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Dissertation Final SPINOZA’S METAPHYSICS FROM THE HUMAN PERSPECTIVE Robert Kyle Driggers A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences. Chapel Hill 2018 Approved by: Alan Nelson Andrew Janiak C.D.C. Reeve Mariska Leunissen Thomas Hofweber Ó 2018 Robert Kyle Driggers ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT Robert Kyle Driggers: Spinoza’s Metaphysics from the Human Perspective (Under the direction of Alan Nelson) In this dissertation, I argue that Spinoza intended his metaphysics to be understood from the “human perspective.” On my interpretation, Spinoza’s theory about the fundamental nature of reality—his theory of God’s attributes—is intended to render reality wholly intelligible to human beings. This interpretation contrasts sharply with the vast majority of interpretations of Spinoza’s metaphysics. According to most readers, Spinoza took God to have humanly uncognizable attributes, or, aspects of reality that humans cannot cognize. This commitment threatens the coherence of Spinoza’s philosophy. First, I argue that my Human Perspective Interpretation is licensed by Spinoza’s text—most interpreters take his text to mandate a God’s Perspective Interpretation on which there are humanly uncognizable aspects of reality. I argue that an exhaustive textual analysis reveals that there is no such mandate. Second, I argue that Spinoza’s theory of God’s attributes is a theory about the different ways we conceive God and not a theory about God’s intrinsic nature. The attributes, in other words, are only conceptually distinct from God. Finally, I argue that we ought to prefer the Human Perspective Interpretation because God’s Perspective Interpretations commit Spinoza to the view that he could not understand his own metaphysics. Ultimately, if Spinoza’ project of assisting humans in attaining contentment of mind and virtue is to be successful, his work must be understood from the human perspective. iii To Jennie. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First and foremost, I would like to thank Alan Nelson for his invaluable guidance and assistance with this dissertation and my other scholarly work. I began to study the history of philosophy partway through my graduate students and Alan was the most welcoming faculty member I’ve interacted with at UNC. Thank you. I would also like to thank the other members of my dissertation committee: David Reeve, Andrew Janiak, Mariska Leunissen, and Thomas Hofweber. I appreciate your comments and encouragement and I think that each of you played a really important role in my success as a graduate student. (A special thanks to Mariska for helping me with my four cats!) I also would like to thank Ram Neta for his insightful comments on my work outside of the context of my dissertation. Over ten years ago, I took my first philosophy class with Scott Hestevold at the University of Alabama. I truly believe that I would not be a graduate of UNC with a PhD in Philosophy without his mentorship and I will never be able to fully express my gratitude to him. I would also like to thank my family—Bryant, Martha, Zach, and Emma Driggers for their continued support and encouragement throughout my (lengthy) education. None of this would have been possible without them. And, I want to thank Jennie Minor, who was there with me every day from the frenzied nights leading to my master’s thesis to the final edits on this dissertation. v TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................................................. ix ABBREVIATIONS AND CITATION GUIDE .................................................................................x INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 12 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 12 2. Becoming Acquainted with the “Human Perspective” ........................................................... 12 3. The Human Perspective, Characterized ................................................................................... 16 3.1. The Cognizability Condition ............................................................................................ 17 4. Becoming Acquainted with “God’s Perspective” ................................................................... 18 5. The “Objective” and “Subjective” Interpretations .................................................................. 21 6. The Human Perspective Interpretation, stated ......................................................................... 22 7. Why the Human Perspective Interpretation? ........................................................................... 23 8. The Chapters to Follow ............................................................................................................. 23 CHAPTER 1: SPINOZA’S THEORY OF THE ATTRIBUTES: A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS .... 25 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 25 2. God’s Perspective vs. Human Perspective Interpretations ..................................................... 31 2.1. The Definition of “Attribute” ........................................................................................... 31 2.1.1. Which Intellect? ........................................................................................................ 31 2.1.2. Is the “perception” accurate?.................................................................................... 32 2.1.3. For whom is “attribute” being defined? .................................................................. 33 2.2. The Definition of “God” ................................................................................................... 35 2.3. Deciding between these Interpretations ........................................................................... 37 3. The “Intellect” in the Definition of Attribute .......................................................................... 37 3.1. Does “intellect” refer to only the infinite intellect? ........................................................ 37 3.2. Does “intellect” refer to only the finite intellect?............................................................ 41 3.3. Is the “perception” referred to in that definition inaccurate? ......................................... 41 3.4. Summary ............................................................................................................................ 42 4. The “Infinity” of God’s Attributes ........................................................................................... 43 4.1. Direct Textual Evidence against the Numerosity Interpretation .................................... 43 vi 4.1.1. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Uses of “Infinite” ................................................................ 43 4.1.2. The “Infinite” in the Imagination versus the Intellect ............................................ 46 4.1.3. Texts that Support the Totality Interpretation ......................................................... 51 4.1.4. Are there Texts that Require the Numerosity Interpretation? ................................ 52 4.1.5. 1P9 ............................................................................................................................. 56 4.1.6. 1P8s2 – The Arbitrariness of “Two” Attributes...................................................... 58 4.1.7. Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 60 4.2. “Other Attributes” ............................................................................................................. 61 4.2.1. 2P7s ............................................................................................................................ 61 4.2.2. 2P13d, Letters 64 and 66 .......................................................................................... 64 4.2.3. Letter 56 to Hugo Boxel ........................................................................................... 68 4.2.4. From the Short Treatise ............................................................................................ 73 5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 79 CHAPTER 2: THE CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTION AMONG SUBSTANCE AND ITS ATTRIBUTES IN SPINOZA ................................................ 81 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 81 2. Two Puzzles ............................................................................................................................... 85 2.1. The Identity Puzzle............................................................................................................ 86 2.2. The Simplicity Puzzle ....................................................................................................... 89 2.3. Motivating the Aspect Interpretation ............................................................................... 91 3. Spinoza on “real distinctions” ..................................................................................................
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