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Supreme Court of the United States 2/s/17 No. In the Supreme Court of the United States JOHN COTTAIVI, Petitioner V. DOUGLAS PELTON, Resp On (lent On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Eleventh Circuit PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTI.OSR.ARI John Cottam Pro Se 802 Centerbroo.k Dr. 13ran d on, 141335 11 Sl,-,I'[email protected] 813 318 2539 QUESTIONS PRESENTED: This case highlights the significant extent of protection of law enforcement officers engagecl in criminal activities against innocent citizens. If left stand. the rulings of the lower courts will not only entrench, but greatiy expand an already pervasive culture of corrupt..on: One SO deep that police themselves are the ones who coined the term "testiing". The well documented criminal fabrication of a felony charge of eluding (car chase) against an innocent citizen has been protected at all levels of law enforcement in the State of Florida. This protection, in this case, so far, extends fully to the Eleventh Circuit. The question here is: Whether items of evidence showing a law enforcement official fabricated multiple components of a felony charge against a citizen are "material" in terms of rule 56 relative to a false arrest complaint, and if so, does this preclude summar judgment per Federal rule 56. Whether the presence, or not, of any actual "probable cause" in a fahrcati.on case is a factual matter, requiring understanding of the totality of the case, and therefore a function of the trier of facts (jury), not the Federal Judge. QUESTIONS PRESENTED - Continued Whether the presence of any minor "arrestable offense" (such as speeding) though nOt acted upon by an Officer, is a sufficient to purge the taint of an Illegal fabrication of a separate felony charge. An illustrative example: A police officer approaches a panhandler. The officer does not arrest the man for panhandling (though he can), but instead fabricates a felony cocaine dealing charge, gets caught lying about and planting the cocaine, and the case is dropped. The man, after being jailed. enduring great expense and anguish, brings a false arrest claim in Federal court. Even though the person "could have been arrested" for panhandling, is that fabrication of the separate felony considered a false arrest under Constitution or federal laws? In other words, can an officer arrest a person for any fabricated charge (as long as the person "could have been arrested" for a minor charge (but was not)), without any liability in Federal court even when the fabrication of the felony is proven or claimed? Whether deliberate fabrication of a felony charge by an officer, and subsequent jailing (deprivation of liberty) of the innocent citizen (for any amount of time, even one night), and suffering a long, unsuccessful prosecutorial process due to the fabrication, constitutes a malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Ainendment. or Section 1983. PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING: All parties to the proceeding are named in the caption of the case as recited on the cover page. CORPORATE DISCLOSURE There are no nongovernmental corporate parties requiring a disclosure statement under Supreme Court Rule 29.6. Iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................................................. PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING.............................iii CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMIENT.................... iIi] TABLE OF CONTENTS .....................................................iv INDEX TO APPENDIX ............................................ vi TABLE OF AUTHORITiES ............................................. vii DECISIONSBELOW ........................................................... JURISDICTION.................................................................... CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 1NVOILVED ... ............ I STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................2 Factual Backuround.............. ............................ 3 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ................ I. The Courts below failed to consider facts in the light most favorable to Cottam, presenting opinions completely inconsistent with. Supreme Court and multiple circuits' precedents ...............5 On-The-Record Evidence Raises important Questions Conflicting With Relevant Decisions Of ThisCourt .......................................................... 7 Pelton Fabricated Every Major Component Of The Eluding Charge ..................................7 Fabricated: "Another Officer Caine From The Opposite Direction And He Stopped rf1e17 Fabricated Cottam "Made An Extremely Abrupt, Reckless Turn,.."............................8 Fabricated He Was "... Calling Out. A Vehicle Was Not Stopping ............................ 9 TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued V ID. 1-'ItI)11 lal):r1cat((i I:I(e Had I:! iS Sireii On .]() Pe].ton Fabricated He Saw Cottam Looking in His Rear View Mirror...........10 Peiton's Claim "Cottam's Path Was Unreasonable" Is Obviously Untrue ....... 11 Peiton Fabricated Cot;tam Told Him He Was "Lost". etc............ ....................... 12 Peiton Fabricated. He "Never Lost Sight Of.." Cottam .......................................12 Pell on Fabricated Cottam "Accelerated" Away From Him .................................. 1 2 Pelton Fabricated There Was Not Any Other Traffic On The Road ...................... 12 Peiton Fabricated He Didn't have To Pass AnyCars . ......... ............................... 12 Pelton Fabricated Cottam "Disregarded The Posted Signs. ." ...................................12 II. The Courts below Did Not Follow Rule 56 In Spirit Or Application . ............................. 13 ifi The Lower Courts Showed Significant Bias toward Peiton and Against Cottam............14 The Lower Courts improperly Used "Probable Cause" and Qualified, immunity ...............22 The Lower Courts are Improperly Using False Legal. Precedent, Requiring Review..................................................25 I!" VI. Malicious Prosecution Criteria A.e Not Well Defined in Fabrication Cases, Requiring Review......... .......................................... 29 VII. The DC Wrongly Ruled Pelton Not Liable For Emotional Distress..................................32 Summary of Lower Courts' Errors.........................34 CONCLUSION .................................................. .5 INDEX TO APPENDIX APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Appendix A Eleventh Circuit Opinion ................... 1 Appendix B District Court Order........................ 12 Appendix C Eleventh Circuit order denying en bane hearing ..........................................31 Appendix D Excerpts froin Documents.................33 I Pelton's answers to Cottam's Request For Admissions (RFA) ...................................33 II Pel.ton's answers to Cottam's Interrogatories........................................33 III Pelton's Deposition .... ................................. 34 IV Officer Smalt's deposition............................39 V Ms Tanner's Deposition................................43 Appendix E Pelton's Charging Document.............48 Appendix F Eyewitness (Sarah Akav) Affidavit ..... 51 vi Table of Authorities Anderson v. LibertvLobbv,Irc. 477 U. S. 242, 255 (1936)....................13 21 Bailey v. .Pataki 708 P.3d 3.91, 404 (2d Cii. 2013) ...............23 Bailey n. United States U.S. 133 S Ct. 1031,1037 (2013)..................31 Black v. Wigington 811 F 3d 1259,1263(11" Or. 2016) .........29 Bouchat v Baltimore Ravens 346 F 3d 514, 525 (411 Cir. 2003) .................6 Brower v. County of Inyo 489 U.S. 593, 596-597, 709 S.Ct. 1378. 103 L.Ed.2d 628 198.9,) .................................. 31 Celotex Corp. v. Ccit ret 477 U.S. 317 1986)...................................24 Courson V. McIV[illia 939 F.2d 1479, 1.487 (11th Cii. 1991)..........24 Fernandez V. Bankers Nat. Life Ins. Co. .906F.2d 559(11th Cii. 1990)....................24 Flameout Design & Fabrication 994 S. W2d at 834. 1999) Groman v. Tap. of Manalapan 47F.3d 628, 635 (3d Ci;. 1.995).........................32 VIII Table of Authorities - Continued Halsey V. Pfeiffer 750 F. 3d 273 (2014).............24, 28, 30,32,36 IIaminett v. Pan/ding Cty. No. 16-15764. 2017 WL 5505114. at *6 (11th Cir. Nov. 17, 2017)....................................20 Hoffman v A/lied Corp. 912F.2d 137.9. 1,783 (IF" Or, 1990)...17. 21 Johnson V. Knorr 477 F. 3d 75 (2007)....................................31 Rubgsianci V. City Of Miami 11°' Cii August 31, (2004).....................24,31 Kisela v. Hughes 138 S. Ct. 2018 (per euriam) ........................ 6 Koon v. United States 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996)............................28 Lee v. Ferraro 284_F.3d.1188,11.96 (lit/i Cir.'02..24,25,26,27 Limoiie v. Condon 372 F. 3d 3.9. 45 (1st Or. 2004)....................."2 Matsushita Electric v Zenith Radio Corp 475 U.S. 574 (1986).................................15 Peterson v. Bernardi 719 F. Supp. 2d 419, 428 (D.N.J. 2010)........93 ix Table of Authorities - Continued Petruzzi 's IGA Sujermarkets v. Darling-Delaware Co. 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cii. 1.993).............15 Pierce v. Giichrest 359 F. 3d 1279, 1285-86 (10/1 Cii 2004).................32 Reedy v. Evanson 615F.3d197,, 223 (3d ir.2010)....................23 Reid v. Henry Cty., Ga. 568F. App'x 745-9(11" Cl j- 2014).....25, 26,27 Rose v. Bartle 871 F.2d 331 349 (3d Cii. 1989)..................3.1 San.tana v. Miami-Dade County, et al, No. 15-14338 (11th Cii'. 201 7) ...................24 Saucier v. Katz 533 U.S. 194(2001)...................................94 Sheth v. Webster 145 F.3c1 1231, 1236 (.11th
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