The American Political Science Association APSA Volume 13, No. 3 Comparative Democratization October 2015 In This Issue CD Information, Disclosure and Regime Stabilit y James R. Hollyer, University of Minnesota “Authoritarian Media Control” overnments, whether autocratic or democratic, depend on at least a minimal level of consent from their populace to survive in office. Should large masses of citizens turn out in protest or revolt against their 1 Editorial Board Notes Staffan I. Lindberg, Dan Pemstein, leaders, regimes of any type will rapidly find the polity ungovernable. Yet such and Brigitte Zimmerman G demonstrations are collective acts—to be successful they require the participation of large 1 Information, Disclosure and numbers of citizens. In circumstances where citizens lack common knowledge of others’ Regime Stability James R. Hollyer intent to protest, how can such coordination take place? What is the effect of the broader 1 Online Censorship and informational environment on such coordination? How then does the informational Responsiveness in China Jennifer Pan environment affect the survival of autocratic and democratic regimes? Given these 2 The Logic of Contagious implications, when and why do governments tolerate an open informational environment? Contention in Autocracies In several recent articles and working papers, and in an on-going book project, I—along Navid Hassanpour with Peter Rosendorff and Jim Vreeland—examine precisely these questions.1 2 The Arab Media After the Uprisings 1. These published and working papers consist of: James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff, and James R. Vreeland, Marc Lynch “Democracy and Transparency,” Journal of Politics 73 (October 2011): 1–15; James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff, 4 Media Capture Outside and James Raymond Vreeland, “Measuring Transparency,” Political Analysis 22 (Autumn 2014): 413–434; James R. Advanced Democracies Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff, and James Raymond Vreeland, “Transparency, Protest and Autocratic Instability,” American Maria Petrova Political Science Review 109 (Forthcoming 2015); James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff, and James Raymond Vreeland, 22 Section News “Transparency, Protest and Democratic Stability” (unpublished manuscript); James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff, and (click to continue on page 5) 28 New Research 35 Editorial Committee

Online Censorship and Responsiveness in China Jennifer Pan, Stanford University From the Editorial Board here is ongoing debate over whether authoritarian regimes can retain Welcome to a new academic control over the creation and dissemination of information in spite of year from the editorial board the rise of new information communication technologies (ICTs). Some of the APSA-CD newsletter! argue that newT technologies disrupt the ability of authoritarian regimes to control information, This issue is co-edited by and ultimately to maintain political survival. According to this view, technologies like social guest-editor Dan Pemstein and media allow any individual to act as a broadcaster, making information production incredibly editorial board-member Brigitte diffuse and improving coordination of collective action against authoritarian regimes. Zimmermann. I really welcome However, others refute this perspective and point to the use of technology as well as and more initiatives for participation traditional forms of repression by authoritarian regimes to retain control over information. from APSA-CD members as guest editors. While we have While speculation that new information technologies spell doom for authoritarian regimes an excellent and growing team may be premature, it is inevitable that technological advances, such as the Internet and on the board, I am well aware mobile communications, which fundamentally alter interactions among individuals and that we cannot possibly cover organizations, will also affect political dynamics. How have authoritarian regimes, where all aspects of our dynamic field. information has traditionally been heavily controlled and manipulated, reacted to these On that note, please join me in (click to continue on page 9) (click to continue on page 3) Vol. 13, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2015

The Logic of Contagious Contention in Autocracies: A Novel Paradigm for Organization under Limited Information Navid Hassanpour, Columbia University ollective action is often a product of coordination, and coordination is facilitated by information. However, in response to the introduction of personalized media, a revived debate on the role of information in collective political behavior strives to provide explanations for novel forms of political mobilization in societies with limited accessC to information:1 namely that some of the most spectacular acts of political contention under autocracies were utter surprises, did not bear the marks of clear leadership, and proceeded with tremendous speed. In the following I argue that, in the discussion of clandestine contention, explanations based on coordination via selective incentives, focal points, common ideologies, and routine repertoires of action do not fully capture the properties of collective political behavior that only recently have become more visible in the mirror of new social media. To fully understand the dynamics of such connective acts of contention, it is necessary to emphasize temporal dynamics instead of statistical averages, interpersonal connections instead of total population parameters, and marginal network effects as much as centrally situated political activity. My goal in the following is to outline a logic that can provide explanations where a coordination-based logic of collective action cannot, and to enumerate a few methodological procedures for empirically testing the paradigm I propose.2 To summarize, public information and unifying informational elements such as ideology, focal points, repertoires of action, and selective incentives do not fully answer

1. For early work see Timur Kuran, “Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Revolution,” Public Choice 61 (April 1989): 41-74 and Timur Kuran, “Now Out of Never: The Elements of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989,” World Politics 44 (October 1991): 7-48. This work builds on Mark S. Granovetter, “Threshold Models of Collective Behavior,” The American Journal of Sociology 83 (May 1978): 1420–1443. Also see a recent report in Marc Lynch, “After Egypt: The Limits and Promise of Online Challenges to the Authoritarian Arab State.” Perspectives on Politics 9 ( June 2011): 301–310. On collective action and incentives to censor in a limited information environment see Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression.” American Political Science Review 107 (May 2013): 326–343.

2. See W. Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg, The Logic of Connective Action, Digital Media and the Personalization of Contentious Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) for more discussion of the term and Donatella della Porta, Clandestine Political Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) for a treatment of clandestine collective action. I present the arguments discussed here in full in a forthcoming monograph, for details see Navid Hassanpour, Leading from the Periphery: The Network Dynamics of Decentralized Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming 2016).

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The Arab Media Af ter the Uprisings Marc Lynch, George Washington University here is now a significant literature on the role of the media during the Arab uprisings of 2011: changing the distribution of information, empowering societal actors against the state, facilitating the organization and mobilization of protest movements.1 The focus on the democratizing and mobilizational force of the new media only captures part of the story, however. Almost all of those attempted democratic transitions failed, and the social movements which drove them have suffered severe setbacks. The failings of the T 2 Arab media after the uprisings offer a cautionary tale about the potential for a plural public sphere following transitions from authoritarian rule. The impact of new media on the failure of post-uprising transitional politics in the Arab world has thus far received surprisingly little attention.

To build a theoretically coherent account of the media’s effects on politics, it is useful to approach the media’s impact on the post- transition failures through the same specific causal mechanisms which have been highlighted in the literature on mobilization. Some of these mechanisms are: the failure to reform state media, the intense fear triggered by radical institutional uncertainty and deep conflicts over the identity and power structures of transitional states, and the prevalence of highly partisan and intensely polarized media.

First, both national and transnational media proved susceptible to political capture by states, political movements, or by old elites. State media sectors largely resisted meaningful reforms in the aftermath of the uprisings, leaving widely viewed state television as a potent weapon in the hands of the security state and the old regime. Most new television stations and other mass media were owned by wealthy, politically ambitious businessmen or by political movements, and tailored their coverage accordingly. Transnational satellite television stations such

1. This essay is adapted from Marc Lynch, “Trashing Transitions: The Arab Media after the Uprisings” Journal of Democracy 26 (October 2015): 90-99. For a broader examination of these issues, see Marc Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today (New York: Columbia University Press 2006); Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (New York: PublicAffairs 2012); and Marc Lynch,“Media, Old and New” in Marc Lynch, ed., The Arab Uprisings Explained (New York: Columbia University Press 2014).

2. Katrin Voltmer, The Media in Transitional Democracies (New York: Polity Press, 2013): 6; also see Marc F. Plattner, “Media and Democracy: The Long View,” Journal of Democracy 23 (October 2012): 62-73. (click to continue on page 16)

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From the Editorial Board, continued (continued from page 1)

welcoming our new editorial board members. From this issue’s editors: collective action. Kyle Marquardt holds a PhD from U of We chose to focus this issue on media control Wisconsin-Madison and Anna Lührmann in non-democracies and transitional regimes. In his piece, Navid Hassanpour also explores who holds a PhD from Humbolt University. Media is rapidly changing form and function, horizontal information transfer, arguing Both are presently postdoc’s here at the V-Dem forcing political leaders to quickly adapt their that the effect of information is increasingly Institute, at the University of Gothenburg and media use and information control strategies contingent on structure of interpersonal make terrific additions to the team. to the modern information environment. This connections. He advocates for a shift away issue presents recent findings on information from coordination-based logic of collective This issue’s focus is on media control and the manipulation and control, highlights some action towards analysis that considers editors write in more detail on that below. The gaps in the current literature, and suggests network dynamics, degree of centralization, remaining issues of our two-year tenure will avenues for future research. and hierarchical structure, and even offers feature conversations on opposition parties suggestions to the discipline about how in authoritarian regimes ( January), and The authors in this issue represent the to collect data on these phenomena. democratization and civil conflict ( June). As forefront of research on media control, and, Moreover, his works shows that, under some indicated at the last business meeting, however, together, their pieces highlight several critical circumstances, limiting access to information we already have additional issues in the outstanding questions. First, James Hollyer can, paradoxically, stimulate collective action. pipeline debating democracy support, the role focuses on the role of vertical information of linguistic-ethnic divides in regime change, transfer, from governments to citizens, in While the preceding authors focus and the relationship between democracy and facilitating regime change. He argues that largely on the role that information plays economic-human development, should we be improving the informational environment in fomenting collective action, Marc asked to continue for another term. constitutes a “risky gamble” for authoritarian Lynch offers a cautionary tale about the leaders. Greater transparency may insulate the potentially destabilizing effect of the modern On that note, let me hand it over to the editors regime from internal threats but may also raise information environment on transitional of the present issue! the risk of mass protest and democratization. regimes. Examining the impact of new media For democracies, on the other hand, on post-uprising politics in the Arab world, Staffan I. Lindberg information transparency plays a legitimizing he concludes that many of the characteristics Executive Editor role, encouraging regime survival. of the media environment that facilitated the Arab Spring may undermine the consolidation Continuing the thread of exploration about of the new regimes. the dual power and threat of information, Jennifer Pan considers whether authoritarian Finally, Maria Petrova offers a broad review of regimes will be able to continue their control what we know about media control in non- over horizontal information transfer between democracies, focusing largely on a literature citizens, while simultaneously encouraging in economics that may not be well known to the use of information technology by our readership. Synthesizing research from business. Examining China, she highlights around the world, she discusses the commonly a tension between stability and economic employed methods of, conditions for, and growth, arguing that information technology effects of authoritarian media capture. undermines stability but fosters growth. She argues that, to date, the Chinese regime has Taken together, these pieces describe some of been largely successful at bringing the state the most compelling outstanding questions censorship apparatus to bear to undermine in the literature on media control in non- the coordination of collective action through democracies. We hope you enjoy this issue social media. Yet, she leaves us with a and that your fall semesters are productive! compelling research agenda to investigate: how far can the repressive approach scale, On behalf of the Editorial Committee, and could horizontal information transfer, and regime responsiveness, perhaps serve as Dan Pemstein and Brigitte Zimmerman an alternative pressure valve for discontent, thereby reducing the likelihood of larger scale

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Media Capture Outside Advanced Democracies Maria Petrova, Barcelona Institute for Political Economy and Governance n most countries, people get information about politics from mass media. As a result, politicians have incentives to control, or capture, the media, and, sometimes, engage in propaganda, especially in countries with weak democratic institutions. The goal of this article is to overview recent literature about the determinants and consequences of media control outside advanced Idemocracies: i.e., in autocracies, hybrid regimes, and new democracies, with a focus on economic literature on the topic. I’ll talk about evidence of media capture, the political impact of captured media, the presence of alternative sources of information, like independent and social media, and the limits to propaganda.

Some formal theoretical literature suggests that mass media can increase political accountability by monitoring public officials and publishing stories about politicians’ misbehavior. To avoid this possibility, corrupt governments can exert control over mass media through a variety of channels, including direct ownership, provision of financial resources, and media regulation. Theoretically, competition between outlets can force even controlled media to reveal some information, although not to the same extent as independent sources.1 It is an open question whether controlled media can nonetheless promote accountability. In what follows, I first review the empirical evidence on media control in various countries, then discuss what are known determinants of media capture, then talk about the influence of controlled media, and, finally, sketch some emerging evidence on the role of social media in countries where traditional media is controlled.

What Are the Methods of Media Capture? Governments can use different forms of media control. Bribing media managers or journalists is an obvious method. McMillan and Zoido (2004) provide evidence of direct bribery of media firms. They study Fujimori’s Peru, where the head of secret police, Vladimir Montesinos, collected the records of bribes he paid on behalf of the government to different actors. Essentially, the paper shows that directors of TV channels were getting higher payments than were politicians or judges. In total, Montesinos paid 100 times more in bribes to media outlets than to all judges and politicians combined. This suggests that media was viewed as a significant force in the Peruvian political system. Another popular method of media control is to ensure that the “right” politicians get the most broadcast time, while others almost never appear on radio or TV. For example, Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya (2011) show that the amount of time devoted to pro-government politicians in Russia in 1999 was disproportionately high on the state- controlled channels. For Berlusconi’s Italy, Durante and Knight (2012) find that politicians from the Berlusconi party had a higher chance to speak on public TV when Berlusconi was in power. Adena et al. (2015) show that Nazi politicians had almost no access to German radio before 1933, but were given disproportionate access to radio in 1933, after Hitler was appointed the Chancellor.2

Provision of governments’ advertising money is another method to ensure that media is favorable to incumbent politicians. Di Tella and Franceschelli (2012), for example, look at the content of the front pages and of advertising section for four main newspapers in Argentina in 1998-2007. They find that newspapers with government advertising are less likely to talk about government corruption, and these results are robust to controlling for newspaper-president and corruption scandal fixed effects. Similarly, governments use media regulation to avoid critical media coverage. For Mexico, Stanig (2015) shows that defamation laws are important determinants of media coverage of corruption, and local newspapers reported less corruption in 2001 in states in which defamation laws were stricter. This is consistent with the idea that government regulation of media markets, and especially defamation laws, is one of the ways to control mass media. Starr (2004) arrives at similar conclusions from his historical overview of media development and media regulation in different countries.3

In recent years, with the advancement of new technologies, censorship has taken on new forms. When governments cannot perfectly control blogs or online news aggregators, they may engage in selective deletion of information. King et al. (2013) study selective deletion on content in modern China, trying to understand which types of online content are likely to get censored. They make snapshots of 1. David Strömberg, “Radio’s Impact on Public Spending,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (February 2004): 189-221; David Strömberg, “Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy,” Review of Economic Studies 71 ( January 2004): 265-284; Timothy Besley and Andrea Prat, “Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? The Role of the Media in Political Accountability,” American Economic Review 96 ( June 2006): 720-736; Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse Shapiro, “Competition and Truth in the Market for News,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22 (Spring 2008): 133–154; Scott Gehlbach and Konstantin Sonin, “Government Control of the Media,” Journal of Public Economics 118 (October 2014): 163-171.

2. John McMillan and Pablo Zoido, “How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18 (Fall 2004): 69-92; Ruben Enikolopav, Maria Petrova, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, “Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence From Russia,” American Economic Review 111 (December 2011): 3253–3285; Ruben Durante and Brian Knight, “Partisan Control, Media Bias, and Viewer Responses: Evidence from Berlusconi’s Italy,” Journal of the European Economic Association 10 ( June 2012): 451-481; Maja Adena, Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, Veronica Santarosa, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, “Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 130 (Forthcoming 2015).

3. Rafael Di Tella and Ignacio Franceschelli, “Government Advertising and Media Coverage of Corruption Scandals.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3 (October 2011): 119–51; Piero Stanig, “Regulation of Speech and Media Coverage of Corruption: An Empirical Analysis of the Mexican Press,” American Political Science Review 59 ( January 2015): 175-193; Paul Starr, The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of Modern Communications (New York: Basic Books, 2012). (click to continue on page 20)

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Hollyer, continued (continued from page 1)

Before one can determine the relevance likely to be relevant than information are revealed as such, and that these of the informational environment to only pertinent to a select few. autocrats inspire protest by the public. regime survival, one first must specify Perhaps more surprisingly, a richer the type of information of theoretical Equally critical is the extent to which informational environment will unconditionally relevance. When dealing with anti- information is publicly observed. If destabilize an autocratic regime so long as regime protest, the relevant concern a given citizen observes a bit of such protest is `hard’—i.e., the consequences is whether any one citizen can infer information, she may naturally update for participating in a failed protest are that others are willing to take part in her assessment of the government’s sufficiently dire and/or the numbers demonstrations against the sitting performance. But, she also knows required to successfully unseat the leadership. Since small protests that others are observing the same leadership are sufficiently high. The are likely to fail—at high cost to information and conducting the reason for this is as follows: If protest participants—while large protests may same updating process. Hence public is hard, citizens must be confident succeed in upending the regime, each information enables citizens to refine that demonstrating will be a successful citizen is only likely to protest if she their higher order beliefs about the tactic before they are willing to turn out believes enough of her fellows will also distribution of discontent. If a piece in the streets. In an environment where participate. The willingness of others of damning news is publicly observed, public information is scant, this level of to turn out in the streets might be each citizen knows that others have confidence is unlikely to ever be attained. termed the distribution of discontent. also received this news and that they Hence, regardless of their performance, Under autocratic rule, this distribution cannot have too high an opinion of autocratic leaders are unlikely to face is unlikely to be common knowledge. the incumbent government as a result. much threat from the public. As the However dissatisfied any one citizen Conversely, publicly observed good news informational environment improves, is with the government’s rule, she is will cause each citizen to realize that under-performing leaders face greater unlikely to be certain of the number others are updating their beliefs about risk of protest, while the risks faced by of her fellow citizens who are similarly the government in a positive manner, those autocrats who deliver economic dissatisfied. Moreover, she is likely to and hence cannot hold too negative an growth and public goods are largely be aware that other citizens cannot opinion of their rulers. Since all citizens unchanged. Thus, the overall probability infer her level of dissatisfaction. That are able to update their understanding of regime collapse rises as greater public is, she is unlikely to be able to refine her about the beliefs of others, and can information becomes available.2 Hence, higher order beliefs—her beliefs about similarly deduce that others are a rich informational environment the beliefs held by others—regarding engaged in the same updating process, serves to destabilize autocratic regimes willingness to participate in protest. public information facilitates the against threats from their publics. formation of a common understanding Certain types of information, however, of the distribution of discontent. Public The informational environment may help to overcome this problem. information therefore facilitates the plays a radically different role under Information may play this role if formation of a shared understanding democratic rule. This is because it is publicly observed (and known of when protest is likely to take place, free and fair elections generate to be publicly observed), pertinent enabling coordinated demonstrations public information. Election returns, to government performance along by individual citizens. participation in election rallies, and dimensions of concern to many public statements by candidates and citizens, and credible. Since the issue In the forthcoming APSR piece citizens surrounding elections all serve in this instance is with discontent with referenced above, my co-authors and as public signals to the citizenry of the the current government, information I explore a formal model with just distribution of discontent. It is for this must credibly reflect that government’s such intuitions. Unsurprisingly, the reason that James Fearon argues that performance in office. Similarly, this model reveals that autocratic survival democracy is self-enforcing—should information must be relevant to a becomes more strongly conditioned an incumbent fail to heed electoral large swath of the citizenry—hence, on government behavior as the results, any given citizen is likely to be information that reflects the aggregated informational environment becomes 2. In the unlikely circumstance that protest is easy, experiences of many citizens is more increasingly rich. As more information the predisposition of the public is reversed—citizens will tend to take to the streets even if highly becomes available, it becomes more uncertain of a protest’s likelihood of success. In these James Raymond Vreeland, “Why do Autocrats likely that under-performing autocrats circumstances, greater information may actually serve Dislose?” (unpublished manuscript). to decrease risks to the regime.

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aware that many others are willing to ensures that democratic institutions currently freely available and have long protest this behavior and demand the better resolve problems of political been made accessible to researchers incumbent’s ouster.3 agency. As citizens’ votes align more and the press. While we do not expect closely with incumbents’ performance, citizens to directly access such data, In the presence of free and fair elections, elections work better—whether this we do expect that the availability therefore, the broader informational is defined in terms of selecting “good” of credible economic information environment is likely to play little role types of politicians or inducing “bad” to the World Bank proxies for the in facilitating protest. The distribution types to act in the public interest. As availability of credible information on of discontent is already likely to be the democratic process better serves its the performance of the economy more common knowledge due to the electoral intended role, political institutions are broadly. process, and other forms of information vested with greater outcome legitimacy. are likely to play at most a marginal Both of these legitimating effects point Across these two papers, we find that role in updating beliefs about this in the same direction with regard to transparency is robustly associated distribution. Public information about democratic survival: Democracies with regime-type transition. We find government performance is instead are more likely to survive, and less that a one standard deviation increase likely to shape the behavior of citizens likely to revert to autocracy, as public in transparency in our sample of at the polling booth. Such information information becomes more readily autocratic states is associated with a plays two roles: First, it ensures that available. 39 percent increase in the hazard of any individual citizen’s voting decision transition to democracy (with a 95 is more likely to be in line with the My co-authors and I empirically test percent confidence interval running government’s performance. Voters are the claims that a rich informational from a 8 to an 78 percent increase), more likely to support governments environment, respectively, destabilizes when growth is at its sample average. A that perform well and vote against autocracies and stabilizes democracies. one standard deviation increase in our governments that perform badly as To do this, we rely on a measure of measure of transparency in a sample they grow more informed. Second, informational environment (which of democratic states is associated with the greater availability of public we term transparency) of our own a 74 percent decline in the hazard of information ensures that any given construction.4 This measure is based on democratic collapse (with a 95 percent voter is more likely to believe her fellow the presence/missingness of data from confidence interval running from a citizens are well-informed, and hence the World Bank’s World Development 91 to a 29 percent decrease), when voting in a rational manner. Indicators (WDI) data series. To growth is at its sample average.5 We construct it, we fit a scaling model to a plot graphs of these marginal effects Both of these effects ensure that a richer dataset capturing the presence/absence on the estimated hazard of regime-type informational environment legitimates of each of 240 indicators from the WDI transition (based on Cox proportional democratic rule. A richer informational for 125 countries from 1980-2010. hazards regressions) in Figure 1. These environment implies that voters are Transparency is the captured as a latent results include controls for GDP per more likely to view their fellows as term that predicts reporting of these 240 capita, past experiences of transition, behaving in an informed and rational variables. Hence, our measure reflects and economic growth—some of the manner, vesting the democratic process the availability of economic information most robust predictors of regime with greater procedural legitimacy. As of great relevance to citizens’ level of transition. We further demonstrate that more information is made publicly discontent with the current leadership. 5. Our measure of democracy is from José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond available, it grows less feasible for anti- It reflects the availability of credible Vreeland, “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited” democratic forces to rally sub-groups of information, insofar as disclosed data Public Choice 143 (April 2010): 67–101. Estimated citizens against democratic institutions are subject to quality review by the hazards of transition are based off a Cox proportional hazards model, including controls for economic by claiming that others’ votes were ill- World Bank. And it proxies for publicly growth rates, GDP per capita, and experience of informed and illegitimate. Moreover, available information, as the WDI are past transitions. Models also include an interaction between transparency and growth. The marginal the greater availability of information 4. See Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland, effect of transparency in both models is slightly 3. James D. Fearon, “Self-Enforcing Democracy,” “Transparency, Protest and Autocratic Instability,” reduced as growth increases. We explore the Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(November 2011): and Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland, robustness of these results to a host of additional 1661-1708. On this point, also see Andrew T. Little, “Transparency, Protest and Democratic Stability,” controls in both Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland, Tom LaGatta, and Joshua A. Tucker, “Elections, on autocratic instability and democratic stability, “Transparency, Protest and Autocratic Instability” and Protest, and Alternation of Power,” Journal of Politics respectively. We introduce our measure in Hollyer, Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland, “Transparency, 77(October 2015). Rosendorff, and Vreeland, “Measuring Transparency.” Protest and Democratic Stability.”

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Figure 1: Hazard of Transition, Autocracies and Democracies

Hazard rate of regime type transition for autocracies and democracies, respectively. Regime type is defined according to the DD dataset. Estimates from a sample of autocratic states are to the left, those from democratic states are to the right. (Both graphs are based on sub-samples that have not experienced prior regime-type reversals.) Dark lines depict estimates when transparency is at its mean value in the respective samples. Dashed lines depict estimates when transparency is at one standard deviation above the mean. Results are from Cox proportional hazard models with additional controls. Note that the axes are not to the same scale across the two figures.

transparent autocratic regimes are more democracies—particularly high income This might be termed the threat from likely to fall via mass unrest or transition democracies—tend to have richer below. The other threat is posed by to democracy, using the Milan Svolik’s informational environments than their regime elites, who might use violence definition of an autocratic regime: the autocratic counterparts. Not only are or administrative maneuvers to replace continuous succession of politically citizens given greater opportunity to the sitting leadership. This is the threat affiliated dictators.6 However, the demand the collection and disclosure of from within. informational environment is not information by the government under predictive of other forms of autocratic democratic rule, but such disclosure These two threats are interrelated. weakness—and, indeed, is negatively serves to reinforce the institution of Actions by members of the elite against correlated with the frequency of coups. democracy. autocratic leaders may be difficult or Similarly, transparent autocracies impossible to disguise, and may signal experience more frequent strikes and Why, however, would an autocratic to the public the fractured and weak demonstrations, but are no more likely regime ever tolerate transparency, state of the regime. Such actions at the to experience other forms of unrest given the threat a rich informational elite-level may thus provide a spark (assassinations, guerrilla movements) environment poses for the continued for mass protest and the potential than their opaque counterparts. stability of the regime? In a recent displacement of the regime as a whole. working paper, my co-authors and Before attempting to discipline their Improvements in the informational I explore precisely this question.7 leaders, therefore, autocratic elites environment are therefore valuable We contend that the answer lies in must consider the implications of their contributors to democracy and the interplay between mass and elite actions for their own continued survival democratic consolidation. Transparency— politics in autocratic regimes. in privileged positions.8 here measured by the availability of credible economic information— Autocratic leaders face two threats to 8. Timothy Besley and Masayuki Kudamatsu, is associated both with hastened their survival in office. One is the threat “Making Autocracy Work,” Development Economics Discussion Paper Series (London: London School transitions to democracy and with of collective protest by (portions) of the of Economics and Political Science, 2007) available more stable democratic rule. It is citizenry aimed at upending the regime. at sticerd.lse.ac.uk and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. therefore perhaps unsurprising that 7. Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland, “Why Do Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, 6. Milan W. Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule Autocrats Dislose?” MA: The MIT Press, 2003). (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

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Elites may then be cowed into transparency increases the likelihood a risky gamble. On the one hand, greater quiescence when they perceive that the of democratization or regime collapse transparency may insulate leaders mass public is particularly capable of due to mass unrest even as it reduces against internal threats. But, on the mobilization.9 Increased transparency, the risk of coup. It also suggests that other, it raises the risk of mass protest and other liberalizing reforms, may autocratic leaders will tend to increase and democratization. For democracies, therefore reduce the threat autocratic transparency when the threats from a rich informational environment leaders face from within the regime, within the regime are particularly is an unambiguous good. Greater even as it increases the threat from great—i.e., when legitimacy is vested in information complements democratic below. This argument is consistent with institutions rather than the personality institutions and renders them more the results from our APSR paper, that of the particular leader, or when robust, reducing the threat of transition 9. Note that this refers to the mobilization potential the leader is new to office. We find to autocracy. of the public. The strategic incentives of regime that, indeed, transparency rises when elites differ greatly when citizens are already out in the streets and the regime is already at high risk of autocratic leaders are new to office James R. Hollyer is an assistant professor toppling see Brett Allen Casper and Scott A. Tyson, and is lower in personalistic regimes as of political science at the University of “Popular Protest and Elite Coordination in a Coup d’état” Journal of Politics 76(April 2014): 548–564 compared to other autocracies. Minnesota and a visiting research fellow and Milan W. Svolik, “Contracting on Violence: at Princeton University’s Niehaus Center The Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and For autocrats, therefore, improving the on Globalization and Governance. Military Intervention in Politics” Journal of Conflict Resolution 57(October 2013): 765–794. informational environment constitutes

(photo courtsey of jerryofwong/flickr/creative commons)

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Pan, continued (continued from page 1)

new technologies? Here, the experience growth continues to this day, and the flows are highly valued and desired by of China’s single-party regime presents current president, Xi Jinping, has authoritarian regimes, which use a range an interesting paradox: a regime repeated emphasized the importance of methods from informants to academic that has aggressively embraced these of economic development and stability. surveys, to obtain this information.3 technological advances yet exerts great In contrast, horizontal flows of effort to manage the content produced For the CCP, stability at the most information are also essential to an and disseminated via these technologies. fundamental level refers to political authoritarian regime like China, but also stability or the continuation of CCP perceived to be inherently hazardous. What we can learn from the Chinese rule, but also refers to a society experience is that technologies like the where protest, collective action, and Although horizontal flows of Internet and social media are viewed lawlessness will not obstruct economic information underpin economic as indispensable by the regime in its development and prosperity. In order to growth, the CCP believes that the pursuit of economic growth, but at the achieve this expansive type of stability, flow of information among societal same time, these technologies are also the regime needs to mitigate threats to its actors can also lead to the spread of viewed as inherently dangerous because power such as cross-class mobilization collective action. Technologies such as of their ability to propagate collective but needs also to deter smaller-scale mobile phones and instant messaging action and threaten stability. To balance collective action such as labor protests can be used to organize and mobilize this double-edged sword, the regime from hindering the attractiveness of collective action, and as important, engages in censorship to prevent the the Chinese market. However, stability technologies such as social media spread of real-world collective action is not sufficient to produce growth. spread knowledge of collective behavior, and promotes responsiveness to prevent Economic development also requires inspiring others to join or to organize. discontent from fomenting real world human capital that can engage in action. While these efforts have been, innovation and market competition. This tension inherent in horizontal in many ways, successful, a thin line information has generated a paradox separates the failure and success of The Paradox of Information Technologies in China, where the regime actively these tactics in allowing the Chinese Economic growth is not possible promotes and supports the development Communist Party (CCP) to maintain without the flow of information of technologies that bolster the its pursuit of stability and growth. between businesses, markets, suppliers, horizontal flow of information, but at and customers. The type of information the same time, devotes substantial efforts Pursing Stability and Growth flow essential to innovation and to control the substance of information In 1989, Deng Xiaoping said, “To business competition—what scholars flowing via these technologies. China’s problems, the overwhelming refer to as horizontal information— priority is stability. Without a stable is generated by, and shared among, For example, China has invested a environment, nothing can be achieved, societal actors. Horizontal flows of great deal in its Internet infrastructure, and what has been achieved will be information contrast with vertical flows working to extend access to remote, lost.” These words, and the concept that of information, where information rural areas. Because of these efforts, stability trumps all, have been repeated generated by societal actors is gathered China has gone from less than 23 countless times in CCP documents and by the regime.2 Vertical information million Internet users in 2000 to the speeches of China’s top leaders, the 20th century, and of increasing per capita GNP nearly 650 million Internet users today, to the level of medium-developed countries by 2050. and this pursuit of stability is reflected making China the country with the in China’s institutions and governing 2. See Peter Lorentzen, China’s Controlled Burn: largest number of Internet users in the structure. However, stability is not the Information Management and State-Society world, representing over 21 percent of Relations under Authoritarianism (unpublished sole priority of the CCP. Indeed, Deng manuscript, 2015). A third type of information pursued stability because it formed a flow is information transmitted to citizens by the among citizens. regime, including objective information about necessary precondition to achieving the regime (transparency) or information aimed 3. For example Martin K. Dimitrov, “What the his vision of an economically powerful at persuasion (propaganda). I do not include this Party Wanted to Know: Citizen Complaints as 1 type of information in either horizontal or vertical a ‘Barometer of Public Opinion’ in Communist China. This focus on stability and information flows where societal actors are the source Bulgaria,” East European Politics & Societies 28 1. According to Deng, stability is the first condition of information. The tension between horizontal and (May 2014): 271-295; Martin K. Dimitrov, for the “three steps” economic development strategy vertical information flows exists because the regime “Internal Government Assessments of the Quality of doubling gross national product (GNP) from 1981 benefits from information from citizens but does not of Governance in China,” Studies in Comparative to 1990, of quadrupling the 1980 GNP by the end of benefit when this same information is disseminated International Development 50 (March 2014): 50-72.

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the world’s share of Internet users.4 To balance the need for horizontal for several hours before all mentions Telecom and Internet investments information while mitigating its of the event are removed. Let us also continue to this day and are seen perceived dangers, the Chinese suppose that there is a person living in as a way to bolster growth. In May regime engages in censorship to eastern Beijing who is sympathetic to 2015, Chinese premier Li Keqiang prevent the spread of collective this cause, but who find no evidence of said: “speeding up the construction action and encourages government this protest by the time he goes online of information infrastructure will responsiveness to societal demands because all discussions of this protest boost investment and support.”5 to prevent discontent from fomenting have already been removed. As a result, into real world action. Each of these this person is unaware of the event, At the same time as China is beefing up strategies is discussed in turn below. and cannot be inspired to join in and its Internet infrastructure, the regime to organize similar types of activities. is also increasing its control over the Censorship to Prevent the Spread of By removing all discussion of events, Internet. In January 2015, China’s Collective Action for many, it is as if the event never Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs Through a large-scale observational occurred, and collective action cannot and its executive arm, the Cyberspace study of content filtering—the manual spread without awareness. Censorship Administration of China (CAC) removal of Internet social media content in the form of content filtering prevents began disrupting VPN services use to after it has already been posted online— the spread of collective behaviors. circumvent China’s website filter, the King, Pan, and Roberts (2013) find Great Firewall of China, that prevents that censorship is aimed at removing However, while censorship may prevent individuals located in China from all discussions of real-world events the spread of collective action, it does accessing certain foreign websites such with collective action potential, while not appear to be an effective strategy as YouTube and Facebook. The same allowing for a great deal of criticism for preventing collective action from month, dozens of websites and WeChat of the regime.7 Through a randomized emerging in the first place. While accounts were shut down for producing experiment of censorship on 100 social in theory censorship tactics such as unsanctioned information.6 In May of media sites including microblogging keyword filtering—flagging content 2015, CAC set limits on what outlets sites, blogs, and forums, King, Pan, and containing certain terms for removal— can produce “news” in an effort to Roberts (2014) find that discussing would prevent content deemed to be control the production of information real-world events with collective action inappropriate from appearing online; by individuals and non-governmental potential causes censorship, regardless in practice, these ex-ante censorship groups, and to limit the spread of of whether discussions support or methods are largely ineffective. Through this information by Internet news criticize the regime; in contrast, randomized experimentation, King, aggregators like Sohu.com and 163. criticisms of the government unrelated Pan, and Roberts (2014) observe that com. These recent efforts come on top to events with collective action two thirds of Chinese social media sites of censorship activities such as website potential do not cause censorship.8 use keyword filtering to flag posts for blocking keyword filtering, search review, but keyword review has virtually filtering, and content filtering that Removing discussions of real-world no effect on what content is removed have been de rigueur in China for years events with collective action does not from appearing online because human 4. See details at “Internet Users by Country (2014),” prevent these events from occurring censors correct errors after keyword Internet Live Stats, last modified by July 1, 2014 based on data from International Telecommunication in the first place, but it limits the filtering techniques are applied. Union, United Nations Population Division, Internet growth potential of these events. Let us & Mobile Association of India, and the World Bank, suppose there is a sizable environmental Responsiveness to Prevent the http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by- country/. protest in northwest Beijing, and the Emergence of Collective Action protest is discussed on social media Rather than censor, the government 5. See “China Reveals Ambitious Broadband Plan,” BBC News, 14 May 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/ 7. Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, prevents the emergence of collective technology-32736199. “How Censorship in China Allows Government action through responsiveness. In Criticism but Silences Collective Expression.” recent years, there is growing evidence 6. See Cao Siqi, “Foreign VPN Service Unavailable American Political Science Review 107(May 2013): in China” Global Times, 1 January 2015, http:// 326-343. that officials in authoritarian regimes www.globaltimes.cn/content/903542.shtml and are responsive to citizens, and much of “China Shuts 50 Websites and Social Media 8. Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. Accounts” Reuters, 13 January 2015, http://www. “Reverse-Engineering Censorship in China: this research has been done in China. reuters.com/article/2015/01/13/us-china-internet- Randomized Experimentation and Participant Through a survey experiment, Meng, idUSKBN0KM1F320150113. Observation.” Science 345 (August 22, 2014): 891. 10 Vol. 13, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2015

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Pan, and Yang (N.d.) find that by the existence of a strong social quickly mobilized to impose control, approximately half of provincial and desirability bias to appear responsive but when faced with amorphous and city-level officials in China believe to citizen demands. In Meng, Pan, unrealized threats, mobilizing resources that suggestions from local residents and Yang’s (2014) survey experiment, to continually engage in prevention is should be seriously considered when almost all official surveyed said they difficult. However, China’s pursuit of making policy and expenditure would be receptive to citizen demands growth and stability require information decisions, even when these suggestions in direct questioning, while only half to continue to flow horizontally, and are expressed through the Internet responded in the affirmative through relying more intensively on repression rather than state institutions a list experiment. This suggests two and control when faced with the such as residential committees, important considerations—first, proliferation of information generated people’s congress representatives, that responsiveness is deemed to be by new ICTs could thwart efforts or the local CCP organization.9 a priority, and second, that many to use these technologies to support officials only pay lip service to the task. growth, investment, and innovation. Measuring responsiveness more directly, Chen, Pan, and Xu (N.d.) Responsiveness breaks down further New information technologies are a conduct a randomized field experiment in regions where there is antagonism double-edge sword in China. Because among 2,103 Chinese counties by between the state and citizens and, the country aims to pursue both submitting online requests for help in indeed, the CCP has identified stability and economic growth, new obtaining social welfare and measuring antagonism as a main cause of information platforms are essential the government response.10 Overall, one collective action against the state. In yet potentially dangerous. The tension third of county governments responded regions with high levels of state-society between promoting and constraining to demands expressed online, but when antagonism, officials are much less new ICTs begs the questions of a vague threat of small-scale collective responsive to demands residents express whether outcomes of the unconstrained action was appended to the request online, although responsiveness to information flow on the Internet and for help, local governments became demands expressed through in-person, social media feared by the CCP regime considerably more responsive. The formal channels remains unchanged. are likely to transpire. For example, if increased responsiveness to unrealized there were no censorship, would there threats of collective action suggests that These results show that while be more, and larger scale, collective responsiveness is a way for the regime censorship efforts to prevent the spread action? Or would open debate and to prevent the emergence of protest. of collective action have been largely discussion provide a pressure valve for That responsiveness is a priority for the successful, responsiveness efforts are discontent? These and other questions CCP regime is further substantiated more mixed. This is perhaps reflective require further research, but for now, 9. Tianguang Meng, Jennifer Pan, and Ping Yang. of the general phenomenon that it China’s delicate balancing act continues. “Conditional Receptivity to Citizen Participation is easier to mobilize in response to Evidence from a Survey Experiment in China.” Comparative Political Studies 48 (Forthcoming 2015). crisis than it is to vigilantly prevent Jennifer Pan is an assistant professor in crisis from appearing in the first place. Stanford University’s Communication 10. Jidong Chen, Jennifer Pan, and Yiqing Xu. When a crisis, such as collective action Department. “Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China.” American Journal of Political has already occurred, resources are Science 59 (Forthcoming 2015).

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the puzzle of spontaneous and fast of unification, accurate information, adopters of risky social behavior. These growing contention. Decentralization, and centralized contention can set into early adopters are less likely to be spontaneity, and lack of hierarchy at motion contentious processes with influenced by the risk-aversion of the times set into motion revolutions, bank dynamics different than well-rehearsed majority of the population, and in turn runs and religious reversals that, unlike coordinated contentious politics. are more likely to influence their small what the logic of coordination predicts, Neither of the two major models of social circle. Now if these speculations benefit from limited information, are collective action, Granovetter’s (and on the nature of mobilization from faster growing when the size of the Kuran’s) threshold model, and Morris’ the periphery are plausible, then there group is larger, and are led from the definition of global games, import is a need for formulating contentious periphery of the sociopolitical network, network structure in their formulation processes that do not originate from the not the center. The cognizance of such of collective action processes. In centers of attention, but instead take processes advances our understanding Kuran’s formulation, everybody is hold at the margins of a social network of contentious politics in autocratic visible to all. Such high levels of and move towards the center stage. The environments, particularly because centrality are plausible towards the end need is pressing because in autocracies much of informational transactions of revolutionary processes, not at their much of contention is hidden from the therein are interpersonal, local and beginnings, where my research question watchful state apparatus.4 clandestine. lies. Global games, too, assume a simplified information structure, in Collecting empirics on decentralized High risk collective action is deemed to which stylized signals are either public, and clandestine collective action is be a product of strong social ties and visible to all in the system, or private. challenging, as they mostly happen a hierarchical line of command. First There is no intermediate apparatus of before the process reaches levels that note that all solutions to the collective information dissemination that could are visible to the public eye. New action problem as a giant prisoner’s describe local networks of information data rich environments, however, dilemma emphasize elements that propagation and contentious action. allow researchers to collect data economize on coordination. Lichbach The dynamics of risk-taking based that are inadvertently captured in and Olson offer a solution based on on the threshold models of collective communications leading to the selective incentives for participation, action depend on the structure of ascendance of the movement. In the Tilly presents repertoires of action as underlying social network. The same is following, I discuss three classes of unifying modes of contention, Schelling true of global games. data sources: surveys, geographic data offers focal points as the unifying on conflict processes, and network apparatus for coordination, Hardin Note that many Middle Eastern experiments each can shed light on takes common identity as a facilitator capitals, the theaters of the 2011 the dynamics of decentralized and of coordination on a cause. Finally popular confrontations, with dense clandestine collective action. I have put in the setup of global games accurate local urban structure, fit well in the the predictions of the network models public information facilitates collective category of small world networks: into the test using the same empirical action.3 Nevertheless, I argue that lack they are comprised of interconnected strategies. 3. Mark Irving Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation? dense neighborhoods with strong local 4. On risk taking and early adoption, see Mark The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and features, a point that I will return to S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties.” The Dissent,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 31( June 1987): American Journal of Sociology 78 (May 1973): 1360– 266–297; Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective when I discuss the consequences of a 1380, while discussing the importance of weak ties in Action (New York: Schocken Press, 1971); Thomas total communication shutdown, and engendering collective action, Granovetter mentions C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior observations by Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978); Russell Hardin, lack of public information. Furthermore, Innovations, 5th Edition (New York, NY: Free Press, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton: early studies of collective action in 2003) on the marginal location of early adopters of Princeton University Press, 1995); Charles Tilly, networks made clear that marginal risk social innovations. For a discussion of public and From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA: hidden transcripts, see James C. Scott, Domination Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978). See takers are more likely to be the early and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). Also negative of Black Insurgency 1930-1970 (Chicago: University 2003), a variation exists in Stephen Morris and Hyun coalitions Mark R. Beissinger, “The Semblance of of Chicago Press, 1982) for an argument for strong Song Shin, “Social Value of Public Information,” Democratic Revolution: Coalitions in Ukraine’s organization. For the definition of the standard American Economic Review 92 (December 2002): Orange Revolution.” American Political Science Review global games see Stephen Morris and Hyun Song 1521–1534. Public information and social action, 107(August 2013): 574–592, common to many of Shin, “Global Games: Theory and Applications,” rational ritual, is discussed in Michael Chwe, spontaneous rebellions, shape in environments that in Mathias Dewatripont et al., eds., Advances in “Structure and Strategy in Collective Action,” are hostile to political organization. In the absence of Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, American Journal of Sociology 105 ( July 1999): clear leadership and ideology, cascades of collective Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 128–156. action are more likely to originate from the periphery.

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Surveys on contentious activity provide civil conflict in Damascus in 2012; in the peripheries of the social network, subjective information on the event, but later I outline some of the results on I also examine the findings with a there is a tension between the subject the communication-conflict nexus. number of controlled experiments of of the study, which is a dynamic event Finally, laboratory experiments of collective risk-taking. process, and methods for pinpointing collective action are another venue for a representative sample based on exploring the dynamics of risk taking In the months following the ill-fated static socioeconomic parameters. in a controlled setting. Measuring risk Egyptian Revolution of January 2011, I Convenience and representative propensity is a well rehearsed practice ran a survey with a convenience sample samples are easier to come by in in behavioral economics; knowing the of more than seven hundred Cairo the spatiotemporal proximity of the risk propensity of a subject leads to residents on their protest participation event itself. In the absence of survey an opportunity to test the dynamics and media usage behavior during the data in conflict zones, Geographical of collective action in a heterogeneous 18 days of the protests. I found that Information System (GIS) analysis is network. Once the risk takers, or early the vanguards, the early adopters of another means for tracing the dynamics adopters of a social innovation, are the contentious activity, those who of conflict. Particularly, in urban identified, then one can arrange them in had protested on the first day of the environments, with the heavy presence different network positions, have them protests, January 25, 2011, had done of human recording, the contentious engage in a collective game of risk- so in substantially more geographically networks embedded within the spatial taking, an online lottery in our case, dispersed manner compared to the web of public squares, major and minor and observe the dynamics of risk-taking late adopters, and their levels of streets and dense neighborhoods are diffusing from the margins to the other protest outside Tahrir was as high aptly susceptible to GIS methods. Real parts of the network. The results shed on the first day of protests, January time spatiotemporal tracing reveals light on the dynamics of mobilization 25, as they were on January 28, a day patterns of contention that are invisible from the margins, otherwise invisible to of blanket shutdown of all means of to a local observer, or unavailable in aggregate measuring mechanisms. communication in Egypt. The protests, a post hoc survey. A triangulation of as a whole, were also the most dispersed social media reports in text, image, To test the predictions of a contagion on January 28; the rate of those who and video, as well as reports in online based dynamics I turned to contentious reported being in Tahrir, conditioned and news media outlets can help to processes in 2011. I noted above that on participation, were the lowest among pinpoint contention in space and time. decentralized mobilization interacts the 18 days of contentions, although Early examples of geographical analysis with information regimes in ways the total number of those in Tahrir in the context of urban conflict can different from mobilization based on Square itself was unprecedented. In be found in Roger Gould’s pioneering coordination. Hence, it was imperative other words, the protests were the most study of the Paris Commune.5 Detailed to find cases in which the access to dispersed during the day of blackouts. geolocated data, often provided by information had drastically changed in Unlike January 25, when the protest handheld devices used by the parties the course of the mobilization process, processions converged in Tahrir, on the in contention, leave traces of irregular and to test the dynamics of recruitment 28th they flared in multiple corners of rebellion in unprecedented formats, and risk taking in time and space. the city, despite repeated prior public residues that facilitate novel modes During the Middle Eastern contentious calls for convergence to Tahrir. Later of empirical analysis. I have applied processes post 2011, at least on two I sifted through more than seventy GIS methods in the context of the occasions countrywide blackouts in emails sent out January 25 by the April 5. See Roger V. Gould, Insurgent Identities: Class, Egypt and Syria, in early 2011 and in late 6th Youth Movement, which played Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the 2012, provided grounds for detecting an important role in organizing the Commune (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995). in conjunction with Gould’s dynamic network risk taking dynamics that often protests on the first day of the Egyptian models Roger V. Gould, “Collective Action and work side by side with coordination Revolution in 2011. The April 6th Network Structure.” American Sociological Review 58 (April 1993): 182–196. He argued that remodeling based, centralized dynamics, but are Youth Movement, emerged as an of Paris by Haussmann meant the Paris Commune masked in the presence of more visible opposition group in the labor protests in 1871 engaged in mobilization efforts different from those of the 1848 urban rebellion. Stathis N. contentious elements. A vacuum of of Mahalla El-Kubra in April 2008, and Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars (New York: public information could bring their played an important role in organizing Cambridge University Press, 2006) also implements significance to the fore. To further the protests on the first day of the an argument based on categorization of space and information. examine the role of instigators situated 2011 Egyptian Revolution in 2011.

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Several of its leaders, including those Intended—and unintended—interruptions areas,8 altitude adversely influenced who lead the movement on January 25, in communications in conflictual the rates of rebellion in urban areas, were eventually arrested and sentenced situations happen often,7 therefore and as expected, the rates of violence to prison. In particular, I traced the there are a number of cases where increased with the population and total convergence and decentralization the very same dispersion hypothesis, sum of street length in each square mile processes on the micro level. On the decentralization of contention during window. The most instructive finding 25th, these emails were sent out from a blackout, can be put into the test. In is that contagion, defined as “conflict an operation room every hour (every 30 November 2012 another countrywide in [the] spatiotemporal neighborhood minutes in the afternoon), and contain disruptions of communications of previous conflict”, was effectively an itemized list of protest movement happened in Syria in the midst of activated during the blackout. The reports around the city of Cairo and civil conflict in and around the city spatiotemporal profile of the conflict other major Egyptian cities. The of Damascus and lasted for three depicts a process that is clustered locally emails were sent out to hundreds of days. I used a detailed dataset of daily and dispersed globally, particularly April 6th activists. Tahrir, the eventual violent conflict locations in Damascus during the blackout. Interestingly destination for protesters on the 25th, during 2012 to study the dynamics enough, this topology is the main was not in the list of four distinct Cairo of the conflict before and during the characteristic of small world networks, a locations designated for congregation blackout. For doing so I divided the network structure, in which I argue, a on that day. The emails start to report area under study (a spatial window of disruption of public signal encourages on the presence of protesters in Tahrir 14 by 18 miles) using a one-mile square more contention, not less. only in the early afternoon. There were grid that contained Damascus and no such convergence mechanisms in its satellite neighborhoods. The grid Finally, to further our understanding of place on the 28th, the protests were division facilitated tracing the patterns the dynamics of collective risk-taking effectively decentralized during the of contagion in time. Again, unlike the in regimes of limited information, I blackout.6 predictions of the coordination logic, designed and implemented synchronous the geographical dispersion of conflict experiments of collective risk taking If mobilization in Cairo streets was in Damascus was unprecedented during online, in which the risk takers were solely based on coordination processes, the blackout. Neither conflictual first identified through their decisions then the complete absence of the means business as usual, extrapolated from over lotteries of different risk levels, of communication that had proved the patterns of violence during the and then assigned to network positions crucial on the 25th, should have had first 11 months of the year 2012, nor based on the level of their risk aversion. a devastating effect on mobilization. the pattern of government attacks I observed that assigning risk takers to Instead disrupting the opponents’ on the rebels, extracted from the data peripheral network positions generated means of communication brought about which differentiates between rebel cascades of collective risk taking that the exact opposite of what Mubarak’s and state violence, can fully account were on par with a central assignment regime had planned. The blackout for the decentralization of the conflict of instigators. Furthermore, and as amplified face to face interpersonal on November 30 and December 1. important, compared to a baseline of and local dynamics, decentralized and Controlling for a number of structural random assignment in experimental leaderless protests became much harder variables for each square mile, such as networks, when the cascades of collective to control than a sole colossal meeting approximate levels of income, ethnic action or collective apathy happened, in Tahrir. The Syrian case I detail composition, population, temporal they were reached more quickly than below, provides further evidence on and spatial trends, and a lagged central and random assignments on the contagious nature of decentralized version of the dependent variable average. These results are significant, contention. (the rates of violent conflict in each because social organizations, as well mile by mile cell per day) I find that as campaigns of opinion reversal and unlike the civil conflict outside urban political promotion are fixated on central and visible actors: they are 6. The effect (dispersion hypothesis) can not be solely 7. Philip N. Howard, Sheetal D. Agarwal, and explained by either police blockage or Friday prayers Muzammil M. Hussain, “When Do States easier to identify. in mosques, Navid Hassanpour, “Media Disruption Disconnect Their Digital Networks? Regime and Revolutionary Unrest: Evidence from Mubarak’s Responses to the Political Uses of Social Media.” 8. See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, Quasi-Experiment.” Political Communication The Communication Review 14(September 2011): “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” American 31( January 2014): 1–24. 216–232. Political Science Review 97( February 2003): 75–90.

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However, the dynamics of contention in To return to the question that motivated between communication technology the field and the laboratory I outlined the inquiry: the presence or absence of and conflict.10 above, show that mobilization from the information influences rates of collective margins possesses dynamics that are action in ways that are contingent on the Navid Hassanpour is an adjunct professor different than coordination from the underlying structure of interpersonal in the QMSS (Quantitative Methods in center. Those who lead are not always connections. For example, removing the the Social Sciences) Program at Columbia the leaders.9 public signal in a global games model, University. 9. See Damon Centola, “The Spread of Behavior increases the rates of collective action in an Online Social Network Experiment,” 10. See Jacob N. Shapiro and Nils B. Weidmann, Science 329(September 3, 2010): 1194–1197 for in small world networks, but not in fully “Is the Phone Mightier than the Sword? Cell an experimental example Damon Centola and connected ones. The distinction between Phones and Insurgent Violence in Iraq” International Michael W. Macy, “Complex Contagions and Organization 69(March 2015): 247-274, and the Weakness of Long Ties,” American Journal of coordinated organization from the Jan H. Pierskalla and Florian M. Hollenbach, Sociology 113(November 2007): 702–734 outline center, and contagious contention from “Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of complex contagion processes that underlie the the margins helps to explain the extant Cell Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa” dynamics. Sinan Aral and Dylan Walker, “Identifying American Political Science Review 107(May 2013): Influential and Susceptible Members of Social contradicting reports on the relation 207–224, the former argues that cellphone coverage Networks,” Science 337( July 20, 2012): 337–341 international conference on Knowledge, Discovery, decreased insurgent violence, while the latter discuss identifying influence in experimental and Data mining, New York, 24 August 2003, 137– finds the introduction of wireless communication networks, for a theoretical discussion of the influence 146. The experimental results and further discussion to have increased rates of violent conflict. The maximization problem in social networks see David are included Navid Hassanpour, Leading from the underlying structure of rebellion network, and Kempe, Jon Kleinberg, and Eva Tardos, “Maximizing Periphery: The Network Dynamics of Decentralized the levels of cooperation needed in each case are the Spread of Influence through a Social Network,” Collective Action (New York, NY: Cambridge obviously different, hence the disparate influence of proceedings from the ninth ACM SIGKDD University Press, Forthcoming 2016). communication technology in the two cases.

(photo courtsey of mkhmarketing

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as al-Jazeera, which had served as a virtual Yemen, rapidly polarized as the moment of and ideas circulated through Arab politics, Arab public sphere as recently as early 2011, revolutionary enthusiasm gave way to hard in a hyper-mediated environment in which increasingly morphed into transparently political combat over the extent of reforms, states retained considerable structural partisan actors supporting the interests the distribution of power, and the identity power and in which all political actors of their state patrons and local proxies. of the state. This self-segregation into saw the media as a potential weapon. ideological or sectarian clusters drove politics During the period of relatively stable Second, the media magnified the fear and towards the extremes, undermined the autocracy, this media ecosystem offered uncertainty which inevitably accompany common ground of politics, and intensified important opportunities to challenge state transitions, particularly when those and accelerated conflicts and divisions. monopolies over information, expand the transitions involve profound institutional realm of political contention, and develop disarray and potentially incipient anarchy. The Arab Media Ecosystem the foundations of a new public sphere. Where the media tended to support Transnational, national, and social media The potential for deeper change offered by revolutionary enthusiasm by demonstrating interact with each other in intimate, intense the Arab uprisings dramatically raised the success in the early Arab Spring, by the ways, with a distinctive combination of stakes for such public discourse at all levels: middle of 2011 it frightened viewers with media characterizing each national media transnational, domestic, and social media. terrifying accounts of violence and mayhem ecosystem. These three types of media from Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. The cannot be understood as discrete sources Transnational Broadcast Media types of media which characterized the of information or opinion. Broadcast Transnational broadcast media, which had period of the uprisings (i.e., unreformed media relied heavily upon videos and for a decade offered a platform for a region- state media, weakly institutionalized images from social media, especially wide public sphere, rapidly degenerated private media, and intense social media) from war zones such as Syria and Libya, into an arena for regional power struggles were particularly prone to exacerbating the while social media users frequently and proxy wars, with al-Jazeera serving the fear of violence or political subjugation by retweeted and discussed the stories interests of the Qatari regime and Saudi- publicizing worrisome information, ideas, disseminated by broadcast and print media. owned media closely aligned with Riyadh’s and rumors, and by encouraging the self- regional policies. Bahrain was one turning segregation of sectors of the public into The Arab information environment differed point, as Arab stations either did not cover echo chambers where only such polarizing from most other regions experiencing or slanted their coverage of its popular information tended to circulate. This democratic transitions in three ways. By uprising in sectarian terms to justify media ecosystem tended to amplify and the late 2000s, most Arabs had hundreds of the Saudi-led intervention. Pan-Arab exacerbate the uncertainty associated with free-to-view satellite channels from which stations openly campaigned for chosen institutional change into existential fears. to choose, while internet access spread groups. Al-Jazeera came to be viewed as widely from initially low levels to near a publicity machine for Islamists such as Finally, where social media allowed the ubiquity in key urban centers. First, each Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Tunisia’s bridging of traditional political divides individual Arab country was embedded Ennahda, while other Gulf-based stations during mobilizational moments, after within a transnational Arabic language peddled wild, sensational stories which that moment of enthusiasm it offered the media ecosystem of satellite television, fed anti-Islamist anger and suspicion. ideal conditions for intense polarization. pan-Arab newspapers and websites, and This partisan turn, along with the images Media outlets typically sought out a social media. Few of the transitions outside of horrific violence and state collapse in distinctive political niche and catered to the Arab world have a comparable level Libya and Syria, likely contributed to that constituency to the exclusion of others. of regular, intense transnational media the diminishing enthusiasm for popular Islamists watched one set of television involvement in national political spheres. uprisings. It also removed the possibility that stations and Twitter feeds, while anti- Second, Arab national media sectors had transnational media could provide a neutral Islamists consumed an entirely different a comparatively high degree of direct forum to help bridge the political divides set. Transnationally, al-Jazeera went from and indirect state control. Finally, the between intensely contested national media. the primary source for news and political rapidly evolving social media introduced discourse across ideological lines to an very new dynamics into the familiar Domestic Media in Transitional States outlet catering to Islamists and shunned democratic transitions of decades past. A democratic transition from authoritarian by their enemies. Nationally, the media in rule should, in principle, entail the transitional states like Egypt and Tunisia, These different media platforms formed a emergence of a more open national as in failed states such as Syria, Libya and media ecology through which information public sphere able to monitor domestic

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politics, hold politicians to account, independent media rallied to the side of fears of “Islamization.” Constant reporting devote sustained attention to local issues, the revolution in early 2011.5 The sight of of economic and social breakdowns, along and become the site for national opinion top generals being grilled on live TV by a with widely circulating rumors of Islamist formation. The early post-uprisings period revolution-sympathizing talk show host perfidy, fueled popular discontent and in some Arab states did see the flourishing seemed like an early sign of the emergence shaped the popular support for the July of a wide variety of new national media, of a public sphere in the classical sense. So 2013 military coup. Following the coup, the from television to radio and newspapers. did the robust, critical debate in the opinion regime formed an even tighter symbiosis It did not last, however, due to the limited pages of leading independent newspapers, with the media. Journalists and television extent of institutional and legal reforms, the which opened the debate to a wide range hosts dropped any pretense of objectivity, rapid polarization of politics, and resource of new voices and relaxed the red lines competing with each other over who constraints on new media initiatives. constraining political criticism. Egyptian could most enthusiastically support the media outlets soon found themselves facing regime. Liberal politician Amr Hamzawy It is worth briefly explaining why reforms regulatory pressure, capture by powerful scathingly described this as a “neo- to the media sector proved so difficult.3 In social groups, state intimidation, and fascist” period for the Egyptian media. the absence of settled rules of the game and attachment to local political trends. The intense polarization, all sides feared that state media sector remained largely intact. 6 Tunisia’s pre-revolutionary media was far these institutions could quickly come to be Activists and protests were soon targeted by more rigidly controlled than Egypt’s, but dominated by their political rivals. Where the military-controlled media, demonized the experience proved remarkably similar. there is a broad political consensus, there as foreign-backed agents of destabilization Serious efforts were made at media reform may be the chance to establish independent, and blamed for the country’s ills. Though after the revolution: a new press code non-partisan institutional reforms. But activists continued to find ways to creatively adopted in 2011; a new oversight body where politics quickly becomes zero- use new media, they were shouting into the established in November 2012; robust sum and highly polarized, then every abyss or preaching to a dwindling choir. protections for freedom of speech and the move towards institutional reform will media included in the new Constitution, be interpreted as a political purge aimed The Muslim Brotherhood’s victory in the ratified in 2014. Nonetheless, national at institutional capture. Egypt’s newly June 2012 Presidential shifted dynamics. television and radio remained dominated elected President Morsi, for instance, had Efforts to reform state institutions, by the old guard. Previously existing private every reason to seek fundamental change including the media, now triggered intense television stations adapted quickly to the in the institutions at the heart of the old Journalism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013); Edward new market, with their owners often using Webb, The Media in Tunisia and Egypt (New York: regime, from the Interior Ministry to state Palgrave Pivots, 2014). them to promote their personal profile and broadcasting, and most revolutionaries advance their political agendas. Ennahda would agree that such change was essential. 5. Ramy Aly, “Rebuilding Egyptian Media for a and its rivals each set up television stations Democratic Future,” Arab Media and Society 14 Every effort to actually do so, however, (Summer 2011); Mark A. Peterson, “Egypt’s Media to advance their agendas, leading, as in frightened political opponents who feared Ecology in a Time of Revolution,” Arab Media Egypt, to the fragmentation and self- and Society 14 (Summer 2011); Fatima el-Issawi that Muslim Brothers would simply take and Bart Cammaerts, “Shifting Journalistic Rules segregation of the public into hostile, over those institutions to impose their in Democratic Transitions: Lessons from Egypt,” mutually incomprehensible camps. The rule. A similar dynamic played out in Journalism: Theory, Practice and Criticism OnlineFirst media contributed to the near breakdown (April 15, 2015): 1-18; Anne Alexander and Miriyam Tunisia, where the attempt at reforming Aoragh, “Egypt’s Unfinished Revolution: The Role of Tunisia’s transition in mid-2013 with the media and the state led civil society and of the Media Revisited,” International Journal of sensational reporting on events like the Communication 8 (2014): 890-915. journalists to rally against what they viewed assassination of opposition figure Chokri as an attempt by Ennahda to subordinate 6. Jared Maslin, “Pro-regime journalists are shaping Belaid or allegations of Ennahda corruption those institutions to an Islamist agenda. public opinion in Egypt,” Columbia Journalism and infiltration of state institutions. During Review, 22 January 2015, http://www.cjr.org/b-roll/ egypt_sisi_mona_iraqi.php; Rasha Abdulla, “Egypt’s the Tunisian Presidential campaign in The key transitional cases of Egypt and Media in the Midst of Revolution,” Carnegie Papers the winter of 2014, a furious President ( July 2014); Fahmy Howeydi, “Playing with the Tunisia had remarkably similar experiences Media,” Al-Shorouk, 20 August 2014 (Arabic); Moncef Marzouki lashed out at the media with the media.4 Most of Egypt’s Mohammed Elmashed, “We Completely Agree: as “sleeping remnants of the old party” Egyptian Media in the Era of President el-Sisi,” 3. Andrew K. Milton, “Bound But Not Gagged: Committee to Protect Journalists, 28 April 28 2015, and lambasted National TV as a “lying Media Reform in Democratic Transitions,” https://cpj.org/2015/04/attacks-on-the-press- and corrupt media which doesn’t have the Comparative Political Studies 34( June 2001): 493-526. egyptian-media-in-the-era-of-president-el-sisi.php; right to speak in the name of Tunisians.”7 Amr Hamzawy, “Types of Arab Neo-Fascist Media,” 4. Naomi Sakr, Transformations in Egyptian Al-Masry al-Youm, 19 July 2014 (Arabic). 7. Quoted in Al-Balad, November 3, 2014 (Arabic).

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Domestic Media in Non-Transitional and Social Media Debates within like-minded clusters Failed States Social media, which many had hoped tend to favor the more extreme voices Arab regimes that did not experience would provide an antidote to the toxic over the voices of caution or moderation. transitions mostly proved able to use legacy of official Arab media, could not This has very disturbing implications for familiar media methods, from censorship escape – and often exacerbated – its socially, ethnically or politically divided to undermining opposition to mobilizing pathologies during the transitions.9 There countries, where social media homophilia nationalist passions. In Morocco and is no doubt about the rapid growth of may tend to exacerbate such cleavages Jordan, the regimes used both official social media usage across the region, or and fuel the potential for violent conflict. and private outlets to mobilize support of its broad political and cultural impact. Social media is very good at cultivating a for the political order, market limited As described above, however, social media sense of aggrieved identity among an in- constitutional reforms, and raise fears should be understood as part of a broader group and mobilizing resentment and fury of the bloody potential consequences of media ecosystem rather than in isolation. against out-groups. The enthusiastic online civic unrest. Regimes in the Gulf adopted Media and social media formed symbiotic embrace of Egypt’s military coup in the especially draconian control against both relationships, with newspapers reporting summer of 2013, the sectarianism which the formal media sector and against on stories and publishing images appearing ran rampant through Gulf social media, and individual online activists. Kuwait, which on blogs. In Saudi Arabia and much of regional online support for violent jihadist had long enjoyed one of the most open the Gulf, Twitter is the most important factions in Syria show very powerfully how and contentious media spaces in the location of the public sphere, while social media can empower illiberal forces. region, witnessed severe crackdowns after Facebook plays a greater role in Egypt and 2011, imprisoning multiple citizens for much of North Africa. The importance of Second, the accelerant and intensification tweets criticizing the Emir and pressuring these social media platforms can in part effects of the extremely rapid spread of newspapers. Bahrain fiercely attacked be seen in the extreme efforts taken by information and dissemination of visceral independent media and oppositional online regimes to control them, particularly with imagery can drive destructive, self-fulfilling networks. These regimes typically found a wave of disproportionate punishments prophecies of conflict. The Arab transitions ways to manage the media to their benefit. by Gulf states of satirical or critical tweets. were replete with the spread of such highly destructive rumors and falsehoods over These mechanisms were exacerbated in Social media is good at mobilizing social media, which undermined confidence countries where state institutions failed transient coalitions around immediate, in transitional orders. The mass media, both more dramatically and violent anarchy had urgent protest issues, whether the demand transnational and domestic, also generated become a reality rather than a concern. to overthrow Hosni Mubarak or fury enormous amounts of misinformation, In Libya, for example, the proliferation of over police abuse in Ferguson, Missouri. partisan spin, and mobilizational national and local television stations aligned It is less useful for the consolidation of content, which fed the social media mill. with particular political factions contributed long-term, strategic coalitions or the to polarization, fear, and insecurity.8 The institutionalization of political movements. The Media in Context lack of a pre-existing media ecosystem, after The allure of street battles and purist The role of the media should of course not decades of Qaddafi’s autocratic rule, opened politics can prove far more attractive to be viewed in isolation from the underlying the door to highly partisan transnational mobilized youth, especially given the political challenges. The pernicious effects media and social media to define the inevitable frustrations and inefficiencies of the Arab media took root in transitional information space. Collapsing political of institutional democratic politics. environments characterized by institutional institutions, the absence of reliable non- uncertainty, personal insecurity, and partisan media, and the very real violence Two common features of socially mediated ideological or sectarian divisions. Such magnified the impact of the information environments are particularly destructive uncertainty, fear and anger created a circulating through these media platforms. in transitional situations. First, individuals fertile environment and eager audience embedded within informational clusters for sensationalist media, which fanned 8. Anja Wollenberg and Jason Pack. “Rebels with a tend to be exposed disproportionately rumors targeted at political adversaries, and Pen: Observations on the Newly Emergent Media to confirming information, and when fueled divisive and demonizing narratives. Landscape in Libya,” Journal of North African Studies 18 (February 2013): 191-210; Fatima el Issawi, discordant information does appear it is In particular, transitional moments in “Transitional Libyan Media: Free at Last?” Carnegie usually only to be mocked or challenged. most Arab cases revealed profound Papers (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013). 9. Philip Howard and Muzammil Hussain, “The disagreements about national identity Role of Digital Media,” Journal of Democracy 22 ( July and deep fears about the future. Long 2011): 35-48. 18 Vol. 13, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2015

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delays and highly contested processes in emergence of a new Arab public sphere. the protest wave. When political conditions the drafting of constitutions contributed Regimes and old elites proved quite capable change, the media will likely once again to the intensity of these identity conflicts. of adapting to the challenge and turning the accelerate and intensify episodic protests Initial moments of unity consistently new media environment to their advantage. and political challenges to the brittle new gave way to growing polarization around The same media that helped to drive authoritarian regimes in the region. If no regional, ethnic, sectarian or ideological the diffusion of protest during the early lessons are learned from the previous few identities, and between Islamists and anti- Arab uprisings proved equally effective years, however, then the same destructive Islamists. Populist, mobilizational media at driving resentment, fear, division and post-uprising path is likely to be repeated. interacted with partisan, polarized social demobilization of exhausted publics. But networks to drive discourse to the extremes despair is premature. The underlying Marc Lynch is professor of political science and intensify divisions between groups. transformations in the media environment and international affairs and director that originally empowered the Arab of the Project on Middle East Political The past two years have proven profoundly uprisings have not disappeared. Nor have Science at George Washington University. dispiriting to those who put faith in the the deep grievances that originally sparked

(photo courtsey of Essam Sharaf /Flickr/Creative Commons)

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the Chinese blogosphere every 20 minutes Baldasty (2002) suggests that the growth only if oil rents are not too high, and to identify content that is deleted ex post. of advertising – or “commercialization of bureaucrats are still important for economic They find that Chinese censors were more the news” – was one of the drivers of the growth. Petrova (2008) shows that income likely to delete appeals for coordination and development of independent press in the inequality leads to lower media freedom, collective action than the content critical United States. Petrova (2011) empirically as rich elites have incentives to manipulate of the Communist Party of China. In a tests the claim that an increase in advertising public opinion to prevent redistribution. related study, King et al. (2014) performed helped newspapers in 19th century U.S. to VonDoepp and Young (2013) show that a field experiment that confirms this become independent. More specifically, the media capture also depends on regime finding. Using randomized blog postings paper shows that newspapers were more stability, since governments that are in Chinese online social media they find likely to enter the market as independents uncertain about staying in power have that coordination messages indeed had or more likely to switch their political stronger incentives to control the media.6 a higher probability of being censored, affiliation to an independent affiliation in as compared with information messages, places with higher growth of advertising What Is the Effect of Media Capture? which only contained critical information revenues. The effect holds if after Recent empirical work demonstrates about the regime. Ananyev et al. (2015) instrumenting for advertising revenues that even controlled media can have a present a formal model of online censorship using restrictions for outdoor advertising significant causal effect on people’s behavior. with information and coordination aspects, and handbill distribution. These results Yanagizawa-Drott (2014), for example, arguing that regime stability and the confirm that growth of advertising was an shows how media availability can promote costs of censorship determine the optimal important driving force in the development violence. Specifically, he uses geographical censorship strategy. Empirically, they find of an independent press in 19th century variation in accessibility of the RTLM radio that lower regime stability, measured by United States. Similarly, Qin et al. (2014) in Rwanda, which openly called for violence the yields on government bonds issued by suggest that commercialization of the news against the Tutsi minority population at different countries, increases governments’ is an important factor affecting the content that time, and he finds that the radio was reliance on coordination censorship, of newspapers in modern China. They find responsible for 10 percent of anti-Tutsi such as denial-of-service (DDoS) that newspapers, which are less directly violence during 1994 genocide events. The attacks, using daily data for 43 countries.4 controlled by the Communist Party and paper also suggests that the impact of radio is partially depend on commercial revenues, multiplied by social interactions, which can When Is Media Capture Most Likely? have a lower probability of reporting about explain geographic spillovers in violence.7 The presence of media control, or media low-level corruption. At the same time, capture, depends on both “demand for more commercial newspapers are more Adena et al. (2015) look at the impact of capture”, i.e. the incentives of politicians likely to produce entertaining content radio in Weimar Republic and in Nazi to control media, and “supply of capture,” such as articles about sports or celebrities. 5 Germany, using variation in area topography i.e. the willingness of the media outlets to and in radio content for identification. They change their content in exchange of favors. Several papers look at the determinants of find that radio had an important effect on The absence of political competition and media capture and media freedom in cross- Nazi party support. Specifically, before state ownership of media are important country perspective. Egorov et al. (2009) 1933, when Nazis had almost no access factors allowing governments to control show that higher oil revenues are associated to radio, radio availability decreased vote media (Djankov et al., 2003), but other with lower media freedom, and this effect shares of NSDAP. After Hitler became the factors also play a role. The ability of media to is especially strong in nondemocratic Chancellor in January 1933, the availability earn independent revenues can successfully countries. Their argument is that free of radio had a positive effect on different protect the media from capture by media monitor bureaucratic behavior, but 6. Georgy Egorov, Sergei Guriev and Konstantin Sonin, “Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer politicians or interest groups. For example, this monitoring is beneficial for autocrats Media: A Theory And Evidence From Panel Data,” 4. Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret Roberts, 5. Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh, Tatiana American Political Science Review 103 (November “How Censorship in China Allows Government Nenova, and Andrei Shleifer, “Who Owns 2009): 645–668; Maria Petrova, “Inequality and Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,” the Media?” Journal of Law and Economics Media Capture,” Journal of Public Economics 92 American Political Science Review 107 (May 2013): 46(October 2003): 341–82; Gerald Baldasty, (February 2008): 183-212; Peter VonDoepp and 326-343; Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret The Commercialization of News in the Nineteenth Daniel Young, “Assaults on the Fourth Estate: Roberts, “Reverse-Engineering Censorship In China: Century (Madison, University of Wisconsin Explaining Media Harassment in Africa,” Journal of Randomized Experimentation And Participant Press, 1992); Maria Petrova, “Newspapers and Politics, 75 ( January 2013): 36-51. Observation” Science 345(August 22, 2014): 891; Parties: How Advertising Revenues Created an Maxim Ananyev, Maria Petrova, and Galina Independent Press,” American Political Science Review 7. David Yanagizawa-Drott, “Propaganda and Zudenkova, “Content and Coordination Censorship 105(November 2011): 790-808; Bei Qin, Yanhui Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Rwandan in Authoritarian Regimes,” (unpublished manuscript, Wu, and David Strömberg, “Determinants of Media Genocide,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 129 2015). Capture in China,” (unpublished manuscript, 2014). (November 2014), 1947-1994.

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indicators of Nazi support, such as voting can play a role. For example, Enikolopov, viewers are likely to turn off propaganda for NSDAP, joining the party in spring Petrova, and Sonin (2015) provide evidence messages in the form of cadenas, unexpected 1933, discrimination against Jews in that publications in a Russian blog about interruptions of TV programming by 1933-1934, and more violent expressions corruption in state-controlled companies Hugo Chavez speeches. This response was of anti-Semitism in the late 1930s. significantly affected the stock market stronger for viewers of opposition-leaning performance of the targeted companies channels. Viewers were also more likely Can an Independent Media Mitigate and their corporate practices. Enikolopov, to switch to cable opposition channels, Media Capture? Makarin, and Petrova (2015) show that which were not required to show cadenas.10 A separate but related question is whether higher penetration of the leading online independent media can become important social network in Russia had a positive Finally, there is evidence that propaganda when other media are controlled. effect on the incidence and the size of may backfire if a propaganda message is too Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya political protests in 2011-2012, possibly different from prior beliefs of the audience. (2011) examine the effect of an independent because of the reduced costs of collective Adena et al. (2015) show that impact of radio TV channel (NTV) on support for the action. To identify this effect, they exploit in Nazi Germany depended on citizens’ pro-governmental Unity party in the 1999 over-time variation in the origins of predispositions. Although, on average, Russian Parliamentary elections. In this students who studied at St. Petersburg State radio exposure increased denunciation of election, there was one independent TV University as an instrument for network Jews and anti-Semitic violence, they find channel critical of Unity to which only penetration. Similarly, Acemoglu, Hassan, that in places in which population was a portion of the population had access, and Tahoun (2015) demonstrate that in historically tolerant to Jews, exposure to whereas the entire population had access the aftermath of Arab Spring in Egypt, radio actually decreased denunciation of to government-controlled TV channels the content of social media predicted Jews and anti-Semitic violence, consistent that supported Unity. Using idiosyncratic the size of next-day political protests.9 with idea that propaganda can backfire. geographical variation that exogenously determined access to NTV, the authors find What Are the Limits on the Powers of Conclusion that exposure to NTV increased combined Media Capture? Empirical evidence shows that politicians vote share of the opposition parties by 6.3 Although the existing research suggests are often able to control the media. percentage points, while decreasing the vote that media capture can have an important There are several implications from the share of Unity by 8.9 percentage points. effect, the effects may be limited by several recent literature to understand the role of mechanisms. If readers or viewers know mass media in such environments. First, There is also evidence on the effect of cross- that media is captured, they can discount controlled media outlets have different border exposure to independent television information coming from the biased content from independent media outlets, from Western Germany on the behavior of sources. Bai et al. (2015) test this directly in and governments in different countries use people in Eastern Germany, where the pro- a lab experiment by looking at how people various methods for controlling the media. Communist government controlled all the update their beliefs about air pollution Second, even controlled media might still media inside the country.8 They find that in China after receiving information affect people’s behavior. Third, independent Eastern Germans with exposure to Western from either government-controlled or and social media are especially important TV were more likely to support communism independent sources. They found that in environments where other media outlets and less likely to apply for asylum, probably people do not fully discount information are captured. Finally, there are limits to the because they knew more about Western coming from government media, and propaganda power of controlled media. Germany and were less likely to idealize overall have problems with interpreting it. These results also suggests independent information from conflicting sources. On Maria Petrova is ICREA Research Professor media is important when most other media the other hand, Knight and Tribin (2015) at the Barcelona Institute for Political Economy outlets are controlled by the governments. use high-frequency ratings of different and Governance (IPEG); Adjunct Professor of programs in Venezuela to show that Economics at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra; Can Social Media Mitigate Media and Affiliate Professor at Barcelona Graduate 9. Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, and Konstantin Capture? Sonin, “Social Media and Corruption,” (unpublished School of Economics. Finally, in environments in which manuscript, 2015); Ruben Enikolopov, Alexey 10. Jie Bai, Mikhail Golosov, Nancy Qian, and Yan Makarin, and Maria Petrova, “Social Media and Kai, “Understanding the Influence of Government traditional media is controlled, social media Protest Participation: Evidence from Russia,” Controlled Media: Evidence from Air Pollution 8. Jens Hainmueller and Holger Kern, “Opium for (unpublished manuscript, 2015); Daron Acemoglu, in China,” (unpublished manuscript, 2015); Brian the Masses: How Foreign Media Can Stabilize Tarek Hassan, and Ahmed Tahoun, “The Power of Knight and Anna Tribin, “The Limits of Propaganda: Authoritarian Regimes,” Political Analysis 17 the Street: Evidence from Egypt’s Arab Spring,” Evidence from Chavez’s Venezuela,” (unpublished (Autumn 2009): 377–99. (unpublished manuscript, 2015). manuscript, 2015).

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2015 Section Award Winners Best Book Award moderate popular contention in the third Juan Linz Prize for Best Dissertation in Kurt Weyland (University of Texas at wave of democratization. Protest against the Comparative Study of Democracy Austin) for Making Waves: Democratic authoritarian regimes spread more slowly, Henry Thomson (University of Oxford) Contention in Europe and Latin America since but it was more likely to succeed. for his dissertation on “Food and Power: 1848 (Cambridge University Press). Authoritarian Regime Durability and The committee recognized with Honorable Agricultural Policy.” Thomson completed Honorable Mentions: Rachel Beatty Ridel Mention citations the excellent books his PhD in Political Science at the University (Northwestern University) for Authoritarian by Ben W. Ansell and David J. Samuels, of Minnesota. Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Inequality and Democratization: An Elite- Africa (Cambridge University Press) and Competition Approach, and Rachel Beatty Committee Members: Leonid Peisakhin Ben Ansell (University of Oxford) and Riedl, Authoritarian Origins of Democratic (New York University); Paula Valeria Munoz David Samuels (University of Minnesota) Party Systems in Africa. Chirinos (Universidad del Pacífico); and for Inequality and Democratization: An Arturas Rozenas (New York University). Elite-Competition Approach (Cambridge Best Article Award University Press). Jordan Gans-Morse (Northwestern University), Committee’s Remarks on the Award Sebastian Mazzuca (Universidad Nacional de Winner: Henry Thomson’s dissertation Committee Members: Scott Mainwaring San Martín and CIAS), and Simeon Nichter is an especially insightful and in-depth (University of Notre Dame); Aníbal Pérez- (University of California, San Diego) study of the dynamics of authoritarian Liñán (University of Pittsburgh); and Anna for their article “Varieties of Clientelism: survival. Thomson sets out to explain how Grzymala-Busse (University of Michigan). Machine Politics During Elections” authoritarian rulers manipulate agricultural American Journal of Political Science 58 (April policies and resultant food prices under the Committee’s Remarks on the Award 2014): 415-432. pressure of demands from urban residents Winner: The committee selected Kurt and rural agricultural producers. Thomson Weyland’s book, Making Waves: Democratic Committee Members: Lisa Blaydes demonstrates that dictators who are Contention in Europe and Latin America (Stanford University); Nahomi Ichino especially dependent on elite support are since the Revolutions of 1848, as the winner (University of Michigan); and Joseph likely to tolerate higher food prices in order of the 2015 prize for the best book in Wright (Pennsylvania State University). to appease large-scale agricultural producers. comparative democratization among the This argument challenges the common 35 books submitted. Making Waves covers Committee’s Remarks on the Award wisdom that dictators are especially a grand sweep of time and geography with Winner: beholden to urban interests. Forced to an interesting original research question and This article presents a unified theoretical pander to wealthy rural interests by the argument. Weyland notes that early waves framework to explain the mix of clientelistic nature of elite politics, some authoritarians of regime contention in Europe (1848 and strategies that political parties may employ are pushed onto a particular developmental 1917-19) occurred more rapidly but with in an election with the distribution of voters trajectory, which eventually comes to shape lower rates of success of achieving democracy in two dimensions: how inclined they are democratic transition via feedback loops. than a later wave in South America (1979- to vote and whether they favor the party. In laying out his argument and supporting 90). The model generates predictions on who it with empirics, Thomson brings to bear is bought in an election, and therefore, an impressive knowledge of the theories To explain this puzzle, he develops an predictions on the optimal mix of four of political development and masterfully organizational argument grounded in strategies in an election: vote buying, turnout deploys cross-national data as well as a theories of bounded rationality. The earlier buying, rewarding loyal voters, and double fascinating case study of Imperial Germany waves of contention occurred before persuasion. It further explores how several under Bismarck. All in all, the author tackles political parties, labor unions, and other factors in the political environment shapes an important and overlooked question with organizations that characterize modern mass the optimal mix of strategies. The article theoretical rigor, meticulous attention to democracy became well-entrenched. As a uses examples from around the world to detail, and stellar use of empirical methods, result, popular contention spread rapidly, but illustrate the impact of institutional changes all along remaining keenly aware of the without leadership that took more informed such as the introduction of compulsory argument’s limitations and pitfalls. These decisions. In contrast, organizational leaders voting, the secret ballot and characteristics qualities make this dissertation especially with more information and more seasoned of the electorate and party system such as worthy of the legacy of Juan Linz. judgments had the capacity to spur or political polarization. This study recasts our

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understanding of vote-buying and related support in diverse subnational settings, The committee is also delighted to extend strategies in a broader context and generates interrogating the role of ethnic visual cues an honorable mention to Michael Broache a set of novel hypotheses that can be applied in Indonesian campaign materials. Among for his dissertation: “Assessing the Impact of and tested in diverse settings around the other fascinating insights, in analyzing International Criminal Court Prosecutions world and across time. over 15,000 election posters across rural During Ongoing Conflict.” Broache’s Indonesia, Fox identified two categories research into combatant responses to ICC Best Field Work Award of visual appeals on the basis of ethnicity: prosecutions in the Democratic Republic Barry Driscoll (University of Wisconsin bonding and bridging cues. Candidates of Congo presented powerful military and - Madison) for his work on “The Perverse tended to display “bonding” cues when their rebel elites with hypothetical scenarios in Effects of Political Competition: Building own ethnic group comprised a majority in order to assess their knowledge, behavior Capacity for Patronage in Ghana” and Colm any district, while displaying “bridging” and decision-making processes on the Fox (Singapore Management University) cues to appeal across ethnic lines when battlefield. Broache conducted in-depth for his work on “Appealing to the Masses.” the support of other groups was needed to interviews in a highly volatile research secure electoral victory. environment, at times placing himself at Honorable Mention: Michael Broache considerable personal risk, in order to shed (Columbia University) for his work on Both Fox and Driscoll demonstrated light on an important topic in comparative “Assessing the Impact of International incredible skill, creativity and methodological politics and international relations for which Criminal Court Prosecutions During innovation in the research practices they existing data is notoriously thin. Ongoing Conflict.” employed in the field. Both spent years immersing themselves in their respective The committee extends heartfelt Committee Members: Milli Lake (Arizon fieldsites, becoming proficient in local congratulations to each of the recipients of State University); Michael Weintraub languages and dialects, and intimately this year’s award. (Binghamton) and Calvert Jones (University acquainted with regional political culture. of Maryland). Both employed an impressive combination Best Paper Award of methodological approaches in order to Kenneth Greene (University of Texas Committee’s Remarks on the Award develop, substantiate, test and refine their at Austin) for his paper on “Ousting Winners: The selection committee for the arguments. Autocrats: The Political Economy of Hybrid Comparative Democratization Section’s Autocracy.” Best Fieldwork Award has enthusiastically Over the course of his research in Ghana, selected Barry Driscoll and Colm Fox as co- Driscoll implemented a comprehensive Committee Members: Christian Houle recipients of the 2015 award. survey of tax collection and public goods (Michigan State University); Michael provision in 88% of Ghana’s 170 local Albertus (University of Chicago); and Ryan Both recipients explored questions related governments. He supplemented this work Kennedy (University of Houston). to electoral mobilization at the subnational with exciting ethnographic and interview- level: Driscoll in Ghana and Fox in based research with civil servants and Committee’s Remarks on the Award Indonesia. Driscoll’s dissertation, “The market traders across the country, offering Winner: We are pleased to award the best Perverse Effects of Political Competition: crucial new insights into the realities of paper prize in comparative democratization Building Capacity for Patronage in Ghana” tax collection and public goods provision to Kenneth Greene’s paper ‘Ousting found that Ghanaian party leaders offered in areas of weak state capacity. Fox, on the Autocrats: The Political Economy of Hybrid club rewards to local activists for ensuring other hand, spent nearly two years collecting Autocracy.’ Kenneth Greene develops an that constituents turned out to vote. Contrary and photographing campaign materials innovative argument according to which to the findings of much of the recent in a convenience sample of nine district the capacity of incumbents in competitive scholarship on political competition, districts elections to create the largest dataset of authoritarian regimes to retain power with greater electoral competition fostered election posters ever gathered. Additionally, depends primarily on their ability to politicize patronage networks, whereas districts he employed a rigorous analysis of election- public resources. He supports his argument with less competition facilitated the more related news coverage from 1997 to 2011 and using both quantitative and qualitative equitable distribution of public resources. months of immersive observational research evidence. This paper has the potential to Colm Fox’s dissertation, “Appealing to the in selected districts in order to deepen his make a very valuable contribution to diverse Masses” similarly examined the conditions understanding of the types of ethic appeals subfields, such as the study of comparative under which electoral candidates mobilized made by candidates.

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authoritarian regimes, of the incumbency 1303 Granger Avenue, Apt #2 Comparative Democratization published advantage and of regime transitions. Ann Arbor, MI 48104 in 2015 (authored, co-authored or edited). [email protected] Copies of the nominated book should be Call for Nominations: Section Awards at sent to each committee member in time to APSA Annual Meeting: Christian von Soest arrive by March 15, 2016. Books received The Comparative Democratization Section Head of Research Program 2: Violence and after this deadline cannot be considered. will present five awards for scholarly Security Deadline: March 15, 2016 work at the 2016 APSA annual meeting GIGA German Institute of Global and in Philadelphia: the Linz Prize for Best Area Studies Committee Chair: Dissertation, and the Best Book, Best GIGA Office Berlin Kurt Weyland Article, Best Field Work, and Best Paper Friedrichstrasse 206 Department of Government prizes. Members are strongly encouraged to 10969 Berlin, Germany University of Texas at Austin submit nominations (including, for several [email protected] 158 W. 21st St. A1800 awards, self-nominations) to the appropriate Austin TX 78712-1704 committees listed below. Please also forward Best Article Award [email protected] this information to colleagues and graduate Single-authored or co-authored articles students. We ask you to note the eligibility focusing directly on the subject of Committee Members: criteria, deadlines for submissions, and democratization and published in 2015 are Sheena Chestnut Greitens materials that must accompany nominations; eligible. Nominations and self-nominations Department of Political Science direct any queries to the committee chairs. are encouraged. Copies of the article should University of Missouri be sent by email to each of the committee 113 Professional Building Juan Linz Prize for Best Dissertation in members. Columbia, MO 65211-6030 the Comparative Study of Democracy Deadline: March 15, 2016 [email protected] Given for the best dissertation in the Comparative Study of Democracy Committee Chairs: Rachel Beatty Riedl completed and accepted in the two calendar Jordan Gans-Morse Sciences Po bordeaux years immediately prior to the APSA Department of Political Science Les afriques dans le monde Annual Meeting where the award will Northwestern University Institut d’Etudes politiques be presented (2014 or 2015 for the 2016 Scott Hall #203 11, allee Ausone Annual Meeting). The prize can be awarded 601 University Place Domaine Universitaire to analyses of individual country cases as Evanston, IL 60208 33607 Pessac Cedex long as they are clearly cast in a comparative [email protected] France perspective. A hard copy of the dissertation, [email protected] accompanied by a letter of support from Sebastian Mazzuca a member of the dissertation committee, Department of Political Science Best Field Work Award should be sent to each member of the prize Johns Hopkins University This prize rewards dissertation students selection committee. 358 Mergenthaler Hall who conduct especially innovative and Deadline: March 15, 2016 3400 N. Charles Street difficult fieldwork. Scholars who are Baltimore, MD 21218 currently writing their dissertations or Committee Chair: [email protected] who complete their dissertations in 2015 Henry Thomson are eligible. Candidates must submit two Nuffield College Simeon Nichter chapters of their dissertation and a letter New Road Department of Political Science of nomination from the chair of their Oxford, OX11NF, UK UC San Diego dissertation committee describing the field [email protected] 9500 Gilman Dr. work. The material submitted must describe La Jolla, CA 92093 the field work in detail and should provide Committee Members: [email protected] one or two key insights from the evidence Mai Hassan collected in the field. The chapters may be Department of Political Science Best Book Award sent electronically or in hard copy directly to University of Michigan Given for the best book in the field of each committee member.

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Deadline: March 15, 2016 221 Gross Hall the Mythology of the Strong Leader” in the Committee Chair: Campus Box 90204 August 2015 Leadership, in which he argues Barry Driscoll Durham, NC 27708 that contemporary political commentary Department of Political Science [email protected] attributes too much power to individual Grinnell College leaders, ignoring the impact of deliberative 1210 Park St NEWS FROM MEMBERS policy-making and enabling the myth of Carnegie Hall, Room 302 Michael Albertus, assistant professor of the “strong” leader in both autocracies and Grinnell, IA 50112 political science, University of Chicago, democracies. [email protected] published Autocracy and Redistribution: the Politics of Land Reform (Cambridge Lenka Bustikova, assistant professor of Committee Members: University Press, 2015). The book challenges politics and global studies, Arizona State Michael Broache traditional conceptions of land reform University, published “Voting, Identity and University of Tampa and offers a new theory and typology for Security Threats in Ukraine: Who Supports 401 West Kennedy Boulevard understanding land reform policies under the Ukrainian ‘Svoboda’ Party?” available Box Q democracies and dictatorships. online July 26, 2015, in Communist and Tampa, FL 33606 Post-Communist Studies. The article uses [email protected] Albertus also published “Explaining 2010 survey data to show that support for Patterns of Redistribution under Autocracy: Svoboda was rooted not in ethnic hostility Colm Fox The Case of Peru’s Revolution from Above” but in anxiety over perceived threats to the Singapore Management University in Latin American Research Review (Vol. 50, identity of the Ukrainian state. 90 Stamford Road, Level 4, #04-052 No. 2); “The Role of Subnational Politicians Singapore 178903 in Distributive Politics: Political Bias in Melani Cammett, professor of government, [email protected] Venezuela’s Land Reform under Chavez” in Harvard University, published A Political the September 2015 Comparative Political Economy of the Middle East, fourth edition Best Paper Award Studies, and will publish “Authoritarian (Westview Press, 2015) with Ishac Diwan, Given to the best paper on Comparative Survival and Poverty Traps: Land Reform Alan Richards, and John Waterbury. This Democratization presented at the previous in Mexico” in the forthcoming World edition includes two new introductory year’s APSA Convention. Papers can be Development. chapters as well as new discussion of oil nominated by panel chairs or discussants. economies, private sector growth, crony Self-submissions are also encouraged. Gerardo Berthin, senior democracy capitalism, and civil society. Deadline: March 15, 2016 and governance associate, Tetra Tech International Development, published Cammett also received awards for two Committee Chair: “Democratic Governance and Corruption books published in 2014: Compassionate Kenneth F. Greene in Latin America” in Latin American Communalism: Welfare and Sectarianism Department of Government Democracy: Emerging Reality or Endangered in Lebanon (Cornell University Press, 158 W 21st St., Stop A1800 Species? (Taylor and Francis, 2015), edited 2014) received the 2015 Giovanni Sartori University of Texas at Austin by Richard Millett, Jennifer Holmes, and Book Award from the APSA Section on Austin TX 78712-1704 Orlando Perez. The chapter explores the Qualitative and Multi-Method Research [email protected] persistence of both perceptions of corruption and was an honorable mention for the and corrupt practices and the effects on 2015 Gregory Luebbert Book Award Committee Members: democratic governance. from the APSA Section on Comparative Allen Hicken Politics, and The Politics of Non-State Social University of Michigan Archie Brown, Emeritus Professor of Welfare (Cornell University Press, 2014) 505 S. State Street Politics, Oxford University, and Emeritus received an honorable mention for the 2015 Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1045 Fellow, St. Anthony’s College, was given Outstanding Book Award of the Association [email protected] the Distinguished Contributions to Slavic, for Research on Nonprofit Organizations East European, and Eurasian Studies and Voluntary Action. Edmund Malesky Award for 2015 by the Association for Department of Political Science Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Michael Coppedge, professor of political Duke University Studies. He also published “Questioning science, University of Notre Dame, and

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co-principal investigator, Varieties of in St. Petersburg, published Authoritarian of constitutionalism through which cross- Democracies (V-Dem) Institute, has issued Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime cultural comparisons are possible. a call for papers for a fall 2106 conference Changes (University of Pittsburgh Press, at the University of Notre Dame to mark 2015). The book explores the development Maria Koinova, reader in international the release of the latest V-Dem data, which of electoral authoritarianism in Russia. relations, Warwick University, published will be released on December 31, 2015. Gel’man also published “The Vicious “Sustained vs. Episodic Mobilization Topics can include anything that employs Circle of Post-Soviet Neopatrimonialism Among Conflict-Generated Diasporas,” V-Dem data and is related to the nature, in Russia,” available online August 10, 2015, available July 8, 2015, in International causes, or consequences of democracy or its in Post-Soviet Affairs. The article examines Political Science Review. The article explores components; or research on measurement the incentives responsible for Russia’s poor differing mobilization patterns among methods. If you would like to be considered record of post-Soviet economic reform and conflict diaspora groups from the same for an invitation to this conference, send an presents options for changing them. region living in the same host country, abstract and CV to Michael Coppedge at suggesting that issues binding the diaspora, [email protected] by November 20, 2015. Maiah Jaskowski, assistant professor of the host-state, and the home-state are More information regarding the V-Dem politics and international affairs, coauthored crucial to the creation of sustained diaspora project may be found at http://www.v-dem. and coedited American Crossings: Border movements. net. Politics in the Western Hemisphere with Arturo C. Sotomayor and Harold A. David Kuehn, research fellow, Heidelburg Arolda Elbasani, Visiting Fellow, European Trinkunas ( Johns Hopkins University University, and Aurel Croissant, professor University Institute, published “Islam Press, forthcoming). The book examines the of political science, University of Heidelberg, and Democracy at the Fringes of Europe: complicated modern history of borders in have obtained funding from the Deutsche The Role of Useful Historical Legacies” the Western Hemisphere and their impact Forschungsgemeinschaft to conduct a three- in the June 2015 Politics and Religion. The as geopolitical boundaries, key locations for year research project entitled “Dictator’s article examines how Albanian Muslims internal security, spaces for international Endgame: Theory and Empirical Analysis contributed to democratization and trade, and areas where national and of Military Behavior in Authoritarian European integration in post-Communist community identities are defined. Regime Crises, 1946-2014.” The project will Albania. She also edited The Revival of Islam begin October 2015 and will explore the in the Balkans: From Identity to Religiosity Debra Javeline, associate professor of conditions under which militaries defend, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) with Olivier political science, University of Notre Dame, or defect from, authoritarian regimes under Roy. This edited volume uses a cross- published “Expert Opinion on Extinction threat from popular mobilization and how country approach to examine the complex Risk and Climate Change Adaptation for different forms of defection can be explained. relationships between the post-communist Biodiversity,” available July 15, 2015, in Balkan states and Islam. Elementa: Science of the Anthropene with Carl LeVan, assistant professor of Jessica J. Hellmann, Jason S. Mclachlan, international service, American University, Natalia Forrat, doctoral candidate in Dov F. Sax, Mark W. Schwartz, and Rodrigo published “When Talk Trumps Text: the sociology, Northwestern University, Castro Cornejo. The article discusses the Democratizing Effects of Deliberation published “The Political Economy of circumstances in which managed relocation During Constitution-Making, 1974-2011” Russian Higher Education: Why Does of species threatened by climate change is a with Todd A. Eisenstadt, professor of Putin Support Research Universities?” justifiable conservation tactic. government, American University, and available online June 23, 2015, in Post-Soviet Tofigh Maboudi in the August 2015 Affairs. The article explains that Russian Jeremy Kleidosty is now a postdoctoral American Political Science Review. The government support for research universities researcher at the University of Jyväskylä in authors use data from 138 constitutions reinforced the regime by dividing university Finland, where he will work on a research in 118 countries to explore the effects of communities, masking attacks on university project entitled “Political Power in the Early constitution-making on democratization. autonomy, and containing anti-regime Modern European and Islamic Worlds.” He student activity. recently published a book entitled The Concert LeVan also edited African State Governance: of Civilizations: The Common Roots of Western Subnational Politics and National Power ( July Vladimir Gel’man, professor of political and Islamic Constitutionalism (Ashgate, 2015) with Joseph Olayinka Fashagba and science and sociology, European University 2015), in which he develops a definition Edward R. McMahon. The book contains

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chapters on Kenya, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Yonatan L. Morse, assistant professor Olukunle Owolabi, assistant professor South Africa, with a strong focus on state- of teaching, Georgetown University, will of political science, Villanova University, level legislative politics. Receive 30% off the publish “From Single-Party to Electoral published “Literacy and Democracy despite list price by emailing [email protected] Authoritarian Regimes: The Institutional Slavery: Forced Settlement and Postcolonial for a coupon from the publisher. Origins of Competitiveness in Post- Outcomes in the Developing World” in Cold War Africa” in the October 2015 the October 2015 Comparative Politics. Staffan I. Lindberg, professor of political Comparative Politics. The article highlights The article examines the impact of forced science, University of Gothenburg, was differences in party institutionalization settlement on the developmental legacy of selected to the editorial board of the and patterns of social incorporation as key countries decolonized after 1945 finding American Journal of Political Science and was aspects that help explain the competitiveness that forced settlement colonialism resulted in recently appointed director of the V-Dem of elections. significantly higher literacy rates and higher Institute at University of Gothenburg, mean levels of postcolonial democracy than Sweden. The institute has been recognized Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, professor of domination over indigenous populations. as a university-wide research infrastructure democracy studies, Hertie School of by the Vice Chancellor of the University, Governance, published The Quest for Good Ani Sarkissian was recently promoted to making it a candidate for 7-year institutional Governance: How Societies Develop Control associate professor of political science at grants by the Swedish Research Council. He of Corruption (Cambridge University Press, Michigan State University. Her recently is also co-author on a series of nine articles 2015). The book examines the governance published book, The Varieties of Religious in the V-Dem Working Paper Series/SSRN structures used to maintain integrity in Repression: Why Governments Restrict Religion V-Dem Journal. Lindberg published “From the allocation of public resources while (Oxford University Press, 2015), explores Sticks to Carrots: Electoral Manipulation in diminishing systemic corruption and the various forms of religious repression Africa, 1986–2012” with Carolien van Ham explores how to influence governance to and their challenges to democratization, in the July 2015 Government and Opposition. protect the rights of policy-makers and civil pluralism, and civil society development. societies to defend those resources. Cyanne Loyle is now assistant professor of Carsten Q. Schneider, associate professor political science, Indiana University, where Pippa Norris, McGuire Lecturer in of political science, Central European she will be teaching courses on human rights Comparative Government, Harvard University, and Kristin Makszin won and conflict studies. University, and director, Electoral Integrity the 2014 Socio-Economic Review Project, published the second installment Annual Prize for their article, “Forms of Stanislav Markus, assistant professor of in her trilogy on electoral integrity, Why Welfare Capitalism and Education-Based political science, University of Chicago, Elections Fail (Cambridge University Press, Participatory Inequality,” published in the published Property, Protection, and Predation: 2015). Using structural, international, and March 2014 Socio-Economic Review. The Pirahna Capitalism in Russia and Ukraine institutional accounts of elections which article analyzes how institutional conditions (Cambridge, 2015). The book advances fail to meet international standards, Norris shape the impact of differences in education understanding of this issue beyond state argues for the need to prevent political on political participation in capitalist predation and commitment to property actors from manipulating electoral integrity democracies. rights (or lack thereof ), instead proposing while allocating sufficient resources and a broader theory of agent predation and capacities for officials to manage elections Mariela Szwarcberg, assistant professor of the firm-level alliances that allow property effectively. She also co-edited the 2015 political science, Reed College, published owners to protect themselves. executive report, Checkbook Elections: Mobilizing Poor Voters: Machine Politics, Political Finance in Comparative Perspective Clientelism, and Social Networks in Argentina Markus will also publish “Sovereign with Andrea Abel van Es and Lisa Fennis, (Cambridge University Press, 2015). Commitment and Property Rights: The project coordinator, Electoral Integrity Observing the consolidation of clientelism Case of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” Project. The report, copublished by Global alongside democratic development, this available online July 23, 2015, in Studies in Integrity, the Sunlight Foundation, and the book explains the perverse incentives for Comparative International Development, in Electoral Integrity Project, can be found at utilizing clientelistic strategies to mobilize which he explores the unexpectedly negative www.moneypoliticstransparency.org/. voters in poor neighborhoods and the relationship between democratization and consolidation of political machines at the property rights. local level.

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Jan Teorell, professor of political science, Christian Welzel, professor of political poverty, stagnation, and dictatorship, the Lund University, is currently a Fernand culture research, University Lueneburg, was developing world has in fact been making Braudel Fellow at the European University awarded the 2014 Stein Rokkan Prize for his steady progress for over two decades in health, Institute in Italy for the 2015-2016 academic book Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment education, income, and conflict reduction, along year. He recently published “Demography and the Quest for Emancipation (Cambridge with democracy. and Democracy: A Global, District-Level University Press, 2013). The book explores Analysis of Electoral Contestation” with reasons for the recent expansion of universal Authoritarianism Goes Global (II) John Gerring, professor of political science, freedoms and democracy while providing a I. “The Leninist Roots of Civil Society Boston University, and Maxwell Palmer in well-reasoned theory of emancipation. Repression” by Anne Applebaum the August 2015 American Political Science East European communists inherited the Review and “A Quality of Government Matthew Winters is now an associate Bolshevik obsession with repressing any Peace? Explaining the Onset of Militarized professor of political science at the University genuinely independent civil society groups. Interstate Disputes, 1985-2001” in the of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. October 2015 International Interactions. II. “Civil Society Under Assault” by Douglas Jong-Sung You, senior lecturer of political Rutzen Gunes Murat Tezcur is now the Jalal and social change, Australian National Once widely celebrated, civil society today is Talabany Chair of Kurdish Political Studies University, published “The Cheonanregarded as a threat by many governments, at the University of Central Florida. Incident and the Declining Freedom of leading them to restrict its funding and Expression in South Korea” in the April 2015 activities. Michael Wahman is now an assistant Asian Perspective. Examining the controversy professor of political science at the University surrounding North Korean culpability for III. “The Kremlin’s Information War” by of Missouri. He published “Are Democratic the 2010 sinking of the Cheonan warship, Peter Pomerantsev Sanctions Really Counterproductive?” with this article discusses South Korea’s reliance The Kremlin is now bringing to the rest of the Christian von Soest in the October 2015 on national security rhetoric and criminal world the kind of propaganda and conspiracy Democratization. The article explains that defamation to suppress free speech. His theories it has been churning out at home. although sanctions do not generally increase earlier article with Stephan Haggard, the level of democracy, they increase the Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor IV. “China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine” instability of authoritarian rule which is of Korea-Pacific Studies, Universityby Anne-Marie Brady associated with a higher probability of of California-San Diego, “Freedom of China is aggressively working to reshape regime and leadership change. Wahman’s Expression in South Korea,” was published its image, touting the “Chinese Dream” and article “Nationalized Incumbents and in the January 2015 Journal of Contemporary its desire for a peaceful rise to power on the Regional Challengers: Opposition- and Asia and discusses the country’s declining international stage. Incumbent-Party Nationalization in Africa” freedom of speech more broadly. also became available online on July 23, “Decentralizing for a Deeper, More Supple 2015, in Party Politics. New Research Democracy” by Jean-Paul Faguet, Ashley M. Fox, and Caroline Pöschl Brian Wampler, professor of political SELECTED JOURNAL ARTICLES Can decentralization deepen democracy or is it science, Boise State University, published ON DEMOCRACY doomed to weaken the state? If well designed, Activating Democracy in Brazil: Popular decentralization can have a positive impact Participation, Social Justice, and Interlocking Journal of Democracy on national unity, conflict mitigation, policy Institutions (University of Notre Dame Press, The October 2015 (Vol. 26, no. 4) Journal autonomy, service delivery, and social learning. 2015). The book examines the proliferation of Democracy features clusters of articles on of democratic institutions within Belo “Authoritarianism Goes Global” and “After After the Arab Spring Horizonte, Brazil and how those institutions the Arab Spring,” as well as individual I. “Caught in History’s Crosswinds” by have transformed the manner in which articles on militarism in Latin America and Michele Dunne citizens, civil society organizations, and non-Western democracies. We are still struggling to understand the mostly political parties work together to generate bitter harvest of the Arab Spring, but there are political and social change. “The Rise of the World’s Poorest Countries” a few lessons that can be drawn. by Steven Radelet Widely believed to be hopelessly mired in

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II. “People Still Want Democracy” by Democracy features a cluster of articles on by Patrick Merloe Michael Robbins “Authoritarianism Goes Global,” as well Nonpartisan election monitoring has helped to Data from the Arab Barometer suggest that as individual case studies on Azerbaijan, foster democratization over the last thirty years, Arabs have not rejected democracy. In fact, they Rwanda, Hungary, Nigeria, China, and but now dictators are trying to sabotage it, often still by and large believe in it and want it. authoritarian successor parties. by spreading lies and confusion.

III. “How the Media Trashed the “Europe and Azerbaijan: The End of Shame” “Nigeria’s Hopeful Election” by Peter Lewis Transitions” by Marc Lynch by Gerald Knaus and Darren Kew The Arab experience shows that the same media Europe’s most significant intergovernmental In a surprising turn of events, opposition that facilitate the toppling of dictators can make organization for safeguarding human rights, candidate Muhammadu Bhuari was able to it harder to build democracy. the Council of Europe, has sold its soul to a outpoll incumbent Goodluck Jonathan—and dictator, and for a laughably low price. It’s a tale the latter peacefully acknowledged his defeat. IV. “Do Muslims Vote Islamic Now?” by as sad as it is shameful. Charles Kurzman and Didem Türkoglu “The Medieval Roots of Democracy” by Islamic political parties were not especially “Rwanda: Progress or Powder Keg?” by Filip Jørgen Møller popular with voters in Muslim-majority Reyntjens Europe in the Middle Ages was hardly countries before the Arab Spring. Has that Rwanda under Paul Kagame has been hailed for democratic, but it did have law-based changed? its visionary leadership, economic progress, and institutions that could and did stay the hands reforms in education, health, and agriculture. of kings, laying a crucial basis for future state- V. “The Islamist Compromise in Tunisia” by Yet the regime’s autocratic rule, human-rights building and democracy-building alike. Kasper Ly Netterstrøm abuses, persecution of the Hutu majority, and How did a potent Islamist movement come to growing inequality point to an ominous future. “Comment on Møller: The Importance of accept a non-Islamist constitution? The answer Equality” by Francis Fukuyama lies in that movement’s self-protective reflexes. “Hungary’s U-Turn: Retreating from It is fine to acknowledge the importance of Democracy” by János Kornai law-based rule to the eventual rise of modern VI. “Are Secular Parties the Answer?” by The great achievements of Hungary’s 1989- democracy, but we must not overlook the even Mieczystaw P. Boduszyñski, Kristin Fabbe, 90 transition—including democracy, rule of greater contribution of the idea of equality. and Christopher Lamont law, market-oriented reform, and pluralism in A close look at secular parties in the Middle East intellectual life—are being dismantled as the “Structural Conditions and Democratization” today raises doubts about whether they are ready world looks the other way. by Grigore Pop-Eleches and Graeme B. for prime time. Robertson Authoritarianism Goes Global How are trends in global democratization “Exploring ‘Non-Western Democracy’” by I. “Countering Democratic Norms” by likely to be shaped by the distribution of such key Richard Youngs Alexander Cooley structural factors as income, ethnic or religious Often called for but seldom defined with any Favored by global conditions that lean their diversity, and the quality of the state? precision, “non-Western democracy” could end up way, authoritarians have been busy over the giving cover to authoritarianism, but also could last decade coming up with new and inventive “Authoritarian Successor Parties” by James allow potentially useful democratic innovations ways to thwart the global advance of democracy Loxton to be tried and tested. and human rights. Why do significant numbers of people, after gaining the right to choose their leaders via “A New Militarism in Latin America” by II. “Cyberspace Under Siege” by Ron free and fair elections, vote for political parties Rut Diamint Deibert with deep roots in dictatorship, and how do such Latin American countries are burdened with Rosy assumptions once held that the Internet parties affect the consolidation of democracy? domestic security problems and institutional would inevitably undermine unfree regimes. A weaknesses that have led to a rising political role look around the world today, however, indicates Democratization for the military forces. Are there serious dangers that something very different and far more The Volume 22, no. 6 (2015) issue of in this “turn toward the barracks”? disturbing is going on. Democratization includes articles on democratic sanctions, cultural values, The July 2015 (Vol. 26, no. 3) Journal of III. “Election Monitoring vs. Disinformation” Belarus, Palestine, and subverting autocracy.

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“Are Democratic Sanctions Really “The Enfranchisement of Citizens Abroad: American Political Science Review, Vol. 109, Counterproductive?” by Christian von Soest Variations and Explanations” by Jean- no. 3, August 2015 and Michael Wahman Michel Lafleur “International Interventions to Build Social Capital: Evidence from a Field Experiment “The Relation between Cultural Values and “The Enfranchisement of Resident Aliens: in Sudan” by Alexandra Avdeenko and Models of Democracy: A Cross-National Variations and Explanations” by David C. Michael J. Gilligan Study” by Ammar Maleki and Frank Earnest Hendriks “How Does Development Assistance Affect “‘Keeping Pandora’s (Ballot) Box Half- Collective Action Capacity? Results from a “Who Owns ‘the Spring’ in Palestine? Shut’: A Comparative Inquiry into the Field Experiment in Post-Conflict Liberia” Rethinking Popular Consent and Resistance Institutional Limits of External Voting in by James D. Fearon, Macartan Humphreys, in the Context of the ‘Palestinian State’ and EU Member States” by Derek S. Hutcheson and Jeremy M. Weinstein the ‘Arab Spring’” by Philip Leech and Jean-Thomas Arrighi “Women’s Participation in Violent Political “The Election Trap: The Cycle of Post- “Expatriates as Voters? The New Dynamics Organizations” by Jakana L. Thomas and Electoral Repression and Opposition of External Voting in Sub-Saharan Africa” Kanisha D. Bond Fragmentation in Lukashenko’s Belarus” by by Christof Hartmann Konstantin Ash “Clan Governance and State Stability: The “Immigrant Enfranchisement in Latin Relationship between Female Subordination “Strategic Silence as a Third Way: Political America: From Strongmen to Universal and Political Order” by Valerie M. Hudson, Parties and Transitional Justice” by Filipa Citizenship” by Cristina Escobar Donna Lee Bowen, and Perpetua Lynne Raimundo Nielsen SELECTED JOURNAL ARTICLES “Rethinking Pathways to Democracy: Civil ON DEMOCRACY “War and Revenge: Explaining Conflict Society in Portugal and Spain, 1960s–2000s” Initiation by Democracies” by Rachel M. by Tiago Fernandes African Affairs, Vol. 114, no. 456, July 2015 Stein “Rejecting Rights: Vigilantism and Violence “Subverting Autocracy: Emancipative in Post-Apartheid South Africa” by Nicholas “Demography and Democracy: A Global, Mass Values in Competitive Authoritarian Rush Smith District-level Analysis of Electoral Regimes” by Margarita Zavadskaya and Contestation” by John Gerring, Maxwell Christian Welzel “Ethnicity, Intra-Elite Differentiation and Palmer, Jan Teorell, and Dominic Zarecki Political Stability in Kenya” by Biniam E. “Beyond the Arab Revolts: Conceptualizing Bedasso “When Talk Trumps Text: The Civil Society in the Middle East and North Democratizing Effects of Deliberation Africa” by Anders C. Härdig “The Political Economy of Grandduring Constitution-Making, 1974–2011” Corruption in Tanzania” by Hazel S. Gray by Todd A. Eisenstadt. A. Carl LeVan, and The Volume 22, no. 5 (2015) issue of Tofigh Maboudi Democratization is a special issue on “Voting “The Political Economy of Property Tax Rights in the Age of Globalization.” in Africa: Explaining Reform Outcomes “International Knowledge and Domestic in Sierra Leone” by Samuel S. Jibao and Evaluations in a Changing Society: The “Beyond Citizenship and Residence? Wilson Prichard Case of China” by Haifeng Huang Exploring the Extension of Voting Rights in the Age of Globalization” by Daniele “After Restitution: Community, Litigation Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 48, no. Caramani and Florian Grotz and Governance in South African Land 12, October 2015 Reform” by Christiaan Beyers and Derick “A Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy” “Morphing the Demos into the Right Shape. Fay by Svend-Erik Skaaning, John Gerring, and Normative Principles for Enfranchising Henrikas Bartusevičius Resident Aliens and Expatriate Citizens” by “Briefing: Why Goodluck Jonathan Lost Rainer Bauböck the Nigerian Presidential Election of 2015” “Electoral Authoritarianism and Human by Olly Owen and Zainab Usman Development” by Michael K. Miller

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New Research

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 48, no. Beissinger, Amaney A. Jamal, and Kevin “Political Opposition in Russia: The 11, September 2015 Mazur Challenges of Mobilisation and the “Elections in the Arab World: Why Do Political–Civil Society Nexus” by David Citizens Turn Out?” by Carolina de Miguel, “The Production of Electoral Intimidation: White Amaney A. Jamal, and Mark Tessler Economic and Political Incentives” by Isabela Mares and Boliang Zhu “Women’s Human Rights in Russia: “Ethnic Parties and Public Spending: New Outmoded Battlegrounds, or New Sites of Theory and Evidence From the Indian “Literacy and Democracy despite Slavery: Contentious Politics?” by Vikki Turbine States” by Tariq Thachil and Emmanuel Forced Settlement and Postcolonial Teitelbaum Outcomes in the Developing World” by “The State, Civil Society and Social Rights in Olukunle P. Owolabi Contemporary Russia” by Eleanor Bindman Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 48, no. 10, September 2015 “Land Institutions and Political Ethnicity East European Politics, Vol. 31, no. 2, 2015 “How Economic Integration Affects Party in Africa: Evidence from Tanzania” by “Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: Issue Emphases” by Dalston Ward, Jeong Catherine Boone and Lydia Nyeme Test of Early Impact” by Nina Bandelj, Hyun Kim, Matthew Graham, and Margit Katelyn Finley, and Bogdan Radu Tavits “From Single-Party to Electoral Authoritarian Regimes: The Institutional “Do Spoilers Make a Difference? “Executive Power and Media Freedom in Origins of Competitiveness in Post-Cold Instrumental Manipulation of Political Central and Eastern Europe” by Richard L. War Africa” by Yonatan Morse Parties in an Electoral Authoritarian Bairett, Jr. Regime, the Case of Russia” by Grigorii V. Comparative Politics, Vol. 47, no. 4, July Golosov Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 48, no. 9, 2015 August 2015 “Multi-Level Elections and Party Fortunes: “Persistence and Decline of Political Parties: “Clientelism as Persuasion-Buying: Evidence The Electoral Impact of Decentralization in The Case of Estonia” by Tõnis Saarts From Latin America” by Joby Schaffer and Western Europe” by Bonnie M. Meguid Andy Baker “Nationalisation of Regional Elections in “Propaganda as Signaling” by Haifeng Central and Eastern Europe” by Arjan H. “Legitimacy Buying: The Dynamics of Huang Schakel Clientelism in the Face of Legitimacy Challenges” by Ezequiel González-Ocantos, “Beyond the Secularism Trap: Religion, International Political Science Review, Vol. Chad Kiewiet de Jonge, and David W. Political Institutions, and Democratic 36, no. 4, September 2015 Nickerson Commitments” by David T. Buckley “Women’s Descriptive Representation in Developed and Developing Countries” by “Issue Entrepreneurship and Multiparty “Information, Elections, and Political Daniel Stockemer Competition” by Sara B. Hobolt and Change” by Grigore Pop-Eleches and Catherine E. de Vries Graeme B. Robertson “Helping Hand or Heavy Hand? Foreign Aid, Regime Type and Domestic Unrest” “Beyond the Machine: Clientelist Brokers “The Communist Party’s Miracle? The by Daniel Yuichi Kono, Gabriella R. and Interest Organizations in Latin Alchemy of Turning Post-Disaster Montinola, and Nicholas Verbon America” by Alisha C. Holland and Brian Reconstruction into Great Leap Palmer-Rubin Development” by Christian Sorace “The Rise of the Cosmopolitan Traditionalists: From the Arab Spring to a Comparative Politics, Vol. 48, no. 1, October East European Politics, Vol. 31, no. 3, 2015 Global Countermovement?” by Adam K. 2015 “State–Society Relations in Contemporary Webb “Explaining Divergent Revolutionary Russia: New Forms of Political and Social Coalitions: Regime Strategies and the Contention” by Ammon Cheskin and Luke Structuring of Participation in the Tunisian March and Egyptian Revolutions” by Mark

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New Research

“Democracy, Ethnic Fractionalisation, Using Sectarianism to “De-Arabize” and “Attribution And Accountability: Voting for and the Politics of Social Spending: Regionalize Threats to National Interests” Roads in Ghana” by Robin Harding Disentangling a Conditional Relationship” by Elizabeth Monier by Carsten Jensen and Svend-Erik Skaaning “Elections and Collective Action: Evidence “Censorship and the Islamic Republic: Two from Changes in Traditional Institutions Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 53, Modes of Regulatory Measures for Media in Liberia” by Kate Baldwin and Eric no. 3, September 2015 in Iran” by Babak Rahimi Mvukiyehe “China’s Example for Meles’ Ethiopia: When Development ‘Models’ Land” by “Rabbi ‘Ovadia Yosef, the Shas Party, and “Democracy, Elite Bias, and Financial Elsje Fourie the Arab-Israeli Peace Process” by Nissim Development in Latin America” by Victor Leon Menaldo and Daniel Yoo “Unchanging Public Order Policing in Changing Times in East Africa” by Bruce Middle East Policy, Vol. 22, no. 3, Fall 2015 SELECTED NEW BOOKS ON Baker “Egypt’s Conspiracy Discourse: Liberals, DEMOCRACY Copts and Islamists” by Sherifa Zuhur and “Between Party Capitalism and Market Marlyn Tadros ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES Reforms – Understanding Sector Ballots, Bullets, and Bargains: American Differences in Rwanda” by Pritish Behuria “China and the Uyghurs: The ‘Palestinization’ Foreign Policy and Presidential Elections. By of Xinjiang?” by Michael Clarke Michael H. Armacost. Columbia University “‘Hands Off My Constitution’: Press, 2015. 289 pp. Constitutional Reform and the Workings of Party Politics, Vol. 21, no. 5, September Democracy in Mali” by Susanna D. Wing 2015 Bringing Race Back In: Black Politicians, “A Case of Valence Competition in Deracialization, and Voting Behavior in the “The Battle for Zimbabwe in 2013: From Elections: Parties’ Emphasis on Corruption Age of Obama. By Christopher T. Stout. Polarisation to Ambivalence” by Julia in Electoral Manifestos” by Luigi Curini University of Virginia Press, 2015. 186 pp. Gallagher and Paolo Martelli Democracy’s Muse: How Thomas Jefferson Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 57, “Pre-Electoral Coalitions and Voter Became an FDR Liberal, a Reagan no. 3, Fall 2015 Turnout” by Erik R Tillman Republican, and A Tea Party Fanatic, All “States as Gender Equality Activists: The While Being Dead. By Andrew Burstein. Evolution of Quota Laws in Latin America” Party Politics, Vol. 21, no. 4, July 2015 University of Virginia Press, 2015. 256 pp. by Jennifer M. Piscopo “Parties for Hire: How Particularistic Parties Influence Presidents’ Governing Strategies” Democratic Humility: Reinhold Niebuhr, “Distributive Politics in Developing Federal by Marisa Kellam Neuroscience, and America’s Political Crisis. Democracies: Compensating Governors By Christopher Beem. Lexington, 2015. for Their Territorial Support” by Lucas I. “Party Institutionalization and Democratic 173 pp. González and Ignacio Mamone Consolidation: Turkey and Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective” by Empire’s Twin: U.S. Anti-Imperialism From “Assessing Freedom of Information in Latin Şebnem Yardımcı-Geyikçi the Founding Era to the Age of Terrorism. America a Decade Later: Illuminating Edited by Ian Tyrrell and Jay Sexton. Cornell a Transparency Causal Mechanism” by “Left–Right Reversed: Parties and Ideology University Press, 2015. 299 pp. Gregory Michener in Modern Turkey” by Abdullah Aydogan and Jonathan B Slapin The European Union: Democratic Principles “Electoral Realignment and Economic and Institutional Architectures in Times of Change Among Brazil’s ‘New Middle “Interactive Party Effects on Electoral Crisis. Edited by Simona Piattoni. Oxford Classes’” by Fabrício H. Chagas Bastos Performance: How Ethnic Minority Parties University Press, 2015. 298 pp. Aid the Populist right in Central and Middle East Journal, Vol. 69, no 3, Summer Eastern Europe” by Dan Koev In Search of Democracy. By Larry Diamond. 2015 Routledge, 2016. 469 pp. “Egypt, Iran, and the Hizbullah Cell: World Politics, Vol. 67, no. 4, October 2015

32 Vol. 13, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2015

New Research

In-Your-Face Politics: The Consequences by Claire Metelits and Stephanie Matti. Institutions. By Brian Wampler. University of Uncivil Media. By Diana C. Mutz. Lexington Books, 2015. 173 pp. of Notre Dame Press, 2015. 297 pp. Princeton University Press, 2015. 263 pp. Oil, Democracy, and Development in Barrio Rising: Urban Popular Politics No Freedom Without Regulation: The Hidden Africa. By John R. Heilbrunn. Cambridge and the Making of Modern Venezuela. By Lesson of the Subprime Crisis. By Joseph University Press, 2014. 270 pp. Alejandro Velasco. University of California William Singer. Yale University Press, 2015. Press, 2015. 321 pp. 215 pp. Water, Civilisation and Power in Sudan: The Political Economy of Military-Islamist State Challenging Social Inequality: The Landless Party in the Street: The Antiwar Movement Building. By Harry Verhoeven. Cambridge Rural Workers Movement and Agrarian and the Democratic Party After 9/11. University Press, 2015. 314 pp. Reform in Brazil. Edited by Miguel Carter. By Michael T. Heaney and Fabio Rojas. Duke University Press, 2015. 494 pp. Cambridge University Press, 2015. 313 pp. ASIA The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of Crafting Policies to End Poverty in Latin Practicing Democracy: Popular Politics in a Rising Power. By Thomas J. Christensen. America: The Quiet Transformation. By Ana the United States From the Constitution to W.W. Norton, 2015. 371 pp. Lorena De La O. Cambridge University the Civil War. Edited by Daniel Peart, and Press, 2015. 178 pp. Adam I.P. Smith. University of Virginia China’s Human Rights Lawyers: Advocacy Press, 2015. 296 pp. and Resistance. By Eva Pils. Routledge, Enduring Reform: Progressive Activism and 2015. 297 pp. Private Sector Responses in Latin America’s Running From Office: Why Young Americans Democracies. Edited by Jeffrey W. Rubin and Are Turned Off to Politics. By Jennifer Citizen Publications in China Before the Vivienne Bennett. University of Pittsburgh L. Lawless and Richard L. Fox. Oxford Internet. By Shao Jiang. Palgrave Macmillan, Press, 2015. 270 pp. University Press, 2015. 211 pp. 2015. 268 pp. Entrepreneurial Cuba: The Changing Policy Sovereignty: The Origin and Future of Pakistan’s Enduring Challenges. Edited Landscape. By Archibald R.M. Ritter and a Political and Legal Concept. By Dieter by C. Christine Fair and Sarah J. Watson. Ted A. Henken. First Forum Press, 2015. Grimm, translated by Belinda Cooper. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015. 310 373 pp. Columbia University Press, 2015. 167 pp. pp. Mobilizing Poor Voters: Machine Politics, Voters’ Verdicts: Citizens, Campaigns, The Political Development of Modern Clientelism, and Social Networks in and Institutions in State Supreme Court Thailand. Federico Ferrara. By Cambridge Argentina. By Mariela Szwarcberg. Elections. By Chris W. Bonneau and Damon University Press, 2015. 328 pp. Cambridge University Press, 2015. 175 pp. M. Cann. University of Virginia Press, 2015. 163 pp. Protest Dialectics: State Repression and South Political Landscapes: Forests, Conservation, Korea’s Democracy Movement, 1970–1979. and Community in Mexico. By Christopher When Should State Secrets Stay Secret? By Paul Y. Chang. Stanford University R. Boyer. Duke University Press, 2015. 337 Accountability, Democratic Governance, Press, 2015. 291 pp. pp. and Intelligence. By Genevieve Lester. Cambridge University Press, 2015. 239 pp. EASTERN EUROPE AND THE Revolt of the Saints: Memory and FORMER SOVIET UNION Redemption in the Twilight of Brazilian AFRICA Nothing Is True and Everything is Possible: Racial Democracy. By John F. Collins. Duke Christianity, Islam, and Liberal Democracy: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia. By University Press, 2015. 464 pp. Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa. By Peter Pomerantsev. Public Affairs, 2014. 241 Robert A. Dowd. Oxford University Press, pp. Unearthing Conflict: Corporate Mining, 2015. 224 pp. Activism, and Expertise in Peru. By Fabiana LATIN AMERICA AND THE Li. Duke University Press, 2015. 265 pp. Democratic Contestation on the Margins: CARIBBEAN Regimes in Small African Countries. Edited Activating Democracy in Brazil: Popular MIDDLE EAST Participation, Social Justice, and Interlocking The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and

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New Research

Reform. By Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, Morocco and the Arab World. By Avi Max Managing Conflict in a World Adrift. Edited and Andrew Reynolds. Oxford University Spiegel. Princeton University Press, 2015. by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, Press, 2015. 324 pp. 246 pp. and Pamela Aall. USIP Press, 2015. 629 pp.

EU Democracy Promotion and the Arab COMPARATIVE, THEORETICAL, Networked Regionalism as Conflict Spring: International Cooperation and GENERAL Management. By Anna Ohanyan. Stanford Authoritarianism. By Vera Van Hüllen. The Anomie of the Earth: Philosophy, Politics, University Press, 2015. 250 pp. Palgrave Macmillian, 2015. 242 pp. and Autonomy in Europe and the Americas. Edited by Federico Luisetti, John Pickles, The Paradox of Liberation: Secular Revolutions Gaining Freedoms: Claiming Space in and Wilson Kaiser. Duke University, 2015. and Religious Counterrevolutions. By Istanbul and Berlin. By Berna Turam. 260 pp. Michael Walzer. Yale University Press, 2015. Stanford University Press, 2015. 250 pp. 172 pp. Decolonizing Democracy: Intersections of Iron Cast of Liberalism: International Philosophy and Postcolonial Theory. By Ferit The Puzzle of Non-Western Democracy. By Politics and Unarmed Revolutions in the Güven. Lexington Books, 2015. 121 pp. Richard Youngs. Carnegie Endowment for Middle East and North Africa. By Daniel P. International Peace, 2015. 212 pp. Ritter. Oxford University Press, 2015. 273 Democratic Transitions: Conversations with pp. World Leaders. Edited by Sergio Bitar and Ranking the World: Grading States as a Tool Abraham F. Lowenthal. Johns Hopkins of Global Governance. Edited by Alexander Islam and Politics in the Middle East: University Press, 2015. 467 pp. Cooley and Jack Snyder. Cambridge Explaining the Views of Ordinary Citizens. University Press, 2015. 241 pp. By Mark Tessler. Indiana University Press, Enemies of Violence: Transnational 2015. 245 pp. Feminism, Postsocialism, and the Politics of The Shape of the New: Four Big Ideas and Sex Trafficking. By Jennifer Suchland. Duke How They Made the Modern World. By National Elections in Turkey: People, University Press, 2015. 260 pp. Scott L. Montgomery and Daniel Chirot. Politics, and the Party System. By F. Michael Princeton University Press, 2015. 492 pp. Wuthrich. Syracuse University Press, 2015. Foreign Policy Breakthroughs: Cases in 342 pp. Successful Diplomacy. Edited by Robert The Taming of Democracy Assistance: Why Hutchings and Jeremi Suri. Oxford Democracy Promotion Does Not Confront Political Islam and Democracy in the Muslim University Press, 2015. 284 pp. Dictators. By Sarah Sunn Bush. Cambridge World. By Paul Kubicek. Lynne Rienner, University Press, 2015. 272 pp. 2015. 349 pp. Fragile Democracies: Contested Power in the Era of Constitutional Courts. By Samuel U.S. Foreign Policy on Transitional Justice. Turkey’s Difficult Journey to Democracy: Issacharoff. Cambridge University Press, By Annie R. Bird. Oxford University Press, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back. By İlter 2015. 298 pp. 2015. 223 pp. Turan. Oxford University Press, 2015. 252 pp. If God Were a Human Rights Activist. By Why Elections Fail. By Pippa Norris. Boaventura de Sousa Santos. Stanford Cambridge University Press, 2015. 256 pp. Young Islam: The New Politics of Religion in University Press, 2015. 130 pp.

34 Vol. 13, No. 2 Comparative Democratization June 2015

Editorial Committee

is the official newsletter of the American Political Science Association’s Comparative Democratization section. Formerly known as CompDem, it has been published three times a year (October, January, and May) by the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies since 2003. In October 2010, the newsletter was renamed APSA-CD and APSA-CDexpanded to include substantive articles on democracy, as well as news and notes on the latest developments in the field. The newsletter is now jointly produced and edited by faculty members of the V-Dem Institute and the International Forum.

Executive Editor Eitan Tzelgov is a senior post-doctoral fellow at the Staffan I. Lindberg is professor of political science V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. He studies and director of the V-Dem Institute, University legislative institutions and political parties. His of Gothenburg; is one of four PIs for Varieties of dissertation, awarded the Carl Albert Award by the Democracy (V-Dem); Wallenberg Academy Fellow; Legislative Studies Section of the American Political Science selected member Young Academy of Sweden; and a Research Association, examines the strategic use of parliamentary speeches Fellow in the QoG Institute. He is author of Democracy and by the legislative opposition. Elections in Africa and editor of Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition?, and has also worked on women’s Yi-ting Wang is assistant professor of political science, representation, clientelism, voting behavior, party and electoral National Cheng Kung University (Taiwan) and systems, democratization, popular attitudes, and the Ghanaian affiliated researcher at the V-Dem Institute, University legislature and executive- legislative relationships. of Gothenburg. Her work primarily focuses on legislative institutions and politicians’ accountability Members strategies with an emphasis on questions of conditions for Anna Lührmann is a post-doctoral fellow at the democratic stability. Her dissertation addresses how and why V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. Her legislative committees differ in their abilities to exert policy doctoral thesis – completed in summer 2015 at influence across democracies. Her current project explores the Humboldt University (Berlin) - studies the causes and effects of consequences of different legislative capacities to participate in United Nation’s electoral assistance. She currently works on law making and monitor the executive for the quality of several research projects concerning electoral manipulation, democracies. regime legitimacy and the impact of democracy promotion. Brigitte Zimmerman is assistant professor of political Kyle L. Marquardt is a post-doctoral fellow at the science and Peter Thacher Grauer Fellow in public V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. He studies policy, UNC-Chapel Hill; affiliated researcher at the identity politics and the politics of authoritarianism. His V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg; and current project uses data from extensive field and survey V-Dem project manager for experiments. Her research agenda research from Eurasia to examine the relationship between examines accountability institutions in consolidating democracies, language and separatism. Other projects involve the use of list with a geographic focus on sub-Saharan Africa. In her dissertation, experiments to analyze support for authoritarian leaders and she analyzed the strategic responses of political officials to anti- Bayesian latent variable analysis of the components of social corruption interventions, documenting patterns of corruption identities. substitution through extensive fieldwork. Other current research addresses discrimination in petty corruption, incumbency Kelly M. McMann is an associate professor advantage in diverse institutional contexts, the political economy of political science at Case Western Reserve of FDI and foreign aid, and the ethics of field research. University and the V-Dem project manager for subnational government. She currently is conducting research on Managing Editor how democracy develops within countries, studying contemporary Melissa Aten is the senior research and conferences cases in Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet Union and historical officer at the National Endowment for Democracy’s cases in Europe. Her earlier research focused on corruption and International Forum for Democratic Studies and activism and has been published in the books Corruption as a associate director of the Network of Democracy Last Resort: Adapting to the Market in Central Asia and Economic Research Institutes. She earned an M.A. from The George Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, where she focused on foreign policy and Central Europe.

The International Forum for Democratic Studies 1025 F Street, NW, 8th Floor Washington, DC 20004

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