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UAJOR BOUONT F. K0BNI0,

Infantry, D.O.L.

THB COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL. Port Loavenworth, Kana&8« Port Leavenworth, yensas 3 April 1933,

MEMORANDUM FOR $ The Director, Second Year Class, the Ccmaand «nd General Staff School, Port Leavenworth, Kansas.

SUBJECT t A Critical Analysis of the Battle of - Sarinebourg, 20 August 1914*

I. PAPERS ACCOkPANYINO ,

1. A 'bibliography for this study. 2. A geographie dictionary covering the German) and Frenoh syninyms of geogrsjphio loo at ions mentioned in this study, arranged both ways. 3. A brief description of the terrain. 4. The weather, 1-21 August 1914. 5. The organisation, down to divisions of the opposing foroes. 6. Maps as follows t No. 1 - So'.ilieffen vs. 2 - The Strategic Trap; 3 - Study acoording to Pooh, 1911. 4 - Concentration Plans* 6 - The Concentration. 6 - Situation, evening 13 August, 7 - The Prenoh advance on 14 and 16 August* 8 - " " " H 16 August, 10 - • • " * 18 " j 11 - " * * « 19 « , 12 -* The Plans of German OHQ on 16 August; « ' 15 - The operations as aotually conducted) 14 - The situation at 6»00 AM, 20 August. 16 • " " " 6i00 » " * .

(Haps 1-4, 12, and 13 are on a scale of li1,000,000 Maps 6-11, 14, and 16 are on n soale of 1»200,000.) II. THE STOP? PRESENTED. -A critical analysis of the battle of Uorhange - , ooveritig the events leading thereto, &nd to include the 20th of August 1914. Ch.pter I - Introduction* III. HISTORICAL PACTS RELATIN GTO THE SUBJECT. Chapters II to VIII* IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISMS.

V* CONCLUSIONS OP THE AUTHOR. T H B BATTLE OF UORHANOE­

SARREBOVRO.

I - INTRODUCTION.

While the eyes of the world were turned towards the speotaoular sweep of the German arpies through BaAgiua, while the attention of soldiers throughout the world was oonoentrating on von Kluok1* army, events of far reaching importanoe were taking plaoe in -, whioh are replete with important lessons to the student of strategy and taotios* Here we see troops, just emerging from their peace time garrisons and drill fields, testing their theoretical knowledge .for the first timo in the oruoible of aotual battle, ¥fe see an entire ansy mdbhing tilth itt eyes open into a prepared trap, urged en by the whip of poli­ tical expediency, while their opponents, trying to be strong everywhere are unwilling to refuse a flank, and spring^ that trap prematurely* He see an a ray throwing away its ohanoes for a Cannae io victory, be­ cause its troops were not ouite well enough disciplined and led to ct>n­ tinue a withdrawal, though as yet unbeaten* Although homogeneous politically only since 1871, the German Kmpire of 1914 was probably as weIV standardised and disciplined as any nation the world has seen sinoe Roman tines. Yet, the ninute oleft of dialect, the well graduated, thtogh distinct anthropological differentiation between South and Prussia^, was* in tho opinion of the author, one the prime oausea for the miscarriage of a boldly oonoeived stra­ tegic trap* Our United States is probably less homogeneous today than the Germany of 1914* The soars of tho Civil War still turn livid on the body politio at the slightest irritation) recently the antagonism between the agricultural Hiddlo Hest and the industrial Bast has become an embittered resentment similar to that preceding sectional antagonisms in other Monolingual nations* Any ideas we may have of a war plan, whioh provides for the voluntary abandonment to the enemy of one part of the nation, while our forces are concentrating strategically elsewhere, will surely be wreokwd on the rftoks of politioal expediency, even as Germany's only bid for success, the original von Sohlieffen plan was wreoked by the unwillingness of tha South Germans to see their oountry Invaded by the French, while the Prussians were sweeping victoriously towards Paris* This thought is presented at this time, so that the ret.der nay follow the developments in Alsace-Lorraine from the view point of poll* xf.oal strategy, and while bearing constantly in mind a not dissimilar situation likely to arise in the United States* HI8TORI0AL FACTS RELATING TO THE SUBJECT,

II. THE OBRMAH WAR PLAN IN LORRAINE.

Wills -von Sohlieffen, following the dictates of his logical mind, placed the weight of the German offensive behind the right wing, he knew that this oould only be accomplished at the expense of the left in Alsace-Lorraine, His plan left south of Ifett a total force of four corps and three cavalry divisions (plus a few brigades of Landwehr and the fearrison). His plan provided for this force of four corps and three oavalry divisions to deliver an early provooative attaok on Nancy* Its purpose was to artract a large Frenoh force to it. The more the merrier* (l) Their mission was not to battle stubbornly, but to draw the French after them. It WAS ddffioult to imagine the left wing of the German army as being in danger, but the main effort oh the right oould have been easily endangered by being too weak. The plans provided that this with­ drawal was to continue and was to be finally stopped at ThionviXle in order to prevent a pinwheel. If the Frenoh should oross the and invade South Germany, they were to be delayed and resisted in the Blaok Forvst. (2) This was the essence of the von Sohlieffen plan for the south. As each year the announced concentration plans were announced, they represented a gradual departure from the original plan. Thus the concen­ tration nlan for 1914 did not oontent itself with a single foroe of four corps south of Ifets, bit provided for two armies of a total strength of wight corps in that area, the Sixth Amy was to consist of five corps, and the seventh Army of three. This was exactly double the force provided by von sohlieffen. ihe ratios bo two en right wing and left, which was seven to one under the Sohlieffen plan, had suddenly beoone three to on*. (3) The primary cause for this change was essentially the fee* of an invasion of South Germany. (4)

The final plans carried with thvm a proviso that if the French should not attack in Alsace, then the seventh Army was to be entrained for the right wing. Bwn rolling stock was set aside for this contem­ plated move. But in any event the olxth Army was to oontinue with its mi­ ssion of protecting the left of the German forces* (6) See Mapa Nos. 1 and 2. The original von Sohlieffen plan provided for no troops in Alsaoe. Sohlieffen advised the use of the troops in Lorraine for a provooative attaok against Nancy. He wrote about this as follows i (6) •Whother this attaok will suooeed depends to a large extent on the actions of the Jrenoh. That is, will they assume the defensive* or, In aooordanoe with their taotlotl doctrine, assume the offensive. If they do the latter, then the main object of an attaok against Nan­ cy will have aehi red its purpose, that is the attraction of a maxi­ mum number of troops. The more troops the Frenoh use in their counter­ attaok, the better for us. The latter must not, however to come en­ gaged in serious battles, but their mission xs to draw fcfter them as many men as possible, and finally to contain them with the assis­ tanoe.of an onlarged Mute*

1) RA, 59, Or, 15, BA, 74, DFF, 2. RA, 63} BA. *f RARA , 6060 , OrOr , IBIB , BABA, 7575 , DFFDFF , 53 . 6 RA, 64, Or, 38 . RA, 62, Or, 36, DFF, 4. 6) Or, 37, RA,

-3* The actual oonoent ration orders for the Sixth and Seventh Armies were as follows s (7) "If the Prenoh assume a defealnive attitude, resting upon the ptotention offerod them by thoir fortresses, then the Sixth and few nth Armies will attack the line of below Prouard, in order to hold the assembled Prenoh foroes in this area and in order to prevent their entralnment for the Prenoh left wing. If on the other hand, the Prenoh attaok with superior foroes between ltotc and the , then the Germans withdraw, The Sixth and Seventh Armies will prevent an envelopment of the main German for­ oes by ooeupylng the Nied petition. In oase the Prenoh offensive should extend well into the Vosges, then the Seventh Army will cooperate with the Sixth Army in opposing the invader." Even before concentration was completed, the Seventh Army waa: placed under Joint oomraand with the Sixth Army* Unity of command, at least, was provided for in this theatre of operations. The main problem, therefore, confronting thiae foroes after the completion of their concentration was whether they were to attaok or withdraw, in aooordanoe with their in­ structions, (8)

III, THE FRENCH PUN OP CMMPilQN IN ALSACE-LORRAINE,

The Prenoh plan of operations in effeot at the outbreak of the World War was known as Plan XVII, It provided for the concentration of the Pirat Army based on Bpinal, and of the Seoond Army at Jteufohateau. Only.jiiDor. JCoroes were to be left at the Italian frontier. Plan XVII stated in part t (9) "In spite of the possibility of a German attaok through italg an Important mission will no doubt be assigned the German armies e*ound Matt and . Por politioal reasons thoy w1M be a'±raoted to Lorraine."

The solid defenses of Prance along the Franoo-German frontier contained an unfortified gap between Bpinal and , known as the Couronne de Charmssr Here was laid a strategic trap, into which the German foroes were to spend themselves, only to be pinched out between the two fortresses,(1) The details of Plan XVII for the southern wing of the Prenoh armies were as follows i . "Between Btflfort and the Sohluoht Pass, the VII Corps will act as covering forcej from Praite to the XXI Corps will be so designated, and from Manonviller to the Moeelle the XX Corps will be the covering force, (11) The Pirst Army* based on Bpir.nl will oonsist of five corps and two oavalrv divisions,-with army artillery of twlve heavy batteries. (12) The Seoond Army will oonsist of five corps, two oavalry divi­ sions, and three reserve divisions. (IS) Under all conditions it is the intention of the ooamander-in­ ohlef to bring all his foroes to actaok >he German armies. There will be two main actions t Otfi between Vie stronghold of the Vosges and the Moselle at Toul. and the other on the left north of the - Mete line, (14)

(7) Gr, 36-37} BA, 76} RA, 63. (12) POA, 62, RA, 234. 6 Or, 371 BA, "-63; DPP— , 7~, (13) PO~" A 63~~) BA" , ~79" . (9, POA.,... , 62-S3#„ 24.._,, 40 ; RA, 231, (14) POA 54} BA, 80. 110)POA, 28, BA, 78, (11)POA, 26, BA, 79.

-4­ Vhe directive's of plan XVII for the First and Seoond Annies tie re as follows ( (15) "The First Amy, whioh oooprises the right wing of the oonoentratlon will hold itself prepared to attack In the general direction t Baooarat - S&rrebourg - , with the right of its main body following the orest of the Vosges, its right flank In the plains of Alsaoe, in order to rest the flank of the entire group of armies on the Rhine, In its forward movement , it will oooperate with the offeniAve of the Seoond Amy whioh attaoks in the direction Chateau Salins, In order to prepare for this action, one portion of the First Amy, consisting of the VII Corps and the 8th Cavalry will penetrate as far as possible in upper Alsace via the gap, the Sohluoht pass, and into mediae© passages, on the general direction of . Its mission is to oooupy Alaa.'ve and to attaok hostile forces whioh may attempt to oross west of the Yoages no.rth of the Sohluoht, and to facilitate the rising of the Alsatian v population remaining faithful to the cause of Fr&noe, Incidentally it will attercpt to destroy the Oerman railroad station at Basle, the bridge at Neuenburg, and all oHier moans of orossing over the Rhine, It will imoet the bridgehead at Neuf Brisaoh, The Seoond knay will be prepared to attaok in the general dlrec­ tiom Chateau Sallns - Sarrebruok, It will establish a bridgehead assuring the continued possession of Nanoy, The group of reserve di­ visions attached to the Seoond Army will prevent the debouohemoat of German forces from Mate in the region north of Nsnoy, and will pro- toot the left flank of the Seoond A "

IV. THE CONCENTRATION PERIOD.

a, GERMAN.

The oonotmtration of the Sixth Arty proceeded according to sohedulu i (16) III Bavaradn Corps south of Couroelles II Bavarian Corps south of Faulquement XXI Corps in the vicinity of Dieute I Bavarian Corps in the vioinity of Sarrebourg. I Bavarian Reserve Corps in the vioinity of Sarreguemines, See Maps Nos. 4 and 6. The concentration of the Seventh Any, however d^d not go as planned, was considerably displaced to the north, and also delayed as a result of the unexpected advance of the Fronoh VII Corps and 8th Cavalry Division on llulhouse and Colmar, (17) XV Corps was assembling northwest of Strasbourg, XIV Reserve Corps between Lahr and Burkheim, XIV Corps between Burkheim and isHlheim. (18)

(16) FOA, 56| BAi 81. t\7\ R ^ 135-136, BA, 37-?8. (16) BA, 40-41} KA, 134-135. (18) RA, 137> BA, 37-40.

-5­ The fortresses Strasbourg and Neuf Brieach, as well as the bridgeheads at Go rathein, Sohonau, and Markolaheim were organised* the fortress Istein, on the right bank of the Rhine near Switzerland, was garrisoned* (19) The Go mans organized two aooailed fortified positions* One was the sooalled "Hied Position", whioh following the course of the Oeixan Nied (Hied Allcnande) was staked out in tines of peaoe and <*as to be organised by oivilian labor and garrisoned by the 33d Reserve Division when the mobilisation was ordered. The position had as its purpose the limiting of a Frenoh advance at a point east of Ifett, and to furnish a line of departure for the count©rattaoking* Germans* It was one side of the trap, into whioh it had been hoped the Frenoh would advance* (20) The other was the aocalled "Bruohe Position", looated along the Bruohe on the road to Strasbourg* It was to bo held by the seventh Array, and represented the eastern jaw of the trap set by the Germans*(21) b* FRS1CH. The concentration of the Frenoh First and Seoond Amies prooeeded aocording to the schedules of Plan XVII* The essential difference between tho Gernand and Frenoh sohomes for mobilisation was in the fact that the.Germans relieved their peacetime frontier guards as quickly as possible, and had a brigade covering the oonoen­ tration of eaoh oorpa in t^e army; the Frenoh assigned those Corps whioh had been stationed at the border during peaoe times to oover the oonoentration of the remainder of their army* Thus the VII, XXI and XX Corps oovered the oonoentration of the First and Second Armies*(22) o. BVBOTS PRIOR TO 14 AUGUST* While the Germans were completing their concentrations, Frenoh GHQ issued their General Orders No. 1, on 8 August* The missions assigned to the First and Sooond Armies were as follows i (23)

"The First Army will tako as its objeotive the Oerman foroes whioh oooupy the area t Sarrebourg - tho Donon - and the Bruohe, nnd will throw them baok on Strasbourg and the lower Alsace. This will be preceded by the VII Corps advanoing on Colmar and Sohlett­ stadt* The Second Army, protecting its flank towards lfetz will act offensively in the general direction of Sarrebruck on the front t Dieuce - Chateau Salins - Delne* Contact with the First Army in the region of the lakes* It will hold at the disposal of GHQ two oorps on its left in the region i Berneoourt - Roslerea-en-Haye prepared to operate towards the north* Boundary between armies i Charmes - - Oerbeviller - Uarainviller - Babe nue nil - Moussey - Dianne-Capelle - Funa strange." (24)

(19) BA, 36) RA, 137. (22) DF, 509, BA, 43, RA, 79) (20) RA.63 | BA, 76. i FOA, 126, (21) BA, 37} RA, 64. (23) RA, 233, FOA, I65j DF, 310* (24) FOA, 167) RA, 234*

-6­ General Ebb ail, commanding the Frenoh First Array decided to push his XIII and XIV Corps to the right bank of the Uoselle on the 10th of August, (26) General Castelnau, commanding the Second Anay coraplained to GHQ, that inasnaoh as he held a front of some 72 kilometers between Pa nestrange and Pont-a- he needed the group of reserve divisions now bo ing held in GHQ reserve,.In order to by able to guarantee the safety of the Grande Couronoe de Nanoy* Be also stated that, owing to delays in concentration he would not be able to oross the before the 17th. (26) Air reconnaissance of 8 August showed that the Germans had flooded the valley of the Seille by opening the sluice gates of Lake Lindre, and that the sheet of water extended all the way from that lake to Mareal.(27) On 10 August the Frenoh VIII Corps orosaed the Maurthe and establi­ shed outposts on the line t - northern edge of the forest of Mondon, The IX Corps was ready now to cover the left of the Second Army. (28) There were two minor engagements during this period* One was the fight at Lng&rdo on 11 August. This was fought by «,he Bavarian Cavalry Division (consisting of a brigade of Uhlnns and one brigade of Cheveau­ legers) and the German 42d Division against the covering brigade of the French XV Corps. (29) An important Frenoh army order was found on the body of the dead brigadier* The Frenoh were driven out of Lagarde, lo­ sing eight guns and 14€7 prisoners. ((30)* The other was the fight at Badonvlller, 12 August. Although di- rooted by army orders merely to hold the line i Blamont - Cireyf the Bavarian body guard regiment became involved in an outpost skirmish, whioh eooji involved not only the entire regiment, the entire let Bavarian Divi­ sion, and threatened to involve the I Bavarian Corps, until a atop was put to it by the army* Opposed to them was the Frenoh 25th Division of the XXI Corps* The losses on both sides were very heavy, as the figh­ ting lasted all day, and the green troops did not wait for their artillery support before attaoking. (31) In the mean time the Frenoh had advanced with their VII Corps to lailhouse, ooouptying that town on 8 August without muoh resistance. The Germans diverted their XIV and XV Corps to the repelling of that invasion, and were busily engaged in that operation until IS August. It was a disaster for both sides. On the Frenoh side the commanders of the VII Corps and of the 8th Cavalry Division were relieved of their oommend, and on the German side two corps had been thrown into battle, were exhausted, badly disorganized, and their concentration dislocated* (32) It was as a result of the battles in the Vosges that the German army oonmander of the Seventh Army oalled upon the Sixth Army for help* Consequently the I Bavarian Corps was ordered to advance on St* Die in order to relieve the situation at Mulhouse* But rumours and counter* orders brought this planned operation to naught, but it did exhaust the troops, and delayed their final organiration and oonoentratlon. (33)

(25) FOA, 167? Bub, 10. (30) BA, 63| RA, 174* (261 FOA, 167) BA, 43-44. (31) BA, 65-71j RA, 170-171| Ru, 8) (27) FOA, 167| DF, 308. FOA, 124| OA, 9* (28) FOA, 168) RA, 171. (32) FOA, 118-126j Dub, 19| BA, 37, (29) FOA, 128-129) BA, 55-57) RA, 172, RA, 169-167. Ru, 6-6* (33) BA, 47t63j RA, 169, CA, 9.

-7­ V. PREPARATIONS FOR THE ADVANCE. a. GERMAN.

i During 10 August German GHQ received news of heavy Frenoh concentrations between Pont-a-Uousson and Raon 1'Btape, They there­ fore oonoluded that the main effort of the Frenoh would bw made between Mutt and the Vosges. The French were then estimated to eonsiat of Sixteen Corps, two oavalry divisions, and two groups of reserve divisions* Mottko felt that the main decision of the war would fall there, and that the campaign of the right wing would be a mere secondary effort.(?4) By the 12th of August, however the estimate of the Frenoh strength had shrunk to nine and a half corps And two cavalry divisions• (35) On 10 August Crown Prince Ruppreoht; of Bave.ria assumed command of the Sixth and Seventh Armies. (36) He planned a withdrawal before the Frwnch advance, until he had readied the Nied position, and then to attaoic then from both sides, the Sixth Army from Ifetz, the seventh Army from the Bruohe position. The use, even of the German Fourth and Fifth armies was considered for suoh an attack. (57) Voltke then committed his strategio reserve of six and one half Depot divisions, and ordered them moved to Satrebruok and Strasbourg. Lieutenant Colonel Tap pen, 0-5 at GHQ disagreed with this move, and warned that ir; represented a oomplete abandonment of the Sohlleffen plan.(38) By 16 August, however, after the strategio reserve had been oom mitted, German GHQ knew that the Frenoh main foroes were not in Lorraine but elsewhere, and tho original plan of campaign oame to the fore again* (39). The mission of the Sixth and Seventh Armies then beoame again pri­ marily tho protection of the left flank of the German arny. It was ordered not to become involved in an engagement, or to run the risk of being do feat ad. The Sixth Army was to withdraw behind the Sarre and the Eichel, makiiig oontaot with the Fifth Army at the Nied position, while tho Seventh Army was to hold the line of the Rhine-liar no Canal. (40) In oase the Frenoh did not attack, the armies TOre to advance in order to provoke a Frenoh attack, and then withdraw. (41) Tho reoent events in the Vosges had exhausted the Seventh Any, find in addition had disorganized the I Bavarian Corps at the battle of Badonviller. Ruppreoht felt that his first task was to disengage the Seventh Army from llulhouse, end to bring about a oloser cooperation between the two armies under his command. (42) It had been estimated that the Frenoh would haw completed their mobllifcatldatiand be ready to attaok by the 11th of August* But when the 13th arrived and no offensive move was made by then* they were assumed to be on the defensive, and the Germans laid their plans for an attaok* The Sixth Army was to advanoe in the direotion of Luneville, while the Seventh Army attacked on both sides of St. Die* (43)

341 RA, 184) BA, 76) Ru, 9. 39) RA, 186-186) BA, 119. 35 RA, 191) Or, 39. 40) BA, 76; RA, 189. 36 RA 184 4 189) Ru, 6) BA, 53, 74. 41) BA, 76» RA, 190) Or, 39, 37 Or, 40) RA* 184 42) BA, 77) Ru 8. 38 RA, 185) BA, U4) Ha, 83) RA 201, (43) Or, 401 HA, 189-190. The final deoieion was hoiwer a compromise. On 13 August Ruppreoht deoWed to move the XIV Corps south of Sarrebourg, the XIV Reserve Corps north of the Bruohe, and the XV Corps southwest of Strasbourg. The XIV Reserve Corps was to mow by marohing, the XIV Corps by rail on the right bank of the Rhine, end the XV Corps by rail on the left bank of the Rhine. The advance on the was to begin as soon as the above moevements had bs*n completed, (44) On hearing of these plans, German GHQ directed that no advanoe be made beyond the Moselle or the Ifeurthe, unless the enemy did not attaok, and it would be necessary to attract his foroe and to oontain thorn there* (46) b. FRBNCH. As a result of the instructions contained in General Orders No. 1 of 8 August, plans for the offensive continued. (46) The flooding of the Seille valley (of whioh German aooounts are silent) gave great oonoern to Castelnau as well as Joffre. (47) On the afternoon of 10 August, Casteln*u (commanding the Seoond Army) Informed GHQ of whi plan of advanoe, whioh was as follows i(48) The IX Corps was to remain near Mont Amanoe. The XX, XV, and XVI Corps, in line from left to right, were to oross the Seille on 14 August. In order to oross the Salines Canal it was etsimated that it would be necessary to hold the ridge t Donnelly - Juvtlite, the first objeotive, the seizing of whioh was to preodded by an advanoe en Maieleres. The main effort of the army was to be on the right. After further consultations with GHQ, orders were issued directing units of the IX Corps to relieve the outposts of the XX Corps north of Nancy, and oriata were issued for the concentration of the army for the advanoe. (49) On 11 August, Joffre sent orders to the First and Seoond Andes to attaok on 14 August, as this was the agreement made with the Russians, who were to launch their offensive the same day* (50) Field orders No. 4, of GHQ directed the following i (61) The two left oorps of the First Army* orosfling the Ifeurthe, were to Attaok in the direotion i Bjaniont - Cirey. The two right oorps of the Seoond Army, the XVI and XV were to attaok in the direotion of Avrioourt. The Seoond Army was charged with the responsibility for security in the lake regions and around Dieuie. The enemy was to be attaoked wherever met* The XVIII Corps wns to remain in GHQ Reserve.

(44) BA, 77, RA. 192. (48) FOA, 169j DF, 312. (46) Or, 59] RA, 192* (49) FOA WO-161, Ann 168. (46) RA, 233i BA, 81 FOA 102, 166* (50) FOA 161i BA, 86. (47) FOA, 127. 168} DF, 308. (61) FOA, 181, DF, 313.

-9­ On 12 August General Castelnau issued his orders for the advance and attaok on the 14th. (52) In the mean while the Prenoh High Command had created on 10 August a new army* called the Armee d'Alsaoo, and plaoed General Pau in command* If took away the Til Corps, the 8th Cavalry Division tfnd the 67th Reser­ ve Division from the First Any, This new army also had a group* of reserve divisions (69th, 63d, 66th) available to it. The 44th Division and the 12th, 15th, 22d, 28th and 30th Chasseur Battalions, whioh had arrived from the Italian frontier were also assigned to it.(63) This army oould of oourae not be organised over night, and it would there. fore not be ready to advance before the 16th of August. (64) The First Amy, now weakened by the,creation of the army in Alsaoe, planned to attaok in two general groups* The VIII and XIII Corps were to attaok in the general direction of , with Blamont and Cirey as the first day's objective, while the XXI Corps was to advanoe up the v&lley of the Bruohe to oapture the Donon and S chime ok, (66)

VI, THE ADVANCE OF THE RBNCH INTO THE TKAP. a. 14 August 1914. T^e VIII and XIII Corps of the First Army had been given Blamont and Cirey as their objectives for the first; day of the advance. By noon(66) they had reaohed th*» line $ Chat©lies - Vsrdenal - - Uontreux. At this time it was discovered that the orders for the advance of the Seoond Army did not provide for their advance beyond the line t Reilion - Leintry, whioh would have left the flank of the VIII Corps exposed. At the request of General Duball, Cafltelnau changed the objeotive of his flank Corps, the XVI, to * He stated that, however his flank oould not go beyond that point, for his XV and XX Corps were being held up by the enemy. ((67) The VIII Corps ooeupled Blamonh, but was unable to ttebouch there­ from due to heavy fire. The XIII Corps was unable to enter Cirey, whioh was being defended stubbornly, and i t suffered a uerious setbaok in the fight whioh ensued, and for while threatened to Involve the VIII Corps as well. (68) The units of the Seoond Army advanced with the XVI, XV, and XX Corps in line from right to left. The units of the XVI Corps reaohed Gondrexon without difficulty and at night held the line i Gondrexon - . It maintained lontaet with she First Army. (69) The XV Corps reaohed Coinoourt and the heights to the northwest, opposed by but feeble infantry and dismounted oavalry. But when the lea­ ding division reaohed koncourt it net with considerable resistance, and that evening General Bpin&see sent word that he would require reinforoe­ nents. (60) Fooh, commanding the XX Corps, had suggested earlier that he would be able to reaoh the commanding terrain around Juvelite and Donne lay that day. But he was toll to await coordinated action. (61) So, in compliance with the general soheme of advanoe this oorps reaohed the frontier, holding at dark the forward edge of the woods of Betange-la-Qrande, Juvrooourt, and the heights west of Rechioourt-1%-Petite. (62)

[62) FOA* 163-164) AHa 209. (68 FOA, 179-180) RA, 199) BA,107. 63) FOA, 114-116) BA, 84) DF, 307. ; " I FOA, 230) RA, 236. [64) FOA* 117) BA* 84. FOA, 231) BA, 106-106. 65) FOA 173-174) BA, 86. FOA, 2301 BA, 106. 66) FOA* 176) Dub, 27j RA, 234) BA* 104< 62) FOA. 231) BA* 106. 57) FOA, 177) Dub, 34. -16* That day, GHQ informed General Caste lnau that a oavalry corps oomposed of the 24 6th, and 10th Caralry Divisions, and ooamanded by General Conneau had been oreated in order to exploit the stooess and to pursue the enemy in the 8arrebourg Motor* (63) Castelnau, howver, replied that his XV and XX Corps were seriously encaged in the region ot Juvteoourt and Monoourt, and that therefore he oould 111 afford to give up the 2d Cavalry Division, whloh at that time was attached to the XX Corps. (64) X

b. IS August 1914, The advanoe was resumed on he morning of the 16th* Clrey had bean evaouatod during the night by the Germans. At IOICO AM suddenly all further resistance ceased on the front of the First Array, and the VIII Corps reAotod at dark the line i Foulorey - - northern edge of the Blamont woods. Cavalry outposts soent the night in St. Georges.(66) The XXXI Corps that day reached the line i Northern edge of the woods - - Chateau do Ohatillon, with its 25th Division and the Colonial Brigade. The 26th Division, whioh had been badly worsted at Clrey was reorganizing in the violnlty of * As this WAS going ahead slowly. General Alix requested the use of the Colonial Brigade (intended for army reserve) for the following day. This was approved. (66) Contact between the First and Seoond Armies was maintained that day* The XVI Corps was at Xouese and also held the Avrioourt railroad station* (67) A brigade whioh had been promised to the XX Corps was reassigned to its organic corps, the XV, over the complaint of Fooh,(XX C) (68) Castelnau warned the First Army not to expect too muoh ooopera­ tion from the Seoond Army, especially the XVI Corps from now on.(69) During tho day that oorps advanoed to the line i Signal de Xousse - Ignay - Avrioourt, with its rifcht at Aaenonoourt in contact,with the First Army. (70) The XV Corps remained at Koncourt, disorganised, and fired on by heavy artillery. The oorps commander stated that it would berinoapable of offensive action for the next 48 hours, and unable to withstand a German counterattack for the next 24 hours. (71) Tfhen pressed by the Army, however, he agreed to be ready to continue the advance and attaok chw following day* (72) The XX Corps remained in Its present position that day, prepared to support the XV Corps* (73) The IX Corps on thw left flank drove German oavalry out of Clemery and Noneny, and established outposts in those towns* (74) The XVIII Corps remained at Doaevre-en-Haye in GHQ Reserve.(76) That evening General Caste lnau stated, that he was confronted by a well organised defensive position on the front of the X XV Corps, and thnt one division of that oorps was badly shaken and had suffered serious losses^ also that the Germans had long range artillery to which the Frenoh artillery was unable to reply* (76)

(63) FOA, 231} HA, 236* BA, 103* (70) FOA, 233) RA, 236) BA, 112* (64) FOA, 231-232) Ann 276. (71) FOA, ?W| BA, 112. (66) FOA, 1BO, Dub, 36) BA, 110-111. (72' FOA, 234) Ann 354» 336, 336. 66 FOAt 180-181) RA, 236. (73 FOA, 234) PA, 16) BA, 112. 67 FOA, 181) Dub, 36. (74. FOA, 234) BA, 1)2. 68 FOA, 232) Ann 276. (76 FOA 236) Ann 318* 69 FOA* 233) RA, 236* (76, FOA, 234) Ann 318*

-11­ o. 16 August 1914.

The left of the First Aray met praotioally no resistance on that day, exoept for long range artillery fire, whioh caused but Minor losses* That evening both the VIII and the XIII Corps reaohed the assigned objectives i Saint Oworges • Hattigny - - Saint Quirin, Con­ taot was maintained with the Seoond Army* (77) The orders given for that day by General Castelnau to his any were as follows t The XVI Corps was to oooupy Avrioourt with one division, while detaohaents pushed on and Hellooourtj the remainder of the oorps was to assist the XV Corps in its attaok on the woods of Haut-de-la-Croix. (78) The XX Corps was to capture , while the IX Corps with the 70th Reserve Division attaohed was to continue to hold the Nancy bridgehead* (79). These orders were exouted without difficulties. The Inundations of the Soilie had reconsaenoed, and as a result the cavalry could not reconnoiter very far in that valley* (80) d. 17 August 1014*

While in the tone of action of the First Any, the XIII Corps reaohed Vaspenriller - Laneuveville-les-Lorqulh, and moved it s outposts to the Red Sarre, the VIII Corps, learning that the terrain north of che Rhine - Ifarns Canal was strongly held by the enemy, requested the assistance of rhe neighbouring XVI Corps in oapturing the heights north of Bondrexange. But later on inhabitants informed then that the German! bad evacuated Burning, Hertting and Gondvexange* So It moved into thote villages* (81) The XVI Corps as a mattor of fact occupied Oondrexange and sent an outpost to seite the bridges over the canal des Houilleren at Diame ­ Cap*lie. (82) The XV Corps advanced to the Sellle, oooupied Varsal, and seised control of xhe sluice gates of Lake Llndre, which had been the means of flooding the valley of the Seille. On its right this oorpo found Ouermange oooupied, and therefore rw fused its flank to A*senonoourt.(84) The main body of the XVI Corps was sent into the lakes area and rea­ ched Rorbaoh and the south edge of woods with its 51st Division* (85) The XX Corps oooupied Chateau Salins and the river orossings at Vio, Moyenvio, Salonne, Bruthecourt and . (85) On this date General Castelnau reoeived an order froa GHQ, relie­ ving the XVIII Corps from the Seoond Any, and directing its detraioeaent co the north. Its plaoe was to be taken by xfce reserve division now at Toul. (86)

(771 FOA, Jb82| RA. 203) BA, 116-117* 82) FOA* 186, 236) RA, 249. FOA, 236} RA. 248» Pr, 31 16* 83 FOA 236.) RA. 206) BA, 123* POA 236} RA, 248} BA, 117-118* 64 FOA, 238) BA, ie$jRA» 206* FOA. 236) Ana 411. 86 FOA, 238) Pa, 16) RA> 206. Si FOA, 185-186) RA, 249/ BA, 121-122. [86 FOA, 237) Ami 343.

-12­ ©.18 August 1914.

Prisoners reported that Sarrebourg had been evouated by the Germans, Castelnau suggested therefore to Dub ail that he oooupy it a? soon as possible, and also informed him thatttt the Cavalry Corps Conneau was on its way to Sarrebourg to take up the pursuit* (87) GHQ oonfirmod the rumours, and stated that in view of that fact any further advance of the second Army in its present direction was witaoit purpose• As a result of the change of direction ordered by QHQ(88) Castelnau informed Dubai 1 that all hw could oount on in vhe way of cooperation from the oecond Army would be a reinforowd inantry regi­ ment at Dianne-Capelie. (89) The 96th Infantry entered Sarrebourg at 2t5O FK with bands playing and colors flying* ihe remainder of the VIII Corpo intrenched itself along tho line i Korprich-aux-bois - Northern edge of the Hinting woods* (90) The Cavalry Corps attaoked from and Haut-Clocher on , but was repulsed and withdrew to Oondrexange for the night* (91) The XIII Corps advanced that day to the line i Sohneokenbusoh - Bruderdorff - Plain-de-Yalsh. (92) The situation in the seoond Army was nuoh store oompllonted* As a result of General Joffre's order tho entire army was to change direo­ tion and turn towards the north* Orders for the 18th had already been issued Pni ulin lfltii. when these instructions arrived from GHQ, So chan­ ges were made, but it was not expeotod to execute then until «,he 19th» (93) On this date arders also arrived directing the relief of the IX Corps and its entrairmtnt for tho left flank of the Frenoh armies* (94)

At 6|00 AW Rorbach ws attacked by the Germans* The Frenoh oounter­ attaoked and were able to establish thomaelves on the northern heights of that village, but they oould not get to Cutting, Loudrefing, or Uittersheim, at 'ill of whioh points there was determined German resistance. (•8) The XV Corps did however oapture Zonmange* Dieuge was found to be evacuated, but the corps oomnander did not trust the German artillery and deoided not to oooupy it* (96) The group of reserve divisions began to relieve the IX Corps* (97)

(87 FOA, 188j Hnp 87# 93) FOA, 242| Ann 463. FOA, 197, 240) Ann 403. 94) FOA, 241) Ann 456. Us FOA, 240) Dub, 46) Ann 47C, 476. 96 FOA. 243{ BA, 160-166. 89 FOA, 198) Ste, 127) Cub, 46. 96) FCA, ?43| Pft, 16} RA, 49, 90 FOA, 198, 243) RA, 2&0* BA, 166* 91 FOA, 198) RA, ?60. (97) FOA 244) BA, 178* 92

•18­ f> 19 August 1914*

Joffre plaoed the Cavalry Corps Conneau under the command of the First Aray for the 19th of August for the purpose of assisting -chat unit in the oapture of the heights beyord Sj>rrebourgt(98) The Cavalry Corps vras therefore directed by Dubell to cooperate with the VIII Corps. (93) The VIII Corps, supported by its Corps, and all the Any Artillery, attaoked the heights, but its attack broke down under galling fire.(100) The Cavalry CCorps tried to debouch from Langatte on Gos Be lining, with a view to creating a breach and advancing thence on Sarrunion, It also was repulsed, (101) The reinforoed infantry reginrint of the XVI Corps, 8econd Any, in the vioinity of Dianne-Capelie was released to the VIII Corps upon the latters request, and was moved to Longatte, prepared to attack OosselAing at 4|OO PH. (102) There was BO change of the position of the XIII Corps. Hor» had been ordered. (103) The XVI Corps, leapfrogging its divisions, tried again to advano* over the Saline Canal, but was thrown bao): in disorder* (104) The XV Corps, on the other hand progressed fairly well. It oap­ ture d the line t Wolfert - - ICerprioh - Ouesbestroff - Oruone­ stroff, and had a snail detachment in the forest, of Bride and Kooking* Its chasseurs were in Yergaville and Zorcnange. (105) The XX Corps nade the gains of the day. It arrived at dark along the line t Martil - Aohaine - Perange - - Haut-de-Koeking,(106) Amy orders, dated 6|2O PM directed Pooh to guard the road Conthil - Dieuge, and to cover the debouohes of the forest of Bride and Koeklng. These orders, were however, never reoftived. (107) To the left of the XX Corps, the 68th Reserve Division held the line Lamonoourt - Don jours - Viviers - Fftx«| the 70th Reserve Division extended froa Jalluoourt to Array*,, and the 69th Reserve Division co­ vered the line % St. 06 no vie ve - Ley*. (108)

VII. THB GERMAN WITHDRAWAL AND PLAKS FOR THEIR COUyfBROFFBNSIVB.

The first German units whioh oame in oontao*; with the advancing columns of the Frenoh, were thosti pertaining to the I Bavariin Corps at Blamont end Cirey, Owing to tywlr advanood position, this oorps had already moved Its trains north of the Ytxouae, and had received orders to withdraw, in oatd it ware attaoked in foroe. (109)

I 98) FOA» 201) Ann 467. (104) FOA, 246, PA, l?j BA, 170-176, 99) FOA, 202} Dub, 49. (105) FOA» 250} PA, 17} RA» 250) j 100) FOA, 202) Dub, 48} BA, 169. BA, 171-176• 1011 FOA, 203, kMXX&tx Dub, 4,9, BA,170(106) FOA 250) PA, 17) RA, 250) 102) FOA 203) Ann 465. Ha, 87. 103) FOA, 204) RA, 250. (107) Fo, )9, Ha, 88. (108) FOA. 262) PA, 17| BA* V? (109) BA, 104, 107-'ll0) F0X,1 RA, 199. However the advanoe of tht Frenoh did come as surprise to tht Germans, who had, it la true expected an advanoe nanx around the 11th of August, out when now materialised then, had oonoluded that the Frenoh had been definitely oommitted to the defensive (11$) Ife have lien how the Frenoh XT Corps was badly worsted at Uonoourt on the 14th. The opposing German XXI Corps on the other hand was also oalling for assistance and reinforoements* (ill ) But, taken as whole, the advanoe of tho Prenoh net resistance only where the Oemans had to delay them, in order to ocTsr the with­ drawal of their trains and supplied* The I lavurian Corps also had the nission of oovering the detralmrtnt of the XIV Corps between and Sarrobourg, and its rate of withdrawal had to be slowed down in order to gain time for the completion of that detrainment. (112) fhen the I Bavarian Corps, heard, however of the capture of the Oonon, considerable alarm was felt at the possibility of a French advance on Abresohviller, and the engineers were oailed upon to execute demo­ litions in countering this threat. (115) On 16 August Sixth Anay 3eadquarten ordered that a less deto rained resiiit&Tioe be offered to the advancing French, and that the first delay should b« obtained behind the Sarre river* (114) For the next few days the Frenoh and German main foroes were there­ fore separated by considerable distances, with only security detachments in between* 1'he German cavalry had originally baen intended to be used as a provisional corps and was to sake a reconnaissance in foroe in the direction of Baooarat. But in the withdrawal gaps began to appear, and the 7th Cavalry Division was attaohwd to the I Bavarian Corps, while the Bavatian and the 8th (Saxon) Cavalry Divisions closed gaps between the various corps• (116) The I Bavarian Ke serve Corps, which had been in army reserve up to then, was ordered forward to takes it s plaoe between the I Bavarian and the XXI Corps, and to assist in o ova ring the detraintaent of the XIV Corps, (116) An 16 August German GHQ informed Crown Prince Ruppreoht of it s plan to permit thy Frenoh to advance as far as the Kied, east of lfets, and then to attack then with the Sixth and Seventh Armies from the east, with the Fifth, and possibly parts of the Fourth, from the west. Aooor­ ding to Voltke this was to become the deoisive battle of the war. (117) That was the time when Uoltke oonaitted his strategic reserve of six and one half depot divisions. The plan provided for a concentration of the sew nth Army between and Uolsheia. Tho Sixth Army's right flank was to r««t on 8arrebruok instead of Sarrelouis, as had been pre­ viously planned. The gan between there and the Nied position was to be left open, or merely filled with cavalry. (118) Army orders coordinated the withdrawal, by requiring all units to reach the Sarre by the 16th* (119)

110) BA, 104, RA, 191, 197. (116) BA, 106) RA, 199. .111) BA, 106-106} FOA, 231, 116 BA, 112) RA, 203. 112) BA, 106-107) RA, 194, (117; BA, 113) RA, 201, Ru, 11) 113) BA, 111) RA, 200. Gr, 40. 114) BA, 116) RA, 203, (118) BA, 114, RA, 186, 201) Ha, 83) Ru, 11.

-16­ On 16 August, however, there came a ohange of opinion, German OHQ began to doubt if the forces advanoing J.n Lorraine represented the main Frenoh foroes, and began to advise lets speed in the withdrawal. Doubt* also began to arise if the Frenoh would be so aeconodatlng as to go all the way into thu -crap set for then. But then no ideas of an offensive in Lorraine was thought, of. (120) ihe laok of aggreesivt'-'ness of the Frenoh, Their oautious aavanoe, and the haciness of the situation beoame tantalising, iherw was one sure way of making an end to all this uncertainty and that was to attack. So on 16 August the Bavarian Crown Prince deoided to attaok,(121) - Troop* movements in the Frenoh rear areas already indioated a shffting of foroes to the Belgian front. It was considered high tine to engage the Frenoh, so that further withdrawals fron Lorraine would become impossible. So orders were issued for all corps to hold their present line. (122) The Seventh Army reported however that it oould not be ready to attack until 20 August. An irradiate offensive was therefore not be thought of* Neither oould the enemy bo enveloped. His right flank was secure in the Voages, while his left rested on the Couromve de Nancy. (123) On the 17th Lieutenant Colonel von Domes arrived in Stl Avoid, the Sixth Army Headquarters, He was a liaiaon offioer from GHQ who had come not to deliver orders but to make suggestions, and to present the viewpoint of ths Supreme Command* OHQ, aooording to him, was still minded to oon­ tinue the withdrawal until the French had reached the Hied. But Ruppree'nt was determined to take offensive aotion. (124) The orders issued for the oorps to hold their lines, inoreased th'» severity of the figthing on the 18th and 19th. Thus a bitter oonteat developed at Mittersheia between the I B Reserve Corps and the Frenoh XVI Corps, in whioh finally the Bavarians held their positions. (126) Officially, German GHQ had not changed the mission of the Sixth and Seventh Amies. In,order to settle the uncertainty and to obtain the oonsent of the higher headquarters for their intended offensive, Oeueral Krafft von Delmensingen, Chief of Staff of the Sixth Army oalled up OHQ and talked to General von Stein, Deputy Chief of Staff. Again GHQ indioa­ ted that they proferfed to draw the Frenoh as far as the Njed position before attaoldng. Upon being asked i f that meant that they would forbid the attaok, General von Stein that he would do them no such favor. That the responsibility was thetr's. Upon being told that the deoision had been made. Stein answered "Hay God help you." (126) The gap whioh threatened between the I B Corps and the XXI Corps was filled during the 19th completely by the I B Reserve Corps, whioh renlaoed the 7th Cavalry division in that mission. (127) The gap between the XXI Corps and II B Corpu, about three miles in extent was guarded by the Bavarian Cavalry Division, whioh was lo ­ cated in the vioinity of . (128) Rodalbe was the objeotive of the XV Corps for that day. This brought about the figth at Lidrecing, whioh for while threatened to involve both sides beyond their desires. The German oalled off their troops that evening to prevent a premature battle all along the line. (129)

(120) BAi H9| RA, 206. (125) BA, 160-166} FOA, 243* 121( BA» 119) RA, 206,263j Ru, 13-14. (126) BA, 167j RA, 210-211) Or, 42. 122 RU, 12| BA, 119r FOA, 23?. (127) BA, 171) RA, 196. (123) BA, 120) RA, 207. (128) BA, 177) RA, 207. 124 Or, 41) BA 124-126) RA 208) Ru, .17(129} BA, 171-177) FOA, 260*

-16­ VUI. THE 20th OF AD OUST 1914.

a. PLANS.

The German plan called for a frontal attack, with the main effort to be made by tho Sixth Ai"my in the direction of Delmej by the Seventh Army in the direction of Abrosohviller. The I B Corps was attached to the Seventh Army, and the 33d Reserve Division, reinforoed, the Jfetx garrison was attaohed to thu Sixth Any. (ISO) The Frenoh orders for the 20th contemplated a oontinuanoe of their advance. The bridges at Oosselming and Obe retime 1 were to be seised, to be followed by an attaole of the VIII Corps aoross the Sarre* The XVI and XV Corps were to advance their lines past Cutting and , while the XX Corps was to hold its present advanoed position* (131) b. A BRIEF RBSU1B OF THE EVENTS OF THE DAY. The ohange of attitude by The Germane ease as oomplete surprise to the Frenoh, although they had been warned by Joffre to expeut just that. Frenoh plans indicated a oontinued pursuit of a beaten enemy* (132) The Frenoh had planned on Oapturing and before* daylight, but for some reason their division did not get started in time, and the Ik effeot of surprise here was lost. They did, however capture these two villages by 5iOO AM. By 7i00 AH their advance was stopped} finally they were driven out of these villages, but recaptured then later, only to lose them again in the afternoon. (133) The division commander in this part of the front reported that the "Situation was not bad11, and that he was being opposed only by artillery* Orders were issued for the capture of hills 326 and 316, due north of Sarrebourg. (134) At lOtOO AM, the enemy in the zone of the First Any had not shown any signs of activity. (135) Of oourse the Frenoh did not know then, that the German Seventh Arny had set its H hour at lliOO AM, in order to give its units in the Vosges tine to get into action, and that the I B Corps was now assigned to that any* (136) From the tine that the Germans jumped off, their advanoe was irre­ sistible.* Sarrebourg was evacuated by the Frenoh at StOO Pll, and at 6t00 PM, General Caste Hi commanding the Frenoh VIII Corps ordered the withdrawal south of the Rhine - Uarne Canal* (137) Along the northern edge of the Vosges a bitter contest was being waged for the terrain around and Schneokenbusoh. The XIII Corps (Fr) oounterattaokedj then, when it beoame pressed in turn, the Frenoh XXI Corpn oame to its assistance. As a result very little ground was lost by the Frenoh in that area* (138)

(130) BA, 180-181} Ru, 23* (136) FOA, 209} Ru, 26} BA, 181. 1131 BA, 181-182} FOA, 207} DF, 324* (136) FOA, 210} Dub, 60* 1132 RA, 266, 279} FOA, 208} Dub, 49} Ru, 26} Ha, 28, 87} PA* 16i Fo. 18. (133 RA, 272} BA, 260-272} FOA, 209. (131) FOA, 210} Dub. 61} RA, 445­ (134 FOA, 209} Dub, 49* (138) FOA, 211, 212} DuV, 51} BA, 272-273) RA, 273.

-17­ In the vioinity of Morhange we find an inter*stingexample of subordinate initiative* The French XX Corps had advanced well ahead drfrihg 19 August, and Foohr its oommander, had deolded to take advantage of the situation, and to seise the high ground north of Morhange and BaronviHer, with a view of being able to assist tho advance of the XV Corps oh Rodalbe. Ac 6|2O AU ho received a direct s±sc telephonio order from the Second Amy t "Absolutely forbidding any attack, and demanding strict compliance with Field Orders No, 27*" Fooh however did not recall his divisions, but meruly informed them that they could expect no further support that day* Later on in the day, this action of Fooh*s bore fruit, beoausw he was able to oover the withdrawal of the hardpressed XV Corps, and thereby saved the entire army from disaster* (1595 The German Sixth Army attacked at 61OO AM* By 7t00 AM, Oron and Chioourt were abandoned by the Frenoh, who withdrew into the forest of Chateau Salins to reorganise* As the German attaok was set for one hour earlier than the F?Anoh, who had planned on advanoing at 61OO AM, the latter were considerably surprised, and suffered some initial terrain losses, suoh as Conthil, which nay bw fully ascribed to the offeot of this surprise* (140) Due to inprpper coordination within the Frenoh Seoond Army, the Forvst of Bride and Koeldng had never been 00copied, ihe ordar directing Fooh to oooupy then had never been reoeived by him, (141) The XV Corps was struck in flank by oerman troops debouohing from that forest, which had been assumed to be in Frenoh hands* In order to relieve the situation of the XV Corps and out off the Gerwan in the forest, Fooh was ordered to oouncerattaok on Lidresing. (142) Although at 8,00 AM, Fooh had or­ dered his corps to prepare a defensive position and to hold it, he counterattacked at 8,16 AM* (143) But in spite of all, they were driven baok, vhe AY Corps falling baok on Muloey and Blanche-«glise. (144) In the region of the lakes (ponds;, $he gap which had arisen between the Frenoh First and Seoond Armies, end which had been only partially stopped by Conneau's Cavalry Corps proved the cause of much grief to tho Frenoh* (146) The XVI Corps was in difficulty all day, and early steps were taken to cover the withdrawal of its trains and supply establishments* The XV Corps which had been asked to counterattack on Zonpinge in ords'r to oover the withdrawal of the XVI Corps had Troubles of its own and could do nothing, (146) At 10110 AM, Castelnau issued warning orders for the withdrawal of the Seoond Army, giving the following objectives 1 (147) XVI Corps t Maiiierea, B«ohioourt-le-Chateau. XV Corps t Marsal, Donnelay, Uarimont* XX Corps t Befusing its right flank, resting it on the Seille at Marsal, Hauont, Aneleoourt, Fresnes-«n- Salnoia,* Jallauoourt* But things began to get worse. Units could no longer hold against the advanoing enemy, whom they had recently considered defeated. Troops were exhausted after a day of hard fighting* (148)

(139) FOA, 263-254) DF, 327) PA, 17-18) F8, 19-20} BA, 182) HA, 447* (140) RA, 266-268) FOA, 264} BA, 183-190(144) FOA, 266) Fo, 20, Ha, 86) Fo, 19* (1461 FOA, 267) BA, 229-260* FOA, 266} BA, 229) RA, 447. (146) FOA, 267) DF, 327) RA, 270. 143) FOA, 268) PA» l7)Fo, 19* (147 FOA, 267-268) DP, 328* (148) FOA, 264) RA, 447*

-IB­ Only the XX Corp a was holding. Its 11th Division stood like a rook, as a result of th« foresight of the Corps Commander who had ordered its organisation of a defensive position* Plans had even been made for exocution of ft counterattack by the 21st Brigade by Pooh, when orders for the withdrawal of the Second-Army reached him* Then at last he told his entire Corps to fall back. (149) At noon Castelnsu ordered withdrawal as follows t (160) XVI Corps to Lunoville, Fort Manonviller, and the forest of Parroyi XV Corps to Donbaslej XX Corps to Saint Kioolas and Laneuvevlllejj The Oroup of Reserve Divisions to Nanoyj I All supply trains and establishments to be west of the lfeurth] The XX Corps to cover the withdrawal of the army. At 6|00 PM he ordered a line held, still further to the rear. He ordered the bridges over the Jfeurthe to be destroyed by the XX Corps, and the oommander of the fortress Toul was told to proetot the left flank. (161) TThat it had taken a week of fighting, of worry, planning, and swea­ ting, as well as many lives, was lore in the course of single day* (152) The German advance, however was no mere pushover. German units had to fight hard, and there was many a bitter struggle* Divisions called to their corps for help, and corps asked the army for cooperation from neighbouring units. But there was never any doubt as to the outcome of the battle. Only nightfall, and the fatigue of men and animals brought the pursuit of the day to a olose. (163) The Frenoh withdrew safely beyond the Ifeurthe during the next few days. But the deoisive day was the 20th of August 1914. (164)

IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISMS.

Holtke had won his "Great Victory in Lorraine". At one time he had hoped that it would be the deoisive victory in the west* But it was not. The deoision was to be made at Ifarne. (166)

The grand strategy of the Germans was not helped. The Frenoh, now based upon their fortresses, oould hold there with reduoed fortes and send still more troops to the deoisive front, while Germany's lines had to be held by the complete Sixth and Seventh Armies* (I K (166) Uotlke paid the prioe for this viocory, whioh he had fought con­ trary to Sohlieffen's ideas, later at the . (167) Franoe, whioh would have done better, not to have attaoked at all. had invaded Alsaoe for politioal reasons, expecting her opponent to be guided by the same motive* (166) Instead of listening to the teaohing of its great strategist, Fooh, and basing its right wing on the Vosges, Franoe attempted to rest it on the Rhine, with the Vosges aouoss its lines of oommunioations. It proved impracticable. (169)

149) FOA, 256, Fo, 19. (155! RA. 184) DFF, 4-6. 160 FOA, 260} RA, 448. (166, DFF, 32; RA, 279) Or, 36. 161 FOA, 264-265) DF, 329. (167 DFF, 84) Gr, 43. 162 FOA, 266-261) RA, 448| 278. 1168 FOA, 24, 40, 52-63) DF, 331. 163 BAi 183-276, RA, 266-278. (169 DF. 331) RA, 87. 154 BA, Vol II) RA, 280-302.

-10­ French GHQ, instead of coordinating the aotions of the First and Ueoond Armies, as wall as of ii * Cavalry Corps Conneau and the Araae diAlsaoo, under a common leader, tried to oommand eaoh unit separately* ihese units all had a oommon mission in one small' theatre of operations* ihe Germans on the other hand had appointed the Bavarian Crown Prinoe in oommand of their forces in Alsace Lorraine, before the concentration was completed, (160) As soon as Sarrebourg fell, Frenoh GHQ stated that "The coopera­ tion of the First and Second Armies is no longer needed", and promptly directed the two armies on diverging directions, (161) This action created a gap in the lakes region, and indioated that they did not appreciate the influence of terrain upon strateglo and tae­ tioal operations, (162) In their withdrawal on the 20 August the French neglected demoli­ tions of the future hostile means of oonraunioatlons. Thus Dubail writes that at midnight 20-21 August the Germans were moving up supplies as far as Avrioourt by railroad, (163) German GHQ was unwilling to make the deoision as to wthether there should be an attack in Lorraine or not. They refused to aooept the res­ ponsibility for any deoision made there. Yet the war as a whole was to be vitally affeoted by the oharaoter of that aotion, beoause Ruppreoht attaoked too soon, and contrary to the intentions of GHQ, (164) The Sixth Army Headquarters, as well as German GHQ were vaooillating in their attitude, espaoially during the period 14-18 August, (166) The excuse that the troops were "itohing to fight" was the poorest sort of an excuse for the premature German attaok, (166) Had the Germans drawn the Frenoh further into Lorraine, instead of attaoking when they did, they oould have oontainod them with infe­ rior foroos, while sending reinforcements to , the Frenoh on the other hand would have had to maintain a relatively large force in order to secure their lines of communications, (1670 Even had the Germans insisted en attaoking, they should have waited until the French were well up against the Mied position, for then they would have been able to inflict a Cannae instead of merely driving the Frenoh back into their fortresses, (168)

(160) RA 184, 189, Ru 6) BA, 63, 74, (165) BA, 82, 83) HA, 205, 207, FOA, 102| \66j DF 331. 210-211| Or, 43. 161 FOA, 197, 240/ DF, 332, {166) Or, 44|Ru, 19, 162 DP, 333) BA, 181) Dub, 63. (167) Or, 35, DFF, 32. 163 Dub, 52} CA, 56. (168) Or, 3G, DFF, 33, Foe, 41, 164 BA, 167, RA, 210-211| Or, 42,

.20­ V. CONCLUSIONS OF THE AUTHOR.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS may enter into a war plan and influence the deoidion in suoh a way as to endanger the conduct of the oampaign. Thus the French deoision to invade Alsace proved to be a oostly mistake. As no important German forces wore located there, the Frenoh violated the prinoiple of the objective,

Germany tried to be strong ac all points, and resulted in being weak everywhere. Had Germany clung to the original Sohlieffen plan, her deoisivu effort would have had a mi oh better chance of being euooess­ ful. By trying to be sxrong in Alsace-Lorraine as well, the violated the principle of eoonoiy of foroe and the prinoiple of mass,

"It should be laid down as, a prj.noiple , never to leave intervals by which the enemy oan penetrate between corps formed in order of battle, unless it be to draw him into a snare." Maxim XXXIV of Napoleon. The gap between the First and Seoon d Armies, and between the XX and XV Corps were the sou roe of ma oh grief to the French, and should never have been permitted to ooour. "Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command) for this reason, whwn war is oarried on, uto." Maxim LXIV of Napoleon* ihe Fr^noh tried to run uverything from GHQ, although all the forces in Lorraine had the same mission* they should have had a single oocanan­ der.

The French had been warned by the faot that they were meeting ever increasing resistance, that they were about to meet organised positions, and that hostile artillery was ooming up, that the Germans would pass to the offensive, xet in spitv of that the Germans were able to completely surprise the Frenoh on the 20th of August.

When Moltke committed his strateglo reserve and sent it to Lorraine instead of to his main effort, he violated the prinoiple of the objeotive.

"The transition from the defensive to the offensive is one of the most delicate operations in war." lfaxln XIX of Napoleon. The ohange by the Germans was ma4e with very little disorganization, beoause their troops had not been actually defeated, when she was withdrawing. On the other hand we see that it is still more diffioult to keep unbeaten troops retiring, unless they know the i'Atentions of their leaders, and have confidence in their leadership.

"Clear and deoisive orders are the logical result of definite and and sure deoisions ..." Extract from Par. 25, F.S.R., 1923. The German Supreme Command as well as the German Sixth Army were giving vasoillating orders during the period of 10-18 August. Thus they lost the confidence of their subordinates. Had they been firm and deoisive, the insistent demand from the ranks for an attaok would not have been possible.

"The offioer issuing the order oannot share the resposibility therefor with any of his subordinates. The deoision, no matter how arrived at, is his alone." Bxtraot from Paragraph 19, F^S.R., 1923. When Holtke refused to acoept the responsibility for the actions of the armies in Lorraine, he indicated that he was inoapable of command!^,*£. He alone knew the strategio picture as a whole. The decision of the attitude to be taken by the German armies in Lorraine was his alone, »nd his is the resposibility today* even though he shirked it at the tine*

-21­ BIBLIOGRAPHY.

1* Are no i Les Carneta d'un Soldat en Haute Alsaco et dans lee Yosges, Paris, 1917. 2. Baer, C.H. i Der Vfllkerkriegj vol. lj Leintig, 1914. 3. Bavaria i Die Sohlaoht in Lothringen; Bayerieohee Kriogearehiv; , 1929. 4. Bo11oo, Hi11aire » A General Sketch of the European War) The First Phaser London, 1916* 5. Breant, Commandant i De L'Alsaoe & la Scums; Paris, 1917, 6. Castelli, General t Le Ylllena Corps en Lorraine; Paris* 1926, 7. Ch&rnoune&u i La Bataille des Frontieres et la Battaille de la lforne, 6 aout - 15 8epteabre 1914* Paris, 1919. 8* Churchill, Winston S. i The Worl Oriels; London, 1924* 9. Conneau, General tL'Histoire du Corps de Cavalry Conneaxi) Paris. 10* Coraat, Luoien t 1914 - 1916| Histoire de la Guerre; vol 1} Paris 1923. 11. Dubai 1, General i Oju&tre Aimees de Cosunandenent, 1914 - 1918. Paris, 19204 12. Duffour, General i L'Blenent de Terrain en Strategic; Revue Militaire Francaisej Kay and June 1932, 13. Duffour, General t La Guerre de 1914 - 1918; Textbook on history of the Boole de Guerre, Paris. 14* Fayolle et Duball, Gen<

19. Groener, General Ton i Das Testament de Grafe» Schlleffen; Berlin, J927. 20. Hart, Uddell i Pooh, the Man of Orleans; London, 1931. 21. do i The Real War, 1914 - 1918; London. 22. Hierl, Constantln i Der Weltkrieg in ttarlssen; Berlin, 1926. 23* Kraus, Professor Dr. 8 i Lothringen; Die Kriegssohauplltse 1914-1918 geologlsoh dargestellt; Berlin, 1926* 24. lCuhl, General von j Der Ibltkrieg, 1914 - 1918| Berlin 1930* 25. do i Der Deutsohe Oeneralstab in de Vorbereitung and der FShrung de Wsltkrcieges; Berlin, 1920* 26. IJtfran, Comundant i XX Corps a la Battallle de Uorhange; Rewe Ullitaire FraROAit«} October 1930* •22­ 27. Mantey, 0 be ret von t Kartenblld der Grentsohlaohten im Vfeaten la JLugu«t I914j Berlin, 1950. 28. do i Betrachtungen (fber did Grengcohlaohten, August 1914} Berlin, 1931. 29. Koraht, Major t Tage dee Xriegea} Berlin, 1916, 30. New York Tines Current History t The Buropetn War) vol 1} New York*

31. Niox, General i Th eOreat War, 1914j A Simple Narrative; Paris 1921* 32* Palat, General t La Grande Guerre Sur le Front Oooldental} 1V| Lea Battallles de Lorraine} Paris, 1917. 33. do i La Part de Fooh dans la Victoi:»j Paris, 1930. 34, Repington, Colonel i La Premiere Guerre Mondiale, 1914 - 1918} Paris, 1924. 55. Ruppreoht, Kronprinc Ton Payer* t Ibin Kriegstagebuoh} vol 1} Berlin, 1929. 36. Schwarte, II $ Der Orosse Krieg, 1914 - 1918} Der Deutsohe Landkrieg} Brster Tell} (Lieut.Col von Krall). Berlin, 1925. 37. Souroe Retordst Source Reoords of th& G.eat War; Amerioan Legion Edition} vol 2} New York, 1922. 38. Stegemann, Herman i Stegeman's Gesohiohte des ffeltkrieges} vol 1} Berlin, 1917.

.25­ RBFBRBNCB ABBREVIATIONS.

1, Ann - Lea Araeea Francaises dans la Orando Ouerre; Annexes to xoio9 I, Vol. If Paris 1922. • 2. BA - Die Schlaoht in Lothringenj Bayer isohes Kriegsarehiv; Munich 1929, 3. Co - L'Histoire du Corps de Cavallerie Conneau; General Conneau; Paris.

4, CA - Le VHIemo Corps en Lorraine; General Castell 4; Paris, 1926* 6. DP - L'Blenent du Terrain en Strate≤ General Duff our; Revue Kilitaire Franoaise; Hay and June 1932. 6. DPP - La Guerre de 1914 - 1918j General Duffour; Textbook on history of xhe Boole Superieur de Guerre. Paris. 7. Dub - Quatre Annees de Coma an dement, 1914-1918) General Dubailf raris 1920. 8. FOA - Les Arnees F-ancaiaes dans la Orakde Guerre. Tone I, rol.l) The Ppenoh offioial aooount. Paris, 1922. 9. Fo - The Ifenoirs of Marshal Fooh} (ifott); Garden City, 1931* 10. Foe - Der Graf Ton Sohlleffen und der ffeltkrlegj Lieut.Col.Foerster; Berlin 1921. 11. Gr - Das Testament den Grafen Soblieffenj General von Greener; Berlin, 1927. 12. Ha - Fooh, the Kan of Orleans; Liddell Hart; London, 1931. 13. HA - The Real War, 1914-1918; Liddell Hart; London. 14. PA - La Part de Fooh dans la Victoire; General Palat; Paris, 1930. 16. RA - Der ifeltVrieg, 1914-1916) Reiohsarohlv; The German Offioial Aooount; Berlin, 1926. 16. Ru - lfein Kriegstafeabuoh; Kronprint Ruppreoht Ton Bayerni Berlin, 1929. 17. Ste - Herman Stegeman's Gesohlohte des HsltkrioKes. Stuttgart & Berlin*

-24­ OBOOBAPHI C DICTIONARY

PART I - GERMAN-FRENCH.

Abenhofen Abonoourt Falkenberg Adinghofen Adainoourt Pax Paxe Alberachhofen Alberachaux Finatingen Peneatrange Alberachwiler Abreachviller Flodoaldaho ton Plooourt Allenhofen Allaincourt Folkringen Poulorey Anerlchshofen Anele court Fonbaoh Ponrupt Ana Idaho fee Ajau court Fontenlngen Analingen Atoudange FOBsingen FOB Bleux Armadorf Frachelfingen Fra(j\elfing Arrioh Arry Fremerchen Prenery Auning Pronto ningen Prontlgny Artweiler Araohriller Gebllngen Oebllng Bateahofen Ba court Gellshofen Jallauoourt Balderahofeh Baudre court GerbertBhofen Gorbe court Baronweiler Baronviller Garden Lagarde Beohingen Beohy Germ Inge n Oueraange Bettingen Baeaing ( Glaselfingen Jury Biedeadorf Bidestroff G0hn Ooin Bionahofen Bionoourt G8rx Gorte Blen Plains Grenaioh Gremaoey BOllingen Bellange Oflblingen Gueblange Bortenaoh Bourdonnaye Gunderohingen Gondrexange Breuaoh B ruche Breuach»Urbaoh Pouday BruohheiM Brehain Handorf Hannooourt Bruch Kaatel Chateau Brehain Hanhauaen BrAlingen Haraldshofen Harraucourt Burg-BreuBoh Bourg- Haaelburg Hatelbourg Mrlingshofen Burlionoourt Hattingen Hattigny Bflrtenhofen Burthe court Heiligblaaen St. Blaise Hellohof Hollooourt HergoXafeld Hergauohanp Corningen Corny Heraelingen He melange Heasen Beaae Hinterberg Outremont Dagaburg Dabo Hoohwalaoh Plain de Valsh Dalheiat Dalhaln Hoffnung Eaperanoe Dedlingen Da deling Rudingen DeutBohenhag Hale dea Alleaandii Kubortsweiler Huberrille Destrioh Deatry Husserell Houaaerelle Dianen Kapelle Dianne Cape li e Diedenhofen Thlonville Diedolahauaen Bonhonne Ibingen Ibigny Diexingen lnavteiler Ina Tiller Dinklrch Tinorey Donnenhein Doraim Dolvingon Dolving Kabartahof Cabart Dunningen Donnelay Kaltbaoh Prarupt . Dffrlcaatel Chateau Youe Ksmbrioh Chambrey Duat Dieute Kemnat Dust Porst Foret de Bride et Koeking Kleinprunaoh Purnoy l a Chetivo Kolrein Colroy 1A Roche Koltore Couture s Bdelinghofen Attilonoourt KrouE St.Croix aux Mines Biohendorf Chenoia Kubern OuTry Blfringen Arrioourt Kurtol Coureellea Brian Aulnoia Kuttingen Cutting Baohen Aehaia Baohelmer Raohlaette

.26­ Langd(orf) Langatte Rappoltsmoiler RibeauTille Laoh Lalage Reioh Riohe LaB»enborn Lesoenborn Reiohental Riohoval Lautorflngen Loudrefing Reiohsnark Marinont Leba Lieporette Re melaoh Remiily Leinlngen Leming Rintingen Rinting Leonsberg St. Leon Rixingen Reohioourt Leo oh Lease Roggenbaoh Rauvoipt Liedorohen Lidrequin Rohrbaoh Rorbaoh Liedarsingen Lidreting Linhofen Lio court Lixingen Luoy Sail Lflrohingen Lorouin Saaralben Losdorf Saaraltdorf Sarraltroff Loreningen Louriany -BuokenlvJ imSarrunion Lubenhofen Lube court Sarrebourg Luppingen Salixrn Floss Canal d'Huillieres Lussdorf Chaume de Lusse Kanal Salzdorf Saltern Saulxures Maohern Maitieres Saltheim Saloee Malandshofen llalaaoourt Sanringen Sanry Uallhofen URlauoourt Sarbelingen Uanningen yagny Saussenrupt Saudsonrupt yatnrald Mtnhoue Sohau-Berg Voyemont Markiroh St. Varie aux yines . Sohennerioh Chenery Marleien Marly Sohenris yardeningen Uardigny Sohersingen Cherisey liedewioh Msyenvic Sohnierlaoh Poutroye Mekle-ven yeoleuves So)i8llen Miltingen Muloey Sohflngrund, Bellofosse Mittelsoher Charbes Sohollhofen Xooourt Vonohern Monoheux 8oh«eixingen Monhofen Monoourt So lie Seille ydrohingen Vorhange Sillingon Silly en Salnois yorsheim Morville les Vio Sillningen Sillogny Morsroiler Uorvmo sur Nied Solgen Soigne Ifud Lenud Spangen Fange Uulsach Voussey Stanberg Stampoumont Steigerh9ho Lee Bas Steinbiederdorfpontpierre Neu Breisaoh Neuf Brisaoh St. Barbara Ste.Barbo Neuburg Noveant St. Srffert St. Epvre Neuendorf Laneuveville St. Johann von St. Jean de Bassel Neuhaim " en Salnois Neu ache nor Naufcher Kapelle St. Ludwig St. Louis Kapelle Stookwaiher Etang da Stook Niederbd Stondorf Villers Stonoourt Niederhof Niderfeoff Niederlinder Lindre Basse Hiedwoiler Villers aux Oies Tranaoh Vussbaun Blano Uoyer Unterhofen Seoourt Urweiler Uriville Cberlinder Lindre Haute Ollhofen Holaoourt Hacherberg Vaucremont Onntfrlch tame ray Wahlen Vahlen Orhofeh Oriooourt TTaldhoftfn ResBainoourt Orn Oron Warnhofen Vameoourt Ornaeh Orny Wasperweiler Vaspenriller Wastingen Ifeiher ViTiers pottenhofen Weiler Ville Pewingen Pevange Tfeln-Berg Cliaont pfaltburg Phalsbourg Heisshole Bois Blano Pontingen Tfemingen 'Verity ferobsthofen P re vo court Wioh Vio Wiling© n Pouilly Wimaingen Vinningen Pflschingen Pucieux Tfingert Vigny Ptfttingen Wirtedorf Verga-ville Wiss Iluiese Zabern Savor ne Wittenhofen Vittonoourt Zomnange Sittersdorf Haut Clooher Ziwibrfleken Doux Ponts. -26­ PAST XI - FRENCH - GERMAN.

Abonoourt Atenhofen Dabo Dagaburg AbrtfaohYiller Alberschwoiler Dalhein Aohaln Eaohen Cedeling Dedlingen Adinghofen De8try Dostrich Ajauoourt Analdshofen Deux Pont a ZwoibrflcVen Alterschaux Alters ohhofen Diarme Capelie Dianen Kapelle Allaincourt Allonhofan Oleuse Duis Araele court Anoriohahofen Dolving Dolvingen Arrainoourt Anas dor f Doumom Donnenhelm Arry Arrioh Donnelay Dunningen Arschvlller Aremiler Attiloncourt Edelinghofen Auinola Brlen Bsperanoe Hoffnung Augny Auning Btang du Stook Stookmiher Avrioourt Slfringen Aroudange l Paulquemont Falkenberg Faxe Fax Baoourt Badonhofen Fe no strange Finatingen Baronviller Barorwoiler Flooourt Plodoaldshofen Basaing Bottingen Ponrupt Fonbaoh Baudre court Belderahofon Ponteny Fonteningen Beohy Beohingen Foret de Bride Bellange BBllingen et Koeking DUB a Forst Bellefosee Sohflngrund Possieux Foaaingen Beux NiedorbS Fouday Breuaoh - Urbaoh Bideatroff Biedeadorf Foulorey Folkringen Bionshofen Fr&okelfingen BlanoNoyer Kusabaua Frarupt Kaltbach Bois Blano Woieaholt Fremery Frenerbhen Bonhomrod Dledolshausen Frontigny Fronxingen Bourdonnaye Bortenaoh Bourg-Bruohe Burg-Breuaoh Brehain Bruohhelm Oebling Oeblingen Bruoho Brouaoh Gerbecourt Oerbertahofen Brulange Brfllingen Coin Oo^hn Mrlingshofon Dondrexange Ounderohingen Burthe court Bflrtanhofon Oorte 08rs Oreneoey Orenaioh Oueblange Oflblingen Cabart Kabarcshof Que mange Germingen Canal Salinen Plosa d»Huilliore& Kanal Chembrey Kembrioh Haohinette Baohelner Chanville HanhauBen Raie dea Charbes Uittolaoher Allemands Deuteohenhag Chat, brehain Bruoh Kaatel HaiTpont Hudingen Chateau Voue Dfirkastel Harmo court Handorf Chavune do Lusae lussdorf Harrauoourt Heraldshofen Cheminot Kemnat Hattigny Hattingen Chenery Scheimerioh Haut Clocher Zltterndorf ChenoiB Biohendorf Ratelbourg Haaolburg Cherisey Sohersingen Hellocourt Hellohbf Chi court Diexingen He rgtuchamp Hergolafeld Chleulles SohBllen Henna lange Hernelingen Climont Weinterg Hesse Heasen Colsey la Roohe Kolrein Ollhofen Corny Cornlngen Houssere lie HusBerell Couroollea Kurtel Kbenrllle Hubortiweiler Couturea Kolters Cutting Kuttingen Kubern Ibigny Ibingen Inaviller Inawoiler Jallauoourt Oellahofen' Jury Oisaelfingen Juvelite Oeiatkiroh

-27­ Lagarde Gerden Raurupt Roggenbaoh Lalage • Laoh Reohioourt Rixingen LaneuTeville Kauendorf Remllly Rene laoh. * en Salnoia Neuhein Ras8ainoourt Waldhofen Langatte Land (Lan£orf) Ribeauville RappoltaVreiler Lasoenborn Lassenborn Riohe Reich ..';. Lenud Wud Rioheval Reiohental Laming Leininger. Rlnting Rintingon Les Be La s oh Rorbaoh Rohrbeoh Lidrequin Liederohen Lidreting Ldedersingen Lieporette Leba Saales Saal r Lindre Basse Niederlinder Saloee Salthe im Lindre Haute Ober Under Salonnes Saledorf Liooourt Lionhofen Sanry Sanritigen Lorquin UJrchingon Sarralbe Saaralben Lost roff Losdorf Sarraltroff Saaraltdorf Loudrefing Sarrebourg Saarburg Louvigny Lovaningeh Sarrunion Saa r« Buoke nhe i m Lube court Lubenhofan Sausflonrupt Saussenrupt Luoy Lixingen Saulxui-e8 Salrern Luppy Luppingen Savyrne Zabern So cou rt Untfrhofen So'ille Selle Ifagny Matmingen Sil'lningen Mai tieres Machern Silly en Snlnois Sillingen Malancourt Malandshoxen Soigne Solgen Malauoourt Kallhofen St ampounont St ru&be rg Manhoue ICaniTaldn Ste, Barbe St. Barkara Mardigny Mardeningen st. Blaise Heillgblasen Marimont Roiohsirkrk St. Croix aux Hires W¥WnflW Kreus Marly Iferleion St. BpTfe Si;. Brffert Meoleuves Mekleven St. Jean de Basstil - St, Johann von Vonoheux Mondtern Basel Monoourt Vonhbfen St. Louis St. Ludwig Morhange Mflrohingon Ste. Uarie aux Morville Vines Marklroh les Vio Morsheixn " sur Nied Uorswsiler Voussey UUlsaoh Thionville Diedenhofen Tinorey Dinlciroh Tragny Tranaoh Neuf BrisRoh Jteu Naufoher Kapelle Nausohener Kapelle Uriville Urwiler Novaant Nauburg Vahlen TTahlen Vanne court Varehofen Ommaray Qonerioh Waaperweiler Oriooourt Orhofen Vauoremont Wacherberg Orny Ornach Vaxy VTastingen Oron Orn VYirtsdorf Outre mont Hinterberg Verny fleraingen Vlo Wioh Vigny Wingert Spangen Ville Tfeiler Pettonoourt Pettenhofen Villers Stonoourt - Stondorf Povange Pewingen Vinningen Wimmingen Phalsbourg Pfaltburg Vittonoourt Tfitten'iofen Plain de Valsh Hoohwalsoh Viriera Tfeihor Plaine Bien Voyemont Sohauberg Pontoy Pontingen Pouilly Pullingen Poutroye Schmierlaoh YMisse Wiss Prevooourt Probsthofen Purnoy la Chetive Kleinprunaoh Xanrey Schenris puttigny Pflttingen Xooourt Sohollhofen Pugieux Pflsohingan Xouaxange Sohweixingen Zarbeling Sarbellngen Zermningen A BRIEF DESCRIPTION

OF THE TBBRAIH, based on thw personal familiarity of the author with this region, photographs published by 4fcs Bavarian Arohives, and a book called "Die Kriegssohauplftte Geologisdh Dargestollt" volumes 1 and 2 (of 15) by Frofeseor Dr, B. Kraus, and published in Berlin in 1926.

MOUNTAINS - The battlefield is bounded on the south by the thickly wooded mountains known as the VOSGBS. These are low mountains, not insu­ perable, and more to be oomparod to our Alleghanies in height and appearance. Routes of approaoh to cither side are limited by roads to the following main passes i The Sohluoht Pass between Spinal and Colmarj The Bruche pass leading from Raon l'Etapa to Strasbourg vin Sohirmeok) the col do Ste. Uarie aux Mines, between St. Di»e and Schlettstadtj and several passes in the Belfort area* The frontier ran along the orest of the Vosges* RIVERS - The Rhine and the Ueuse are the main rivers to which the Vosges form the watershed. The Rhine has lowlying banks at this stage* and although deep and swift would favor a crossing by pontons. the lfbaell* forms the backbone to Frances fortification*, running through «pinal and Tcul. The Meurthe. also unfordable is the forward boundary of the Frenoh defensive system. It was their line of departure on the 14th and their lire of resistance on «.he 21st. *he oarro on the other hand formed the backbone of the German resistance. The Soille is the »nly important river running aast to Ttest. LAKES -A number of very small lakes dot one portion of this region* ihey are really snail ponds and used for irrigation and flood control purposes, However they olutter up a large area and form a deoidedly diffi­ cult terrain feature for military operations* CANALS - The Rhine-Kara* Canal runs from Nancy to Sarrebourg through Lake Gondrexange. It was a busy, import an "artery of oommeroe. The Canal des H^illeres was important as a cot»l oarrler and runs north from the Rhine Uaroe canal to oonroot with the lower Sarre basin. Av • r .. ,..• •;. .. '•>• KOAD8 - Yloads are good and plentiful. National roads run from Luneville to Sarrobourg atid from Nanoy to Chateau Salins. On each side of the bo*der there were good lateral roads maintained already in times-of peaoe* I n the Vosges the Raon l'Etape - Uolsheim road was oonneoted to Sarrebourg by a secondary road via St. Quirin and afcother via Abresohviller,

RAILROADS i There were no railroads crossing the Voages north of Colmar. The main Frenoh - German line of communications ran through Avricourt, where there was a large customhouse on both sides* Another Railroad ran from Nanoy to Chateau Salins and Bensdorf• Bonsdorf was an important railroad center. Junotions were also at Rechioourt and Chateau Salins. A lateral ran on eaoh side of the border*

FORESTS - Th« Vosges are wooded about 86^. North of the Vosges the .; wooded are covers about 42^ of the terrain. The Forest of Bride .et Koeking, of speoial incerost to us is looated between the Vio - Jta nest range road and the Chateev Salins - Bensdorf railroad* The lakes region is generally woo4 dad. GENERAL ASPECT OF THE COUNTRY - The, battle field of Iforhange Sarrebourg as covered by the speoial map is generally rolling farming oountry with interspersctd forests of needle bearing trees, and oopses of herbaoeous trees. Many snail villages are everywhere. Houses aro of stone, end usually have tiled roof a, with oooasional strftw thatohes. Every rillage ha8*ohuroh steeple All opftri terrain is under cultivation or in pasture. Fences are usually hedges* By 1914 only 15# of the fencing was of wire. Orchards are usually close to the villages. Small streams have as a rule gently sloping firm banks and are not erodod. Slopes are gentle. Observation and oonoealment are both exoellentj conaunlcatlons very good, find as a whole it forms an ideal maneuver ground outside of the small lakes region, where movement is highly restricted due to water courses. -29­ T H B WEATHER.

(Taken from page 893, "Die Sohlaoht in Lothringen", published by the Bavarian Archives in Minion in 1929*)

1-14 August 1914 - Great heat, 15 August - Rain in the evening. 16 - 17 August - Cool, cloudy, ooeaeional rain. 18 August - Clearing. 19 - 21 August - Greet heat.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE

OPPOSING FORCES, a. GKRMAN ­ Sixth knay - Grown Prinoe Ruppreoht of. Bavaria XXI Corps (v. Below) 31st Division 42d Division I Bavarian Corps (v. Xylander) 1st B Division 2d B Division XI Bavarian Corps (v. Martini) 3d B Division 4th B Division III Bavarian Corps (v. Gelbsattel) 5th B Division 6th B Division I Bavarian Reserve Corps (v. Fasbender) 1st B R Division 5th B R Division 5th B Reinforced Landwehr Brigade

Seventh Arny - General von Heeringen XIV Corps (v. Hoinihgen) 28th Division 29th Division XV Corps ( v. Delulling) 30th Division 39th Division XIV Reserve Corps (v. Schubert) 26th R division 28th R Mvision 60th Landwohr Brigade. Provisional Cavalry Corps, III. (von Fronoel) Bavarian Cavalry Division 7th Cavalry Division 8th Cavalry Division (Saxon), -30­ b, FRENCH ­

Pi rat Aray - General Dubail. VII Corps (later to Arose d'Alsaoe) 14th Division 41st Division VIII Corps (Caste ill ) 16th Division 16th Division XIII Corps 25th Division 26th Division XIV Corps 27th Division 28th Division XXI Corps 13th Division 43d Division 44th Division (later from the Anne© des Alpes) 1st Group of Reserve Divisions (58th, 63d, and 66th Divisions) 67th Division (Belfort garrison) 71st Division (Bpinal garrison) 8th Cavalry Division (later in Corps Conneau)

Second Any - General do Castelnau IX Corps (later to the Fourth Anw) 17th Division 18th Division XV Corps 29th Division 30th Division XVI Corps 31st Division 32d Division XVIII Corps (later to the Pifth Arny) 36th Division 36th Division XX Corps (Pooh) 11th Division 39th Division 2d Oroup of Reserve Divisions, ( The 69th, 68th, and 70th Reserve Divisions) 7Sd Division (garrison of Toul) 64th and 74th Reserve Division (tram. Italy later) 2d Cavalry Division (later in Corps Conneau) 10th Cavalry Division " •

••THE END ***

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