AQUINAS' INCONSISTENCY ON THE NATURE AND THE TREATMENT OF ANIMALS

JUDITH BARAD

Indiana State University

When Aquinas' views on animals are we learn that he was only interested in not presented by those advocating animal rights, treating animals cruelly for instrumental reasons; that is, treating animals cruelly can reduce the sympathy men have for one another. But basically animals are things lacking irtrinsic value, to be used by people as they see fit. Now this is ~ side of the story­ --a side which barely differentiates Aquinas' disregard for animals from Descartes' disregard. Andrew Linzey declares that "Descartes carried the line of indifference to cruelty to animals (as not wrong in itself), already indicated by St. Thomas, to its logical

conclusion. II 1 The much neglected other side is that Aquinas holds that animals are ontologically superior to vegetative life which is in turn superior to inanimate objects. But Aquinas' ontological view is inconsistent with his ethical position. If human beings are Jim Harter, Animals: m2 i~~:zygre;-bO~?9tratiODS. accorded opposite treatment due to their ontological value (as Aquinas insists), and if animals have more ontological worth thM mere things, then animals should be treated differently than mere things.

I will first present the neglected side of the issue, explaining Aquinas' hierarchical doctrine of being and his views on the cognitive and

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.4 co kG. , aii & . L 4.t affectiveaffective lifelife ofof animals.animals. ThenThen II willwill turnturn toto movement,movement, thethe levellevel anan entityentity occupiesoccupies onon thethe his positionposition onon thethe treatmenttreatment ofof animalsanimals andand hierarchyhierarchy ofof beingbeing dependsdepends uponupon thethe extentextent toto furtherfurther exploreexplore thethe inconsistencyinconsistency indicatedindicated byby whichwhich itsits activitiesactivities areare immanentlyimmanently determineddetermined by the being itself. hishis diversediverse teachings.teachings. Finally,Finally, II willwill suggestsuggest by the being itself. somesome implicationsimplications thatthat might be generated by a Employing thisthis criterioncriterion of comparison,comparison, consistent Thomistic doctrine. Aquinas distinguishes threethree levelslevels of life:life: plant, animal and human. A plant acts more That Aquinas places animals above mere independentlyindependently thanthan a stone because itsits growth things can be seen by examining his things can be seen by examining his involvedinvolved absorbing substances fromfrom itsits hierarchical view of being. Beings vary in hierarchical view of being. Beings vary in environment and metamorphosing themthem intointo itsits perfection according as they approach or perfection according as they approach or own sUbstance.substance. But a plant grows, changes, 2 recederecede from thethe perfection of God. The and dies inin reactionreaction toto outside forcesforces as well perfection of a being can be measured by itsits as according to itsits own internalinternal form, which nearness to "divine Iikeness."3 Since no operates on a strictly biological or botanical creature could ever reflect God's perfection, level.level. Therefore, of the three levelslevels of life,life, many degrees of being were created which plants manifest the leastleast degree of novelty inin overlap in such a way that there are no their activities. unaccounted for spaces in the structure of being. Aquinas held that diversity makes the It becomes increasingly difficult to idea of degrees necessary, for if one enumerate all the kinds of activities an animal "observes the natures of things" he will find can perform, for an essential characteristic of "that the diversity of things is accomplished an animal, as opposed to a plant, is mobility by means of gradations. Indeed he will find from place to place which seems to be plants above inanimate bodies, and above purposive. A plant does not move from place plants irrational anianimals,mals, and above these to place, but it only moves its components in intellectualintellectual substances." Aquinas adds, "And reaction to various stimuli. Since the lowest among individuals of these types he will find a species of animals are continuous with the diversity based on the fact that some are more highest species of plants, the least developed perfect than others, inasmuch as the highest animals may be expected to move in a manner members of a lower genus seem quiteqUite close to similar to plants. Differentiating higher the next higher genus; and the converse isis also animals from "immovable animals, such as true; thus, immovableimmovable animals are likelike shellfish," Aquinas explains that animals plants.plants."4 ,,4 In other words, the lowestlowest species possessing "locomotive powers. . .require of animals are continuous with thethe highest many things for their life,life, and consequently formsforms of plants and thethe highest formsforms of movement toto seek necessaries of lifelife fromfrom a a 7 animals are continuous with thethe lowestlowest formsforms distance." As animal lifelife develops, the of human nature. sensory-motor system, consisting of muscles, bone, brain, nervous system and the senses As one ascends thethe hierarchy of being fromfrom becomes more complexcomplex and thethe animal becomes thethe non-living toto thethe livingliving and fromfrom vegetativevegetative increasinglyincreasingly capable of self-determination. lifelife toto animalistic life,life, thethe element of freedomfreedom Accordingly, therethere are degrees within thethe increasesincreases with each step.step. Aquinas sayssays thatthat animal realmrealm itselfitself which manifest increasingincreasing thethe lessless developeddeveloped aa thingthing is,is, thethe moremore likelylikely spontaneity.spontaneity. InIn short,short, animals adaptadapt willwill itit bebe "fixed"fixed toto oneone place.place."5,,5 AA stone,stone, forfor themselvesthemselves toto newnew situationssituations inin aa wayway whichwhich instance,instance, cannotcannot movemove itselfitself fromfrom one one placeplace toto neitherneither plantsplants nornor automataautomata can.can. another.another. InIn contrast,contrast, livingliving thingsthings areare thosethose whichwhich byby naturenature areare ableable toto movemove themselves.themselves.6S ItIt wouldwould seem,seem, then,then, thatthat AquinasAquinas andand SinceSince toto livelive isis toto bebe ableable toto engageengage inin self-self- DescartesDescartes havehave littlelittle inin commoncommon regardingregarding

103103 BE'IWEENBE'IWEEN THETHE SPECIESSPECIES ~:--- .~=-~=

11 their views on the ontological status of capable of being taught. animals. But it has been noted that the concept of instinct is a common link in both of their Since the natural tendencies of animals philosophical positions. "Instinct," in this possessing memory and hearing are modifiable usage, means "the arrangement by which by learning and experience, there seems to be providence assures the existence of the little purely instinctive behavior among the species, thus looking upon it as a mechanical higher animals, including the human animals. and uncontrollable impulse, and making individuals into little more than mach ines."8 Based on Aquinas' distinction, John Deely And there is textual evidence to support the attributes instinct to those animals at the correctness of such an observation. Aquinas lowest levels of existence which respond only reasons that "artificial works," such as a to immediate sensations and intelligence to clock, are to "human ingenuity" as· natural those animals which are capable of adapting things, that is, animals, are to "divine art." themselves to diverse circumstances. God plans that animals should carry out "intricate processes" by their natural What Aquinas is getting at. . .is the inclinations just as human beings plan that a distinction between instinct strictly clock carries out intricate processes. Aquinas so-called, i. e., between a species supports his conclusion "by the fact that all dominated by a pattern of behavior members of the same species display the same which is "species-predictable". . .and intelligence, i. e., species the behavior pattern of behavior.·9 of which does not seem to be dominated 12 On the other hand, Aquinas extends the by a gene-determined pattern. term ·voluntary· to animals insofar as "they are moved towards an end through some Higher animals do not always respond in a uniform way to identical stimuli, and knowledge of it.,,10 To the extent that both conversely, quite disparate stimuli often evoke human beings and animals direct their a uniform reponse. Aquinas' distinction activities towards an apprehended goal both between the three levels of animal life means, humans and animals are free. But how can then, that only those animals who are at the AqUinas hold, on the one hand, that animals are lowest levels of existence possess instinct in little more than machines, all members of the same species acting the same way, and, on the the sense of a completely determinate other hand, that they are capable of voluntary mechanical operation whereas higher animals activities? This conundrum can be resolved by are capable of voluntary activity. AqUinas' distinction between three levels of sensitive life ranging from immobile animals Just as AqUinas acknowledged that there is lacking a capacity for memory to those whose continuity between the highest form of animal capacities allow a broader scope of behavioral life and the lowest form of human nature, he adaptation through experience. notes a parallel continuity in the cognitive sphere. The first level is that had by animals which have neither hearing nor memory, and which Not only in the apprehensive powers are therefore neither capable of being taught but also in the appetitive there is nor of being prudent. The second level is that something which belongs to the of animals which have memory but are unable sensitive soul in accordance with its to hear, and which are therefore prudent but own nature and something else incapable of being taught. The third level is according as it has some measure of that of animals which have both of these participation in reason, coming into faculties and which are therefore prudent and contact at its highest level of activity

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with reason at its lowest. 13 "After several days of training they exhibited every-different types of leaps and In other words, there is continuity between contortions, apparently 'realizing' that the the highest achievements of animal intelligence forms of behavior they had displayed and the birth of primitive concepts in the previously would not be rewarded."16 The human being. process by which the dolphins come to regard all new tricks as meriting rewards of fish is According to Aquinas, the real object of the way in which human conceptual knowledge knowledge of both sensory cognition and arises and from which very basic concepts are intellectual cognition is form. But a form directly developed. 17 In addition to perceiving needs to undergo a transformation before it individual rewards, the dolphins must be able can be grasped by a mind. Knowledge results to abstract from individual cases, form a from the disengagement of forms from their general concept and apply this concept to particular material conditions. Since forms particular situations. Having no need for need to be dematerialized, they can only be verbal expression, the dolphins reached a received by a mind which is to some extent conclusion very much like the proposition "All immaterial itself. new tricks issue in rewards."

Plants have no knowledge because they Aquinas' two general divisions of the only receive forms in a material way. An senses in both human beings and animals, animal, however, receives forms in a partly external and internal, supplies a further link material and partly immaterial way. For between human and animal life. Aquinas, example, a cat knows certain features of his discussing the function of the external organs, owner, such as her shape, smell and hair color. says: The cat abstracts from matter a shape he apprehends but does not apprehend this shape The purpose of hearing is to provide in a way that is completely independent from communication between animals. It is material conditions. The process of necessary that animals transmit their abstraction in incomplete since the cat only experiences to one another to live; as knows this shape as it characterizes a is especially evident in the gregarious particular object and not in general. is especially evident in the gregarious Nevertheless, the cat could not know his owner animals whose youyoungng are reared by the at all if he had to receive her into himself in parent. Hence, too, the tongue is her entire physical being. It is necessary, necessary that one animal may therefore, that the cat be to some extent communicate, by sound, its feeling to immaterial, like the shape which he another.18 abstracts.1 4 For Aquinas, all human and animal faculties Aquinas allows animals the ability to think have purposes. And just as humans are certain kinds of thoughts "because of the need endowed with hearing and a tongue to communicate their experiences and feelings, for action."15action."15 If an animal were not able to animals have these faculties to communicate think in any way, it would be difficult to see their experiences and feelings. how it could learn anything or apply its own actions with some knowledge of what will The internal senses are responsible for result. For example, stating that dolphins imagination, sensible awareness, memory and "have been shown to be capable of relatively 19 abstract thinking," animal researchers tell of the estimative sense. Both imagination and an experiment in which dolphins were trained memory produce sensible impressions but the to perform a MY£.~ trick for a reward of fish. proper object of memory is past experience 105 BEIWEEN THE SPECIES recognized as past, in contrast to the object of attraction in animals and human beings. imagination, which is simply representation. According to Aquinas, Rsome inclination Aquinas notes that animals in which a sensible follows every form:23 Inanimate things do impression remains after the sense object is not know what their inclinations are or what removed Rare capable of having some kind of changes they will undergo. Aquinas knowledge in the mind beyond sense; and these says, Rln those things which lack knOWledge, are the animals which have, memory.RAnd the form is found to determine each thing only just as memory is produced by retaining to its own being...Therefore this natural form impressions of sensations, so experience is followed by a natural inclination, which is arises Rfrom many things retained in the called the natural appetite:24 memory.R20 Since Aquinas admits that animals have experiences and sensations, he Animals will act not only according to the must allow that animals can have both painful form which determines what they are but also and pleasant experiences. Observing a cat according to the form which determines their lying in the sun's rays, I can know just as well cognition. If I shake an apple from ,a tree, its as I know in the case of human sunbathers that action will be according to its natural form. the center of her felt experience is enveloped Under any given conditions, there is only one by an agreeable warmth. And if someone steps course that the apple can take without a on her paw, I can know that something violation of its nature. In contrast, if I shake a unpleasant has occurred in her world which is tree to bring down a cat, he may, run away, not unlike that which happens in the human climb higher, or come down to me of his own world when I jam my finger in a drawer. desire. Aquinas says, Rthe good to which natural appetite tends is definite and always Unlike the other internal senses, the the same; but this is not true of the good estimative sense does not directly depend on sought by an animal appetite:25 the external senses. It is this sense that is responsible for the continuity between animal The animal appetite displays marks of and human intelligence. By means of the emotion precisely similar to those we observe estimative sense an animal is able to apprehend in human beings, showing in diverse ways immediately the harmful or beneficial aspects signs of fear, pleasure, anger and affection; of sense objects and so can try to obtain or and Aquinas is cognizant of this fact. eschew them. This sense enables an animal to Attributing familiar emotions to animals, he appreciate an object's usefulness or potential explains how some of these emotions are for harm, even when there are not agreeable evoked: or disagreeable sensations to suggest this. Thus a sheep may flee a wolf whose hostility it All the passions of the irascible has never sensed not because the wolfs color appetite rise from passions of the and shape are noxious but because it perceives concupiscible appetite and terminate in the wolf as opposed to its nature.21 When the them; for instance, anger rises from sheep flees the wolf, it does so by a kind of sadness, and having wrought spontaneously derived decision which has its vengeance, terminates in joy.26 source in the estimative sense. The feelings aroused by the concupiscible The estimative sense is not only the appetite concern an animal's normal attraction highest intellectual faculty in an animal but it toward what is friendly to its nature. For also directs sensitive appetite.22 Generally, example, the concupiscible appetite is RappetiteR connotes all forms of inclination, responsible for the desire to have sexual including the natural tendencies of plants and intercourse which, Aquinas says, REven among inanimate things, and the feeling of conscious animals conduces to a certain sweet

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J.. ".{; b&& ;u .il friendship. ,,27 The irascible appetite, on the that animals are subject to and mere other hand, involves an arduous attraction and instruments of human beings. "Now, an repulsion, since the thing desired is difficult to instrument is not valued for its own sake, but achieve or the thing feared is difficult to as useful to a principle agent." But if animals escape. The stresses and strains produced by are mere instruments, then human animals such situations engender more violent need have no scruples about using other emotions. animals. And we find Aquinas saying this very thing: In summary, Aquinas holds that since "animals are capable of participating in divine We refute the error of those who claim goodness in a more eminent way than other that it is a sin for man to kill brute animals. For animals are ordered to inferior things,,,28 they have more intrinsic man's use in the natural course of value than these things. Animals are beings things...Consequently, man uses them possessing locomotive powers and manifesting without any injustice, either by killing spontaneous actions. Able to think certain them or by employing them in any kinds of thoughts, they are partly immaterial or spiritual beings. Having the same sense other way.30 organs we do, animals can communicate their feelings to one another. They can create a It might be objected that even if human synthesis of their sensations and form images animals do approach nearest to the divine of things, and by their memory they can likeness, it does not follow that all beings treasure up the acquisitions of individual inferior to human are instruments to be used experience. And their estimative sense gives as humans deem fit. Aquinas might agree that them abilities bordering on intellectual this fact alone does not warrant the cruel cognition. Moreover, Aquinas makes it clear treatment of animals. But he would condemn that animals have a rich affective life, cruelty to animals not because of the pain complete with emotions and desires. In all inflicted on them, but because such cruelty these diverse ways, animals can have may lead people to be cruel to one another. experiences that are similar to many human Commenting on the Old Testament, Aquinas experiences. Following Aquinas' principle that suggests that we distinguish between reasons a thing's mode of activity is proportionate to and passion. When humans experience passion, its mode of existence, if animals resemble pity is aroused by animal SUfferingsUffering because humans in their mode of activity, they must "even irrational animals are sensible to resemble them in their mode of existence. pain.31 Animals' very capacity for pain opens up the possibility that they may be treated But Aquinas does not recommend that cruelly. But the only reason not to treat them animals be treated in accord with their mode of cruelly or sadistically is because "if a man existence. In fact, he insists that they be practice a pitiful affection for animals, he is treated as mere things. Aquinas contrasts all the more disposed to take pity on his "the intellectual creature" as "master of its fellow-men. ,,32"32 Again, we are back to the acts" with "things which have no domain over point that animals are of only instrumental their acts" in order to show that creatures value for human beings. that participate less in the divine likeness are intended by God to be subordinated by If animals are mere instruments, they can creatures that participate more in His be killed for food, fursfu rs or sport,spo rt, or likeness. 29 Since the intellectual creature experimented upon at the whim of human alone is free, animals "have the formal beings. Aquinas implies this in saying, "He character of an instrument because they are that kills another's ox sins, not through killing not rational." Therefore, Aquinas concludes the ox, but through injuring another man in his

107 BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES ......

property."33 Should someone privately smash if an animal has a capacity that is for its own the head of an ox on his own property, Aquinas sake yet can be used by human beings, then the would be committed to the view that nothing end that "takes precedence" should be the end wrong is done to the ox. As far as the ox is that is for the animal's own sake. The tusks of concerned, the action is morally indifferent. an elephant are for fighting, and this takes The only restraint on treating animals cruelly precedence over their use as material for is that if it is too sadistic it might adversely chess pieces. Aquinas holds that if an activity has a natural end, then it is wrong to preclude affect the way the perpetrator treats his the attainment of that end. The natural end of fellow-men. In short, cruelty or sadism an animal is to grow to the state of maturity towards animals is not in jtself wrong. But characteristic of its species; if an activity how does the practice of treating animals as contributes to the efficient functioning of the mere instruments accord with Aquinas' animal, then its natural end is to make that account regarding animal ontology? contribution. An animal's capacities have value independent of their usefulness to human Comparing the two doctrines we are beings. If this is the case, we do not give confronted with a glaring inconsistency. The animals their "due" by treating them as mere instruments that first come to mind are on the instruments or things, for they have a order of hammers, that is, mere things. The fundamental right to be treated in ways that nature of a hammer is such that we can use or indicate respect for their independent value. abuse it in whatever way we desire. Having no And insofar as animals use their capacities as cognitive or affective life, a hammer is very they are due, these capacities can be matters low on the ontological scale. But why would of precept. animals be endowed with all the capacities Aquinas attributes to them if they exist only to Now the objection can be raised that if it is be used by humans? Do animals feel sadness, wrong to prevent a living thing from fulfilling vengeance and joy and experience friendship its natural end for its own sake, then doesn't with one another merely for the sake of the cow do wrong in eating grass and humans? Aquinas himself says, "For the preventing grass from attaining its natural purpose of intelligence in animals is to direct growth? But on Aquinas' principles, the grass them in their actions and passions so as to seek cannot "know" its end and thus cannot value its and avoid things according to the requirements activity. If grass has intrinsic value, that of their nature." value is given it by a knowing being, since grass cannot enjoy its activity. For Aquinas, Further, Aquinas' teleological view of since only "things endowed with knowledge" nature does not accord with the view that animals are instruments. He says, "that a can enjoy life,36 "the full meaning of thing must be done arises from the necessity enjoyment applies to rational creatures, of some end."34 In other words, the concept something short of this to animals, but nothing of teleology implies the concept of duty: of the sort to other creatures.37 An animal values its activities by its very enjoyment of A thing is a matter of precept, in so them, knowing the end their activities• lead to. far as it is something due. Now a thing is due in two ways, for its own sake, The fact that animals are beings endowed and for the sake of something else. . with knowledge is also the basis for attributing .Now in every genus that which is for rights to animals and not to plants. Turning to its own sake takes precedence of that Aquinas' doctrine of rights, we find him which is for the sake of another.35 distinguishing two fundamental kinds:

Applying this principle to the animal genus, The natural right. ..is that which by its

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very nature is. . .commensurate with proper to them. Thus a precept based on the another person. Now this may happen natural inclination to "live in society" would be in two ways: first, according as it is "to avoid offending those among whom one has considered absolutely: thus a male by to live."41 Human beings share some of the its very nature is commensurate with same inclinations that animals have, such as the female to beget offspring by her.. sexual intercourse and the education of .Secondly, a thing is naturally offspring.42 Like human beings, animals are commensurage with another person.. capable of acting from such inclinations and .according to something resultant from obtaining the goods to which they lead. Since it, for instance the possession of human beings and animals have inclinations to property.38 pursue goods completing their natures, and since human beings are granted rights based on Aquinas proceeds to place the right of their natural in"clinations, perhaps animals animals as part of the natural right. "Now it capable of apprehension should also be granted belongs not only to man but also to other rights on the basis of their natural inclinations. animals to apprehend a thing absolutely: wherefore the right which we call natural is It is true that Aquinas does not draw this common to us and other animals according to conclusion, but it seems that inconsistency the first kind of commensuration.,,39 Since requires him to do so. For AquinasAqUinas must either Aquinas maintains that animals have natural say that animals have rights due to their rights considered absolutely, rights belong to intrinsic natures or that they have no rights them as something more than the property of because they are on the same ontological level human beings. Note that his differentiation of as property, human artifacts or any mere animals from property in this passage directly thing. The adoption of the latter position would conflicts with his statement that killing entail major modifications in Aquinas' another man's ox is only wrong insofar as it is epistemology, metaphysics and teleology. In a sin against another's property. Here he contrast, adopting the first position would insists that an absolute right is what is due to require only minor modifications in relatively any creature capable of apprehension. By peripheral issues. Human beings could still establishing that animals have absolute rights, remain at the summit of earthly creation and Aquinas is establishing that how animals should have correspondingly more rights than be treated cannot be decided without animals. But having more rights does not mean considering their rights. that any time a human being wishes he or she Aquinas not only establishes that animals may violate an animal's rights. "More rights," have absolute rights; he also provides a way to in this sense, means that since a human being determine what particular rights belong to has more natural inclinations than an animal, animals. Animals participate in the same he or she has rights commensurate with those eternal law as human beings, but since human inclinations that an animal does not possess. beings, unlike animals, can discover the For instance, animals lack and human beings precepts of the eternal law, Aquinas calls have the right to vote, the right to worship as human participation in the eternal law "the they please and the right of free speech and natural law."40 Human beings become aware freedom of the press. of the precepts of the natural law by examining their natural inclinations, for their inclinations On the other hand, the veal industry reveal those things which complete their provides an example of how a contemporary natures. Accordingly, the natural inclinations practice would violate a consistent Thomistic of human beings form the basis for designating position. Depriving veal calves of solids and the particular precepts of the natural law iron means depriving them of eating what they

109 BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES are naturally inclined to eat. Taking them from 6 Ibid., I 18, 1. their mothers at the age of one to three days old deprives the cow of the right to educate her young and the natural inclination to "mother" it. Forcing calves to stand in one 8 Elena Quarelli, Socrates and the Animals position for their entire lives is a violation of translated by Kathleen Speight (London: the freedom of movement which is natural to Hodder and Stoughton, 1960), p. 35. all higher animals. Finally, raising the calves in darkness frustrates their inclination to know and experience the world around them. In all 9 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I 13, 2 ad 3. It these ways, Aquinas must admit, in the is noteworthy that Descartes also compares interest of consistency, that calves' rights are animals to clocks. Cf. Discourse on Method being abrogated. Although to say this much and Meditations, translated by Lawrence J. would require little alteration of Aquinas' Lafleur (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1960), philosophical system, it would not only correct p.43. his inconsistency but would also dissolve one source of support for the disregard of animals rights that has had so much influence through 10 'Voluntary' is a derivative term and can be the ages. extended to things where there is some share in volition through activity which is f\OTES really like it. Accordingly, voluntary activity is attributed to animals insofar Andrew Linzy, Animal Rights (London, 1976, as they are moved towards an end through some knowledge of it. J..tllii., I-II 6, 2. p. 12. 11 S. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the MetaphYsics,Metaphysics, translated by J. P. Rowan, 2 2 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, vols. (Chicago: Regency, 1964), I Lectio 1, translated by Fathers of the English n. 13. Dominican Province, 5 vols. (Westminster, Maryland: Christian Classics, 1981), I 44, 1. 12 John Deely, "Animal Intelligence and Concept Formation" in The Thomjst, vol. 35, 3 St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, January 1971, p. 62. translated with an introduction and notes by Anton C. Pegis, 5 vols. (Notre 13 St. Thomas Aquinas, On Truth, translated Dame:University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), by R. Mulligan, B. McGlynn, R. Schmidt, 3 III 97. vols. (Chicago: Regnery, 1952-1954), 25, 2.

4 J..tllii,J..tllii. I will restrict the use of the term Elsewhere Aquinas says, "Man's superiority 'animal' throughout the rest of this paper to to the beasts in animal shrewdness and the higher vertebrates. memory does not result from anything proper to the sensitive part, but from an affinity and closeness to intelligence 5 Aristotle's De Anima with the commentary which, so to speak, flows into them. These of St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by Kenelm powers in men are not so very different Foster and Sylvester Humphries with an from those in animals only they are introduction by Ivo Thomas (New Haven: heightened." S. T. I 78, 4 ad 5. Yale University Press, 1951), Book II, Lectio 3. 14 Aquinas, On Truth, 22, 3.

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15 Aquinas, Commentary on thethe Metaphysics, II 34 .l.bld..,.l.blQ.., 11-1111-11 44, 2. Lectio 1, n. 14. 35 .lblQ..Ibid. 1 6 Bernd Wursig, "Dolphins""Dolphins" inin Ani m a I Societies and Evolution, with an introductionintroduction 36 .!.!2l.Q..,l.!2l.Q.., I-II 11, 2. by Howard Topoff (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1981), p. 86. 37 l!li.d..l.!.li.d..

17 Deely argues thatthat according toto Aquinas 38 Ibid.,Ibid., 11-11II-II 57, 3. animals apprehend the "accidental universal" whereas human beings can also apprehend the 39 Ibid. "essential universal." pp. 72-74. 40 .l.bld..,.l.blQ.., I-II 91, 2. 18 Aristotle's De Anima,Anima. III 13, n. 874. 41 Another example Aquinas uses is that a 19 Aquinas, Summa Theologica,Theologica. I 78, 4. precept based on the human inclination to "know the truth about God" would be "to shun 20 Aquinas, Commentary on the posteriorPosterior ignorance."ignorance." Ibid.,Ibid., 1-11 94, 2. Analytics, translated by F. R. Larcher with a preface by James A. Weisheipl (Albany, New 42.l.b..i.d.. York: Magi Books, 1970), II Lectio 20.

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22 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I 81, 3.

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24.L!:lli:!..24.l.b..i.d.. Not only the best writing on ethics and animals, but fiction, poetry, and autobiography 25 Aquinas, On Truth, 22, 3 ad 3. by leading animal liberationists too! 26,26. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I 81, 3. $15 from San Francisco Bay Institute, P.O. Box 254, Berkeley, CA 94701 Sample back issue $3.00 27 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentjles,Gentiles, III 123. 28 AqUinas,Aquinas, On Truth, II 3, 3 ad 3. ~

@QUa"edY~ Quarterly JoumalJournal of E'hksEthics 29 Aq~inas, Summa Control Gentiles, 111 pt. 2, 112. "Between the Species is a must for anyone who feels we have to toss 30.l.b..i.d..30 l!li.d.. away our old conceptions about animals a'sas ... not deserving ethical treatment, and find a way of relating 31 1tlli!...L!:lli:!.. to them as, perhaps, peers." Jim Swan (Shaman's Drum) 32 .l.Q.lQ..,.l.Q.lQ.., I-II 99, 1. Contributing Editors include Peter 33 Aquinas, Summa TheologTheologica, ica, I-II 102, 6 ad Singer, Michael Fox, Bernard Rollin, and Tom Regan. 8. 111 BEI'WEENBE:I'WEEN THE SPECES