Competitive Equilibrium Hyperinflation Under Rational Expectations
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Research Papers in Economics No 578 ISSN 0104-8910 Competitive Equilibrium Hyperinflation under Rational Expectations Fernando de Holanda Barbosa, Alexandre Barros da Cunha, Elvia Mureb Sallum Janeiro de 2005 Os artigos publicados são de inteira responsabilidade de seus autores. As opiniões neles emitidas não exprimem, necessariamente, o ponto de vista da Fundação Getulio Vargas. Competitive Equilibrium Hyperinflation under Rational Expectations Fernando de Holanda Barbosa Professor of Economics Getulio Vargas Foundation Graduate School of Economics Alexandre Barros da Cunha Assistant Professor Ibmec School of Business Elvia Mureb Sallum Associate Professor Institute of Mathematics and Statistics University of SãoPaulo Abstract This paper shows that a competitive equilibrium model, where a representative agent maximizes welfare, expectations are rational and markets are in equilibrium can account for several hyperinflation stylized facts. The theory is built by combining two hypotheses, namely, a fiscal crisis that requires printing money to finance an increasing public deficit and a predicted change in an unsustainable fiscal regime. Keywords and Phrases: Hyperinflation, Rational Expectations, Competitive Equilibrium, Fiscal Crisis. JEL classification: E31, E42, E63. Competitive Equilibrium Hyperinflation under Rational Expectations Fernando de Holanda Barbosa* Alexandre Barros da Cunha** Élvia Mureb Sallum*** 1. INTRODUCTION Cagan’s (1956) seminal work provided the first attempt to explain the hyperinflation phenomenom. That essay was so influential that small variations of Cagan’s model can be found in several textbooks such as Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), Romer (2001) and Sargent (1987). Cagan’s model is capable of generating hyperinflation under two types of expectation mechanisms: adaptive and rational.
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