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Aquinas' Inconsistency on the Nature and the Treatment of Animals

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Aquinas' Inconsistency on the Nature and the Treatment of Animals AQUINAS' INCONSISTENCY ON THE NATURE AND THE TREATMENT OF ANIMALS JUDITH BARAD Indiana State University When Aquinas' views on animals are we learn that he was only interested in not presented by those advocating animal rights, treating animals cruelly for instrumental reasons; that is, treating animals cruelly can reduce the sympathy men have for one another. But basically animals are things lacking irtrinsic value, to be used by people as they see fit. Now this is ~ side of the story­ --a side which barely differentiates Aquinas' disregard for animals from Descartes' disregard. Andrew Linzey declares that "Descartes carried the line of indifference to cruelty to animals (as not wrong in itself), already indicated by St. Thomas, to its logical conclusion. II 1 The much neglected other side is that Aquinas holds that animals are ontologically superior to vegetative life which is in turn superior to inanimate objects. But Aquinas' ontological view is inconsistent with his ethical position. If human beings are Jim Harter, Animals: m2 i~~:zygre;-bO~?9tratiODS. accorded opposite treatment due to their ontological value (as Aquinas insists), and if animals have more ontological worth thM mere things, then animals should be treated differently than mere things. I will first present the neglected side of the issue, explaining Aquinas' hierarchical doctrine of being and his views on the cognitive and PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY 102 .4 co kG. , aii & . L 4.t affectiveaffective lifelife ofof animals.animals. ThenThen II willwill turnturn toto movement,movement, thethe levellevel anan entityentity occupiesoccupies onon thethe his positionposition onon thethe treatmenttreatment ofof animalsanimals andand hierarchyhierarchy ofof beingbeing dependsdepends uponupon thethe extentextent toto furtherfurther exploreexplore thethe inconsistencyinconsistency indicatedindicated byby whichwhich itsits activitiesactivities areare immanentlyimmanently determineddetermined by the being itself. hishis diversediverse teachings.teachings. Finally,Finally, II willwill suggestsuggest by the being itself. somesome implicationsimplications thatthat might be generated by a Employing thisthis criterioncriterion of comparison,comparison, consistent Thomistic doctrine. Aquinas distinguishes threethree levelslevels of life:life: plant, animal and human. A plant acts more That Aquinas places animals above mere independentlyindependently thanthan a stone because itsits growth things can be seen by examining his things can be seen by examining his involvedinvolved absorbing substances fromfrom itsits hierarchical view of being. Beings vary in hierarchical view of being. Beings vary in environment and metamorphosing themthem intointo itsits perfection according as they approach or perfection according as they approach or own sUbstance.substance. But a plant grows, changes, 2 recederecede from thethe perfection of God. The and dies inin reactionreaction toto outside forcesforces as well perfection of a being can be measured by itsits as according to itsits own internalinternal form, which nearness to "divine Iikeness."3 Since no operates on a strictly biological or botanical creature could ever reflect God's perfection, level.level. Therefore, of the three levelslevels of life,life, many degrees of being were created which plants manifest the leastleast degree of novelty inin overlap in such a way that there are no their activities. unaccounted for spaces in the structure of being. Aquinas held that diversity makes the It becomes increasingly difficult to idea of degrees necessary, for if one enumerate all the kinds of activities an animal "observes the natures of things" he will find can perform, for an essential characteristic of "that the diversity of things is accomplished an animal, as opposed to a plant, is mobility by means of gradations. Indeed he will find from place to place which seems to be plants above inanimate bodies, and above purposive. A plant does not move from place plants irrational anianimals,mals, and above these to place, but it only moves its components in intellectualintellectual substances." Aquinas adds, "And reaction to various stimuli. Since the lowest among individuals of these types he will find a species of animals are continuous with the diversity based on the fact that some are more highest species of plants, the least developed perfect than others, inasmuch as the highest animals may be expected to move in a manner members of a lower genus seem quiteqUite close to similar to plants. Differentiating higher the next higher genus; and the converse isis also animals from "immovable animals, such as true; thus, immovableimmovable animals are likelike shellfish," Aquinas explains that animals plants.plants."4 ,,4 In other words, the lowestlowest species possessing "locomotive powers. .require of animals are continuous with thethe highest many things for their life,life, and consequently formsforms of plants and thethe highest formsforms of movement toto seek necessaries of lifelife fromfrom a a 7 animals are continuous with thethe lowestlowest formsforms distance." As animal lifelife develops, the of human nature. sensory-motor system, consisting of muscles, bone, brain, nervous system and the senses As one ascends thethe hierarchy of being fromfrom becomes more complexcomplex and thethe animal becomes thethe non-living toto thethe livingliving and fromfrom vegetativevegetative increasinglyincreasingly capable of self-determination. lifelife toto animalistic life,life, thethe element of freedomfreedom Accordingly, therethere are degrees within thethe increasesincreases with each step.step. Aquinas sayssays thatthat animal realmrealm itselfitself which manifest increasingincreasing thethe lessless developeddeveloped aa thingthing is,is, thethe moremore likelylikely spontaneity.spontaneity. InIn short,short, animals adaptadapt willwill itit bebe "fixed"fixed toto oneone place.place."5,,5 AA stone,stone, forfor themselvesthemselves toto newnew situationssituations inin aa wayway whichwhich instance,instance, cannotcannot movemove itselfitself fromfrom one one placeplace toto neitherneither plantsplants nornor automataautomata can.can. another.another. InIn contrast,contrast, livingliving thingsthings areare thosethose whichwhich byby naturenature areare ableable toto movemove themselves.themselves.6S ItIt wouldwould seem,seem, then,then, thatthat AquinasAquinas andand SinceSince toto livelive isis toto bebe ableable toto engageengage inin self-self- DescartesDescartes havehave littlelittle inin commoncommon regardingregarding 103103 BE'IWEENBE'IWEEN THETHE SPECIESSPECIES ~:--- .~=-~= 11 their views on the ontological status of capable of being taught. animals. But it has been noted that the concept of instinct is a common link in both of their Since the natural tendencies of animals philosophical positions. "Instinct," in this possessing memory and hearing are modifiable usage, means "the arrangement by which by learning and experience, there seems to be providence assures the existence of the little purely instinctive behavior among the species, thus looking upon it as a mechanical higher animals, including the human animals. and uncontrollable impulse, and making individuals into little more than mach ines."8 Based on Aquinas' distinction, John Deely And there is textual evidence to support the attributes instinct to those animals at the correctness of such an observation. Aquinas lowest levels of existence which respond only reasons that "artificial works," such as a to immediate sensations and intelligence to clock, are to "human ingenuity" as· natural those animals which are capable of adapting things, that is, animals, are to "divine art." themselves to diverse circumstances. God plans that animals should carry out "intricate processes" by their natural What Aquinas is getting at. .is the inclinations just as human beings plan that a distinction between instinct strictly clock carries out intricate processes. Aquinas so-called, i. e., between a species supports his conclusion "by the fact that all dominated by a pattern of behavior members of the same species display the same which is "species-predictable". .and intelligence, i. e., species the behavior pattern of behavior.·9 of which does not seem to be dominated 12 On the other hand, Aquinas extends the by a gene-determined pattern. term ·voluntary· to animals insofar as "they are moved towards an end through some Higher animals do not always respond in a uniform way to identical stimuli, and knowledge of it.,,10 To the extent that both conversely, quite disparate stimuli often evoke human beings and animals direct their a uniform reponse. Aquinas' distinction activities towards an apprehended goal both between the three levels of animal life means, humans and animals are free. But how can then, that only those animals who are at the AqUinas hold, on the one hand, that animals are lowest levels of existence possess instinct in little more than machines, all members of the same species acting the same way, and, on the the sense of a completely determinate other hand, that they are capable of voluntary mechanical operation whereas higher animals activities? This conundrum can be resolved by are capable of voluntary activity. AqUinas' distinction between three levels of sensitive life ranging from immobile animals Just as AqUinas acknowledged that there is lacking a capacity for memory to those whose continuity between the highest form of animal capacities allow a broader scope of behavioral
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