functioning without a single in-house trainer for DM.

 Technical Expertise: Existing staff of the DMD or the 21 nodal officers have not yet been systematically trained on disaster risk analysis, planning and programming; however, a few officers have had opportunities to participate in capacity building workshops and conferences. This has resulted in limited technical expertise on disaster risk analysis, planning and programming amongst the nodal officers and the DMD. This is so probably because DM occupies a very small part (2-3 days in a 6 month period) of the training programme for administrative officials, and additional training efforts have been piecemeal. Different kinds of technical capacities are required at different levels, for e.g. policy-making, expenditure of allocated budget (only 20 percent of the planned expenditure was spent in 2012-13), data-management (use of population data for risk analysis and planning), planning and implementation. Additionally, capacities for designing and delivering effective training are yet to be strengthened to an optimal level. While this review did not focus on the technical capacities within the various non-governmental agencies and groups, Various it is pertinent that these be explored in detail for a better understanding of the available resources within the state. schemes, long- Capacity building forms a key component of many civil society initiatives, including training courses on community- based disaster risk management for their staff, amongst others. The impact of these needs to be studied to explore term whether this has created a pool of technical experts, or further enabled the emergence of risk reduction initiatives by programmes, these individuals. Currently, there doesn’t exist a comprehensive roster of all the trained experts in the state, even projects and though the Inter-Agency Group facilitates this process from within their members when there is a requirement. activities for DM Programmes are being carried The realization of policy objectives by actors in the DM ecosystem is undertaken through various programmes out in the state. including projects (for e.g. the Kosi Recovery Project was started by the World Bank in 2010 to support flood recovery and risk reduction efforts of GoB), schemes (for e.g. the Anna Kalash Scheme was launched by the GoB in 2011 to However, a prevent starvation deaths by ensuring decentralized access to contingency food grains, especially in drought-prone comprehensive districts), and activities (for e.g. BSDMA organises the observation of Earthquake Safety Week in the state from 15th analysis of January). These programmatic actions are undertaken in different stages of the DM cycle and vary from as short a time period as one week, to a couple months (as in the case of small-scale responses), to long term programmes (for existing and e.g. UNICEF’s Community-based Disaster Risk Reduction Programme has been on-going since 2009). The nature 30 requisite of work carried out in these programmes also has commonly emerging themes running across different stages like infrastructure development, provision of equipment and materials, capacity building etc. At the same time, some capacities for programme actions are typical to a stage of disaster management. A snapshot of the on-going programme actions in DM is yet to be different stages of the disaster management cycle is presented in the illustration below (Figure 4). This is followed by undertaken an analysis of the design and nature of programmes in the ecosystem.

57 ﬂood shelters have been proposed under the Kosi Recovery Project.

Picture: Flood shelter in Birpur block of Supaul district.

While there exist Analysis of Programmes in the DM Eco-system • Hazard Focus: An analysis of the nature of programme activities reveals that their focus is largely on a singular diverse hazard i.e. floods. While such a focus in the response and rehabilitation / reconstruction phases can be explained initiatives for DM by the non-occurrence of major hazardous events other than floods in the recent history, it is still noticeable that in the state specific actions for earthquakes, fires, and drought are either minimal or missing from the preparedness and mitigation / prevention stages as well for e.g. all the equipment and material that has been provided to the district along all stages administration so far is for flood preparedness. The flood-prone districts are equally prone to frequent fire of the DM cycle, incidents that, although localized, cause substantial damage to the affected households. Yet, adequate fire- fighting equipment is yet to be made available and accessible in times of need. There exist civil-society DRR many emerge as programs that take multi-hazard perspectives, working with communities for taking precautionary measures being mono- against fire incidents or ensuring earthquake safety in schools but these are limited to the pilot districts. At the same time, there are few on-going civil society programmes for drought in the stages, even in the districts of south hazard focused. Bihar that face droughts annually. Finally, initiatives have been undertaken towards earthquake awareness and They lack development of guidelines for safer construction in the state, but these remain marginal so far. people's • Geographical Focus: It was observed that while most on-going programmes in the DM ecosystem are designed participation and to address the principle risks faced by districts, the contextual risks of socio-geographies within the districts are 32 not addressed through differential planning. All the governmental and non-governmental programmes are leave many implemented uniformly across all areas, without addressing the differential risks within and outside the contextual embankments. Civil society targeting does seek to address social vulnerabilities by focussing on areas with large population of Maha-dalits and dalits, but the program design remains constant. In the same vein, urban risks underlying risks remain largely unaddressed due to focus on rural areas. un-addressed. • Community Participation: Discussions with different stakeholders in the eco-system revealed that almost all the government initiatives for DM were not community-driven and often involved minimal community participation, both in the design and implementation phases. The design of capacity building modules or awareness campaigns does not involve inputs from communities either in the form of needs assessment or inclusion and utilization of traditional knowledge. Similarly, while role of people’s representatives is envisioned for the identification of beneficiaries during response, the lack of community engagement in the preparedness phase results in implementation gaps. This was also reflected in the process of construction of flood shelters in selected districts in the Kosi river basin, whereby neither the identification of location, nor the management of the shelters is community-driven. While it is evident that gaps in the existing level of functioning of the PRIs in Bihar translates in to the lack of people’s participation in DM programs, it is also true that a well-defined role for PRIs has not been envisioned in the DM eco-system yet. Perhaps, the only exception to this is the Owner Driven Reconstruction component of the Kosi Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project wherein the owners of the houses are involved in the selection and construction of their houses. Started as a civil society initiative, the housing reconstruction project was transferred to Despite multi-hazard risks, the focus of most the government and engages community DM programmes is still largely on floods. facilitators for ensuring people’s participation. Picture: Fire Station in Bettiah, West Champaran • Piecemeal approach on DRR: This review is not meant to be an evaluation of the government and civil society programmes. Yet, the sense that one gets while interacting with the actors from the DM ecosystem and especially the communities across 10 districts is that the nature and design of the civil society initiatives is more “project” based wherein the scale and duration of the initiative is limited. For e.g. for a decade now, DRR programmes by civil society have focussed on creating and strengthening community institutions for DM resulting in numerous such 33 committees across the state. However, a stock- taking exercise of these institutions and their level of functioning has not been done even as more institutions continue to be created. Increasingly, civil society actors incorporate lessons learnt from past programmes to focus on establishing linkages with the government, but a long-term vision is still lacking and the challenges of sustainable development also continue to be faced by DM programmes. DRR is yet to be integrated in the DM related programming by actors of the DM ecosystem in the state despite the evident need for the same. Performance

Measuring the performance of DM policies, people and programs presents unique challenges, in a large part because of the dependence of performance on the occurrence of a hazard event. This challenge is heightened as one moves across the stages of the DM cycle, wherein actions taken during a response can be measured against its intended outcomes in the short-term, and preparedness actions against response actions when there is a response. For example, such retrospective analyses of the response to the 2008 floods due to the breach on the Kosi embankment have been carried out and informed action thereafter. According to a report34, “one of the clear lessons learned that emerged from the Kosi 2008 floods for the Government of Bihar is to improve the institutional performance of agencies engaged in flood risk management activities in the state. Shortcomings in decision making, staff skills and delays in maintenance were some of the key factors that underpinned the Kosi Afflux Bund breach in 2008.” However, it is difficult to estimate the impact of other risk reduction actions. Standards, like the Sphere Standards, enable benchmarking and evaluation of a response performance, and by extension, preparedness actions as 34 well. But no such standards exist for risk reduction actions. Internationally, the Hyogo Framework of Action35 provides a comprehensive framework for risk reduction, and there exist indicators for monitoring progress on its five proposed priority actions. But this has not been adapted for the Indian context yet. Nationally, the NDMA Act and policy instruments like the NDMA Guidelines provide hazard-specific actions for DM across all stages. These, and state level instruments like the SOPs, have been used in this section to review Bihar’s performance so far. Further, in order to overcome the challenge of performance measurement, a real-time analysis was undertaken in the monsoon months in August 2013 to enrich the findings of this report. The preparedness and response sections are informed by this real-time analysis. Policy Performance Policy Performance: Bihar’s Flood Control Policy T h e f o r m a t i o n o f a s e p a r a t e department of disaster management The policy of controlling floods in Bihar through embanking its has brought in focussed action major rivers has been consistently upheld since the 1950’s. Since towards DM, extending beyond relief. the pre-1954 period, when there were 160 km of embankments, the However, this department still remains total length of embankments in the state has increased to 3,465 km. as an additional charge with the Government expenditure36 on flood protection works has increased Principal Secretary of the Health from INR 0.13 million in the First Five Year Plan (1951-1956) to INR Department. Currently, the DMD is 106 billion in the Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-2007). INR 159 billion only able to spend 20 percent of its has been spent by the WRD on flood protection works in 2010-2011 planned expenditure, and lacks staff at alone. Despite the increasing investment towards the policy, an the sub-state level as well as lack evaluation of its projected and real impacts is yet to be undertaken technical staff at the state level. at the state-level. Additionally, large-scale responses also impact the financial management Even as a systematic study is yet to be conducted, an analysis of 35 at district, circle and GP levels wherein the pre- and post-embankment socio-geographies is indicative of large sums of money flow in during the changes brought about by the construction and maintenance of disasters which the PRIs and banks embankments. The estimated flood-prone area has gone up37 from are not equipped to handle, leading to 2.5 million hectares in pre-1945 period to 6.89 million hectares in leakages. BSDMA has carried out the post-1954 period. A study38 of land contours shows that the river several, albeit piecemeal, initiatives bed has risen approximately one metre per decade after the for risk reduction and has established embankments were built. This is due to the siltation in the rivers, the norms and rules for its operation in especially Kosi, resulting in a situation where the riverbed is higher 2012. But it currently lacks technical inside than that outside the embankments. Despite the capacity for planning, monitoring and rehabilitation process accompanying embankment construction, implementation and has inadequate nearly 25 percent of the population in northern Bihar lives within the staff. embankments in 380 villages39. Performance analysis of the state’s flood control policy has been presented separately below given the criticality of the same: Despite the rehabilitation policy, 9.88 lakh people continue to live within embankments, commuting across the rivers to the mainland.

Photo: Supaul block, Supaul The settlements within the embankments face annual inundation resulting in flooding of varying intensities. As per reports and experts, heavy flooding is caused when the water discharge from the barrage exceeds 350,000 cusecs and results in inundation of that heightened level for more than a week. This heavy flooding results in the river waters entering people’s houses causing displacement. During this period, people take up temporary shelters on the embankments for several weeks at a stretch resulting in complete disruption of access to and provision of entitlements as well as emergence of dignity and protection-related issues. Such heavy flooding has occurred a few times (1987, 1990, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004 and 2007) in the past couple of decades. Medium flooding is caused when the water discharge from the barrage is between 200,000 to 350,000 cusecs and results in inundation for more than a week. This medium flooding results in the river waters entering people’s agricultural lands and causing land erosion and at times also loss of home-stead lands. Medium flooding of such nature occurs in those years when heavy flooding is not there.

Given the state’s stance on having rehabilitated these settlements and the continuing disruption of access, provision of entitlements within these villages is impacted all year round. On the other hand, the villages immediately outside the embankments experience water-logging for 0.5 to 1 km on both sides, hindering agricultural activity in water-logged fields. The seepage of water from the embankments contributes to this situation. A comparative analysis of development indicators between these settlements and outside is yet to be undertaken. While this was not the focus of 36 this review, the team’s discussions in these districts suggest variability in access to essential services, infrastructure development and security conditions. The heightening social unrest in these areas was especially flagged as a cause of concern by many. Interestingly, the only available study40 comparing these settlement types concludes that the “strategy of gradually moving away from reliance on embankments and instead building infrastructure to live with floods would (1) Not result in a net loss of agricultural or other output or health, etc., (2) Save large sums of money currently going into embankment maintenance, and (3) Prevent the apparently inevitable disasters that occur every few years when there is a major embankment breach”.

Further, an analysis of the breach history reveals two salient points. Firstly, despite the investment in embankment protection (it is estimated41 that the cost of managing embankments is far higher than building them), 13 breach incidents have occurred on the Bagmati river embankment alone since 1985. Secondly, the causes of the breaches are not just natural and may result from local understanding and actions towards release of river water by cutting the embankments.

This evolving disaster risk context in Bihar merits questioning whether the current ﬂood control policy is “encouraging mitigation measures based on technology, traditional wisdom and environmental sustainability”, as envisioned in the National Policy on Disaster Management (2009); thus, also necessitating that future risk reduction actions be informed by an analysis of the context and the relevance of existing policies towards addressing the risks. Salient features of the policy and programmatic performance across various stages (refer to Key below) of the DM cycle are presented in the tables below: Figure 8: Performance Analysis Policy Performance

 Institutional strengthening and policy instruments have created a paradigm shift from relief to preparedness.  The Flood SOP has streamlined monsoon preparedness planning by providing a checklist of clear actions that need to be taken. However, this does not always get translated into action uniformly at all levels.  Other SOPs are yet to be ﬁnalized or used by the districts.

 Existing administrative structures from state to circle levels are geared for L142 flood, fire and drought responses; relief distribution has been standardized through the State Disaster Relief Fund norms.  However, the engagement of communities and people’s representatives has not been realized yet, leading to gaps in outreach and exclusion biases.  The incident command system is not clear for an eventuality of L2/L3 floods or earthquakes, especially in urban areas.  The provisions for effective drought management are also yet to be standardized in state policy and guidelines.  Neither the policies nor its instruments provide clear guidance on declaration of a disaster event.

 The rehabilitation policy for embankment related displacements is yet to be evaluated for its effective implementation, while a large population continues to live within embankments.  The Kosi Rehabilitation policy is being actualized, but with reported operational challenges (including targeting and inclusion) and delays. 37  Lack of a clear roadmap and leadership for mainstreaming has resulted in DM focus largely towards preparedness and response.  Review of urban policies has been initiated but ULBs currently have a limited role in town-planning and legal enforcement and therefore, monitoring and regulation of modiﬁcations to existing buildings, including seismic strengthening and retroﬁtting is not being carried out currently.  The State Disaster Relief Fund is meant for preparedness and response measures and therefore mitigation and prevention actions remain marginal.  DM has been incorporated in the school curriculum for class 9 and 10.  Civil Society actors like INGOs and NGOs also don’t have a clear policy for mainstreaming within their own systems, wherein on-going projects under different sectors are yet to incorporate disaster risk reduction measures.

Program Performance: Planning

 The pre-monsoon preparedness plans and drought contingency plans are made based on the directives by the respective state department. Besides, all departments at the district level function as per the directives and orders of the District Magistrate.

 The State-level response plans currently are not made for different levels of disasters or for multiple hazards; most of north Bihar districts prepare ﬂood preparedness plans and the south Bihar districts contingency plan on drought. No plans include earthquake or on ﬁre preparedness which is common in the state.

 As per the DM Act 2005, the state is responsible in drafting the SDMP at the state level and DDMPs at the respective district level, the state plan has recently been released. The drafting of DDMPs is being done on a pilot basis with civil society organizations,with a couple of DDMPs released. Most of them, however, are still yet to be ﬁnished.

Preparedness Response Early Recovery, Rehabilitation & Reconstruction Mitigation & Prevention Program Performance: Capacity Building The currently existing model for capacity building in all stages does not involve a systematic engagement with different elements of the learning cycle – learning needs assessment, design of modules based on needs at different levels, follow-up with participants with refresher courses, evaluation of impact or ensuring the application of acquired knowledge and skills.

 The lists of trained divers are archived with the district and local authorities but it was observed that at critical times it becomes difficult to mobilize these trained divers. This is a partly a reflection of the participant selection process (often from one village for the entire district) and partly because the participants are not engaged with after the training. In certain situations it was reported that these divers were not able to handle actual situations as they did not feel confident even after undergoing the training.

 Community Emergency Response Teams and task-forces established by civil society have shown to respond to disasters in the past, but there has been no systematic evaluation of their performance. Given that the communities have always been ﬁrst responders to disasters, the response actions cannot be conclusively attributed to capacity building efforts. Similarly, the Red Cross is reported to have trained 75,000 volunteers across the state who play an active role immediately after a disaster, yet this hasn’t been systematically analyzed or their performance tested.

 Capacity building was undertaken for masons and architects under the Kosi Recovery Programme for reconstruction work, and they are currently engaged with the programme for the same.

 The training on earthquake resilient building for engineers, architects, masons and contractors is a promising initiative by the state. Efforts are on-going to bring technical experts from IIT to deliver these training. However, the entire process was delayed by 1-2 years as the state lacked capacities for undertaking this process. 38 Additionally, there is low uptake amongst the master trainers for this training, which is delaying the process further.

Program Performance: Infrastructure

 EOC buildings have been established at state and district levels. However, operational mechanisms for the EOCs are yet to be developed despite initiation of the process since 2009-10. This impacts DM actions like the dissemination of early warning messages from the state to the community (last mile connectivity), which are yet to be carried out effectively during disasters.  Similarly, the newly constructed warehouses in the districts visited are yet to be fully used for prepositioning, which is proposed for the pre-ﬂood season every year.

 Construction of all the proposed flood shelters is still on-going, and is perceived as a welcome development in the recipient villages. Since there hasn’t been an event since then, their use hasn’t been tested, but currently operational mechanisms for the shelters are yet to be put in place.  The infrastructure for fire hazards, both primary and as a secondary hazard from earthquakes remains largely inadequate. This includes fire-stations and hospitals that need to be equipped for mass casualty management.

 The newly constructed bridges and road network has increased connectivity to previously remote areas in north Bihar. At the same time, it is opined that the bridges may further restrict the flow of the fast-paced rivers without creation to alternate exit points for the water. This is yet to be analysed.  Solar panelled hand-pumps and iron filters fitted in Kosi recovery areas, but were not found to be functional in areas visited.

 The issue of raised river bed inside the embankment has so far not been resolved thereby creating additional pressure on the embankments and worsening the risks. Moreover there is no clear stance and / or guidelines about development of public infrastructure for areas within the embankments.

Preparedness Response Early Recovery, Rehabilitation & Reconstruction Mitigation & Prevention Program Performance: Data Management Program Performance: Equipment and Material

 Forms ‘P’ and ‘S’ are collated by the district health societies and shared with  The state has identified 21 departments related to DM. These 21 state health societies to ensure early warning and early action systems for departments have appointed one designated nodal officer (officer in- detection of outbreak. The operational and quality issues with data collection charge) to oversee the DM activities in their respective departments. has affected the readiness of the systems for early detection and response to However, these nodal officers do not come together at a common platform outbreaks of disease. for joint planning and coordination of preparedness actions.  Currently, there is no system for collecting, analyzing and monitoring risk  The Bihar IAG which is a civil society initiative is appreciated by the state information for better preparedness apart from the information received by the and is a coordinating body between the government and the civil society. districts about water discharge from barrages. The civil society supports the government in DM activities for e.g. in developing SOPs, finalizing SDMP, etc.  Form IX is prepared and sent on a weekly basis along with report from blocks to District during floods. These are then compiled and sent to the state based on  Though there is good coordination between the government and other which decisions about relief and compensation are meant to be taken. stakeholders at the state and district level, however at the block level there However, the credibility of the data for decision-making was questioned by is a lack of coordination amongst departments. Actions are taken as per many stakeholders interviewed. Further, there are currently no monitoring the directions of CO and BDO who are the weakest link in the entire DM processes to ensure robustness of this data. eco-system. In most occasions the local authority ends up seeking support from community first responders, volunteers and civil societies.  Kosi recovery project monitored and evaluated by the World Bank and GoB, but these results are currently not in the public domain.  39 There is very less involvement of DMD and BSDMA in rehabilitation work.  Village-wise information about flood-proneness exists with FMIS. The state has also developed flood atlas which is yet to be released. A multi hazard  There is lack of coordination and structured dialogue between WRD and vulnerability mapping exercise is also in process. DMD as the prior is involved in embankment construction and the later in  Despite these innovations, these efforts remain piecemeal, and most relief distribution. There is no dialogue with civil society activists on issues importantly, currently do not inform planning. related to embankments and drought.

Program Performance: Equipment and Material

 After the experiences from 2008, it is the first time that boats and  NDRF is well-equipped with all necessary equipment and materials. They communication equipment have been provided at the district levels. This has are aware of the usage and maintenance been accompanied with training of boat drivers in some districts, but not all.  Where boats are available, their deployment is not based on a standard Discussions with district level officials revealed, however, that the quantity is not and transparent process. enough for e.g. most districts get 2-3 motor boats, while they are required by  The State is yet to involve corporate sector in making available their different departments in addition to administration. Private boats are hired in services and resources to the government during immediate aftermath of this scenario, but many boat owners are not ready to work for the local disasters. authorities due to delayed payment procedures.  District officials are not aware of the usage of office equipments like GPS, fax machine and computers and in most districts these still remain unused, therefore not serving the purpose it was intended to.

Preparedness Response Early Recovery, Rehabilitation & Reconstruction Mitigation & Prevention The partnerships Critical Analysis - Catalysts and Barriers A retrospective analysis of the performance of the DM ecosystem reveals that certain factors have aided and between civil expedited progress towards DM goals. At the same time, there exist barriers that hinder optimal performance of society, the ecosystem. Emerging from analysis, these factors were also discussed and validated with key informants in government Bihar. These are discussed below: actors and the Catalysts political • Event History: Bihar has witnessed multiple events of various hazards over the past few decades, some resulting in impact of very high magnitude (most recent being floods in 2002, 2004, 2007 and 2008). This has leadership in the drawn national and international attention to the flood-related risks in the state as well as enhanced the sensitivity state emerge as of the state administration towards the risks due to first-hand experiencing of the events by the officials. This coupled with the recent discussion and debate in the disaster management discourse has acted as a catalyst in catalysts influencing the agenda and urgency in functioning of the DM ecosystem in Bihar. enhancing the • Political will and Leadership: The keenness of the current political leadership towards ensuring that the scale of efficacy of the devastation experienced in past disasters is not witnessed again emerged as a common theme across many 40 discussions with administrative officials at all levels. It was opined that this will and its practical expressions, when DM ecosystem coupled with the existing incident command system, is a clear catalyst. Further analysis of the DM context timeline reveals that many critical DM actions and developments have been preceded by the appointment of the current heads of the DMD and BSDMA. Despite the clear lack of human resources, the leadership has been able to steer the DM institutions towards development of policy instruments and introduction of DM programmes outside of the relief-centric approach. And this leadership emerges as a salient catalyst towards the evolution of the DM ecosystem in Bihar.

• Policy-mandated Institutions and Instruments: The establishment of DM institutions and development of policy instruments have deﬁnitely brought focused attention towards DM actions, acting as connectors between the multiple actors in the ecosystem. A separate department of Disaster Management has enabled allocation of human (albeit few) and ﬁnancial resources towards disaster management, while the BSDMA has initiated many studies and policy review processes, initiatives that were clearly undertaken because of the formation of these institutions.

Advocacy and Partnerships: The role of partnerships between civil society and government / quasi-government actors is evident, especially in development of policy instruments like the SOPs, awareness programs like the Flood Awareness Weeks and capacity building programs like the planned mason training courses. This recognition of the need for collective action and its translation into practice is a key factor for expediting progress of the ecosystem. Barriers The barriers • Demand for DRR: Despite the frequent event history and regular impact of disasters in majority of the state, the hindering the demand for disaster risk reduction appears to be very low across the political spectrum and the primary constituency viz. the affected-communities. Disaster relief still continues to be an entitlement that is sought and efﬁcacy of the ﬁnds articulation in the demands and actions of people’s elected representatives. At the same time, however, it needs to be explored whether the demand (for risk reduction actions, especially mitigation, prevention or DM ecosystem mainstreaming) itself is low or the avenues for its expression limited. In either case, this translates into an absence of people’s pressure, which perpetuates the prioritization of DM actions in the eco-system towards preparedness are and response only. underpinned by • Public Discourse on DM: The engagement between different actors in the eco-system is yet to be a sustained and vibrant one, resulting in sub-optimal utilisation of the space for discourse and knowledge creation despite the political partnerships established. That DM has not entered the public discourse beyond relief is evident in the lack of activities like the people’s report or annual ranking of DM actions; seminars; research papers; media engagement economy and lastly, of dissenting voices in the eco-system. This further impacts decision-making, which still has to be informed by debate, incorporation of local wisdom and collective evaluation of the disaster management policies factors in Bihar so far. 41 as well as the • Collective Envisioning: The lack of collective envisioning by all the actors in the eco-system is also a barrier to its effective functioning for even though several actors are involved with varying mandates, resources and systematic gaps capacities, they are currently not working towards commonly set goalposts. within the DM • Technical Competencies: Even where institutional goals and strategies exist there is a lack of technical competencies for risk analysis, risk-informed design and management of programmes, both in the administrative ecosystem itself framework and in the policy-making / shaping institutions. This also includes the lack of competencies for carrying out the capacity building work itself and is thus, a key barrier for progress.

• Lack of adequate human resources: The lack of rank and file, for the DMD, at the district and sub-district level acts as a barrier given that the revenue department’s officials at district to community level are required to undertake the DM related actions, which do not become a priority until a disaster is declared. The lack of orientation or capacity building on disaster risk analysis and risk-informed development planning of the revenue department’s officials at the cutting edge also acts as a barrier in the effective functioning of the DM ecosystem. Chapter Endnotes

17: Government of Bihar (2007) Bihar State DM Policy, pp 4 18: DMD, Government of Bihar (2012) 19: The two approved SOPs are available at http://disastermgmt.bih.nic.in/publication_1.htm 20: See for example, Zone V Guidelines http://bsdma.org/images/stories/Documents/BSDMA/Zone5.pdf 21: Erramilli, B. P., 2008 "Disaster Management in India: Analysis of Factors Impacting Capacity Building", Political Science Dissertations. Paper 15. 22: Amounting to INR 51,60,53,000 (GoB, 2013) 23: Amounting to about INR 400 Crore (GoB, 2013) 24: GoI, Approach Paper to 12th Five Year Plan 25: Launched in 2008, the agricultural road map is an initiative by the Department of Agriculture in Bihar to increase the income of farmers to viable levels, ensure food and nutritional security, and revitalize farming and to ensure agricultural growth with justice. It not only focuses on 42 agriculture, but also on its allied fields of livestock and poultry, sericulture, fishers, etc. 26: Government of India, 2008 “Bihar’s Agriculture Development: Opportunities and Challenges – A report of the Special Task Force on Bihar” 27: Kishore A., 2004 “Understanding Agrarian Impasse in Bihar”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol 39, No. 31 28: Mishra, D. K., 2008 “Trapped! Between the Devil and Deep Waters” 29: See Machlis, G E, Force, J E, and William R Burch, Jr., 1997 “The Human Ecosystem Part I: the Human Ecosystem as an Organization Concept in Ecosystem Management”, Society & Natural Resources 10, 347–367 and Pickett, S T A, William R, Burch, J, Dalton, S. E., Foresman, T W, Grove, J M, and Rowntree, R., 1997 “A Conceptual Framework for the Study of Human Ecosystems in Urban Areas”, Urban Ecosystems 1(4),185–199 30: UNU/IAS (2003) Defining an Ecosystem Approach to Urban Management and Policy Development 31: Villages in Bihar comprise clusters of households called hamlets, often located a distance away from each other. A village may have as many as 5-6 hamlets. 32: The Sphere of Influence is based on interactions with key stakeholders on the perceived mandates and roles of actors in the eco-system, scale of resources allocated for DM, and the current levels of functioning 33: As also discussed here, UNICEF/BIAG/ Knowledge Works, 2012 “Review of Disaster Management Act, 2005 - Potential and Prospects” 34: GoB, 2010, as quoted in International Growth Centre, 2012, “Strengthening the Institutional Framework for Flood and Water Resources Management in Bihar: Developing a Strategy for Reform (Phase One)” 35: The HFA is a 10 year framework for action, developed and agreed on in 2005 between governments, international agencies, and disaster experts. It outlines five priorities for action, and offers guiding principles and practical means for achieving disaster resilience. More information on the HFA can be found at http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfa 36: NDMA Guidelines categorize the levels of disasters into L0, L1, L2, & L3 based on the ability of various authorities to deal with them. 37: WRD Annual Report 2010-11, as quoted in: International Growth Centre, 2012, “Strengthening the Institutional Framework for Flood and Water Resources Management in Bihar: Developing a Strategy for Reform (Phase One)” 38: Ibid. 39: Dixit , A., 2009 “Kosi Embankment Breach in Nepal: Need for a Paradigm Shift in Responding to Floods” 40: Mishra, D. K., 2008 “Trapped! Between the Devil and Deep Waters” 41: Somanathan, E., 2012 “Are embankments a good flood-control strategy? A case study of the Kosi river” 42: International Growth Centre, 2012 “Strengthening the Institutional Framework for Flood and Water Resources Management in Bihar: Developing a Strategy for Reform (Phase One)” 4 RECOMMENDATIONS A. Policy Development and Strengthening

1. Enroot a collective vision for the DM Ecosystem: Given the multiplicity of actors functioning within the DM ecosystem and the varying nature of their mandates and foci, it is imperative that this ecosystem collectively evolves a vision for itself. This vision would help in setting consensus-based goalposts and identifying a role for every actor at different stages of the DM cycle. It is recommended that the DMD initiates this envisioning process with other key actors like BSDMA, B-IAG and civil society, resulting in a vision document for disaster management in Bihar. It is further recommended that this vision document should guide development of a joint strategy, prioritization of focus areas, programming and the management of ensuing DM actions by the DM ecosystem.

2. Integrate priority areas in the policy environment: The complexity of disaster risks and diversity of DM actors in Bihar necessitates a dynamic policy environment that takes into account multiple hazards and geographic variability in disaster impact, and ensures integration of DM actions within the existing institutional framework. Thus, it is recommended that the DMD and BSDMA develop an approach paper providing a roadmap with clear milestone-based actions for all the actors of the DM ecosystem, whereby: i. A multi-hazard approach is adopted, which mandates risk analysis, planning and action for all probable hazard 44 events in the state at all stages of the DM cycle. ii. Urban risks are recognised, systematically analysed, and addressed. iii. DM actions across all stages of the DM cycle are encouraged with risk-reduction actions being prioritized through appropriate resource allocation. iv. DM is mainstreamed, both through a convergence with related policies and implementation of programme actions. Mainstreaming needs to be informed by an analysis of the 600-odd GOB and GOI schemes in the state from a DM lens, identifying creative spaces for integrating DM actions. For e.g. construction of disaster-resilient houses can be undertaken as a part of the Indira AwasYojana. Further, this policy shift towards mainstreaming is also recommended for non-governmental actors for ensuring that their programming is informed by an analysis of disaster risks in their operational areas and that risk reduction actions are integrated into their initiatives. v. Role of PRIs is strengthened through policy reﬁnement and appropriate resource allocations whereby the PRIs could play an integral part in risk analyses as well as undertaking of risk-informed DM actions across all stages of the DM cycle in addition to their existing role in few preparedness and response actions and recommending and monitoring of relief measures. vi. Declaration of an event as a disaster is streamlined through reﬁning the norms / parameters for determining and declaring an event as disaster, bringing in more transparency in the assessment of an event and how this assessment gets translated into a declaration (or non-declaration).

vii. Scope of the Right to Public Services Act is widened so as to include the key actions across DM cycle (especially the preparedness, relief and response measures, and risk reduction actions) under this Act. This is possible given that actions across the DM cycle are essentially public goods and services. This, widening of scope of the Act, would enable the state to transition from the present culture of ‘right to relief’ to a culture of ‘right to risk-informed development’. This process could be initiated by including the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) under the ambit of the Act.

3. Strengthen disaster risk analysis: At the moment, the disaster risk analysis is mono-hazard focussed, not done on a regular basis and does not take into consideration all inherent vulnerabilities and complex risks in the state. This has led to the DM planning and programmes being not informed by a robust and regular risk analysis. Hence, it is recommended that the DMD and BSDMA undertake regular disaster risk analysis along with B-IAG and other relevant actors, which results in the development of a ﬁve-yearly publication on the disaster risk analysis of Bihar. This disaster risk analysis needs to: 45 i. Be such that it’s timely and is accessible at different levels.

ii. Inform planning and action whilst addressing the multi-hazard nature, underlying and differential vulnerabilities as well as the limited capacities and technical competencies existent in the state.

iii. Enhance community participation and / or be community driven by taking into account the traditional knowledge.

iv. Integrate the use of technology not only in the disaster risk analysis but also in the design of actions across all stages of the DM cycle as well as in real time documentation and sharing of the same.

4. Develop a vision paper for Capacity Building for DM: Even as the need for capacity building emerged as one of the key gaps from within the DM ecosystem itself (especially the lack of technical competencies) and many programme actions seek to address this gap, the DM ecosystem does not have a vision for capacity building yet. Not only have the intended outcomes not been identified, the strategies for achieving the same (assessing learning needs, following-up with participants, evaluating impact etc.) have not been mapped or made operational. It is recommended that such a vision paper be developed, guided by the DM ecosystem’s vision. This vision paper should not only map the existing capacities, skills and competencies, but also the expected outcomes of capacity building, the role of different actors in achieving the same, and application in practice. 5. Conduct an impact assessment of flood control / embankment policy: The flood control policy of the state has been consistently pursued for 50 years. Even as the flood-prone area is reported to have increased three-fold, a significant population is still residing within embankments and there have been several breaches causing large- scale flooding in the past, this policy is yet to be evaluated for its intended and real impact. It is recommended that such an impact assessment be undertaken and inform policy decisions on disaster risk reduction in the state.

6. Finalize the Water Management Policy: The state’s disaster event history in the past decade reveals that there have been two major ﬂoods and three major droughts impacting multiple districts and with large-scale losses. The changing water use and availability patterns, including an unregulated and systematic mismanagement of water bodies and rapid urbanization exacerbates the existing disaster risk scenario. Couple of departments (WRD, PHED) of the state government have developed draft water management policies, which have non-uniform outlook and also have not yet been ﬁnalized. It is recommended that a comprehensive water management policy is developed for the state.

B. People and Programs for DM

1. Develop human resource for DM: DMD is the principal stakeholder, within the DM ecosystem, mandated for

policy and programming on DM. Yet, the department has officials either on special duty or on deputation with 46 significant number of posts vacant. Further, the department does not have a rank and file (administration / officials) at the district, block and community level to implement the DM policies and programmes. It is recommended that a technically competent cadre of officials be created at the district and block level specifically for DM and holding DM as their primary responsibility. This would enhance: i. Policy shaping and planning. ii. Prioritize implementation of the existing policies and programmes by bringing in an efficacy in the same. iii. Effective monitoring and data management.

iv. Optimal resource allocation for overcoming the infrastructure, equipment and materials related gaps. This could be done by developing a five-year perspective plan, in line with the state five-year plan, for budget allocation and spend for the infrastructure, equipment and materials related gaps as well as orientation of all relevant officials on ushering a culture of safety and on ensuring that allocated budget is spent in a given financial year as per the perspective plan. 2. Establish a planning and monitoring cell in the DMD: While the DMD is responsible for policy and programming on DM, 21 other key departments related to DM in GoB (Health, PHED and such) also have either an officer on special duty or a nodal designated officer for DM within their department. However, there is no planning and monitoring cell in the DMD to oversee the actions of these officials or even to supervise the implementation of the DM policies, instruments and programmes. Thus, it is recommended that a planning and monitoring cell should be established in the DMD for support in planning, data management and evidence generation as well as engaging with relevant departments for risk analyses, prioritization of focus areas, programming and the management of ensuing DM actions through regular reviews. A planning and monitoring cell in DMD would enable the department to oversee the actions of these officials as well as the implementation of the DM policy instruments and programmes.

3. Establish a resource centre for DM: Key actors within the DM ecosystem have a good rapport that translates into a good working relationship; however the focus is mainly on operational aspects without much focus on drawing out learning from the policy instruments and programmatic actions. This coupled with the lack of technical competencies underlines the need for establishment of a resource centre pertaining to DM. This resource centre can play the role of bringing in technical excellence and knowledge from the wider DM discourse in the functioning of the DM ecosystem. Further, it can also contribute in assessing the functioning of the DM ecosystem and 47 drawing out the policy and programmatic learning from the same through instruments like ‘DM report card’ and an annual / status report on the DM ecosystem. RedR India “Gokul”, House no. 1, Sr. No. 79, Plot No. 37+44, Pooja Park, Paud Road, Kothrud, Pune, India- 411 038 Tel.: +91 20 32912532 [email protected]