[ -/0307 mE COLLAPSE OF ,HE GERlfllN WEHRMACHT UNCLASSIFieD -'-H"E"t .,.,' "=~-" l -H­,"c G-2 suut TARY OF ENEIJY ACTIVITY ON xxt CORPS FRONT 28 FEBRUARY - 6 HAY UNCLASSIFIED 14 JUl 194~ TABLE OF CONTENTS, \ .Pal~~inate Part +. J' The. Saar Triangle:. Penetrati9't of the WostvvaU to the Rhine. A. Force~ Opposing XXI Corps, 28 February ~9~$ B. Defense of the Saar~and c. C91~apse in the Saarland. Paj;*t II. The,;:9oi1apse ot the Yfehrrnacht Crossing the Rhino \,~; " 1\. "Dis-order of Battle • j ~:;$~'.: C. ,Strons f,Qints and St~ori.g IJen 1,1 . .,D .'Re;~'er,~ ~ r. iHeNa~onal Redoubt F. ~~~own of Nationai IvIorale' ,~ t~r).bl\l:s~'~ \ Introduction: The Wes-tem Front, February 1945 The war seemed to have come to a standstill after Field Marshall von RUl1d­ ,stedt,! s abortive Ardennes offensive in December 1944. ' But 'military observers knew that this desperate offensive effort was the last gasp of a once-povvcrful V!ehrmacht. They Il1ight even find an analogy in the 1918 offerlSi ve of the Gerll1aU J~,nw, a gamble designed to upset the Allied timetable and aver~ the end, of, the Tf~. i!{hen such a gamble fails;) the 1"85ult is inevitable: . Both the German EU1d A~+-ied BighCommands Imew it 0 Only those Nazis who still had a blind implicit faith inDer Fuehrer beleived that he Blight produce some secr~t'Tre~pon to avoid collapse. In the East the Russians had begun their long-heralded vrinter offensiv~ and 'Vrere rolling we s tward in e aleulated dri:ves <) The pres sure was sueh' that Hit­ Iar had been forced to send tho SiJ;:th SS Panzer Army, vv-hich Tras 'still trying to recuperate from the Eifel QiSastoT~ acr-oss GermanyintoHunga~r. Thore it again ,attempted to delay the inevitable by lTI.ounting a coul1teroffensivenear Budapest. ~fai.lurG This effort toovras doomed to l) The Nazis hadneithor the men nor the materiel to stop the Russian attack. \ On the Western Front thcrclo.:tivo quiot during late January and early Feb­ ruary 1945 must have been distur'1J:Lng to the German High Command. They undoubt­ odlyknevr that while the Arden...1J.cs break-through had :r~quired a shift of Allied forces it had not/upset the well",.dosignodplans for e,ffcnsivo 'action 'andthats be.... , hind the qceries mill;i.Qns of mon wore preparing the dEath blow. Meanwhile on a frortt\ hundreds of· ~~~\3 long that strotched from Hollaild to the upper roaches of tho Rhine, pre\~m;p.ary Allied forays were testing the Gcrm8X1 lmos, jabbing and thrusting likc,:a 'profossionalboxcr seeking his opponentls vvoaknosscs. Eighty German. divisions, somo of'thom batterod and vrorn, '1iiTOre thus being kept off-balance as the' stage VV-tlS set. In the North, Army Group uRn, vrith its ~~onty-fifth Ar~ and First Parachute Arnw, faced thcAllicd 21st Arnw Group. m the center, Arrrr:l Group HEu, composoc1 of Fifteenth Army and Fifth Panzer Army,. was confronted. by tho American 12th 1a'l~W Groupo. .And in, tho South, four nor:Ul1al Gorr:k'U1 Armies - Sli3venth,First, Ninoteen-th, and Tvrenty-fourth ..... under iu'my Group fIGn, 'Vrere opposing 6th Arrrrj Group, On1-! the Seventh and First German Arnrios wero 1YOrthy of tho name, for the Ninoteonth had lost most of its,'combat cifGe... tivos in the Colmar debaclo end was being forced· to send its rel1mailts to the North to hqlp ,meet the ever-increasing pressure., The TT16nty-fourth Arnr~r was a never realizod force vvrittOl1 up on paper and broadcast to confuse tho Allies. It -rras an almo$t cl1ildish'offort, for oven had such an army eJCistedit could not have halted the Allied attack onco started•. During February this attack began - first in the cento!' vJherc 12th- Arrrry Group started the push to the Rhine. Tho end-of the month found the offensive, vuth noreand more units involvQd, m.otlnting to a crescundovrith presstlre being exerted skillfully along tho whole front tothG Rhine southeast of Haguonau. < With no relief on the Eastorn Front, whore the Russians continuod thoir tr:;i.pharm:lor bloW's in military cadonce, tho YJehrmacht could do nothing but defund. Hoarsoly tho Fuohror called upon his pooplo to protoct tho Fatherland" but his was a , voice in th8vdldomo.ss. He had alroad;)r lost tho war even though he might stUb­ bornly rofuse to' recognize the fact. Tho empiro he had envisioned was val1.ishing liko a dissolving dream. Part I • . 'The Saar-Palatinate Triangle: Penetration of tho Wostwall to the Rhino A. Forces Opposing XXI Corps, 28 Fobru~ry 1945 On 28 February 1945 XXI Corps took over its original sector in the central portion of the Saar-Palatinate Trianglediredtly opposito tho most il~ortant 'city of the Saar Basin, Saarbru6Qkon. This territory, especially ir.lportant to the Nazis because of the ,loss of Silosia in the East and tho threat -to the Ruhr Valley in tho West, had been bittorly defended 'during the carly Tdntor. Bohind S01:10 of tho strongest fortifications of the Siegfried Line , German forces had rosisted all j;.llied probings ~ Now, hovlOvor, their position was baing mado untenable by tho rush of othor l..lliod .i~rt1ios to the Rhino .. · North of tho }~sello" River, vfhichropresontod tho northern boundary of the Triangle ,..,:·,~~:~~,~nerican Third Army. There was no SioGfried Line there to aSsist in thodofcnse. Still, froTJ. Adolf Hitler, came the order that the Saar Basin should be hold to tho last man. Llilitaryc01:ull<9nd­ ors gave lip sorvice to the cOll1m~d, tr~11,~lU:tted t~1~ order to 10nr:,~e\r~~lons'- . U ~1.~ ~,it., tw J .. mld put precious gasoline in their personal vehicles as a precautionary Doasurc. 'rhe bost defense of Saarbrucken lay south of the city, whore a ridge COD­ manded the approaches to it. lllong this line,.on the south sidG of the Saar River". the Germans hadconstructod an extonsion ofthoirSiogfried Line forti­ fic.ations. It was this, line which tho GOl"mans thought had to be ponotrated by ~;:XI Corps to roach Saarbrucken itself .. Opposite the Corps onerny forces wore. ostimatodto havoa total combat str­ Qngth of 10,800 mon at tr.d.s time., i.bout half· of those wore accounted for b-y tJ':tr:oo infantry divisions, while the rouaindor belonged to numorous fortress bat­ talions, Volkssturm li..'1irts, and rniscollcU1oous :Sattlu Group:;; (, . Such a grouping, whilo it could nQv~r bot classified as first rate m~ilitary personnel, could not be discolmted completely a,s a defensive forcG bohind such fortifications? '1'ho three divis~_ons were 3L.7 Infm1try, 559 Volksgrenadior.; and 19 Infnntr'J. 347 Infantry Divisj.on~ Imovm as tho flHmvk tl Division, was formod in Octobor 1942 , and.appc<,l.J:>od ill, H()llnnd in early 19L~3~ It participated in the Battlo of Franco, but by January 1945 had vrithdraTJll tio the Saarland" It had three reginonts and, on 28 February an estimated. combat strength of 1900 mon. 19 Infantry Div::'sion was a Du.ch noro rodent formation. It was formod as tho IIJuttland Division1! in Dcmnark in tho autumn of 19.44 fron rOl:.mants of several battvrcd units. It vras idontifiodon Sovonth DoS" ArrlrJ front in January 1945, whore its o1ononts WGro shuttlodfrom placo to placo in stopgap rolos .. B.v thc' end of February 'its combat strength was ostimatod at ~;L65 cmd included throe infantry regimonts 0 ! . 559 VG Divi~1.on W8,8 a nevrcomer in the area south of Saarbru.eken. It had come from the Bitche ~ector on 23-24 Februar; m1d represented an increase of forces in the Corps zone 0 The division ,,'fas one of the series of Volksgrenadier divisions organized during the SUI:ll'I1er 9£1944" It was first identified on the Tvestern Front in Dc'tobor and fi:rst appeared before Seventh U,S. Arr:ry in January 1945,·Numerica11y it was th~ .woakest of the~ thre.e divisions opposing X:;~I Corps. On 28 FebruC),ryitvfas credited with only 160() combat effeGtives. Tho .threedivisions were cOl:rponen-l; parts ot First German Arr:ry., Yvhich had' ull.der lts controla.:l.l units OppOSii1g Seventh U.S. Army. 19 InfantFy Division, de· p10yodto the southgast of Saarbrucken, was attached to XIII.SS Corps •. 559 VG Division, holc1ingthe heights south of, the city",and 347 Jnfantry Division/ . south and'iiiBst of the city on the opposite of the Saar River, vrore controlled by :r;;c..'C:II Corps. .... .. .. Since the major concern .of tho Gerna.iJ. Conmand on XII Corps front was ~ho dofol1seof Saarbrucken, greatest em.phasis was placed on tho disposition of 'for.. cos. on the bridgehead~across the Saar River direct1ysouth of the city. '1'0 the south"ivost of Saar9ruck(m control of/the opposite bankaf tho .River 'was considered of loss importance because of the ll8,turo of the terrain and the Siegfried Line defonses between the city a11.dt,he River. Directly to the south of thecitYJ hoyrevor _', i twas of. critic<ll inportMce that the.s outhorn shore of the River be con-broIled. Here the banks of the River are high and the fOToos dominating' thOI:1 dor.ti.nated Saarbrucken.- . How sensitive the enemy was at this pointbecamo clear during the attack rJade by 70 and 63 U.s. Infantry Divisions south of.Forbach and StiriligWendol during tho last VtTeek of February" 559 VG Division was iinJ'1odiatoly brought .J.nto tho area tel .reinfOl?ce 347 Infantry·. Division,.