[ -/0307 mE COLLAPSE OF ,HE GERlfllN WEHRMACHT
UNCLASSIFieD
-'-H"E"t .,.,' "=~-" l -H,"c
G-2 suut TARY OF ENEIJY ACTIVITY ON
xxt CORPS FRONT
28 FEBRUARY - 6 HAY
UNCLASSIFIED
14 JUl 194~ TABLE OF CONTENTS,
\ .Pal~~inate Part +. J' The. Saar Triangle:. Penetrati9't of the WostvvaU to the Rhine.
A. Force~ Opposing XXI Corps, 28 February ~9~$
B. Defense of the Saar~and
c. C91~apse in the Saarland.
Paj;*t II. The,;:9oi1apse ot the Yfehrrnacht Crossing the Rhino
\,~; " 1\. "Dis-order of Battle
• j ~:;$~'.: C. ,Strons f,Qints and St~ori.g IJen
1,1 . .,D .'Re;~'er,~ ~ r. iHeNa~onal Redoubt F. ~~~own of Nationai IvIorale' ,~ t~r).bl\l:s~'~ \ Introduction: The Wes-tem Front, February 1945
The war seemed to have come to a standstill after Field Marshall von RUl1d ,stedt,! s abortive Ardennes offensive in December 1944. ' But 'military observers knew that this desperate offensive effort was the last gasp of a once-povvcrful V!ehrmacht. They Il1ight even find an analogy in the 1918 offerlSi ve of the Gerll1aU J~,nw, a gamble designed to upset the Allied timetable and aver~ the end, of, the Tf~. i!{hen such a gamble fails;) the 1"85ult is inevitable: . Both the German EU1d
A~+-ied BighCommands Imew it 0 Only those Nazis who still had a blind implicit faith inDer Fuehrer beleived that he Blight produce some secr~t'Tre~pon to avoid collapse. In the East the Russians had begun their long-heralded vrinter offensiv~
and 'Vrere rolling we s tward in e aleulated dri:ves <) The pres sure was sueh' that Hit Iar had been forced to send tho SiJ;:th SS Panzer Army, vv-hich Tras 'still trying to recuperate from the Eifel QiSastoT~ acr-oss GermanyintoHunga~r. Thore it again ,attempted to delay the inevitable by lTI.ounting a coul1teroffensivenear Budapest. ~fai.lurG This effort toovras doomed to l) The Nazis hadneithor the men nor the materiel to stop the Russian attack. . \ On the Western Front thcrclo.:tivo quiot during late January and early Feb ruary 1945 must have been distur'1J:Lng to the German High Command. They undoubt odlyknevr that while the Arden...1J.cs break-through had :r~quired a shift of Allied forces it had not/upset the well",.dosignodplans for e,ffcnsivo 'action 'andthats be.... , hind the qceries mill;i.Qns of mon wore preparing the dEath blow. Meanwhile on a frortt\ hundreds of· ~~~\3 long that strotched from Hollaild to the upper roaches of tho Rhine, pre\~m;p.ary Allied forays were testing the Gcrm8X1 lmos, jabbing and thrusting likc,:a 'profossionalboxcr seeking his opponentls vvoaknosscs. Eighty German. divisions, somo of'thom batterod and vrorn, '1iiTOre thus being kept off-balance as the' stage VV-tlS set. In the North, Army Group uRn, vrith its ~~onty-fifth Ar~ and First Parachute Arnw, faced thcAllicd 21st Arnw Group. m the center, Arrrr:l Group HEu, composoc1 of Fifteenth Army and Fifth Panzer Army,. was confronted. by tho American 12th 1a'l~W Groupo. .And in, tho South, four nor:Ul1al Gorr:k'U1 Armies - Sli3venth,First, Ninoteen-th, and Tvrenty-fourth ..... under iu'my Group fIGn, 'Vrere opposing 6th Arrrrj Group, On1-! the Seventh and First German Arnrios wero 1YOrthy of tho name, for the Ninoteonth had lost most of its,'combat cifGe... tivos in the Colmar debaclo end was being forced· to send its rel1mailts to the North to hqlp ,meet the ever-increasing pressure., The TT16nty-fourth Arnr~r was a never realizod force vvrittOl1 up on paper and broadcast to confuse tho Allies. It -rras an almo$t cl1ildish'offort, for oven had such an army eJCistedit could not have halted the Allied attack onco started•. During February this attack began - first in the cento!' vJherc 12th- Arrrry Group started the push to the Rhine. Tho end-of the month found the offensive, vuth noreand more units involvQd, m.otlnting to a crescundovrith presstlre being
exerted skillfully along tho whole front tothG Rhine southeast of Haguonau. < With no relief on the Eastorn Front, whore the Russians continuod thoir tr:;i.pharm:lor bloW's in military cadonce, tho YJehrmacht could do nothing but defund. Hoarsoly tho Fuohror called upon his pooplo to protoct tho Fatherland" but his was a , voice in th8vdldomo.ss. He had alroad;)r lost tho war even though he might stUb bornly rofuse to' recognize the fact. Tho empiro he had envisioned was val1.ishing liko a dissolving dream. .
Part I • . 'The Saar-Palatinate Triangle: Penetration of tho Wostwall to the Rhino
A. Forces Opposing XXI Corps, 28 Fobru~ry 1945
On 28 February 1945 XXI Corps took over its original sector in the central portion of the Saar-Palatinate Trianglediredtly opposito tho most il~ortant 'city of the Saar Basin, Saarbru6Qkon. This territory, especially ir.lportant to the Nazis because of the ,loss of Silosia in the East and tho threat -to the Ruhr Valley in tho West, had been bittorly defended 'during the carly Tdntor. Bohind S01:10 of tho strongest fortifications of the Siegfried Line , German forces had rosisted all j;.llied probings ~ Now, hovlOvor, their position was baing mado untenable by tho rush of othor l..lliod .i~rt1ios to the Rhino .. · North of tho }~sello" River, vfhichropresontod tho northern boundary of the Triangle ,..,:·,~~:~~,~nerican Third Army. There was no SioGfried Line there to aSsist in thodofcnse. Still, froTJ. Adolf Hitler, came the order that the Saar Basin should be hold to tho last man. Llilitaryc01:ull<9nd ors gave lip sorvice to the cOll1m~d, tr~11,~lU:tted t~1~ order to 10nr:,~e\r~~lons'- . . U ~1.~ ~,it., tw J .. mld put precious gasoline in their personal vehicles as a precautionary Doasurc. 'rhe bost defense of Saarbrucken lay south of the city, whore a ridge COD manded the approaches to it. lllong this line,.on the south sidG of the Saar River". the Germans hadconstructod an extonsion ofthoirSiogfried Line forti fic.ations. It was this, line which tho GOl"mans thought had to be ponotrated by ~;:XI Corps to roach Saarbrucken itself .. Opposite the Corps onerny forces wore. ostimatodto havoa total combat str Qngth of 10,800 mon at tr.d.s time., i.bout half· of those wore accounted for b-y tJ':tr:oo infantry divisions, while the rouaindor belonged to numorous fortress bat talions, Volkssturm li..'1irts, and rniscollcU1oous :Sattlu Group:;; (, . Such a grouping, whilo it could nQv~r bot classified as first rate m~ilitary personnel, could not be discolmted completely a,s a defensive forcG bohind such fortifications? '1'ho three divis~_ons were 3L.7 Infm1try, 559 Volksgrenadior.; and 19 Infnntr'J. 347 Infantry Divisj.on~ Imovm as tho flHmvk tl Division, was formod in Octobor 1942 , and.appc<,l.J:>od ill, H()llnnd in early 19L~3~ It participated in the Battlo of Franco, but by January 1945 had vrithdraTJll tio the Saarland" It had three reginonts and, on 28 February an estimated. combat strength of 1900 mon. 19 Infantry Div::'sion was a Du.ch noro rodent formation. It was formod as tho IIJuttland Division1! in Dcmnark in tho autumn of 19.44 fron rOl:.mants of several battvrcd units. It vras idontifiodon Sovonth DoS" ArrlrJ front in January 1945, whore its o1ononts WGro shuttlodfrom placo to placo in stopgap rolos .. B.v thc' end of February 'its combat strength was ostimatod at ~;L65 cmd included throe infantry regimonts 0 ! . 559 VG Divi~1.on W8,8 a nevrcomer in the area south of Saarbru.eken. It had come from the Bitche ~ector on 23-24 Februar; m1d represented an increase of forces in the Corps zone 0 The division ,,'fas one of the series of Volksgrenadier divisions organized during the SUI:ll'I1er 9£1944" It was first identified on the Tvestern Front in Dc'tobor and fi:rst appeared before Seventh U,S. Arr:ry in January 1945,·Numerica11y it was th~ .woakest of the~ thre.e divisions opposing X:;~I Corps. On 28 FebruC),ryitvfas credited with only 160() combat effeGtives. Tho .threedivisions were cOl:rponen-l; parts ot First German Arr:ry., Yvhich had' ull.der lts controla.:l.l units OppOSii1g Seventh U.S. Army. 19 InfantFy Division, de· p10yodto the southgast of Saarbrucken, was attached to XIII.SS Corps •. 559 VG Division, holc1ingthe heights south of, the city",and 347 Jnfantry Division/ . south and'iiiBst of the city on the opposite of the Saar River, vrore controlled by :r;;c..'C:II Corps...... Since the major concern .of tho Gerna.iJ. Conmand on XII Corps front was ~ho dofol1seof Saarbrucken, greatest em.phasis was placed on tho disposition of 'for.. cos. on the bridgehead~across the Saar River direct1ysouth of the city. '1'0 the south"ivost of Saar9ruck(m control of/the opposite bankaf tho .River 'was considered of loss importance because of the ll8,turo of the terrain and the Siegfried Line defonses between the city a11.dt,he River. Directly to the south of thecitYJ hoyrevor _', i twas of. critic During tho first two weeks in ,IvIarch constant attl0cks mado by ,ZXI C01";~9s troOpE! served to anchor three onol:JY dirisional, formations fn tho relatively 118,rrOVT Saar~" bruckon sector, theroby proventing tho release of any ono'of thO!':l t:.) roinforco ,units opposing the major friendly, offort which 'was 'being r1adb b:>t Third U(jS~Arl'Tf on our 10ft flank. This effort consistod in forcing tho on01:1'1 back across the, Mosolle RiVOl" and was clim8.Xcdby Third Armyt s thrust 'to tho Rhino i tSGlf at $dblonz. In spiteof the shattering blovr8'which So'Vonth Gornlal1 Ar1W was rocoiv ing at tho hai1ds of Thj_rdArny-· blovfswhichultinatuly rodlicodtho Sovol'lth Gorban Aruyt s combat offectp..vonoss 'by fifty porcont .... enemy,forces in tho Saarbruckon aroa wore. noVur calloclupon to pt'ovido roliof tl . TpJ.s .is.all tho 1:10rO surprising \ bocause of tho heavily fortified fixod dofenses ,of,theSiogf:riod Lino in the, Saar':' bruckon aroa and bocausoof /tho fact that thorost of the First Gorman Arqy during tho month of Fobruar'".{ had s'ufforod 'a not"loss of soven divisions; in Qrdor to strongthen othor D}oro sovorely tbl"catcnod SGC tors C.,Collapse· in tho Saarland Anong .therqasons now being offotedby~ho Gorr.mn High Cor~1T.um.dtooxplain their dof(;a~,Hitlorts intorJB,orenco in nattors 'of stratogy loolJ.slargo. His 03;' dm'.' of no retr8at froLlth0 Sanrlancl is citod by high ranking ,officers as 0110 of tho critical decisions loading to disaster.' It. l:mde 'dofonso of, tho Rhino in Southern Gornlaqy imposs'iblo ,byprovcn"cing an ordorly vdthdravialto tho Rivor. CaUGht in/ tpo Saar....Palatinatutrap, First. and ,Sevonth German Arr.uos yroro, crushed bcdiTlOOl1· the; elos'ing jayJ'S of Seventh arld Third U(,S e Arrlios. Thus. thoporsol''..l101 and cquipnont .W1'd 'rJuch valuablotimowhich night have boonuaodto forti;fy tho cc~storn hanks of' the ,Rhino vvoro irrovoca.1J~y lost.. jUlY, illusions ontor:tainod by tho! GOl';danHighCOl:wland trrata stand along ,tho Rhil1o.yvould havo changed .tbD f;inal OU"'GcOi:lO are of ..courso , grol.l.ndloss .. ' Novertholoss i tisUlldol:i.bticdlY' truo that tho cOLrplotorollt ,of' dorr-lan. forces in' tho, Saar-Palut. inato r:erianglonado subsequent Rhino c6rssings there1ativelY8a~J matter thoy 'turnod out to be and; thus hastonod the ultioatodocision, It also cxpla.insin largo'1Jar-ttllo higly ,disorganized state,intO which Gornan Ordor of Battlo iT.11:100. iat.olyfoll aJ.1d i'ronwhich it novor rocoverod throughout tho rorJuiningT10qks of tho canpaign in Southorn G,,;rtlcmy. Onco Third U.S. Ar,my hadseizod control, of tho full length of, tho ibscllo Ri;"Or to tts junction Ydt~tho Rh~l1a at Coblonz the fate, o~ tho. Saar-~~~<1tina:to '1'r:l.tl.11glc was soaled. It ~s concc~vablc, .however, that an~l:1ncdiate wl"chd:r.avv.:l.l across tho Rhine bySevonth and First Gornan.AI'l'1ieSfJight have sparod thOl.l at, least part of the woo whi.ch the ensuing debaclO' brought d01,m .upon thoa, 7ho with.· dra.rro.l, hovrovor, began too lata andvrith 'too littl'e decision. Tho first indications of ,-rithdra:rfal occurred onller Corps front on lJand 11.\. 'March. This provodtobo a liLlited novonent, however, and involved meroly tho abffi1QOnnent of thebridgohoad across tho Saar River south of Saarbruckon except for the heigl),ts diroctly south of tho city-_.Both 347 and 559 Divisions -oxcopt for one re eiq~nt ofthg j~ig~~ ;t1Jl,~, ~!ffiMtt~~*~r.,,~nto SaarbruckOl an~" ", \ ' ,' ,'~;,~~i ~~,~~\~ ~~~~:~:~;'9~~\?~~~i;8~;~, " "" ' , , "" butsoPillst9 have 1DC:G~1i~:tt¢9P'btqc ',,' " ,.,' ,rlny', Jiyht),§(1' lii:¥;i~;;;if&,~ll)j!ii'a:~tlIWiets;'t&,giji':B"'~l%l%~';'s:~txi~iii~'!iij~iS'~~~i~fi.~~·i£iili~liij~ij,'t¥:;;;)*¥i!;t@~:a:tten~lPl:f~,;l16?:·· '~~','frt~\:'1;~1..('F;.:,~'i':''''''':~:;~J""i>,:~i~·,f;'! '-~.,i~- '" .."\~\~2~,'"",, ,,- '"""'-:~:"" " ',_ _, , " '" , ,f,,, "" --.' , • ,,' , ,_' ,,", ,,".k . 'l.',,' :':"..1~";'(Il;" ...:';-,;,~:,,::.\ti!:f·~M""r""L -~'·';':.'i';':8'~l.d<"'h,;r:~'t,;;r,,/,'!i "k::y: THE COLLA.PSE OF THE 1YEHF,MACHT ------_ _-'--'-'-----_., ----- ... A, Crossihg, the Rhine ." -e±"',-' .. ,' ______-:For reilsons already made evident the Rhine River; at :l.east,in , Southern Germany", never proved to be the formidable bar:::'iei.- originally e~ect~d.Alreadydramatically :~r'o'ssed at Remagen on 9 March by First Army, the River was crossed by ThirdArmy at twb points south 'ot, Coblenz between 21 and .25. MarchQ . IV Corps troops sJ?earneaded Seventh Army's crossing on '25.-26 Ma:,ch atWotms '; Yvbile'some resistanceV{&s encountered initially, the •. 8stablished/bridgehead soon fanned out to meet ThirdA;rlmY'$ ,troops ,to the north and t6"ihcl~lde the city of ,Mannheim to the south. '" .,;rt Yrould he artifj.cial,in a ~ummary of enemy activities duri:ng the remaining weeks of the campaign'in Southeran Germany to try to divide this activi~y:into chronolo'gical stages., The stages are a.lmost entirely a pro p.uctof the friendly situa"tiono The enemy story :ts one of complete and utte~' collap~e, broken only by .scattered and poorly coordinated l!tttetnp-ts t6bring a little or'derinto, the chaos~,?f~mall and .~sparate lihits which diutte:vedthefront. .The fo~lowing sedtidns~ accordingly, describe sev- . ~ral phases '?£ehemi .8.ctivity durin'g the- perio-d-not 'nec8$sarily in chron.. ological order' ~.,which will illustrate the complete s~ate of deTIforalizli I '-bion into which the Wehrmacht had fallen q For considerations of time and place. it. will be sufficient 110 recall that the r~'\-i te .of adv~nc~ of Corps troop&during the month of April and untilthecessa~ionofhoS'tilities on 6 Ma.y.was as follows: First, from Mannheim east thro~gh ;the Odenwald to Wurzburgand,Schweinfurto . A swing to the .south was then made which carried the Corps to'Rothenburg) across the Schwaebisch 'Hills into the ~ vlide Danube. 'Plain, and fitiallyto the Danube itself at Dillingen•..... Here the River was ._immed~atelY'bridged_ . The final advance was southeast into the Bavarian Alps, ,where the. Austrian border was crossed'by the'time up 'eonditional surrender of'all German uni"ts in· the· Southwc9.s offered and acce.pted. Bt' Dis ....Order of'.Be. ttle Thedi"isionasa potent organized force had practically disappeared from the Southern German front by the· time _the Rhine was crossed.... ThiS fact appears g;r"aphically in an analysis of PWs taken by the Third U.S, Army over a 'period of, time extending from before the penetra-tionaf the / Westwall to the lastweeks of 'the W9-t" •. ,At the beginning of the period the number of PWsfromnondivisional formations-thatis,miscellane"ousunits of· all sorts - was: almos t negligible • At'the end of the period,. however, these mis'cellaneous formations accounted for ninety percent of all PWs taken. . .. .,The same ..• situ.ation .,existed.on XX~a.t1tfadJacent,Corps . fronts. '. Units bearing, divisi9rlalnllmbers"ex~sted,·.bl.lti?mc:>,stcasestheywerenothing butstaffs. .. Insotne instances they managed. to~.extend theircontrol over several .. independent~a ttle··'groups ,butfteq~ently this control axisted on paper only., .. Arew"divisionsncontiIlUe~ .tc.·appear ..·with .the numbered l'eF;imentwusuallyassociat¢~w:tththem... BUt these. were hardly~ore than ba:ttle groups. . Theywere,iweak· in numbers. and. in -supportingunits'. Per~ s8r,mel consisted of the 'rawest of recruits and equipmentwa$!'Shoddyor !~0nexistent0' The bulk or the front consisted of "a wide "'1rariety of assorted unit~ At times during tltese .final weeksitwa.s l1ot·:unusualfor c9.. hundred dif IBY.'eJ.1tuni~ name~. to,be represented by·t.he·pW~V'takerlduringone:dayon t,ne Co:r'ps front ll' ..~hesenames indicatedahcs t of. replaqement units, ,training st;,hools, AA .1b~it$;lions , . Landesschuetzen. battalions and· iniscellaneous g:~'vU'ps of'=straggle'r~,convalescents,r~mnarttsofbrokenformations, or lle7{.dral1ieos thrown'together into impromptu battlegrqups. Such, So, conglomeration of units created sErrteral ser:i.'OD.'3 problem;] i for. those a.ttempting to keep track of en~my Or9-er of ,'Rattle in the usual manner ~ In the fi:-ostplD.cethe report of a unitnG:nedicJ, not . \ necessa.rnyme9.n~ that the unit itself,w.t.ts present" An improvisE;d battle group frequently cont3.ined stragglers; .. convale~,cen~s-, or men Dn f\tcr.loug~ fro.rna nuobet' of other units .. Battlegrot;ps :w81~etqrown togeth(3rso nn~:, riedly that, oftenSoldbuchs were "not' ehmJ.geda'Jid'lt w~smo:re· ,then likely .i th:l~ the ~Whadnoid88.. ?f~hena~e ,of h:1.~l1i1itt.mtl.ch le~s o~ ~ts, c.:mposi-\ tion, and s trength~ .' AgaJ.n :.,l.ncons~8Tency J.rl c''ll+J-ng· ~., u~~_t, b,:i. 1.ts. n~.mber or by' the nome! of ~he o~.'i'ioer whocom.''I'}1~ld_8d i.·t, ,or by the name of the town. in' which it' o:ri.p-jnated often \resuj_ t0dinthe. reporting 'of :the single formation' as ,two 01" ~ore' diffeJ,"ent uni.ts;.. 'F':ceq\lE,n-(j changes of.'· COs com plicated thfs probie1n:J , ' ....., Another Q-iffir:ulty was encountered in attempting ,to determin,e a chainofcoJ;ntrmnd. on the qor?s ft·on·:-. ~. theh.gsncies which con~rol1ed the different!units' and t,h,(~:;rre'.lai:lon to 8a'(h' oiAter,g,.':""-.A:c'tua}ly.~ of ,course, organizatiiolJ was,ve:cy loo,~e and l.J?ec.;:uzn-:il:v'dj.d ·YlO:G-ezJ.st,) Un~tsr were committed 'and destx-cyed in su.ch hO;Eitethatthe:i.:r' a·Gt·~Gll:n~r..t,was nerer kno,m, by 'themselves, . mucl~ ,le.s~br 11S c 1i\The~'e,or6an:'_~[J;Gion did,,~xist j it was in a constant sta:~~. of flEX,,' . As enem;y' te:"'r:Lt(n~y was cut and severed by our·arinoreddrJ.ves)theerlem~ywasfo,~c;ed,cO'n-Li:rEJlllyto.change t,he .pa.ttern of his .orgemizhtion,;; Th~ ve!ji' l'2.pidi1-)y of. these 'changps'-led to confusion :tn thee'nemycc);;:u:nands" . Frel.::l.~e·ntlY1Tlore tiJ.an oneh,igher echelon cl~d.med control over the. S8me frbntJ.in60Y'ganizE~tion) J~ harr-iec~.commander of one of the latter,happy to find 'his tioub:l~es at an ('end in· our P'Wen clo'8uI'e, claittied.,that he had taken orders .~. :Lnmos-cOq,ses coni'l:tcting from no lass than eight h~ghe~'com.'11andsin'thespade o'f one night.~.. , . During ·thefirst two weeks after our 'R:,1ine crossing,.compl~te. confusion existed' in ~nemtO/B on the Cdrpsfront o After the fall. 9:f' W~rzbu:rg4' and'.·nevei~ however J a semblance of' organizat:i.on···painfully achieved' stable began to 'appear\;. .Th~ enemy.wa.s provided a short, breathingspellby our regrouping and supply rk'oblems j which temporarily slov-fed our advance 1I 'They seizeq upon this' occasion and attempted ... ,with partial succ.ess .... to esta.blish sE;ctors andclo.rify'the lines. of authorfty in the sorainble"of 'Units to Which the' Wehrmacnt had beenreducedo On .the central !~ortion of our .front, '~southwest of the Main River, thel'te .had appeared .a·collection, of' battle groups { most ofwllich organized ~n replacement and train~ng units. fr6.p the sUrJ:lounaing. ,region ~ .BY 6 April ,J. t hadbeconleapparent tnroug0- captured documents) . maps J.and. PWstatements that these'unii:,s, were.? ". 'at least theoretically;. u:uder. the controil. ofa.' Cpl. von Massenhach5 who was' repiacect by. ,a Lt 'J leol" VOl1 Uobe c: This 0011ec- tiori'p1.lJ:'ported to ,be, a .division bearing the n'ame ofits co ~ '. It ,had some ar.tillery, suppprt, and what few tanks, and. .assault .guns were·· en?ountered ono-Lir front, were . under the .:oont1]'ol .of 'this .fcprrn~·t1.on~ Plfrs regularly insisted that the l5-6ddbattle' groups:qf the !'di-vil3iqnU were organized on a thr,ee-regiment. basis Q With £?CJ.u,al regul?-rity their statements con flicted a~to_which battle groups were,th(8'control1.ing units; and as to theattp.~hmetlt oftheothers,,/'~,consistentline-up was' never ascertained _I which was undoubtedly beca.usenoneetist~d.. , , \. { After the .fa:ll of Wurzburg'the(.:remnants from ,this encount~r'retrec1-ted i:nto thear8a north or. the Main Riverto$chweinfurt. A capture,d,--divisional \combat order of6 April revealed tha1;, the staff of 416 InfanttyDivision had ~.ssumed contro1, of. this,.entire ,area" Anambitiou,s projectI'orthe defefls8 of the region was. outlined iIi· the .. order andthe,dif.fer.ent i try''IJlvision may have hadQ . The defens1eof $qhvr;einfurt i tselfwo.s' :hStndled b~T a Defense Comrnanderand 41qlhfantry'Divisioin does not see·m:to have .f.xlr;ticj~pated.,yJ~th,a.shiftingof bQunejtlJ!i,es between XV and 'XXI Gorps the D~4vision passed into the former 's'sector.,:mdwas ,last heard.o£feebly at tempting to exe,rei,se its author,ity oyer. small group~· adrift.in .the Nurnburg ~ area. ' ...... "Iry. f'"' I; ft I CIt ft . ~'";' .;'.; 1., L.n'IV .•~...1 f·§II:.!J ;~~l~. UN.C [ASSlfi£ U' .... :-.'.. .. The ,c~utter ·of ullits on 01lrSolltherrl\ flank was asgr,eat,e~s .that ,on yhe centsq.4./9-!}d northernpot'tions' ofthe'Gorps,ZOn8'j . Tho1;'e Y{GresayercQ~ candiqa.tgs" f'o'!' the joti of CQntrolling'agencY,$'buti'bwassOffio"ti}i"t§::bel,(3):'e tA{3scb¢rne'of,o:rgani~ation-such as·i't:was': ~elIiorg8do " A:;''''(J~lnd (Lpr:tl . . a battle g'roup o:f§S":·AApersonr+e+ B.~pearedon theseene;i ccITl1n,snded, b~y Lt Qolpi.-!!nage1. F0r' a time it seemed,~s tho'u!5h he vrcn:tldplay the :ea~ing rol~·iIf:.the'tcr~eia;'l, .~ShortlyafterWards" "however, he' mo'ved:irito' VI, Corps terr~.te!'j["VV:ith.his SS troopsand~'if,thereever had been a,nlp.Xl:.for hi~ organIi~i1g't~6.Jsqc;~or~ i~t£o11tl;r:'OugJjo.' ", . .. .'; " " The task of,controlvvssfinaJ.lydividedpetween two dfvisional stalfs,; ,,212 VG DLV" took over our, ex~reme :right flank, While '79 VG' Divi~ sian assumedco1TJ.r!land',of the area b-etween.Division;voh Hobe g,nd 212 VG Diyj.sion. The battle groups ab'sorbt;cl' t>y212 '\Tn Diyisio!lvvqre cd~solid~ted into' threenumberedr§3gii:lertts'(J:" Sometime ,la,ter the )ni:sce·ll~neou·s gr:ollps taken<,oyeI; .by?9' VG ]jfvisiop,pa:rad.ed·~ne:(iiTly:.acqtlired,reg:im~p;t.alnumbers •. :'The frantic~efforts to welda It vias inl;jvitable thatth~,teriuous··organization so hastily created by the enemy on our front should crumble before such S'Vveeping act.ion~ Lines of communication were r~311t apart and divisionalformntions e·~a. porated. The spotty resis~ance encountered during the final ,period was mainly of a dela.ying nature in an effort to cover mass retreat. It was carried out by isolated battle groups~ such as the youthful SS units com mitted in the vicinity/ of £talon ahd· Ellwangen,which were the homes of their replacement battalions. Tv\l'O regir.lents of 151 Field Training D:i:vi sian were also rushed to help stem the ,.onslaught, but ~Q'ere decimated a~: most immediately. The great majority of PHs who flocked into our cages were' stragglers ana. deS0'rters'"'1-rhoknew -ulroacry that the C'ltt~ta.if.i'''had.'f~l len. To the very end, however, the paper strategy game tlias played by the G@rman ~rr:rgfi"e"b111l'n,art&o A·'dt)etmitm.'t~'d:~:t'e'di' t 1'Ia"- -'O't'I~'~~~aj'"S" 'W~·" ~~~i~~~~~~;t~~~~e~~~ ~l~~.) proaches to the Alps 'in our. sector l) .xn thE; earlier stages of theSouthem Germany Campaign, 17 SS PG Division had been in contact on VI Corps fr9nt Later it had hastened to Nurnberg ina vain attempt to hold that city' gga~nst XV Corps. Still later it lias idontified in ,Third U. SOl' Army zorn • But nov-; it was fleeing into the mountainfastness'es of Southern Bavaria and Austria and attell1pting to ~rect a paper barricade to our penetration of these regions. ,That the Division was hardly more than a staff was made clear by the document,.,. The troops of,the once-crack S8 formation YJ'ere 'now reduced to the nuclei:for>tf1r?~:battlegnmups, most of Ylho?e personnel ccun:e from a collection of. Ail units.· We did contact 17 SSPG Division at this time;contac'c VJas with 'fleeing r~mnants" h01lvever, and :r'lot with last-ditch defenders:. '.. I Order of ''Battle bf, the German Army. on XXI corps. front hAd COl:1Pl.ete~ ' collapsGd when·theend came,.on,6 l,Iay" ..It should be remembered, howcye,r, that disintegration had overtaken Anny Group HGH with the penetration ,of the "t!estvJ'a:l1in Harch~ Withth9 exception of temporarily stubborn 're sistance, in the few strongly defEfnded; tovms, y"hieh' w~llbe discussed in the'following. section, enemy. action' east o,f' the Rhir+e wAs;J..argely, ~ con, tinuation ·of that disastrous "flight tothe~ River. through the Saar :-' pu+a tmat'e . Triangle~> ' . I d:'. Strong Points a.nd strong HQ:l During .thee~rly part of\ April, Keitel, Hl!1lm1er, and ~o:r~al1!1'rr;a~e ';;t._he:'fo:t~vn~g,,",j0dt~obl\ radi¥I~!hP,~~~~~~:t;},~~~e, !4:~:";"I~,Ll~G~~Yys~~Ja-..:Com- ' .419.nd::' \;~'" . "",. ' , ' . \"k,~';~j:0J9.~,\l~~i'/~b~,;l~iJf~~~~Jl~· :11: ;, .. '~, .. . '; :: -: ,-:.;>::~,:, ,':. J:> ~'::'> t 'I"<'~~':>' f:,{. 1..." ,\-,"~,~. ,.. _:1'1','.~"~'" ; Cit ~e s.arc is i tuated,atimpQJ:'tant t~~fJfic,. junct~()ns!.:rhe~~fQr,e'i :,th~y 'l1l\l;st.' pe.d~,fe~d~~. i~n~' ·hQid.:'~?1-th6c" U~l~OSt, '~~()-'ma~t.~:l"wPrat' P~q7;,;.:' lnises qrthreats are"carried,.by:. ~ntermed~ar,J.eq or:,,:r4dJ.ptl"an.snusfl ," ':s~.onq·1?y,tp~·~~eT:1Y .,':,For ;th8:qxO:Gut~or:,of'Jt~}s~,,!?rdyr ~ht?~ B~tt,le" Cqrnr:1an When tht'?,declsionwasrnade to defend a'town ,threatehed by ,us , the Defen~e Gonnnander -sent his .. HDefenso staffU, into the surrounci:ingareas to pick up s,tragglel~s'andorgf3,nize tneminfo alarm unit$~ Remnants, of' tactical units retreatiT).g,throughthe. al'e~1.ver8t3upposed'to'rep6rttb··the Defense Conunanderartd pa:rticip_3:ce 1.ni:;he defense either as ,inQ.ividual units or merged with .aJ.arm unHsunder"theI!Defe1n.se Staff.ll±i1som~ . cases, as in Nutnpel~g,all mcnbetyreen the, ages of JS and 65 were cf3,1led . into the Voll<:s~turm."Means of. trai1s,P0rtatiQnand food supplies fort~B,Be improvised f((nn.~tions were \fJ:'ei:luentl,y confl.scatedf'rom'thelocalpopula.... '. tion...... , . organizationof'the Defense Command itself was at timet? obscure \ ,,',/":".' -, ,.",. It appears that the We hrkreis c0l1ll11and was' supposed tobein . In Nu~nb~rg'oppbsit).on tode;fkn~eof.theeit,y.cameXlot-:pniy; fro~ the,populationthrollgh its Burgomeister but"aJ.so from repr~sentatives s~ ,the .AJ:'myi:tselfo Ab?ut10 ApriltheIDefe~seG?:mr'la~:r;"B~igGer: ... ' " ·,]ff!1eller".a.I1d1:faj ... Gen vry~ssenberger'.OGof>Wen.J'krE?~r;tXIi'I) .. 1;>o~h'.dec~!ied·· ;' tha:t,)~tde;fense·· of Nurnbergwas.. sBl1se1@ssa~d;be:t\lse(;1 to 1161dth.ecity.• · :, Tl1c .' Party, ." hoVV;ever,- prOVed '. strongetthan 'they~ The,.two-genE;jrals wer.e relieved ofc()llml~ndand'Gauleiter:Kar.l "Holz was, appointedDE3fenSeCotl L1-ander bYI1irmnI.er,; ....He .. ~\TaSputl inabso:1ute controloi' 'aJ..J.o;rg~izations,'. _j.....-' ,ooth eivi+aTldmilitflry, in theai~triet'•. ,·Deathby •. puoiJ,ichanging'was ·pro-o1.9.:tme~'t1;le.:p~na~t~Jot even PJ?otestingllgainst ,as well a;srefusal to particiP.,ate' in, t9t~19:~fenseofthecity. ,-9~--""·. ' '. ,'.~" ~. :,U'iMCJ·~:,SM$JJJ'Jp·1 Bad Mergentheim provides the case of a leader full of big words and little action. The SS Comandor, Lt. Col. Dirnagel, took charge of the defenses of this town" He boasted that the SS i1fought to the last manu. Tb.ey did - that is, to the last man of the Stomach Battalion which Dirnagol put ou:t in front of his sS troops 0 The SS, he said) vrouJP. hold the tll'[Rn" The Colonel must have revised his tacticaJ. plans j how ever,for by the time we reached :sad Mergentheim this 11LR had evaporated. From then on the IfLR proved sor;lewhat elusive" for we never encountered any of Dirnagelfs dauntless SS troops in actual combat o In Augsburgwe have the case of8.n Army_ cottnander, Brig Gen Fehn, deternrl.ning to hold the city not only against the advice of Burgomeister, ~ishop, and even Gauleitor, but also contrary to his own better judgemert. For the(defense of the city he had at his disposal only 3.50 men from VJ: "tous Army units, plus anoque.l nUYllber of Volkssturm. By the time tho Americans arrived, the VolksstuTIa 'had gone home at the insistence of their wives, while part of the ArJay personnel had vanished. The General'S CP was inLiediately surrounded and he was t.aken prisoner 0 All in all 'the defense of t~i~TIS in XXI Corps area proved of little hindranco-tq our advance in spite of strenuous efforts ma.de by several strong-willed individuals p 'one of·tho chief reasons offered by the enemy for holding towns was to provide time to prepare a defensive line further to the rear" In no case, however, vras such an opportunity ,pro vided. Disintegration of enemy forces had progressed so rapidly thnt it would have taken a Stalingrad to permit the time necessary for reo~gnn ization; 'and enemy troops and equipment had long passed the stage where a defensive action equal t.o the historic Russian undertaking was possible. D~ Reserves The problem of reserves must be divided into two warts: Local re placements and st~ategic reserves or Borces capable of intervention. The former was of most imn1ediate concern to XXI Corps, although the lat ter constituted -a fac-bor that could never be <;lisregarded even at a time When Germany was so obviously feeling Allied pressure on all sides. The primary phenolilenon viewed in our advance was the complete bre'':'" .akdown of the YJehrmacht repl3.cement system, with a resultant opportpn ist use _of reserve and training units in the fieldo In foregoing sec-, tions it has been pointed out that the old-time replacement system, in which every unit in the field had a responsible reserve unit, h~d stag gered ill1der the impact of Alfied blows west of the Rhine. After the ) River was crossed, there washo longer an organized attempt to provide replacements for specific 'units. liTehrkre~se Jande some effort to func tion, but their efforts were fruitless because of the speed of the a~ vance and the'-disruption 01". co:rnr:nmications. /Finally, replacement bat talion cadres, t-ogether with Yvhatover attached personnel they were sup posod to be training, were called- up as alarm conpanies or were thrust hurriedly into any larger formution. 'llhey could \0.0 little in such a situation, arid like a rolling snowball the disorganization became great .er and greater• . Yrith regard to strategic reserves military histo.ri~ns of the_ future will hever agree as to the salient reasons behind Adolf Hitler1,s deplcu.§illlent of troops. It was a TIl?-tter of some concern to the Allied nrl.litary leaders on all fronts that the Nazis even in their dying "hours appeared to have strength in reserve. liJhy.was no attempt made to bring / down froLl. Norvray more of the 11 Divisions that remained there to the very, end of the war? Ymy was the High COIl1I]and unWilling to shift a greater nUl11ber of moD out of the Italian Theatre, constricting the line there if necessary? TIlly wasn1 t the Balkan' -territory abandoned in the face of alElost certain eventual defeat so tha:t the 12 divisions tied up there.could bo used more effectively on other fronts. " - 10 .... • IS ~NClASSJfl[D conceived as an ultimate defensive fortress has not been determined. At ,the present time it seems that the' concept' oxistodonlyin the ninds .;;tnd on the, plO-ruling table oTa few Nazi high ranking officers, for it turned out to be neither' tlNational" 'nor a uRedoubtt'I., But such thinking is after the fact. The Allios could ill afford £ounderestirln:t;e t.he'willingnoss of the epemy to fight. The natilDnal, will to resist may have been cracl::ed anciL rent asunder in the last year of tho war"but there was always the possibility that the hard core of resis·tance, the Naz:i fanatics, would retreat tio the Alps, there to fight and be exterminated rather than surrendero Such a possibility could not be overlooked, despite the ,qvident disintegration of the ':rehrnacht. Between Lake Constance and Steyr, from the Italian border to Rosenbeim lio the Bavarian-Austrian··Italian Alps 0 Here was the birth place of Naziism" despite the Iact that Bavarians were not' the most en thusiastic, of Part;}! followers <:1 Here was the best defensive land avail able if the Allies overran the rest of Gen11anyc Into this area. it' might be possible: to withdraw troops frOLl Italy,,-, - Jugoslavia, Bohemia, and the rrestern Front. In order t,o accor.lplish this, however" a sustained holding action was necessary to permit evacuation land regrouping, and this' would have',to be carried' out in the face of constant and paralyzing bombardment of r.lain t;ransportation and supply arteries by, Allied Air Forces 0 ~ Tthat took place was relativ01y simplG~', Approximately lO~divisions on the other fronts which might have ,ret:r~ated to the mountains melted in thefac.e of the Allied attack" YThat occurred on XXI Corps front has been seen. There was no effective.figh~ing.fo:c~1eft in o~r zone of. advance to seek the natural dcfpnslvo tbr~aln In the mountalns. And In tho Alps the often-reported crack SS nnd mountain divisions' in the vor'arl berg, Itmsbruok,andSalzburg areas .. natural focal points ,for resistance failed to:materia1ize as forces capable of determined defense.IEvan though HiXl1Inler in February was reported to have ordered 100,000 raen to this area, factors beyond his control prevented the strategic regroup ing. TJhethor the,reports of troop concentrations wore exag~rrate-d'. or whether the men melted away or we:re given discharges is not yet deter"'! mined 0 Today we know only that the Campaign of the National Redoubt became one of cleaning out a'few pockets and elininatipg roadblock? de fended by small aJ;'r,lS fi,re ll F II ':Bre:akdGwn of National Morale . Theqisintegration oftha i-Tehrmacht, the inability to setup a N~tional Redoubt, the lack of 'willingness to fight in the latter months of the war wore occasioned by a virtually complete breakdown of natiorJ£ll morale 0 Tho dry-rot of cQrru,ption was apparent not only in-the r:ehrm acht but also in the German nation as a Whole' for some months e As the Allied advance continued, the evidence mounted until the complete rot tenness of the structu;r'Q could be seen by a11 0 There were certain specific phases of the breakdown that could be traced in these nonths. The interrogation of PrIs steadily brought to light manifestations of the'change in attitude. It was so~n best in the Volkssturm, in the ensuing contest between civilians and mili tary 1':1en, and in theultinmte differences that. developed bot'h between Army and Nazi elements and between officers arid men. Because thes.'e were pot-ent factors'in 'the breakdown of' national mora:Le, leading fin... ally to military impotency,col1e>ideration shoulC\. bel g'iven them. In the autumn of 1944 as the trap began to close around the Nazi empire, Hitler and his men realized that more manpower than could bo de; veloped for Regular Army use had to be prepared for de£ense of the Fa1rer lando The result was the paper proclamation of a People's Army or Vons sturm in a decree of the'J:!uehrer on 25 Septenber 1944. All German male s 16 to 60 were to be liable £01" service and organization was to· bo entt ... rely, in the hands or' the Party under th\3 leadership of Heinri~h'Himml~ r .' .... \12 • g LIP' J • . The plan was as methodical and complete a.s the German mind could make it. It seemed like aforlilidablc forne -. on paper. But tho Nazis hud not reckoned on S01:18 of tJ:-Wactors at vrork in tho ninds of their people. F,ighting a winningimft7'fJ~~ seomod a fine thing to most Gernans j theY'V'iore evon willi.ng to pay the cost in terms of sons., hus bands, or brothers kiJ_led or maimod" But fighting in ono's own back... , yard was a different 8'00ry" Tho cost now seomed too great, especially since the air was f:i,11ed "VIJ:Lth tho roar of airplanos that made li.fe pre carious day and nic;ht" The CO'1i.Gl.on man S00:11S to have read the handwrit ing on tho 'IVall and thr!.S j whi.le he :may hO-vo given'li:p service to the latest dictum abo1.~t the ,?Gople 1s ArmY:J many rosolvedto avoid giving up their livos fora lost ec~11se.. ' The program was put into effect, but it appears never to havere ceived popular support" In part that dependc,d again on the quality of local leadorship and tho degree of fa~laticisr.l inculcated since 1933. But it became increasingly apparent to Allied loaders that tho bulk of the Volkssturm was ince.pe.1)loof fulfilling \any of the tasks assigned to it. Even,whore olononts with tho 'Hill to fight wero found by our 1L11its they had neither the ,training nor the r.1c:.teriel to' stop the Allied forces. This was the case in XXI Corps zone of advance. Before Saarbrue cken, Volkssturm elements had appeared;) but all in all they were a pretty sad 10t~ rThon they wore 10 it as sacrif'icfual lambs, they demon strated what they roalTy were~ bewildered civili.ans confronting_a mochan ized aTluyo Few wanted to play 'tho r610 of Dartyr; few dido Those who had been drilled each Sunday- morning and had boon given the People's woapon,the Panzerfaust, quietly threw the unfamiliar weapon away) took off the volkS8turm amband, and as civili<111s waited i?he arfiyal of the ,Allied forces;> Evon before the Danube had been reached thore vms no Dare talk of tho People I s Armyo 1'ho volkssturm had vanished into thin , air~ " So closely linked with the at-tituclo of the Volkssturn M to be virtually indistinguishable wi,1s tho civilian dtitude.. There are, however, several pther points that should bo made in this connection, for they alsocon-gributed, to the military defeat of Germany. Not 0::'11y was the Gorman unwilling to,die as a nenber of the Volkst stur::l•. but as the Allied advance continued and he realized more cJ.oar ly wh;t wns happening ho als 0, boc~,me interest-od in preserving what he could of his own~ Survival arrel the desire to save as nany porsQnal pO,s ... :Sessions aspoSJinble bocame the tenets of his creed. He CDmo to want desperately to seo the Allied war r;;o.chine pass him by" He had seen.9 if ho lived in a large city with any industrial significance.. what con trol of the air Taoo.nt 0 He had hoecrd as 'livell What happened to those towns and cities where .the ITehrmacht tried to set\ up a defense 0 Ho wanted to avoid such catastrophe in his ownvillageJ town, or city:;;. if it hadn't , " 21ready been partially del:101ished .fron above" If it had) ho was afraid ,of 'further terror:, he waG sick ofporsonal war, of nights in bomb sllelters J of uncertaintY$ of wrecl<:age. ' There are exceptions to all generalizations, but on the basis of tho evidence co:':..lected by XXI Corps interrogators it soems safe to say that tho clvilian will to resist had nlready beon broken in our sector ~{torthe .Rhine limB crossed" It hilS boen shown in an earlier section of thisI'oport ,that thoJ;'o were occas::tonal strong points:J such as ,those at V['JTzl)'urgand Scb:-,'winfurt , but thesewero tho exceptions" It has boen sh0w.n t,ao that ,tho nel1JS of what h,q.ppened to such strong points sped a hoc:.r.:'" ofthl=, ref,re:'l-::,l:Lko a s'~Tong vYir"d" Tho rosult was a stiffeni11g of ci-":11ic;1dote:2D::x.:,,tion not to al::"ow thoir owh Arny tOY:ltike a stand in their 01m nGigJii..iorhooc'I.Qc ,Soldiers complainodithattho people would give them no food and no 'sheltor as thoy-soUGht the ever-niovipg l1LR; civilians -13 d2 L UN CIASSI fJ [~ , 7 • confronted Arny officers with theder.ltmd that thoy move) out and on; women ploaded lIvith Ar11Y element~ugh quicklyboforo the Allies caught up; some civilian offrc~iod to telephone their desire to surrender a to\m or sont er;u.ssariQs to capitulater white :flags were. hung from the City Hall or on tho church ste?ple ~ and each houso fOlli1d a sheet or towol or napkin to indicate that its inhabi t ants hac;i enouGh. f Against .such an .:lttitudc the retro,;:-cting l1.rmy could do little. The situationpresontod a conflict, howevor, that was wagcdbittorly in soi:J.o placos. Somo. old Arlny officers joined with)I.Tazi elenonts to decry tho botraynL stern J:1oasu:fos wore somctirJos taktim, as has al ready boon shown" Oivilinns· WOre"' shot and ho.nged for their roaclcit-' ranee. But the sevority of thesoattompts to snvc the situation were of no avail. Control Dust bo unifornuyeffoctive in putting down rebel lion. of this kind~ In Bavaria, Where SOl:le people had nursed agriev anco against North Germans and Na.ziisla fora long thle, neither the party nor t~1estill-resistingeleLlenlis of tho Lrmy could control the ciVilian attitude.. The people in this torrit.ory had onough of war and, discernine: tho new weakness of tho opposition, were often '\lUlling to s'W so. ',"Iithin the Array itself a struggle had boenapparont ever since tho cracking of the ~7estwall in the Saar-palatinate Triangle. 11.ctu " ally there were two schisns: one betwoon tho' officers and non and another between the Army and'8S elements. The first was characterized by a persistent devotion of the officers to a losing cause through habit or duty, which made them ex.'lort theirsor.1otimes-un1"1illing men to fruitless stands. The r:ien, on the oither hand, their .. spirits oft~n 'dul led by too much war and by the c.ertainty" of eventual defoat,lost even more of their :willingness to serve as they watched many of their offioors save themselves. Tho frontlino ,soldier, like tho civilian, was willing to take part in a winning bdttle. But: he knows best of allvvhat it means to have no air support, insufficient"fuel, food, and ammunition and what it means to fight a losing battle, to have no reserves for re lief 0 There was no mutiny, no open rebellion in the ranks, but a sol dier doesn1t,need to resort to such measures. As tho officers belabor od himt~ fight on, many a private resolved to /get out of the war alive. It· often could be done nnd it was done. Even before the Rh:ine was 'eros sod, .the Corps record of interrogation :of pris proved that many of tho prisoners ·were deserters in spirit if not in name •. Later; after the passage of the Rhine and after it had .becoLle evident that. no sec'rot weapon was forthcomne miraculously to turn tho tide, .the attitude of the officor.s swung toward that of the. men. Then larger andlargor numbers of nondons and officors arranged surren ders or allowed thouselves to fall into oneL1Yhands after what amounted to l:1ere token resistance.o The vrill to live, to preserve what little thore was left finally becane as strOl'lg aJaonl; both officers and soldiers as anong civili~s.f All ranks seemed ready to compromise with the in evitablo o r: 'In ardor to ,account for the fact that resistance oontinued for '80 long a time in spite of 'this breakdmvn of Army and civilian morale, 'it is neceasary to turn to the SS for· an explanation" The will to resist burned brightest and longest in the' SS, if ·only because its personnel had most to lose~ Again and again the explanation waS offered to inte~ roc;atoTs,:: fear of S5 'or. fear 6f indirect Nazi retaliation strengthened .the d:.rrrr:d.ng desire to fight 0 Naz2isIl had' a powerful, all.·pervasive or ganizatiQtl, its roots went deep intoe-v-oryform of livirig in Germany and it could still crack its whip> Through habit or foal' there ;was still a response" - 14 - IThen~he end came, it is ironic to note, the SShad not enough strength within itself to offer the last-man resistance it had demanQ ed from the Army. For the same factors which had been leading to the disintegration 0'f the Army had also been ope,rating within the SSe New. half-trained recruits had replaceq..1aany of the old stalwarts; the con tinued/Allied advance was making last-inqJ:l de.fense seem foolhardy to ' these recruits•.17 S8 Panzer Grenadier Division, which appeared on XXI Corps front at tHe last TI;loment, turned out to be the same conglo~ration of miscellaneous units that was found in the Regular Arr:ry formations. The SS, like tho Army, broke under continued pressure and meekly submit ted to the most-hated of military tonns, unconditional xurrender. G. Conclusion General Gustav JodI on 7 Uay 1945 signed GertJany's unconditional surrender at Rheims, with a characteristic plea to the victo~s to be merciful to th.a vanqilished. Resistance ceased on all fronts at 0001 hours 9 .May 1945. But the end had cooe earlier for XXI Corps. on5 May notifica tion was given that an accredited representative would surrender all of Arny Group uGit, effective 061200 Hay.. Because of the lac~ of com.... munications with elements of theA:n:J.y Group, however,slight resistance in some sectors continued until news of the surrender could be broad cast. The impending collapse had be&n presaged.by events on all fronts the surrenq.er; of the Gerpan ArtJies on the Italian front; the fall of Berlin, the reported negotiations in the North, the capture.qf' top- . ranking military men like vonRUndstedt, ~he continued inexorable ad vance of Aliiedforces,the inability of theeneLlY to split the Allies in the final I1ooents. All these and nore. were the hands of the "clock moving toward midnight -the hour of the complete collapse of Nazidom, its leadets and their vainglorious warped hopes for world domnation. The part that/XXI Corps played can befit only in:to this larger picture. But on its front all the elements COl':lpostng the whole are re presented. The dollapse of the W(;3hrnmcht" of the whole nation can be seena,s the story.uilfolds on the Corps front•. Not all the data have been collected; .details of the; surrond!;lr have not yet been correlated. Through the ,ninth of Hay more than 200,000 PTs had been taken by the Corps, most of them in the last 60'days Of oper.:ltion. High':'ranking military and civil personalities -von ,Rundstedt,Ho:rthy, w"JI:aan, 'Frick, . et al. - had paraded through the Corps Cage. 'lJhole German divisions had evaporated on tb,e Corps front and literally hundreds of smallunits had been swallowed up in advance. Hundreds of rules on both sideS of the Rhine had been. covered as,.the opposition was overthrown when it ap peared. Historians will sane d,ay gather all the statistics, correlate the data, bring new evidence to light, .and perhaps even change the inter pretation~ Buttoday.the. olB analysts. ca.nsee only those.factShere presented. On the basis of 'this evidence interpretation has been of fered. In XXI borps- zone part of aonce...tJighty Army succ1lr.1bed,slowly\ " disintegrated, ,andbecanefin[J.l1y a riddled grouping of· heterogeneous disparate units. This was their end; to surrender abjectly, uncondi tionally. And this the Ger:rL1annation ha.dbrougp.t upon its81.f When on the second of Septsnber' 1939 it declared war'on Poland. The end,almost six years later, :was not necessarily inevitable, for the venture c~ perilously close to succeeding. But it was Dete and right that the Geman Elilitary power should fina.l1y have been ground to bits by those who. believed that the Nazi way of ·life was not'£or them. 7~~'~H~~HP'(~HHf*-)H}-X~t';{~..HH~~.P,HH.~~- ... 15 1 ...