Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Master's Theses Graduate School 2002 The American and South Vietnamese pacification efforts during the Vietnam War Matthew ouD glas Pinard Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Pinard, Matthew Douglas, "The American and South Vietnamese pacification efforts during the Vietnam War" (2002). LSU Master's Theses. 2732. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/2732 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE AMERICAN AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE PACIFICATION EFFORTS DURING THE VIETNAM WAR A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Liberal Arts in The Interdepartmental Program In Liberal Arts by Matthew D. Pinard B.A. The University of Michigan, 1996 May 2002 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to thank my family for encouraging me to continue the pursuit of higher education. I would especially like to thank all the members of my family who have served in the military, in particular, John, Thomas, David, and Sean Cannon. I would also like to extend a special thanks to MAJ Joel E. and MAJ Jeannine C. Hamby for their support with my thesis, and Dr. Stanley E. Hilton, DeGrummond Professor of History, for his encouragement throughout the process. Finally, I wish to thank all the men and women who faithfully served with honor throughout the Vietnam War including my uncle, Thomas Cannon. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . ii ABSTRACT . iv CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION . 1 II. THE VIET CONG INSURGENCY . 5 III. ALLIED PACIFICATION EFFORTS . 46 IV. FRUSTRATION AND FAILURE . 91 V. CONCLUSION . 117 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 121 VITA . 129 iii ABSTRACT This thesis closely examines the American and South Vietnamese pacification efforts in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. The perspectives of the United States military and civilian organizations that supported the war effort, the South Vietnamese government, and the Viet Cong insurgents are discussed in detail. This includes an analysis of military strategy, theory, and practice of the combatants in the Vietnam War in order to gain an understanding of the reasoning behind decision-making policies of military leaders on both sides of the war. A dissection of the Viet Cong insurgency, from the origins of insurgent political movements leading to the formation of the Viet Cong forces and the aggressive application of these beliefs throughout the war, provides an understanding of the motivations and goals of the foe that the Allies faced. The basic strategy of the North Vietnamese Army sheds light on the reasoning behind monumental decisions regarding the military treatment of South Vietnam. A detailed analysis of the relationship between The United States and the Government of South Vietnam provides the context surrounding the trials experienced by the Allies in the battlefield throughout the countryside of Vietnam. A presentation of basic military tactics and beliefs embraced by The United States military will focus on questions of how and why the war progressed in the manner it did between the two enemy forces. A discussion of the motivations of each side in the war will lead to a greater insight of why the Vietnam War occurred, and how the outcome affected U.S. military strategy. iv CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION The pacification initiative in Southeast Asia throughout the Vietnam War consisted of numerous efforts to rid the Vietnamese countryside of Communism. These efforts supported a multitude of specified programs, including the Chieu Hoi program, the CIA-supported Phoenix operation also known as Phung Hoang, and the strategic hamlet program, and implemented strategies with the intent of gaining control over the villages in South Vietnam. The Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) structure, and the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) assumed responsibility for programs. Pacification was the organizational structure for the policies of the combined U.S. and South Vietnamese military efforts for destroying the Viet Cong (VC). The theory behind the pacification initiative was to win the “hearts and minds” of the South Vietnamese villagers: “pacification had become a catchall description for the self-interests of a dozen different US agencies, all with their Saigon government counterparts. The results were little more than a shared cliché—‘winning hearts and minds,’ and with the military in overall control the priority was reflected in a slogan bandied by the Marines: ‘Get ‘em by the balls and their hearts and minds will follow.’”1 The goal of this thesis is to examine the dynamics of these individual programs that shared common goals throughout the Vietnam War. Analysis of each of these programs and the various factors affecting them will lead to a greater insight into their success or failure. Pacification is defined as: the military, political, economic, and social process of establishing or reestablishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of the people. It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy’s underground government, the assertion or re-assertion 1 Michael Maclear, The Ten Thousand Day War, Vietnam: 1945-1975, p. 255. 1 of political control and involvement of the people in government, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion.2 The American pacification effort, designed as a means to battle Communist insurgency, hoped to build a national political community in South Vietnam. The main goal of pacification was to endorse an independent and sovereign South Vietnamese government. Pacification assumed many roles throughout the Vietnam War with a multitude of different programs exerting varying degrees of authority and responsibility for the village hamlets. This included guaranteeing the financial and social futures of the villages. The U.S. Army in concert with American civilian agencies played a critical role in the attempt. Pacification “advisers” provided technical, administrative, and military support to South Vietnamese villages. Unfortunately, a number of influential factors weakened the initiative, the most notable being the attempt to merge the management of military and civilian agencies under one unified command. This problem, exacerbated by the South Vietnamese determination to preserve their independence vis- à-vis the American military and political organizations, was not easily solvable. Lack of a coordinated effort between these dueling governmental bodies, and a general mistrust between an increasingly corrupt South Vietnamese government and the U.S. military weakened the effort. Pacification discovered its roots between the 1950s and 1960s at a time in history when the effort against insurgency in the Third World attracted much attention. Fighting the Cold War meant “getting our hands dirty” in poor, under-developed nations struggling to resist the grasp of Communism. Defeating insurgency required combating Communism from all aspects of society—militarily, socially, economically, and diplomatically. In Vietnam, this meant attacking the issue from both the military and civilian sectors. In the civilian sector, pacification 2 Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification, v. 2 influenced economic development, land reform issues, and the political structure of the South Vietnamese. In the military sector, South Vietnamese and U.S. military police agencies provided security with U.S. paramilitary and counterinsurgency forces supported by mobile, light infantry units operating to defeat the guerrillas. The South Vietnamese military also trained special “cadre” teams to improve rural economic and social structures in the villages. By enhancing the social and economic lives of the villagers, pacification advisers offered a political alternative to rural villagers: freedom from oppressive Communist based policies and the opportunity to build a democratic process throughout the countryside. The effort required joining the fight against Communist insurgency. The doctrinal beliefs embraced by American military leaders demonstrated how a failure to adapt a consistent and compatible strategy toward pacification approaches and general military policies led to a long, protracted, and unsuccessful struggle against the VC. Evaluation of the doctrines of the VC military and insurgent infrastructures will provide a greater understanding of the enemy the United States encountered. Different schools of military thought, previous examples of counterinsurgent operations, and internal memoranda and reports generated by the military/civilian command structure of the United States will focus on fundamental problems existing within the American approach to Vietnam. The American military engaged the enemy openly in large offensive operations, attempted to discourage enemy infiltration with a massive bombing campaign, and sought to dismantle the VC infrastructure (VCI) in the countryside with an effective counterinsurgency program. These efforts failed to