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China Oilfield Services (2883 HK) China Oilfiel D Ser Vices China Energy 22 April 2020 China Oilfield Services (2883 HK) China Oilfiel d Ser vices Target price: HKD6.30 Share price (22 Apr): HKD5.83 | Up/downside: +8.1% Initiation: deep-value domestic offshore OFS play Dennis Ip, CFA (852) 2848 4068 CNOOC’s new capex release at end-April likely a positive for COSL [email protected] A domestic play relatively immune to global oil capex cuts Anna Lu, CFA (852) 2848 4465 Initiating with an Outperform (2) rating and TP of HKD6.3 [email protected] Investment case: We initiate on China Oilfield Services Limited (COSL), Share price performance Asia’s largest oilfield equipment and services (OFS) company, with an (HKD) (%) Outperform (2) rating. With c.80% of its revenue derived from affiliate 13 165 CNOOC (883 HK, HKD8.24, Hold [3]), COSL’s profitability is dependent on 11 144 CNOOC’s domestic capex commitment. We believe further clarification 9 123 7 101 from CNOOC on its capex in late April will be a potential catalyst for COSL, 5 80 leading it to rerate from 0.62x 2020E PBR to a 0.68x 2020E PBR. Apr-19 Jul-19 Oct-19 Jan-20 Ch Olfield (LHS) Relative to HSI (RHS) CNOOC’s domestic capex likely upbeat. During the previous oil crisis in 2015-17, COSL’s net profit turned negative as CNOOC cut domestic capex 12-month range 5.18-13.00 significantly, leading to serious underutilisation of COSL’s assets (rig Market cap (USDbn) 3.59 utilisation rate of 40% vs. c.90% in previous years). In the current crisis, we 3m avg daily turnover (USDm) 19.83 Shares outstanding (m) 4,772 believe CNOOC will keep domestic capex intact in response to the Central Major shareholder CNOOC Group (50.5%) Government’s call for national energy security. We note CNOOC has already vowed to keep its domestic production target unchanged, which is Financial summary (CNY) feasible, in our view, given its low all-in cost. We think COSL’s current Year to 31 Dec 20E 21E 22E share price reflects the worst outcome for CNOOC’s capex, and that its Revenue (m) 28,504 26,701 35,322 capex update in late-April will support a slight share-price recovery. Operating profit (m) 3,717 2,300 3,858 Net profit (m) 1,866 1,202 2,250 Core EPS (fully-diluted) 0.391 0.252 0.472 Asset-light transformation paying off. The revenue contribution of its EPS change (%) (14.1) (35.6) 87.2 asset-light and counter-cyclical well services segment rose from 30% in Daiwa vs Cons. EPS (%) (38.4) (62.6) (42.8) PER (x) 13.6 21.2 11.3 2015 to 48% in 2019, thus injecting stability into COSL’s profitability. Dividend yield (%) 2.8 1.8 3.1 Meanwhile for its asset-heavy drilling segment, which saw negative EBIT of DPS 0.147 0.095 0.167 CNY10,076m back in 2016, we expect positive EBIT for 2020E given PBR (x) 0.6 0.6 0.6 CNY8,261m was actually impairment losses in 2016, and we do not believe EV/EBITDA (x) 4.4 4.9 3.7 ROE (%) 4.9 3.0 5.4 substantial booking of impairments will be needed this time as COSL has Source: FactSet, Daiwa forecasts not booked any significant impairment reversal since 2016. Unjustifiably low valuation. COSL’s share price has corrected by 52% YTD vs. Jereh’s 32% and Anton’s (3337 HK, HKD0.48, Hold [3]) 47% correction YTD, which we view as unjustified as COSL should be relatively immune to global oil capex cuts given its domestic focus (with 78% of revenue from China). COSL-H is also trading at a 228% discount to COSL- A (601808 CH) (vs. a 179% past-12-year discount). Catalysts: 1) Higher-than-anticipated domestic capex of CNOOC, and 2) higher-than-market-anticipated rig utilisation rate. Valuation: We initiate on COSL with an Outperform (2) rating and TP of HKD6.3, on a 2020E PBR of 0.68x, or 1.34SD below its past-16-year average. Risks: Lower-than-expected domestic capex for CNOOC; lower- than-expected oil prices. See important disclosures, including any required research certifications, beginning on page 33 China Oilfield Services (2883 HK): 22 April 2020 Table of contents All eyes on CNOOC's capex .................................................................................... 6 CNOOC’s capital discipline in 2015-17 oil down-cycle .......................................................6 Why this time is different? CNOOC’s loss is COSL’s gain. .................................................7 Asset-light transformation paying off ....................................................................13 Well services: the stable earnings contributor .................................................................. 14 Drilling services: workload will be okay but day rates under pressure .............................. 16 Marine support services: cut back of charted fleet is unavoidable .................................... 21 Geophysical acquisition & surveying services: victim of exploration capex cut ................. 21 Financials .................................................................................................................23 Healthy gearing with aggressive capex plan .................................................................... 24 Valuation ..................................................................................................................26 Initiating with an Outperform (2) rating and TP of HKD6.3 ............................................... 26 Investment risks ......................................................................................................27 Larger-than-expected decline in CNOOC’s capex ............................................................ 27 Larger-than-expected decline in oil prices ........................................................................ 27 ESG Activities ..........................................................................................................28 Appendix I: company background .........................................................................27 2 China Oilfield Services (2883 HK): 22 April 2020 How do we justify our view? Growth outlook Valuation Earnings revisions Growth outlook COSL: EBIT by segment We forecast COSL to see a mild 5% YoY decline in EBIT (CNYm) for 2020E as it is likely to see a substantial decline in day 5,000 rates for rig services and its geophysical acquisition and 0 surveying services segments upon contract renewal in 2H20E. We look for a further 38% YoY decline in EBIT for (5,000) 2021E, assuming the current oil-price weakness prevails (10,000) for a long period of time. Nonetheless, we see significant upside for COSL’s EBIT if there is a major turnaround in oil (15,000) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E prices. Geophysical acquisition & surveying services Marine Support Services Drilling Services Well Services Source: Company, Daiwa forecasts Valuation COSL: PBR band COSL-H shares are trading currently at a 0.62x 2020E PBR (x) PBR, which is 1.46SD below its past-12-year average. 3.0 COSL-A (601808 CH), its dual listed A-share entity listed 2.5 on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, is trading currently at a 2.0 2.0x Avg+2SD 1.5x 2020E PBR. The 228% A-H premium for the same company’s PBR valuation (past-12-year historical average: 1.5 1.6x Avg+1SD 1.2x Avg 179%) suggests that COSL-H is undervalued vis-a-vis 1.0 different markets. We see COSL as a deep-value play for 0.8x Avg-1SD 0.5 investors looking for over-corrected oil names after the outbreak of the oil price war. 0.0 May-… May-… May-… May-… May-… May-… Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17 Jan-18 Jan-19 Jan-20 Sep-15 Sep-16 Sep-17 Sep-18 Sep-19 Sep-14 Source: Bloomberg, Daiwa forecasts Earnings revisions COSL: Bloomberg-consensus EPS forecast The market revised up COSL’s 2020-22E earnings (HKD) throughout 2019. Nonetheless, the street then cut its EPS 1.2 forecasts in 2020 as oil prices retreated significantly with 1.0 Brent diving from c.USD65/bbl earlier this year to 0.8 c.USD25-35/bbl due to COVID-19 and the oil-price war. 0.6 Our 2020-22E EPS are 38-63% below the consensus, 0.4 likely due to our lower day rate assumptions for the drilling segment and marine support segment due to our more 0.2 pessimistic global oil price outlook. Jun-19 Mar-19 Mar-20 Sep-18 Dec-18 Sep-19 Dec-19 2020E EPS 2021E EPS 2022E EPS Source: Bloomberg 3 China Oilfield Services (2883 HK): 22 April 2020 Financial summary Key assumptions Year to 31 Dec 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E CNOOC domestic capex (CNYbn) 34.7 21.3 24.7 36.2 50.8 50.6 70.0 71.0 Jack-up utilisation (%) 74 56 61 67 81 85 80 80 Semi-sub utilisation (%) 62 40 45 68 71 65 55 70 Jack-up day rate (000'USD/day) 94 68 71 65 69 62 61 67 Semi-sub day rate (000'USD/day) 296 185 204 173 172 163 160 176 Profit and loss (CNYm) Year to 31 Dec 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E Well Services 6,913 5,568 6,996 9,793 15,030 14,732 14,338 20,016 Drilling Services 12,040 6,499 6,341 7,750 10,825 10,113 8,939 10,872 Other Revenue 4,222 3,019 4,122 4,344 5,221 3,659 3,424 4,434 Total Revenue 23,174 15,086 17,459 21,887 31,076 28,504 26,701 35,322 Other income 242 153 324 284 352 323 303 400 COGS (15,387) (19,221) (10,517) (15,748) (21,222) (18,689) (20,262) (23,226) SG&A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Other op.expenses (6,399) (7,385) (5,798) (5,780) (6,311) (6,420) (4,441) (8,638) Operating profit 1,632 (11,368) 1,468 644 3,895 3,717 2,300 3,858 Net-interest inc./(exp.) (595) (917) (1,001) (975) (1,051) (709) (618) (725) Assoc/forex/extraord./others 360 477 (124) 1,038 628 1,856 406 546 Pre-tax profit 1,396 (11,807) 342 706 3,472 4,863 2,088 3,678 Tax (288) 348 (261) (618) (944) (1,322) (568) (1,000) Min.
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