The EU's Limited Response to Belarus' Pseudo 'New Foreign Policy'
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No. 151 y February 2008 Introduction The EU’s Limited Response Relations between the European Union and Belarus have seen little change since President to Belarus’ Pseudo Alexander Lukashenko came to power in 1994. Belarus has languished in a state of self- ‘New Foreign Policy’ imposed political isolation despite the George Dura subsequent waves of enlargement – most notably, the 2004 enlargement which made speculates on how the EU can engage with the Belarus a direct neighbour of the EU – and the people of Belarus more effectively. Finally, the formulation in 2004 of the European Union’s paper puts forward a series of short-term and longer- Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The EU’s dual-track term measures that the EU might consider, on the approach of imposing sanctions and trade condition that Belarus commits to addressing the restrictions whilst promoting democratisation in most basic requirements in the field of human rights Belarus have so far yielded minimal results. and democratisation. The EU renewed its offer in December 2006 “to the people of Belarus” of closer cooperation, in return 1. EU policy towards Belarus so far for a series of democratisation measures, put Relations between the EU and Belarus swiftly forward in the form of an unofficial document. cooled down after Alexander Lukashenko swept to Today, however, there still exists no framework for power in 1994. Relations further worsened after political dialogue at the highest level between the Lukashenko held a referendum in 1996, thereby EU and Belarus. The energy crisis between Belarus changing the constitution to extend his presidential and Russia in December 2006-January 2007 created mandate until 2001. Throughout 1996-97, President the impression that Belarus wished to move closer Lukashenko increasingly adopted an authoritarian to the EU. However, one year later, Belarus appears style of government. As a result, the Partnership and to have mended its fences with Russia and has toned Cooperation Agreement (PCA) negotiated in 1995 down its pro-EU rhetoric. with the EU never entered into force, and neither did The aim of this paper, therefore, is to analyse the Interim Trade Agreement. At the time, the EU whether the dynamics of EU-Belarus relations have grew concerned with the lack of separation of changed at all one year after the oil and gas crisis, powers in Belarus, the absence of a dialogue and if so, whether the EU has succeeded in between the authorities and the opposition, the increasing its leverage over the country. A first worsening human rights conditions and the section briefly reviews the EU’s policy towards increasing restrictions on the freedom of the media Belarus since the coming to power of Lukashenko. and press. The EU refused to back Belarus’ Next, the paper looks into the oil and gas crisis and candidacy for membership to the Council of Europe examines if Russia has radically changed its policy and until today, Belarus has not yet been accepted as towards Belarus, by effectively ending the subsidies. a full member. Thirdly, we analyse Lukashenko’s efforts to offset At the time when the EU was formulating its the effects of the oil and gas crisis and the neighbourhood policy in 2003-04,1 which paved the seriousness of his pro-European rhetoric. The fourth part attempts to verify whether there are any 1 fundamental changes in the dynamics of EU-Belarus See European Commission, “Neighbourhood: A new framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern relations following the oil and gas crisis and Neighbours”, 11 March 2003 (http://ec.europa.eu/world/ George Dura is a Research Assistant at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels. CEPS Policy Briefs present concise, policy-oriented analyses of topical issues in European affairs, with the aim of interjecting the views of CEPS researchers and associates into the policy-making process in a timely fashion. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is associated. Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.eu) y © CEPS 2008 way for closer cooperation with the EU’s eastern Canada have followed the EU in its visa ban and and southern neighbours, Lukashenko yet again also frozen the assets of the Belarusian leadership. modified the constitution through a grotesquely The EU renewed its calls for the democratisation of flawed referendum in 2004, which ensured his Belarus in December 2006, when the European possible re-election ad vitam. The lack of Commission published a non-paper4 addressed to democratic reforms and the violation of the most the people of Belarus (in an obvious snub to the basic human rights in Belarus meant that Belarus leaders of Belarus) in which it promises easier was a priori excluded from the European travel, increased trade and investment, cooperation Neighbourhood Policy. This has left the EU without in a number of sectoral policies (environment, a well-defined political and economic framework transport and energy), cultural and educational for conducting its relations with Belarus. exchanges, etc., in return for a series of For well over a decade, the EU has consistently democratisation measures to be carried out by the issued declarations and resolutions on Belarus, Belarus authorities (see Box 1). In this document, calling for urgent democratic reform, free elections, the EU explains to Belarus’ population that their respect for fundamental human rights and freedom country cannot be included in the ENP and benefit of the media and press. Trade, though steadily from closer ties with the EU if their government growing in recent years,2 has remained below the its does not end its self-isolation by proceeding with potential and EU financial assistance in the period democratic reforms. The EU also pledges continued 1991-2005 has totalled a mere €221 million.3 The support for the broadcasting of independent TV and EU has re-directed aid predominantly to projects radio programmes to Belarus and support for promoting democratisation, projects with a social Belarusian students studying in the EU. vocation or projects linked to the legacy of the The Commission’s non-paper has meant significant Chernobyl disaster. moral support for the Belarusian opposition, adding The EU also took a number of negative measures an element of external legitimacy to their stance and sanctions against Belarus, whilst trying to avoid against Lukashenko’s regime. Despite the fact that direct harm to the population. These started with the opposition activists have promoted the document in decision to freeze the PCA and the Interim Trade rallies and marches, so far the non-paper seems to Agreement in 1996 and to put an end to high-level have passed largely unnoticed by the wider political contacts with Belarus. The European Belarusian population. In addition, the Belarusian Parliament also decided to withhold its assent on leadership did not attach any importance to it, as any bilateral agreement with Belarus. After the attested to by the local elections several weeks after flawed presidential election in 2001 in Belarus, the the release of the EU’s non-paper, in January 2007, EU slapped a visa ban on Belarus’ leadership. This which fell short of democratic standards and where ban has been renewed on a yearly basis until today excessive repressive measures were taken against and currently comprises 35 persons, including the opposition. judges and prosecutors involved in the harsh For more than a decade, the EU’s dual-track sentencing of opposition activists. The subsequent approach of imposing sanctions and trade flawed presidential election in 2006 provoked the restrictions whilst focusing its aid efforts EU to impose a freeze on the assets of the predominantly on democratisation has not been able blacklisted people. In June 2007, the EU also to influence the political situation in Belarus: withdrew Belarus’ trade preferences under the Lukashenko remains in power with high rates of Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), after the popular approval. The EU’s leverage (political and International Labour Organisation voiced concern economic) with regard to Belarus remains limited, over the curtailing of the rights of trade unions in in the absence of overwhelming popular support for the country. Belarus also faces one of the most the EU membership in Belarus (support hovers restrictive trade regimes with the EU in the textiles around 35%). Although the EU’s non-paper puts the sector. Other EU partners such as the US and ball in the court of the Belarusian leadership, Belarus has never shown any sign of interest in joining the EU or indeed even its neighbourhood enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf) and European Commission, Strategy Paper on the European Neighbourhood Policy, 12 policy. On top of lacking an official framework May 2004 (http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/ through which to engage Belarus, the EU’s task was strategy_paper_en.pdf). further complicated by Russia’s overbearing 2 According to Eurostat data, bilateral trade has been picking up since 2004, when the total trade volume stood at €5.2 4 European Commission Non-Paper, “What the European billion. In 2006, the total trade volume reached €8.7 billion. Union could bring to Belarus”, 5 December 2006 3 See the website of the EU TACIS Branch Office in Minsk (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/belarus/intro/ (http://www.delblr.ec.europa.eu/page84.html). non_paper_1106.pdf). 2 | George Dura presence, whose exclusivist approach with regard to 2. Shifts in Russia’s policy towards Belarus holds no room for a ménage à trois with the Belarus EU. However, Russia made some changes in its policy at the end of 2006. For several years, Putin had been calling for an end to Russian subsidies to the Belarusian economy, granted mainly in the form of gas and oil deliveries Box 1.