The Command and General Staff School
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SOLUTION NO &Q THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL M»p Probltn No fi. S*r<M...X. IN CA8E OP REPLY TO BE RETURNED TO RECEPTACLE BY 0:00 A.M. 1028 -C. % 0 . R. S<-h , Tort r**VMi«orll> -3 i&-.1l-2JM Ho. 60 IR - 193S. P * * [ INDIVIDDAL RBSEARCH STUDY. 0 U f> n F* n :.i > *'t < o t2 KCJUf-i TH E BATTL E O F o " S 2 B p ° S r-r o 3 e l ^? M 0 R HA N 01 5 8AR1EB0UR 0 5, O O M H O n t 2 0 A U 0 U S T 1 9 1 4 • w M -' :: b p: M ! t > o Submitted by t UAJOR BOUONT F. K0BNI0, Infantry, D.O.L. THB COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL. Port Loavenworth, Kana&8« Port Leavenworth, yensas 3 April 1933, MEMORANDUM FOR $ The Director, Second Year Class, the Ccmaand «nd General Staff School, Port Leavenworth, Kansas. SUBJECT t A Critical Analysis of the Battle of Morhange - Sarinebourg, 20 August 1914* I . PAPERS ACCOkPANYINO , 1. A 'bibliography for this study. 2. A geographie dictionary covering the German) and Frenoh syninyms of geogrsjphio loo at ions mentioned in this study, arranged both ways. 3. A brief description of the terrain. 4. The weather, 1-2 1 August 1914. 5. The organisation, down to divisions of the opposing foroes. 6. Maps as follows t No. 1 - So'.ilieffen vs. 2 - The Strategic Trap; 3 - Study acoording to Pooh, 1911. 4 - Concentration Plans* 6 - The Concentration. 6 - Situation, evening 13 August, 7 - The Prenoh advance on 14 and 16 August* 8 - " " " H 16 August, 10 - • • " * 18 " j 11 - " * * « 19 « , 12 -* The Plans of German OHQ on 16 August; « ' 15 - The operations as aotually conducted) 14 - The situation at 6»00 AM, 20 August. 16 • " " " 6i00 » " * . (Haps 1-4, 12, and 13 are on a scale of li1,000,000 Maps 6-11, 14, and 16 are on n soale of 1»200,000.) II. THE STOP? PRESENTED. -A critical analysis of the battle of Uorhange - Sarrebourg, ooveritig the events leading thereto, &nd to include the 20th of August 1914. Ch.pter I - Introduction* III. HISTORICAL PACTS RELATIN GTO THE SUBJECT. Chapters II to VIII* IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISMS. V* CONCLUSIONS OP THE AUTHOR. T H B BATTLE OF UORHANOE SARREBOVRO. I - INTRODUCTION. While the eyes of the world were turned towards the speotaoular sweep of the German arpies through BaAgiua, while the attention of soldiers throughout the world was oonoentrating on von Kluok1* army, events of far reaching importanoe were taking plaoe in Alsace-Lorraine, whioh are replete with important lessons to the student of strategy and taotios* Here we see troops, just emerging from their peace time garrisons and drill fields, testing their theoretical knowledge .for the first timo in the oruoible of aotual battle, ¥fe see an entire ansy mdbhing tilth itt eyes open into a prepared trap, urged en by the whip of poli tical expediency, while their opponents, trying to be strong everywhere are unwilling to refuse a flank, and spring^ that trap prematurely* He see an a ray throwing away its ohanoes for a Cannae io victory, be cause its troops were not ouite well enough disciplined and led to ct>n tinue a withdrawal, though as yet unbeaten* Although homogeneous politically only since 1871, the German Kmpire of 1914 was probably as weIV standardised and disciplined as any nation the world has seen sinoe Roman tines. Yet, the ninute oleft of dialect, the well graduated, thtogh distinct anthropological differentiation between South Germany and Prussia^, was* in tho opinion of the author, one the prime oausea for the miscarriage of a boldly oonoeived stra tegic trap* Our United States is probably less homogeneous today than the Germany of 1914* The soars of tho Civil War still turn livid on the body politio at the slightest irritation) recently the antagonism between the agricultural Hiddlo Hest and the industrial Bast has become an embittered resentment similar to that preceding sectional antagonisms in other Monolingual nations* Any ideas we may have of a war plan, whioh provides for the voluntary abandonment to the enemy of one part of the nation, while our forces are concentrating strategically elsewhere, will surely be wreokwd on the rftoks of politioal expediency, even as Germany's only bid for success, the original von Sohlieffen plan was wreoked by the unwillingness of tha South Germans to see their oountry Invaded by the French, while the Prussians were sweeping victoriously towards Paris* This thought is presented at this time, so that the ret.der nay follow the developments in Alsace-Lorraine from the view point of poll* xf.oal strategy, and while bearing constantly in mind a not dissimilar situation likely to arise in the United States* HI8TORI0AL FACTS RELATING TO THE SUBJECT, II. THE OBRMAH WAR PLAN IN LORRAINE. Wills -von Sohlieffen, following the dictates of his logical mind, placed the weight of the German offensive behind the right wing, he knew that this oould only be accomplished at the expense of the left in Alsace-Lorraine, His plan left south of Ifett a total force of four corps and three cavalry divisions (plus a few brigades of Landwehr and the Strasbourg fearrison). His plan provided for this force of four corps and three oavalry divisions to deliver an early provooative attaok on Nancy* Its purpose was to artract a large Frenoh force to it. The more the merrier* (l) Their mission was not to battle stubbornly, but to draw the French after them. It WAS ddffioult to imagine the left wing of the German army as being in danger, but the main effort oh the right oould have been easily endangered by being too weak. The plans provided that this with drawal was to continue and was to be finally stopped at ThionviXle in order to prevent a pinwheel. If the Frenoh should oross the Rhine and invade South Germany, they were to be delayed and resisted in the Blaok Forvst. (2) This was the essence of the von Sohlieffen plan for the south. As each year the announced concentration plans were announced, they represented a gradual departure from the original plan. Thus the concen tration nlan for 1914 did not oontent itself with a single foroe of four corps south of Ifets, bit provided for two armies of a total strength of wight corps in that area, the Sixth Amy was to consist of five corps, and the seventh Army of three. This was exactly double the force provided by von sohlieffen. ihe ratios bo two en right wing and left, which was seven to one under the Sohlieffen plan, had suddenly beoone three to on*. (3) The primary cause for this change was essentially the fee* of an invasion of South Germany. (4) The final plans carried with thvm a proviso that if the French should not attack in Alsace, then the seventh Army was to be entrained for the right wing. Bwn rolling stock was set aside for this contem plated move. But in any event the olxth Army was to oontinue with its mi ssion of protecting the left of the German forces* (6) See Mapa Nos. 1 and 2. The original von Sohlieffen plan provided for no troops in Alsaoe. Sohlieffen advised the use of the troops in Lorraine for a provooative attaok against Nancy. He wrote about this as follows i (6) •Whother this attaok will suooeed depends to a large extent on the actions of the Jrenoh. That is, will they assume the defensive* or, In aooordanoe with their taotlotl doctrine, assume the offensive. If they do the latter, then the main object of an attaok against Nan cy will have aehi red its purpose, that is the attraction of a maxi mum number of troops. The more troops the Frenoh use in their counter attaok, the better for us. The latter must not, however to come en gaged in serious battles, but their mission xs to draw fcfter them as many men as possible, and finally to contain them with the assis tanoe.of an onlarged Mute* 1) RA, 59, Or, 15, BA, 74, DFF, 2. RA, 63} BA. *f RARA , 6060 , OrOr , IBIB , BABA, 7575 , DFFDFF , 53 . 6 RA, 64, Or, 38 . RA, 62, Or, 36, DFF, 4. 6) Or, 37, RA, -3* The actual oonoent ration orders for the Sixth and Seventh Armies were as follows s (7) "If the Prenoh assume a defealnive attitude, resting upon the ptotention offerod them by thoir fortresses, then the Sixth and few nth Armies will attack the line of Moselle below Prouard, in order to hold the assembled Prenoh foroes in this area and in order to prevent their entralnment for the Prenoh left wing. If on the other hand, the Prenoh attaok with superior foroes between ltotc and the Vosges, then the Germans withdraw, The Sixth and Seventh Armies will prevent an envelopment of the main German for oes by ooeupylng the Nied petition. In oase the Prenoh offensive should extend well into the Vosges, then the Seventh Army will cooperate with the Sixth Army in opposing the invader." Even before concentration was completed, the Seventh Army waa: placed under Joint oomraand with the Sixth Army* Unity of command, at least, was provided for in this theatre of operations. The main problem, therefore, confronting thiae foroes after the completion of their concentration was whether they were to attaok or withdraw, in aooordanoe with their in structions, (8) III, THE FRENCH PUN OP CMMPilQN IN ALSACE-LORRAINE, The Prenoh plan of operations in effeot at the outbreak of the World War was known as Plan XVII, It provided for the concentration of the Pirat Army based on Bpinal, and of the Seoond Army at Jteufohateau.