DOCSLIB.ORG

Cartel Regulation 2021

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Cartel Regulation 2021 In association with Dechert LLP © Law Business Research 2020 Keep moving forward Dechert has the global presence and experience to work with you across jurisdictions to quietly and efficiently prevent or resolve cartel investigations. You can trust us to understand your business, efficiently manage internal investigations and successfully implement remedies and preventive measures that minimize risk. If a government investigation is imminent, you are in good hands. We routinely defend raids and work with enforcers at the Department of Justice, the European Commission and other major competition authorities. Our advocacy has helped clients prevent charges and reduce compliance burdens and fines, often with no public attention. It’s simple. You’re in the business of progress — we’re here to help you keep moving forward. dechert.com/antitrust © Law Business Research 2020 Publisher Tom Barnes [email protected] Subscriptions Claire Bagnall Cartel Regulation [email protected] Senior business development manager Adam Sargent 2021 [email protected] Published by Law Business Research Ltd Contributing editor Meridian House, 34-35 Farringdon Street London, EC4A 4HL, UK Neil Campbell The information provided in this publication McMillan LLP is general and may not apply in a specific situation. Legal advice should always be sought before taking any legal action based on the information provided. This information is not intended to create, nor does receipt of it constitute, a lawyer– Lexology Getting The Deal Through is delighted to publish the twenty-first edition of Cartel client relationship. The publishers and Regulation, which is available in print and online at www.lexology.com/gtdt. authors accept no responsibility for any Lexology Getting The Deal Through provides international expert analysis in key areas of acts or omissions contained herein. The law, practice and regulation for corporate counsel, cross-border legal practitioners, and company information provided was verified between directors and officers. October and November 2020. Be advised Throughout this edition, and following the unique Lexology Getting The Deal Through that this is a developing area. format, the same key questions are answered by leading practitioners in each of the jurisdictions featured. Our coverage this year includes new chapters on Argentina, Bulgaria, France and Spain. © Law Business Research Ltd 2020 Lexology Getting The Deal Through titles are published annually in print. Please ensure you No photocopying without a CLA licence. are referring to the latest edition or to the online version at www.lexology.com/gtdt. First published 2001 Every effort has been made to cover all matters of concern to readers. However, specific Twenty-first edition legal advice should always be sought from experienced local advisers. ISBN 978-1-83862-310-4 Lexology Getting The Deal Through gratefully acknowledges the efforts of all the contri- butors to this volume, who were chosen for their recognised expertise. We also extend special Printed and distributed by thanks to the contributing editor, Neil Campbell of McMillan LLP, for his continued assistance Encompass Print Solutions with this volume. Tel: 0844 2480 112 London November 2020 Reproduced with permission from Law Business Research Ltd This article was first published in December 2020 For further information please contact [email protected] www.lexology.com/gtdt 1 © Law Business Research 2020 Contents Foreword 5 Finland 111 Neil Campbell Mikael Wahlbeck, Antti Järvinen and Niko Hukkinen McMillan LLP Frontia Attorneys Ltd Global overview 6 France 120 Roxann E Henry, Lisa M Phelan, Megan E Gerking and Lionel Lesur and Anna Sacco Robert W Manoso Franklin Morrison & Foerster LLP Germany 128 Argentina 9 Markus M Wirtz and Silke Möller Miguel del Pino and Santiago del Rio Glade Michel Wirtz Marval O'Farrell Mairal Hong Kong 137 Australia 16 Marcus Pollard and Kathleen Gooi Fiona Crosbie, Rosannah Healy and Ted Hill Linklaters Allens India 144 Austria 26 Anima Shukla and Subodh Prasad Deo Andreas Traugott and Anita Lukaschek Saikrishna & Associates Baker & McKenzie, Diwok Hermann Petsche Rechtsanwälte LLP & Co KG Japan 153 Belgium 32 Eriko Watanabe and Koki Yanagisawa Laure Bersou and Pierre Goffinet Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu Daldewolf Malaysia 164 Brazil 41 Nadarashnaraj Sargunaraj and Nurul Syahirah Azman André Cutait de Arruda Sampaio and Onofre Carlos de Arruda Sampaio Zaid Ibrahim & Co OC Arruda Sampaio – Sociedade de Advogados Mexico 173 Bulgaria 50 Rafael Valdés Abascal and Agustín Aguilar López Anna Rizova and Hristina Dzhevlekova Valdes Abascal Abogados Wolf Theiss Portugal 182 Canada 61 Mário Marques Mendes and Alexandra Dias Henriques William Wu, Guy Pinsonnault and Neil Campbell Gómez-Acebo & Pombo McMillan LLP Singapore 194 China 74 Lim Chong Kin and Corinne Chew Ding Liang Drew & Napier LLC DeHeng Law Offices Slovenia 205 Denmark 90 Irena Jurca, Katja Zdolšek and Stojan Zdolšek Frederik André Bork, Olaf Koktvedgaard and Søren Zinck Odvetniska druzba Zdolsek Bruun & Hjejle South Korea 213 European Union 100 Hoil Yoon, Chang Ho Kum and Yang Jin Park Mélanie Thill-Tayara and Marion Provost Yoon & Yang LLC Dechert LLP 2 Cartel Regulation 2021 © Law Business Research 2020 Contents Spain 225 United Kingdom 283 Andrew Ward, Irene Moreno-Tapia, Carlos Alberto Ruiz and Elizabeth Morony, Samantha Ward, Ben Jasper and Alexandra Buckley Marta Simón Clifford Chance Cuatrecasas United States 295 Sweden 236 Steven E Bizar and Julia Chapman Johan Carle, Fredrik Sjövall and Stefan Perván Lindeborg Dechert LLP Mannheimer Swartling Vietnam 305 Switzerland 246 Nguyen Anh Tuan, Tran Hai Thinh and Tran Hoang My Mario Strebel and Fabian Koch LNT & Partners CORE Attorneys Ltd Quick reference tables 314 Turkey 259 Gönenç Gürkaynak and K Korhan Yıldırım ELIG Gürkaynak Attorneys-at-Law Ukraine 272 Nataliia Isakhanova, Yuriy Prokopenko and Andrii Pylypenko Sergii Koziakov & Partners www.lexology.com/gtdt 3 © Law Business Research 2020 Foreword Neil Campbell McMillan LLP This 21st edition of Cartel Regulation is the most current and compre- jurisdictions, the extent and depth of coordination is not nearly as signif- hensive source of information about cartel laws and enforcement icant as in merger reviews. around the world. Cartel Regulation 2021 provides a detailed explanation of the state During the first two decades of the 21st century, there has been of play in this high-stakes field, including recent developments over the enormous growth and development in competition laws and enforce- past year and an overview of future changes that may be expected in ment activity. The International Competition Network (ICN) has each jurisdiction. In addition to the in-depth coverage provided for 30 of played a significant role in fostering this expansion through its Cartel the most active jurisdictions, this essential reference includes a global Working Group. overview prepared by Morrison & Foerster LLP. Cartel Regulation 2021 Anti-cartel provisions are a core pillar of every competition also includes new chapters on Argentina, France, Germany, Spain and law regime. This reflects the broad consensus that certain types of the United States. competitor coordination are so unlikely to have pro-competitive or The deskbook is structured using a template that ensures consistent efficiency-enhancing benefits that they can safely be prohibited – and presentation and ready access to the relevant information about each penalised severely – without the need for a case-specific assessment of subject in each jurisdiction. The country profiles include overview mate- anticompetitive effects. rial on the legislation and enforcement institutions, information about The global pandemic has prompted competition law enforce- the jurisdictional and substantive coverage of the regime, and detailed ment agencies to reconsider priorities and how they discharge their discussions regarding the design and operation of immunity and leni- mandates. Most are adapting quickly and effectively. Many agencies ency programmes as well as contested proceedings and penalties. The have signalled a willingness to exercise discretion not to enforce cartel increasing scope for private, collective or class actions by affected direct laws against competitor collaborations that have genuinely positive or indirect purchasers, and how they interface with agency proceedings, health objectives. However, in most cases, this has been accompanied are addressed as well. This year’s volume also summarises changes by clear warnings that attempting to use covid-19 as a cover for conduct in laws or enforcement policies arising in response to the challenges that is not in the public interest would not be accepted and those cartel caused by the coronavirus pandemic. laws would be vigorously enforced in such situations. The chapters in Cartel Regulation 2021 have been prepared by Despite the ‘soft convergence’ regarding the importance of cartel leading experts in each jurisdiction. We deeply appreciate their efforts enforcement, there are significant differences in the design and opera- to provide thorough reports on their regimes, which include practical tion of individual regimes. Differences related to institutional design, advice on how enforcement really works and tips for ‘getting the fine enforcement processes, legal standards and sanctions generate down’. I would also like to thank the Lexology Getting
Recommended publications
  • The Limits of Punishment Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism

    The Limits of Punishment Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism

    i n s t i t u t e f o r i n t e g r at e d t r a n s i t i o n s The Limits of Punishment Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism May, 2018 United Nations University – Centre for Policy Research The UNU Centre for Policy Research (UNU-CPR) is a UN-focused think tank based at UNU Centre in Tokyo. UNU-CPR’s mission is to generate policy research that informs major UN policy processes in the fields of peace and security, humanitarian affairs, and global development. i n s t i t u t e f o r i n t e g r at e d t r a n s i t i o n s Institute for Integrated Transitions IFIT’s aim is to help fragile and conflict-affected states achieve more sustainable transitions out of war or authoritarianism by serving as an independent expert resource for locally-led efforts to improve political, economic, social and security conditions. IFIT seeks to transform current practice away from fragmented interventions and toward more integrated solutions that strengthen peace, democracy and human rights in countries attempting to break cycles of conflict or repression. Cover image nigeria. 2017. Maiduguri. After being screened for association with Boko Haram and held in military custody, this child was released into a transit center and the care of the government and Unicef. © Paolo Pellegrin/Magnum Photos. This material has been supported by UK aid from the UK government; the views expressed are those of the authors.
  • Cartels" Under the New German Cartel Statute

    Cartels" Under the New German Cartel Statute

    Vanderbilt Law Review Volume 11 Issue 2 Issue 2 - A Symposium on Trade Article 1 Regulation and Practices 3-1958 "Cartels" Under the New German Cartel Statute Heinrich Kronstein Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons Recommended Citation Heinrich Kronstein, "Cartels" Under the New German Cartel Statute, 11 Vanderbilt Law Review 271 (1958) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol11/iss2/1 This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW VOLUME 11 MARcH, 1958 Nuavim 2 A SYMPOSIUM ON TRADE REGULATION AND PRACTICES "CARTELS" UNDER THE NEW GERMAN CARTEL STATUTE HEINRICH KRONSTEIN* Introduction On January 1, 1958, the "Cartel Statute" of the Federal Republic of Germany' became effective. American interests in this event are threefold: (1) During the past decade Americans have tried to convince the Western world that in an industrial, democratic society legislation of the American antitrust type is imperative. Is the German cartel statute a piece of legislation of this type? (2) The enactment of the statute brings to an end the application of Law No. 56 enacted by the American Military Government on January 28, 1947. The Paris Treaty between the Allied Powers and Germany provided that the Allied "cartel laws," though administered by the German Minister of Economics, should remain in effect until the German legislature could agree on a new statute.
  • Managerial Economics Unit 6: Oligopoly

    Managerial Economics Unit 6: Oligopoly

    Managerial Economics Unit 6: Oligopoly Rudolf Winter-Ebmer Johannes Kepler University Linz Summer Term 2019 Managerial Economics: Unit 6 - Oligopoly1 / 45 OBJECTIVES Explain how managers of firms that operate in an oligopoly market can use strategic decision-making to maintain relatively high profits Understand how the reactions of market rivals influence the effectiveness of decisions in an oligopoly market Managerial Economics: Unit 6 - Oligopoly2 / 45 Oligopoly A market with a small number of firms (usually big) Oligopolists \know" each other Characterized by interdependence and the need for managers to explicitly consider the reactions of rivals Protected by barriers to entry that result from government, economies of scale, or control of strategically important resources Managerial Economics: Unit 6 - Oligopoly3 / 45 Strategic interaction Actions of one firm will trigger re-actions of others Oligopolist must take these possible re-actions into account before deciding on an action Therefore, no single, unified model of oligopoly exists I Cartel I Price leadership I Bertrand competition I Cournot competition Managerial Economics: Unit 6 - Oligopoly4 / 45 COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR: Cartel Cartel: A collusive arrangement made openly and formally I Cartels, and collusion in general, are illegal in the US and EU. I Cartels maximize profit by restricting the output of member firms to a level that the marginal cost of production of every firm in the cartel is equal to the market's marginal revenue and then charging the market-clearing price. F Behave like a monopoly I The need to allocate output among member firms results in an incentive for the firms to cheat by overproducing and thereby increase profit.
  • The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, and Rules Robert H

    The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, and Rules Robert H

    University of Baltimore Law ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship 2000 The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, and Rules Robert H. Lande University of Baltimore School of Law, [email protected] Howard P. Marvel Ohio State University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons Recommended Citation The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, and Rules, 2000 Wis. L. Rev. 941 (2000) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ARTICLES THE THREE TYPES OF COLLUSION: FIXING PRICES, RIVALS, AND RULES ROBERTH. LANDE * & HOWARDP. MARVEL** Antitrust law has long held collusion to be paramount among the offenses that it is charged with prohibiting. The reason for this prohibition is simple----collusion typically leads to monopoly-like outcomes, including monopoly profits that are shared by the colluding parties. Most collusion cases can be classified into two established general categories.) Classic, or "Type I" collusion involves collective action to raise price directly? Firms can also collude to disadvantage rivals in a manner that causes the rivals' output to diminish or causes their behavior to become chastened. This "Type 11" collusion in turn allows the colluding firms to raise prices.3 Many important collusion cases, however, do not fit into either of these categories.
  • Cartel Enforcement Global Review – September 2020 CARTEL ENFORCEMENT GLOBAL REVIEW – SEPTEMBER 2020

    Cartel Enforcement Global Review – September 2020 CARTEL ENFORCEMENT GLOBAL REVIEW – SEPTEMBER 2020

    Cartel Enforcement Global review – September 2020 CARTEL ENFORCEMENT GLOBAL REVIEW – SEPTEMBER 2020 Fight against cartels continues to consolidate around the world The period between 2017 and the beginning of 2020 has shown the importance of the prosecution of cartels in the context of global competition law enforcement. Competition authorities are intensifying their initiatives and concluding investigations in strategic sectors such as technology and digital services, construction, transport and mobility services, life sciences, financial services, retail and consumer goods, agriculture, food and energy. In many jurisdictions, fines imposed against participants In the EU, Directive (EU) 2019/1 (ECN+ Directive), in cartels have increased significantly or remained at a aimed at providing competition authorities of high level in the reference period. the Member States with the means to implement competition rules more effectively and to guarantee In 2019, the European Commission imposed cartel the proper functioning of the internal market, should be fines of around EUR1.4 billion. Taking into account fines implemented by Member States by February 2021. of National Competition Authorities, the total fines imposed within the EU (excluding the UK) exceeded The criminal prosecution of cartels continues to be a key EUR4 billion in 2019. factor in many jurisdictions, with particular regard to US, Canada, Australia and Ireland. New Zealand introduced In the US, the amount of fines for cartels, criminal penalties adopting a law that will come into after an important decrease in 2017, rose again force on April 8, 2021. In the UK, the authorities to USD356 million in 2019. continue to seek directors’ disqualification orders in addition to monetary penalties.
  • JP Morgan and the Money Trust

    JP Morgan and the Money Trust

    FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS ECONOMIC EDUCATION The Panic of 1907: J.P. Morgan and the Money Trust Lesson Author Mary Fuchs Standards and Benchmarks (see page 47) Lesson Description The Panic of 1907 was a financial crisis set off by a series of bad banking decisions and a frenzy of withdrawals caused by public distrust of the banking system. J.P. Morgan, along with other wealthy Wall Street bankers, loaned their own funds to save the coun- try from a severe financial crisis. But what happens when a single man, or small group of men, have the power to control the finances of a country? In this lesson, students will learn about the Panic of 1907 and the measures Morgan used to finance and save the major banks and trust companies. Students will also practice close reading to analyze texts from the Pujo hearings, newspapers, and reactionary articles to develop an evidence- based argument about whether or not a money trust—a Morgan-led cartel—existed. Grade Level 10-12 Concepts Bank run Bank panic Cartel Central bank Liquidity Money trust Monopoly Sherman Antitrust Act Trust ©2015, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Permission is granted to reprint or photocopy this lesson in its entirety for educational purposes, provided the user credits the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, www.stlouisfed.org/education. 1 Lesson Plan The Panic of 1907: J.P. Morgan and the Money Trust Time Required 100-120 minutes Compelling Question What did J.P. Morgan have to do with the founding of the Federal Reserve? Objectives Students will • define bank run, bank panic, monopoly, central bank, cartel, and liquidity; • explain the Panic of 1907 and the events leading up to the panic; • analyze the Sherman Antitrust Act; • explain how monopolies worked in the early 20th-century banking industry; • develop an evidence-based argument about whether or not a money trust—a Morgan-led cartel—existed • explain how J.P.
  • Buyer Power: Is Monopsony the New Monopoly?

    Buyer Power: Is Monopsony the New Monopoly?

    COVER STORIES Antitrust , Vol. 33, No. 2, Spring 2019. © 2019 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association. Buyer Power: Is Monopsony the New Monopoly? BY DEBBIE FEINSTEIN AND ALBERT TENG OR A NUMBER OF YEARS, exists—or only when it can also be shown to harm consumer commentators have debated whether the United welfare; (2) historical case law on monopsony; (3) recent States has a monopoly problem. But as part of the cases involving monopsony issues; and (4) counseling con - recent conversation over the direction of antitrust siderations for monopsony issues. It remains to be seen law and the continued appropriateness of the con - whether we will see significantly increased enforcement Fsumer welfare standard, the debate has turned to whether the against buyer-side agreements and mergers that affect buyer antitrust agencies are paying enough attention to monopsony power and whether such enforcement will be successful, but issues. 1 A concept that appears more in textbooks than in case what is clear is that the antitrust enforcement agencies will be law has suddenly become mainstream and practitioners exploring the depth and reach of these theories and clients should be aware of developments when they counsel clients must be prepared for investigations and enforcement actions on issues involving supply-side concerns. implicating these issues. This topic is not going anywhere any time soon.
  • The European, Middle Eastern and African Antitrust Review 2018

    The European, Middle Eastern and African Antitrust Review 2018

    The European, Middle Eastern and African Antitrust Review 2018 Published by Global Competition Review in association with AEQUO Law Firm FBC – Fischer Behar Chen Well Popovici Nit¸u Stoica & Asociat¸ii Baker Botts LLP Orion & Co Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP bpv Hügel Rechtsanwälte Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP Shearman & Sterling LLP Bruun & Hjejle Gide Loyrette Nouel Simonsen Vogt Wiig AS Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP Herbert Smith Freehills LLP SZA Schilling, Zutt & Anschütz Cooley Hogan Lovells Rechtsanwalts AG Covington & Burling LLP Kellerhals Carrard Vieira de Almeida & Associados DLA Piper Morgan Lewis & Bockius UK LLP Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP Dryllerakis & Associates Motieka & Audzevicˇius WilmerHale LLP ELIG, Attorneys-at-Law Norton Rose Fulbright LLP Fatur LLC Oppenländer Rechtsanwälte GCR www.globalcompetitionreview.com GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW Germany: Federal Cartel Office Andreas Mundt President Digitalisation and globalisation are triggering an enormous trans- important adjustments with regard to the notification of merger formation process that is challenging not only for the business com- cases that do not meet the established turnover thresholds. Cases munity but also for competition authorities, which have to deal with concerning the acquisition of companies that did not achieve high new markets, new players and new business models. The task of the turnovers in the past may also appear important in terms of their competition authorities is not changing, but the focus is. The Federal economic and competitive value for the purchaser. In those cases, Cartel Office is very well positioned to deal with this. the company’s economic potential can often be better expressed by One focus of our case work will be to keep markets open in the the purchase price.
  • 35 Measuring Oligopsony and Oligopoly Power in the US Paper Industry Bin Mei and Changyou Sun Abstract

    35 Measuring Oligopsony and Oligopoly Power in the US Paper Industry Bin Mei and Changyou Sun Abstract

    Measuring Oligopsony and Oligopoly Power in the U.S. Paper Industry Bin Mei and Changyou Sun1 Abstract: The U.S. paper industry has been increasingly concentrated ever since the 1950s. Such an industry structure may be suspected of imperfect competition. This study applied the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) approach to examine the market power in the U.S. paper industry. The econometric analysis consisted of the identification and estimation of a system of equations including a production function, market demand and supply functions, and two conjectural elasticities indicating the industry’s oligopsony and oligopoly power. By employing annual data from 1955 to 2003, the above system of equations was estimated by Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) procedure. The analysis indicated the presence of oligopsony power but no evidence of oligopoly power over the sample period. Keywords: Conjectural elasticity; GMM; Market power; NEIO Introduction The paper sector (NAICS 32-SIC 26) has been the largest among the lumber, furniture, and paper sectors in the U.S. forest products industry. According to the latest Annual Survey of Manufacturing in 2005, the value of shipments for paper manufacturing reached $163 billion or a 45% share of the total forest products output (U.S. Bureau of Census, 2005). Thus, the paper sector has played a vital role in the U.S. forest products industry. However, spatial factors such as the cost of transporting products between sellers and buyers can mitigate the forces necessary to support perfect competition (Murray, 1995a). This is particularly true in markets for agricultural and forest products. For example, timber and logs are bulky and land-intensive in nature, thus leading to high logging service fees.
  • Corporate Disclosure As a Tacit Coordination Mechanism: Evidence from Cartel Enforcement Regulations∗

    Corporate Disclosure As a Tacit Coordination Mechanism: Evidence from Cartel Enforcement Regulations∗

    Corporate Disclosure as a Tacit Coordination Mechanism: Evidence from Cartel Enforcement Regulations∗ Thomas Bourveau Guoman She Alminas Zaldokasˇ This version: September 2019 - First version: October 2016 Abstract We empirically study how collusion in product markets affects firms’ financial disclosure strategies. We find that after a rise in cartel enforcement, U.S. firms start sharing more detailed information in their financial disclosure about their customers, contracts, and products. This new information potentially benefits peers by helping to tacitly coordinate actions in product markets. Indeed, changes in disclosure are associated with higher future profitability. Our results highlight the potential conflict between securities and antitrust regulations. Keywords: Financial Disclosure, Antitrust Enforcement, Collusion, Tacit Coordination JEL Classification: D43, G38, M41, L15, L41 ∗Bourveau is at Columbia Business School. She and Zaldokasˇ are at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST). Thomas Bourveau: [email protected]; Guoman She: [email protected]; Alminas Zaldokas:ˇ [email protected]. We thank our editor Haresh Sapra and the anonymous referee for their constructive comments and guidance. We thank our discussants Julian Atanassov, Luzi Hail, Rachel Hayes, Gerard Hoberg, Hyo Kang, Vardges Levonyan, Xi Li, Tse-Chun Lin, Tim Loughran, Mike Minnis, Vladimir Mukharlyamov, Vikram Nanda, Kevin Tseng, Jiang Xuefeng, and Xintong Zhan for comments that helped to improve this paper. We also thank Sumit Agarwal, Phil Berger, Jeremy Bertomeu, Matthias Breuer, Jason Chen, Hans Christensen, Anna Costello, Sudipto Dasgupta, Wouter Dessein, Hila Fogel-Yaari, Joey Engelberg, Eric Floyd, Yuk-Fai Fong, Jonathan Glover, Kai Wai Hui, Bruno Jullien, Christian Leuz, J¯uraLiaukonyt_e, Daniele Macciocchi, Nathan Miller, Jeff Ng, Kasper Meisner Nielsen, Giorgo Sertsios, Daniel D.
  • Unit 7 Business Regulation Case Study: Standard Oil

    Unit 7 Business Regulation Case Study: Standard Oil

    UNIT 7 BUSINESS REGULATION CASE STUDY: STANDARD OIL CHAPTER 1 THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION ..................................................................................................1 CHAPTER 2 ROCKEFELLER’S MILLIONS ...........................................................................................................7 CHAPTER 3 JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IN CLEVELAND.................................................................................12 CHAPTER 4 THE THEORY OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE................................................................................................15 CHAPTER 5 EMPIRE ʹS CHALLENGE TO STANDARD ..................................................................................19 CHAPTER 6 BUSINESS 0RGANIZATIONS.........................................................................................................23 CHAPTER 7 ROBBER BARON OR INDUSTRIAL STATESMAN ....................................................................28 CHAPTER 8 THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT AND STANDARD OIL....................................................33 CHAPTER 9 STANDARD OIL ON TRIAL...........................................................................................................36 CHAPTER 10 THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES...............................................................................................39 by Thomas Ladenburg, copyright, 1974, 1998, 2001, 2007 100 Brantwood Road, Arlington, MA 02476 781-646-4577 [email protected] Page 1 Chapter 1 The Industrial Revolution he word ‘revolution’ implies
  • The Dismantling of the Standard Oil Trust

    The Dismantling of the Standard Oil Trust

    The Dismantling of The Standard Oil Trust The saga of Standard Oil ranks as one of the most dramatic episodes in the history of the U.S. economy. It occurred at a time when the country was undergoing its rapid transformation from a mainly agricultural society to the greatest industrial powerhouse the world has ever known. The effects of Standard Oil on the U.S., as well as on much of the rest of the world, were immense, and the lessons that can be learned from this amazing story are possibly as relevant today as they were a century ago. Standard Oil Company was founded by John D. Rockefeller in Cleveland, Ohio in 1870, and, in just a little over a decade, it had attained control of nearly all the oil refineries in the U.S. This dominance of oil, together with its tentacles entwined deep into the railroads, other industries and even various levels of government, persisted and intensified, despite a growing public outcry and repeated attempts to break it up, until the U.S. Supreme Court was finally able to act decisively in 1911. John D. Rockefeller John Davidson Rockefeller was born the second of six children into a working class family in Richford, (upstate) New York in 1839. In 1853, the family moved to a farm in Strongsville, Ohio, near Cleveland. Under pressure from his father, Rockefeller dropped out of high school shortly before commencement and entered a professional school, where he studied penmanship, bookkeeping, banking and commercial law. In 1859 Edwin Drake struck oil in Titusville, in western Pennsylvania.