After Revolution : Reading Rousseau in 1990S China

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

After Revolution : Reading Rousseau in 1990S China This document is downloaded from DR‑NTU (https://dr.ntu.edu.sg) Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. After revolution : reading Rousseau in 1990s China van Dongen, Els; Chang, Yuan 2017 van Dongen, E., & Chang, Y. (2017). After revolution : reading Rousseau in 1990s China. Contemporary Chinese Thought, 48(1), 1‑13. doi:10.1080/10971467.2017.1383805 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/143782 https://doi.org/10.1080/10971467.2017.1383805 This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Contemporary Chinese Thought on 14 Dec 2017, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10971467.2017.1383805. Downloaded on 29 Sep 2021 15:15:43 SGT The final version of this article was published in Contemporary Chinese Thought 48.1 (2017): 1-13. https://doi.org/10.1080/10971467.2017.1383805 Introduction After Revolution: Reading Rousseau in 1990s China Els van Dongen and Yuan Chang Abstract This article reviews Zhu Xueqin’s (b. 1952) writings on Jean-Jacques Rousseau against the background of the reception of Rousseau in China since the late nineteenth century. Rousseau was both an advocate and critic of the Enlightenment, and his work hence appealed to many Chinese intellectuals who struggled with the conundrum of how to modernize. During the late nineteenth century, Chinese supporters of Rousseau drew on his work to defend the viability of revolution. During the 1990s, following the tragedy of Tiananmen and the decline of socialism, Rousseau served to reflect on China’s twentieth-century trajectory and the disastrous political consequences of collective moral idealism. For Zhu Xueqin, a key question was: Why were the French Revolution and the Cultural Revolution so similar? Rousseau and the Double-Edged Sword of Modernity In the history of modern Western political thought, few have managed to achieve the fame and influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). Yet even fewer have managed to leave a legacy as paradoxical as the great “Citizen of Geneva.” His reputation has run the gamut, from being the inspiration and leading light of the French Revolution in the view of Maximilien Robespierre to the intransigent enemy of liberty and the master thinker of “totalitarian democracy” in the writings of Isaiah Berlin and Jacob Talmon.1 The latter used the term totalitarian democracy to refer to the collective pursuit of an all-embracing vision of a perfect society where politics came to dominate all aspects of human life and social action served to realize the general good. A central figure of the Enlightenment, Rousseau was, however, at the same time a sympathizer of a primitive and pastoral past, a believer in rustic simplicity, and a passionate critic of modernity.2 Immanuel Kant once described him as the “Newton of the moral world,” while Allan Bloom wrote that “Rousseau gave antimodernity its most modern expression and thereby ushered in extreme modernity.” 3 This conflicting evaluation of Rousseau forms part of the broader conflicting evaluation of the Enlightenment philosophers. For some scholars, they were closet Christians engaged in the construction of a “heavenly city”; for others, conversely, they were Lumières who sought to replace religion with rationality.4 The ambiguity surrounding Rousseau is also reflected in the continuing discussion of that mystical concept known as the general will”(volonté générale) introduced in The Social Contract (1762), which more than any other idea has become synonymous with the Genevan maestro.5 1 Rousseau’s contemporaries, however, mostly equated him with revolutionary thinking; he was after all a thinker who believed in the “radical transformation and reformation of state and society.”6 Rousseau has been credited with influencing the French Revolution, a connection that Edmund Burke famously made in his 1790 work Reflections on the Revolution in France. Other contemporaries such as Benjamin Constant, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Hippolyte Taine made similar observations.7 Both the revolutionaries themselves and Robespierre appealed to Rousseau, a connection symbolized by the revolutionaries’ moving of his body to the Pantheon for reburial after his death.8 From being the inspiration for the French Revolution, Rousseau became associated with revolution tout court. It was only later that scholars began to see Rousseau in different and often contrasting lights. What more can be said about Rousseau? The following is an attempt to explore the reception and study of Rousseau in 1990s China through the work of Zhu Xueqin 朱学勤 (b. 1952), a noted liberal scholar and historian who has published widely on Chinese culture and Western thought. Zhu became famous by and large due to his 1994 book titled The Demise of the Republic of Virtue: From Rousseau to Robespierre.9 This work, which is based on his PhD dissertation, has attracted countless readers since its publication and is still being read in the People’s Republic of China today. Before we formally analyze Zhu and his writings in depth, a description of the context of the reception of Rousseau in modern China is required in order to facilitate the discussion: Why did Chinese intellectuals engage with Rousseau in the 1990s? During this period, China witnessed debates of Rousseau’s thought against the broader background of the crisis of revolutionary ideology and amidst the advocacy of a reformist approach to solve the problems of Chinese modernity. The 1990s is also a period of significant interest due to the post-1989 Tiananmen effect, as the liberal intellectual atmosphere of the 1980s came to a close. It serves as a microcosm of modern Chinese intellectual history because the period witnessed the return of intellectual discussions of the problem of Chinese modernity that had first come about in the late nineteenth century. This time around, however, the intellectual atmosphere was more poignant, given that the Chinese had experienced the harsh realities of the failures of repeated radicalizations and revolutions during the long twentieth century. The end of the Cold War and China’s move toward globalization following Deng Xiaoping’s famous Southern Tour in 1992 triggered new questions about China’s socialist path, the relation between the state and civil society, and the role of intellectuals in Chinese society. Still, the question remains: Why Rousseau? What makes his thought so engaging to Chinese intellectuals, not only in the 1990s but throughout the entire modern period? What lies behind the allure of his philosophy? Because the quest for modernity in China was at the same time an attempt to resist the Western powers—what Wang Hui has referred to as “anti-modern modernization”—Rousseau was particularly appealing to the Chinese audience given his dual role as advocate and critic of modernity.10 During the late nineteenth century, Rousseau became interpreted in China in the context of Western expansion, and supporters referred to his work to advocate a revolutionary Chinese modernity. During the 1990s, however, after a century of upheavals, Rousseau helped scholars analyze the limits of Chinese modernity and the vicissitudes of revolution in China’s long twentieth century. Now, connecting the French Revolution to the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) in China, intellectuals tried to come to terms with the realities of post-1989 China. The stance of Chinese intellectuals toward this philosopher hence symbolizes China’s continuing struggle with the conundrum of modernization and the quest for a Chinese modernity. 2 The Reception of Rousseau in China Given the above, we hence first need to return to the period of crisis that was the late nineteenth century. In the span of less than a hundred years, China had gone from being a dominant civilization in Asia to a weak and fractured society. By the end of the nineteenth century, many of the leading writers of the day expressed the fear that Chinese civilization would eventually dissipate under the weight of European imperialism. The mounting pressure from the West led to new thinking and reflections on the status of Chinese culture and to the increasing study of Western literature, philosophy, and history. As the situation within the country worsened and as the failure of the Self-Strengthening Movement became apparent with the loss to Japan in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, Chinese intellectuals began to call for political reforms of the highest order. Modern China’s exposure to Rousseau began during this very period of Western intrusion and the quest for modernization. Historical records show that in 1878, Guo Songtao (1818-1891), the Qing ambassador to Britain, made a note in his diaries about a French thinker named Rousseau who was resented and feared by the church. Another diplomat mentioned Rousseau in the same year as well, indicating that his work was influential in Europe.11 The literatus-scholar Wang Tao (1828-1897) wrote about Rousseau in 1890 and called him a “famous sagely man.”12 In 1899, a partial translation in classical Chinese of The Social Contract by the Japanese scholar Nakae Chomin (1847-1901) was published in Shanghai. This was probably the first time that Rousseau’s work was formally introduced to Chinese audiences. Other translations of The Social Contract soon followed, and along with it, commentaries and discussions of the text by the prominent figures of the day, including Yan Fu (1854-1921), Zou Rong (1885-1905), Liang Qichao (1873-1929), and Zhang Shizhao (1881-1973), among others.13 While some scholars such as Zhang Xirou (1889-1973) devoted time to study the content of Rousseau’s thought, more scholars seemed to prefer to use Rousseau to express their own view on the affairs of the day. This was especially so for the topics of individual liberty and the viability of political revolutions.14 According to Max Ko-wu Huang, Rousseau was popular during this period because of the fear that China would perish, which led intellectuals to embrace theories that required drastic action.
Recommended publications
  • The Case of Zhang Yiwu
    ASIA 2016; 70(3): 921–941 Giorgio Strafella* Postmodernism as a Nationalist Conservatism? The Case of Zhang Yiwu DOI 10.1515/asia-2015-1014 Abstract: The adoption of postmodernist and postcolonial theories by China’s intellectuals dates back to the early 1990s and its history is intertwined with that of two contemporaneous trends in the intellectual sphere, i. e. the rise of con- servatism and an effort to re-define the function of the Humanities in the country. This article examines how these trends merge in the political stance of a key figure in that process, Peking University literary scholar Zhang Yiwu, through a critical discourse analysis of his writings from the early and mid- 1990s. Pointing at his strategic use of postmodernist discourse, it argues that Zhang Yiwu employed a legitimate critique of the concept of modernity and West-centrism to advocate a historical narrative and a definition of cultural criticism that combine Sino-centrism and depoliticisation. The article examines programmatic articles in which the scholar articulated a theory of the end of China’s “modernity”. It also takes into consideration other parallel interventions that shed light on Zhang Yiwu’s political stance towards modern China, globalisation and post-1992 economic reforms, including a discussion between Zhang Yiwu and some of his most prominent detractors. The article finally reflects on the implications of Zhang Yiwu’s writings for the field of Chinese Studies, in particular on the need to look critically and contextually at the adoption of “foreign” theoretical discourse for national political agendas. Keywords: China, intellectuals, postmodernism, Zhang Yiwu, conservatism, nationalism 1 Introduction This article looks at the early history and politics of the appropriation of post- modernist discourse in the Chinese intellectual sphere, thus addressing the plurality of postmodernity via the plurality of postmodernism.
    [Show full text]
  • Issue 1 2013
    ISSUE 1 · 2013 NPC《中国人大》对外版 CHAIRMAN ZHANG DEJIANG VOWS TO PROMOTE SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY, RULE OF LAW ISSUE 4 · 2012 1 Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee Zhang Dejiang (7th, L) has a group photo with vice-chairpersons Zhang Baowen, Arken Imirbaki, Zhang Ping, Shen Yueyue, Yan Junqi, Wang Shengjun, Li Jianguo, Chen Changzhi, Wang Chen, Ji Bingxuan, Qiangba Puncog, Wan Exiang, Chen Zhu (from left to right). Ma Zengke China’s new leadership takes 6 shape amid high expectations Contents Special Report Speech In–depth 6 18 24 China’s new leadership takes shape President Xi Jinping vows to bring China capable of sustaining economic amid high expectations benefits to people in realizing growth: Premier ‘Chinese dream’ 8 25 Chinese top legislature has younger 19 China rolls out plan to transform leaders Chairman Zhang Dejiang vows government functions to promote socialist democracy, 12 rule of law 27 China unveils new cabinet amid China’s anti-graft efforts to get function reform People institutional impetus 15 20 28 Report on the work of the Standing Chairman Zhang Dejiang: ‘Power China defense budget to grow 10.7 Committee of the National People’s should not be aloof from public percent in 2013 Congress (excerpt) supervision’ 20 Chairman Zhang Dejiang: ‘Power should not be aloof from public supervision’ Doubling income is easy, narrowing 30 regional gap is anything but 34 New age for China’s women deputies ISSUE 1 · 2013 29 37 Rural reform helps China ensure grain Style changes take center stage at security Beijing’s political season 30 Doubling
    [Show full text]
  • China Perspectives, 55 | September - October 2004 the Debate Between Liberalism and Neo-Leftism at the Turn of the Century 2
    China Perspectives 55 | september - october 2004 Varia The Debate Between Liberalism and Neo-Leftism at the Turn of the Century Chen Lichuan Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/417 DOI: 10.4000/chinaperspectives.417 ISSN: 1996-4617 Publisher Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine Printed version Date of publication: 1 October 2004 ISSN: 2070-3449 Electronic reference Chen Lichuan, « The Debate Between Liberalism and Neo-Leftism at the Turn of the Century », China Perspectives [Online], 55 | september - october 2004, Online since 29 December 2008, connection on 28 October 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/417 ; DOI : 10.4000/ chinaperspectives.417 This text was automatically generated on 28 October 2019. © All rights reserved The Debate Between Liberalism and Neo-Leftism at the Turn of the Century 1 The Debate Between Liberalism and Neo-Leftism at the Turn of the Century Chen Lichuan EDITOR'S NOTE Translated from the French original by Nick Oates 1 From the beginning of the 1980s to the middle of the 1990s, three movements took centre stage on the Chinese intellectual scene: radicalism, conservatism and liberalism. This article sets out to retrace the debate between liberalism and neo-leftism by relying exclusively on the polemical texts of the Chinese writers1. How can we present an intellectual debate that is a process of questioning and clarification and that does not arrive at a consensual conclusion? How can we render intelligible the concepts debated in extracts from the original texts? How can we evaluate the impact that this debate has had on a society undergoing a profound transformation? These are just some of the difficulties with which we were confronted.
    [Show full text]
  • Inter-Asia Cultural Studies the Politics
    This article was downloaded by: [University of Chicago Library] On: 03 February 2014, At: 15:22 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Inter-Asia Cultural Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/riac20 The politics of imagining Asia: a genealogical analysis Wang Hui & Translated by Matthew A. Hale Published online: 01 Mar 2007. To cite this article: Wang Hui & Translated by Matthew A. Hale (2007) The politics of imagining Asia: a genealogical analysis, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 8:1, 1-33, DOI: 10.1080/14649370601118925 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649370601118925 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction: Put Politics in Command Christopher Connery
    Introduction: Put Politics in Command Christopher Connery In a converted warehouse in the Putuo District of Shanghai, Liu Debao, former Red Guard and active in the “Sent Down Youth” alumni orga- nizations in Shanghai,1 maintains a warehouse of pre- 1978 memorabilia, mostly from the fifties and sixties, comprising everyday-life objects, com- plete issues of newspapers and unofficial publications, and, most impor- tantly, over three thousand reels of film, largely uncatalogued. A photog- rapher by profession and an insatiable collector by nature, he had noticed 1. This refers to movements that sent millions of young people who volunteered or were, more often, assigned by the authorities to terms in the countryside during the sixties and into the seventies, some to nearby communes and some to the edges of the country, in Xinjiang, Heilongjiang, and Yunnan. The groups coalesce around a variety of affective relationships to this time of their youth: some organize around social assistance to their former villages; some petition, protest, and pursue legal remedies for the services and benefits denied to them by the Shanghai municipal government; some gather in parks and other public places to talk, sing, and dance. For a history of the movement, see Bonnin 2013. A recent nine-hour documentary by Gao Zipeng and Wu Meng, Shanghai- ren (Shanghainese [2014]), documents the protest movement of Shanghainese returnees from Xinjiang over the course of the last few years. boundary 2 46:2 (2019) DOI 10.1215/01903659-7496960 © 2019 by Duke University Press Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/boundary-2/article-pdf/46/2/1/569078/0460001.pdf by guest on 03 October 2021 2 boundary 2 / May 2019 that as the economic reforms were gathering strength, the culture depart- ments of various municipalities and counties were throwing out archived film footage of documentaries, instructional films, feature films, and news- reels from the pre- 1976 era and began to collect them, traveling great dis- tances to buy reels of film, even when he did not know their contents.
    [Show full text]
  • Living in an Intellectual Village
    Arbeitsberichte 199 Hui Wang Living in an Intellectual Village Wang Hui, Research Fellow of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, Editor in Chief of Dushu magazine (Readings), Guest Pro- fessor of Tsinghua University, was born in 1959 in the city of Yangzhou, where he graduated from the Teachers’ College before moving to the Chi- nese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing in 1985. There, after completing his doctoral work, he became a research fellow in its Institute of Lit- erature. Since then, he has published numerous papers and books in the fields of Chinese intellec- tual history, modern Chinese literature and social theory. His main books are (in Chinese): Revolt- ing Against Despair: Lu Xun and His Literary World (1991); No Room for Hesitation: the May Fourth and its Echoes in Chinese History (1994); A Self-Selection by Wang Hui (1996); Warming up the Dead Fire (2000); The Rise of Modern Chi- nese Thought, vol. 1 and 2 (forthcoming 2002). Some of his papers and books have been trans- lated into English, Japanese, Korean, and French. − Address: 17-906 Xibahe Beili, Chaoyang Qu, Beijing, 100028, P. R. China. On the evening of my last day in Berlin, I went to the Wissenschafts- kolleg to check my mail. Everybody had gone. In the emptiness, it suddenly came to me that, before I came to Berlin, a former Fellow described to me the life at Wiko as living in an international intellec- tual village. After my one-year stay, I found that I like the image of Wiko as a village: lake, forest, villagers, kids, intimate relationships, the regular ritual practice (Colloquium on the morning of every Tuesday), cooking, singing, playing ping-pong, etc.
    [Show full text]
  • The Chinese Liberal Camp in Post-June 4Th China
    The Chinese Liberal Camp [/) OJ > been a transition to and consolidation of "power elite capital­ that economic development necessitated further reforms, the in Post-June 4th China ism" (quangui zibenzhuyr), in which the development of the provocative attacks on liberalism by the new left, awareness of cruellest version of capitalism is dominated by the the accelerating pace of globalisation, and the posture of Jiang ~ Communist bureaucracy, leading to phenomenal economic Zemin's leadership in respect to human rights and rule of law, OJ growth on the one hand and endemic corruption, striking as shown by the political report of the Fifteenth Party []_ social inequalities, ecological degeneration, and skilful politi­ Congress and the signing of the "International Covenant on D... cal oppression on the other. This unexpected outcome has Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" and the "International This paper is aa assessment of Chinese liberal intellectuals in the two decades following June 4th. It provides an disheartened many democracy supporters, who worry that Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."'"' analysis of the intellectual development of Chinese liberal intellectuals; their attitudes toward the party-state, China's transition is "trapped" in a "resilient authoritarian­ The core of the emerging liberal camp is a group of middle­ economic reform, and globalisation; their political endeavours; and their contributions to the project of ism" that can be maintained for the foreseeable future. (3) age scholars who can be largely identified as members of the constitutional democracy in China. However, because it has produced unmanageably acute "Cultural Revolution Generation," including Zhu Xueqin, social tensions and new social and political forces that chal­ Xu Youyu, Qin Hui, He Weifang, Liu junning, Zhang lenge the one-party dictatorship, Market-Leninism is not actu­ Boshu, Sun Liping, Zhou Qiren, Wang Dingding and iberals in contemporary China understand liberalism end to the healthy trend of politicalliberalisation inspired by ally that resilient.
    [Show full text]
  • Copyright by Yue Ma 2004
    Copyright by Yue Ma 2004 The Dissertation Committee for Yue Ma Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: The Catastrophe Remembered by the Non-Traumatic: Counternarratives on the Cultural Revolution in Chinese Literature of the 1990s Committee: Sung-sheng Yvonne Chang, Supervisor Margherita Zanasi Avron Boretz Qing Zhang Ban Wang The Catastrophe Remembered by the Non-Traumatic: Counternarratives on the Cultural Revolution in Chinese Literature of the 1990s by Yue Ma, B.A.; M.A. Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Texas at Austin December 2004 Dedication To my personal savior, Jesus Christ, who touched my life and sent me the message that love never fails. To the memory of my father, who loved me and influenced my life tremendously. To my mother, who always believes in me, encourages me, supports me, and feels proud of me. To my husband, Chu-ong, whose optimistic attitude towards life affects people around him and brings hope and happiness to our family. To my precious son, Daniel (Dou Dou), whose heavenly smiles never fail to melt my heart. Special love to a special you. Acknowledgements I would like to offer a special thanks to Dr. Yvonne Sung-sheng Chang, my academic advisor, who has supervised my study during the past six years and helped me in numerous ways. My appreciation also goes to Dr. Margherita Zanasi and Dr. Avron Boretz. Taking your classes and having opportunities to discuss various questions with you have been inspiring and rewarding experiences for me.
    [Show full text]
  • Depoliticization and the Chinese Intellectual Scene Alexander Day Wayne State University, [email protected]
    Criticism Volume 53 | Issue 1 Article 8 2011 Depoliticization and the Chinese Intellectual Scene Alexander Day Wayne State University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/criticism Recommended Citation Day, Alexander (2011) "Depoliticization and the Chinese Intellectual Scene," Criticism: Vol. 53: Iss. 1, Article 8. Available at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/criticism/vol53/iss1/8 depoLiticizatioN it is not easy to construct a Left critique in china today. one has ANd the chiNese to work hard both to differentiate iNteLLectuAL oneself from the socialist past— sceNe especially the contentious period Alexander day of the cultural revolution—and to critique the capitalist present. it is much easier to fall into a liberal the end of the revolution: china position of maintaining an opposi- and the Limits of modernity tion between the market and what by Wang hui. New york: Verso, is considered civil society, on one 2009. pp. xxxiii, 274. $26.95 cloth. side, and the socialist state, on the other. Wang hui, one of the stron- gest critics of contemporary in- equality and the marketization of society and politics in china, argues against the ideological separation of the market and the state that has undergirded much of chinese in- tellectual discourse since the 1980s. this argument is forcefully made in the end of the revolution, a new english-language collection of his essays published by Verso. the book is a difficult read because the thread linking its essays is not always clear; they cover a broad se- ries of topics and were written over more than a decade.
    [Show full text]
  • MA Thesis Yu-Hsuan
    The University of Chicago The New Left vs. Liberal Debate in China: How Ideology Shapes the Perception of Reality By Yu-Hsuan Sun July 2021 A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Masters of Arts Degree in the Masters of Arts Program in the Social Sciences (MAPSS) Faculty Advisor: Marco Garrido Preceptor: Wen Xie Abstract: The tragic June 4th Crackdown on the Tiananmen Student Movement dealt a devastating blow to the hope of China’s democratization. In the 1980s, the majority of young Chinese students expressed overwhelming support for the democracy movement and the New Enlightenment thought trend which preceded the 1989 protests. The homogeneity of the 80s intellectual sphere, however, is a stark contrast to the intense debate between the “New Left” and “Liberal” camps in China which began in the late 1990s. My paper seeks to answer the question: “Why did China’s intellectual homogeneity dissolve so quickly in the 90s?” And more importantly, “What is at stake in those debates between intellectual camps?” To answer these questions, I argue that ideological differences among Chinese intellectuals fundamentally change their perception of China’s post-1989 reality. After the Tiananmen Movement, Deng Xiaoping intensified China’s economic reforms as an answer to both the internal and external crises to his political power after June 4th. While this new wave of reforms brought about unprecedented economic growth and commerce in China, it also created looming social problems such as inequality and corruption. However, these social issues generated polarizing responses from Chinese intellectuals who offered contradicting explanations to these social and economic issues.
    [Show full text]
  • Composing, Revising, and Performing Suzhou Ballads: a Study of Political Control and Artistic Freedom in Tanci, 1949-1964
    Composing, Revising, and Performing Suzhou Ballads: a Study of Political Control and Artistic Freedom in Tanci, 1949-1964 by Stephanie J. Webster-Cheng B.M., Lawrence University, 1996 M.A., University of Pittsburgh, 2003 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Music Department in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2008 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH MUSIC DEPARTMENT This dissertation was presented by Stephanie Webster-Cheng It was defended on [author‟s name] October 31, 2008 and approved by Mark Bender, Associate Professor, East Asian Languages and Literature, Ohio State University Xinmin Liu, Assistant Professor, East Asian Languages and Literature Wenfang Tang, Associate Professor, Political Science Andrew Weintraub, Associate Professor, Music Akin Euba, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Music, Music Dissertation Advisor: Bell Yung, Professor of Music, Music ii Copyright © by Stephanie J. Webster-Cheng 2008 iii Composing, Revising, and Performing Suzhou Ballads: a Study of Political Control and Artistic Freedom in Tanci, 1949-1964 Stephanie J. Webster-Cheng, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2008 This dissertation explores the dynamics of political control of the arts and artistic freedom in the musical storytelling art of Suzhou tanci between 1949 and 1964, years marked by extensive revision of traditional performance repertoire, widespread creation of new, contemporary-themed stories, and composition of boldly innovative ballad music. I examine four stories and ballads either composed or revised during this time, looking broadly at the role of the State in the creative process. I consider the role of high-ranking officials whose personal comments to artists shaped their creative processes, and the role of societal political pressure placed on artists through political movements and shifting trends in the dramatic arts.
    [Show full text]
  • Your Show's Been Cut: the Politics of Intellectual Publicity in China's
    YOUR SHOW’S BEEN CUT: THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PUBLICITY IN CHINA’S BRAVE NEW MEDIA WORLD YUEZHI ZHAO Abstract 118 - This paper examines the increasingly important com- Yuezhi Zhao is Professor munication politics between the media and intellectual and Canada Research fi elds in China’s brave new media world. It starts by outlin- Chair in Political Economy ing key factors that have shaped the evolving post-1989 of Global Communication politics of intellectual publicity in China. It then describes at Simon Fraser University, a deep “liberal versus new left” division within the Chinese and Changjiang Scholar intellectual fi eld and the ascending power of theNanfang Chair Professor at Weekend and liberal intellectual alliance within China’s the Communication CCP-controlled media system. In a subsequent case study, University of China, Beijing; I analyse how the destructive logics of media sensational- e-mail: [email protected]. ism, academic corruption, ideological polarisation, and “lib- eral media instrumentalism” have intersected to spectacu- larise intellectual in-fi ghts and distract both the media and the academy from engaging the public around the urgent Vol.19 (2012), No. 2, pp. 101 2, pp. (2012), No. Vol.19 political economic and social issues of the day. 101 Introduction Chinese media and intellectuals have been extensively studied in their respec- tive relationships vis-à-vis the Chinese state, and more recently, in terms of how they each have been caught “between state and market” or “the party line and the bo om line” (Zhao 1998). There are also studies of prominent Chinese intellectuals working in the media during the Mao era, most notably Deng Tuo, who served as an editor-in-chief of the People’s Daily during the Mao era (Cheek 1997).
    [Show full text]