DOCSLIB.ORG

Scientific Contribution Catharsis and Moral Therapy II: an Aristotelian Account

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Scientific Contribution Catharsis and Moral Therapy II: an Aristotelian Account Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy (2006) 9:141–153 Ó Springer 2006 DOI 10.1007/s11019-005-8319-1 Scientific Contribution Catharsis and moral therapy II: An Aristotelian account Jan Helge Solbakk Section for Medical Ethics, Faculty of Medicine, University of Oslo, 1130, Blindern, NO-0318, Oslo, Norway (Phone: +47- 22844641; Fax: +47-22850590; E-mail: [email protected]) Abstract. This article aims at analysing Aristotle’s poetic conception of catharsis to assess whether it may be of help in enlightening the particular didactic challenges involved when training medical students to cope morally with complex or tragic situations of medical decision-making. A further aim of this investigation is to show that Aristotle’s criteria for distinguishing between history and tragedy may be employed to reshape authentic stories of sickness into tragic stories of sickness. Furthermore, the didactic potentials of tragic stories of sickness will be tried out. The ultimate aim is to investigate whether the possibilities of developing a therapeutic conception of medical ethics researched in a previous article on catharsis and moral therapy in Plato may be strengthened through the hermeneutics of the Aristotelian conception of tragic catharsis. Key words: Catharsis, emotions, error, fallibility, fear, guilt, hamartia, therapy, tragedy Introduction in their teaching, i.e. on conceptual clarifications and purifications, on methodological case study The present article aims at investigating Aristotle’s analyses and on rational strategies and theories for controversial treatment of the notion of tragic resolving moral dilemmas, while neglecting the catharsis in the Poetics. There are three reasons for cathartic role that pity, fear and other painful limiting the scope to the Poetics. For a first, there emotions, such as e.g. anger and embarrassment are reasons to believe that Aristotle’s conception of may play in the process of moral discourse and poetic catharsis represents ‘‘some sort of response learning. In this way I also hope to show that the to Plato’’ (Nussbaum, 1992, p. 281). Second, in his possibilities of developing a therapeutic conception definition of tragedy in the Poetics, Aristotle makes of medical ethics demonstrated in a previous article a controversial connection between catharsis and on Plato’s conception of cathartic treatment and the emotions of pity (eleos) and fear (phobos).1 moral regimen may be strengthened through the Third, there are reasons to believe that an inves- hermeneutics of the Aristotelian conception of tigation of the emotional potential of Aristotle’s tragic catharsis. poetic conception of catharsis may lead to a more accurate diagnostics of the particular didactic challenges involved when training medical students Aristotle’s poetic account of cathartic treatment to cope morally with complex or tragic situations of medical decision-making; these are situations One argument that will be substantiated in this where one is forced to make decisions with paragraph is that Nussbaum is right in her claim potentially disastrous consequences for one or that Aristotle’s conception of poetic catharsis several of the parties involved, while at the same represents a response to Plato, notably to the time one is faced with the fact that the possibility of purist view of catharsis advocated in the Phaedo abstaining from making a choice or of making a and the Republic. On the other hand, by limiting choice not contaminated with some sort of error or her scope to the two most idealistic dialogues of guilt (hamartia) is non-existent.2 Plato, i.e. the Phaedo and the Republic, she fails to My claim is that lecturers in medical ethics acknowledge that the conception of cathartic mainly focus their attention on instrumental issues treatment suggested in the Charmides and the 142 JAN HELGE SOLBAKK Sophist is fully compatible with Aristotle’s concep- moral interpretations, including interpretations of tion of tragic catharsis introduced in the Poetics. catharsis as an education of the emotions, According to J. Hardy (Hardy, 1932, p. 16) catharsis conceived of as the experience of emo- there is no passage in Greek literature more tional relief, famous than the ten words of the Poetics where aesthetic interpretations or interpretations of a the notion of catharsis is dramatically depicted as dramatic or structural nature, and finally interrelated with the painful emotions of pity complex or ‘holistic’ interpretations of catharsis. (eleos) and fear or terror (phobos). The passage In my analysis I nourish no ambition of being which throughout the centuries has given rise to able to settle the old controversy and determine such ‘‘a deluge of works’’ (German: ‘‘Flut von which of the interpretations of catharsis mentioned Schriften’’, Gudemann, 1934, p. 167), reads as best complies with Aristotle’s definition of tragedy. follows:3 My aim is of a rather different and more modest Tragedy is a representation of a serious, complete nature: to investigate the didactic potential of each action which has magnitude, in embellished interpretation in illuminating the process of med- speech, with each of its elements [used] separately ico-moral discourse and learning. In other words, in the [various] parts [of the play]; [represented] by what I hope to achieve is to demonstrate how the people acting and not by narration; accomplishing different interpretations of the notion of tragic by means of pity and terror the catharsis of such catharsis may be used to uncover and substantiate emotions. By ‘embellished speech’, I mean that the variety of forms of clarification and cleansing which has rhythm and melody, i.e. song; by ‘with involved in the process of medico-moral discourse its elements separately’, I mean that some [parts and learning. In doing this, I also hope to make of] are accomplished only by means of spoken clear why tragic stories of sickness should be verses, and others again by means of song. considered as the most prominent teachers and sources of medical ethical wisdom. In the secondary literature no substantial consen- sus has been reached as regards the exact meaning Medical interpretations of ‘tragic catharsis’ Aristotle attributes to ‘catharsis’ in his definition. On the contrary, a whole range of seemingly One of the most medically minded interpretations of disparate interpretations have been suggested, tragic catharsis, still vividly debated in the literature which I shall turn to in a short while. The notion was launched by J. Bernays, an uncle by marriage of as such, however, belongs, as mentioned in the Sigmund Freud. In an influential essay published in previous article, to a family of words (catharos, 1857 Bernays advances the argument that attending catharsis, catharmos) that were in use in many a tragic play may have a direct therapeutic effect on different contexts (Nussbaum, 1992, p. 280–281): the spectator, in the sense that it may clear and ‘‘everyday practical, educational, medical, reli- alleviate him from build-ups of undesirable emotions gious, literary’’. According to Nussbaum, there of pity and terror. Bernays draws support for his are no indications to suggest that ‘catharsis’ ever ‘‘pathological standpoint’’ (German: ‘patologischer became separated from its original family and Gesichtspunkt) from Politics VIII 7.1342a4-16 took on a different meaning. On the contrary, the (Bernays, 1857/1979, p. 158).4 In this passage, which ordinary meaning – i.e. ‘cleaning’ or ‘clearing up’ is quoted in the preceding note, Aristotle explains the – seems to have prevailed throughout. The meaning and role of catharsis in relation to pity and disagreement about ‘catharsis’ in Aristotle’s def- terror by making a comparison with the psycholog- inition of tragedy does not therefore relate to the ical healing process which people affected by hyster- formal meaning of the word, but to what kind of ical outbreaks of emotion (enthousiasmos)undergo ‘cleaning’ or ‘clearing up’ Aristotle actually had in when cathartic songs are used as therapeutic devices. mind. Bernays takes this comparison to mean that Aristotle In the secondary literature it is possible to conceived of tragic catharsis as a therapeutic device distinguish between at least six different groups of in the treatment of pathological emotions: interpretations: medical interpretations and interpretations of Catharsis then becomes a special type of iatreia catharsis as a natural process of discharge/release (which is why that term [meaning ‘healing’] is or outlet of emotions, used before it): ecstasy turns to calm through catharsis conceived of as emotional and intellec- orgiastic songs as sickness turns to health tual clarification, through medical treatment – not through any CATHARSIS AND MORAL THERAPY II 143 treatment, but through one that employs cathar- without turning tragic catharsis into a therapeutic tic means to fight off illness. Thus the puzzling device reserved for emotionally unbalanced people, piece of emotional pathology is explained: we can has been suggested by H. Flashar (Flashar, 1956, pp. make sense of it if we compare it with a patho- 12–48). His alternative is to unravel the medical logical bodily reaction ... basis of Aristotle’s understanding of pity and terror ... operative in both clauses. Flashar finds that in prevalent pre-Aristotelian views of the effect of ...catharsis is a term transferred from the physical poetry (in particular those of Gorgias and Plato), to the emotional sphere, and used of the sort of pity and terror are always associated
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Politics of Roman Memory in the Age of Justinian DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the D
    The Politics of Roman Memory in the Age of Justinian DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Marion Woodrow Kruse, III Graduate Program in Greek and Latin The Ohio State University 2015 Dissertation Committee: Anthony Kaldellis, Advisor; Benjamin Acosta-Hughes; Nathan Rosenstein Copyright by Marion Woodrow Kruse, III 2015 ABSTRACT This dissertation explores the use of Roman historical memory from the late fifth century through the middle of the sixth century AD. The collapse of Roman government in the western Roman empire in the late fifth century inspired a crisis of identity and political messaging in the eastern Roman empire of the same period. I argue that the Romans of the eastern empire, in particular those who lived in Constantinople and worked in or around the imperial administration, responded to the challenge posed by the loss of Rome by rewriting the history of the Roman empire. The new historical narratives that arose during this period were initially concerned with Roman identity and fixated on urban space (in particular the cities of Rome and Constantinople) and Roman mythistory. By the sixth century, however, the debate over Roman history had begun to infuse all levels of Roman political discourse and became a major component of the emperor Justinian’s imperial messaging and propaganda, especially in his Novels. The imperial history proposed by the Novels was aggressivley challenged by other writers of the period, creating a clear historical and political conflict over the role and import of Roman history as a model or justification for Roman politics in the sixth century.
    [Show full text]
  • Tragedy, Euripides, Melodrama: Hamartia, Medea, Liminality
    Vol. 5 (2013) | pp. 143-171 http://dx.doi.org/10.5209/rev_AMAL.2013.v5.42932 TRAGEDY, EURIPIDES, MELODRAMA: HAMARTIA, MEDEA, LIMINALITY BRIAN G. CARAHER QUEEN’S UNIVERSITY BELFAST, NORTHERN IRELAND [email protected] Article received on 29.01.2013 Accepted on 06.07.2013 ABSTRACT This article examines socio-historical dimensions and cultural and dramaturgic implications of the Greek playwright Euripides’ treatment of the myth of Medea. Euripides gives voice to victims of adventurism, aggression and betrayal in the name of ‘reason’ and the ‘state’ or ‘polity.’ Medea constitutes one of the most powerful mythic forces to which he gave such voice by melodramatizing the disturbing liminality of Greek tragedy’s perceived social and cultural order. The social polity is confronted by an apocalyptic shock to its order and its available modes of emotional, rational and social interpretation. Euripidean melodramas of horror dramatize the violation of rational categories and precipitate an abject liminality of the tragic vision of rational order. The dramaturgy of Euripides’ Medea is contrasted with the norms of Greek tragedy and examined in comparison with other adaptations — both ancient and contemporary — of the myth of Medea, in order to unfold the play’s transgression of a tragic vision of the social polity. KEYWORDS Dramaturgy, Euripides, liminality, Medea, melodrama, preternatural powers, social polity, tragedy. TRAGEDIA, EURÍPIDES, MELODRAMA: HAMARTÍA, MEDEA, LIMINALIDAD RESUMEN Este artículo estudia las dimensiones sociohistóricas y las implicaciones culturales y teatrales del tratamiento que Eurípides da al mito de Medea. Eurípides da voz a las víctimas del aventurerismo, de las agresiones y de las traiciones cometidas en nombre de la ‘razón’ y del ‘estado’ o el ‘gobierno’.
    [Show full text]
  • Levels of Homophobia
    Levels of Homophobia Negative Positive Repulsion Pity Tolerance Acceptance Support Admiration Appreciation Nurturance Negative Levels: Repulsion: Homosexuality is seen as “a crime against nature.” Homosexual people are sick, crazy, sinful, immoral, wicket, etc. Anything is justified to change them, it: prison, hospitalization, from behavior therapy to shock treatment. Pity: Heterosexual chauvinism. Heterosexuality is more mature and certainly to be preferred. Any possibility of being straight should be reinforced and those who seem to be “born that way” should be pitied. Tolerance: Homosexuality is just a phase of adolescent development that many people go through and ‘grow out of’. Thus lesbians, gays and bisexuals are less mature than heterosexual people and should not be put in positions of authority because they are still working on adolescent behaviors. Acceptance: Still implies that there is something that must be accepted. Characterized by such statements as ‘you’re not gay to me, you’re just a person’. Denies the social and legal realities, while ignoring the pain of invisibility and the stress of closeted behavior. Positive Levels: Support: Work to safeguard the rights of LGBT people. May be uncomfortable themselves, but are aware of the social climate and irrational unfairness. Admiration: Acknowledges that being LGBT in our society takes strength. Such people are willing to truly look at themselves and work on their own homophobic attitudes. Appreciation: Values the diversity of people and sees LGBT people as a valid part of diversity. These people are willing to combat homophobia in themselves and others. Nurturance: Assumes that LGBT people are indispensable to society. They view all homosexual people with genuine affection and delight and are willing to be open and public advocates.
    [Show full text]
  • Response: Hamartia in Greco-Roman Context
    “Go and sin no more”? Brad Jersak QUESTION: In your blogpost, Missing What Mark? you mentioned that the traditional understanding of the Greek word translated “sin” is missing the mark. You suggested that the mark in question is not moralistic perfection. Instead, you said, the mark, goal or telos of humanity is union with God. Therefore, sin is not so much law-breaking behavior, but rather, turning away from the loving care of God. Repentance, then, would essentially involve turning from alienation and returning to the Father’s house and reconciling ourselves to his loving care. If I’ve understood you, does this approach still align with the literal sense of hamartia? RESPONSE: First, yes, you’ve understood me perfectly. And simply put, my approach to missing the mark is within the semantic range of hamartia since the word does literally mean missing the mark or to err. The thing is, hamartia never specifies what the mark refers to. A recipe of original context and our preferred theology determine what mark we’ve missed. As for hamartia or any other foreign term, we need to remember that when we translate ancient words, we aren’t using ancient dictionaries. We explore how the word is used in context—or rather, its various contexts over time, since the word may be used in different ways in different times and places. Hamartia is complex because it has multiple uses both within the Bible and elsewhere in Greek and Roman literature. I did some further fact-checking, which itself always warrants double- checking in the primary sources.
    [Show full text]
  • Suffering, Pity and Friendship: an Aristotelian Reading of Book 24 of Homer’S Iliad Marjolein Oele University of San Francisco, [email protected]
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of San Francisco The University of San Francisco USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences 11-2010 Suffering, Pity and Friendship: An Aristotelian Reading of Book 24 of Homer’s Iliad Marjolein Oele University of San Francisco, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.usfca.edu/phil Part of the Classics Commons, and the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Oele, Marjolein, "Suffering, Pity and Friendship: An Aristotelian Reading of Book 24 of Homer’s Iliad" (2010). Philosophy. Paper 17. http://repository.usfca.edu/phil/17 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts and Sciences at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy by an authorized administrator of USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Suffering, Pity and Friendship: An Aristotelian Reading of Book 24 of Homer’s Iliad Marjolein Oele University of San Francisco [email protected] Book 24 of Homer’s Iliad presents us with one of the most beautiful and chilling scenes of the epic: the scene where Achilles and Priam directly face one another at the point when the suffering (pathos) of each seems to have reached its pinnacle. Achilles’ suffering is centered on the loss of his best friend Patroclus, while the suffering of Priam – although long in the making due to the attack on his city and his family – has reached a new level of despair with the loss of his dearest son Hector.
    [Show full text]
  • Tragedy After Darwin by Manya Lempert a Dissertation Submitted In
    Tragedy after Darwin by Manya Lempert A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Dorothy Hale, Chair Professor Ann Banfield Professor Catherine Gallagher Professor Barry Stroud Summer 2015 Abstract Tragedy after Darwin by Manya Lempert Doctor of Philosophy in English University of California, Berkeley Professor Dorothy Hale, Chair Tragedy after Darwin is the first study to recognize novelistic tragedy as a sub-genre of British and European modernism. I argue that in response to secularizing science, authors across Europe revive the worldview of the ancient tragedians. Hardy, Woolf, Pessoa, Camus, and Beckett picture a Darwinian natural world that has taken the gods’ place as tragic antagonist. If Greek tragic drama communicated the amorality of the cosmos via its divinities and its plots, the novel does so via its characters’ confrontations with an atheistic nature alien to redemptive narrative. While the critical consensus is that Darwinism, secularization, and modernist fiction itself spell the “death of tragedy,” I understand these writers’ oft-cited rejection of teleological form and their aesthetics of the momentary to be responses to Darwinism and expressions of their tragic philosophy: characters’ short-lived moments of being stand in insoluble conflict with the expansive time of natural and cosmological history. The fiction in this study adopts an anti-Aristotelian view of tragedy, in which character is not fate; character is instead the victim, the casualty, of fate. And just as the Greek tragedians depict externally wrought necessity that is also divorced from mercy, from justice, from theodicy, Darwin’s natural selection adapts species to their environments, preserving and destroying organisms, with no conscious volition and no further end in mind – only because of chance differences among them.
    [Show full text]
  • Resiliency and Character Strengths Among College Students
    Resiliency and Character Strengths Among College Students Item Type text; Electronic Dissertation Authors Chung, Hsiu-feng Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 02/10/2021 04:26:47 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/195507 RESILIENCY AND CHARACTER STRENGTHS AMONG COLLEGE STUDENTS by Hsiu-feng Chung _________________________________ Copyright © Hsiu-feng Chung 2008 A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 2008 2 THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA GRADUATE COLLEGE As members of the Dissertation Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation prepared by Hsiu-feng Chung entitled Resiliency and Character Strengths Among College Students and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy _______________________________________________________________________ Date: 04/01/08 Mary McCaslin, Ph. D. _______________________________________________________________________ Date: 04/01/08 Thomas Good, Ph. D. _______________________________________________________________________ Date: 04/01/08 Sheri Bauman, Ph. D. _______________________________________________________________________ Date: 04/01/08 Heidi Burross, Ph. D. Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate’s submission of the final copies of the dissertation to the Graduate College. I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement.
    [Show full text]
  • The Difference Between Empathy and Sympathy by Thoughtco., Adapted by Newsela Staff on 12.20.17 Word Count 829 Level 1010L
    The difference between empathy and sympathy By ThoughtCo., adapted by Newsela staff on 12.20.17 Word Count 829 Level 1010L Image 1. A woman gives food to a homeless man in New York City. Photo by: Ed Yourdon/WIkimedia. Is that "empathy" or "sympathy" you're showing? These two words are often used interchangeably, but that is incorrect. Their difference is important. Sympathy is a simple expression of concern for another person's misfortune. Empathy, however, goes beyond sympathy. Empathy is the ability to actually feel what another person is feeling, like the saying "to walk a mile in their shoes." Taken to extremes, deep or extended feelings of empathy can actually be harmful to one's emotional health. Sympathy Sympathy is a feeling and expression of concern for someone, often accompanied by a wish for them to be happier or better off. An example of sympathy is feeling concerned after finding out someone has cancer and hoping the treatment goes well for him or her. In general, sympathy implies a deeper, more personal level of concern than pity. Pity is really just a simple expression of sorrow. However, sympathy does not imply that someone's feelings for another person are based on shared experiences or emotions. That is empathy. Empathy Empathy is the ability to recognize and share another person's emotions. Empathy requires the ability to recognize the suffering of another person from his or her point of view. It also means openly sharing another person's emotions, including painful distress. Empathy is often confused with sympathy, pity and compassion.
    [Show full text]
  • Essays on Aristotle's Poetics
    Essays on Aristotle's Poetics edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty + "FROM CATHARSIS TO THE ARISTOTLIAN MEAN" RICHARD JANKO PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS From Catharsis to the Aristotelian Mean* Richard Janko In this essay, I shaU argue that Aristotle believed that catharsis can lead to virtue: our responses to the representation (mimesis) of human action can habituate us to approximate more closely to the mean in our ordinary emotional reactions. Literature, and especially drama, can contribute to the formation and continuing education ofmature citizens. Aristotle's views are central to continu­ ing debates about public control over artistic representation and the mass media, and the role of art and the artist in education and society. My argument builds on recent revisions of the influential view of catharsis as the purgation of undesirable emotions set out by J. Bernays. 1 An analysis of Aristotle's general theory ofthe emotions shows that there is adose connection between Aristotle's views on representation and catharsis. New textual evidence2 clarifies how watching representations of actions can enable us to approach the virtuous mean. The notion of catharsis was of fundamental importance to Aristotle's theory of literature. Although he ends his definition of tragedy with the statement that • This essay was written in Fall 1990 while I held a Fellowship provided by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation at the National Humanities Center. I wish to thank both these institutions for their support. 1 am also grateful to the staff at the Center and to audiences at the Center, at the University of North Carolina, Chape! Hill, and at Wellesley College, to whom I presented versions of this paper.
    [Show full text]
  • Theatre I Ms. Vernon Catharsis, Hubris, Hamartia, and the Tragic
    Theatre I Ms. Vernon Catharsis, Hubris, Hamartia, and the Tragic Flaw Catharsis – the cleansing of emotion – usually tragic – through the artistic experience Catharsis was described by Aristotle in The Poetics. It is the reason we go to scary movies, the reason we are interested in tragedies including murder mysteries and crime shows, is that we need to deal with these emotions. Of course, we’d rather not have to deal with them in real life, so the artistic experience allows us to go through the fear or pity or grief or anger and let it wash through us. We come out as a clean slate after. Hubris – proud behavior in excess; this arrogant behavior indicates a blindness to one’s own flaws Hubris is usually associated with “pride goeth before a fall.” This means that undue pride, the kind that is overboard or blinds you to yourself or others, usually leads to a bad end. In ancient Greek myth Icarus ignored his wise father’s warning and flew to close to the sun and died. That’s hubris Hamartia – the error in judgment that leads to the tragic flaw; an unwitting mistake Hamartia is more complex than hubris. In the twentieth century the tragic flaw began to replace it but there are subtle differences. Hamartia can be traced to a specific moment in which the wrong choice was made - someone doesn’t listen to good advice or trusts the wrong person – and then that leads to the tragic events. Usually the error in judgment is closely related to character, so hamartia and tragic flaw and really intertwined.
    [Show full text]
  • Action and Hamartia in Aristotle's Poetics
    E – L O G O S ELECTRONIC JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY/2008 ISSN 1211-0442 Action and Hamartia in Aristotle’s Poetics. Philip Tonner Abstract In what follows we outline Aristotle’s philosophy of tragedy in his Poetics paying particular attention to his account of action and hamartia. We situate his account of tragedy in terms of his ethical philosophy and philosophy of action generally. We argue that tragedy is disclosive of the frailty of the human situation in its precarious contingence. By this, we link Aristotle’s philosophy of tragedy to twentieth century aesthetic, ethical and European philosophy. 1 Introduction. Aristotle’s account of tragedy is intimately connected with his theory of action and his ethical theory. His Poetics was intended to form a central part of his extended inquiry into the nature of human action and happiness. It was his view that in tragedy, the tragic hero falls into misery through a hamartia, a mistake or error, that results in irreparable damage to the life of the protagonist and/or the lives of their loved ones. Hamartia or ‘tragic error’ brings to the fore the fragility and contingence of human flourishing. Thus, in addition to being read as a work of aesthetics the Poetics can be usefully read in terms of Aristotle’s ethical theory and thus ultimately in terms of his account of what it is to be a flourishing human being. If this reading of the Poetics is plausible then Aristotle intended his aesthetics to follow naturally from his ethics. Ethics, for Aristotle, had a much wider determination than it tends to accrue in some contemporary philosophical debate.
    [Show full text]
  • Compassion (Karuṇā) and Pity (Anukampā) in Mahāyāna Sūtras
    Compassion (Karuṇā) and Pity (Anukampā) in Mahāyāna Sūtras WATANABE Shogo It is a well-known fact that ideas of “devotion” and “compassion” can be seen at the roots of Indian thought. For example, in the bhakti movement of the itinerant poet-saints known as Alvars salvation is considered to result from interaction between the believer’s devotion (bhakti) to God and God’s blessing (anukampā) bestowed on the believer. The principle of shared feelings and shared suffering to be seen in this sharing of devotion closely matches the workings of compassion (karuṇā) and pity (anukampā) in Buddhism. The god Viṣṇu and the Buddha are both entities who bestow blessings and are compassionate (anukampaka), but etymologically speaking they are also “sympathetic.” Especially in the notions of compassion and pity to be seen in Mahāyāna Buddhism the idea of sympathy or empathy in the form of sharing suffering is clearly in evidence, and this is underpinned by a spirit grounded in a sense of equality with all beings. In this paper I wish to examine compassion and pity as seen in Mahāyāna sūtras, and by doing so I hope to show that the principle of shared feelings and shared suffering is a concept that ties in with the contemporary idea of coexistence, or living in harmony with others. 1. Defining Compassion (Removing Suffering and Bestowing Happiness) The Sino-Japanese equivalent of “compassion” is the two-character compound cibei (Jp. jihi) 慈悲, and I wish to begin by analyzing this term. (a) Ci / ji 慈 (maitrī “friendliness” < mitra “friend”) This signifies “benevolence” or “kindness,” bringing benefits and happiness to others.
    [Show full text]