A Comparative Study of the National Defence Policies of Singapore and Taiwan Between 1965 and 2008

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A Comparative Study of the National Defence Policies of Singapore and Taiwan between 1965 and 2008

By Shang-su Wu

Thesis for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

2012 Abstract

Research on the defence of small states is limited, particularly states in maritime strategic locations, such as Singapore and Taiwan. While a substantial body of respective research on the security of Singapore and Taiwan is available, there is insufficient comparative research of the national defence of the two states. This dissertation explores and compares the national defence of these two small states in strategic maritime locations. A case-study comparative approach is undertaken in this research of the two countries’ deterrent strategies. This study concludes that Singapore presents a more suitable example for Taiwan in that it is also a small state focusing on keeping the peace and its own survival through the use of appropriate measures of deterrence. The ultimate goal of Taiwan’s deterrence, similar to that of Singapore, is not to engage in war but to maintain the status quo in the short-term. Additionally, Taiwan’s deterrence would also improve Taiwan’s position vis-à-vis China in the long-term as well as bring an assurance that China’s approaches toward Taiwan are firmly based in negotiation and respect for Taiwan.

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………i TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………………….ii Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………….v ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………………………… vi CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION.………….…...…………………………1

1. THE IMPORTANCE OF SINGAPORE AND TAIWAN………………1 1.1 THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF SMALL STATES………………………………1 1.2 SINGAPORE AND TAIWAN……………………………………………………………3

2. LITERATURE REVIEW………………………………………………………7 2.1 NATIONAL DEFENCE AND SMALL STATES……………………………………7 2.2 SINGAPORE………………………………………………………………………………13 2.3 TAIWAN……………………………………………………………………………………..14

3. RESERCH QUESTIONS………………………………………………………16

4. RATIONALE…………………………………………………………………….17

5. RESEARCH APPROACH……………………………………………………18 5.1 DATA RESOURCES………………………………………………………………………20 5.2 TERMINOLOGY……………………………………………………………………………21

6. CHAPTER OUTLINE…………………………………………………………24

CHAPTER TWO DETERRENCE AND SMALL STATES…………27

1. THE GROUNDS FOR DETERRENCE……………………………………27

2. THE EVOLUTION AND CONTEXT OF DETERRENCE……………29

2.1 NUCLEAR ORIGIN………………………………………………………………………29

2.2 CONVENTIONAL EDITIONS OF DETERRENCE………………………………36

3. PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH……………………………………………48

4. SMALL STATE DETERRENCE……………………………………………49

5. THE SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MARITIME SECURITY FOR

SMALL STATES IN MARITIME STRATEGIC LOCATIONS………54

6. CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………57

CHAPTER THREE TAIWAN’S DETERRENCE STRATEGY……59

1. GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND HISTORICAL

BACKGROUN……………………………………………………………………..59

2. AUTHORITARIAN PERIOD (1965-1988)……………………………64

2.1 FROM “RETAKE THE MAINLAND” TO DEFENDING TAIWAN …64

2.2 UNDERMINING EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND STRUGGLING

GENERAL DETERRENCE………………………………………………………78

3. THE PERIOD OF DEMOCRATISATION (1988-2008)……………90

3.1 TRANSFORMATION FROM AUTHORITARIAN REGIME TO

DEMOCRACY (1988-1995)………………………………………………………90

3.2 THE CRISIS PHASE (1995-2000)…………………………………………101

3.3 THE MINORITY GOVERNMENT PHASE (2000-2008)……………110

4. CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………123

CHAPTER FOUR SINGAPORE’S DETERRENCE STRATEGY…129

1. HISTORICAL AND STRATEGIC CONDITIONS……………………129

2. THE ESTABLISHMENT PERIOD (1965-1975)…………………134

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3. THE COLD WAR PERIOD (1975-1990)……………………………151

4. THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD (1990-2008)……..……………164

5. CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………187

CHAPTER FIVE THE COMPARISON OF NATIONAL DEFENCE BETWEEN SINGAPORE AND TAIWAN…….192

1. EXTENDED DETERRENCE………………………………………………192

2. GENERAL DETERRENCE…………………………………………………195

3. THE LESSONS FOR TAIWAN……………………………………………217

BIBILOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………224

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to all those who gave me the capability and resolve to complete this thesis. First of all, I am deeply indebted to my supervisor, Andrew Tian Huat Tan, for his insightful guidance, clear instruction, infinite patience and rapid response to my drafts and questions. His supervision not only significantly accelerated my progress but also set an excellent example to conduct my research. I would also like to thank my co-supervisor, Ji You, for his broad knowledge and advices on my thesis. Next, I very much appreciated the committee of annual progress reviews carried out at the school of social sciences, especially Andrea Benvenuti, for strengthening my thesis through constructive questioning.

I would also like to acknowledge the people who assisted me in conducting interviews and material collection. I appreciate that the interviewees, Chong-pin Lin, Kuo-Cheng Chang in Taiwan and Joshua How Hoang Ho and Bernard Fook Weng Lo in Singapore, accepted my requests for interviews and provided me with appropriate material and ideas. I am also grateful to the staff at my school, Katrina Harrison and Diane Taylor, for helping me to apply for the funding to cover the trip to Singapore.

I am thankful to my friends, Lucian T.H. Hsu, Shao-Yen Chou, and Winston Yu- Tsang Wu, who readily discussed issues relating to my thesis. Thanks also go to my friends in Sydney, James Chuang, Kristine Shalvey, Naomi Murakami, Asano Tomo- nori, Takaaki Kosaka, Fiona Gordon, and Mette Granvik for giving me a balanced life.

I would also like to offer special thanks to my family. Despite suffering from pancreatic cancer, my mother was very interested in my research and life in Aus- tralia through daily Skype conversations in my first year. After she passed away, my father and sisters continued to show interest in my thesis.

Another person I want to thank is my girl friend, Janet Castro. Although we have had an “intercontinental relationship” since the beginning of 2010, her enduring love has been demonstrated from reading my first draft to listening to my rehearsal of the presentation in the postgraduate seminar. Without her thoughtful support, I could have not written my thesis with a peaceful mind.

Newtown, October 2012

Shang-su Wu

ABBREVIATIONS

AAM Air-to-Air Missile

ADC Air Defence Council

AIDC Aero Development Centre

APC Armoured Personnel Carrier

ARF ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations

ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare

AWACS Air Warning and Control System

BVR Beyond-Vision-Range

C3I Command, Control, Communication and

Intelligence

C4I Command, Control, Communication, Computer and

Intelligence

CCP Chinese Communist Party

CIS Chartered Industry of Singapore

CIWS Close-In Weapon System

CPM Communist Party of Malaya

CIST Chungshan Institute of Science and

Technology

DPP Democratic Progress Party

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

FPDA Five Power Defence Arrangement

FRAM Fleet Rehabilitation And Modernisation

GLC Governmental Linked Company

HIMARS High Mobility Artillery Rocket System

IADS Integrated Air Defence System

ICJ International Court of Justice

IDF Indigenous Defence Fighter in Ch. 3; the Israeli

Defence Forces in Ch. 2 and 4

IFV Infantry Fighting Vehicle

IISS International Institute of Strategy Study

IT Information Technology

JCC Joint Consultative Council

KMT Kuomintang, the Chinese Nationalist Party

LCM Landing Craft, Mechanised

LSD Landing Ship, Dock

LST Landing Ship, Tanks

MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group

MAD Mutually Assured Destruction

MAF Malaysian Armed Forces

MBT Main Battle Tank

MC Maritime Command

vii

MINDEF Ministry of Defence

MLRS Multi-Launch Rocket System

MND Ministry of National Defence

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty

PAC-3 Patriot Advanced Capability 3

PAP People’s Action Party

PGM Precise Guided Munitions

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force

PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy

PLANAF People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Force

PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation

PRC People’s Republic of China

PSI Proliferation Security Initiative

R&D Research and Development

RMA Revolution of Military Affairs

RMAF Royal Malaysia Air Force

RMN Royal Malaysia Navy

ROC Republic of China

ROCA Republic of China Army

ROCAF Republic of China Air Force

viii

ROCN Republic of China Navy

ROK Republic of Korea

RSAF Republic of Singapore Air Force

RSN Republic of Singapore Navy

SADC Singapore Air Defence Command

SAF Singapore Armed Forces

SAM Surface-to-Air Missile

SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome

SCDF Singapore Civil Defence Force

SLOC Sea Lines of Communication

SSBN Nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine

SSK Hunter-killer submarine

SSN Nuclear powered attack submarine

ST Singapore Technologies

TMD Theatre Missile Defence

TRA Taiwan Relation Act

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UMNO United Malays National Organisation

UN United Nations

US United States

Chapter One Introduction

1. The Importance of Singapore and Taiwan

1.1 The national security of small states The significance of small states is increasing relative to their number and growing interdependency in the world. More and more countries have come into being since the end of the Second World War, and most of these new countries are small states; this is especially true in terms of their military capabilities. Furthermore, the impact of warfare and other events related to national security is far broader than it was in previous eras. Firstly, growing globalisation, through internationally distributed production chains, trade and other international ties, makes interdependency deeper and tighter. Thus, a small armed conflict may shock the global economy by disturbing those connections across national boundaries.1 Secondly, means of rapid communication such as the internet and the globalised mass media spread the news of these incidents more rapidly and graphically. High definition images of damage and casualties can lead to political effects in democratic countries as a result of the public being moved by what has been witnessed.2 During the past decades, a considerable number of studies have been conducted on bipolar powers and their related issues, while little attention has been given to small states. The existing research on small states places undue emphasis on Europe and Israel due to internationally significant situations, while other small states, including some in strategic maritime locations, have been relatively ignored in comparison. Differing geographical environments have resulted in countries adopting different national defence policies. The national defence policies of small states in strategic maritime locations would necessarily be different from those of Israel and the small states in Europe.

1 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “Globalization, Kitsch and Conflict: Technologies of Work, War and Politics”, Review of International Political Economy, Vol.9, No.1, March 2002, p. 4. 2 This process is also called “CNN effect”. See Piers Robinson, “The Policy-Media Interaction Model: Measuring Media power during Humanitarian Crisis”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No.5, 2000, pp. 613-633.

Strategic maritime positions, also called chokepoints, are specific geographic areas that can be used to easily control or blockade international waterways. The ocean provides limitless access for countries to trade, colonise and project national power, because no country can occupy the ocean and passing through it does not require the permission of any country.3 In addition, sea transport is much cheaper than air or land transport, and forms part of the arterial network of global economic development. However, there are more than twenty islands, peninsulas and other locations worldwide that constitute threats to passage by sea, which are a crucial element of international security.4 Historically, chokepoints have been of serious concern to great powers. Since the beginning of the age of exploration in the fifteenth century, major Western powers, especially the British Empire, competed for and possessed almost every strategic maritime location in the world, for example Aden and Gibraltar.5 Most chokepoints have been successively controlled by various great powers until decolonisation after the Second World War. The security of strategic maritime positions was merely one part of overall power politics before such locations became independent countries. After gaining independence from colonisation, these new countries began to take responsibility for their own security. As chokepoints were targets for both the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, these new, small countries in strategic locations became a prominent focus of international security.6 In the post-Cold War era, strategic maritime positions have been subtly transformed. Most chokepoints are not as militarily significant as they were previously, due to the end of the East-West rivalry. At the same time, the rapid growth of the global economy has magnified the economic importance of

3 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783 (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1965), pp. 25-27. 4 The number of chokepoints identified varies in terms of military technology, international environment and other factors. According to the US scholar Donna J. Nincic, there are 22 chokepoints around the world. For their locations see: Donna J. Nincic, “Sea Lane Security and US Maritime Trade: Chokepoints as Scarce Resources”, in Sam J. Tangredi (Ed.), Globalization and Maritime Power (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002), p. 146. 5 John M. Collins, Military Geography for Professionals and the Public (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998), p. 15. 6 Colin S. Gray & Roger W. Barnett, Sea Power and Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989), pp. 303-305.

2 chokepoints because sea transportation has increased in volume.7 Any armed conflict, especially involving a strategic position may now have far reaching consequences for the world as a whole, including severe political and economic impact. When piracy off the coast of Somalia is able to constitute an international security issue, it is clear that the national security of small states in strategic maritime locations is certainly important.

1.2 Singapore and Taiwan Singapore and Taiwan are significant in terms of security because they occupy strategic maritime positions in the Asia-Pacific, an area with potential for international conflict, as most countries in this region have unresolved sovereignty disputes with their neighbours.8 For example, disputes arising over the South China Sea involve more than seven countries.9 Various territorial controversies in the second half of the twentieth century have resulted in a number of armed conflicts and wars. Furthermore, external great powers may intervene in such conflicts in the Asia-Pacific for their own national interests. For instance, when China attempted to influence the first presidential election in Taiwan in 1996 through military exercises including launching ballistic missiles, the US deployed two carrier battle groups near the Taiwan Strait.10 Since then, there has been ongoing friction between the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the US Navy.11 US-Sino confrontation is another source of potential instability in this area.

7 International seaborne trade more than tripled from 1970 to 2007; the more considerable increase happened after 1990. The UNCTAD Secretariat, Review of Maritime Report 2008 (Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2009), p. 6. 8 There is a series of territory disputes around China. Office of Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of People’s Republic of China 2008 (Washington D.C.: Office of Secretary of Defense, 2008), p. 11. In addition, several sovereignty disagreements exist among Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore. Alex J. Bellamy and Bryn Hughs, “Emancipation and force: the role(s) of the military in Southeast Asia”, in Anthony Bruke and Matt McDonald (Eds.), Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), p. 44. Finally, there are other islands disputed by China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Chang Fang-Ming and Steve Bercic, “Gov't Handling Of Tiaoyutais Strains Taiwan-Japan Ties”, Central News Agency (Taiwan), Jun 20, 2008; Kunitaka Tanaka “Takeshima Mondai” (The Problem of Take Island), (http://www.geocities.jp/tanaka_kunitaka/takeshima/) site accessed 21 November, 2008 9 South China Sea disputes involved at least Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), pp. 36-51. 10 For relative analyses see Greg Austin (Ed.), Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan’s Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power (Canberra: Australian National University, 1997). 11 Those events included the aerial incident in 2001 and the intrusion of Song Class submarine in the

Due to their common characteristics and the relationship of defence issues, Singapore and Taiwan are selected as comparative research subjects. They are both small countries possessing a number of common strategic characteristics: strategic maritime locations, vulnerability, fragmented population construction and short national history. Further to this, the following four characteristics are absent in research into the security of small states. Firstly, geopolitics and maritime strategy significantly influence the history of Singapore and Taiwan. During the British colonial period, London had noticed the strategic values of Singapore and intensively developed it as an important naval base of national interest in the Far East area. After independence, the continuous military deployment of Britain, Australia and New Zealand, and the subsequent Five Power Defence Arrangement demonstrated a high concern of the Commonwealth powers in relation to Singapore. As for Taiwan, a number of powers including Spain, Holland, France, Japan and a few Chinese empires either captured it or attempted to capture it since the sixteenth century and several wars were waged for control it. The powers controlling Taiwan, for example Japan, would often turn it into a base for further expansion. After the US achieved maritime hegemony in the Pacific War, Washington also paid attention to both countries and developed military ties such as its close cooperation partnership in defence and security with Singapore and the Taiwan Relation Act. Secondly, both countries are more vulnerable than other small countries which have been the focus of research. The extremely small size of the territories of Singapore and Taiwan leave them very little space to conduct defence on their own homeland. Moreover, their very limited natural resources mean that Singapore and Taiwan’s economies are orientated towards international trade and highly reliant on imports, including food, fuel and other raw materials. Low self-reliance denotes that they are all the more sensitive to external threats, including low-intensity actions, such as embargoes. Therefore, the survival threats take many forms rather than being purely military ones thus necessitating comprehensive solutions.

Kitty Hawk carrier strike group. “Aerial Incident off the Coast of China”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 95, No. 3, July 2001, pp. 630-633; Office of Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of People’s Republic of China 2007 (Washington D.C.: Office of Secretary of Defense, 2007), p. 2.

Thirdly, neither Singapore nor Taiwan has homogeneous populations. The population in Singapore is ethno-religious pluralist, made up of Chinese (Christian, Buddhist and Confucian), Indian (Muslim, Hindu and Sikh) and Malay (Muslim).12 As neighbouring Malaysia and Indonesia are mainly constituted by Malays, the racial issue in Singapore is more than merely a domestic affair. In Taiwan, while the population is not as complex in composition as that of Singapore, those who fled from China in 1949 with the present regime have occupied significant positions in the government for decades, and their Sinicisation policies have widespread influences, including on national identity.13 The problems of national identity and loyalty are serious and present a common challenge for these countries. Further, this characteristic of heterogeneity is important for research undertaken on small states in general, as more multi-ethnic countries come into being. Fourthly, both research subjects have had short histories as independent countries due to their colonial historical backgrounds. Case studies of security in small states, such as Israel and Finland, can trace their history back for hundreds of years.14 In comparison, Singapore and Taiwan have much shorter histories as sovereign states, and their people have diverse origins and cultures. As a result, forming a will to defend their own country constitutes a formidable challenge in either Singapore or Taiwan. The military links between Singapore and Taiwan must be noted. Taiwan has given significant assistance to the city state in establishing and training its armed forces and this military linkage is still maintained by both sides. For example, Singapore maintains training facilities in Taiwan to this day.15 However, the development of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) later probably surpassed its Taiwanese counterparts in terms of both equipment and conceptions of warfare.

12 Robert W. Hefner, The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), pp. 38-39. 13 The 1.5 million Chinese who came with Chiang from China controlled almost all fields with the KMT organisation and the indigenous Taiwanese merely occupied lower-level positions. John Minns, The Politics of Developmentalism: The Midas States of Mexico, South Korea and Taiwan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p.199. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 14 Although Israel was only established in 1948, it has a profound and historic religion to support its defence will. As for Finland, before independence in 1918, the Finns had a hundred years to foster nationalism during the Russian occupation, from 1815 to 1918. Eino Jutikkala & Kauko Pirinen, Trans. Paul Sjoblom, A history of Finland (London: William Heinemann, 1979), pp. 171-177. 15 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2012, p. 280.

The SAF has dedicated significant efforts to adopting the Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA), expanding its military capabilities and international network of cooperation, as well as maintaining a reasonable life cycle of major weapon systems - goals which the Taiwanese armed forces have had difficulty of achieving.16 The importance of each research subject to the overall research can be attributed to different factors. Singapore’s importance is mostly based on its geographic location, at the point of connection between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This position enables control not only of critical trade routes but also of the main access to oil for China, Japan and other East Asian countries.17 Taiwan does not occupy the same critical position as Singapore, but is potentially a ‘detonator’ in US-Sino relations.18 In addition, although air and sea transport may detour to avoid Taiwan, the increased costs, particularly insurance, and the general disturbance associated with such changes, would still adversely affect the economies of East Asia. Ultimately, while Beijing is developing its “Blue Water Navy”, Taiwan plays a pivotal role in Chinese naval exercises. The PLAN is not only divided into two parts by the Taiwan Strait, but also requires safe access routes to deeper parts of the Pacific for its nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).19 In sum, both research subjects are significant on the matter of international security. While Singapore and Taiwan share similar strategic features and military links, their national defence policies are not identical. Analysing the dissimilar aspects of development of the two countries’ military capabilities is worthwhile within the overall frame of general security research on small states, as it will uncover the factors that lead to dissimilar national defence policies. The following

16 The comparison of the armed forces in Singapore and Taiwan is conducted in the final chapter. 17 Referring to trade, Singapore is the largest container port in the world and 40 percent of the world’s container ships transit there. Furthermore, half of the top ten container ports (Hong Kong, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Pusan and Kaohsiung) are also in the Asia-Pacific region. As for oil, 80 percent of China’s and 70 percent of Japan’s imported oil passes through the Malacca Strait yearly. Jtirg E. Kursener, “Strait of Malacca and Singapore- Unique Chokepoints”, Naval Forces, November 2007, p. 24. 18 The Taiwan Strait is much less significant than the Malacca and Singapore Straits and some sea lines do not pass through it. Ji Guoxing, “SLOC Security in the Asia-Pacific”, Center Occasional Paper Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. (http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Ji%20Guoxing- SLOC%20Security%20in%20the%20Asia%20Pacific.htm) site accessed January 14, 2009. 19 If Taiwan were to be controlled by China, in addition to improving PLAN’s manoeuvrability, the Chinese SSBNs would increase their safety and thus be of greater threat. Peter Howarth, China’s Rising Sea Power: The PLA Navy’s Submarine Challenge (New York: Frank Cass, 2006), pp. 38-40.

6 three factors may explain the differences between the two countries’ national defence policies. Firstly, Taiwan’s national status is different to that of Singapore. The Taipei Authority, formally entitled the Republic of China (ROC), has a long and complex relationship with China, namely the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Despite its de facto independence, components of China are still ubiquitous in Taiwan, from the constitution to the education system.20 At the same time, China also poses the biggest threat to Taiwan’s survival. This represents a somewhat incongruous coexistence of similar identity on the one hand and hostility on the other. Secondly, unlike Taiwan, which has undergone several political transformations, Singapore has been governed continuously by the same party and has never experienced any striking political transitions. Changes in government may therefore have had an effect on national defence. Finally, the geographical conditions of Singapore and Taiwan are dissimilar in terms of size, topography, and climate. The following chapters will discuss the reasons for such different national defence policies, based on these and other factors.

2. Literature Review This section reviews previous academic works examining the defence of small states and the particular research subjects. Consequently, there are three categories of literature: national defence of small states, Singapore’s defence and Taiwan’s defence.

2.1 National Defence of Small States Approaches to defence of small states can be divided into four groups: traditional defence, non-offensive defence, the Israeli model, and asymmetric conflicts.21 Traditional defence places emphasis on defence capability and alliances;

20 The Constitution of ROC was drawn up and ratified in China. See Denny Roy, Taiwan: A Political History (New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 83, 96. 21 There are other terms for the same concept. For example, Wilhelm Agrell used “alternative defence”, and Bjørn Møller adopted “Non-offensive defence”. Wilhelm Agrell, “Small but Not Beautiful”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 21, No. 2, Special Issue on Alternative Defense, June 1984, p. 158; Bjørn Møller, “Small States, Non-offensive Defence and Collective Security”, in Efraim Inbar and Gabriel Sheffer (Eds.), The National Security of Small States in a Changing World (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 127.

7 non-offensive defence proposes that small states resolve security problems by themselves; Israel is in a separate group due its unique characteristics such as its high possibility of using force; and, finally, research on asymmetric conflicts provides some possible strategies for small states to defend or deter more powerful countries. The traditional defence approach, based on Realism, illustrates the security of small states through balance of power. Michael Handel et al stated that small states cannot resolve security problems using their own power alone. Thus, when small states wish to overcome a given situation, they must increase their power by ‘borrowing’ from others’ in the form of alliances. If increasing defence and alliances are unable to deter the enemy, small states must ‘hold on’ long enough to receive support from other countries. Hence, traditional defence focuses on internally promoting the national defensive capability, and externally forming alliances with great power.22 There are several faults associated with traditional defence. The most obvious one is that it is becoming outdated. Michael Handel’s Weak States in the International System was published in 1981 but the international environment has undergone a series of dramatic transformations since then. Technology has also made astounding leaps forward since the 1980s and has certainly been influential on small states’ defence. For example, the RMA has in some way affected the way small states are able to strengthen their defence capability.23 Clearly, there is scope here for a great deal more research into the post-Cold War period. Finally, the threats small states confront and appropriate solutions to them are often comprehensive rather than only of a military dimension. Thus, traditional defence is insufficient to analyse small state security. With respect to support from a third party, traditional defence can be related to an approach to small state defence, namely extended deterrence. Extended deterrence, literally, is when a ‘protector’ country extends its deterrence to protect a protégé country against attack from a ‘challenger’ country. In this triangular

22 David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 59-86; Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System (London: Frank Cass, 1981), pp. 78-103, 121-152. 23 The concept of RMA is discussed in the second, third and fourth chapters.

8 system, protector and challenger—usually great or regional powers—are the major subjects, and small states usually play the role of the protégé.24 Regarding the relationship between protector and protégé, Gerald L. Sorokin pointed out that alliance is not the only element of successful extended deterrence. Taking Israel as an example, the interest and defence capability of the protégé are more important than alliances.25 Vesna Danilovic also addressed interest as a critical factor in extended deterrence. Among the factors determining the interest of a protégé, she notes that geographical location is more influential than natural resources in a protector’s decision-making.26 As for the deterrent effect toward a challenger, Paul K. Huth concluded that alliances, economic and military-political ties such as trade and arms transfer have nothing to do with successful deterrence, based on statistics from historic events.27 Extended deterrence is a good but incomplete research instrument to analyse the external strategic situation of small states. The focus of extended deterrence is distributed among the three players, and the protégé, usually a small state, is neglected, because of their relatively lesser power. Also, the inner issues of small states are not the primary concern of extended deterrence; nevertheless, national defence encompasses many internal issues. Thus, extended deterrence is insufficient for research on the security of small states. With the tense situation of the Cold War, it is hardly surprising that an alternative to traditional defence was conceived and that it has since attracted considerable attention. Non-offensive defence is an independent defence strategy conducted on a country’s territory using purely defensive measures.28 In the literature, four aspects of non-offensive defence are examined: people’s participation in military, pure defence, multi-dimensional and independence. Adam Robert’s work has reviewed the history and form of people’s

24 In some exceptional cases, small states protected weaker countries. For example, Greece tried to extend deterrence to stop Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus in 1974. Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (London: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 25. 25 Gerald L. Sorokin, “Alliance Formation and General Deterrence: A Game-Theoretic Model and the Case of Israel”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 2, June 1994, pp. 299, 302-304, 315. 26 Vesna Danilovic, “The Source of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.45, No.3, June 2001, pp. 348-350. 27 Ibid, pp. 82-83. 28 Adam Robert, Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 7.

9 participation in the military. A citizen’s involvement in the military can be seen as a form of political participation, and this observation matched Gunnar Åselius’ Swedish case study. 29 George J. Stein indicated this sort of system enables small states like Switzerland to optimise their human resources for defence.30 Regarding the second aspect, pure defence, Bjørn Møller observed that, a security policy that does not consider an adversary’s perceptions is counter-productive, and often brings about arms races and pre-emptive strikes during a crisis. Non-offensive defence can resolve the security dilemma because it only fortifies one side’s security and does not decrease that of the other side.31 The question then arises as to how to determine whether forces are defensive or offensive: total military structure and the posture of units is the answer offered by Møller.32 In his case study of Switzerland, Dietrich Fischer added that national policies and historical records help to clarify intentions for dual-purpose weapons, such as fighter planes.33 Finally, Wilhelm Agrell focused on the effects of technology, such as precision guided munitions (PGM), in non-offensive defence.34 Regarding the third aspect, Håkan Wiberg argues that territorial defence has not only a military dimension but also a multi-dimensional strategy. He concluded that there are four dimensions: military, economic, social and cultural. 35 The case studies of Switzerland and Austria also verify that these dimensions exist in both countries’ security policies.36 Finally, as many scholars including Bjørn Møller and Håkan Wiberg have maintained the drawbacks of alliances are the ‘abandonment versus

29 This issue also led to a long-term strategy debate in Sweden. Ibid, pp. 15-37, 247; Gunnar Åselius, “Swedish Strategic Culture after 1945”, Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2005, pp. 30, 36-39. 30 After mobilisation, the density of Swiss soldiers would be higher than NATO by two to three times. George J. Stein, “Total Defence: A Comparative Overview of the Security Policies of Switzerland and Austria”, Defence Analysis, Vo.6, No.1, 1990, p. 21. 31 Bjørn Møller, “Small States, Non-offensive Defence and Collective Security”, p. 130. 32 Ibid, pp. 132-133. 33 Switzerland used historical records to prove its offensive weapons are used only in its territory. Dietrich Fischer, “Invulnerability without Threat: The Swiss Concept of General Defense”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1982, pp. 217-218. 34 Wilhelm Agrell, “Small but Not Beautiful”, pp. 161-163; Bjørn Møller, “Small States, Non-offensive Defence and Collective Security”, p. 138. 35 Håkan Wiberg, “The Security of Small Nations: Challenges and Defences”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 24, No. 4, December 1987, pp. 339-343. 36 George J. Stein, “Total Defence: A Comparative Overview of the Security Policies of Switzerland and Austria”, pp. 18-20, 25; Dietrich Fischer, “Invulnerability without Threat: The Swiss Concept of General Defense”, pp. 216-217.

10 entrapment’ dilemma, and hostility. The former refers to a situation of distrust within an alliance where small states are afraid of being abandoned by the great power(s) who in turn are worried about being entrapped into unexpected or undesired conflicts. An alliance would be matter of several scenarios involving one or more potential enemies and thus hostility is stirred up. As a result, small states should try to avoid or diversify dependency (security, economy and so on) on great powers and try to unite with other small states.37 There are several newer studies like that of Bjørn Møller’s that investigate territorial defence in the post-Cold War era, but their unsuitability for this comparative study is evident. Firstly, the independence principle is not compatible with the situation of Singapore and Taiwan. For example, territorial defence is unable to explain why the Five Power Defence Agreement exists. Secondly, non- offensive defence is incapable of dealing with the maritime environment. It cannot be applied in the case of small coastal states in the matter how to independently keep SLOCs accessible while facing blockades or other seaward threats, especially for non-self-sufficient strategic material such as petroleum. Finally, non-offensive defence proposes no solution for small states with tiny strategic depth such as Singapore, because these countries have no space to absorb thrust or undertake defence operations on their own territory. Hence, it is apparent that current research on non-offensive defence cannot supply this study with sufficient material or framework. As Efraim Inbar has noted, Israel is uniquely characterised by its power which is based on self-reliance and unilaterally deterrent characteristics.38 Avner Yaniv held a positive attitude toward the Israeli model maintaining that Israel’s conventional deterrence, despite its many imperfections, had been a resounding success, before the First Intifada.39 However, in the late 1990s, Inbar stated that

37 Bjørn Møller, “Small States, Non-offensive Defence and Collective Security”, pp. 143-145; Håkan Wiberg, “The Security of Small Nations: Challenges and Defences”, pp. 349-357. 38 David Ben-Gurion, the first Prime Minister of Israel, who developed the Israeli power-based and self- reliance strategy when founding the state, “hoped to achieve a capacity to respond unilaterally to any emerging security challenges and to establish a deterrent power”. Efraim Inbar, “Contours of Israel's New Strategic Thinking”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 42-45. 39 Avner Yaniv, “Israel’s Conventional Deterrent: A Reappraisal”, in Louis René Beres (Ed.), Security or Armageddon: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Health and Company, 1986), pp. 45, 49, 50-58.

Israeli conventional deterrence was problematic. In spite of a strong military capability, the Israel Defence Force (IDF) could not achieve its strategic or political goals, either against the Arabic countries or the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).40 During the first decade of the twenty-first century, Sanu Kainikara and Russell Parkin concluded that, despite its excellent armed forces, which are much better than those of its neighbouring countries, Israeli deterrence is still being eroded by irregular warfare and the international environment.41 The Israeli model is unfit for this research for several reasons. Firstly, Israel uses force more daringly than other countries because it believes in enhancing deterrence credibility by waging warfare. It is tactically referable for other small states but presents difficulties for use as an overall research framework. Secondly, although Israel is a coastal country as well, the maritime environment has not played a salient part in national defence strategy. Most decisive military operations of the IDF or its enemies have been conducted onshore and in the air. Thirdly, the Jewish State has an extraordinary relationship with Washington D.C. and it is hard to find another small state with such a strong advantage. The literature on asymmetric conflict is completely focused on how small states fight against (a) stronger invader(s). Several successful cases of asymmetric conflict following the Second World War contradicted Realism and have been explored through academic research. Andrew Mack made use of the asymmetric structure between the two sides to explain the outcomes of wars in Vietnam, Algeria and other places.42 Unsatisfied with Mack’s theory, Ivan Arreguin-Toft conceived a strategic interaction theory, drawing on the historic statistical database. The trend he perceived indicated that small states have enjoyed higher and higher rates of victory.43 While asymmetric conflict research offers a better understanding of warfare between weak and strong countries, there are some disadvantages associated

40 Efraim Inbar, “Israeli National Security, 1973-96”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 555, Israel in Transition (Jan. 1998), pp. 72-78, 81. 41 Sanu Kainikara & Russell Parkin, Pathways to Victory: Observations from the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah Conflict (Tuggeranong, Australia: Air Power Development Centre, 2007), pp. 7-10, 12-16. 42 Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict”, World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2, January 1975, pp. 181-189. 43 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict”, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1, Summer 2001, pp. 99-112, 124-128.

with this approach. Firstly, asymmetric conflicts are based on events that have occurred; therefore, this approach is not entirely applicable to this research because it hardly describes and explains situations in peacetime. Secondly, this kind of research tends to generalise across cases and has not emphasised classification of diverse cases. Thus, the case of small states in strategic maritime locations has not yet been elaborated.

2.2 Singapore A growing number of studies are now available to shed some light on Singapore’s national defence. While some research has focused on the military and related issues such as total defence, some examines different perspectives such as security sectors and the perception of security. Much of the research on Singapore emphasises the military. Tim Huxley’s comprehensive work outlines the vulnerabilities of and threats to Singapore, for example its lack of hinterland, and discusses how government strategy and policies react to these.44 However, as his book was published prior to 11 September 2001, it is a little outdated and has been supplemented by the later work of Felix K. Chang, Ron Matthews and Nellie Zhang Yan, whose work follows up on subsequent organisational reforms, military build-up and other developments.45 Some research, however, has taken a different approach examining aspects other than the military. From the standpoint of Realism, Narayanan Ganesan connected internal and external security challenges in Singapore, analysing the interaction between both sides and how the People’s Action Party manipulated them.46 See Seng Tan and Alvin Chew examined it from a unique viewpoint, that of security sector governance, and addressed new issues such as sanitation threats to discuss the expanding security concept and organisational reform in Singapore. For instance, the crisis of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 promoted organisational integration in the Singaporean government. Moreover, the

44 Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2000). 45 Felix K. Chang, “In Defence of Singapore”, Orbis, Vo.47, No.1, Winter 2003, pp. 114-123; Ron Matthews and Nellie Zhang Yan, “Small Country ‘Total Defence’: A Case Study of Singapore”, Defence Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3, September 2007, pp. 381-395. 46 Narayanan Ganesan, “Singapore: Realist cum Trading State”, in Muthian Alagappa (Ed.), Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influence (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 579-606.

13 authors explored the characteristics of Singapore’s security by comparing it with neighbouring and Western countries.47 In the literature on Singapore’s defence, what seems to be lacking is comparison rather than analysis. While many comparisons are conducted to draw a contrast between potential enemies such as Malaysia and to illustrate a strategic situation, little research has been done to compare Singapore with nations in similar situations, especially Taiwan. 48 Comparison not only clarifies the superiorities and inferiorities of Singapore’s defence, but can also use the lessons of Singapore’s defence to contribute to the understanding of other small states and advance academic research in this area.

2.3 Taiwan Due to the general tension in the Taiwan Strait, concern over Taiwan’s defence has been growing and several themes appeal to researchers. The first focus is the strategy adopted by the Taipei Authority. A review of the evolution of Taiwan’s defence strategy is required to clarify this matter. Historically, Taiwan’s defence underwent several transformations after the Second World War, but there is no general agreement on a time scale. A number of works marked time frame using diverse criteria such as presidencies, international and domestic events, and the campaigns in the Taiwan Strait or a combination of all three criteria. Nevertheless, there is agreement across the literature that there was an evolution from offensive to defensive.49 Moreover, historical review is conducted in only a few academic works and most of these reviews are very brief. Although Bernard D. Cole

47 See Seng Tan & Alvin Chew, “Governing Singapore’s Security Sector: Problems, Prospects and Paradox”, Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2, August 2008, pp. 242-245, 250-251. 48 For example, “Singapore, Malaysia and Singapore: strategic comparisons, 2000” in Huxley’s book. Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore, p. 64. 49 Bernard D. Cole viewed the battle in 1962 as the first turning point, and changes in the international environment in the mid 1970s as the second one. Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang followed Presidencies. Michael D. Swaine examined the severing of diplomatic relations with the US in 1979 and democratisation. Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 52-53; Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “A National Defense Strategy for Taiwan in the New Century”, in Peter C. Y. Chow (Ed.), The “One China” Dilemma (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 257-260; Michael D. Swaine, “Taiwan’s Defense Reforms and Military Modernization Program: Objective, Achievements, and Obstacles”, in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Ed.), Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan- China Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 137-138.

14 spent a chapter discussing historic events, some important factors such as the regiment of Japanese military advisors were neglected.50 Michael D. Swaine claimed that there has long been no comprehensive defence strategy in Taiwan and there are political obstacles to forming one.51 While some work has been done on Taiwan’s defence strategy, more attention has been paid to Taiwan’s defence reforms. Apart from highly political slogans, major governmental guidelines for defence strategy have been absent except for some opaque concepts proposed in the 1990s. Unlike the complete concept of ‘total defence’ in Singapore, the guidelines from Taipei are too short to comprehensively encompass national defence.52 Consequently, researchers have concentrated on the defence conditions and a discussion of several possible scenarios about armed conflicts. It was noted by Michael S. Chase that while the massive military reform since the 1990s was very broad, it was still hindered by many factors.53 Andrew Yang’s paper presents a clear view of a variety of projects in the reform.54 Regarding the defence conditions, as observed by David Shambaugh et al., Taiwan’s primary defence advantages lie in its natural conditions.55 As to analysing possible scenarios of conflicts in the Taiwan Strait, the papers edited by Steve Tsang provide extensive discussions.56 In addition to insufficient historical review, research on Taiwan’s defence

50 After withdrawing to Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek recruited a group of ex-Japanese officers to train soldiers and educate high-ranking officers. They worked in Taiwan for about 30 years. Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects, pp. 13-31; Kiyoshi Ogasawara, “Syoukaisei!Wo Sukuuta Nihonsyokoutan!\Chiang Kai-shek’s Japanese Military Advisor Group^ȿ-!Bunshun, August, 1981, pp. 158-166 (Translation by author). 51 Michael D. Swaine, “Taiwan’s Defense Reforms and Military Modernization Program: Objective, Achievements, and Obstacles”, pp. 138-139, 144-145, 147. 52 There were also some guidelines during Chiang Cing-kuo’s presidency that were more like political propaganda than defence strategy, for example: “reunification with the three principles of the people” and “peaceful unification”. The guidelines in the 1990s were “resolute defence, effective deterrence”. Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “A National Defense Strategy for Taiwan in the New Century”. 53 Michael S. Chase, “Defense Reform in Taiwan: Problems and Prospects”, Asian Survey, Vol. 45, Issue 3(Oct. 2005), pp. 363-379. 54 Andrew Yang, “Taiwan’s Preparation against Beijing’s Military Attacks”, in Shiping Hua (Ed), Reflections on the Triangular Relations of Beijing-Taipei-Washington Since 1995 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 179-189. 55 David Shambaugh, “A Matter of Time: Taiwan’s Eroding Military Advantage”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2, Spring 2000, pp. 122-123; Chong-Pin Lin, “The Military Balance in the Taiwan Straits”, The China Quarterly, No. 146, Special Issue: China's Military in Transition, June 1996, p. 591. 56 Steve Tsang (Ed.), If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics (London: Routledge, 2006).

15 suffers from two further shortcomings. Firstly, the overall or basic strategies of national defence for Taiwan have not been fully discussed, especially from the perspective of a small state. Many American studies, aimed at policy-making in the White House, the State Department or the Pentagon, were inclined to exclude potentially provocative options such as pre-emptive strike. Research from the perspective of Taipei is still sparse. Secondly, in a similar fashion to the literature on Singapore, comparison is absent. While the case of Taiwan’s defence is somewhat unique, it has many similarities with other small states. Lastly, academic studies of Taiwan’s national identity and other related topics are rarely addressed by the literature on defence, while these are mentioned in most of the research on Singapore.

3. Research Questions: This study focuses on small state security. It addresses several primary research questions, as follows:

(1) How do small states such as Singapore and Taiwan ensure their survival in an anarchic international environment through their national defence policies?

Using the cases of Singapore and Taiwan, this paper examines the means by which a small country’s defence policy can respond to a variety of challenges. In an international society without any authority superior to a country’s sovereignty, survival is the main objective of national defence policies and military power is the last resort for countries to ensure their survival. However, due to their narrow strategic depth, relatively weak military capabilities and other vulnerabilities, small states are often in an inferior position when force is used. Furthermore, the types of threats faced by small states are not confined to the military realm. Thus, a comprehensive policy of defence that is broader than the portfolio of the national defence ministry, along with appropriate international security arrangements is required. For decades both Singapore and Taiwan have faced such circumstances; as such, their experiences may be useful examples for other small states.

(2) What are the differentiating factors in the defence policies of Singapore and Taiwan?

The diverse development of national defence in Singapore and Taiwan reflects a range of factors pertinent to small states that are crucial to national defence. Apart from the obvious factors such as geographic conditions, other less obvious aspects are worthy of analysis. Through individual review and comparison, those factors are elucidated and may be useful for further research.

(3) What can Taiwan learn from Singapore’s approach to national defence?

The effectiveness of national defence often arises from the accumulation of long-term management efforts. This study proposes that Singapore is more effective than Taiwan in terms of defence for a number of reasons, including different statehood, domestic politics, diplomatic strategies, economic development and so on. These reasons are analysed in the final chapter. This is not to say that Singapore is unequivocally stronger than Taiwan in terms of national defence, but that Singapore presents an important lesson for Taiwan. This study further addresses this hypothesis in Chapter Five.

4. Rationale Summarising the context above, there are three arguments arising in this study. Firstly, SLOCs are crucial to global economy and security. The security of chokepoints is closely associated with SLOCs, and thus is an important issue on an international level. Secondly, as the literature review indicated, very few attempts have been made to analyse the security of small states in strategic maritime locations. Such cases, like Taiwan, are best covered in the research on small state security. Finally, although individual studies have been conducted on the two research subjects, there has not yet been a comparative study. Comparing these two small countries will also provide a more objective understanding of their security.

5. Research Approach The method used to carry out this strategic study is a case-study comparative research approach. A qualitative approach is more suitable than a quantitative one due to the limited number of conflicts and other significant events occurring in these research subjects. Furthermore, it is not possible to quantify many elements, such as scenario reasoning. Nonetheless, simple static methods may be utilised for some quantitative data, such as defence budgets. Associated strategic theories such as Realism and deterrence theories will be employed in this strategic research. Realism is instructive for this research because several core concepts including anarchy and balance of power are the basis for this study. Whilst there is still no supranational organisation or a world government capable of ensuring national survival, anarchy certainly affects the international system, and consequently most states rely on their own power, particularly military force, to protect themselves. When states sometimes find that their own power is insufficient for their security, a common reaction is to borrow the power of others to ‘balance’ an enemy or a potential enemy, this being defined as balance of power. The premise of the state as a unitary actor in Realism must be adjusted to fit this study. In Realism, a country is supposed to be a whole and rational actor, but this study will not treat the research subjects as whole or perfectly rational. It is necessary to recognise various factors at work within a country, in particular as this research will deal with domestically fractured situations, especially in the case of Taiwan. The concepts of deterrence will be employed as a research instrument in this study for two reasons. Firstly, deterrence can effectively explain national defence in peace time. Singapore has not been involved in any war since it became independent, and there have been no major battles in the Taiwan Strait since 1965.57 It is possible to discuss, through deterrence, the relationship between peace and national defence for the two research subjects. Secondly, the concepts of deterrence can be applied to analyse themes on different levels of national defence.

57 Alexander C. Huang, Chinese Warfighting - The PLA Experience since 1949 (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), p. 245.

Three types of deterrence, extended deterrence, general deterrence and immediate deterrence, correspond to three levels of national defence: international, domestic and individual scenarios. Extended deterrence is useful in illustrating the international surroundings of small states. Allying or cooperating with great powers to balance external threats is one method in the Singaporean and Taiwanese national defence. A triangular model aids in elucidating strategic interaction between protégé, protector and challenger. General deterrence is used to broadly investigate national strategies. When its goal is to protect the status quo, general deterrence can demonstrate how decision-makers in Singapore and Taipei conceive of grand strategies. For vulnerable small countries with limited resources and strategic depth, defence concerns usually go beyond the military sphere and include civil defence measures. Immediate deterrence refers to the phase in which the challenger has already taken action against the status quo, such as military deployment, but armed conflict has not yet broken out.58 In such a situation, the deduction of scenarios is the method employed to analyse immediate deterrence, because the probability of reaching specific strategic goals determines whether the deterrence will eventually work. In other words, the potential outcomes of a scenario would explain why it occurs or not. Additionally, since the operation plans and/or other official information concerning Singapore and Taiwan’s reactions to the scenarios are definitely classified, scenario deduction based on public information on the military capability of these countries would provide a feasible solution. Finally, some recent factors that may significantly affect the scenarios are included, especially those relating to Taiwan. For instance, cyber warfare would be an important factor in the scenarios relating to Taiwan. As one of the major sources of international internet hacking, China is highly likely to possess experience and human capability to carry out cyber operations.59 In addition, the common language of communication, the increase in commercial ties across the Taiwan

58 Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1, March 1993, p. 62. 59 Cyber warfare is considered a major threat to national security by the British defence review, as it can paralyse specific websites and infrastructure. China has been blamed for several internet attacks, despite Beijing’s denial. Anthony Dhanendran, Computeractive, October 28, 2010, p. 64.

Strait and other advantages decreases any difficulties the PLA might have in launching such attacks against Taiwan. These factors are further elaborated in the third chapter. A three-level framework, integrating the three types of aforementioned deterrence, is utilised to analyse the research subjects. While the framework is intended to cover a set of instruments that may ensure the security of a state, such as economy and diplomacy, the focal point of this study is the role of hard military defence, given its importance in Taiwan and Singapore. There are three reasons for this focus. Firstly, the two countries’ practices reflect their close attention to military matters: for instance, both armed forces are large relative to their populations.60 Secondly, the effectiveness of other instruments of national security such as economy is limited. For example, the economy is unable to replace armed forces as the backbone of repulsing or denying an invasion. Furthermore, the effort on economic defence is usually aimed at decreasing vulnerability to a certain degree, rather than actively punishing or denying an adversary action. 61 Similarly, education and other domestic policies are mainly designed to support military defence, not to replace it. Finally, chokepoints and their high importance are of strategic value. In other words, a country’s control of a chokepoint through its armed forces is essential to international security.

5.1 Data Resources This study mainly relies on public resources, including primary and secondary, which can be supplemented with information from interviews. National security is usually a sensitive topic for most countries, including Singapore and Taiwan. Accordingly, using public resources will enable this study to respect the research subjects’ sovereignty, regulations and other national interests. Interviews will be conducted using appropriate questions and the subjects are personnel involved in

60 Both Singapore and Taiwan have large armed forces. There are72,500 active soldiers in Singapore and 290,000 active soldiers in Taiwan. As for reserve, Singapore has 312, 500 soldiers and Taiwan has 1, 657, 000 soldiers. The number is larger than for many countries, even some regional powers such as Australia (54,747 soldiers active; 19,915 soldiers in reserve). The IISS, The Military Balance 2009, pp. 377, 407, 410. 61 Economy is one weapon in the arsenal of the great powers that is not available to small states, except for major oil-producing countries. Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System, p. 242.

20 defence policies in Singapore and Taiwan. Public resources relating to Taiwan’s defence are grouped into two types: official (primary) and civil (secondary). Officially, the Ministry of Defence in Taipei has a website enabling a search of historical files, down-loading official publications, such as the Quadrennial Defence Review, and news announcements. Furthermore, the Military and Translation Office in the Ministry of Defence published a series of books about military history and the military history museum in Taipei exhibits some historical data as well. Finally, reports and other information from the U.S. or authoritative governmental defence departments are relevant, despite being secondary. In addition, newspapers and other mass media will serve to give information on events such as accidents. The quality and authenticity of these materials are uncertain and they will be handled with caution. Lastly, several international defence journals, such as Jean’s Defence Weekly, and some reports and articles from research institutes, such as RAND, will be utilised in this study, as well as a number of annual reference works such as SIPRI Yearbook. Public resources about Singapore are also classified as official and civil. Under the strategy of total defence, several official websites, in addition to those of the Ministry of Defence, will be the primary resources for this study. Similarly, the main focus for official publications will be those from the Ministry of Defence, such as Pointer, but those from other departments will also be included if necessary. In addition, the respective museums of the Army and Air Force in Singapore as well as the Singapore Discovery Centre for promoting the policy of total defence are also official resources. Finally, evaluations and other correlative releases from the U.S. and the members of the Five Power Defence Agreement are also useful official information, despite being secondary resources. As for civil resources, this study will use information from Singaporean mass media, The Straits Times for example, to gain non-official perspectives. Global and regional defence journals, such as Asia- Pacific Defense Forum, as well as other literature like Military Balance are important external resources.

5.2 Terminology There are three groups of terms that need to be defined. One group is those

21 terms associated with Taiwan. The first is the name of the government in Taiwan. Since 1949, there have been many names referring to the regime in Taipei, such as the official “Republic of China”, “Nationalist”, “Free China”, “Kuomintang” or “KMT”, Taiwan and so on.62 To avoid confusing the ROC with the PRC, unless mentioning the precise official name of the government, this study will avoid using “Republic of China” or its acronym, “ROC”. As to “Nationalist”, “Kuomintang” and “KMT”, they represent the same party. Since they were not the governing party between 2000 and 2008, these expressions are no longer suitable. This study is will use “Taiwan”, “Formosa”, “the Taipei Authority”, “the ROC regime” and “Taipei” chiefly and this government will be treated as a country, not a rebellion group or one side of a civil war in China. It must be noted that despite less frequent usage in recent years, “Formosa” has been the term used for Taiwan in several major international treaties, such as the San Francisco treaty between Japan and 51 Allied countries in 1951.63 Thus, Formosa is also adopted for usage in this study, referring to the islands rather than the government. Furthermore, although the ROC government fled to Formosa in 1949 and lost its control of almost all of China, this regime brought with such factors as China’s membership of the United Nations, and the few islands close to China’s coastline, amongst others. In order to clarify complicated connections such as these, the term “ROC regime” must be used in certain contexts. As the official names of Taiwan’s armed forces are still related to the ROC regime, their official names, such as the ROC Navy or the ROCN, need to be used as they stand. Finally, to the geographic area of China, the culture of China and the People’s Republic of China, where the confusion might arise, clarification will be given. The second group is the general terms used in this study. Despite being subtly different, ‘country’, ‘nation’ and ‘state’ in this research all represent the same concept-that of sovereignty. Further, there are two meanings of the word ‘power’: one refers to the influence or strength of countries and the other is synonymous with strong and influential countries.64 To distinguish between the two, this study

62 Chi-lin Yang, Military Politics in the Transition Democracy: Changing Civil-Military Relations in the Republic of China (Taiwan), 1949-1994, PhD Dissertation, State University of New York, 1996, p. 14. 63 Trong R. Chai, “The Future of Taiwan”, Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 12, December 1986, pp. 1313-1315. 64 These countries have a greater number of strategic and economic interests and greater capacity for

22 will use ‘great power(s)’ to refer to strong countries with global influence, such as the U.S. ‘Small states’ in this thesis refer to countries that are unable to significantly improve security on their own.65 Despite a number of criteria measuring power, such as GDP, population and defence expenditure, such criteria are inadequate to analyse the security capabilities of Singapore and Taiwan. Both of these small states have increased their GDP, population and defence expenditure since 1965 considerably, but their vulnerable strategic conditions have not been essentially altered. Both Singapore and Taiwan continue to remain unable to significantly change their geo-strategic circumstances. ‘National defence policy’ denotes a synthesis of the Singaporean and Taiwanese official definitions. Singapore’s official definition of ‘defence policy’ is “to ensure that Singapore enjoys peace and stability, and that Singapore’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are protected”.66 The official definition of ‘national defence policy’ by the ROC regime is “to defend its free and democratic society from external aggression and to promote the peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific”. 67 Both countries noted the integration with non-military sectors as part of their defence policies aimed at compensating for vulnerabilities, but Singapore has a comprehensive concept of total defence.68 As Singapore and Taiwan face considerable difficulty in maintaining the status quo due to being small states, searching for external countervailing assistance is not mentioned but observed in their defence policies.69 By and large, ‘national defence policy’ in this thesis refers to governmental efforts to preserve national interests, mainly peace

projection; they tend to become involved in more international disputes than less powerful states. Renato Corbetta & William J. Dixon, “Multilateralism, Major Powers, and Militarized Disputes”, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 1, March 2004, p. 5. 65 Robert Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemma: Small States in International Politics”, International Organisation, Vol. 23, No. 2, p. 296. 66 “Defence Policy”, Ministry of Defence, Singapore (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_us/defence_policy.html) site accessed 16 August, 2012. 67 The Government Information Office, the Republic of China (Taiwan), the Republic of China Yearbook 2011 (Taipei: The Government Information Office, 2012), p. 92. 68 “National Defense Report 2009”, the Ministry of Defense (http://163.29.3.66/english/index_01.html) site accessed 16 August, 2012; “What Is Total Defence”, Total Defence (http://www.totaldefence.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/totaldefence/about_td.html) site accessed 16 August, 2012. 69 Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke, Strategies of Survival: the Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States(St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1978), pp. 5-6

23 and sovereignty, through international and domestic means to deter one or more potential enemies in challenging the status quo. These military and civil efforts are examined in specific scenarios. Lastly, various deterrence concepts such as ‘first strike’ are used in this dissertation and some modifications are necessary. Most deterrence concepts were developed for nuclear strategies during the Cold War and different conditions mean that they do not fully encompass the particular context of this study’s research subjects. The review and modification of these deterrence concepts will be discussed in the next chapter.

6. Chapter Outline Ch. 1 Introduction Ch. 2 Theories of Small States’ Survival The second chapter investigates deterrence and other strategic theories in order to establish the appropriate conceptual tools for examining the national defence policies of Singapore and Taiwan, respectively. This chapter first reviews the development of deterrence, including its genesis in nuclear strategies, and then goes on to discuss the ways in which concepts of nuclear deterrence can be modified and lessons that can be learned from conventional deterrence in order to suit the conditions of the research subjects. A number of cases of conventional deterrence and the lessons to be learned from them are also highlighted within this chapter. Lastly, other theories applicable to the circumstances of Singapore and Taiwan, such as strategic maritime theory, are discussed and examined.

Ch. 3 Review of Taiwan’s National Defence As a starting point for the period under research, 1965 represents a turning point in the strategic situation in the Taiwan Strait. During that year, several conditions including China’s nuclear weapons and anti-ship missiles plus the three failed naval conflicts in the Taiwan Strait made the offensive operation toward China infeasible.70 As a result, Taipei implicitly abandoned preparations for its

70 These conditions are further discussed in the third chapter.

24 large-scale operation to “retake the mainland”, and its strategic situation in the Taiwan Strait began to evolve from one of offence to defence.71 A three-level research framework of deterrence is utilised to review the development of national defence in Taiwan. As traditional rational assumptions are inadequate to examine the unique, dual-national ideology of Taiwan, political, social and economic factors are included at the general deterrence level, along with the application of additional theories such as prospect theory.72 In terms of military capability, Taiwan’s development of armed forces is also reviewed at the general deterrence level, with various scenarios addressed at the immediate deterrence level. The timeframe of the study is separated into two sections: the Authoritarian Period, from 1965 to 1988 and the Democratic Period, from 1988 to 2008. These two periods are further divided into two to three segments according to a number of international and domestic factors. A brief evaluation of the national defence policies of the later government that came into power in 2008 is also provided in this chapter.

Ch. 4 Review of Singapore’s National Defence The development of Singapore’s national defence strategy is reviewed and analysed in this chapter through a lens of deterrence within the three-level framework. Similar to the previous chapter, non-military factors such as social and economic perspectives are included at the general deterrence level. The timeframe for the development of Singapore’s national defence is divided into three chronological phases: the Initial period, from independence to the end of the Vietnam War in 1975; the Cold War period, from 1975 to 1991; and the post-Cold War period, from 1991 to 2008. As a single government has ruled the city-state continuously, these three phases are defined by associated regional

71 Da-Nian Pung, ⬄⺐䤓⇫㒿岗䟺᧶⦚⏘岗䟺-♲承㸆⚁ Chenfeng de Tsochan Jihua: Kuokuang Jihua- Koushu Lishih, Taipei: Military History and Translation Office, the Ministry of National Defense ROC, 2005, pp. 14-16, 55-59. 72 Prospect theory is a curvilinear relationship between increasing gains and subjective value. The principal distinction between prospect theory and rational choice lies in this asymmetrical relationship between gains and losses. The core finding under prospect theory is that decision-makers evaluate each choice anew and against a neutral reference point. See Jeffrey D. Berejikian, “A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 2, March 2002, pp. 165-183.

25 factors.

Ch. 5 Comparison between Singapore and Taiwan The fifth chapter compares the national defence policies of Singapore and Taiwan on the levels of extended deterrence and general deterrence, because the scenarios of both countries are too diverse to compare. Contrasting aspects of the research subjects are also examined. In addressing extended deterrence, the research focuses chiefly on the way in which the two research subjects have established and maintained extended deterrence from other powers in order to secure their survival. At the general deterrence level, the chapter examines both countries’ strategies, efforts, performance and limitations. In addition to offering comparisons, this chapter will also attempt to answer the research questions: Can or should Taiwan learn from Singapore with respect to national defence? If the answer to this question is positive, what can Taiwan learn from Singapore?

Chapter Two Deterrence and Small States

1. The Grounds for Deterrence The primary focus of sovereign states, particularly small ones, is ensuring their survival in an anarchic international system. The anarchic nature of the international system has led to most small states to rely on their own power for national survival. While small states may form alliances, even with great powers, such as the United States, these arrangements cannot absolutely safeguard a nation’s survival. For example, Washington abandoned the Republic of Vietnam in the 1970s, and subsequently the Saigon regime was defeated by North Vietnam. Alliances may act to allay to some extent the threat to survival for small states, but they have a number of drawbacks, such as a partial loss of autonomy and reduced diplomatic flexibility. Further, as Krause and Singer noted, “alliance commitments are honoured in little more than one fourth of all war-performance opportunities”.1 International norms, regimes and laws undeniably contribute to the security of small states, yet they have not been an effective means of preserving national survival as they have a number of flaws. Firstly, there is as yet no reliable and powerful mechanism to guarantee a nation’s survival. As the United Nations has no military capability, it has to rely on its member countries to provide armed forces. Thus, it is slow to react to conflict situations and its actions are easily vetoed by one of the five permanent members of the Security Council.2 Secondly, since no international organisation or institution so far is supranational, it is necessary for countries to concede partial sovereignty or to accept the jurisdiction of international institutions.3 In other words, intergovernmental organisations such as the International Court of Justice are helpless when one party in a crisis refuses to accept external involvement. Thus, the realistic solution for small states is to establish their own armed forces

1 Volker Krause, J. David Singer, “Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns”, in Erich Reiter, Heinz Gärtner (Ed.), Small States and Alliances (Vienna: Physica-Verlag, 2001), p. 20. 2 Thierry Tardy, “the UN and the Use of Force: A Marriage against Nature”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 38, No.1, 2007, pp. 52-53. 3 In the International Court of Justice, the States concerned must also have access to the Court and have accepted its jurisdiction, in other words they must consent to the Court's considering the dispute in question. This is a fundamental principle governing the settlement of international disputes, States being sovereign and free to choose the methods of resolving their disputes. The website of the International Court of Justice (http://www.icj-cij.org/information/index.php?p1=7&p2=2#2) site accessed 18 September, 2010.

27 to ensure their own long-term viability. In fact, almost all small states continue to maintain the most basic method of national defence: armed forces.4 If a small state opts to defend itself using military power, a serious challenge arises: it is difficult to ensure that a small state in particular has sufficient national resources to build strong defence mechanisms which are viable enough to defend or repel potential threats from other state(s). As a result, deterrence provides a valuable tool in the national defence strategy of small states. Deterrence is, as defined by John J. Mearsheimer, “persuading an opponent not to initiate a specific action because the perceived benefits do not justify the estimated costs and benefits”.5 In other words, if a small state is able to inflict damage on its attacker, the invader could abandon its invasion because the costs are perceived to be higher than the benefits. Based on this interpretation, deterrence does not involve a direct comparison of the respective national power of two countries, but rather requires the attacker to calculate the costs and benefits of a proposed attack.6 Certainly, in some circumstances discrepancies in national power, particularly in terms of military capability, between a small defender and an attacker may be too great for deterrence. However, deterrence is not only implemented in bilateral interactions between a defender and an attacker; it can also involve more than two countries. A small state can “borrow” another country’s power to compensate for its insufficient deterrent capability. Deterrence is a useful concept for research in the defence of small states because it is employed for the most part in peacetime. Although wars and armed conflicts are the best demonstration of a country’s military capability, the number of available cases is insufficient for research on the impact and usefulness of deterrence. Deterrence can explain why countries take no military action in a crisis, when the options of using force are readily available. Moreover, deterrence represents a broad view of defence, which is not merely limited to the use of military means, with result that non-military factors can sometimes be more influential in deterrence. Before discussing the concepts of deterrence in relation to the national defence of

4 According to the Military Balance 2010, there are 174 countries and territories possessing armed forces. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 490. 5 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 14. 6 Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a theory of National Security (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University, 1961), p. 3.

28 small states, it is necessary to undertake a brief review of the history of deterrence and outline why some of its concepts are suited specifically for application in the small state context.

2. The Evolution and Context of Deterrence 2.1 Nuclear Origin While deterrence is a strategy that has been used throughout history, it was first conceptualised as an analytical instrument in the middle of the twentieth century, when it arose as a defence strategy after the development of nuclear weapons.7 Since the combination of long distance bombers and the atomic bomb coupled wrecked devastation on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, nuclear weapons have played a powerful role in dissuading an enemy from initiating warfare.8 Subsequently, a spectrum of issues and concepts relating to deterrence has arisen, particularly following the further development of nuclear weapons technology and strategies. Further, many of the underlying deterrence strategies applicable in nuclear scenarios can also be extrapolated and used in conventional situations.9 The first wave of deterrence theory emerged after World War II, when deterrence began to dominate US foreign and defence policies, including “punishment and denial”, “the impossibility of defence”, and “the attraction of first attack”.10 According to Glenn H. Snyder, punishment and denial are two basic approaches to deterrence. Denial involves thwarting the adversary’s military actions using military means, and punishment involves the violent retaliation or the threat of violent retaliation against an adversary. As such, retaliation may be disproportionate and therefore may inflict far greater damage upon the opponent than that suffered; whereas punishment acts as a form of deterrence. For instance, sending fighters to intercept enemy bombers is a form of denial, while dispatching aircraft to bombard one or more targets in the enemy territory in response to a previous air raid can be seen as punishment. An important aspect of this form of deterrence is the lack of specificity as

7 Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p. 248. 8 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), pp. 22-23, 38. 9 Michael Evans, Conventional Deterrence in the Australian Strategic Context (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 1999), p. 4 10 Colin S. Gray, “Deterrence in the New Strategic Environment”, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 11, No. 3, July 1992, p. 247; Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 44.

29 this causes the enemy to hesitate. Furthermore, while the enemy can calculate the cost of its action where denial is applied, the cost is virtually incalculable when punishment is implemented.11 The enemy may be able to estimate counter-measures such as aerial combat with interceptors, but has no firm idea of what, how and when retaliation will occur. Since the end of World War II, the destructive capability of inflicting extremely high costs upon an enemy through the use of nuclear exchange has been a valuable tool in punishment deterrence. The relationship between denial and punishment can be cooperative or mutually exclusive. The punishment approach is usually powerful but inappropriate in some circumstances, such as where proportionality is required, and where the denial approach can meet the need. For example, when a small-scale firearms attack occurs, to retaliate with nuclear weapons would be excessive whereas countering with mortars would be more appropriate. However, in the face of a denial approach, the enemy may be more willing to go to war when they can quantify the cost of an armed conflict. When there is no definite boundary between denial and punishment, reconciling the two approaches presents a great challenge for policy makers in national defence.12 The “impossibility of defence” refers to the defender holding a very weak position in the face of nuclear attack, due to insufficient technology solutions being available for defence. When bomber aircraft were the main vehicles for delivering nuclear warheads, it was impossible for any air defence system to intercept all approaching enemy aircrafts, as it only took a few bombers loaded with hydrogen bombs to cause unacceptable damage.13 When ballistic missiles began to replace bombers, the problem worsened due to the extremely high speed of the missiles.14 Patrick M. Morgan contends that since there is no effective defensive method for this kind of strategy, the best defence is to attack.15 Hence, as Lawrence Freedman points out, the “balance of terror” soon became the core idea of nuclear deterrence. Mutually assured destruction (MAD) now represents the eventual development of the impossibility of defence, with both

11 Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a theory of National Security, pp. 15-16. 12 Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and Punishment (New Jersey: Center of International Studies in the Princeton University, 1958), pp. 1-5. 13 Uzi Rubin, “Historical Background”, in Ben-Zion Narveh & Azriel Lorber (Ed.), Theater ballistic Missile Defence (Lexington, Massachusetts: MIT Lincoln Laboratory, 2001); Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 44. 14 In the final boost phase, the speed of ICBM is 5.5 miles per second. Benson D. Adams, Ballistic Missile Defence (New York, American Elsevier Publishing Company, 1971), p. 4. 15 Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (London: Sage Publication, 1976), pp. 30-31.

30 superpowers stockpiling massive numbers of warheads.16 The attraction of initiating the first strike is that it achieves devastating and irrevocable destruction, making the use of nuclear weapons more advantageous in the early phase of warfare compared to later phases. Destroying the enemy’s nuclear forces, such as their bombers or missiles, before the opportunity arises to use them would obviously be the best means of preventing retaliation. Further, using nuclear weapons in the initial phase can annihilate the enemy, preventing drawn-out warfare. For example, during a crisis, Pakistan could conduct a nuclear attack on India, enabling Islamabad to achieve strategic superiority after destroying India’s nuclear arsenal, and vice versa.17 However, as occurred on the eve of World War I, in a deterrence situation this scenario would alert both sides to the possibility and advantages of a first strike, and then war would be avoided less readily.18 Apart from political rapprochement, the unilateral solution to the threat of first strike is by means of a second strike which will be discussed later. Following the “Massive Retaliation” strategy of the Eisenhower Administration, the next wave of deterrence theory emerged, consisting of “the Triple C of deterrence: credibility, capability and communication”, and “the nature of targets”. Massive retaliation is a strategy based primarily on the deterrence formula, whereby “the costs to the aggressor must always outweigh his gains” proposed by John Foster Dulles. Under this strategy, the US resolved to use massive nuclear strikes to punish any attack by the Soviet Union.19 However, as Morgan noted, the obvious question arising from such a severe threat is related to the first of the Triple Cs, i.e. credibility: whether a defender dares to implement deterrent threats claimed in advance when a specific scenario occurs; and if the attacker believes the defender’s claim. If the defender’s threat or other claim is not credible to the opponent, deterrence will be unsuccessful. If the attacker can obtain sufficient information about the defender’s reputation and means, this will also affect credibility.20 If a country enjoys a reputation of being victorious in its previous

16 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 248-249. 17 In fact, India and Pakistan presently hold cautious attitudes toward nuclear weapons. The former claimed “no first use” of nuclear weapon, as the latter may strike first but insists it is “the last resort if survival is threatened”. Vernie Liebl, “India and Pakistan: Competing Nuclear Strategy and Doctrines”, Comparative Strategy, Vol.28, Issue 2 (2009), pp. 155-156, 162. 18 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 33, 124-133; Robert E. Osgood & Henning Wegener, Chapter IV, in K. Subrahmantam (Ed.), Study on Deterrence(New York: United Nations, 1987), p. 47. 19 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 76-87. 20 Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, p. 85.

31 war efforts, this makes its threats more credible. The means of deterrence in proportion to the objectives at stake are also crucial. The credibility problems associated with large- scale retaliation referred to the US’s reputation for disproportionate threats. Massive retaliation was an excessive reaction to some situations such as a conflict in a small scale. As Betrice Heuser pointed out, small-scale invasions were also a concern for NATO members. In fact, Britain tended to reject Massive Retaliation and called for alternative strategies.21 When both superpowers possess nuclear weapons, this strategy also represents a structural problem: the US homeland would suffer nuclear retaliation from the Soviet Union, if Washington was likely to launch a nuclear attack to counter an invasion in Europe. Whether the US was willing to risk the destruction of New York in exchange for saving Paris was questionable for NATO members.22 James H. Wyllie maintains that capability refers to the substantial military power of deterrence, while communication requires the defender to make the potential enemy aware of the resolution, intention and other elements of deterrence to avoid misunderstandings or misjudgements.23 According to Robert E. Osgood & Henning Wegener, communication can be both implicit, such as performing manoeuvres, as well as explicit, such as “hot line” telephone communication between national leaders.24 However, the potential invader is by no means merely an audience to the deterrent messages and must react accordingly. To submit to deterrence may have negative consequences for national reputation or regime legitimacy, and Freedman observes that the potential invader may ignore or intentionally underestimate the defender’s deterrent capability.25 The potential enemy’s reactions to deterrence, particularly through written or oral advice such as public speeches or proclamations which may be regarded as merely propaganda, are insufficient for evaluating the effect of communication. Thus, substantial behaviours such as actual military deployment would be better evidence for the effect of deterrence.

21 Betrice Heuser, “The Development of NATO’s Nuclear Strategy”, Contemporary European History, Vol.4 No.1, March 1995, p. 44, 54-55; John R. Raser, “Deterrence Research: Past Progress and Future Needs”, Journal of Peach Research, Vol.3, No.4, 1966, p. 310. 22 Frankline B. Weinstein, “The Concept of a Commitment in International Relations”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.13, No.1, March 1969, pp. 39-40, 48-50. 23 James H. Wyllie, “The Deterrence Condition”, in Roger Carey &Trevor C. Salmon (Ed.), International Security in the Modern World (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), pp. 64-65. 24 Robert E. Osgood & Henning Wegener, Chapter IV, p. 51. 25 Before acquiring nuclear weapon the Soviet literature played down the importance of atomic bombs. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 58

Prior to the 1920s, as Ward Thomas points out, distinguishing civilian targets from military ones was a matter of course and was clearly prescribed in the international conventions regarding war. However, after Giulo Douhet presented the concept of strategic bombardment, the distinction between civil and military targets was no longer crucial and both the Axis powers and the Allies began to conduct indiscriminate air assaults.26 On account of the extremely destructive nature of massive retaliation, as Freeman found, alternative strategies were proposed to prevent all-out nuclear war and restrain the destructive effects of nuclear engagement on civilians. For example, the limited war theory suggested that the targets of nuclear engagement ought to be limited to military targets as opposed to civilian ones. Of utmost concern in the limited war strategy was the avoidance of civilian targets, in order to ensure the lower casualty rates.27 Attacks were grouped as counter-force (aimed at military assets) and counter-value (cities and other civil facilities) according to the nature of the targets.28 Determining the nature of the targets, however, was a somewhat dubious practice for the superpowers during the Cold War. For instance, during the Cuba missile crisis, the Pentagon evacuated bombers from military air bases to civilian airports.29 Another wave of deterrence theorising followed with the Flexible Response strategy utilised by the Kennedy Administration, which consisted of “escalation” and “second strike” strategies. In brief, Flexible Response required that the scale of force used should correspond to the size and character of an attack by another power.30 Escalation, defined as the gradual use of increasing military means, arose naturally because in order to constrain the methods and the scale of warfare, decision-makers were reluctant to fully engage during the initial phase of war. However warfare could be intensified subsequently based on communications and military concerns. In terms of military considerations, escalation was intended to provide sufficient power, through the denial or punishment approaches, to prevent invasion or, as argued by Avner Yaniv, to attract the attention of other countries. 31 Escalation was also a means of

26 Ward Thomas, “Victory by Duress: Civilian Infrastructure as a Target in Air Campaigns”, Security Studies, Vol.15, No.1, April 2006, pp. 4-5. 27 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 96. 28 Stephen J. Cimbala, The Past and Future of Nuclear Deterrence (London: Praeger, 1998), pp. 15-16. 29 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p.244. 30 Frank C Zagare, “NATO, Rational Escalation and Flexible Response”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 29, No.4, November 1992, pp. 435, 437. 31 Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb: the Politics of Israelis Strategy (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 268-269.

33 communicating firm resolve. However, in a nuclear situation, escalation is viewed as a risky idea because it can easily turn a low-level engagement into an all-out war. The concept of second strike, as noted by Karen Ruth Adams, is a deductive consequence of the concept of first strike. The purpose of second strike is to survive the enemy’s first strike while retaining sufficient capability for retaliation. For example, if the US could retain sufficient nuclear force to inflict unacceptable damage upon the Soviet Union, Moscow would not launch a first strike to gain a strategic advantage over the US, and vice versa. The decision-makers in Washington and Moscow, while possessing sufficient retaliatory means, would not be eager to strike first due to the feeling of insecurity arising from the probability of a devastating second strike in retaliation.32 The correlative technologies developed in the 1960s, increased the survivability of nuclear vehicles such as nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and stealth nuclear submarines making the concept of second strike both reliable and practical.33 Extended deterrence is another concept associated with the development of nuclear deterrence. Under the dichotomous international structure, the US and the Soviet Union individually and unilaterally extended deterrence, also known as a nuclear umbrella, to protect their alliances, such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, against the other side.34 Figure 1 The Model of Extended Deterrence A

B C

For A, as Vesna Danilvoic has suggested, the main concern is to protect its interests as a defender at the lowest cost. These interests can include its international reputation, the extent of its influence or control over C, securing passage through C and constraints

32 Karen Ruth Adams, “Attack and Conquer: International Anarchy and the Offence-Defence-Deterrence Balance”, International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3, Winter 2003, p. 82. 33 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 167-169, 262. 34 Erich Weede, “Extended Deterrence, Superpower Control, and Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1962-76”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.26, No. 1, February 1989, p. 7.

34 on B.35 The costs to A include the distance between A and C, the risk of conflict with B, C’s dependence and the involvement by A in any conflict caused by C. B’s main consideration is to thwart A’s intervention and to acquire the most interest from C at the lowest cost under the precondition of regime survival.36 While faced with extended deterrence, invading C is not beneficial for B; instead, drawing C away from A and back to a bilateral scenario may be the best option, because usually B enjoys great superiority over C. In addition, B can support A’s enemies to create unrest in another region in order to “pin down” A’s national power. Alternatively, if excluding A proves too arduous, neutralising A’s intervention is the second most beneficial objective for B. For example, B may deliver a rapid strike, destroying C’s power before A can intervene. For C, the main concern is maintaining national survival at an acceptable cost. This can include losing some political or economic freedom through forming an alliance with A or spending a high proportion of its GDP on its defence budget. As the weakest player in the scenario, C’s biggest nightmare is being abandoned by A, or B breaking through A’s extended deterrence. Thus, C may request A to station troops in C’s territory or increase its own defence capability as a backup.37 Strengthening C’s forces may also lower A’s intervention cost and make A more willing to maintain extended deterrence. A classic case of extended deterrence is the Korean War. After World War II, two separated regimes were established, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) which were individually supported by the US and the Soviet Union respectively. Since Moscow provided more military support to Pyongyang than Washington did to Seoul, North Korea rapidly achieved military superiority over South Korea. Thus it was necessary for the US to conduct extended deterrence in order to keep the DPRK in check. However, a number of ambiguous claims by US officials in 1949 and 1950 caused Kim ll Sung to ignore or fail to notice the existence of extended deterrence, which resulted in the Korean War.38 Following the armistice in 1953, the US

35 Vesna Danilovic, “The Source of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.45, No.3, June 2001, pp. 342-343. 36 Survival is also an important concern for the attacker. Robert E. Harkavy, “Triangular or Indirect Deterrence / Compellence: Something New in Deterrence Theory?” Comparative Strategy, Vol.17, Issue 1, January 1998, p. 65. 37 US troops in Europe was just commitment, not defence. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 90; Gerald L. Sorokin, “Alliance Formation and General Deterrence: A Game-Theoretic Model and the Case of Israel”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 2, June 1994, p. 303. 38 The obvious one is that the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson made his much misunderstood speech to the

35 and the ROK have maintained extended deterrence against the DPRK to the present day.39 The US still stations 28,500 soldiers in South Korea serving as a trigger of extended deterrence and regularly conducts joint military manoeuvres.40 In summary, following the advent of nuclear weapons and the Cold War, a series of deterrence concepts emerged and can be applied to an analysis of conventional deterrence with some modifications.

2.2 Conventional Editions of Deterrence Three kinds of conventional deterrence strategies emerged during the Cold War era, when nuclear weapons dominated the field of deterrence. NATO, Israel, and the concept of “Non-Offence Defence” presented conventional alternatives to nuclear deterrence that relied on weapons of massive destruction. According to Asa A. Clark, the conventional deterrence practised by NATO that emerged in the 1980s was a result of two factors. The first arose from the fact that the bipolar nuclear balance had been realigned. In the 1970s the Soviet nuclear arsenal surpassed that of the US, both strategically and tactically. This meant that nuclear force became an insufficient means of deterrence for NATO to compensate for its inferior conventional forces compared to those of the Warsaw Pact.41 The second factor was that technological improvements gave NATO a chance to repel potential invasions from the Soviet Union without the use of nuclear weapons. Various precision guided weapons developed in the 1970s, especially anti-armour missiles such as HOT and TOW which had the capability to repel the large number of tanks and other armoured vehicles from the Warsaw Pact countries.42 Prior to the availability of these anti-tank weapons, the

National Press Club in the beginning of 1950 and neglected Korea in the US national interest. Ronald McGlothlen, “Acheson, Economics, and the American Commitment in Korea, 1947-1950”, Pacific Historic Review, Vol. 58, No.1, February 1989, pp. 44-45. 39 President Obama also used “deterrence” to describe the role of the US in the Korean Peninsula. “US to help South Korea 'deter future aggression' by neighbouring North”, The Australian, 24 May 2010. (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/us-to-help-south-korea-deter-future-agression-by- neighbouring-north/story-e6frg6so-1225870624430) site accessed 25 May, 2010. 40 The extended deterrence is the core of the military cooperation between South Korea and the US. According to the agreement between the US and the ROK in 2008, the number of US military personnel is capped at 28,500. Chung Min Lee, “Crises and Conflicts Short of War: the Case of Korea”, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.8, No.1, Summer 1996, p. 31; US Department of State, “Background Note: South Korea”. (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm) site accessed 10 September, 2010. 41 The nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the US was reached in the early 1970s. Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace, against the Nuclear Threat, Strategic Stability under the Conditions of Radical Nuclear Arms Reductions (Moscow: Novosti, 1987), pp. 6-8. 42 Asa A. Clark, “Deterrence versus War Fighting”, in James R. Golden, Asa A. Clark and Bruce E. Arlinghaus (Ed.),

36 only feasible option against the superior armoured troops of the Warsaw Pact was tactical nuclear weapons or deploying a similarly sized battery of armed units. The former was likely to trigger nuclear escalation and the latter represented a heavy burden for NATO countries. The primary purpose of NATO’s conventional deterrence was not to defeat the Warsaw Pact, but rather to diminish the possibility of Moscow securing a swift victory. As Mearsheimer proposes, there are three main categories of conventional options for an invasion: attrition, blitzkrieg and limited aims. A war of attrition is the least desirable for any invader because, of the three options, it has the greatest cost. In the Cold War, a war of attrition also carried the risk of escalating into a full-scale nuclear exchange. The limited aims strategy was also ineffective against the forward deployment of forces practised by NATO. As a result, the blitzkrieg strategy was the most desirable choice for the Warsaw Pact; and for NATO conventional deterrence was the most effective means of countering it.43 If the conventional capability of NATO was sufficient to prevent a swift victory, nuclear escalation would occur more gradually because the forces of NATO were only able to defend using conventional means. As a result, the decision-makers would obtain more time to consider their strategy, before the conflict could reach a nuclear level.44 However, an attempt to enlarge the role of conventional deterrence highlighted three problems: firstly, as NATO forces conventionally practised denial deterrence, the Warsaw Pact could more readily calculate the cost of war than when facing a nuclear threat under the punishment approach. That is, if war were to break out, it had the potential to incur a cost that Moscow could afford. Secondly, mobilisation once again became critical, as human power has a larger role in conventional forces than in nuclear ones, due to the fact that most equipment and weapon systems are manned; thus delayed or insufficient mobilisation would endow the attacker with quantitative superiority. Although a pre-emptive strike is advantageous in conventional deterrence before the other side can mobilise, the mobilisation of conventional forces is more apparent to an adversary than the preparation for a nuclear attack.45 In other words, a

Conventional Deterrence: Alternatives for European Defence (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1984), p. 14. 43 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, pp. 29-30, 165. 44 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 291. 45 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, pp. 166-168.

37 conventional surprise attack is more difficult to execute than a nuclear one, because mobilisation is not easy to conceal. Finally, both the cost and duration of conventional deterrence were unclear. Expanding conventional forces was costly for NATO members, especially for enlarging their high-tech arsenal, and while major weapon systems comprising of new technology are difficult to mass produce, their consumption in modern warfare is very high.46 Once NATO had exhausted its conventional armaments, it would once again face the initial dilemma of whether to engage with nuclear weapons or to surrender.47 There is no conclusive indication that NATO did in fact improve its capability of conventional deterrence prior to the end of the Cold War. However, due to the successful implementation of conventional means used in post-Cold War battlefields such as Iraq in Operation Desert Storm and the Balkans, it is apparent that conventional deterrence using high-tech weaponry is both possible and powerful, albeit expensive. NATO’s Conventional Deterrence subsequently led to a broader concept, the Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA). According to Michael Evans, the US commenced the RMA, which represented a military technological revolution made up of three parts: the coordination of C4ISR (Communication, Control, Command, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), precise munitions, and stealth or low-visible platforms.48 The C4ISR endows commanders with capability to dissipate “the fog of war”, to efficiently deploy units and to swiftly conduct joint operations. Precise munitions are not only an effective way to paralyse an enemy but also help to clearly be able to exam the effect of such attacks. The stealth or low-visible platforms are able to enlarge the enemy’s “fog of war” and make them unable to respond effectively.49 Within the RMA, conventional arms are more powerful than before and consequently constitute considerable deterrence. In contrast, Israel’s conventional deterrence strategy differs from the nuclear

46 High cost was the main reason NATO member countries in Europe refused to build up conventional troops. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 78, 106. 47 Michael L. Brown and Thomas J. Leney, “Conventional Defense: Technology, Doctrine, and Force Structure”, in James R. Golden, Asa A. Clark and Bruce E. Arlinghaus (Ed.), Conventional Deterrence: Alternatives for European Defence, pp. 173-174. 48 Michael Evans, Australia and the Revolution in Military Affairs (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2001), p. 3. 49 Richard O Hundley, Past Revolutions Future Transformations: What can the Revolutions in Military Affairs in History about Transforming the US Military (Washington D.C: RAND’s National Defence Research Institute, 1999), p. 8.

38 counterparts and is uniquely built on “practice”, i.e. it is developed in actual conflict situations rather than during peacetime. Since the Jewish state was founded in 1948, Israel has engaged in military deterrence based on its own specific strategic environment. Israel’s distinct style of deterrence has been shaped by strict strategic conditions. First, as all of its neighbouring countries held an adversarial attitude toward Israel and professed a desire to eliminate the Jewish state, Israel could potentially encounter conflict on more than one front. Second, as Israel’s territory is comprised of a small area and is narrow, there is not enough strategic depth to launch a defensive campaign in case of invasion and a war would likely destroy the small state. Simply put, for Israel, allowing the enemy to make the first strike would equate to a national disaster. Third, Israel initially had difficulties in forming alliances with other great powers in order to implement extended deterrence, because a relationship with numerous Arabic countries with abundant petroleum resource is more attractive for most nations than a relationship with a single, small state with limited natural resources. Given the above three conditions, achieving a first strike is very significant for Israel, as this would enable it to avoid engaging in combat on more than one front and would reduce the risk of sustaining an attack within its tiny territory.50 Israel identified its own deterrence strategy by means of “trial and error”, with several notable turning points. Following the war that established Israel’s statehood in 1948, there was debate regarding the benefits of the denial and punishment strategy: exemplified by the Swiss “spatial defence” model (denial) and mobile offensive units such as armour divisions (punishment). Due to Israel’s requirement to make the first strike, its need for a flexible response to multi-front conflict and its desire to preserve resources, the punishment approach became the strategy of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). Under these guidelines, the IDF maintained limited regular units and large reserves. When intelligence emerged regarding a potential threat or neighbouring countries moved across the demarcated “red lines”, the IDF would mobilise its reserve soldiers ready to make the first strike. If violent engagement ensued, the two goals of the IDF would be to attain a swift victory and to ensure the battle remained well away from Israeli territory. This punishment approach brought the IDF two eminent victories in 1956 and 1967, and also affirmed the credibility of Israel’s deterrence strategy. The threat of escalation, from mobilisation to first strike, was also used effectively by the

50 Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb: the Politics of Israelis Strategy, pp. 3-20, 48-53.

Israeli Government as a diplomatic tool in peacetime.51 The Yom Kippur War in 1973 was the second major turning point for Israel’s deterrence strategy. After the Six-Day War in 1967, the IDF occupied a broad area of captured territory, meaning its defence forces were thinly dispersed. This compounded the IDF’s existing problems such as faulty intelligence, decision-makers’ hesitation, the lack of a definitive red line and a range of other mistakes as a result of complacency. Thus, Israel suffered high casualties and incurred extensive damage from the ensuing first strike issued by Egypt and Syria. Two points of note arise from this situation. Firstly, alliances and diplomacy are crucial elements of Israel’s national defence in addition to military deterrence. Despite the high cost incurred by Israel in 1973, the US’s rapid and abundant resupply support decreased isolation of Israel and the US managed to obviate Israel’s major threat, Egypt, through diplomatic means.52 Secondly, since it had been taken by surprise during the Yom Kippur War, the IDF expanded quickly in the aftermath, supplementing the original guidelines. While the IDF’s expansion continued to emphasise first-strike and an offensive military strategy, such as armour divisions, the larger number of units also enabled preparation for different scenarios, such as a war of attrition.53 The shortcomings of Israel’s conventional deterrence strategy emerged gradually in the 1980s, even as its relations with neighbouring countries grew more peaceful. By the time Jordan and Egypt had successively established formal diplomatic relations with Israel, Iraq had become engaged in a war with Iran and only Syria remained hostile toward Israel in the 1980s.54 At the same time, a comparatively minor threat increased in prominence; the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), later Hezbollah and other non-state organisations, began to engage in irregular warfare such as small-scale raids and rocket bombardments against Israel. The standard IDF reaction to this was to retaliate strongly against military targets in countries harbouring those organisations.

51 David Ben Gurion had used mobilisation to deter Egypt’s deployment on Sinai in 1960, but Levi Eshkol did not use it in the same way before the Six Day War in 1967. Ibid, pp. 31-37, 57-67, 121, 263; Efraim Inbar, “Contours of Israel's New Strategic Thinking”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 1, Spring 1996, p. 44. 52 Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb: the Politics of Israelis Strategy, pp. 129, 135-138, 147-149, 162- 164, 175, 188-189. 53 Ibid, p. 224; Sanu Kainikara & Russell Parkin, Pathways to Victory: Observations from the 2006 Israel- Hezbollah Conflict (Tuggeranong, Australia: Air Power Development Centre, 2007), pp. 8-9. 54 Avner Yaniv, “Israel’s Conventional Deterrent: A Reappraisal”, in Louis Rene Beres (Ed.), Security or Armageddon: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Health and Company, 1986), pp. 54- 55.

However, the IDF’s retaliation was ineffective against Lebanon, because this country was embroiled in a civil war and at the time there was no government in control of the southern area near Israel, the source of the attacks. Although Israel invaded and occupied the area several times in order to neutralise the bases of these non-state organisations, these actions were not effective because the IDF did not find and annihilate their main force. Thus, there was no real target for its deterrence strategy of punishment. As a consequence of this, Israel’s punishment approach failed to deter attacks from non-state organisations. Conversely, those groups anticipated the IDF’s retaliation and made of use the punishment attacks for propaganda purposes, enabling them to portray Israel as a violent invader.55 There are several distinct characteristics associated with Israel’s conventional deterrence strategy, which was developed with the aid of decades of experience. Firstly, the aim of deterrence is to change the enemy’s political and strategic cognition, with the hope that the enemy would gradually acknowledge and accept the existence of the state of Israel. This means that Israel’s conventional deterrence differs from that of many nations, which usually aim to prevent war. Israel aims instead, to establish its credibility by waging war, as it believes that successful warfare enhances the efficiency of its deterrence. As such, Israel’s conventional deterrence strategy appears to have the potential of altering the neighbouring countries’ political mindsets, as evidenced by Egypt and Jordan’s acceptance of the existence of the Jewish state.56 Second, the first-strike strategy remains very attractive in conventional deterrence due to its initial advantages, as a surprise attack can be catastrophic for the defence of a state, especially for small states, as they have neither sufficient resources to replace the loss nor land to disperse their forces. By the same token, due to a lack of strategic depth, Israel is particularly vulnerable to first strikes. Israel’s four wars against its Arabic neighbouring countries indicate that a first strike is advantageous. As Yaniv observed, whenever Israel made the first strike the outcome was usually militarily positive as was the case in the Six-Day War and the Suez Canal War. On the other hand, Israel suffered

55 Efraim Inbar, “Israeli National Security, 1973-96”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 555, Israel in Transition, January 1998, p. 77; Elli Lieberman, “Israel’s 2006 War with Hezbollah: The Failure of Deterrence”, in Robert O. Freedman (Ed.), Contemporary Israel (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 2009), pp. 320-328; Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb: the Politics of Israelis Strategy, pp. 226, 229- 234, 239-240. 56 Kevin Wein, “Conventional Deterrence and Israeli Security: Reflections on an Evolving Doctrine”, International Affairs Review, Vol. 7 No.1, Winter 1997, pp. 68-72.

41 heavy casualties and damage after being attacked pre-emptively in the Yom Kippur War and during the war of independence in 1948.57 Thirdly, the relation between ambiguity and punishment is important. Using the strategy of punishment to deter an adversary from taking specific actions means that it is necessary to define a series of “red lines” to activate military forces and aid in decision making. However, whether or not to reveal those “red lines” is a significant question, as making threats and their associated conditions apparent, may prevent the outbreak of wars that result from miscalculation. However, once revealed, red lines may also act as “price tags” in that they enable the adversary to consider which actions are affordable and then attack accordingly. Further, open “red lines” may decrease a small state’s flexibility in a crisis, forcing decision-makers to confront the dilemma: either retaliate in accordance with the breach of the red lines or lose credibility. Due to these reasons, Israel conceals its red lines.58 Fourthly, for Israel escalation in its deterrence strategy differs from its counterparts in regards to nuclear and conventional contexts. For most countries, the outbreak of war is equivalent to a failure of deterrence, particularly in nuclear situations. Yet for Israel it is not the same as it is the understanding that warfare increases its credibility. Regardless of whether escalation occurs before or after war breaking out or during engagement, it is an indispensible element of Israeli deterrence that communicates a clear message: Israel makes no allowance for other countries encroaching upon its territory or other national interests, even to the slightest degree. Israel fears that without an adequate reaction, any strategy by an adversary, no matter how limited, such as annexing a small territory, may be tolerated and accepted by the international society as a fait accompli. Fifthly, Israel’s history shows a strong link between national power and alliance. Prior to the Suez Canal War, Israel sought an alliance or other guarantee of national survival from great powers, but failed. After Israel’s first clear victory in 1956, France established a constrained alliance, providing military equipment and other forms of assistance. Israel’s resounding victory in the Six-Day War eventually attracted the attention of the US, which went on to build a special relationship with Israel that could be argued to be even stronger than a formal alliance. Without question, lobbying by pro-

57 Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb: the Politics of Israelis Strategy, p. 276. 58 Ibid, pp. 266-271; Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a theory of National Security, p. 30.

Israel groups is extremely prevalent and active in the US and has undoubtedly contributed to the special nature of the relationship. In addition, the shared Western democratic values, religious linkage and the US desire to check on the Soviet expansion in the Middle East were also noticeable concerns for Washington in establishing its special relations with Israel. However, the timing for the improvement in US-Israeli relations right after the Six Day War still proved the value of military victory in forming alliances.59 As a final point, it is also clear that Israeli conventional deterrence has limits. These limits include its diplomatic impotence and failure to deal with irregular warfare. Although both Israel’s ferocious conventional deterrence strategy as well as the IDF’s combat capability effectively altered Egypt’s attitude toward the state of Israel, Israel could not have achieved rapprochement without US mediation. Further, Israel’s conventional deterrence strategy is incapable of counteracting irregular attacks carried out by Hamas or Hezbollah.60 It is clear that measures other than military deterrence may be required. In summary, therefore conventional deterrence has effectively secured Israel’s national survival, but is insufficient to cope with all the security challenges that the Jewish State faces. Finally, Non-Offensive Defence, also known as alternative defence or territorial defence, is a purely defensive strategy, arising from the practices of neutral states in Europe, in particular Switzerland, which was inspired by the tense confrontations that occurred during the Cold War. The concepts of Non-offensive Defence are arranged in a concentric circle made up of three layers: diplomacy, military defence, and guerrilla and civil resistance. The outside layer of Non-Offensive Defence is diplomacy, the primary purpose of which is to eliminate the enemy’s motive of aggression utilising neutrality and related policies, because wars are often reactions or pre-emptive reactions of a country to threats or potential threats. Thus, neutral countries voluntarily or passively forgo alliances and as such must maintain a certain distance from power politics. Further, they implement neutrality in their national defence policy, avoid possessing offensive

59 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “Is it Love or the Lobby? Explaining America’s Special Relationship with Israel”, Security Studies, Vol. 18, Issue 1, January 2009, pp. 59, 62-67; Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb: the Politics of Israelis Strategy, pp. 264-266; Michael Thomas, American Policy Toward Israel: The Power and Limits of Beliefs (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 2-3. 60 Eyal Zisser, “Is Anyone Afraid of Israel”, The Middle East Quarterly, Vol. VIII, No.2, Spring 2001, p. 6.

43 weapons and constrain the use of weapon systems with offensive potential, such as fighter planes, within their territory.61 Finally, neutral countries at times compromise their neutrality with great powers under some special circumstance to avoid serious conflict. A good example of this is Sweden who continued to trade with Nazi Germany during World War II.62 The second layer of Non-Offensive Defence is military defence, the primary purpose of which is to impose a marginal cost on an invader. In the Cold War situation, for example, neutral countries usually did not regard themselves as the main target in armed conflicts and thus a marginal cost was a reasonable guideline. By the same token, when facing a targeted attack, the defence strategy is still the same: imposing a higher cost than the benefit the invader obtains. Marginal costs, whether military or political, can deter the invasion of a major power because they prefer to preserve their national power for their major enemies or for maintaining the balance of power. In addition, where neutral countries are able to discharge their neutral obligations after war breaking out, with the probable consequence that they can request foreign support after the outbreak of war, and another great power would intervene to control or balance the invader’s attack. Pure defence policies are concentrated on several points. The first is multi-sector defence preparation which includes the economy and the entire society. To integrate national resources is not only a means of compensating for inferior national power, but also a means of solidifying citizens’ determination to defend their country.63 Secondly, on the matter of providing sufficient manpower to implement defence, a citizen’s army, a mobilisation system and various auxiliary organisations are adopted, with each neutral country adjusting its military structure to match individual strategic conditions. For example, Sweden invests more resources in the air force and navy which are comprised of more regular and professional personnel, because their expansive maritime border in

61 Switzerland used historical records to prove its offensive weapon systems were only used in its territory. Dietrich Fischer, “Invulnerability without Threat: the Swiss Concept of General Defence”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1982, pp. 217-218. 62 Sweden also permitted limited German troops transporting through its territory. Adam Robert, Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), pp. 63-64. 63 For instance, Austria’s Total defence is to combine military with civil defence and link these to the civil economy and political infrastructure. George J. Stein, “Total Defence: A Comparative Overview of the Security Policies of Switzerland and Austria”, Defence Analysis, Vol.6, No.1, March 1990, p. 17.

44 the Baltic Sea conflicted with Soviet expansion plans during the Cold War.64 However, such constrained military defence is virtually useless to countering a nuclear attack, and as such a neutral country may to be subjected to nuclear threats. In the face of a nuclear threat, neutral countries merely rely on the high political cost of using nuclear weapons as a deterrent to their use in an attack.65 The inner-most layer of Non-Offensive Defence is the use of guerrilla and civil resistance, as a supplement or an alternative to regular military defence. Guerrilla and civil resistance can be used side by side with regular military defence, or conducted alone, in situations where the territory is occupied by an enemy. A guerrilla strategy is notable for the three following reasons. Firstly, it is suited to a citizen army; due to military conscription, most male citizens are trained as basic infantry soldiers and as such can implement guerrilla warfare using light weaponry. Secondly, the geographical environment of many neutral countries is mostly ideal for guerrilla strategy because forests, mountains and other terrain features provide shelter from reconnaissance and strikes of the garrison. Finally, guerrilla strategy can be utilised behind enemy lines. Finland provided a good example of effective guerrilla warfare when it successfully defended the country against the Red Army in the Winter War in 1940.66 Civil resistance can take the form of a country’s people destroying their own infrastructure, especially transport infrastructure, in support of their resistance. This is a means of avoiding fatalities and imposing high occupation costs on the invader. There are two reasons why civil resistance is a feature of Non-offensive Defence: First, historically, Norwegian citizens set examples and successfully implemented civil resistance during the German occupation in World War II. Secondly, as the terrain of neutral countries is mostly rugged, demolishing transport infrastructure is a useful means of defence. Over all, as can be seen, guerrilla strategy and civil resistance have their place and can indeed be useful in certain circumstances, but they cannot form a basis of a national defence policy. In practice, therefore they are auxiliary to regular national defence, which has to be the first line of defence.67

64 Adam Robert, Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence, pp. 98-99. 65 Political costs relate to the possible external and internal consequences of an aggressive action. Ibid, pp. 90- 94, 120. 66 Gunnar Åselius, “Swedish Strategic Culture after 1945”, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 40, No.1, March 2005, p. 31; Ibid, pp. 8, 16-7, 115-116. 67 Adam Robert, Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence, pp. 117-8; Peter Ackerman and Berel Rodal, “the Strategic Dimensions of Civil Resistance”, Survival, Vol. 50, No.3, June 2008, p. 118.

In comparison to the three conventional deterrence strategies, NATO’s Conventional Deterrence and Non-Offensive Defence practiced by the neutral states are similar in that they both hold a conservative attitude toward using force, despite having different foci, while Israel’s Conventional Deterrence utilises an active, even offensive style of the use of force. Thus, in terms of using force, NATO’s Conventional Deterrence and Non-Offensive Defence can be categorised as a traditional approach in contrast to Israel’s more radical one. The two divergent views relating to the use of force in deterrence arise from different hypotheses; the traditional view is formed through existing alliances or potential foreign intervention during a crisis. Armed conflicts, invasion or annexation alter the power structure and as such another power intervenes in order to maintain the balance of power. Israel’s view, on the other hand, stresses combat. This is due to their historical experience, as the Jewish state found great powers or regional powers to be unreliable or inaccessible, and therefore felt compelled to secure its own national survival through its own capability.68 The characteristics of the traditional view and that of Israel are diametrically opposed. The traditional view facilitates sharing the deterrence and defence burden with allies or intervening nations. However, this attitude of hesitance in regards to the use of force can perhaps deliver the message of insufficient resolution to the invader. Furthermore, for a small state in a crisis, forgoing a strategic initiative may have disastrous military consequences. Finally, relying on another country for deterrence, even partially, can risk betrayal or abandonment. While Israeli conventional deterrence redresses the above shortcomings, it must be acknowledged that military power alone is unable to solve all of the challenges of national defence. Rapid resupply from the US during the Yom Kippur War, the rapprochement with Egypt and the problems that the IDF encountered in Lebanon with irregular warfare demonstrated the limitations of its reliance on conventional military deterrence. In spite of the IDF’s effort to maintain Israel’s security, it appears that sheer military capability is inadequate to totally replace effective alliances and diplomacy. Overall, there are two drawbacks to the concept of deterrence, these being the

68 After Israel began to receive American support, its decision on using force was less self-determined than before. For instance, Israel refrained from retaliating against Iraq during the Operation Desert Storm. Barak Mendelsohn, “Israeli Self-Defeating Deterrence in the 1991 Gulf War”, the Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.26, No.4, December 2003, p. 84.

46 preconditions of rationality and determination. Firstly, deterrence depends on the potential enemy rationally calculating the cost and benefit of diverse policies and choosing the one with the greatest net benefit. However, in reality, this precondition may not be sufficient because human beings are not perfectly rational.69 Different cultural ideologies or philosophies may cause national leaders and their people to accept the very high cost of invasion rather than peaceful alternatives. Misjudgements also cause war to break out. Secondly, credibility is easily neutralised by anti-war or defeatism in public opinion. Furthermore, the potential enemy can propagandise defeatism to weaken the deterrence credibility of the targeted country. However, deterrence is still meaningful for the defence of small states due to three reasons. Firstly, as previously mentioned in regard to the concept of communication, the irrational behaviour of a potential enemy can be intentionally manipulated for political or strategic purposes. If a small state’s deterrence capability is robust, the cost to the potential enemy will certainly be high, regardless of any outrageous statements or positions that might be spread, as national decision makers of any potential enemy are hardly likely to ignore the negative outcomes of going to war. If there is any level “insanity” or irrationality present in the national leaders of potential enemies, causing the failure of deterrence, the defence capability of a small state can be directly used to protect its national survival. Moreover, for a small state, deterrence is not only a means of intimidating the potential enemy but also a way of announcing its strong resolution to survive as a nation to the international society as a whole. The small state’s resolution will increase the possibility of outside intervention from an extended deterrence protector or other power(s) with national interest involved, because the small state’s resistance will provide a longer time for other countries to react and will lower the cost of intervention. Secondly, deterrence may be influenced by defeatist public opinion, but the government of the small state can also respond to those challenges. Sufficient motives to maintain people’s morale and the credibility of deterrence can be promoted by government, for example with appeals to nationalism, values worthy of national defence, such as democracy, or on a more extreme level, appeals to xenophobia. Furthermore, despite inclusion of some offensive tactics, deterrence is not used for the purposes of

69 Jeffrey D. Berejikian, “A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 2, March 2002, pp. 165-167.

47 invasion. Rather it is used to maintain the status quo and is viewed better both domestically and internationally compared to other alternatives, such as grandstanding or surrender. Undeniably, in some special circumstances, defeatist propaganda can effectively weaken deterrence as the potential enemy exploit national weaknesses in the targeted domestic society, for example poor or fragmented national identity. Deterrence may deal with security challenges but is unable to solve social weaknesses related to national defence on its own. Finally, having national armed forces for deterrence is still the most practical solution for small states to survive in the present international system. Until a supranational regime or institution is established, which and is strong enough to preserve national survival, international laws, alliances, and superpowers all present degrees of unreliability small state defence. Despite some limitations, military deterrence is historically the most workable means of survival and as a consequence is in fact practiced by most small states.

3. Psychological Approaches Prospect theory provides an explanation in regard to the limited rationality of decision making from a psychological perspective. Prospect theory emphasises gains and losses. The main objective of deterrence is to influence the gains and losses of an adversary’s policy options, particularly the losses. Nevertheless, the adversary’s decision-makers do not always treat gains and losses equally, and different framings, or cognition, can sway the decision-makers’ judgement. In terms of gains framings, decision-makers are usually satisfied with the status quo and thus are likely to preserve what they have. Therefore, countries that fall under a gains framing would be easily deterred because they are sensitive to losses. Conversely, decision-makers that fall under a loss framing are not satisfied with the status quo and desperately seek gains. In such cases, countries that fall under loss framing are probably difficult to be deterred because they are not overly concerned about sustaining a loss. Furthermore, in a deteriorating situation, decision-makers are inclined to take risks as opposed to doing nothing. In a bilateral or trilateral deterrence relationship, various permutations of each actor’s framing can be deduced to achieve diverse outcomes of deterrence. Over all, framing can affect the prospect of gains and losses to be considered by decision-makers

48 and can further influence deterrence.70 In addition, framing in the context of status quo influences deterrence, because prospect theory identifies the phenomenon of the status quo bias. Generally, as countries usually prefer to maintain the status quo, deterrence can frequently be successful. Yet, each country may have its own perception of the status quo, which differs from that of its counterparts. As a critical reference point, while practising deterrence, a common mindfulness of the status quo is vital.71 Prospect theory has two associated difficulties. Firstly, various possible factors related to the decision makers will influence framing, including personality, race, culture, age, gender, education, income and profession. Those factors may work in the same direction, adversely, or interactively; in addition, researchers rarely reach a firm conclusion. Whilst experimentation may be helpful, the conditions in laboratories are vastly different from real decision making situation often yielding results that hold little validity. Secondly, the relevant research material is insufficient; particularly in terms of observing the framing in the minds of decision-makers. Material available for analysing framing and relative national behaviour is not adequate, and detailed evidence, such as biographies, is not always available for researchers.72 In conclusion, prospect theory reminds researchers of the importance of a decision-maker’s mindset, but adds a range of associated research obstacles.

4. Small State Deterrence When applied to small states, theories and concepts of deterrence need to be modified based on their characteristics. There is no universal definition of small states due to the increasing range of various categories for them. Before World War I, the term ‘small states’ denoted only European countries that were not great powers. Afterwards, as the numbers and types of small states were expanded after the collapse of several empires and as result of decolonisation, simple indicators such as population size and

70 Ibid, pp. 169-177; Jack S. Levy, “Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems”, Political Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 2, Special Issue: Prospect Theory and Political Psychology, June 1992, pp. 285-287, 290-294, 301. 71 Ibid, pp. 288-290, 294; Rose McDermott, Jonathan Cowden, Cheryl Koopman, “Framing, Uncertainty, and Hostile Communications in a Crisis Experiment”, Political Psychology, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 2002, pp. 134-135. 72 Jack S. Levy, “Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems”, pp. 305-307.

GDP became insufficient to represent the nature of small states. 73 However, in terms of defence, small states have one aspect in common: they are unable to effectively change their security situation on their own due to their various vulnerabilities. For example, although Israel has formidable armed forces and a considerable record of military victories, this country is still unable to change its security situation on its own. Small states are usually subject to vulnerabilities, including size, capabilities and institutions. The small size of the territory leaves little time to respond and less strategic depth to perform defensive operations. Constrained by nuclear non-proliferation, conventional weapons are the main military instruments for small states, which are unable to inflict extensive damage on enemy targets comparable to that of nuclear weapons. In terms of institutions, the military and civil facilities of small states, including command systems, are usually less robust than those of larger powers due to their limited redundancy. For example, a small state’s air force relying on a small number of airbases could be neutralised in the first wave of attacks. Further, as modern society is heavily dependent on infrastructure and services such as water and electricity, precise attacks using “smart” weapon systems which are able to paralyse small states amplify the vulnerability arising from lack of strategic depth. Other recent tactics such as ballistic missiles also pose considerable threats for small states. Due to the various vulnerabilities applicable to small states, deterring a potential enemy by ensuring a high cost of invasion is more realistic than to obtain a military victory. The cost-driven concepts of deterrence adopted by great powers and small states are basically similar, because they depend on the prospect of incurring intolerable costs in order to persuade the leaders of the potential enemy not to challenge the status quo. However, small states must integrate deterrence factors into a more comprehensive policy with two main foci. First, domestic vulnerabilities must be reduced in order to strengthen defence. As mentioned earlier, the vulnerabilities of small states means that weakness related to economic, social and other non-military sectors should be added to strengthen credibility. Second, foreign relations, especially with friendly great powers, are crucial. In order to compensate for small states’ inadequate military capability, extended deterrence is an important means by which to restore a balance of power

73 Baldur Thorhallsson and Anders Wivel, “Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 4, December 2006, pp. 652-653.

50 between a small state and its potential enemy. Additionally, a range of international variables, such as the degree of tension between leading powers, has an influence on the survival of small states.74 Thus, a small state’s active engagement with the international and regional powers would create uncertainty for its potential enemies in terms of using force. As the goal of deterrence is to persuade a potential enemy not to take specific actions, it is possible that a potential enemy’s response in accepting or challenging the status quo could be the main indicator in an examination of the effectiveness of a small state’s deterrence strategy. Undeniably, reasons other than deterrence may discourage a potential enemy; nevertheless, as long as a small state can impose considerable costs on its potential enemy, deterrence would directly contribute to maintaining the status quo. Furthermore, on an indirect level, the small state’s deterrence capability would help to achieve extended deterrence from other countries by displaying its willingness and ability to share regional defensive burdens.75 Most small states more or less adopt deterrence in practice. This can be observed in their possession of reasonably sized armed forces and the maintenance of security cooperation with one or more great powers. However, the context for deterrence strategies depends on the individual characteristics of the small states. Factors such as geography, the international environment and domestic considerations all shape each country’s deterrence and each country must be considered individually in view of the different limitations on their deterrence strategies.76 Due to the characteristics of small state deterrence, it is necessary to modify concepts derived from nuclear deterrence. Pre-emptive strikes pose a serious dilemma for small states and as such the advantages and disadvantages of pre-emptive strikes must be taken into account. On the one hand, several military advantages arise directly from this strategy. When it is possible for a small state to launch a first strike, the military units of an invader must implement measures such as camouflage, dispersion, and a restrained use of radio communications because locations of high concentrations

74 Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke, Strategies of Survival: the Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States, pp. 6-8; Olav Knudsen, “Analysing Small-State Security: the Role of External Factors”, in W Bauwens and OF Knudsen (Ed.), Small States and the Security Challenge in the New Europe (London: Brassey’s, 1996), pp. 3-20. 75 Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2000), pp. 39- 40. 76 Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke, Strategies of Survival: the Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States, p. 5.

51 of military units, such as crowded stations or ports, are high value targets for a first strike. Encountering a potential first strike consumes the invader’s resources and extends the time required for the intrusion. In addition, a first strike can decrease the defensive pressure on a small state because the invader’s attention is shifted away from the original operation plan and moved towards defending itself. On the other hand, the drawbacks of a first strike are numerous and include alliance deterioration, loss of legitimacy, the sobering outcome of failure, provoking the enemy, and the possible erosion of domestic support. Firstly, a power that is willing to extend deterrence for a small ally usually seeks a status quo outcome, and any party who implements a first strike in the triangular deterrence relation may well be regarded as a troublemaker. If the small state acts first, strong pressure and even punishment may result from its protector. Secondly, adopting the image of a victim is an effective tactic to win over public opinion and sympathy in a globalised world where international pressure on an invader is greater than ever before. For example, the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon in 2006 was stopped partly as a result of the international pressure.77 First strike also raises legal issues in international law. Before the UN Charter came into existence, pre-emptive strikes were recognised by international society, albeit with strict conditions revolving around necessity and proportion. Under the UN Charter, there is no clarity regarding a first strike. International law scholars present two explanations, regarding restriction and counter-restriction. The first explanation suggests that the inherent right of self-defence is only valid following a clear armed attack. The second explanation disagrees with this, stating “the intent of the UN charter was not to restrict the pre-existing customary right of anticipatory self-defence”. Both explanations have been individually interpreted by different countries in the UN Assembly, and neither the International Court of Justice (ICJ) nor the Security Council has come to a conclusion. Since the practice of first strikes is still under debate internationally and is not universally recognised, a first strike would damage a small state’s legitimacy.78 Thirdly, a first strike is a bold tactic in military terms, as the historic principle of

76 Shmuel Bar, “Deterring Nonstate Terrorist Group: the Case of Hezbollah”, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 26, Issue 5(Oct. 2007), pp. 471, 485, 487. 77 See Anthony Clark Arend, “International Law and Preemptive Use of Military Force”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.26, No.2, Spring 2003, pp. 89-96.

52 attack and defence denotes that the ratio of attack to defence should be at least 3 to 1.79 While this rule may not be universally applicable on the modern battlefield, the superiority of defence still exists. When a small state tries to initiate the first strike, the commander has to concentrate precious forces in a specific point or area to compensate for an enemy’s superiority in defence. If the first strike is not able to reach the estimated goals due to an enemy’s superior defence, huge losses can squander valuable capital, that is, combat forces. This may result in the original attacker winning the ensuing combat because the small state has depleted its defensive resources. Fourthly, if a state’s intention to make a first strike is evident to the enemy, this may provoke the enemy to launch a pre-emptive attack due to the attraction of a first strike. Finally, sufficient domestic support is unlikely to be available for such a high-risk action. Regardless of whether it is a matter of democratic or an authoritarian regime, political friction or party differences are bound to exist. Negative outcomes of a first strike, such as high casualties, may provide the basis for the opposing political power, whether inside or outside the government, to undermine the incumbent leadership, because the decision makers are held accountable for military outcomes. In other words, a pre-emptive strike is a political gamble for national leaders. In sum, first strikes, due to the fact that they are difficult to predict, may be a feasible option or position during peacetime. They can create a grey zone enabling a small state to enjoy the benefits of deterring the enemy without incurring serious negative effects. However, this depends on the individual circumstances of each nation, and it is a difficult choice to make in a crisis. A second-strike strategy is a dubious option for small states. Due to the limited effect of conventional weapons, if any semblance of a small state’s military capability survives the first strike, it would be insufficient to deter the enemy in the face of a punishment approach. Although the second-strike strategy is strategically unsuitable for small states, some of the associated principles and technologies are useful in enhancing the chance of survival of forces. For example, building or expanding a submarine fleet and keeping a portion of it on patrol can increase the survivability of the navy in the face of a first strike. In terms of small states, escalation is different from that in a nuclear situation. Due to the risk of total annihilation in nuclear scenarios, states usually attempt to avert or

78 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, p. 181.

53 constrain escalation. However, for small states escalation in conventional deterrence situations is quite distinct: the lead-up to escalation is not usually long and it is not as devastating as it is in a nuclear context. Firstly, owing to the limited size of the economy and limited military capabilities, small states need to mobilise large parts or even all of their national power to deal with an enemy in the initial period of a crisis. That is, small states tend to spare no effort in defending their territory and there is little or no room for escalation. Second, under the threat of modern weapon systems, small conflicts can quickly balloon into a threat to the very survival of small states. Simply put, there is not enough time or space for small states to consider escalating, as they must directly and rapidly defend themselves using their maximal resources. The nature of targets for small states in conventional conditions is quite different from that of nuclear ones, and can be analysed from two perspectives. Firstly, distinguishing between civil targets such as big cities from military targets is difficult for small states during a battle. If a small country tries to focus its deterrence on an adversary’s military targets, a larger arsenal plus a more complex intelligence system is required, a heavy burden for a small state. In addition, conventional punishment is weak in a purely military sense, but has the potential to exert other kinds of influence. For example, if Taiwan could deliver projectiles over 1000km to Shanghai City, this would have larger ramifications on China than simply attacking a military base in Jiangsu Province. Thus, non-military targets are difficult to exclude in the punishment approach. Secondly, distinguishing between civil and military targets is a mutual obligation and becomes redundant if either side does not comply. However, it is difficult to determine whether the consensus of distinguishing targets is effective in wartime. Moreover, if a small state tries to persuade its adversary that discriminating measures ought to be implemented, such as not concealing troops in civil areas, such promises may undermine the deterrent capability or amplify the vulnerability of that small state.

5. The Special Significance of Maritime Security for Small States in Maritime Strategic Locations

Due to the strategic environment of the research subjects, namely Taiwan and Singapore, maritime strategy is an essential element of this study. As maritime strategic locations, Singapore and Taiwan must consider their sea-bound characteristics in terms

54 of national defence, making maritime strategy an indispensible research instrument. Based on the unoccupied characteristics of the ocean, the main focus of military maritime strategies is twofold, control and denial. Although the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea expanded the territorial rights over the sea, the high seas are as yet unable to be occupied by any particular state. In light of its non-territorial characteristics, sea control and sea denial are opposing strategic goals. Sea control denotes that a country can make use of sea lines of communication (SLOC) to transport, to project national power, such as gunboat diplomacy, or to exploit natural resources such as fishing and mining; and navies protect these maritime activities.80 However, building up and maintaining a strong naval force to achieve sea control is very expensive and only a few nations in the world can afford such fleets. For countries that fail to gain sea control, the countermeasure is sea denial, which in effect means denying an adversary access to activities in the ocean.81 Prior to the invention of torpedoes in the nineteenth century, sea denial consisted merely of privateers and cruisers depriving the enemy’s merchant vessels of passage through the oceans.82 The advent of the torpedo led to the emergence of France’s “New School”, a revised method of sea denial, as torpedoes gave a weak navy the capability to fight against a larger counterpart, neutralising the adversary’s sea control. Subsequently, the New School has been enhanced and expanded by several new weapon systems in the twentieth century: submarines, aircrafts, anti-ship missiles and various surveillance systems. A clear example of the effectiveness of sea denial can be seen in the use of German U-boats that roved the Atlantic Ocean in both the World Wars and formed a considerable blockaded to the sea transport. Maritime strategy constitutes a crucial aspect of a navy’s military structure. For sea control, large surface ships, including aircraft carriers, are important because they are suitable to escort merchant fleets and other maritime activities over long distances and endure extreme climate conditions. Conversely, navies practising sea denial are usually primarily comprised of various vehicles equipped with torpedoes, mines or anti-

79 Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 12. 80 Sea Power Center, Australian Maritime Concept (Canberra: Defence Publish Service, Department of Defence, 2000), p. 39; Charles W. Koburger Jr, Narrow Seas, Small Navies, and Fat Merchantmen (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 52. 81 Coastal battery, mines and obstacles such as sunken boats were also sea denial tactics before torpedo, but their effect is restrained in small area, not in the high seas. For the strategies and tactics see Andrew Lambert, War at Sea in the Age of Sail (New York: Harper Resource, 2005).

55 ship missiles such as small vessels, aircraft and submarines, and these weapon systems are difficult to transfer for the purpose of sea control.83 It is impossible for aeroplanes to provide air cover over commercial ships for long periods; submarines are incapable of protecting ships from aerial attacks; and small vessels are limited by their short range and poor endurance to extreme weather conditions. Tactically, sea denial is superior to sea control on the basis of cost, because, for example, a single mine may incapacitate a destroyer at a vastly higher cost. Clearly, sea control is more costly than sea denial, and most small navies prefer the latter. Only very few navies can attain sea control and combine both strategic goals effectively. Regional or limited sea control may be a compromise or an intermediate option for some countries to protect their maritime interests where they have limited national resources. The effect of a limited sea control strategy depends on the types of interests that need to be preserved. It would be suitable where the interests are fixed in specific locations or areas such as drilling, mining or fishing, but insufficient to protect the SLOCs due to restricted coverage. Maritime strategy is significant to this comparative research for several reasons. Firstly, small coastal states face a strategic dilemma over sea control and denial. On the one hand, small coastal states rely on the sea for trade, particularly to import externally sourced resource material. However, it is almost impossible for a small state alone to achieve sea control along all relative SLOCs. On the other hand, the sea provides enemies with direct access for invasion, and sea denial is certainly crucial in this regard. Moreover, the cost of sea denial is significantly lower for sea control, an important consideration for small states with limited national resources. Therefore, small coastal states, which do not highly depend on sea transport, may implement sea denial. As for small states relying heavily on SLOCs, sea control would be feasible for limited areas or through a strong alliance with a sea power by playing an auxiliary role. Secondly, the location of small states in maritime strategic areas, also known as chokepoints, is very influential in terms of the balance of power. Historically, there have been two successive global sea powers, Great Britain and the US, while other powers such as Japan, Germany and the Soviet Union have attempted to challenge for maritime hegemony.84 When contending for maritime hegemony, acquiring maritime strategic

82 Colin S. Gray & Roger W. Barnett, Sea power and Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1989), pp. 301-302. 83 Robert S. Jordan, “Introduction: The Balance of Power and the Anglo-American Maritime Relationship”, in John B. Hattendorf (Ed.), Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power: Britain and American in the Twentieth Century (New York: St. Martine’s press, 1989), pp. 9-13.

56 locations is crucial in controlling or denying SLOCs; and this competition is fierce due to the limited number of chokepoints.85 For a small state in a maritime strategic location, this position offers both risk and opportunity; while alliances and extended deterrence can be easily implemented, invaders are also highly motivated.

6. Conclusion In the following chapters, the above-mentioned strategic theories and concepts relating to conventional deterrence are applied in several ways. Firstly, the fundamental elements of deterrence that have been modified for small states forms the basis for reviewing and discussing the geo-strategic conditions and national defence policies of Singapore and Taiwan. Secondly, the three conventional deterrence cases highlight several lessons for small states. In NATO’s Conventional Deterrence, technological factors play an important role and as such may effectively deter an invader’s blitzkrieg strategy. It is meaningful to identify whether and what kind of RMA are appropriate for small states in maritime strategic locations in order to strengthen their conventional deterrence capability. Non- offensive Defence accentuates the necessity for the comprehensive defence of small states. In addition to mobilising sufficient resources to compensate for their inferior national power, comprehensive defence is aimed at preventing a swift defeat due to the associated effects of war, such as social collapse. Comprehensive defence is essential to evaluating the defence capability of small states such as Singapore and Taiwan. Israel’s conventional deterrence has also demonstrated the indispensability of diplomacy, despite the IDF’s clear military might. Israel also illustrates how pre-emptive defence can be implemented, which is another option of national defence for the two research subjects. Thirdly, psychological approaches supplement the perceptions of Singapore and Taiwan, and their potential enemies, as their perceptions are significant for deterrence. In the case of Taiwan, its complex history gives Taipei, Beijing, and Washington diverse interpretations of the status quo from a range of perspectives. The resulting diverse understandings of the status quo in turn influence the means and effect of deterrence. Finally, maritime strategic theories are specifically suited to the sea-bound

84 John B. Hattendorf, “Alfred Thayer Mahan and his Strategic Thought”, in Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power: Britain and American in the Twentieth Century, p. 88.

57 characteristics of the research subjects. Militarily, the maritime environment is directly related to defence policies and is inextricably linked to deterrence. Internationally, the effect of warfare on maritime strategic locations may be more pronounced due to the disturbance of the SLOCs and the balance of power in the ocean; and such concerns may lead to international intervention or extended deterrence. Thus, maritime strategic theory is used to explain the naval strategies necessitated by Singapore and Taiwan’s maritime locations.

Chapter Three Taiwan’s Deterrence Strategy This chapter reviews Taiwan’s national defence from 1965 to 2008, when a three- level framework of deterrence was employed, comprising extended deterrence, general deterrence and immediate deterrence. During this timeframe, Taiwan’s national defence can be distinguished by two broad periods: authoritarian and democratic. The former denotes the period under the rule of the two President Chiangs and the latter refers to the two popularly elected Presidents.1 These two periods can be further separated into several phases according to specific events and international and domestic situations. Thus, an analysis of each phase is conducted according to a three-level framework to identify the evolutional characteristics of Taiwan’s national deterrence strategy.

1. Geographic Conditions and Historical Background Taiwan is an island, also known as Formosa, located in the West Pacific Ocean between the islands of Okinawa and Luzon islands, and is separated from the Asia Continent by the Taiwan Strait which is at least 120 km wide.2 Since the sixteenth century, the Taiwan Strait has acted a route for sea lines of communication (SLOC) between Northeast and Southeast Asia. Compared to the Pacific Ocean, located on the Eastern side of Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait is shallow, with a depth only 100 m, making it unsuitable for submarines.3 Among the few smaller islands in the vicinity of Taiwan, the Pescadores (Penghu) occupy a pivotal location in the Taiwan Strait and act as a midway point for potential invasion from the Asian Continent, and as a choke point of navigation (Map 1).4 Due to climatic factors at play in the region, the sea surrounding Taiwan is often choppy with large waves and seasonal winds in winter, and typhoons in summer:

1 President Lee Teng-hui came to power without popular election, but he promoted democratisation and won the election in 1996. Hence, he is categorised as a democratic leader. 2 Although the term “Formosa” becomes not as popular as “Taiwan”, this term is still be named for many Taiwanese companies, such as the Formosa Plastic, in addition to the usages in several important international treaties. 3 Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 2-3; John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009), p. 4. 4 The Pescadores were first included in Taiwan under the governance of the Ching Empire 䂔ガ⦚ in 1885, when Taiwan Province was established. When Beijing ceded Taiwan to Japan after the Sino-Japan War in 1895, the Pescadores were also contained in the Shimonoseki Treaty. Thereafter, the Pescadores have been seen permanently as part of Taiwan. Robert Gardella, “From Treaty Ports to Provincial Status, 1860-1894”, and Harry J. Lamley “Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism”, in Murray A. Rubinstein (Ed.), Taiwan: A New History (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), pp. 164, 187, 203.

59 these all create impediments to the operation of naval surface fleets.5

Map 1 the location of Taiwan (http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/2-visitor/map/) site accessed 24 April, 2011 The terrain of Taiwan itself is rugged and comprises a series of basins, plains, and valleys with the majority of the landscape being mountainous along the Central Ridge

5 David Shambaugh, “Taiwan's Security: Maintaining Deterrence amid Political Accountability”, The China Quarterly, No. 148, Special Issue: Contemporary Taiwan, December 1996, p. 1317; Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 113-114.

60 and other mountainous ranges.6 Due to its topographical features, land transportation on Formosa can be difficult and natural disasters such as typhoons or earthquakes can easily disrupt transport connections, especially in the Eastern region of the country. The transport infrastructure was developed during and subsequent to the period of Japanese rule (1895-1945), and land transport has improved significantly since then. However, most highways and railways, with the exception of the Chia-nan plain, remain vulnerable to disruption due to natural disasters such as flood.7 In relation to sea transport, there are few suitable locations for ports on Formosa as the Western coastline is comprised mainly of beaches, lagoons and swamps, while the Eastern coastline is too rocky to accommodate appropriate land traffic8. Thus, most sea transport is concentrated in the three ports in the Western Part, Keelung, Taichung and Kaohsiung, while other ports are used for domestic sea transport, fishing and military purposes (Map 2).9 The geographic conditions described above create two natural obstacles to capturing the entire island: gaining entry and proceeding inland are very difficult. Firstly, airlift capacity alone would not be sufficient to support a major incursion, which means that sea transportation is indispensable. Since there are relatively few ports in Taiwan, an amphibious operation would be necessary to conduct an invasion; nevertheless, suitable landing sites are also limited.10 Secondly, even if the debarkation were successful, the advancement of expedition forces on land would be difficult and time consuming, with the rugged terrain constraining mobility and providing opportunities for guerrilla warfare and other forms of resistance. Map 2 the terrain and land traffic in Taiwan (http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/taiwan.gif) site accessed 24 April, 2011

6 The Western part which accommodates most of the population and economy, is separated into three areas: the Chia-nan plain ⢘◦㄂☮, the Taipei Basin ♿▦䥕⦿, a hilly area between them, with the remainder being mountainous regions. The Eastern part, more distinctly segmented by higher ranges, is composed of the Lian-yang basin 墼椌㄂☮, the Hua-tung valley 啀㨀僀廆 with the remainder being mountainous areas. The Government information Office, Executive Yuan, “Taiwan Proper ”, Republic of China (Taiwan) Government Entry point (http://www.taiwan.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=27755&ctNode=1928&mp=1001) site accessed 10 March, 2011. 7 Country Profile: Taiwan(2008) (New York: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008), p. 23. 8 Ming-shih Shen and Chen-Tin Tsai, “An analysis of the Republic of China’s Military Organization and Force Structure”, in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai (Ed.), Taiwan’s Defense Reform (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 102, 104. 9 John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province, p. 5. 10 Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects, p. 3.

Throughout Taiwan’s history, most successful invasions have been conducted by defeating a specific position, such as the capital of the ruling regime, and thereby effecting a morale collapse or ending organised resistance. For example, in 1683 the Ching Empire overcame the defences of Koxinga’s regime by capturing the Pescadores. Japan is the only exception to this pattern; in 1895 within several months, Japan managed to capture the majority of towns in Formosa.11

11 When Koxinga invaded Formosa whilst under Dutch control in 1662, his troops sank the Fort Zeelandia by besieging it, whereupon the Dutch garrison surrendered. April C. J. Lin & Jerome F. Keating, Island in the Stream: A Quick Case Study of Taiwan’s Complex History (Taipei: SMC Publishing INC., 2005), pp. 11-12, 18-19.

Historically, Taiwan has faced a range of invaders from various directions; since 1949, however, the single biggest threat to Taiwan has been from the west in the form of China, officially, the People’s Republic of China (PRC).12 Following the debacle that occurred in the civil war in China between 1948 and 1949, the regime of the Chinese Nationalist Party, formally known as the Republic of China (ROC), fled to Formosa, because this island was the most isolated territory under their control and had the best infrastructure due to the legacy of the Japanese period.13 In 1950, the military forces of the PRC, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), planned a large-scale amphibious offensive to put an end to the civil war, but were prevented from doing so by the Korean War. At this time the US commenced extended deterrence in the Taiwan Strait with patrols by its navy. This extended deterrence was formalised in the Mutual Defence Treaty between the US and the ROC regime in 1954.14 However, the US’s deterrence was aimed not only at Beijing but also at Taipei, as “to retake the mainland” was the core goal of the Taipei Authority and its de facto leader Chiang Kai-shek.15 In line with this, Taipei maintained the armed forces at a high rate of its population, compared with other countries in the East Asia, e.g. South Korea. Despite the direct threat of invasion on land from North Korea, South Korea had 604,000 soldiers for its 28,000,000 population (2.1%) in 1965, while Taiwan maintained 524,000 soldiers for its 12,000,000 population (4.36%).16 In addition, Chiang Kai-shek spent more than half its governmental budget on military expenditure in addition to the considerable US military aid it received.17 In the 1950s and 1960s, several serious but

12 Japan invaded from the North, the Ching Empire from the West and the US planned to raid from the South in World War II. Ming-shih Shen and Chen-Tin Tsai, “An analysis of the Republic of China’s Military Organization and Force Structure”, pp. 102-103. 13 The Japanese established a system of public health, primary education, transport and other infrastructure and made Formosa the highest living standard in the Far East, with the possible exception of Japan itself. Albert Ravenholt, “Formosa Today”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 30, No.4, July 1952, pp. 615-616. 14 David Shambaugh, “Taiwan's Security: Maintaining Deterrence amid Political Accountability”, p. 1284. 15 When the ROC regime officially moved to Taiwan on 7 December, 1949, Chiang Kai-shek had no position in the government after resignation from the presidency, but he still had critical influence, especially in the military. He “accepted” the request from the Executive Yuan (administration) to take the presidency in March 1950. Denny Roy, Taiwan: A Political History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 81-82. 16 IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 65, Issue 1 (1965), pp. 32-33. 17 US economic aid between 1949 and 1960 was 1.3204 billion USD, as the military aid is 1.7684 billion USD. Other statistical data shows US aid to Taiwan between 1951 and 1965 reached 3.7billion USD. Stephen P. Gibert & William M. Carpenter, America and Island China: A Documentary History (New York: University Press of America, 1989), pp. 141-142; Jongseok Woo, “Security Threats and the Military’s Domestic Political Role: A Comparative Study of South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia”, Diss. the University of Texas at Austin, 2007, p. 83; Janne E. Nolan, Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), p. 22.

63 regional-scale armed conflicts between the ROC and the PRC occurred in the Taiwan Strait, but these conflicts did not alter the strategic situation.18

2. Authoritarian Period (1965-1988) 2.1 From “ Retake the Mainland” to Defending Taiwan(1965-1971) I. The Extended Deterrence The year 1965 was a strategic turning point in Taipei’s goal to “retake the mainland”, when, despite the unstable situation of the Cultural Revolution in China, the goal became less feasible than ever. Internationally, the US was deeply involved in the Vietnam War and was trying to prevent Chiang Kai-shek from provoking China.19 Moreover, China had obtained two major military technologies: anti-ship missiles and nuclear weapons, both of which posed serious threats to an amphibious operation.20 The final straw came with the naval conflicts in the Taiwan Strait in 1965. The gun boats and torpedo boats of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) sank the destroyer escorts of the ROC’s Navy (ROCN) using only torpedoes and small-calibre canons, rather than missiles. 21 Accordingly, to launch an offensive across the Taiwan Strait would be a very risky action for the ROC’s armed forces, not to mention being outnumbered by the ground troops of the PLA and militia.22 In 1965, the preparations “to retake the mainland” were secretly suspended.23 However, following the abandonment of this strategy, Taipei neither significantly adjusted its grand strategy nor responded to a series of changes in the international environment until 1971, when the ROC lost its seat in the United Nations to the PRC.

18 There were three major battles in the 1950s: bombardment of Quemoy (Kinmen) in 1954, the mass withdrawal from Ta Chen in 1955, and the larger bombardment of Quemoy in 1958. Ralph N. Clough, Island China, pp. 98-99. 19 Stephen P. Gibert & William M. Carpenter, America and Island China: A Documentary History, pp. 138-139. 20 China conducted its first nuclear test in October 1964. Two types of missile boats (project 205 and project 183R) were included in the Soviet-Sino Technology Transfer Contract signed on February 4th, 1959. China successfully produced Project 183R in 1964 and named the type 024. IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 66, Issue 1(1966), p. 9; Liu Huaqing ┘噾䂔, Liu Huaqing Hueiyilu ┘噾䂔⥭㑅斓 ᧤the bibliography of Liu Huaqing᧥ (Beijing: jiefangjun chubanshe, 2004), pp.295-298. 21 Alexander C. Huang, “The PLA Navy at War 1949-1999 From Coastal Defense to Distant Operations”, in Mark A. Ryan, David Michael Finkelstein, Michael A. McDevitt (Ed.), Chinese Warfighting - The PLA Experience since 1949 (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 260-261. 22 There were 25 to 28 divisions specifically deployed against the invasion from Taiwan in the 1960s. IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 67, Issue 1, p. 11; Vol. 68, Issue 1, p. 11; Vol. 69, Issue 1, pp. 39-40. 23 Da-Nian Pung, ⬄⺐䤓⇫㒿岗䟺᧶⦚⏘岗䟺-♲承㸆⚁ Chenfeng de Tsochan Jihua: Kuokuang Jihua-Koushu Lishih᧤The Operation Plan Covered with Dust: the Oral history of the National Glory Project᧥ (Taipei: Military History and Translation Office, the Ministry of National Defense ROC, 2005), pp. 14-16, 55-59.

During this phase, the extended deterrence offered by the US over Taiwan was advantageous to Taiwan. Firstly, as the Vietnam War deepened, additional US military units were deployed in Taiwan.24 The close US–Taiwan military cooperation signalled the existence of a strong alliance between the two countries. Secondly, China was destabilised by the internal upheaval of the Cultural Revolution and most likely lacked the capability and stability to launch a major operation across the Taiwan Strait.25 Moreover, Beijing was dealing with strategic pressure from the Soviet Union along its northern border and the US military presence in Vietnam near its southern border. These threats were exacerbated by the Damansky Island incident and other armed conflicts on the Soviet–Sino border as well as the ongoing intensification of the Vietnam War.26 In addition to the previously discussed factors, the positive mindset of China’s leaders made deterrence feasible. As the US national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, had commenced official communications with China, Mao Zedong and other national leaders could expect a more favourable international environment where the PRC would replace the ROC to represent the whole of China and isolate Taiwan. This potentially favourable development established a positive mindset among China’s leaders and deterrence was thenceforth easily maintained. At the same time, an approaching unfavourable strategic situation in Taiwan was apparent. Some indications of the changing nature of the US’s policy regarding China emerged in the 1960s, particularly several public statements made by the Republican Presidential candidate Richard Nixon. Nixon noted the possibility of normalising US relations with Beijing, implying the downgrading of the US’s relationship with Taipei and reducing its diplomatic support. A change of this nature would have been detrimental to a small state highly reliant on foreign support, such as Taiwan. Taipei

24 A wing of C-130 tactical transport aircraft and a squadron of KC-135 refuelling aircraft were deployed after 1965 at the Ching Chuan Kang (CCK) air base. In 1969, another detachment of F-4 fighters was deployed at the Tainan air base. Before the Tonkin Gulf Incident, there were 3700 US military in Taiwan with the number later reaching 10000. Stephen P. Gibert & William M. Carpenter, America and Island China: A Documentary History, pp. 146-147; Ralph N. Clough, Island China, p. 23. 25 During the Cultural Revolution, the PLA merely maintained a minimal orthodoxy in the nature of its training and its manoeuvres were aimed rather at intimidating inner opposition groups instead of foreign invasion. Industrial production dropped 25% in some sectors in 1968. The high command became demoralised by the political situation. IISS, Strategic Survey, Vol. 69, Issue 1 (1968), pp. 39-40. 26 The number of Soviet regular divisions along the Soviet-Sino border and in Mongolia was increasing from 15 in 1968 to 44 in 1971. A series of clashes happened between the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region of China and Kazakh Soviet Socialistic right after the Damansky Island incident Republic in 1969. The IISS, Strategic Survey, Vol. 72, Issue 1 (1971), p.56; Vol. 70, Issue 1 (1969), p. 66.

65 however did not take sufficient action to prevent such a move nor did it develop any flexible alternatives to this serious challenge, and as such lost its seat in the United Nations.27 Although formal diplomatic relations with the US remained, reduction in the US’s extended deterrence in Formosa was unavoidable.

II. The General Deterrent Situation During this phase, Taiwan comprehensively strengthened its deterrence, including its economy, social stability and military capability. The Formosan economy was recovering from the devastation of the Pacific War and the disruption caused by a flood of exiles from China. US aid revived the economy considerably, for example, the sugar industry built during the Japanese period recovered, as well as other expansive infrastructure projects. Taipei resumed exporting sugar and rice, which had generated the most revenue during the Japanese period, and began to promote manufacturing, shifting the economic focus from an import-substitution to an export orientation. In 1964, the Taipei Authority reached a breakeven point for the first time and accordingly US aid was terminated in 1965.28 Despite such positive moves, in the late 1960s, Taipei’s financial ability to support national defence was limited and Taipei’s reliance on US military support was considerable.29 Moreover, the rising economy led to a growing reliance on importing foreign material and exporting merchandise. As such, Taiwan’s vulnerability increased significantly due to overwhelming reliance of the import / export trade on sea transport, itself vulnerable to disruption by a blockade. This weakness was amplified by the commencement of Chinese domestic submarine production, thus increasing the threat of a blockade. During World War II, sea transportation in and around Formosa had been

27 When Nixon travelled to Taipei in 1965, he already mentioned that the US had to improve their relations with the PRC. His article in Foreign Affairs repeated the same statement. However, Chiang Kai-shek and other high officials still believed in Nixon’s anti-communist beliefs and treated him as the ROC’s friend. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 31, 35-36. 28 Cal Clark, Taiwan’s Development: Implications for Contending Political Economy Paradigms (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), pp. 157-159, 167-171. 29 The value of US military assistance to Taiwan was US$61.5 million in FY1965, US$86million in FY1966, US$90.5 million in FY 1967, US$67.4 million in FY 1968, US$36 million in FY 1969. The amount of the ROC military purchase from the US was US$0.6 million in FY 1965, US$0.7 million in FY 1966, US$0.7million in FY 1967, US$1.2 million in FY 1968 and US$1.9 million in FY 1969. Comparison of the two data points out how heavy the defence reliance of Taiwan on the US was. Stephen P. Gibert & William M. Carpenter, America and Island China: A Documentary History, pp. 140-141.

66 similarly impeded by US submarines, mining and air raids.30 However, at that time the population of the island had been much smaller and the economy was more self- sufficient than it was in the late 1960s.31 Thus, for Taiwan, a growing economy was not necessarily positive in terms of national defence. Social stability is an important factor in implementing general deterrence. The relationship between the government and native Formosans was fraught with conflict due to the corruption and political conflicts arising out of the ROC regime’s rule after the end of World War II, especially the slaughter of 1947. Demonstrations occurred after a controversial law-enforcement case on 28 February, 1947 and were subsequently escalated to rebellion as a result of the government‘s violent response and the popular anger towards the government. The Nationalist Government subsequently sent reinforcement troops to Taiwan to brutally massacre rebels and other innocent people, resulting in 10,000-30,000 casualties.32 Negative sentiment among the Formosans toward the regime was subsequently amplified by heavy taxes, unequal distribution of wealth and deficient land reforms.33 Further, political power was distributed unevenly: the people who fled to Formosa with the government dominated superior positions in the administration and other governmental institutions.34 In other words, the ROC regime in Taiwan was not unlike a colony.35 An anti-government sentiment thus developed the potential to be exploited by Beijing. Nevertheless, the gradual improvement of the economy provided a basis for some acceptance by Formosans of this external regime. In addition, the imposition of martial law and the establishment of complex and ubiquitous internal security networks effectively consolidated Taiwan and

30 Massive US air raids began in the latter part of 1944. Harry J. Lamley “Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895- 1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism”, p. 236. 31 In 1940, the population of Formosa was 5.8 million and had increased to 12million by 1965. John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province, p. 9; The IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 65, Issue 1, p.33. 32 The takeover using corruption and the slaughter following the February 28th incident in 1947 caused the first wave of disharmony. The second wave was a result of the different treatment by the ROC regime after 1949between of Formosan and Chinese who had fled. Douglas Mendel, the Politics of Formosan Nationalism (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 26-31, 35-37, 55-56; Steven Phillips, “Between Assimilation and Independence: Taiwan political Aspirations under Nationalist Chinese Rule, 1945-1948”, in Murray A. Rubinstein (Ed.), Taiwan: A New History, pp. 295-296. 33 Douglas Mendel, the Politics of Formosan Nationalism, pp. 67, 70-74. 34 This phenomenon happened in military, education and administrative systems as well as in representative institutions. Denny Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, pp. 94-95; Douglas Mendel, the Politics of Formosan Nationalism, pp. 49, 93. 35 J. Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwan’s Colonial history and Postcolonial Nationalism”, in Peter C. Y. Chow (Ed.), The “One China” Dilemma (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 45-46.

67 minimised the possibility of sabotage.36 During this phase, the military capability of Taiwan improved significantly. Firstly, after undergoing a crushing defeat and subsequently fleeing from China, with the help of US aid, the armed forces of the ROC regime recovered and the US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) achieved general reform and modernisation.37 However, as Chiang Kai-shek did not accept all of the MAAG’s suggestions, he hired additional Japanese and German advisors primarily for the purpose of training the army and improving its combat capability; the Japanese advisors’ influence on the army was particularly extensive until 1968.38 Secondly, the conscription system in operation provided sufficient and cheap manpower, and the mobilisation system expanding reserves of the armed forces was also established.39 The large number of soldiers and officers monitored by the political Commissar System (political warfare system) prevented the occurrence of a coup.40 Thirdly, the Vietnam War was beneficial for Taiwan’s armed forces in two ways. One benefit came directly from the battlefield; Taiwan’s military advisors in South Vietnam enriched their battle experience and also acquired various weapon samples from both the Vietcong and the US forces, as well as cheap damaged vehicles from the US Army. The other benefit came indirectly, through logistics contracts from the US forces for the overhaul of aero-piston engines and vehicles. These projects expanded

36 Jongseok Woo, “Security Threats and the Military’s Domestic Political Role: A Comparative Study of South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia”, pp. 160-161; Ralph N. Clough, Island China, p. 42. 37 See Military History and Translation Office, Ministry of National Defence, ROC, US MAAG-Taiwan: An Oral History (Taipei: Military History and Translation Office, Ministry of National Defence, ROC, 2008) for the detail of American advisors. 38 The “White Regiment” lasted from 1951 to 1968. In the beginning, Japanese advisors also had lectures on the navy and the air force, later replaced by the American ones. The “Ming Der” project 㢝㉆⺗㫗 was between 1963 to 1975. Joining the training of the “White Regiment” was necessary for high ranking officers to become generals. Although German advisors provided many lectures and analyses, they had no clear influence on the promotion of officers. See Nakamura Yuethu ₼㧠䯟㌔, Baidan: daiwannkunn wo Tsukuu Nihonkun Shokootachi 䤌⦧-ྎ‴㌷ࢆࡗࡃࡗࡓ᪥ᮏ㌷⺖㪰ࡓࡕ (The White Regiment : the Japanese Military Officers in the Taiwan Army) (Tokyo: Asagiri Shobo, 1995); Wang Yu-chi 䘚䘘無,Ming Der Juanan: deguo jiunshr guwen tzaitai gungtzuo shrshr 㢝㉆⺗㫗᧶㉆⦚慜ℚ櫶⟞⦷♿ぴ⇫⚁⹵ (The Ming Der Project: the History of German Military Advisors in Taiwan) (Taipei: Juangwei Press, 2007) for the detail of Japanese and German advisors. 39 Denny Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, p. 95; Bill Chang, Personal Interview, 23 June 2010. 40 This system was created by Chiang Ching-kuo, based on the counter part in the Soviet Union. It was not only aimed at Communist espionage but also at the factions in troops. Jongseok Woo, “Security Threats and the Military’s Domestic Political Role: A Comparative Study of South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia”, pp. 158-159.

Taiwan’s logistics capacity for defence.41 Fourthly, after the Nixon Doctrine was issued in 1969, Taipei set about developing its domestic defence industry, including the establishment of research and development institutes, the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology (CIST) and the Aero Industry Development Center (AIDC), to conduct coproduction projects, such as the UH-1 Huey helicopter, with American authorisation.42 In other words, Taiwan was now partially self-sufficient in terms of defence. During this period, the deterrence strategy employed was mostly one of denial rather than punishment. On the one hand, Washington controlled the supply of most major weapon systems and related technologies, to prevent Taipei from possessing overt offensive capability. Driven by a deep desire to “retake the mainland”, Chiang Kai- shek and other high officials maintained offence-oriented armed forces, and the US sought to constrain this military capability through providing only defensive weapon systems. Consequently, while the organisation of the ROC’s armed forces was inherently offensive, it lacked the capability for launching offensive actions. For example, Taipei had one airborne brigade, but lacked long-range fighters to escort and support it, due to the US’s refusal to provide or sell such fighter-bombers, for example the F-4 Phantom fighter.43 On the other hand, several US nuclear weapons were deployed on Formosa as deterrence by punishment. Deterrence by punishment was not as crucial for Formosa as it was in Western Europe, because a superior number of PLA ground troops did not constitute a clear and present danger. Thus, deterrence by denial was considered sufficient in the Taiwan Strait. The armed forces of the ROC regime played the main role of deterrence, and each service contributed their own respective approach. The main strategic role of the ROC’s air force (ROCAF) was air defence through achieving air superiority. In the years following its withdrawal to Taiwan, the ROCAF lost air superiority due to its inferior propeller-driven fighters before the arrival of US jet fighters in the mid 1950s. These

41 Tseng, Chiungye 㦍䝙囘, Yuejan Yiwang:Koushu Lishr 怙㒿㑅㈏᧶♲承㸆⚁ (the Vietnam War: An Oral History) (Taipei: Military History and Translation Office, Ministry of National Defence, ROC, 2008), pp. 17-18, 332,342-343. 42 The AIDC was established in 1969 and the first design in production was the PL-1 primary trainer with American engine. Janne E. Nolan, Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea, p. 23; Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (http://www.aidc.com.tw/enaidcsite/web/companyprofile.asp) site accessed 13 January, 2011 43 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China, pp. 94-95.

69 fighter jets, mainly F-86 Sabre fighters, reinstated Taiwan’s air superiority and achieved an outstanding combat record in the crisis, in which the PLA launched a large-scale artillery bombardment of Quemoy and other Islands under Taipei’s control between August and October, 1958.44 In the late 1960s, the ROCAF fighter fleet was composed predominantly of supersonic fighters such as F-104 Starfighter, F-100 Super Sabre and F-5A/B Freedom Fighter.45 In air combat on 13 January 1967, when four ROCAF F- 104Gs engaged twelve MIG-19s of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), the ROCAF shot down two MIG-19s at the cost of one F-104G lost, and continued to enjoy air superiority.46 Apart from air defence, in 1965, the ROCAF established its capability of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) by forming its first anti-submarine unit of S-2A/E Tracker anti-submarine warfare aircraft.47 The ROCAF possessed very little punishment capability due to two technological restrictions: range and capacity. Since the time when the US started to offer military support during the Korean War, no long-range or large-payload bombers or fighters were transferred to Taiwan. For example, the F-100 fighters were seen as the offensive capability but their combat radius was relatively short considering the size of China.48 The only exception was the PB4Y-2 Privateer maritime patrol planes produced during World War II which were used by the ROCAF as bombers, but their service was terminated in 1961 due to their advanced age.49 Thus, the ROCAF’s air strike range and capacity was very limited, and as a result it was not able to conduct strategic bombardment within China’s expansive territory. The ROC Navy (ROCN) conducted strategic planning with a focus on regional sea

44 In 1954, the ROCAF, mainly equipped with F-47 and F-84, failed to secure air superiority in Dachen and Yijiangshan Islands, while facing the Mig-15 of the PLAAF and the PLAN. The air inferiority caused Taipei to lose the control over both islands. However, during air combat in 1958, the kill ratio of ROCAF’s F-86F against the Mig-15 and 17 of the PLAAF and the PLAN was 8 to 1. Ralph N. Clough, Island China, p. 108; Zhang Xiaoming, “Air Combat for the People’s Republic: The People’s Liberation Army Air Force in Action, 1949- 1969”, in Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt (Ed.), Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949 (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), p. 281. 45 Richard Fisher, Jr., “The Air Balance on the Taiwan Strait,” International Assessment and Strategic Center, Feb. 21st, 2010 (http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.224/pub_detail.asp) site accessed8 January, 2011 46 The ROCAF’s 4 F-104G engaged with the PLAAF’s 12 Mig-19 on January 13, 1967 and the outcome was 2:1. Martin W. Bowman, Lockheed F-104 Starfighter (Wiltshire, UK: Crowood Press, 2000), p. 165 47 Military History and Translation Office, Ministry of National Defence, ROC, US MAAG-Taiwan: An Oral History, pp. 100-101. 48 The combat range of the F-100 was 530 miles, which was not enough to attack Beijing. Ralph N. Clough, Island China, p. 106; North American F-100C “Super Sabre”, the Federation of American Scientists (http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/airdef/f-100.htm) site accessed 24 April, 2011. 49 Chen, Yi-ming 椂㑘㢝 & Liu, Wen-shao ┘㠖ⷬ, Military Aircraft in the Chinese Civil War (Taipei: The Wing of China Press, 1992), pp. 68, 90; Stewart Wilson, Aircraft of WWII(Fyshwick, ACT, Australia, 1998), p. 43.

70 control, with several considerations. Firstly, following the strategic goal “to retake the mainland”, amphibious operations were deemed indispensible and this meant a reliance on sea control. Secondly, the Formosan economy was extremely reliant on sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and it was necessary to maintain surface fleets capable of providing an escort to supply shipping both into Formosa and to offshore destinations, such as Quemoy and Matsu, near the coastal areas of China. Finally, surface ships also provided a means of directly denying an invasion by PLAN. Once in an inferior situation, the surface ships could pursue the “fleet in being” strategy by deploying the fleet a specific distance from Taiwan to threaten PLAN’s amphibious operation.50 Hence, the ROCN built up a fleet composed mainly of ex-American surface ships which had been produced during World War II.51 The ROCN’s sea control capability was effected from a group of mid-sized and small surface ships, being five destroyers, eight frigates, dozens of submarine chasers and minesweepers used for patrol and escort in 1965.52 After the late 1960s, the fleet was improved considerably when the US Navy retired a high number of FRAM (Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization) destroyers and successively delivered some of them to Taiwan.53 This transfer can be regarded as a reaction to China’s simultaneous building of the Soviet Union’s Gnevny class destroyers.54 While the ex-US ships significantly increased the ROCN’s tonnage, the modification was necessary in the face of the threat posed by Chinese anti-ship missiles. It must be noted that both ROCAF and ROCN prepared for scenarios of conducting joint operations with their US counterparts, whereby two additional command systems, the air combat command and the naval fleet command, could be transferred to the US

50 “Fleet in being” denotes that the inferior fleet avoids engagement but keeps its strength to constrain the adversary fleet’s behaviour. Julian S. Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy (New York: Dover Publications, 2004), p. 167. 51 During this period, the US Navy transferred 13 destroyers, 12 frigates, 3 tugboats, 7 minesweepers and 2 cargo ships to Taiwan. Teng His 掶䑈, Lau Jiunjian De Gushr 劐慜哵䤓㟔ℚ(The Stories of the Old Warships)(Kaohsiung: the Naval Fleet Command, 2006), pp. 14-21; The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 28 October, 2011. 52 The IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 65, Issue 1, p.33. 53 Navy Memorial Digital Archive: Yang Class Destroyers (http://nmda.teldap.tw/map.htm) site accessed 12 March, 2011 54 China’s first domestic destroyer was started on December, 1968, launched out in the next year and delivered to the PLAN on December 31st, 1971. Liu Huaqing ┘噾䂔, Liu Huaqing hueiyilu ┘噾䂔⥭㑅斓᧤the bibliography of Liu Huaqing᧥, pp. 334-335; John E. Moore, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1986-1987 (Surrey, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group Inc, 1986), p. 100.

71 command. This organisational structure has been maintained until today.55 The large ROC army (the ROCA) and the marine corps under the ROCN’s command had several functions throughout this phase. Politically, the large number of ground troops maintained not only represented the government’s resolution to “retake the mainland” but also maintained firm social control by involving internal security and absorbed most conscripts of military service. The military police, the garrison headquarters and other intelligence institutes under the ROCA dealt with espionage, anti-government statements and other national security issues. The conscription system, including associated military courses in high schools, universities and colleges, mostly provided by ex-army officers, formed an important aspect of the socialisation of citizens, mainly male, and was intended to inspire acceptance of the government and loyalty to it.56 Militarily, the ROCA was assigned to offensive and defensive missions. To achieve its goal of “retaking the mainland”, the ROCA had maintained a large number of soldiers under an organisation and was capable of engaging in various continental scenarios. For example, the size of divisions was too large for geographic conditions in Formosa.57 The offensive units such as airborne brigades and marine divisions were planned for use in establishing a bridgehead in China; other infantry divisions, especially the ones crowdedly stationed in very cramped quarters in offshore positions, were to conduct further battles.58 Although it was almost impossible for the army to fulfil such missions, no major change of formation or deployment occurred during this phase.59 Regarding defence, the ROCA was planning to use anti-landing, defending the offshore islands, and air defence. The surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) were assigned to the ROCA since their introduction. The ROCA received MIM-14 Nike Hercules long-range

55 Bill Chang, Personal Interview, 23 June 2010. 56 Military education on campus was conducted by military officers when the ROC regime was in China. In Taiwan, it was commenced in 1952 and their function involved internal security by checking any anti- government or Communism statements among students. A number of female officers were also assigned to campus to provide nursing courses for female students as well as other functions similar to their male counterparts. Denny Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, p. 92; Chou, Chi-hon ⛷㉦⸞, “Military Training Education”, Encyclopaedia of Taiwan (http://taiwanpedia.culture.tw/web/content?ID=3949) site accessed 13 March, 2011. 57 The American advisors suggested a small scale of the ROC Army but this plan was refused by Chiang Kai-shek. Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects, p. 26. 58 Ralph N. Clough, Island China, p. 106. 59 The organisation of the ROCA was similar in 1965 and 1971. IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 65, Issue 1, p. 33; Vol. 71, Issue 1, p. 45.

SAMs during the crisis in 1958 and obtained additional missiles in the late 1960s. In 1967, the MIM-23 Hawk mid-range SAMs were also put into service as a necessary means of implementing strategic denial of China’s air raids.60 As for other missions, the related scenarios are analysed later in the immediate deterrence section. During this period, modernisation of the army was carried out with the aid of coproduction projects, and direct supplies from the US, including damaged items acquired from the Vietnam War, to replace equipment manufactured during World War II, which was previously provided by the US. There were two major coproduction projects: the UH-1 helicopter, and the M-14 rifle with its 7.62 x51 mm ammunition. The former project substantially improved the defence capability of Formosa, as helicopters could swiftly convey troops over the rugged terrain. This was necessary in order to defend Taiwan from external invasion and to guard against internal sabotage. The M-14 project was not as influential due to its unsuccessful original design, but it did establish the relative production capability and capacity of the Combined Logistic Command, which would become the centre of light weapons development.61 The Vietnam War also accelerated the modernisation of the army, because many vehicles damaged in the battlefield were subsequently sold to Taiwan at a low price. The army also provided an overhaul service for the US Army and expanded its logistics capacity. Finally, the Pentagon’s delivery of some major weapon systems including M-108 self-propelled howitzers, M-113 armoured personnel carriers (APC) and M-41 light tanks reinforced strike capability, mainly anti-landing.62

III. Immediate Deterrence This section describes how Taipei’s denial methods deterred Beijing. Several scenarios will be analysed: assaults or attacks on the islands controlled by Taipei and close to China’s coastline; blockade of the SLOCs to Formosa; air raids; and overall invasion, mainly in the form of amphibious operations but with possible airborne ones

60 73 MIM-14 and 16 MIM-23 missiles were delivered between 1967 and 1970. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 28 October, 2011; Ralph N. Clough, Island China, p. 104. 61 The US Army adopted M-14s in 1957 but abandoned them in 1973 during the Vietnam War. The main reason is that the later type, M-16 with 5.56 x45 mm bullets, was more suitable for the battlefield. Edward C. Ezell, “Cracks in the Post-War Anglo-American Alliance: the Great Rifle Controversy, 1947-1957”, Military Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 4, December 1974, p. 141. 62 225 M-108, 146 M-113 and 150 M-41 were introduced between 1968 and 1969. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 28 October, 2011.

73 as well. Due to the military failures of 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War soon afterward, the PLA had not conquered several small islands close to China such as the Quemoy Islands and the Matsu Islands (Map 2): these islands were still under Taipei’s control with a number of garrisons stationed on them. However, the military of each side was only few kilometres apart and as such could easily be engaged with the use of artillery. Thus, these islands represented a political and symbolic linkage between Beijing and Taipei, and were where most armed conflicts in the 1950s and 1960s occurred. Launching an attack on those positions was a strong political tactic but such attacks faced several inherent difficulties. Militarily, those islands had been well-fortified under the supervision of Japanese advisors and the effectiveness of such fortifications had been proven in previous conflicts.63 Moreover, Taipei had deployed about 80,000- 100,000 soldiers to these tiny islands and had also trained civilians to join self-defence forces.64 This did not mean that the PLA had no chance of seizing those positions, but that it would be rather more difficult than a simple blitzkrieg. If an ensuing long-term battle occurred on these islands, China had to face several strategic threats, as mentioned above, including a halt or reversal of China’s ongoing relations with the US, internal instability, and vulnerability to other outside threats from the Soviet Union. Another option for Beijing was small-scale attacks. However, in the 1960s exchange of fire still sometimes occurred and small-scale attacks were not considered a useful policy tool.65 The second threat posed by the PLA was naval blockades against Taiwan. The PLAN was established in the 1950s under the Soviet Union and its advisors. Moscow’s naval strategy comprised a sea denial strategy, which was aimed at denying the enemy from maintaining sea control. In addition, the Soviet Union had transferred to PLAN, before the breakdown of the Soviet–Sino relations in 1962, high volumes of sea-denial- oriented weapon systems, such as submarines, torpedo and missile boats, and bombers equipped with airdrop torpedos, including their blueprints and other related

63 Nakamura Yuethu, Baidan: daiwannkunn wo Tsukuu Nihonkun Shokootachi, pp. 130-131. 64 The IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 65, Issue 1, p. 33. On the subject of the civilian defence forces, see Michael Szonyi, Cold War Island and the Front Line (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Ch.5. 65 For example, a fire engagement occurred at the Minh River Estuary near the Matsu islands on July 2nd, 1969. Stephen P. Gibert & William M. Carpenter, America and Island China: A Documentary History, pp. 138-139.

74 technologies.66 While PLAN had the potential to impose naval blockades, there were several major constraints. Technologically, small boats with torpedoes or missiles were incapable of long-range cruising and lacked endurance under severe climatic conditions; therefore they could not play an influential role in a blockade operation covering a broad area. Further, the PLAN bombers were capable of detecting and attacking merchant vessels over a long range, and in 1968 the Chinese bomber fleet was improved when it started to produce the domestic edition of the Tu-16 heavy bomber. However, the number of bombers, targeting capability and escort operations all presented challenges. It took a long time to begin to see the effects of a blockade, and long-term operations required a significant number of dedicated planes and robust logistics support.67 In the early 1970s, Beijing had a number of Tu-16s, the Il-28 medium bombers and the domestic edition, the H-5 bomber, but the number of bombers which could be used for a blockade operation was questionable while the threat from the Soviet Union was apparent.68 Moreover, China lacked target-searching capability, with no sea surveillance satellites or maritime patrol planes.69 It would have been inefficient to send bombers to find ships by themselves. It was also likely that China lacked sufficient logistics capability to support a long-term sea denial mission, due to both the termination of Soviet support and the Cultural Revolution.70 In terms of escort operations, the fighters, the MIG series from MIG-15 to 21, were designed mainly for an intercept function and with their short combat radius were unsuited to accompany bombers on long-distance operations.71 Submarines were the most effective vehicles for a blockade, but they had their

66 Liu Huaqing established the Naval Academy following the Soviet model with Soviet advisors’ assistance. Liu, Huaqing ┘噾䂔, Liu Huaqing hueiyilu ┘噾䂔⥭㑅斓᧤the bibliography of Liu Huaqing᧥, pp. 255-259; Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), pp. 94-95. 67 Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris and Matthew G. McKinzie, Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning (Washington D.C.: The Federation of American Scientists & the Natural Resource Defence Council, 2006), p. 93. 68 Beijing had 30 Tu-16s, 250 IL-28s/H-5s in 1971. IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 71, Issue 1(1971), p. 42. 69 China launched its first maritime observation satellite, Haiyang-1A, on 15 May 2002. The first sea patrol plane was Y-8X (based An-12 design) and delivered to the PLAN in 1984. Andrew S. Erickson, “Red China: Satellites Support Growing PLA Maritime Monitoring and Targeting Capabilities”, Jamestown foundation China Brief, Feb. 10, 2011 (http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2671999/posts) site accessed 13 March, 2011; “Yun-8X Maritime Patrol Aircraft”, SinoDefence (http://www.SinoDefence.com/airforce/specialaircraft/y8mpa.asp) site accessed 13 March, 2011. 70 The PLAAF and PLAN were reported to have been more affected by the reduction of Soviet Aid than other services. The IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 65, Issue 1, p. 8. 71 Ralph N. Clough, Island China, p. 112.

75 own particular drawbacks; it took a long time to reach the strategic goals of blockades through the sinking or threatening of commercial ships. Apart from the potential negative outcomes of engaging in long-term warfare, the risk of disrupting the SLOCs or vessels of a third party might complicate the situation significantly. If the US Navy intervened under the mutual defence treaty, a blockade operation would fail, not to mention the resulting negative effect on the normalisation of the US–Sino relations. The final obstacle to a sustained military operation was reliability and endurance; during the Cultural Revolution, most production chains had been disrupted and the quality control for major weapon systems was poor.72 Moreover, sailors and other professional personnel in the PLAN were busy engaging in political activities rather than professional training.73 It was questionable how large the available submarine fleet was and how long it could sustain a blockade. Air raids were the third threat to Taiwan posed by the PLA. The whole of Formosa was within the combat radius of Chinese bombers such as the IL-28s and TU-16s, and the Q-5, a domestic ground-attack aircraft derived from the MIG-19, could also reach a large part of Formosa despite its relatively short combat radius.74 If Beijing coordinated effectively, there was a chance it could carry out a surprise attack on Taiwan. However, US military assistance to Formosa acted to counter such a threat, by providing light fighters, SAMs and radar systems. Like the blockade scenario, the PLAAF and the PLAN’s Air Force (PLANAF) possessed no-long range fighters or electronic warfare airplanes to sufficiently escort the bombers, and as a result the bombers would be exposed to the attack of SAMs and ROCAF’s fighters.75 As mentioned above, there was doubt as to how many bombers Beijing would concentrate on a high-risk mission against Taiwan, as the

72 Originally, the PRC had a bad quality record because the Chinese emphasised quantity over quality. During the Cultural Revolution, production was disturbed further. Richard A. Bitzinger, “Arms to Go: Chinese Arms Sale to the Third World”, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2, Autumn 1992, pp. 90, 101. 73 Xiao, Jin-Guang, Xiao Jin-Guang hueiyilu 埼═⏘⥭㑅斓᧤the bibliography of Xiao Jin-Guang᧥(Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1989), pp. 204-206, 222; Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century, p. 23. 74 Q-5’s combat radius is between 400 and 600 km according to the mission. It was launched in 1965 as a naval torpedo bomber. “Qiang-5 Ground Attacker Aircraft”, SinoDefence (http://www.SinoDefence.com/airforce/groundattack/q5.asp) site accessed 13 March, 2011. 75 The combat radius of the J-6 (Mig-19) is only 370km and the J-7 (Mig-21) is 650km but the flight is less than one hour. China developed its first electronic aircraft, the HD-5 based on the H-5 in the 1980s. Jane’s All World’s Aircraft 86-87 (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co, 1986), pp. 40, 42; “HongDian-5 Electronic Warfare Aircraft”, SinoDefence (http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/specialaircraft/hd5.asp) site accessed 5 April, 2011.

76 threat from the Soviet Union was apparent.76 As such, this threat posed by China’s air forces could also be carried out as an auxiliary operation, for example, as part of an amphibious invasion. Indeed, an amphibious invasion was the ultimate threat to Taiwan but was also highly improbable. As Taipei was unlikely to succumb to the other military threats described above, Beijing had to ensure the capture of Formosa occurred through substantial military presence on land. Although civil vessels could be levied to supplement PLAN, which lacked regular landing ships, this threat was still less feasible than other threats.77 Aside from the precarious international situation and the ongoing Cultural Revolution mentioned above, additional obstacles included natural conditions, the long and extensive preparations required, and the multi-layered defence of the ROC’s armed forces and the US units stationed in Formosa. An amphibious operation differed from a purely naval attack because the invading troops had to convene and re-embark on a range of smaller landing vehicles such as LCMs (Landing Craft, mechanised) offshore from large ships before launching the attack. It was dangerous to carry on such measures under difficult climatic conditions and rough seas. If the PLA troops were to directly embark small landing vessels from departure, their light tonnage and flat bottoms were more vulnerable to surging waves. Accordingly, an amphibious operation would need to be limited to “windows” of hospitable weather. Secondly, surprise was a necessary element of such an attack because the invader had to move faster than the defender could effectively respond. As such, whether carried out by regular ships or private vessels, the gathering of invading forces would have been obvious and the element of surprise would have been difficult to achieve.78 Thirdly, air cover and sea escort were indispensible and were difficult for both the PLAAF and the PLAN to obtain at that time; both services had inadequate planes and surface ships to cover an invasion, not to mention the event of US intervention by air or sea.79 Even if the expeditionary soldiers have been able to reach the shore, the ROC group troops outnumbered them, leaving the invaders with little opportunity to build a

76 The PLANAF had about 100 Il-28 and the PLAAF owned 150 Il-28 plus 30 Tu-16 and few Tu-4. The IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 71, Issue 1, p. 42. 77 In 1971, the PLAN owned hundreds of landing crafts but most of them were less 100 tons. These small vessels were not only devoid of capacity, particularly heavy arms, but also only able to cross the Taiwan Strait in fair weather. Ibid. 78 Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan”, International Security, Vol. 25, No.2, Fall 2000, p. 54. 79 Earl C. Ravenal, “Approaching China, Defending Taiwan”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1, October 1971, p. 51.

77 bridgehead. In sum, Taiwan enjoyed effective deterrence as a result of several factors, including the international strategic confinement of China, the normalisation of US–Sino relations, and the US’s extended deterrence and military superiority in the region. However, this situation was inherently unstable and significant changes followed.

2.2 Undermining Extended Deterrence and Struggling for General Deterrence (1971– 1988) After the Taipei Authority lost its seat on the UN, the deterrence situation in Formosa began to deteriorate as a result of the US reducing extended deterrence. Consequently, Taipei and Washington gradually found an effective means of maintaining deterrence in Taiwan, from typical extended deterrence with clear regulations to a unique situation subject to the restraints of the three US-Sino Communiqués.

I. The Situation of Extended Deterrence The three US–Sino Communiqués that accompanied the normalisation of bilateral relations structurally downgraded extended deterrence: the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972 signified the downturn of the official relationship between Taipei and Washington; the US–Sino Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations in 1978 renounced formal US–Taiwan diplomatic relations and the mutual defence treaty, the legal basis of extended deterrence, and excluded the possibility of US military deployment in Taiwan. Finally, the August Communiqué in 1982 constrained the sales of arms by the US to Taiwan.80 Extended deterrence in Taiwan underwent a metamorphosis, from extended deterrence to a means of assisting Taiwan to enlarge its deterrence capability. From 1971 to 1979, Taipei on the one hand endeavoured to maintain its relationship with the US a little longer; on the other hand, it also attempted to identify alternatives to extended deterrence, such as the Soviet Union. In 1973, the foreign minister of the ROC regime mentioned the possibility of interaction with another country, even a Communist one. In addition, there was a rumour that the ROC intended to rent its naval base in the Pescadores to the Soviet Union, with a further hint of advancing the relations between

80 Background Note: China, U.S. Department of State (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm) site accessed 5 April, 2011

Taiwan and the Soviet Union emerging in 1977.81 However, those attempts were unsuccessful and Taipei was not able to attract an extended deterrence arrangement from Moscow. As Moscow could not replace the protector role of Washington, the key players in the extended deterrence in Taiwan remained the same. After terminating formal US-Taiwan diplomatic relations, both sides focused on prolonging the arms sales arrangements and other material support from the US, rather than the opaque possibility of extended deterrence in the Taiwan Relation Act (TRA) . The regulations in the TRA are as follows:

Implementation of United States policy with regard to Taiwan. (a) Defense articles and services. In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 3301 of this title, the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. (b) Determination of Taiwan's defense needs. The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress. (c) United States response to threats to Taiwan or dangers to United States interests. The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising there from. The President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.

The statement “To enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” provides legitimacy for arms sales and technological assistance, but on the contrary, the statement “The President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with

81 Relations between Taipei and Moscow secretly began in the late 1960s. Some rumours include Soviet financial support for Taiwan’s industry. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China, p. 66; John W. Garver, “Taiwan’s Russian Option: Image and Reality”, Asia Survey, Vol. 18, No. 7, July 1978, pp. 756-758.

79 constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger” leaves a high degree of uncertainty regarding extended deterrence.82 Beijing was also aware of Taipei’s strategy, as reflected in the August Communiqué:

the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long- term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution.83

Accordingly, the Reagan administration bypassed this limit on military support via technological assistance and commercial sales. Moreover, the Pentagon continued sharing intelligence on the PLA with Taiwan.84 To maintain this vital assistance, the Taipei Authority also acted a client of the US in the Nicaraguan civil war.85 The threat posed by China was separated into two phases. Between 1971 and 1978, China’s threat to Taiwan was steady, and perhaps even slightly diminished. Domestically in China, the Cultural Revolution and the associated disorder lasted until 1976 after the key national leaders Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai had died. The subsequent power shift and struggle for leadership in Beijing reduced the possibility of China using force against Taiwan.86 Additionally, the PLA eventually reviewed the problem of insufficient military training during the Cultural Revolution, which had left the PLA inadequate training to conduct a massive military operation against Taiwan.87 Internationally, in addition to the Soviet Union’s military deployment along China’s Northern border, after its unification, Vietnam also emerged as a threat to China.88 This

82 Taiwan Relations Act, United States Code Title 22 Chapter 48, Section 3302 (http://www.taiwandocuments.org/tra01.htm) site accessed 14 March, 2011. 83 Sino-US Joint Communiqué 17 August 1982 (http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/commk82.htm) site accessed 14 March, 2011. 84 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China, pp. 150, 152. 85 Ibid, pp. 164-166. 86 When Hua Kuo-Feng succeeded to Mao’s position in 1976, he fought against the “Gang of Four”. In the following two years, he lost power and finally Teng Xiaoping settled down. IISS, Strategic Survey, Vol. 77, Issue 1 (1976), p. 95; Vol. 78, Issue 1(1977), p. 80; Vol. 79, Issue 1 (1978), p. 71. 87 Jonathan D. Pollack, “China as a Military Power”, in Onkar Marwah and Jonathan D. Pollack (Ed.), Military Power and Policy In Asian States: China, India, Japan (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 56-57. 88 The roots of conflicts came from loans, Cambodia, the Chinese minority in Vietnam and territorial claims.

80 strategic situation left China little opportunity to use force. Its improving relations with Washington and the fall of Saigon possibly gave Beijing the hope of eventually seizing Taiwan. After 1978, the situation regarding Taiwan grew more favourable for China, as it had managed to successfully isolate Taiwan in international society and its national power had began to recover from the Cultural Revolution as a result of economic reforms and a stable internal situation. At this stage, there were three factors deterring China from exercising military options. Firstly, in the preceding phase, Beijing was positive toward its relations with Taiwan because there was no evidence that Taipei would be able to escape the framework of China by claiming independence. As the ROC regime kept its official name, constitution and other Chinese icons, Taiwan was certainly and internationally recognised or regarded as part of China. In this regard, Beijing expected that sooner or later Taipei would go to the negotiation table, despite Chiang Ching-kuo’s temporarily tough policies toward China. 89 As Beijing enjoyed ever increasing superiority in national power over Taipei, such negotiation would eventually be to China’s advantage. Secondly, threats from the Soviet Union, Mongolia and Vietnam were still imminent and China’s war with Vietnam in 1979 confirmed that tense relations with the Soviet bloc existed. Thirdly, as Deng Xiaoping maintained a low profile for China on an international level, China was unlikely to use force against Taiwan and thus avoid conflict with the US.90

II. General Deterrence When political power was assumed by Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo, upon his death, the general deterrence conditions in Taiwan altered considerably. In the mid 1970s, the political opposition went beyond campaigns using independent figures to building an organised movement in order to challenge the ROC regime’s dictates but they encountered the government’s ruthless suppression.91 Finally, in 1986, a group of

Ramses Amer, “Sino-Vietnam Normalization in the Light of the Crisis of the Late 1970s”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 3, Autumn 1994, p. 358. 89 Chiang Ching-kuo proposed “Three Nos” toward China: no negotiations, no compromise and no contact. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China, p. 167. 90 You Ji, “China’s “New” Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, and Defense Strategy”, in Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris, and Qin Yaqing (Ed.), China’s “New” Diplomacy: Tactical or Fundamental Change? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 80. 91 Several political incidents occurred involving the ROC regime and the native political movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s, after which a number of activists were sentenced and put into jail. Some of those

81 people, known as Dang Wai (煷⮥, outside the single ruling party, the Chinese

Nationalist Party, also known as Kuomintang, KMT), organised a political party, the Democracy Progress Party (DPP), without obtaining official approval.92 This move was a clear challenge to the longest period of martial law in modern history, as well as a challenge to the ROC regime itself. Chiang Ching-kuo responded peacefully by lifting the martial law in the next year because he was also planning political reform at the same time.93 This political party was not strong enough to directly affect the national defence policy and deterrence situation in the short term, but it paved the way for events in the following period of time. The advantages and disadvantages of economic growth that occurred at the same time in Taiwan were similar to those of the previous phases but more pronounced. The improved financial conditions due to exports enabled the Taipei Authority to develop its own defence industries and related construction enterprises, which enabled improvement in Taiwan’s defence capability. For example, certain sections of freeways were utilised as alternative runways for the ROCAF. In addition, the Chinese Shipbuilding Corporation which was established by the new shipyards in Kaohsiung in 1973 built various ships for the ROCN.94 However, the two energy crises of 1973 and 1979 clearly demonstrated Taiwan’s dependency on foreign petroleum and international trade.95 Then, in the mid 1980s, enormous pressure from the US resulted in significant appreciation of the New Taiwanese dollar against the US dollar, constraining Taiwan’s exports considerably, its main means of national income.96 In

political prisoners such as Chen Shui-bian became influential politicians later. J. Bruce Jacobs, “”Taiwanization” in Taiwan’s Politics”, in John Makeham and A-chin Hsiau (Ed.), Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 23. 92 “The Party History”, Democracy Progressive Party (http://www.dpp.org.tw/index_en/) site accessed 10 January, 2011. 93 Murray A. Rubinstein, “Political Taiwanization and Pragmatic Diplomacy: The Eras of Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui, 1971-1994”, in Taiwan: A New History, pp. 446-447. 94 There were 6 sections of alternative runways built on the Chunshan Superhighway from 1975 to 1978, according to Swiss model. They were tested using F-100, F-104, F-5, T-33 and other aircraft. “”Han-Guang 20hao Yan Si”—Rende Jhanbei Paodao Yansyun Shaoming ᇷ䆱⏘ 壮䆣剡ᇸ࿻࿻⅐㉆㒿⌨恠拢䆣岢崹㢝 (The description of rehearsal of alternative runway in the Rende Section in the Han Guang 20 Maneuver), the Youth Daily News, 21 July 2004, 6.ġ(http://www.youth.com.tw/db/epaper/es001001/eb0180.htm) site accessed 15 March, 2011; the CSBC Corporation, Taiwan (http://www.csbcnet.com.tw/CSBC/EN/index.asp) site accessed 15 March, 2011. 95 John Minns, The Politics of Developmentalism: the Midas States of Mexico, South Korea and Taiwan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 193-194. 96 Murray A. Rubinstein, “Taiwan’s Socioeconomic Modernization, 1971-1996”, in Taiwan: A New History, pp. 375-376.

82 other words, a booming economy brought a new kind of vulnerability to Taiwan. Militarily, although the primary approach to deterrence was still denial, Taipei began to pay increasing attention to deterrence by punishment. President Chiang Ching- kuo endeavoured to obtain adequate independent means of deterrence against China, which conventional weapons were unable to fully match. To this end, the Taipei Authority was eager to develop both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, but in 1976 the nuclear program was halted and the facilities demolished by the US.97 However, despite its promise to abandon nuclear weapons programs, Taipei resumed its nuclear programs. In 1986, however Taiwan bowed to US pressures by agreeing to end its nuclear weapons projects.98 Thus, despite several attempts, deterrence by punishment through acquiring nuclear weapons was still unavailable to Taiwan. Gradually, Taiwan’s armed forces assumed all responsibility for denial deterrence and maintained their modernisation using both foreign and domestic sources. There were two main approaches to military modernisation: arms sales, and domestic development with technological transfer and assistance. The purchase of “sensitive equipment” such as advanced fighters was excluded during this phase in order to avoid complaints from China. Thus, non-combat equipment such as C-130 Hercules transporters or defensive weapon systems such as TOW anti-tank missiles were on Washington’s list.99 When the volume of arms the US could supply to Taiwan was also regulated under the August Communiqué, Taipei occasionally purchased civil or commercial versions of the same equipment to bypass the agreement. For example, the ROCA bought the Boeing 234 transport helicopter instead of the CH-47 Chinook, and the ROCAF obtained the Sikorsky S-70 rescue helicopters in place of the UH-60 Black Hawks.100 The only exception to this situation was the two Dutch submarines the ROCN bought in 1982, as they were non-American major weapon systems. Unsurprisingly, Holland subsequently attracted strong criticism from China and was eventually forced to

97 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China, p. 96. 98 Denny Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, pp. 143-144. 99 The ROCAF received C-130H in 1986 to replace aging C-119. The TOW missile was first offered during the Carter Administration in the late 1970s. The ROCAF (http://air.mnd.gov.tw/Publish.aspx?cnid=956&p=12551&Level=3) site accessed 15 March, 2011; Wang Chi- wu, “Military Preparedness and Security Needs: Perceptions from the Republic of China on Taiwan”, Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 6, June 1981, p. 663. 100 Taiwan purchased the Boeing 234 in 1984 and the S-70C in 1986. “Boeing-vertol 234 MLR, 1984”. The Helis.com (http://www.helis.com/database/model/333/) site accessed 15 March, 2011; The ROCAF (http://air.mnd.gov.tw/Publish.aspx?cnid=956&p=12551&Level=3) site accessed 15 March, 2011.

83 promise not to sell further arms to Taiwan.101 American technology transfer and assistance programs were undertaken in two ways: one was manufacturing American designed equipment including, the F-5E/F Tiger II fighter, the UH-1 utility helicopter, and the M-48H Patton main battle tank (MBT).102 The other was the production of domestic designs utilising US technologies, such as the Indigenous Defence Fighter (later named after “Ching-kuo” after the President), the CM-21 APC based on the M113 and several missiles developed by the CIST and the Armoured Fighting Vehicle Development Centre. The CIST developed the indigenous Tien Kung (Sky Bow) I SAM, the Hsiung Feng II anti-ship missile and the Tien Chien I (Sky Sword 1) air-to-air missile (AAM) in the 1980s, all possessing a strong resemblance to their American counterparts, the MIM-104 Patriot SAM, the AGM/RGM 84 Harpoon anti-ship missile and the AIM-9L Sidewinder AAM.103 In addition, there were other kinds of domestic equipment, commonly using less advanced technology, such as rifles, that bore a distinctive “foreign shadow” without any clear evidence of foreign technological support or authorisation. For example, the domestically designed 5.56mm rifle, type 65 series, was very similar to the American M-16 rifle.104 Technology transfer and assistance not only bypassed the limitations posed by the August Communiqué, but also helped Taiwan to establish a domestic defence industry. Nevertheless, most made-in-Taiwan products, such as the Ching-kuo fighter, were expensive due to the limited domestic demand, the lack of access to the global market due to Taiwan’s isolated international status, and the necessity to obtain US

101 Those submarines were ordered in 1982 and launched in 1986. Taiwan wanted to purchase additional ones in 1992, but Holland rejected the request under Chinese pressure. Bernard D. Cole, “Command of the Sea”, in Steve Tsang (Ed.), If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 125, 140. 102 The production of the UH-1 was the first co-production project which lasted from 1969 to 1976, with 118 helicopters produced. The F-5E/F project was from 1973 to 1986, and the total number produced was 308. Both types were manufactured by the AIDC. The M-48H, also named the CM-11, is a hybrid tank with the chassis of the M-60A3 and the turret of the M-48A5. This project was begun in 1984 and there were 450 mass-produced between 1988 and 1994. “Military Aircraft”, Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (http://www.aidc.com.tw/tw/services-1.asp) site accessed 15 March, 2011; The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 28 October, 2011; M48H MBT (Taiwan), MBTs and Medium, Jane’s Intelligence and Insight (http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes- Armour-and-Artillery/M48H-MBT-Taiwan.html) site accessed 15 March, 2011. 103 T. S. Jan & C. G. Jan, “Development of Weapon Systems in Developing Countries: A Case Study of Long Range Strategy in Taiwan”, the Journal of Operational Research Society, Vol. 51, No. 9, September 2000, p. 1043. 104 Despite the similarity in appearance, the bolt, bolt carrier and piston-type gas systems of the type 65 series come from the AR-18. “T-65 5.56mm assault rifle (Taiwan), Rifle,” Jane’s Intelligence and Insight(http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-Infantry-Weapons/T65-5-56-mm-assault-rifle-Taiwan.html) site accessed 15 March, 2011.

permission to sell its important parts and technologies.105 Further, once the foreign weapons were again available, while facing the competition of exotic weapon systems, the domestic defence industry might lose domestic market as well. For example, the original purchase number of IDFs was 250, but this was slashed to 130 to preserve funds to purchase the F-16 A/B Falcon and Mirage-2000-5 fighters.106 Due to a set of international circumstances, the national defence policy was forced to become more pragmatic: its aim was to repulse a Chinese invasion, instead of taking an offensive stance. The general order of strategic priorities for the armed forces was air superiority in the case of the air force, continuous sea denial in the case of the navy, and anti-landing in the case of the army.107 This strategic alternation was evidenced by slightly reducing the armed forces and the military build-ups following the general order of strategic priorities.108 In terms of the ROCAF, light defensive fighters were still the primary force. Although the F-5E/F coproduction projects provided a number of fighters as well as using F-104s from Denmark, West Germany and Japan, more advanced models such as the F-16 and F-5G (F-20) had been presented as early as the late 1970s. During this phase, Taipei hoped to acquire new fighters to continue its ongoing air superiority but it was faced with a rejection from Washington.109 When suitable advanced fighters were unavailable, in 1985 the AIDC commenced the Indigenous Defence Fighter (IDF) project with extensive American technological assistance, including jet engines and radars, seeking to maintain air superiority. 110 That is, the IDF project was the alternative for Washington to support Taiwan’s air defence while direct arms sales were unavailable.

105 Wei-Chin Lee, “ The Development of Taiwan’s Commercial Aircraft Manufacture Industry”, Asian Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 1 Symposium on Taiwan, Spring 1996, pp. 36, 60. 106 Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects, p. 108. 107 James Mulvenon has argued that the general order appeared in the early 1990s, but the military structure of the armed forces in Taiwan displayed the same preference in the 1970s. James Mulvenon, “Taiwan and the Revolution in Military Affairs”, in Emily O. Goldman and Thomas G. Mahnken (ed.), The Information Revolution in Military Affairs in Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 142-143. 108 Chiang Ching-kuo slashed the armed forces from 540,000 men in 1971 to 474,000 men in 1979. IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 71, Issue 1, p. 45; Vol. 78, Issue 1, p. 60. 109 The Carter Administration permitted the sales of advanced fighters coded FX, which might have been F-16 /J79 or F-5G (F-20). However, Taipei’s impetuous attitude and Beijing’s vociferous objection resulted in the Reagan Administration’s cancelling. Instead of the FX, Washington extended the F-5E/F project and provided some used F-104s from Japan and West Germany. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China, pp. 134-143, 150-151; The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 28 October, 2011. 110 General Dynamics (now merged into Lockheed Martin) was involved in the airframe design and Honeywell was a partner with the AIDC to supply engine. The GD-53 radar is a variant of Lockheed Martin’s APG-67. Peter R. March, Directory of Military Aircraft of the World (London: Cassell & Co, 2001), p. 11.

Aside from air superiority, the AIDC also issued two types of trainer aircraft, which were put into mass production and assumed a minor role in surface attacks, primarily as part of anti-landing missions.111 Further, the ROCN’s strategy turned increasingly toward sea denial. On one hand, the sea control strategy was still in operation because in the 1970s 22 ex-American FRAM and FRAMII destroyers in total were put into service. Since 1976, these ships had been modernised, initially with Israeli Gabriel anti-ship missiles, and later outfitted with electronic warfare and modern air-defence systems.112 On the other hand, in 1973, Taipei increased its sea denial capability by purchasing from the US unarmed Guppy II class diesel-electric submarines (Hunter-Killer Submarine, SSK), which were launched in World War II and upgraded in the 1950s, adding two new Dutch Zwaardvis class SSKs and introducing missile boat technologies from Israel.113 The domestic ship-building industry and the CIST were indispensible in the program to upgrade destroyers and build missile boats.114 The aim of the ROCA’s modernisation was to achieve mechanisation with regard to anti-landing operations. When the ROCA started to receive US military aid, most armoured vehicles were light like the M41 Walker Bulldog light tank, and the ROCA lacked modern APCs.115 During this phase, in 1973 the army first obtained MBTs, the M- 48A1/A2 Patton with better firepower and protection.116 APCs such as the V-150, additional M-113s and indigenous CM-21s were massively equipped and provided infantry with high mobility to follow tanks. To deal with the increasing number of

111 The two types are the AT-3 advanced jet trainer and the T-CH-1 basic trainer. An attacker type, A-3, was derived from AT-3 but was not put into production. Ibid, p. 12; “Military Aircraft”, Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (http://www.aidc.com.tw/enaidcsite/web/MilitaryAircraft.asp) site accessed 13 January, 2011. 112 The Yang-Class Destroyer (Taipei: the Navy Headquarter, 2005), pp. 67, 71, 110, 159-160. 113ġWhen the ROCN initially introduced the two Guppy class submarines built during World War II, they had no torpedo until they received American assistance in the 1980s. The Hai-Ou 炷㴟浿, sea gull炸 class missile boats are Israeli Dvora Class counterparts.ġ Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China, p. 78; Norman Freeman, The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons Systems, 1997-1998 (Annapolis: the US Naval Institute, 1997), p. 86; Hai Ou-class [Dvora] Fast Attack Missile Craft, Global Security (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/taiwan/hai-ou.htm) site accessed 15 March, 2011. 114 Janne E. Nolan, Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea, p. 58; Norman Freeman, The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons Systems, 1997-1998, p. 519; The Yang-Class Destroyer, pp. 110, 130, 159-160. 115 The M-41 was introduced in 1958. “M41 Ji M-41D Sing Jhan Che M41 㤷 M-41D ⨚㒿慙” (M41 and M41D tank), the Ministry of National Defence, ROC (http://www.mnd.gov.tw/Publish.aspx?cnid=77&p=28) site accessed 16 March, 2011. 116 Sun Chien Chung ⷺㆉ₼, Oral history Interviews with Retired Members of the ROC Armored Forces (Taipei: Military History and Translation Office, the Ministry of National Defense ROC, 2004), p. 126.

86 armoured vehicles, the Armoured Fighting Vehicle Development Centre was established; this institute also designed and produced a series of armed vehicles, from the CM21 to the CM26, based on the M-113.117 In addition to armoured vehicles, several anti-landing oriented weapon systems were developed. First, the UH-1 helicopters were equipped with 2.75-inch rockets, as an alternative to real attack helicopters, which were difficult for Taipei to obtain.118 Second, the CIST developed two types of multi-tube rocket launchers. Third, the chemical corps also tested poisonous gas for anti-landing operations.119 Alongside the limited arms sales, technological transfer and domestic development, Taiwan maintained considerable denial deterrence as US extended deterrence was eroded. However, Formosa’s deterrence capability was still doubtful in the long term due to its arms sources being limited mainly to the US. Taipei’s ultra dependence on Washington would significantly influence its sovereignty and flexibility. The isolated environment was also detrimental to Taiwan’s deterrence; it was difficult for Taiwan’s forces to officially interact with counterparts of other countries, let alone take part in large exercises.

III. Immediate Deterrence Scenarios The threats posed by the PLA between 1971 and 1988 were of a similar nature to the ones of previous phases, but were slightly more serious due to China’s ever- increasing capability. The situation of the offshore islands close to China was deteriorating because of technological and international factors. Technologically, China’s anti-ship missiles, whether onshore or seaborne, were able to blockade the SLOCs to these islands. Furthermore, where sea transport was escorted by the ROCN’s destroyers or frigates, the close distance of engagement left little time for escort vessels to react and as such they would have been “sitting ducks”. As for the ROCAF’s air support or

117 “CM-21/AIFV”, Army Guide (http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product4202.html) site accessed 16 March, 2011. 118 Sun Chien Chung ⷺㆉ₼, Oral history Interviews with Retired Members of the ROC Armored Forces, p. 334. 119 The domestic Kun-feng IV multi-tube rocket launcher systems were initially under the chemical corps’ command in 1973, because one of their missions was to deliver chemical shells for anti-landing. In 1980, the Kun-feng VI with large payload was introduced. In addition, the M-30 4.2inch mortars were also used to deliver chemical shell. Chen Si-song 椂䄹㨍 & Tseng Chiung-ye 㦍䝙囘, Guojiun Huashiuebing Koushu Lishr ⦚慜▥⸇␄♲承㸆⚁ (The Oral History of Chemical Corps) (Taipei: The Office of the Minister of National Defence, 2006), pp. 74, 181-182, 239.

87 supply to these islands, it was also presumed that the Chinese air-defence network with SAMs would deny approaching air planes, with the Yom Kippur War having already proved how lethal the SAM network could be.120 Internationally, during several crises in the Taiwan Strait, the US Navy played a critical role in escorting sea transport to those offshore islands.121 However, after renouncing the mutual defence treaty in 1979, it was virtually impossible for the US Navy to intervene extensively, as the TRA did not cater for such contingencies. In sum, ROC troops on those islands could resist an attack temporarily but Taipei lacked effective solutions to the stalemate in the long term, both militarily and diplomatically. However, since those islands served as the linkage between the ROC regime and China, to forsake those islands would not be feasible, because Taipei still claimed itself as the legal regime of China. Thus, this strategic vulnerability was a problem that continued. In terms of imposing a blockade, Beijing went on to obtain new weapon systems to carry out the mission. The first Chinese nuclear submarine (SSN) was introduced in 1974 and was put into production.122 The number of 033 class SSKs, based on the Soviet Navy Project 633 (NATO code: Romeo), was also increasing during this phase, along with a new modified model, the 035 class SSK.123 Moreover, after the Cultural Revolution the PLAN submarine fleet became more thoroughly trained.124 Additionally, more destroyers and frigates were equipped with anti-ship missiles, giving Beijing additional options to carry out blockades. For example, these surface ships could peacefully impose a blockade as the US Navy did during the Cuba Missile Crisis. In the air, the long-range J- 8 fighter provided an escort for the bomber fleets to block sea transport, and the US even provided the technology to upgrade the J-8s.125 Furthermore, the H-6, the copy of the Soviet Tu-16 bomber, and domestically produced SH-5 amphibious bombers began to carry anti-ship missiles increasing the effectiveness and range of the blockade.126

120 The well-organised Arabic air defence network inflicted significant loss on the Israeli Air Force which was ranked as the finest in the world. Lawrence Whetten and Michael Johnson, “Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War”, the World Today, Vol. 30, No. 3, March 1974, pp. 103-105. 121 The withdrawal from Dachen Island in 1955 and the crisis in 1958, the US naval escort and transport were important. Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects, pp. 20-21, 23. 122 ┘噾䂔, Liu Huaqing hueiyilu ┘噾䂔⥭㑅斓᧤the bibliography of Liu Huaqing᧥, p. 336. 123 There were 34 033 Class (R Class) in 1976 and 74 in 1980. The Ming (035) Class went from 0 in 1976 to 2 in 1980. IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 76, Issue 1(1976), p. 50; Vol. 80, Issue 1, p. 63. 124 ┘噾䂔, Liu Huaqing hueiyilu ┘噾䂔⥭㑅斓᧤the bibliography of Liu Huaqing᧥, p. 475. 125 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China, p. 160. 126 The combat radius of the J-8 is 750-1000km. Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the

As neither the capability of the PLAAF or of the PLAN improved markedly, the threat to Taiwan of air raids did not significantly increase. Although the new J-8 fighter had a larger combat radius, it was not overwhelming in number or performance.127 With the exception of the J-8, China’s other fighters were old designs, copied from the Mig-19 and Mig-21, with a limited range. However, Chinese bombers were equipped with anti- ship missiles, which were not as dangerous as cruise missiles but could be used to strike military or strategic facilities along Taiwan’s coast line. For instance, the Indian Navy carried out such attacks during the war with Pakistan in 1971.128 As there were several petroleum refineries close to the shore in Kaohsiung, it was possible that the PLA could repeat this tactic.129 The least severe threat to Taiwan posed by China during this phase was still amphibious invasion. Certainly, Beijing had better capability, more domestic landing ships and more destroyers and frigates for escort. However, apart from the practical drawbacks of naval operations, weather, and air cover mentioned before, the capacity of China’s landing ships was insufficient.130 Moreover, the new missile era had issued a more formidable challenge; in the Taiwan Strait where it is no wider than 180km, it was very difficult to maintain sea control in order to dispatch expeditionary forces to the far side, because vessels were vulnerable to anti-ship missiles. In additional, eradicating all launchers of anti-ship missiles was almost impossible for China. A single battery of onshore anti-ship missiles could inflict grave damage on a group of landing ships, as the sinking of a single ship would represent the loss of hundreds of soldiers at least. Even just a few sunken ships would greatly weaken the combat capability of the expeditionary troops, and reduce their chances of successful landing. Thus, once Taipei also obtained anti-ship missiles, an amphibious operation by China became much more difficult to execute than previously. Taiwan would have been able to repel such an invasion, even without international intervention.

Twenty-First Century, p. 107; “Jian-8 Interceptor Fighter”, SinoDefence (http://www.SinoDefence.com/airforce/fighter/j8.asp) site accessed March 16, 2011. 127 The number of J-8s in service was 30-55. IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 88, Issue 1, p. 151. 128 The Indian Navy launched Soviet P-15 anti-ship missiles from Soviet Petya Class vessels to attack Karachi harbour. Raju G. C. Thomas, “The Indian Navy in the Seventies”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 4, Winter 1975- 1976, p. 503. 129 Shryou Jiaushr 䪂㽈㟨⸳ (The Classroom of Petroleum), CPC Corporation, Taiwan (http://www.cpc.com.tw/big5/content/index01.asp?sno=192&pno=108) site accessed 5 April, 2011. 130 Bernard D. Cole, “Amphibious Capability”, in Steve Tseng (Ed.), If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics, p. 150.

In brief, changes in the international environment forced the Taipei Authority to face reality; while failing to secure a new protector or achieve nuclear deterrence, Taipei sought means of countering invasion through significantly refurbishing the national defence strategy, and the goal “to retake the mainland” was eventually replaced by a more realistic defence strategy.

3. Democratic Period (1988-2008) This period can be separated into three phases according to major events and political administrations. The missile crisis in 1996 highlighted the threats posed by China and the precariousness of the extended deterrence situation. Hence, it is necessary to discuss President Lee Teng-hui’s terms before and after the missile crisis. During President Chen Shui-bien’s terms, the deterrence situation in Taiwan changed dramatically and as such it will be analysed separately.

3.1 Transformation from Authoritarian Regime to Democracy (1988-1995) I. Extended Deterrence The basic structure of extended deterrence around Taiwan in this phase remained the same: the US provided material and technologies for Taiwan to maintain deterrence toward China, with an uncertain possibility of direct military intervention. Nevertheless several structural issues at the start of this phase complicated the situation. Firstly, the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989 resulted in Western countries withdrawing military technological support from China, thus making Beijing relatively isolated internationally. This not only impeded the modernisation of the PLA but also reduced China’s ability to use force. With China somewhat isolated, Taiwan then had access to more foreign arms sources. In addition to the US, France sold fighters and frigates to Taiwan and Germany supplied minesweeper vessels.131 Secondly, the collapse of the Soviet Union dramatically reduced the strategic pressure around China, from Mongolia, Vietnam, the Central Asian countries and Russia.132 Furthermore, most new countries in the Confederation of Independent States faced economic problems after the systematic transformation, and as a result some of

131 Bernard D. Cole, “Command of the Sea”, pp. 128, 131. 132 Maochun Yu, “Political and Military Factors Determining China’s Use of Force”, in Steve Tseng (Ed.), If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics, pp. 20-21.

90 them, particularly Russia and Ukraine, were likely to sell arms and technology to China. This gave the PLA additional options to pursue its military modernisation while under embargo from Western countries. However, it took some time to transfer the ex-Soviet equipment and to implement its technologies, which also acted to postpone Beijing’s immediate ability to use force. Thirdly, China was influenced by the partial recovery of US-Taiwan relations. China ordered major weapon systems from Russia, like Su-27SK fighters, which in turn affected the military balance in the Taiwan Strait and pushed the US to increase its arms sales to Taiwan such as the 150 F-16A/B, as China was not as strategically valuable as it had been in the Cold War. Consequently, Washington began to review its Taiwan policy as a result of the changed international situation and in view of the process of democratisation promoted by Taipei.133 This review led to a better standard of official interactions between the US and Taiwan, though it did not reach the level achieved in the clear extended deterrence period prior to 1979.134 As a result of the improved Taiwan–US relations, increasing democratisation and the emergence and growth of a Taiwan national identity, Chinese decision makers gradually became more pessimistic in their attitude. Despite the unprecedented negotiations between representatives from Taipei and Beijing in Singapore in 1993, China became anxious about Taiwan gaining independence with possible support from the US, because it suspected the US planned to disintegrate China.135

II. General Deterrence After the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988, the vice President Lee Teng-hui, who is a native Formosan, succeeded him. However, several factions in the ruling party, the Chinese Nationalist Party, wanted to seize control of government and Lee Teng-hui eventually assumed power, despite no factional background.136

133 Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects, p. 28. 134 In this period, officials from both sides were eventually able to enter each other’s governmental buildings. Military officers from both sides could have direct conferences with each other. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China, pp. 203-204. 135 Qingmin Zhang, “Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Domestic politics and PRC’s “Dual-Track” Taiwan Policy”, in Shiping Hua (Ed.), Reflections on the Triangular Relations of Beijing-Taipei-Washington Since 1995: Status Quo at the Taiwan Straits (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 37-38; John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province, p. 210; Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan (London: Prager Security International, 2006), p. 29. 136 Denny Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, pp. 185-188.

Lee gradually advanced the democratisation cause in response to the changing economic conditions, in order to ensure Taiwan’s survival.137 In 1991, his first act was to abolish the special articles of “the Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion” in the Constitution. This special article was aimed at denying the legitimacy of the PRC regime and endowing the ROC regime with exceptional power to cope with civil war, including the deprivation of civil rights. Thus, Lee’s act was to accept the status quo, the separated existence of Taiwan and China, and to return civil rights, the foundation of democracy, to the people. This was followed by several modifications of the Constitution to make the whole government and relative systems closer to reality, rather than the situation when the constitution was ratified in Nanking, China in 1946. Thereafter, Lee introduced popular elections for the Legislative Yuan (the parliament) in 1992, for the Governor of the Taiwan Province and mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung Cities in 1994, and for the Presidential in 1996. During this process, the political system in Taiwan was transformed from an authoritarian regime to a democracy.138 Two new political factors arising from the political reform are pertinent to general deterrence: Taiwanese identity and democracy. Since fleeing to Taiwan in 1949, the ROC regime had kept its constitution, organisations and other icons which had been designed for the governance of the whole of China and claimed itself to be the only legal regime representing China.139 Under these guidelines, public education, mass media and other means of socialisation were mainly used to promote Sinicisation, with alternate ideas brutally suppressed by social control mechanisms.140 Although Taipei eventually no longer represented China on an international level, especially after the ROC regime lost its status as representative of China in the UN and lost a series of formal diplomatic relations with many countries, Sinicisation remained a political guideline in Taiwan.141 This inconsistency led to wide discussion after freedom of speech resumed. Interactions with other countries through bodies such as the TRA, demonstrated that “Taiwan” was

137 Lee Teng-hui, The Road to Democracy: Taiwan’s Pursuit of Identity (Tokyo: PHP Institute, 1999), pp. 91, 95. 138 J. Bruce Jacobs, “”Taiwanization” in Taiwan’s Politics”, pp. 34-36; Huang-Chih Chiang and Jau-Yuan Hwang, “On the Statehood of Taiwan: A Legal Reappraisal”, in Peter C. Y. Chow (Ed.), The “One China” Dilemma, p. 61; Murray A. Rubinstein, “Political Taiwanization and Pragmatic Diplomacy: The Eras of Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui, 1971-1994”, pp. 453-456, 463. 139 Peter Chen-main Wang, “A Bastion Created, A Regime Reformed, an Economy”, in Murray A. Rubinstein (Ed.), Taiwan: A New History, pp. 322, 334. 140 Ralph N. Clough, Island China, pp. 49-50, 57-59; Douglas Mendel, the Politics of Formosan Nationalism, pp. 47, 52-54. 141 Cal Clark, “The Statehood of Taiwan: A Strange Case of Domestic Strength and International Challenge”, in Peter C. Y. Chow (Ed.), The “One China” Dilemma, pp. 87-89.

92 more understandable and practicable than the Republic of China. In addition, native political movements, mainly the DPP, who preferred independence of Formosa over unity with China, were very keen to promote such concepts.142 Finally, Lee also supported a Taiwanese identity, with the term “Taiwan” becoming more popular than “ROC”, both domestically and internationally.143 In the short term, it was possible that the newfound Taiwanese identity would be more negative than positive in relation to general deterrence for the unique conditions in Formosa. For example, a great number of military officers in the ROC armed forces considered themselves as Chinese and held many influential positions in the military.144 Although the goal of “retaking the mainland” had become impossible in the 1960s and the Taipei Authority had changed its strategy to a defensive one, a strong Chinese identity was still the core of all internal political education provided by the Political Commissar System.145 Thus, it was possible that officers would feel conflicted about a Taiwanese identity and President Lee Teng-hui’s intentions of leading the ROC regime toward a union with China.146 The officers’ confusion about political changes had the potential to reduce the effectiveness of Taiwan’s defence capability. Secondly, this metamorphosis changed the Chinese leaders’ mindset regarding unification with Taiwan, from an optimistic one in the 1970s and 1980s to a pessimistic one. This mental shift acted to increase their propensity to take risks. Before the emergence of a Taiwanese identity, Beijing had treated the Taiwan situation as an extension of the civil war in 1940s, or like partisan rivalry between the Communists and Nationalists. The emergence of a Taiwanese identity within a democracy caused such attitudes and associated policies to become irrelevant, as well as presenting a more direct challenge to the view of Taiwan as part of Chinese territory.147 Under this perception, it would be harder to deter Chinese decision makers than it had been

142 Steven Phillips, “Building a Taiwanese Republic: The Independence Movement, 1945-Present”, in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Ed.), Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis (New York: Columbia University, 2005), p. 45 143 Lee Teng-hui, The Road to Democracy: Taiwan’s Pursuit of Identity, p. 51. 144 Richard C. Kagan, Taiwan’s Statesman: Lee Teng-hui and Democracy in Asia (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007), pp. 122-123. 145 Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects, p. 143. 146 Sun Chin-ming, “Taiwan: Toward a Higher Degree of Military Professionalism”, In Muthiah Alagappa (Ed.), Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2002), pp. 69-70; Michael D. Swaine, “Taiwan’s Defence Reforms and Military Modernization Program: Objectives, Achievements and Obstacles”, in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Ed.), Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis, p. 133. 147 Maochun Yu, “Political and Military Factors Determining China’s Use of Force”, p. 29.

93 previously, when they were content with the status quo which they believed would ultimately be in China’s favour. The democratisation of Taiwan had the potential to be generally positive for general deterrence for two reasons. Firstly, instituting democracy gave Taiwan a moral high ground that distinguished it from China. This moral advantage would prove useful not only to improve Taiwan’s relations with the US for material support or extended deterrence, but also to win more international support.148 Secondly, democratisation transformed the Taipei Authority from being an autocratic and externally imposed authority to a native and popularly endorsed government.149 Thus, democratisation had the potential to increase consolidation and thereby indirectly strengthen general deterrence. However, democratisation also brought with it certain negative effects. Firstly, Chinese psychological warfare could exploit the new found freedom of speech in Taiwan. For example, the novel The Intercalary August 1995, about the PLA capture of Taiwan, was popular in 1994 and prompted a growing sense of insecurity among the people of Taiwan. 150 This form of psychological warfare would act to weaken popular sentiment toward defence and undermine the credibility of deterrence.151 Secondly, in the democratic system, a political deadlock was possible. For example, once the administration and legislation were controlled by different parties with opposing ideas, Taiwan could find itself in a political stalemate. Consequently, the military build-up could be delayed, and as a result the capability and credibility of deterrence could suffer. It is worth noting that a major instrument of Lee Teng-hui’s political reform was controlling the ruling party: the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). Unlike other democratic parties, the KMT has been a huge enterprise involved in various businesses in influential fields such as finance, education, and mass media, and held many governmental seats, as it had been the only ruling party throughout the authoritarian period. Thus, the resources of the KMT were abundant, and its support network was

148 Alexander C. Tan, Scott Walker, and Tsung-chi Yu, “Taiwan’s Evolving National Security Policy”, in Uk Heo and Shale A. Horowitz (Ed.), Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan (Westport CT, Praeger, 2002), p. 46. 149 J. Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwan’s Colonial history and Postcolonial Nationalism”, pp. 49-50 150 Chong-Pin Lin, “The Military Balance in the Taiwan Straits”, The China Quarterly, No. 146, Special Issue: China's Military in Transition, June 1996, p. 577. 151 Richard D. Fisher JR, “Unconventional Warfare Options”, in Steve Tsang (Ed.), If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics, p. 76

94 ubiquitous in Taiwan.152 In addition, the KMT’s influence on the mass media remained extensive, despite the newly adopted democratisation.153 By and large, this huge political machine was a determining factor both socially and politically in terms of maintaining general deterrence in Taiwan. Taiwan’s economic vulnerabilities became exposed to China due to their economic links. After 1978 China introduced policies promoting foreign investment in China and used special policies to attract investment specifically from businesses in Taiwan.154 Additionally, in the 1980s, the costs of production, such as labour and land, were increasing and Taiwanese companies started to favour overseas investment; accordingly, China’s proximity and the ease of communication in the similar languages were very attractive.155 The trend of investing in China showed significant growth during this period and the Tiananmen massacre did little to thwart it. Further, the Cross-Strait Talks in 1993 accelerated Taiwanese investment in and trading with China. Thus, in the following year in order to dilute the Chinese influence on Taiwan arising from growing economic ties, Taipei proposed the “Southward” policy, encouraging investment in Southeast Asian countries.156 The deterrence strategy undertaken in Taiwan during this phrase resembled the previous one: denial deterrence using conventional forces, without any clear attempts to impose deterrence by punishment. Taiwan’s armed forces still followed the general order of air superiority, sea denial and anti-landing. According to this framework, each branch of the military acquired a range of new weapon systems to carry out their missions, and in the 1990s the ministry of national defence (MND) began to recognise that fewer ground troops were necessary and introduced a reform plan to reduce ground troop numbers.157

152 The scale of the KMT’s enterprises is unprecedented in the world and the KMT is called the world’s richest political party. It has accumulated great wealth since the 1970s with the booming economy in Taiwan. Lee controlled this power during the democratisation process. See Mitsutoyo Matsumoto, “Political Democratization and KMT Party-Owned Enterprises in Taiwan”, the Developing Economies, Vol. 40, No. 3, September 2002. 153 John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province, p. 133. 154 Weixing Wu, “The Political-Economic Paradox and Beijing’s Strategic Options”, in Edward Friedman (Ed.), China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas and International Peace (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 24. 155 Charng Kao and Wen-Thuen Wang, “Economic Interaction between Taiwan and Mainland China and Its Influence on Both Economies”, in Shiping Hua (Ed.), Reflections on the Triangular Relations of Beijing-Taipei- Washington Since 1995: Status Quo at the Taiwan Straits, p. 159. 156 T.J. Cheng, “China-Taiwan Economic linkage: between Insulation and Superconductivity”, in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Ed.), Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis, pp. 97, 103. 157 Su Jin-chiang 墖拁㇆ and Shen Ming-shih 㼗㢝⸳, “Woguo Guofang Jengtse De Heuigu Yu Chianjan 㒠⦚⦚

The ROCAF pursued its goal of maintaining air superiority by introducing third- generation fighters to its fleets, improving the C3I (command, control, communication and intelligence) system and building underground shelters. When the indigenous fighter project matured and foreign sources became available, Taipei purchased three types of fighters, including 130 Ching-kuo fighters, 60 Mirage 2000-5s and 150 F- 16A/Bs. Then, Taiwan acquired American E-2T Hawkeye AWACS (Air Warning and Control System) planes and upgraded its ground radar with an improved command network.158 Moreover, in 1982 a large shelter construction was undertaken in Eastern Taiwan to provide shelter for fighters during Chinese air raids.159 These achievements ought to have been positive for achieving air superiority but it took some time to realise maximum efficiency of the fighters and other air defence systems. The ROCN, in spite of its sea denial strategy, put attention on acquiring major surface ships. Three types of frigates, eight domestically built Cheng-Kung class (based on the US Navy Oliver Hazard Perry class), six French built Kang-ting class (French Lafayette class) and eight Knox class rented by the US Navy, were planned for the service and took years to finish. The ROCN’s sea denial capability was also strengthened by the deployment of domestically built Hsiung Feng II anti-ship missiles and American Harpoon missiles. Their range, which was less or about 100km, was not extensive but they were useful for the narrow Taiwan Strait.160 Although the ROCN knew the importance of SSKs, there was no source available in the 1990s. The ROCA continued its emphasis on its mobile strike capability in order to oppose amphibious operations or other forms of invasion. This strike force was enhanced by domestic M-48H and American M60A3 MBTs, plus 42 AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters and 26 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior reconnaissance helicopters.161 In

棁㟎䷥䤓⥭櫶咖ⓜ䩊”( The Review and Forward of Our Country`s National Defence Policy), Shinshrji Jengtse Guojia Anchiuan Yu Liangan Guanshi Yantauhuei 㠿₥侏㟎䷥ᨺ⦚⹅⸘⏷咖⏸⽇桫≑䪣岝㦒(The Conference of National Security and the Cross-Strait Relation in the Policies in the New Century), Apr. 2000 (http://www.taiwanncf.org.tw/index-c.htm) site accessed March 19, 2011. 158 Andrew Nien-dzu Yang, “Taiwan’s Defensive Capacities”, in Greg Austin (Ed.), Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan’s Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power (Canberra: Australian National University, 1997), pp. 149-152. 159 Andrew N. D. Yang, “Taiwan’s Preparation against Beijing’s Military Attacks”, in in Shiping Hua (Ed.), Reflections on the Triangular Relations of Beijing-Taipei-Washington Since 1995: Status Quo at the Taiwan Straits, p. 180. 160 Bernard D. Cole, “Command of the Sea”, pp. 128-129. 161 The delivery of American used M-60A3 was finished in 1998. Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects, p. 96; IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 95, Issue 1(1995), p. 192.

96 addition, the 74 Avenger short-range SAMs had the capacity to counter China’s air raids and airborne operations.162 The large aviation force gave the ROCA the capability of rapid response and it would be crucial for anti-sabotage, anti-airborne and other missions. It is worth noting that Lee Teng-hui, unlike his predecessors, lacked the background, knowledge and staff to lead national defence, and was rarely involved in military decision making.163 Lee’s most significant military action was to remove the Chief of General Stuff, Hau Pei-tsun, who posed a threat to his power and thereafter the military openly expressed its loyalty to the civil government.164 However, Lee failed to form a role for the civil MND minister after two attempts.165 In other words, in the early 1990s, the civil government’s political direction and strategic management might have been on the decline.

III. Immediate deterrence The key difference to the threats posed by China during this phase was the use of ballistic missiles. Short-range ballistic missiles and rockets had frequently been used in urban attacks in the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s but were not adopted by Beijing or Taipei.166 When Iraq continued this tactic to bombard Israel and Saudi Arabia in 1991, it created a major psychological effect on Tel Aviv, Riyadh and Washington, because there was no effective countermeasure. This innovative tactic was adopted by China thereafter; in 1992 Chinese ballistic missiles were deployed for the first time near Taiwan, with the number growing to in excess of 100 in 1994.167 With regard to China’s assaults on the islands under Taiwan’s control, the situation was worse for Taipei. The PLAN commissioned more and newer anti-ship missiles to

162 The missile systems were introduced between 1996 and 1998. IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 99, Issue 1, p. 178. 163 Sun Chin-ming, “Taiwan: Toward a Higher Degree of Military Professionalism”, p. 71; Richard C. Kagan, Taiwan’s Statesman: Lee Teng-hui and Democracy in Asia, p. 124 164 M. Taylor Fravel, “Toward Civil Supremacy: Civil-Military Relation in Taiwan’s Democratization”, Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 29, No. 1, Fall 2002, pp. 63, 66. 165 Lee appointed two civil ministers in the early 1990s and the military system rescinded this in 1996. Michael D. Swaine, “Taiwan’s Defence Reforms and Military Modernization Program: Objectives, Achievements and Obstacles”, p. 134; Richard C. Kagan, Taiwan’s Statesman: Lee Teng-hui and Democracy in Asia, p. 122. 166 During the Iran-Iraq War, it was estimated that Iraq fired 516 Soviet R-17 (NATO code: Scud) and relative types missiles at Iran. Iran fired estimated 100 to 231 R-17s. “SCUD-B Shahab-1”, the Federation of American Scientists (http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/shahab-1.htm) site accessed March 19, 2011; “Iraq’s Missile Program”, Iraq Watch (http://www.iraqwatch.org/profiles/missile.html) site accessed March 19, 2011. 167 Richard C. Kagan, Taiwan’s Statesman: Lee Teng-hui and Democracy in Asia, p. 126.

97 blockade the SLOCs, as the PLA enjoyed superiority over its artillery, comprising long- range howitzers, cannons and multi-rocket launchers, not to mention improving its air defence network with various SAMs.168 Furthermore, tens of thousands of conscripts taking their military service were potential targets of hostage taking, if China were to successfully besiege these islands.169 There was the risk that those servicemen’s families would use the media or public demonstrations to pressure the decision makers in Taipei, who now had to consider public opinion. To strengthen the defence for those islands was futile because Beijing could simply add more units to maintain its superiority. As mentioned above, compared to the main island of Taiwan or the Pescadores, in the event that China was to attack the offshore positions close to China, it was less likely that the US would intervene. The greatest deterrent for Beijing might be the threat of damage to China’s economic development if they broke the peace in the region. As for a blockade, the PLAN increased its sea denial capability through submarines, airplanes and surface vessels. The preferred submarine was the Russian 877 project (NATO code: Kilo) SSK favoured for its stealth. It took some time however for the PLAN to incorporate them into its fleet and they remained few in number. Although the total number of Chinese submarines was decreasing, the new 035 class SSK and 091 class SSN replaced the obsolete models, thus maintaining China’s strong denial capability.170 The number of PLAN’s surface ships was similar to that of the 1980s but with additional destroyers and frigates equipped with helicopters and longer-range anti-ship missiles, indicating the increased broad range for the fleet to disrupt sea transport.171

168 The PLA already owned multiple rocket systems with maxima range of 40km such as type 90 in 1990s. On contrary, there was no artillery system in the ROCA with the range more than 25km. Most artillery systems in offshore islands were the antiques of Second World War deployed in the 1950s. Among them, the maximal range of the M59 “Long Tom” 155mm cannon is 24 km, M115 8 inch howitzer is 17km and the M1 240mm howitzer is 23km. “Type 90 122mm Multiple Rocket Launcher”, SinoDefence (http://www.SinoDefence.com/army/mrl/type90.asp) site accessed March 19, 2011; Michael E. Haskew, Artillery: Compared and Contrasted (Heatherton, Victoria, Australia: Hinkler Books, 2008), pp. 67-68; IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 95, Issue 1, p. 192. 169 Cheng-yi Lin, “Confidence-Building Measures in the Taiwan Strait”, American Foreign Policy Interests, No. 23, 2001, p. 93. 170 China ordered four 877 Kilo Class SSKs in 1993 and one delivered in 1995. The amount of Chinese tactical submarines dropped from 113 in 1988 to 52 in 1995. Shirley Kan, Christopher Bolkcom & Ronald O’Rourke, China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisition: Background and Analysis (Washington D.C.: The Library of Congress, 2001), p. 14; IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 88, Issue 1, p. 149; IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 95, Issue 1, p. 177. 171 In 1988, there was one type-051 (NATO code: Luda) destroyer equipped with helicopter but there were three in 1995 plus four type-053H3 (NATO code: Jiangwei) with helicopter. Helicopters can significantly extend the effective range of anti-ship missiles over the horizon. IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 88, Issue 1, p. 149; IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 95, Issue 1, p. 177.

Countering a blockade would have proved extremely difficult for Taiwan’s forces. Although the ROCN had introduced some new ships, anti-submarine warfare was always difficult, especially along the extensive SLOCs with insufficient air cover. The ROCAF’s new fighters were still incapable of providing air cover for merchant vessels due to their limited combat radius. Nevertheless, as in previous periods, a blockade operation involving high sea and major SLOCs might have invited US intervention to protect freedom of navigation. In terms of air raids, the situation was in constant flux. In 1991, the PLAAF procured 24 Russian Su-27SK fighters with a long combat radius.172 Thus, the PLAAF could launch attacks from multiple directions. However, it took time for the new planes and associated weapons to attain combat status and the number of Su-27s was inadequate during this phase. On the other hand, the ROCAF simultaneously introduced additional new fighters and AWACS, and the ROCA introduced the domestically produced Sky Bow (Tien Kung) I middle range SAM.173 As such, Taiwan had now built up several layers of air defence. However, in order to introduce the F-16s and Mirage-2000s, some pilots and ground service personnel were receiving training overseas. Thus, a lack of sufficient personnel might potentially have undermined air defence.174 In addition, China began to threaten the air bases in Taiwan with ballistic missiles. Another new threat that arose during this phase was irregular warfare, such as propaganda warfare plus penetration by Chinese special forces. When the right to freedom of speech was secured in Taiwan during democratisation, the mass media began to report both positive and negative news. However, as an authoritarian regime which determined the news reported, sooner or later, China would be able to project itself as a strong and possibly, overwhelming force facing the Taiwanese people. This tactic was also applied specifically to security issues, in order to damage popular confidence in national defence and weaken resolve. For example, China could only promote the positive news concerning the PLA, from military build-ups to successful exercises. Taiwan could follow a similar pattern, but disseminating negative news about

172 The combat radius of Su-27 is 1500km. “J-11(Su-27 Flanker)”, the Federation of American Scientists (http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/aircraft/j-11.htm) site accessed March 20, 2011. 173 There were 40-50 IDFs and 4 E-2Ts in service in Taiwan. China had 26 Su-27s. Chong-Pin Lin, “The Military Balance in the Taiwan Straits”, p. 579; IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 95, Issue 1, pp. 178, 193. 174 Che Leyi ™㲑券, Hanwei Shingdung: 1996 Taihai Feitan Weiji Fengyunlu 㗜嫪嫛╤᧶1996 ♿䀆歪㇗☀㳮欷榁斓 (Operation Safeguard: The Review of the Missile Crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1996) (Taipei: Liming, 2006), p. 153.

99 the military, such as air crashes and faults in military exercises was unavoidable. Thus, compared to the apparently weaker counterpart of Taiwan, it was inevitable that a strong impression of China’s military power would be established. Penetration of Taiwan by China had various purposes and could occur through several access routes. In the post-martial law period, Chinese special forces were able to penetrate Taiwan by stealth using means such as smuggling, fishing labour, visiting relatives and marriage. During peacetime, they could still collect information and mark important targets. They were also able to directly sabotage air bases, C3I centres and other strategic assets, or indirectly set targets for precision weapons, assess the outcome of attacks and disseminate untrue information, such as creating false rumours of fictional defeats during wartime. 175 Such infiltration tactics were difficult to counteract due to the ethnic similarity. As Taiwan started to allow people to visit China in 1987, Chinese special forces or agents were able to emulate Taiwanese behaviour and accent. In the case of amphibious operations, the difficulties were still great and some factors made it less feasible. Firstly, in this phase the CIST developed and deployed Hsiung Feng II anti-ship missiles. With more than 100 km range they could be launched from vessels, onshore batteries and aircraft.176 Thus, it became much easier to enforce sea denial in the Taiwan Strait. Secondly, there were more obstacles to landing and advancing in Taiwan, as the coastal areas were dominated by buildings of urbanisation as well as by the original hilly environment.177 Additionally, since the 1980s, fish farming concentrated along the coastline had boomed in South-western Taiwan and these were obstacles for amphibious operations.178 Embankments and wave blocks had been built along almost the entire Western shoreline, partly as a result of fishing farming, in order to prevent sea inundation.179 Such obstructions would be likely to substantially impede amphibious

175 Richard D. Fisher JR, “Unconventional Warfare Options”, p. 88. 176 “Hsiung Feng 2”, MissileThreat (http://www.MissileThreat.com/cruise/id.112/cruise_detail.asp) site accessed March 20, 2011. 177 See Haian Dichiu Fanweitu 䀆⽇⦿●乓⦜⦥ (The Illustration of Coastal Areas) (Taipei: Construction and Planning Agency, Ministry of Interior, 2007). 178 The distribution of fish farms is highly concentrated along the Western coastline from the central to Southern parts of Taiwan. “Yu Wen 淩⫼(Fish Farm)”, Natural Source and Ecology GIS Database in Taiwan (http://econgis.forest.gov.tw/FishCultivation/index.htm) site accessed March 20, 2011. 179 Only half of the coast in Taiwan is natural coast. In Western Taiwan, more than 75% of the central part of coastline contains embankments or wave blocks. Tsai Huimin 垰㏶㟞 & Jiang Jinfu 㻮拁⹛, “Haian Guanli Jengtse De Yungshiushing 䀆⽇丰䚕㟎䷥䤓㻇儛㊶(The Sustainability of the Administration Policy of Coast)”, the Sustainable Development Indicators for Taiwan (http://www.initiate.com.tw/demo/sdi/section02_3.htm)

100 operations in Western Taiwan. In sum, the changing international environment gave Taiwan more opportunities to arm itself and improve relations with the extended deterrence provider, the US. However, democratisation exposed several vulnerabilities that had not been apparent previously.

3.2 The Crisis Phase (1995-2000) Two crises, which occurred in 1995-96 and 1999, significantly reshaped the deterrence circumstances in Taiwan. The first crisis arose from China’s aggressive responses to President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the US in 1995, when the PLA conducted extensive exercises in July and August, including launching ballistic missiles into the waters near the major ports and SLOCs in Taiwan. Beijing then continued with ongoing military manoeuvres aimed at manipulating the subsequent congressional and presidential elections in Taiwan. China’s aggression eventually led Washington to respond by sending carrier battle groups to establish a military presence. This crisis ended right after the elections finished.180 The second crisis arose after Lee described the “special state-to- state relationship” between Taiwan and China in July 1999. This statement angered Beijing, as it contradicted China’s one-China policy. China’s responses however were less harsh than they had been three years ago, except for various provocative actions, such as sending fighters across the middle line in the Taiwan Strait.181

I. Extended Deterrence: By 1996, the general situation in the Taiwan Strait had developed into something resembling typical extended deterrence against China’s outright hostility, involving the US. In 1995 and 1996 Chinese decision makers had a change of mindset and adopted aggressive tactics designed to coerce Taiwan. Following the crisis, China’s military capability was continuously strengthened through domestic development, arms sales and technological assistance from ex-Soviet countries.182 When China’s actions became aggressive, the US

site accessed March 20, 2011. 180 John F. Cooper, Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan, pp. 61-63, 91. 181 Denny Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, pp. 221-222. 182 In 1990s, China was the biggest buyer of Russian arms. China also purchased the critical parts such as turbo engines of ships from Ukraine and other CIS countries. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Trade in and licensed production of major conventional weapons: Imports sorted by recipient. Deals with Deliveries or Orders 1989-2005 (China) (StockholmǺ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, 2006); Elizabeth Wishnick, “Russia and China: Brothers Again?” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 5, September- October 2001, p. 806.

101 assumed an even clearer role as Taiwan’s protector. In addition to the deployment of carrier battle groups, US–Taiwan military ties were gradually improved. The first Taiwan-US military conference was held in December 1997 and the US Department of Defence undertook a complete security survey in Taiwan in 1999 after dispatching a military delegation to Taiwan in 1998.183 The Pentagon even considered including Taiwan in its theatre missile defence (TMD) project. Furthermore, in comparison to the Cold War Era, the “Taiwan Lobby” and pro-Taiwan congress members had more influence on the White House in an atmosphere where China had lower strategic value, and the democratisation of Taiwan provided them more legitimacy. Their influence was in evidence when they supported issuing a visa for Lee Teng-hui’s to visit the US in 1995, and they promoted the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act of 1999.184 Finally, the possibility arose for the first time that Japan had the potential to cooperate with the US in maintaining extended deterrence against China.185 However, the US–Taiwan extended deterrence model was unique, with several features highlighting its inherent differences. Firstly, it was unilateral; usually extended deterrence is articulated in a treaty or a similar legal document shared by the protector and protégé, but there had been no such agreement between Washington and Taipei since 1979. Hence the US had greater freedom to extend its deterrence to Taiwan than other scenarios within treaties might allow. In 1996, American extended deterrence was totally a matter of its own decision making, rather than a definite obligation arising from a defence treaty or discussion with Taiwan.186 Secondly, the US imposed fierce constraints on Taiwan in order to preserve the status quo and use Taiwan as a bargaining chip to deal with China. Since the de jure independence of Taiwan and China’s use of force were connected, American extended deterrence was intended to discourage not only Beijing but also Taipei.187 Thus, both the State Department and President Clinton frequently claimed the limitation on Taipei’s

183 Michael Pillsbury, “The Role of the United States in Taiwan’s Defense Reform”, in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai (Ed.), Taiwan’s Defense Reform, p. 144. 184 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China, pp. 245-247. 185 The review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defence Co-operation of 1997 mentioned ‘situations in areas surrounding Japan’s implying that Japan may provide logistical support for American intervention in the Taiwan Strait. Soeya Yoshihide, “Taiwan in Japan’s Security Considerations”, in Richard Louis Edmonds and Steven M. Goldstein (Ed.), Taiwan in the Twentieth Century: A Retrospective View (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 142-144. 186 The generals in Taiwan had no idea of the US military plan in advance. Che Leyi ™㲑券, Hanwei Shingdung: 1996 Taihai Feitan Weiji Fengyunlu 㗜嫪嫛╤᧶1996 ♿䀆歪㇗☀㳮欷榁斓 (Operation Safeguard: The Review of the Missile Crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1996), pp. 201-202. 187 It is also called double deterrence. Lowell Dittmer, “Assessing American Asia Policy”, Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 4, July-August 2007, p. 527.

102 pursuit of its own international space, such as Clinton’s statement of “Three Nos: No two Chinas, no to one China and one Taiwan, and no to Taiwan’s joining international organisations that required statehood for membership.”188 Finally, some mistrust existed between Washington and Taipei. For example, the US wanted Taiwan to concentrate more on its defence, but US officials found that Taiwan’s defence preparations were not as active as America had estimated. As a result, Taipei’s dedication to defence was in doubt in Washington.189 It should be noted that despite being the smallest actor in this tripartite relationship, Taiwan was not passive. In spite of the pro-status quo guidelines of the US, Lee continued to make gradual progress in advancing Taiwan’s international standing, which could also be seen as highlighting Taiwan’s separation from China. His biggest step in this process was defining the “special state-to-state relationship”, which was a forceful response to Clinton’s ‘Three Nos”, but did not result in any significant damage to US–Taiwan relations.190 Thus, due to Taiwan’s unique statehood and extended deterrence, Taiwan had to carve out its international standing in the eyes of China and the US.

II. General Deterrence During this phase, the conditions of general deterrence in Taiwan were similar to those of the early 1990s, with political, social and economic factors continuing to develop in their original manner. Politically, despite criticism from some mass media, popular Lee Teng-hui kept promoting the perception of Taiwan as independent, whilst avoiding de jure independence. First, he proposed the concept of the “New Taiwanese”, based on national identity rather than ethnic background, to unite most of the population of Taiwan.191 Second, Lee declared the status of Taiwan several times. In addition to the special state-to-state relationship, in 1997 he stated that Taiwan was

188 John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province, p. 206. 189 According to American perspective, the ROC regime did not invest enough resources or enthusiasm into defence. The declining defence budget, poor coordination among governmental departments and insufficient pilots for F-16s were some issues which concerned the US. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China, p. 244. 190 Lee only paid a limited price for the statement of “special state-to-state relationship”. For example, the US objected to Taiwan’s application to join the United Nations. The military cooperation and arms sales however were not affected. Ibid, pp. 242-243. 191 Lee Teng-hui, The Road to Democracy: Taiwan’s Pursuit of Identity, p. 61; Cal Clark, “Taiwan Enters Troubled Waters: The Elective presidencies of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian”, in Murray A. Rubinstein (Ed.), Taiwan: A New History, pp. 508-509.

103 already an independent sovereign state, and it was not necessary to declare again.192 Lee’s aim was to match the ROC regime to the realities in Taiwan, its separation from China, and he thus wanted to strengthen people’s sense of belonging to Taiwan. Since the government was unable to compel people to support its ideology or other policies unlike in the former authoritarian period, it was necessary to find some raisons d’être of national defence, such as democracy. However, Lee’s efforts resulted in two negative outcomes for general deterrence: fierce hostility from China and decreased loyalty from the officers and officials with a strong Chinese identity.193 As governmental policies relating to Taiwanese identity opposed their ideology, their loyalty could potentially shift from Taipei to Beijing due to their favouring of China. It would expose vulnerabilities for Chinese spies to obtain access for espionage and infiltration. In terms of the economy, in the late 1990s several features became apparent. First, the growth of investment in China remained strong, with the brief exception of the crisis in 1996 after which the pace of high growth soon resumed.194 The alternative to investment in China, the “Southward” policy, which distributed investment to Southeast Asian countries, was unable to compete with China in terms of language and the regional financial crisis of 1997.195 After the crisis in 1996, Taipei also proposed other constraints such as the “Go Slow” policy, which required enterprises to delay or postpone their investment in China, but this attracted serious criticism from business people.196 Secondly, Beijing’s economic option of coercing Taiwan was very risky because economic ties across the Taiwan Strait were merged with globalisation. If China were to take serious actions against Taiwan, it would likely backfire on Chinese exports, employment and other national interests. 197 Nevertheless, China’s economic dependence on Taiwan was decreasing, while Taiwan’s reliance on China was ever- increasing. If Beijing were to prepare adequately, an economic option would be plausible

192 He mentioned this on the Washington Post in November 1998 stating that the ROC is an independent country. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China, p. 232. 193 Ming-Chang Tsai and Chin-fen Chang, “China-Bound for Jobs? The Influences of Social Connections and Ethnic Politics in Taiwan”, The China Quarterly, No. 203, September 2010, p. 655. 194 T.J. Cheng, “China-Taiwan Economic linkage: between Insulation and Superconductivity”, p. 103. 195 Melody Chen, “Go South Strategy Threatened”, Taipei Times, 29 Sep. 2004, p. 2. 196 T.J. Cheng, “China-Taiwan Economic linkage: between Insulation and Superconductivity”, p. 111. 197 Charng Kao and Wen-Thuen Wang, “Economic Interaction between Taiwan and Mainland China and Its Influence on Both Economies”, in Shiping Hua (Ed.), Reflections on the Triangular Relations of Beijing-Taipei- Washington since 1995, pp. 168-169.

104 in the future. Finally, investment in China resulted in a large number of business-people, managers and technicians residing in China. While their political positions were not necessarily pro-China, they supported more open policies such as direct flights.198 These open policies were also favourable to Beijing because Taipei had to accept inferior conditions as part of negotiations. For example, Taiwan would be treated as a local government rather than a regime equal to Beijing, which would strengthen the impression of ‘one-China’ internationally or set a precedent for subsequent negotiations. In addition, more open policies were likely to bring more opportunity for Chinese intelligence and special forces to infiltrate Taiwan on various level. Militarily, the original denial deterrence strategy was challenged from several aspects. Firstly, the two crises demonstrated the inadequacy of the denial approach to deter China’s ballistic missiles. The only available solution was the American Patriot SAM, but it was very expensive.199 In most military scenarios, a defender with a smaller force can achieve victory with technological or tactical superiority. However, an anti-ballistic missile scenario is a confrontation implying quantity, because a defender must launch at least one or more missiles to intercept an approaching missile. Hence, the number of Patriot SAMs purchased was related to the PLA’s deployment. In the scenario of a war of attrition, there are only two outcomes for the defender: exhausting the missile supply or wasting extensive resources maintaining supplies. If the PLA were to launch surprise salvos, the narrowness of the Strait meant there would be only about 7 minutes to respond. The operators of the missile or the missile itself could indeed fail to react.200 Secondly, where defence is not practical, attack can be the best means of defence. However, converting from deterrence by denial to deterrence by punishment is no simple task. To undertake deterrence by punishment could considerably influence the triangle of extended deterrence and had the potential to be regarded as provoking China as well as giving the PLA a reason to make a pre-emptive strike before a punishment capability could be established. It was also possible that this would be viewed by the US

198 T.J. Cheng, “China-Taiwan Economic linkage: between Insulation and Superconductivity”, pp. 110-111. 199 A Patriot SAM unit (PAC-3) with 16 missiles and its facilities were costed at 2 million US Dollars in 2001. “Lockheed Martin’s PAC-3 Missile Intercepts Advanced Cruise Missile Target”, Lockheed Martin ( http://www.lockheedmartin.com/news/press_releases/2001/LockheedMartinSPAC3MissileIntercept_1.htm l) site accessed March 21, 2011. 200 Jonathan D. Pollack, “Short-range Ballistic Missile Capabilities”, in Steve Tsang (Ed.), If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics, pp. 66-67.

105 as “troublemaking” and result in great American pressure on Taiwan such as cutting arms sales.201 In addition, for deterrence by punishment, specific technologies such as long-distance guidance were required to develop vehicles and warheads. Such technologies were probably not obtainable from the US and would take some time to develop. Therefore, in the late 1990s Taipei lacked adequate means to undertake deterrence by punishment in the face of China’s new threat. Regarding deterrence by denial, Taiwan’s armed forces were effectively reinforced through their various modernisation projects in the general order of strategic priorities: air superiority, sea denial and anti-landing. Moreover, the US was now more likely to sell Taiwan major weapon systems, which provided an alternative to expensive domestic ones. Finally, in the late 1990s sweeping reforms of national defence, including the Jin- shih project and the two laws of national defence, were introduced. The Jin-shih project was intended to decrease the size of the armed forces, particularly the army, increase mobility, streamline the command system and decrease the cost of personnel.202 The MND eventually began to overhaul Taiwan’s entire military structure to suit the strategic environment. The two laws of national defence were aimed to combine the system of two command chains from the authoritarian period to a single chain, to give improved control to the civil government.203

III. Immediate Deterrence Taiwan’s response to the PLA’s manoeuvres during the crises presents a good example of immediate deterrence. Generally, the MND cautiously strengthened its denial capability, mostly on the islands close to China, with sufficient manpower and materials supplies, to prevent public panic and avoid provoking China. These preparations of immediate deterrence were independent of the US military presence.

201 Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “A National Defense Strategy for Taiwan in the New Century”, in Peter C. Y. Chow (Ed.), The “One China” Dilemma, pp. 265-266. 202 Luo Bing-Shiung 刔䍂楓 & Deng Shiue-Tsung 掶⸇⸦, “Guojiun Bingli Jiegou Jr Jengti Gueihua Goushiang ⦚ 慜␄┪俟㱚⃚㠃浣尞┒㱚㎂ ᧤The Plan of Arranging the Military Structure of the ROC Forces᧥”, in Luo Bing-Shiung, Li Cheng-Bau 㧝⩝≬ and Hu Ruei-fu 印䛭䰞(Ed.), Guojiun Tueidung Chiuan Mubingjr Mianlin Jr Kuenjing Yu Tsejin Fangan ⦚慜㘷╤⏷╮␄Ⓟ槱呷⃚⥿⬒咖䷥拁㡈㫗 ᧤ The Difficulties and Solutions of the All Voluntarism System in the ROC Forces᧥(Taipei: Management College, National Defence University, 2008), pp. 4-6. 203 In the authoritarian period, the President could control the forces via the Chief of General Stuff for operations and via the Minister of National Defence for administration. The former was beyond the supervision of the Legislative Yuan. Michael D. Swaine, “Taiwan’s Defence Reforms and Military Modernization Program: Objectives, Achievements and Obstacles”, pp. 134-135.

106

Regarding the offshore islands such as Quemoy and Matsu, Taipei clearly understood their strategic isolation and high possibility of engagement, as was revealed in the preparations for the crises. The MND endeavoured to supply equipment, resources and soldiers in advance, but issued strict rules of engagement to prevent accidental firing. Once engagement commenced, these positions were ordered to defend independently, as air support and further supplies would be very limited, in order to preserve forces to defend Taiwan itself.204 Undeniably, preparation for defence of offshore positions, which presented the most favourable battlefield for Beijing, sent a message that Taipei was determined to protect the status quo, and therefore deterrence would be enhanced. However, this sort of resistance would be strategically meaningless for defending Taiwan, other than sparing a limited number of the PLA troops for the invasion. Although Taiwan’s SAMs and anti-missiles deployed on those islands had the potential to threaten China’s air and maritime movement, the batteries located on small islands, both fixed and mobile, could easily be neutralised or suppressed by the PLA’s fire power. In brief, the strategic impasse remained and the fortification of offshore positions was ineffective in deterring the PLA. The threat of air raids was increased for a number of reasons. Firstly, Chinese ballistic missiles had the ability to strike Taiwan’s air defence facilities, especially large and obvious targets such as airports. While a small number of attacks would not totally paralyse air bases in Taiwan, as modern fighters only require short runways to take off, ballistic missiles could still significantly disrupt and impede the airbase operations. This could prove crucial for Taiwan’s air defence because the narrow Strait gave a window of only 10 minutes to react to an approaching air attack.205 Secondly, the PLAAF and the PLANAF were planning to obtain more advanced fighters, such as production authorisation for the Su-27.206 It was likely Taiwan could maintain air superiority, due to the quantitative comparison of third-generation fighters plus the supplement of SAMs

204 Che Leyi ™㲑券, Hanwei Shingdung: 1996 Taihai Feitan Weiji Fengyunlu 㗜嫪嫛╤᧶1996 ♿䀆歪㇗☀㳮欷榁斓 (Operation Safeguard: The Review of the Missile Crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1996), pp. 76-77, 84, 160, 258. 205 Kenneth W. Allen and Jeffrey M. Allen, “Controlling the Airspace over the Taiwan Strait”, in Steve Tsang (Ed.), If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics, pp. 103, 110. 206 China obtained the production authorisation in 1996. Trade in and licensed production of major conventional weapons: Imports sorted by recipient. SIPRI, Deals with Deliveries or Orders 1989-2005 (China).

107 and AWACS.207 During the crisis in 1996, the ROCAF planned to resist the invading aircraft first with SAMs, including ship-based SAMs, and then using fighters only once a small number of aircraft were approaching. In addition, some of the fighters would be evacuated to the East shelter for strategic preservation. Later, available fighters would be used for covering the ports, where external supplies and the anti-landing operations were located.208 In fact, the ROCAF only raised the level of combat readiness and did not undertake major air defence measures during the crisis in 1996.209 Both negative and positive developments occurred in relation to a blockade scenario during this phase. On the one hand, the PLAN continued to modernise its sea denial capability by purchasing Russian Project 636 SSKs, Sovremenny class destroyers with the P-270 supersonic anti-ship missiles, and domestically produced JH-7 Fighter bombers equipped with domestic anti-ship missiles.210 On the other hand, the US naval presence in 1996 and the extensive terms in the Japan-US Security Treaty made blockade tactics difficult to pursue, because any long-term disruption of SLOCs would justify foreign intervention. In terms of irregular threats, cyber warfare emerged in the mid 1990s. As internet use increased, certain forms of critical cyber assault had potential to create social chaos or even large-scale paralysis. Hence, in 2000 a specific unit dedicated to information warfare and cyber attack was established in Taipei. With sufficient civil resources, Taiwan did not need to be inferior in the cyber battlefield.211 Furthermore, most of its computers and associated operation systems in use in significant infrastructure, such as electricity, are separated from the World Wide Web, thus less likely to be the target of

207 In 1999, the number of Chinese third generation fighters was 52, 50 Russian Su-27s plus 2 domestic assembled J-11s (Chinese edition of Su-27). Taiwan had already introduced all third generation fighters, more than 330 (150 F-16 A/B, 60 Mirage 2000 and 130 IDF). IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 99, Issue 1, pp. 188, 206. 208 According to the instructions issued during the crisis in 1996, only ROCAF fighters engaged the approaching Chinese aircraft, which were numbered less than eight. Che Leyi ™㲑券, Hanwei Shingdung: 1996 Taihai Feitan Weiji Fengyunlu 㗜嫪嫛╤᧶1996 ♿䀆歪㇗☀㳮欷榁斓 (Operation Safeguard: The Review of the Missile Crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1996), pp. 83-85, 174; Kenneth W. Allen and Jeffrey M. Allen, “Controlling the Airspace over the Taiwan Strait”, p. 103. 209 Che Leyi ™㲑券, Hanwei Shingdung: 1996 Taihai Feitan Weiji Fengyunlu 㗜嫪嫛╤᧶1996 ♿䀆歪㇗☀㳮欷榁斓 (Operation Safeguard: The Review of the Missile Crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1996), pp. 153-155. 210 The JH-7 was issued flight certification in 1998. “JianHong-7 Fighter-Bomber”, SinoDefence (http://www.SinoDefence.com/airforce/groundattack/jh7.asp) site accessed March 18, 2011; SIPRI, Deals with Deliveries or Orders 1989-2005 (China); IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 99, Issue 1, p. 187. 211 James Mulvenon, “Taiwan and the Revolution in Military Affairs”, in Emily O. Goldman and Thomas G. Mahnken (Ed.), The Information Revolution in Military Affairs in Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 139-140, 150.

108 hacking. Nevertheless, cyber warfare presented another option for invaders and could be combined with other options. For example, hackers could undertake espionage by gaining access to internal networks and potentially paralysing the governmental websites. It is worth noting that during the course of the crisis in 1996 Taipei was seriously concerned about sabotage. Accordingly, the MND assigned high-mobility troops such as airborne brigades to act as rapid response forces for anti-sabotage missions and enhanced the training of normal troops to react to irregular tactics such as riots.212 However, the effects of these precautions are unclear. Firstly, regardless of how the degree of rigor of preparations, the attacker holds the initiative in terms of when, where and how any assault will be carried out. Secondly, associated intelligence operations are more critical than combat, because any counter measures which can be taken in advance are more effective than those in response. However, intelligence operations are classified and difficult to evaluate. Thirdly, the troops in Taiwan lacked experience in real combat and in joint manoeuvres with their counterparts in other countries. This would influence their ability to perform anti-sabotage operations. The threat of amphibious operations during this phase remained similar to the previous phase but was enhanced by several potential technological advancements such as hovercraft and ground-effect vehicles, which provide the possibility of rapid transit across the Taiwan Strait. The biggest drawback of conventional operations is the time- consuming nature of slow landing ships and conventional crafts. In the 1980s the US and the Soviet Union adopted hovercraft as landing vehicles due to their high speed.213 The Soviet Union had further success with its ground-effect vehicle, the so-called “Caspian Sea Monster”, which was much faster than a hovercraft and had a potential payload of hundreds of tons. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, those technologies and products were made available to China, which it had been already researching since the 1980s.214 Possession of these advanced vehicles plus the larger air transport fleet in China, both

212 Che Leyi ™㲑券, Hanwei Shingdung: 1996 Taihai Feitan Weiji Fengyunlu 㗜嫪嫛╤᧶1996 ♿䀆歪㇗☀㳮欷榁斓 (Operation Safeguard: The Review of the Missile Crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1996), p. 88. 213 The US Marine Corps introduced landing hovercraft in 1987 and the Soviet ones came into service in 1986. “Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC)”, “Project 1232.2 Zubr Pomornik Class Amphibious Landing Craft”, the Federation of American Scientists (http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/uswpns/navy/landingcraft/lcac.html; http://www.fas.org/man/dod- 101/sys/ship/row/rus/1232_2.htm) site accessed March 22, 2011. 214 Michael Halloran and Sean O` Meara, Wing in Ground Effect Craft Review (Melbourne: DSTO Aeronautical and Maritime Research Laboratory, 1999), pp. 17, 27.

109 military and civil, made innovative amphibious operations possible in the near future. However, amphibious operations were still not feasible for the following reasons. Firstly, these new means of transportation were still constrained by the weather and other natural conditions. For example, ground-effect vehicles require calm sea conditions, which are not often available in the Taiwan Strait. Secondly, the process of gathering the vehicles cannot be done on a clandestine basis, whether in ports or airports, thus making their use them in a surprise assault very difficult. Thirdly, these new transport vehicles would be as vulnerable as conventional landing craft. Their high- speed capability does indeed lower the time exposed to enemy fire, but severe damages can still be inflicted by SAMs, air-to-air missiles and small-calibre gunfire as a result of their size. In sum, various new technologies were able to reduce the obstacles to landing to some extent but were difficult to convert to a favourable strategic situation. All in all, the transformation of strategic circumstances in the Taiwan Strait was the outcome of continuous interactions between Taiwan, the US and China. Although Taipei’s general deterrence was eroded by Beijing’s tactics and military forces, Lee Teng- hui’s firm political power in combination with improved Taiwan–US relations compensated for this to some extent. Subsequently, however, the deterrence situation in Taiwan would deteriorate either due to its unstable internal political situation or fluctuations in Taiwan-US relations.

4. The Minority Government Phase (2000-2008) The unprecedented minority government in Taiwan led to a considerable weakening of Taiwan’s deterrence during this phase.

I. Extended Deterrence The most striking differentiating factors were Taiwan-China relations and US efforts. For two main reasons, China significantly altered its strategy toward Taiwan: its new diplomacy and the new-found alliance within Taiwan. After being influenced by a range of competing impulses throughout the 1990s, Beijing’s attitude toward the US eventually became stable as a result of conflict avoidance, limited cooperation, and strategic hedging. China made use of the secure and peaceful environment to modernise its economy and use the magnetic pull of its growing economy to achieve close

110 economic integration with Taiwan.215 When Chen Shui-bian of the DPP won the presidential election with a low number of votes (39%) and was inaugurated with a minority DPP congress in 2000, Taiwan entered a period of small-government.216 Numerous KMT or ex-KMT politicians had lost power and were desperate to return to government. At the same time as Lee Teng-hui stepped down as the chairman of KMT, the huge political machine, including a number of mass media operatives, was taken over by these discontent politicians.217 They shared a common goal with China: to constrain, or even oust Chen from the presidency.218 It is unclear whether the opposing politicians and parties in Taiwan conspired with China, but the ensuing domestic political struggle was certainly a positive situation for Beijing. According to its united-front policy, China was able to exploit Taiwan’s internal instability, by reaching out to those opposing politicians who did not support independence, to undermine Taiwan’s deterrence.219 The US also faced a difficult dilemma in its extended deterrence. Firstly, although George W. Bush and his diplomatic team held a very friendly attitude toward Taiwan in the beginning of his first term, following September 11, Washington became involved in the War on Terror.220 During the war on terror, it was necessary for the US to cooperate with China on global issues such as sharing intelligence and thus maintaining friendly Sino–US relations was required.221 Secondly, the US had not ever dealt with a non-KMT and minority government in Taipei before and the extent of domestic developments in Taiwan confused Washington; for example, Taiwan had requested the purchase of SSKs from the US for decades, but its parliament failed to approve the budget. Finally, Chen Shui-bian’s aggressive and unilateral movements enraged Washington. Unlike Lee Teng- hui’s unilateral acts such as the special state-to-state relations, Chen chose poor timing to promote a referendum during the presidential election of 2004 during Operation

215 Minxin Pei, “China’s Hedged Acquiescence: Coping with US Hegemony”, in Byung-Kook Kim and Anthony Jones (Ed.), Power and Security in Northeast Asia (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), pp. 104, 110-112. 216 Shelley Rigger, “The Democratic Progressive Party: From Opposition to Power, and Back Again”, in Wei-Chin Lee (Ed.), Taiwan’s Politics in the 21st Century (London: World Scientific, 2010), p. 54. 217 Denny Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, pp. 227, 234-235. 218 “Sharing the common enemy” is also known as “united front”; it has often been implemented by the Chinese Communist Party. Richard D. Fisher JR, “Unconventional Warfare Options”, pp. 73-76. 219 Minxin Pei, “China’s Hedged Acquiescence: Coping with US Hegemony”, p. 113. 220 Bush pledged to defend Taiwan in early 2001. Cal Clark, “Taiwan Enters Troubled Waters: The Elective presidencies of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian”, p. 527. 221 Quansheng Zhao and Guoli Liu, “Beijing’s Shifting Positions in the New Era of Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations”, in Wei-Chin Lee (Ed.), Taiwan’s Politics in the 21st Century, pp. 209-210.

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Iraqi Freedom, and insisted in the referendum despite warnings from the White House.222 Chen’s second presidency was similarly discordant with Washington due to his aggressive policies such as holding another referendum for Taiwan to join the UN.223 Despite the problems between Taipei and Washington, bilateral military cooperation was improving. The Pentagon’s military survey of Taiwan provided more than 300 recommendations to Taipei and it also altered its policies such as selling the SSKs.224 Simultaneously, US forces exchanged officers with their counterparts in Taiwan and after 2001 American officers attended and observed major military exercises in Taiwan. 225 This level of cooperation was not as high as that of a standard alliance, but provided Taiwan with substantial support, as well as the further likelihood of extended deterrence.

II. General Deterrence The main factor affecting general deterrence during this phase was domestic politics namely the role of opposition parties in policy-making, and the cooperation between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). After losing the presidential election, the KMT and other parties, which had split from it, reunited and were known as “pan-blue”. The coalition of the DPP and other pro-independent parties were named “pan-green”.226 Generally, “pan-blue” were superior to “pan-green” in resources and in the Legislative Yuan. Although Chen won a second presidency with a tiny margin, his administration was constantly restrained by pan-blue congress members with regard to the Legislative Yuan (National Parliament) and public issues including defence matters.227 For instance, the special budget submitted by the minority government in 2004 for the arms sales project of SSKs, P-3C Orion anti-submarine airplanes and Patriot (Patriot Advance Capability 3, PAC-3) anti-ballistic missiles had been rejected by the opposition congress members mainly due to expense, lack of necessity and other unsubstantiated claims. The MND attempted to negotiate the promotion of public-relations campaigns and to slash the budget from 17.8 billion USD (610billion New Taiwanese Dollar, NTD) to

222 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China, pp. 268- 270. 223 John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province, p. 207 224 Michael Pillsbury, “The Role of the United States in Taiwan’s Defense Reform”, p. 145. 225 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China, pp. 244, 248; Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects, p. 182. 226 Cal Clark, “The Statehood of Taiwan: A Strange Case of Domestic Strength and International Challenge”, pp. 92-93. 227 John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province, pp. 59, 142.

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14.5billion USD (480 billion NTD), but the budget remained unapproved until the US retracted the offer in 2008.228 Afterward, a KMT congressman admitted the rejection was for political reasons only.229 Aside from obstructing policy decision, pan-blue influenced general deterrence through party-to-party cooperation between the KMT and the CCP. After losing the presidential election in 2004, the former KMT chairman Lien Chen visited China in April 2005 after which KMT–CCP cooperation channels and forums were established.230 This might have revived Beijing’s optimism and lowered China’s willingness to use force, because of an expectation that this China-friendly party would return to power in the future. Nonetheless, KMT–CCP cooperation was harmful to the sovereignty of Taiwan, because the statehood of the ROC regime or Taiwan went completely unaddressed.231 In other words, if sovereignty were forced to continue eroding continuously eroding, there would be nothing left to defend. The economic vulnerabilities of Taiwan were further exposed during this phase. Firstly, both trade and investment were excessively concentrated in China. Further, as many countries around the world also invested in China, the bilateral economic interdependence gradually turned into Taiwan being unilaterally dependent on China.232

228 Finally, the PAC-3 and P-3C were relisted in the annual budget, but submarines were still rejected. Michael S. Chase, “Taiwan’s Arms Procurement Debate and the Demise of the Special Budget Proposal: Domestic Politics in Command”, Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No. 4, July-August 2008, pp. 703-704, 710-721. 229 The director of the American Institute in Taiwan, Stephen M. Young, stated in a press conference on June 26, 2009: “An individual who is very high ranking in the KMT Legislative Caucus answered your question better than I ever could. The subject of the controversy back in November 2006, over my remarks urging the Legislature to pass a defense budget that allowed for the purchase of new weapons, came up in our discussion. He said: "You were right, we were wrong; it was just politics."“ Press Conference Stephen M. Young Director, American Institute in Taiwan American Culture Center Taipei, June 26, 2009”, American Institute in Taiwan (http://www.ait.org.tw/zh/officialtext-ot0913.html) site accessed March 23, 2011. 230 Chang, Wu-ueh and Chien-min Chao, “Managing Stability in the Taiwan Strait: Non-Military Policy Toward Taiwan under Hu Jintao”, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2009, pp. 112-113. 231 “Bei Liansunghu Huei Gaibian De Meijungtai Janliue Fangchengshr 塓忋⬳傉㚫㓡嬲䘬伶ᷕ⎘㇘䔍㕡䦳⺷ġĩThe US-China-Taiwan Strategic Formulation was Changed by the Lien-Hu and Soong-Hu Meetings)”, Taiwan Thinktank (http://www.taiwanthinktank.org/chinese/page/3/34/165/0) site accessed March 23, 2011.ġ 232 China became Taiwan’s biggest trade partner in 2002 and the biggest object of investment in 2003. China’s share in Taiwan’s investment (55.4% between 1991 and 2007; 69.72% between January and July, 2008) and trade, particularly export, keeps increasing (Of total trade, China’s share went from 1% in 1984 to 21.95% in 2007. For export, China’s share was from 1.4% in 1984 to 30.11% in 2007). The opposite phenomena happened in China. Taiwan’s share in investment dropped from 3.07 in 2005 to 1.94% in 2008. Taiwan’s share in China’s international trade increased from 1.58% in 1985, reaching a peak of 8.21% in 1996 and dropping to 4. 48% in 2008. Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly, No. 188, July 2009, (http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=52986&ctNode=5934&mp=3) site accessed March 23, 2011.

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A Chinese economist even used the term “diabetes” to describe this dependence.233 Although the cost of imposing economic sanctions against Taiwan was not low, it was calculable and the uncertainty of deterrence would be minimised. Once Beijing accepted this cost, economic sanctions had the potential to exert strong pressure via economic and democratic approaches to Taipei. Furthermore, as most economic levers are non- violent, it would be difficult for the US to intervene. Secondly, the wave of investment in China brought with it approximately one million mainly white-collar Taiwanese workers to China.234 They provided Beijing with the chance to leverage Taipei because China could pressure them to influence Taiwan’s domestic politics in China’s favour.235 Furthermore, if crisis or conflict were to occur, they would be potential hostages, and could be placed in custody as bargaining chips. From any perspective, the situation posed a serious challenge to Taiwan’s effective deterrence. In terms of military matters, Taipei’s attempt to undertake deterrence by punishment was gradually becoming evident but denial deterrence had stalled for both domestic and international reasons. Taiwan’s deterrence by punishment capability primarily relied on systems developed by the CIST, as the associated weapon systems were not available from the US. The Hsiung-Feng II E (extended) cruise missile was the major method of conducting deterrence by punishment. Based on the Hsiung-Feng II anti- ship missile, the Hsiung-Feng II E placed emphasis on longer-range targets, from 500- 1000km.236 In fact, from a purely military perspective, the Hsiung-Feng IIE without a nuclear warhead was not sufficiently powerful to carry out punishment. The main purpose of this punishment strategy was to disrupt the Chinese economy, which represented a significant pillar of Beijing’s legitimacy. Aside from Hsiung-Feng IIE, there were several projects that had the potential to offer deterrence by punishment, such as the Hsiung-Feng

233 Hu An’gang 印樜斋 portrayed Taiwan as a diabetes patient who needs to inject insulin everyday in order to survive, with Taiwan's trade with China being that insulin. The Liberty Times Editorial, “Beware the Chinese Economy Trap”, Taipei Times, 23 April 2006, p. 6 (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2006/04/23/2003304155/2) site accessed March 23, 2011. 234 T.Y. Wang, Lu-huei Chen, Shu Keng, “Symbolic politics, Self-Interests, and Threat perceptions: An Analysis of Taiwan Citizens’ view on Cross-Strait Economic Exchanges”, in Wei-Chin Lee (Ed.), Taiwan’s Politics in the 21st Century, p. 167. 235 Minxin Pei, “China’s Hedged Acquiescence: Coping with US Hegemony”, p. 112. 236 Hsu Shao-hsuan, “Hsiung-Feng II E Missiles Have Been Deployed: Sources”, Taipei Times 18 October 2007, p. 1 (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/10/18/2003383640) site accessed March 23 2011; IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 107, Issue 1(2007), p. 333.

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III supersonic anti-ship missile and Wan-Jian air-to-surface missile.237 A number of problems led to the erosion of denial deterrence. The first was the inadequate budget. As a result of shifting national resources to social welfare, infrastructure and other sectors related to elections, and declining economic growth, the defence budget became less prominent.238 During the 1990s, the national defence budget occupied 24.5~22.7% of the governmental budget, but from 2001 to 2006, its allocation dropped down to 16.1~16.9%.239 The national defence budget as a portion of the gross domestic product also dropped from 4.72% in 1993 to its lowest level of 2.2% in 2006, and never surpassed 2.6% during the minority government period.240 Furthermore, while the amount in budgets throughout the 1990s and 2000s was similar, the more advanced equipment in service in the 2000s was more expensive to maintain.241 The inadequate budget also resulted in insufficient training and logistics support.242 Secondly, military procurement slowed significantly during this phase. When the sale of SSKs, P-3C anti-submarine patrollers and PAC-3 SAMs was halted in the Legislative Yuan, Washington was less likely to process other major projects such as the F-16C/D.243 Hence, except for 4 Kidd class destroyers which “survived” the budget war

237 With its supersonic feature, the Hsiung-Feng III missile would be easier to penetrate Chinese air defence systems, despite its shorter range (estimated at 130km). The Wan-Jian missile was an air-launched missile with a 600km range, which is similar to the American JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition), and can deliver 100-120 sub-munitions. It was reportedly tested several times between 2006 and 2008. “Hsiung-Feng 3”, MissileThreat (http://www.MissileThreat.com/cruise/id.146/cruise_detail.asp) site accessed March 23, 2011; “Taiwan”, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (http://www.the- monitor.org/custom/index.php/region_profiles/print_theme/222) site accessed 5 April, 2011. 238 Ming-shih Shen and Chen-Tin Tsai, “An analysis of the Republic of China’s Military Organization and Force Structure”, p. 109. 239 Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC (Taiwan)(http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/np.asp?ctNode=41) site accessed March 23, 2011. 240 York W. Chen and Martin Edmonds, “The Domestic Context of Defence Reform”, in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai (Ed.), Taiwan’s Defense Reform, p. 68; IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 106, Issue 1(2006), p. 292; Vol. 107, Issue 1, p. 373; Vol. 108, Issue 1, p. 403; Vol. 109, Issue 1, p. 410. 241 Luo Bing-Shiung 刔䍂楓 & Deng Shiue-Tsung 掶⸇⸦, “Guojiun Bingli Jiegou Jr Jengti Gueihua Goushiang ⦚ 慜␄┪俟㱚⃚㠃浣尞┒㱚㎂ ᧤The Plan of Arranging the Military Structure of the ROC Forces᧥”, p. 7. 242 Yang Guo-Lung 㯙⦚椕, Hu Tzu-Ruei 印䯥䛭 and Shen Jiun-Kai 㼗㿩⒀, “Guojiun Houchin Weilai Fajan De Shianjr Yu Janwang ⦚慜㈛╳㦹∕䤋⻤䤓棟Ⓟ咖⻤㦪᧤The Limitations and Forecast of the Logistic Development of the ROC Forces in the Future᧥”, in Wang Jung-Yun 䘚₼⏐, Yang Guo-Lung 㯙⦚椕 and Li Huei-Shiang 㧝㍯䃧 (Ed.), Chianjan Guojiun Houchin Juanshing Szwei Yu Tseliue ⓜ䩊⦚慜㈛╳懘⨚㊬值咖 ䷥䟴 (Looking Forward the Thoughts and Strategies of Transforming the ROC Forces’ Logistic) (Taipei: Management College, National Defence University, 2008), p. 12. 243 Owing to a possible imbalance of air power in the Taiwan Strait, the ROCAF planned to purchase 66 F- 16C/Ds in October 2006 but this deal was turned down by the US. IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 107, Issue

115 in the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan purchased no major arms from the US.244 Since American major weapon systems had been available throughout the 1990s, there were no similar domestic or coproduction projects conducted by the CIST or by other R&D institutes to produce such weapon systems. Although a few domestic products such as the RT-2000 multi-launch rocket system (MLRS) were in service, the domestic defence industry was unable to meet the defence needs.245 Furthermore, it was difficult to develop major weapon systems such as MBTs locally under the constrained budget. Finally, outdated equipment such as the M-41 light tank was still in service but overlooked in budget arrangements, including the special budget.246 Thirdly, the length of individual military service was decreasing. Since the conscription system was established in the 1950s, servicemen were the backbone of the ROC forces, especially in the ground troops. To appease the constituency, the government gradually reduced the term of military service from two years to one year from the 1990s, thus affecting the training cycle.247 While there was discussion about the introduction of an exclusively voluntary military service, several major concerns arose regarding how they could recruit soldiers with sufficient quality and quantity; about means of maintaining the combat capability of reserves; and about means of matching other military reforms.248 The MND had selected a few units for an experiment on voluntarism and found that their performance was slightly better than the period when the units were composed of conscripts.249 In spite of the unremarkable effects of the experimental voluntary units, the MND still proposed a new military structure: regular troops would be composed mainly of voluntary enrolments, and most male

1(2007), pp. 333, 340. 244 There were fierce debates for 4 Kidd Class Destroyers in the Legislative Yuan in 2001 which was finally passed with the mobilisation of DPP congress members and the MND’s promise to lower the price. Taiwan also purchased AAV-7 amphibious armour vehicles to replace the antique LVT-5 and other weapons from the US but those deals did not significantly affect the deterrence situation. York W. Chen and Martin Edmonds, “The Domestic Context of Defence Reform”; IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 101, Issue (2001), pp. 173, 179; Vol. 103, Issue 1(2003), pp. 296-297. 245 Brian Hsu, “Army to Buy Launch Rocket System Built by Taiwan Supplier”, Taipei Times, 6 November 2001, p. 2 (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2001/11/06/0000110289) site accessed March 23, 2011. 246 Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects, p. 177 247 Peng Yu-Ming ㇼ䘘㢝, “Woguo Tueidung Chiuan Mubingjr Jr Yanshi 㒠⦚㘷╤⏷╮␄Ⓟ⃚䪣㨟(the Analysis of All Voluntarism System in our Country)”, in Li Chen-Tung 㧝椂⚛(Ed.), The National Defense Strategy and Joint Operation (Taoyuan, Taiwan: National Defense University, 2008), p. 49; Chong-pin Lin, Personal Interview, 13 June 2010. 248 Luo Bing-Shiung 刔䍂楓 & Deng Shiue-Tsung 掶⸇⸦, “Guojiun Bingli Jiegou Jr Jengti Gueihua Goushiang ⦚ 慜␄┪俟㱚⃚㠃浣尞┒㱚㎂ ᧤The Plan of Arranging the Military Structure of the ROC Forces᧥”, pp. 12-13. 249 Bill Chang, Person Interview, 23 June 2010.

116 citizens would undertake short-term military training after 2013.250 However, this new system had to compete with the labour market. Usually, citizens with higher education degrees or professional skills do not join the military because they are more likely to obtain better civil jobs. Hence, the cost of training soldiers without the relevant qualifications would be higher than before. Moreover, short-term training merely enables normal male citizens to become infantrymen, and they will lack the capability to conduct joint warfare or operate sophisticated weapon systems such as tanks. In the modern battlefield, especially the strategic environment of Taiwan, a high number of infantry alone is of limited use in defence. In addition, the training for conscripts has not been significantly improved. As there is neither a strong sergeant corps in the armed forces of Taiwan nor improved training processes, longer service terms may not necessarily advance the training of soldiers. 251 In sum, the transformation from conscription to voluntarism would not be likely to enhance Taiwan’s defence capability. Lastly, inspired by the US’s revolution in military affairs (RMA), the MND attempted to undertake Taiwan’s RAM through establishing a C4I (Command, Communication, Control, Computer and Intelligence) system and reorganising the chain of command. The former was the Bo Shen Project which coordinated the air force, navy, satellite and even the US military units in a given situation.252 The Chief of General Staff had direct command of ten major battle sections, including three army corps, four regional defence headquarters, the No. 62/63 fleet and air combat command.253 Unfortunately, a spy who was a general in the MND revealed a considerable part of the detail of the Bo Shen project to China, which had the potential to significantly damage the effect of this project.254 Further, the insufficient budget impeded the procurement and training of RAM staff, and the obstructed arms sales from the US stifled a major

250 Quadrennial Defense Review (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, ROC, 2009), p. 32; Lee Seok Hwai, “Taiwan to cut conscription to 4 months in 2013”, the Strait Times, 31 Dec., 2011, Asia News Network (http://www.asianewsnet.net/home/news.php?id=25731) site accessed 23 February, 2012. 251 Bill Chang, Person Interview, 23 June 2010. 252 Andrew N. D. Yang, “Taiwan’s Preparation against Beijing’s Military Attacks”, p. 179; Bill Chang, Personal Interview, 23 June 2010. 253 Wen-Chung Lee, “The Development of Taiwan’s Revolution in Military Affairs after the Implementation of the 2002 National Defence Act”, in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai (Ed.), Taiwan’s Defense Reform, p. 127. 254 Rowan Callick, “Taiwan General Lured by Spy”, the Australia, 12 February 2011 (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/taiwan-general-lured-by-spy/story-e6frg6so-1226004631268) site accessed 5 April, 2011.

117 source of RMA. Finally, there was much outdated equipment which was difficult to integrate into RMA.

III. Immediate Deterrence A new threat emerging during this phase is a decapitation operation, which was inspired by Operation Iraqi Freedom. A decapitation operation denotes a rapid invasion of the capital or the command headquarters of the enemy in order to collapse their leadership, as well as other effects such as coercion and deterrence in advance.255 The PLA had the potential to undertake decapitation operations against Taiwan in an assortment of scenarios: air raid, ballistic and cruise missiles and sabotage. Since the nineteenth century, Taipei has been the ruling centre in Taiwan. To capture Taipei would effectively halt all organisational resistance and create a fait accompli. Furthermore, the terrain of the Taipei basin and the surrounding hills and rivers prevents the supply of reinforcements. Following the unsuccessful coup d’état in 1964, there were limited ground troops stationed in Taipei City and the backbone of defence there was the military police, who bore only light arms.256 While there were several army divisions garrisoned outside Taipei, these were downgraded to brigades during the reforms of the late 1990s and most of their bases were separated from Taipei City by the Tansui River and its tributaries. Finally, as some politicians held China-friendly attitudes and supported unification, it would have been easy for China to find local political figures to cooperate following a decapitation operation and to mitigate the international disruption of annexing Taiwan. However, the fundamental question of any decapitation operation is: what is the next step after eradicating the leaders? Whether to directly annex or to establish a puppet regime, any Chinese decapitation operation had to be followed up with a strong military presence in order to secure control. If the PLAAF and the PLANAF could suppress the air defence around Taipei with the support of ballistic and cruise missiles and sabotage, the PLA could send airborne troops, and perhaps co-operate with marine troops using hovercrafts and ground-effect vehicles to invade Taipei. It must be noted

255 Victor D. Hyder, Decapitation Operations: Criteria for Targeting Enemy Leadership (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Command and General Stuff College, 2004), pp. 4, 56. 256 The Vice Commander of the ROCA armoured troops attempted to lead an armour troop to overthrow the government in 1964 but his attempt was unsuccessful. Sun Chien Chung ⷺㆉ₼, Oral history Interviews with Retired Members of the ROC Armored Forces, p. 248.

118 that in the 2000s in this scenario it would have been useful for China to expand capability to effect precise strikes by adding cruise missiles such as the DH-10 and YJ-63 to its arsenal.257 However, there were several constraints associated with this operation. Firstly, if China’s suppression of the air defence around Taipei was not effective, a small unit of light SAMs such as the Avenger system or anti-air guns had the capacity to inflict considerable damage and casualties on China’s airborne troops by shooting down their transporters. Similarly, just a few anti-ship missiles or other anti-landing weapons would be able to disrupt the landing. For a rapid operation such as this, timing is essential and any delays can affect the outcome. It was also possible that such an operation would be intercepted by the US from Okinawa or other nearby bases. Secondly, if the operation was successful and Taipei was occupied, other parts in Taiwan may have maintained effective resistance and therefore international community may not have accepted at as a fait accompli. Despite the above limitations, the MND responded by deploying its marine brigade to the outlying areas of Taipei and addressing related scenarios in its military exercises.258 During this phase, some key aspects had been changed but the offshore positions were vulnerable. Firstly, civil interactions between the islands and China increased following the introduction of the “small three links” policy in 2001, because direct sea transport became legalised.259 The increasing interactions brought with them additional opportunities for the PLA to carry out espionage, penetration and sabotage. Secondly, the number of troops stationed in these offshore positions has decreased following the military reforms, which on the one hand, acted to conserve some human and material resources for defence, while on the other hand, weakened the defence capability of these

257 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of People’s Republic of China 2008 (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2008), p. 2. 258 Bianjib 偷憾捷(The Editorial Department), “Lianshing 94-1 Amphibious Landing Exercise”, Chiuanchiou Fangwei Jr ⏷䚒棁嫪崛᧤Defence International᧥, No. 253, September 2005 (http://www.diic.com.tw/mag/mag253/253-8-2.htm) site accessed March 24, 2011; Chiou Jr-Chiang 捀㉦㇆, “Niandu Guofang DashrʇHankuang Yanshi ㄃ㄵ⦚棁⮶ℚ—䆱⏘䆣剡(Annual Major Event of National Defence—Hankuang Exercise)”, the Youth Daily News 14 April 2005, pp. 1, 3(http://www.youth.com.tw/db/epaper/es001001/eb0203.htm) site accessed March 24, 2011. 259 The small three link policy defined legalisation of the trade and traffic between offshore islands and China. This policy gradually became more open in the following years. Mainland Affairs Council, , 2000-2007 Jengfu Liangan Jungyau Jengtse Shrshr Chingshing 2000-2007 㟎ㄫ⏸⽇摜尐㟎䷥⹵㡌㍔ㇱ (2000-2007 The Situation of Governmental Major Cross-Strait Policies) (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, 2007) (http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/MMO/RPIR/book426.pdf) site accessed March 24, 2011

119 islands. 260 It became more likely that the PLA would be able to capture the islands swiftly. If Beijing was to overtake these offshore positions, the consequences, such as prisoners of war and low morale would be problematic for Taipei. Air superiority continued to be detrimental to Taiwan. Firstly, the air bases in Taiwan were relatively few and were exposed to China’s ballistic and cruise missiles.261 Whilst ever the PLA continue to increase the number of ballistic and cruise missiles deployed near Taiwan, those air bases would most likely be paralysed, or even destroyed in the first waves of missile fire.262 Contingency plans, such as the use of freeways as runways were adopted by the ROCAF, but China could easily catch up by deploying more missiles because there were only six sections of freeway and one section of highway which were able to be used as runways.263 Secondly, China launched its domestic third- generation fighter, the J-10.264 In addition to the domestic Su-27SK, the J-11, and the Russian Su-30MK2, the PLAAF expanded its fleet of advanced fighters and would eventually have established quantitative superiority over the ROCAF. Thirdly, the PLAAF had obtained supplementary aircraft such as Russian and domestic AWACSs and refuel tankers, which both had the capacity to improve China’s combat efficiency and expand its combat radius.265 Nevertheless, the requirement for air superiority is different for China and Taiwan. For covering other military operations such as amphibious invasion, the PLAAF and the PLANAF have a heavier burden of securing air superiority than their counterpart in Taiwan.266 Thus, as long as the ROCAF or other air defence units could survive at a certain level of capability, it was still possible for Taiwan to impede and,

260 Since the crisis in 1996, the MND downgraded the garrison in offshore islands. For instance, there were 80,000 soldiers in Quemoy in 1970s, 55,000 in the early 1990s, 25,000 in 1996, and 10,000 in 2007. There were 50,000 soldiers in Matsu in 1970s and less than 4000 in 2007. Hsu Shao-Hsuan 峀俈慡, “Jinma Jujiun Tzueiduo Shr Gauda 17wan 摠氻江慜㦏浧㣑浧拣 17 嚻(The Highest Number of the Garrison in Quemoy and Matsu was 170, 000), the Liberty Times (Electronic Edition) 3 June 2009(http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2009/new/jun/3/today-fo1-2.htm) site accessed March 24, 2011. 261 There are 7 airbases in Western Taiwan. “”Han-Guang 20hao Yan Si”—Rende Jhanbei Paodao Yansyun Shaoming ᇷ䆱⏘ 壮䆣剡ᇸ࿻࿻⅐㉆㒿⌨恠拢䆣岢崹㢝 (The description of rehearsal of alternative runway in the Rende Section in the Han Guang 20 Manoeuvre). 262 By November 2007 the number of deployed missile was between 990 and 1070 plus 50-250 DH-10 cruise missiles. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of People’s Republic of China 2008, p. 2. 263 “”Han-Guang 20hao Yan Si”—Rende Jhanbei Paodao Yansyun Shaoming ᇷ䆱⏘ 壮䆣剡ᇸ࿻࿻⅐㉆㒿⌨恠拢䆣岢崹㢝 (The description of rehearsal of alternative runway in the Rende Section in the Han Guang 20 Manoeuvre). 264 The J-10 was introduced into service in 2007. IISS, the Military Balance, Vol. 108, Issue 1, p. 413. 265 The PLAAF owned 116 J-11s, 73 Su-30Mk2s, 32 Su-27UBKs and 31 J-10s in 2008, and the PLANAF had 48 Su- 30Mk2s. There were one regiment of Russian A-50 AWACS and 4 domestic ones based on Y-8 transporters. 18 H-6 bombers were modified as refuel tankers (HY-6) in service in the PLAAF and the PLANAF when the Russian IL-78M was on order. Ibid, pp. 379-380. 266 Kenneth W. Allen and Jeffrey M. Allen, “Controlling the Airspace over the Taiwan Strait”, pp. 105-106.

120 even repel invasion by China. In terms of a blockade, the context of such a threat moved from an economic to a military focus. The original blockade which was intended to have an economic effect had the potential to be replaced by Chinese economic sanctions, the repercussions of which would be less severe than disrupting the SLOCs on the high seas. When the PLAN had increased its sea denial capability using both domestic and ex-Soviet sources, blocking outside intervention in Taiwan, mainly from the US, gradually became feasible. This new form of blockade, known as “anti-access”, was intended “to impede the deployment of US Forces into the combat theatre, limit the locations from which forces could effectively operate, or force them to operate from locations farther from the locus of conflict than they would normally prefer”.267 The anti-access strategy was aimed not only at the US forces but also at Taiwan’s counterparts. While facing this threat, the possibility of ROCN’s ‘fleet in being’ strategy was unlikely. Taiwan’s ‘fleet in being strategy’ was to deploy the main force in a safe zone far outside the strike range of the PLAN and then to deter the PLAN not to launch an amphibious invasion. If the PLAN still sent its amphibious fleet, the ROCN’s survival ships would conduct a decisive battle to prevent the PLA landing. When China eventually develops long-range anti-ship capabilities, the ‘fleet in being’ strategy may prove unworkable, because the safe zone would be too far to deter the PLAN’s movement and/or the ROCN’s fleet would suffer heavy damage on the way to and from the safe zone. In the face of the PLAN’s expansive sea denial capability, Taiwan’s durability and the ROCN’s sea denial capability became even more critical. The longer period of isolation arising from the blockade negatively affected Taiwan’s storage and management of strategic materials and supplies. While Taiwan’s strategic stockpiling of 60 days’ worth of fuel and 25 days’ worth of natural gas seemed adequate, the storage tanks, which were maintained by both governmental and private companies, proved to be easy targets for missiles and sabotage.268 As for food supplies, although Taiwan was not self-sufficient in all sectors, its abundant domestic production of rice, vegetables and

267 See Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton and Kevin L. Pollpeter, Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States (Santa Monica: Rand, 2007). 268 Jingjibu Nengyuanjyu Jioushihci NianBao 倢䉮捷厌䄟⻏⃬◐ₒ㄃⫀ (Annual Report of Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2008)(Taipei: Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2009), pp. 25-26.

121 fruit was sufficient to meet the basic needs of the population.269 However, the effective distribution of strategic materials presented another serious challenge during wartime. The threat of irregular warfare increased for several reasons. Firstly, when interactions across the Taiwan Strait increased, so did avenues of access for the Chinese to visit and, even live in Taiwan.270 This in turn provided the PLA’s special forces with more convenient paths of penetration. Secondly, after retiring, a few generals of the ROC forces moved to China. Identifying strongly with China, some high-ranking officers, including the former commander-in-chief of the ROCA and the former director of general administration in the MND immigrated to China and purchased real estate.271 Those generals possessed valuable military information and thus presented a potential espionage opportunity for China. Furthermore, once some of the generals were absorbed by the Chinese intelligence system, their extensive interpersonal network in the ROC armed forces would be very useful. The most favourable scenario for Taiwan remained an amphibious invasion, due to the technological obstructions across the strait outlined above. Regardless of the means the PLA might use to attack Taiwan, unless Taipei surrendered, sea transport and amphibious operations would be necessary. Although the PLAN aggressively renewed and expanded its fleet of submarines, destroyers, frigates and aircraft, its amphibious capacity remains relatively small, comprising 10,000 soldiers. The air-lift capacity, aside from commercial airlines, is limited to the launching of 5000 paratroopers into Taiwan without heavy equipment.272 Provided the ROCN, without its capital ships, could inflict severe losses on the PLAN while it was crossing the Taiwan Strait, especially before the amphibious operation, the outcome of the war could be reversed. In brief, Beijing was not particularly determined to prepare an all-out invasion of Taiwan.

269 Michael C. Grubb, “Merchant Shipping in a Chinese Blockade of Taiwan”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 (2007), p. 93. 270 Chinese journalists were allowed to visit Taiwan from 2000, tourist groups from 2002, business people from 2005, medical treatment, and athletes from 2007. The quota of Chinese spouses was expanded in 2002 and later, the relatives of Chinese spouse could visit as well. Mainland Affairs Council, 2000-2007 Jengfu Liangan Jungyau Jengtse Shrshr Chingshing 2000-2007 㟎ㄫ⏸⽇摜尐㟎䷥⹵㡌㍔ㇱ (2000-2007 The Situation of Governmental Major Cross-Strait Policies). 271 Huang Chung-Jung, “Liu᧶Tueiyi Jiangling Na Taiwan Feng Jungguo Jrchan 倯᧶抏㈈⺖檧㖎♿䋲⊇函䞱 ᧤Pan-Green Congressman: Retired Generals Purchased Real Estate in China with the Pension from Taiwan ᧥ ”, the Liberty Times(Electronic Edition), 6 April 2007 (http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2007/new/apr/6/today-fo3.htm) site accessed March 24, 2011. 272 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of People’s Republic of China 2008, p. 36

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To sum up, regardless of the threats posed by China, in terms of deterrence, the key point concerns how long Taipei could last. If the PLA were to successfully land on Taiwan, the difficult terrain, vulnerable land transport and organisational defence would make the outcome of an invasion highly uncertain. In other words, despite the PLA’s growing capability, it is still feasible for Taiwan to prevent China from carrying out a successful invasion. During the period of eight years, the minority government in Taipei faced adversity due to its inexperience, the political stalemate in the Legislative Yuan and China’s rapidly growing national power; the most influential factors concerning deterrence in Taiwan have moved from military to political ones.

4. Conclusion The core aspects of Taiwan’s deterrence are its own survival, as well as international economy and security. Firstly, until China fully accepts and respects the existence of Taiwan without making threats of violence, it is imperative that Taipei possesses a military capability and have other measures in place to deter potential invasion or coercion by China. This will help to preserve the survival of its sovereignty, including its democracy and the freedom to choose its own future. In addition, whether in terms of upholding democracy or choosing their own future, the people of Taiwan need a safe environment to express their preferences, through voting and other democratic means, and the function of deterrence is to preserve such freedoms. Secondly, the situation in the Taiwan Strait has direct implications for the stability of East Asia. If an armed conflict or war were to erupt, the regional and global economy would be severely disrupted on account of East Asia’s pivotal role in the global economy today. If China were to annex Taiwan, the strategic circumstances in East Asia would alter dramatically, because it would be a categorical demonstration of China’s national power to other countries in East Asia; further, Beijing would also control the SLOCs between Southeast and Northeast Asia. Thirdly, if war were to break out in Taiwan, Washington may intervene as a result of the TRA or other concerns, such as the need to stand up to China’s emergence and aggression. Since both sides possess nuclear weapons and China’s non-first-use policy

123 may be unreliable, escalation to nuclear engagement is possible.273 Thus, the success of Taiwan’s deterrence in effect prevents armed conflict between two nuclear powers. In terms of geographic conditions, it should not be difficult for Taiwan to create effective deterrence to China’s invasion and coercion, but numerous political and other factors have gradually eroded Taiwan’s deterrence. The main factors that have led to this are Taiwan’s unique international status, its government and its relationship with amongst various other factors. Firstly, Taiwan’s international isolation is a result of diplomatic policies of the ROC regime which has strong Chinese ideological stance. Chiang Kai-shek lost Taiwan’s membership of the UN because he wished to retain his regime’s status as the only legitimate representative of the whole of China. He thus excluded any option for PRC’s participation in the UN and other diplomatic affairs, and in doing so, failed to preserve an international place for the survival of his regime. Consequently, Taiwan has lost formal diplomatic relations with all the countries capable of providing it with extended deterrence, major weapon systems or military cooperation. In this isolation, Taiwan has been suffering a range of defects, including higher costs and long delays in acquiring defence capabilities, as well as very few opportunities for international military cooperation. In addition, its lack of representation in the major international organisations means that Taiwan is unable to obtain the common security protection from international organisations such as the UN. Secondly, the comprehensive sinicisation of Taiwan carried out by the ROC regime since 1945 has affected Taiwan’s general deterrence. The use of the one language, Mandarin, throughout the country, public education and all other areas of socialisation has provided an effective means of rule for Taipei but has also embedded an extreme familiarity with the ‘mainland’. The dominant Mandarin language and familiarity with China are two of the main factors underlying Taiwan’s disproportionately high investment in China, an obvious strategic vulnerability. Furthermore, the familiarity with China has led to a number of people in Taiwan regarding China as their fatherland and has led them to ignore or underestimate threats by China to the survival of Taiwan or the ROC regime. The ease of movement for former retired generals to China indicates

273 Some PLA officers publicly argued to use nuclear weapon when PLA is inferior to its enemy in conventional warfare. Department of Defense, USA, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010 (Washington D. C.: Office of Secretary of Defense, 2010), p. 35.

124 the closeness of these connections. It is also an indicator of the lack of powerful nationalism. This calls into question a potential lack of obvious raison d’être for Taiwan’s national defence, which forms the basis for mobilising people and resources for national defence as in other countries. The sinicisation policies effectively created Chinese nationalism. However, this nationalism is useless because Beijing also highlights Chinese nationalism. Finally, the sinicisation and related effects have transmitted a positive message to China about a potential positive outcome after using force, due to the subsequently feasible occupation and popular support. This indicates a weakening of Taiwan’s deterrence in terms of communication and credibility. Thirdly, aside from factors concerning the ROC regime, Taiwan’s investment in national defence has been decreasing over the last two decades. Facing an enemy such as China, with its ever-expanding military capability, the different administrations in Taipei seem to be oblivious to the menace posed to its survival and prefer to direct national resources and attention to other areas and concerns, such as the economy or social welfare, rather than national defence. This has resulted in the limited training of conscripts and the use of increasingly outdated equipment, both of which have led to low morale first in the armed forces, which then spills over into broader society through stories of conscripts’ negative experiences in military service. Moreover, defence investment appears paltry when compared to the PLA’s extensive and growing military modernisation, and this inadequacy gives the impression to other countries, such as the US, of Taiwan’s weak resolve in resisting China. Thus, Taiwan’s inadequate investment in its general deterrence will affect extended deterrence because a protégé’s capability affects its protector’s decision in matters of intervention. Fourthly, Taiwan’s ability to resist coercive tactics is dubious. Except for an amphibious invasion, all the PLA’s threats are mainly aimed at coercing the government and people of Taiwan. Since an amphibious operation is less feasible due to climatic and military conditions, Taiwan’s defence needs simply to “hold on” in the face of a variety of attacks from China. However, it is not a simple task for Taiwan. Due to the close proximity, the whole island would be exposed to the PLA firepower in the event of conflict, as well as additional possibilities for sabotage of special forces, spies and hackers. In addition to the direct destruction of warfare, other related challenges would be inevitable such as food and fuel shortages and social chaos. The density of Taiwan’s population would exacerbate the consequences of a social chaos. In order to reinforce

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Taiwan’s overall deterrent efforts, military, civil, social and economic sectors all need to be considered, but Taipei’s commitment to such integration is doubtful. Apart from the obstacles within Taiwan itself, the shifting US–Sino balance has also been a key factor. As China’s national power increases due to its booming economy, the US’s strength is being eroded by the financial crisis of 2008 and continued warfare overseas. If China can maintain its current growth rate, the balance of power will gradually shift It would be a formidable challenge for Taiwan to obtain crucial support from the US against China, as US forces would potentially be blocked by the PLA’s anti- access strategy or by non-committal decision makers in Washington. As a result, Taiwan may need to shift its focus from the present “holding for American support” to a high cost of China’s using force. The cost for China of using force against Taiwan would be critical. If China’s coercive tactics, such as missile attacks or air raids, were unable to force Taipei to surrender, subsequent amphibious operations would still be required, although this would be risky. If Beijing were to incur significant losses in achieving victory against Taipei, China’s reputation as a superpower would be considerably damaged. For example, although the Soviet Union won the Winter War against Finland in 1940, the battle exposed the many vulnerabilities of the Red Army and indirectly enhanced Hitler’s desire to invade the Soviet Union in the following year. If Beijing were unable to capture Taiwan, despite achieving tactical victories, the regime and its leaders would likely face fierce internal political upheaval and, as a result, lose political power. Despite China’s opportunity of eventually achieving victory, the resulting weakening their international position afterwards may act as a deterrent, as it did with the neutral states during the Cold War. The neutral states such as Switzerland had no capability to repel a Soviet invasion, but the high cost of invasion would have significantly worn down the Soviet forces. Consequently, Moscow would have had a relatively inferior military capability to pursue its goals or confront its main potential enemy, the NATO countries and the US. Likewise, if Taiwan’s defence were able to cripple China’s military capability, which is valuable for the US-Sino balance of power, another workable deterrence strategy would be maintained. In 2008, the KMT returned to power with Ma Ying-Jeou winning the Presidential election and an overwhelming victory in the congressional election. Since assuming power, their efforts have been directed to developing harmonious relations with China,

126 rather than focusing on deterrence. In terms of extended deterrence, Ma stated: “We will never ask the Americans to fight for Taiwan”. 274 Such a statement has been unprecedented and unusual from a protégé, especially since Taiwan’s defence capability is still inferior to that of its potential enemy. Moreover, some of the policies of Ma’s administration are likely to exacerbate Taiwan’s vulnerabilities to China. For example, Taipei has promoted tighter economic ties with China, which gives Beijing more powerful economic leverage.275 Rapprochement is certainly an option for Taipei, but it would surely be unwise to downgrade extended deterrence or to be in a position of vulnerability to China, as such a situation would potentially expose Taiwan to China’s coercion. Taiwan’s denial capability has gradually deteriorated. Despite acquiring some weapon systems such as submarine-launched anti-ship missiles, major military procurements such as the F-16C/D fighters have been postponed and the performance of military exercises has deteriorated. For instance, about half of missiles fired missed their targets in a military exercise in 2011.276 Moreover, China continues to increase its military build-up, such as launching the prototype of the J-20 stealth fighter, while Taiwan has not even obtained the F-16C/D from the US. In addition, F-16C/D would be far inferior and outdated compared to the J-20 of the future.277 As for deterrence by punishment, the MND continues to develop the Hsiung-Feng 2E and other types of missiles with a strike-range covering a part of China, even Beijing.278 Such missiles not only pose a threat to the Chinese economy but may also be

274 Tom Evans, “Ma: Taiwan Won’t Ask U.S. Fight China”, CNN, 30 April 2010 (http://articles.cnn.com/2010-04- 30/world/taiwan.china.us_1_taiwan-president-ma-ying-jeou-taiwan-strait-china-and-taiwan?_s=PM:WORLD) site accessed March 25, 2011. 275 The very example is the economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA), which promotes more investment and trade with China, overall expanded Taiwan’s economic reliance on China. Nathan Novak, “ECFA Could Marginalise Taiwan”, Taipei Times 18 July 2010, p. 8 (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2010/07/18/2003478197) site accessed March 25, 2011. 276 Richard Chang, “Second Missile Test Misses Mark ; MND Vow to Investigate”, Taipei Times, 24 March 2011 (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/03/24/2003498985) site accessed March 25, 2011; Shirley A. Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales since 1990 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011), p. 67. 277 China conducted its first test flight of J-20 stealth fighter in January 2011 and a second one in April. “China's J-20 stealth fighter makes second test flight”, Brahmand. Com Defence & Aerospace News (http://www.brahmand.com/news/Chinas-J-20-stealth-fighter-makes-second-test-flight/6842/3/13.html) sit accessed 27 April, 2011. 278 Richard Chang, “Military Official Touts Surface-to-Surface Missiles”, Taipei Times, 30 March 2010, p. 3 (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/03/30/2003469293) site accessed March 25, 2011; Agence France-Presse, “Taiwan Missile Can Reach Beijing: Report”, Defense News, 27 April 2011

127 used to implement denial deterrence by striking air fields, ports and missile launchers. Hence, given an adequate number and quality of such missiles, they may act to uphold deterrence. However, they are a strategic weapon and their offensive use may provoke China’s motive of first strike and US pressure to preserve the status quo. It is likely that Beijing realises the high risk of using force against Taiwan instead of using economic, political and other non-violent means to gradually integrate Taiwan. However, effective deterrence is still an indispensible policy tool for Taipei, as it raises the cost of any direct attack, and constrains China’s ability to coerce Taiwan into total submission. A meaningful deterrent capability will help Taiwan to secure the status quo and survival of its democratic society by adding bargaining power, whatever the ultimate outcome in terms of reunification. That is, Taiwan’s successful deterrence may prevent China from using force and may lead Beijing to take a peaceful approach when dealing with Taipei.

(http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=6342539&c=AIR&s=TOP) site accessed 31 May, 2011.

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Chapter Four

Singapore’s Deterrence Strategy

This chapter examines the development of Singapore’s national defence, from independence in 1965 to 2008. In general, Singapore’s national security is based on diplomacy and deterrence, also known as the “twin Ds”.1 It is not feasible for a state, particularly a small one, to rely alone on deterrence for its survival without the use of diplomacy. Conversely, diplomacy alone is insufficient for Singapore to assure its survival, because the city state needs some last resort measures in place. Thus, the twin Ds can be applied in a complementary manner for Singapore’s survival. The focus of this chapter is on deterrence, as well as issues related to diplomacy. During these four decades, Singapore’s deterrence can be divided into three periods of major changes in the strategic environment: the establishment period between independence and 1975, the Cold War period from 1975 to 1991, and the post-Cold War period after 1991. The year of 1975 not only marked a major change in the strategic environment in Southeast Asia, due to the Communist victory in Indochina, but was also the year that Singapore elevated the status of the navy and air force from commands to distinct services.2 Between 1975 and the end of the Cold War, Singapore had to face the regional military presence of Vietnam and the Soviet Union. In 1991, the revolution in military affairs (RMA), which was displayed in Operation Desert Storm, greatly affected the development of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). While the financial crisis in Southeast Asia in 1997 also affected Singapore, it did not have an impact on Singapore’s defence environment. Each of these periods is analysed within a three-level framework of deterrence which is composed of extended deterrence, general deterrence and immediate deterrence. This chapter, which follows on from discussion of Taiwan’s deterrence strategy, examines the contrast with Singapore’s deterrence strategy in relation to various similar strategic conditions such as fragmented populations, maritime strategic locations and low self-sufficiency, as well as their military links.

1. Historical and Strategic Conditions

1 “Defence Policy”, Ministry of Defence, Singapore (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_us/defence_policy.html) site accessed 3 February, 2012. 2 Derek Liew, “1975 - Changing Times - The maturing of the SAF in 1975”, Ministry of Defence, Singapore (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_us/history/birth_of_saf/v11n04_history.html) site accessed 13 January, 2012. 129

Map 1 the regional location of Singapore (http://www.haimenonline.com/images/2011/12/asia-map-countries.gif) site accessed 19 April, 2012 Historic and strategic conditions have significantly shaped the formation of Singapore’s national defence. Singapore is a small island of 687 square kilometres located at the Southern end of the Malay Peninsula, opposite the Sumatra Island. This location can control the Malacca Strait, the shortest sea lines of communication (SLOC) between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.3 Owing to the strategic location, the British Empire established Singapore as a settlement in 1819. Under British colonial governance, Singapore was developed as a major naval base, a sea transport hub, and a regional commercial centre. In accordance with London’s plans, in 1963 Singapore joined the Malaysia Federation after achieving autonomy in the late 1950s. If Singapore were to become part of Malaysia, its strategic value would merge with that of Malaysia. However, political disagreement between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore led to their separation in 1965. Singapore’s independence meant it regained its status as an important strategic location.

3 The CIA World Factbook, “Singapore”, (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sn.html) site accessed 11 August, 2011. 130

Map 2 the territory and surroundings of Singapore (https://www.cia.gov/library/p ublications/the-world-factbook/ maps/maptemplate_sn.html) Site accessed 19 April, 2012 The British colonial period of Singapore was a fundamental determinant of its basic attributes, such as the population structure, the nature of its economy and the types of institutions that govern it. The population formation of the three major ethnic groups in Singapore—the Chinese, the Malays and the Indians—had been established during the British colonial period. The Chinese and Indians arrived in the 19th and early 20th centuries.4 The Chinese group account for a dominant portion of the population, comprising more than 75%, with the rest composed of Malays (15%) and Indians (10%). The relatively small number of Malay citizens in Singapore affects its relations with its neighbouring countries Malaysia and Indonesia, which are inhabited mainly by Malays.5 Regarding Singapore’s independence, the peaceful process of decolonisation from London and separation from Kuala Lumpur decided the role of the SAF. Unlike some Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, the SAF did not contribute to its independence, and this shaped it as a neutral professional institution. As a result, the civil government could fully control the armed forces and lead their expansion through long-term development plans.6 The Japanese invasion and the anti-Communism campaign shaped the security perspectives of Singapore. Japan’s rising national power and ambition after World War I made Britain cautious about the seaward invasion of Singapore.

4 Georgina Carnegie & Diana Sharpe, “Singapore”, Asia-Australia Briefing Papers, Vol. 2, No. 10, 1993, p. 2. 5 C. Mary Turnbull, A History of Malaysia Singapore and Brunei (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989), pp. 258-259. 6 Su Poon Ghee, “Armed Forces’ Contributions to National and Regional Security: A Singapore Perspective,” in David Horner (Ed.), The Army and the Future: Land Forces in Australia and South-East Asia (Canberra: Defence Centre, 1993), p. 143; See Seng Tan & Alvin Chew, “Governing Singapore’s Security Sector: Problems, Prospects and Paradox”, Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Vol 30, No. 2, August 2008, p. 247. 131

The British construction of naval bases, fortresses and other military facilities in Singapore was conducted between 1921 and 1938.7 However, the Japanese Army and Marines, who attacked via Thailand and Indochina, swiftly landed and penetrated the defence lines in the Malay Peninsula at the end of 1941. After a month, the Japanese expeditionary forces coerced the British garrison in Singapore to surrender by cutting the water supply.8 From 1948, the Communist insurgency presented a serious security problem on the Malay Peninsula, including Singapore. After 1949 the scale of the insurgency expanded significantly because the members of the Community Party of Malaya (CPM), mostly from the Chinese community, were inspired by the victory of the Communist regime in the Chinese civil war.9 The Communists did not achieve decisive victory but the social turmoil caused by events such as the riot in 1964 had high costs on wealth and life.10 Therefore, from the start, inner stability has been a critical concern of national security for Singapore and several counter-insurgency regulations such as the Internal Security Act issued in 1960 were aimed at social control.11 The negative experience of being part of the Malaysia Federation affected the nature of the Singapore-Malaysia relationship. The disharmonious relations between the Malaya based United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the Singapore based People’s Action Party (PAP) resulted, in 1964, in calls from some UNMO members for the arrest of key PAP members. This event drove the PAP to plan a government in exile in Cambodia, and some movements of the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) in Johor seemed to justify the PAP’s concerns.12 Thus, a deep sense of insecurity toward Kuala Lumpur affected attitudes of Singapore’s decision makers.13 The historical perspective indicates that threats to Singapore can be classified at three levels: internal, regional and extra-regional. Internal threats

7 Raymond Callahan, “The Illusion of Security: Singapore 1919-42”, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 9, No. 2, April 1974, pp. 78-80. 8 Karl Hack, Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia: Britain, Malaya and Singapore 1941-68 (Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 2001), pp. 39-42; Masanobu Tsuji, Singapore The Japanese Version (Sydney: Ure Smith, 1960), pp. 75, 107-109. 9 Georgina Carnegie & Diana Sharpe, “Singapore”, p. 3. 10 “Birth of Our Army”, Army Museum of Singapore, SAFTI Military Institute, Singapore, August 7th, 2011. 11 The International Security Act was published in 1960 and it endowed the government some measures over due process. Internal Security Act (Charter 143), Singapore Statutes Online.(http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve.pl?actno=REVED-143) site accessed 27 September, 2011. 12 Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 52. 13 Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: the Transformation of a Security System 1957-1971 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 104. 132 comprise the communist movement and the racial riot in 1969.14 Regional threats were those issued by one or more regional countries, for example, the Confrontation from Indonesia between 1963 and 1966.15 Extra-regional threats include those such as the Japanese invasion in World War II. The three layers are not isolated but intertwined. For example, the communist victories in Indochina in the mid-1970s revived the internal communist movement. 16 Additionally, extra-regional invaders usually need a bridgehead in their target region, such as when Japan occupied French Indochina in 1940, one year before the invasion of Singapore. With regard to the military, Singapore’s threats could be landward—from the Malay Peninsula—or seaward, in addition to the possibility of internal sabotage. For threats via land, Singapore’s territory is too small to achieve strategic depth in its defence. Moreover, the inadequate size of water reservoirs exacerbates the difficulty of defending the territory. Furthermore, the Johor Strait with a width of only a few kilometres is not a difficult barrier.17 Seaward threats are relatively minor because of the difficulties of conducting an amphibious landing or blockade, especially in the missile era. In addition, due to Singapore’s strategic location, a maritime invasion would upset the balance of power and invite external intervention. To sum up the threats mentioned above, Malaysia is the main security referent for Singapore. Ethnically, the two states are different, with Singapore having a majority of Chinese in its population where Malaysia has a majority of Malays. The city state’s ethnic alienation from its neighbouring countries has developed into a security concern for several reasons. Historically, the Chinese community has been blamed by Malays for the uneven distribution of wealth and other economic problems, these being the main reasons for cross ethnic riots.18 Ethnic riots in Malaysia also have the potential to spill rapidly over the border into Singapore due to kinship ties. Additionally, the treatment of the Malay minority in

14 The Malay-Sino riot happened first in Malaysia and then spilled over to Singapore. “Countering Threats”, Internal Security Department (http://www.mha.gov.sg/isd/ct.htm) site accessed 13 January, 2012. 15 The Indonesian President Sukarno’s objection to the concept of the Malaysia Federation led to a series of hostile measures such as infiltration into Sarawak since 1963 and military exercises close to Johor in 1964. Damon Bristow, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Southeast Asia’s Unknown Regional Organisation”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2005, p. 3. 16 Shee Poon-Kim, “Singapore in 1977: Stability and Growth”, Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 2, February 1978, p. 195. 17 “ Malaysia-Singapore Second Crossing Bridge”, Shimizu Corporation (http://www.shimz.co.jp/english/theme/bridges/my-sg2nd.html) site accessed 11 August, 2011. 18 Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke, Strategies of Survival: the Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1978), pp. 144-145. 133

Singapore and the Chinese minority in Malaysia form the basis of another major dispute between these two countries. Politically, during the period of the Malaysia Federation, separation eventually came about after a period of the troubled relations between the UMNO and the PAP parties led by Malay and Chinese leaders respectively. As both parties subsequently became the ruling parties of Malaysia and Singapore, the distrust has continued between the political elites of both countries. After separation, a range of disputes has resulted in a sometimes tense relationship between the two countries: these include the Israeli President’s visit in 1986, the dispute over Pedra Branca Island, the water supply contract and various provocative statements by the politicians of both countries.19 In this atmosphere, Singapore’s security concerns are of course aroused by Malaysia’s strategic advantages. From Johor, it would be easy for the MAF to launch a landward invasion and Singapore almost has no strategic depth to defend. MAF’s artillery range could cover almost all of the city state. In addition to armed attacks, the cutting of the water supply would be even more serious. In fact, these tactics were successfully applied by Japanese troops during World War II to take over Singapore. In view of such vulnerabilities for Singapore therefore feels the need to prepare for any contingency arousing from Malaysia.

2. The Establishment Period (1965-1975) Singapore’s basic defence capability was formed during its first decade of independence. Its sudden independence from Malaysia in 1965 and the withdrawal of British forces in 1971 provided the impetus for Singapore to rapidly establish its armed forces. In 1975, the formal founding of an air force—the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF)—and a navy—the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN)—signified the initial development of national defence in Singapore.

I. Extended Deterrence After achieving independence, the city state paid more attention to the balance of power rather than seeking an international power to act as a protector for extended deterrence. This was done for several concerns.20 Firstly, after independence, British military deployment was continuous until 1971 and Singapore built its own defence capability during the course of these years. Afterwards, in addition to the expanding SAF, the Five Power Defence

19 Andrew T. H. Tan, Security Perspectives of the Malay Archipelago (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004), pp. 49-60; Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2000), pp. 46-50. 20 Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability, p. 98. 134

Arrangements (FPDA) signed in 1971 ensured that the military forces of Australia and New Zealand were stationed in Malaysia and Singapore until the 1980s.21 The capability of these military units was considerable, enough to check the forces of regional countries, such as Indonesia. Furthermore, although the FPDA was not an alliance, those foreign military units served as the trigger for activating the potential joint intervention of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. Moreover, the Joint Consultative Council (JCC) and the Air Defence Council (ADC) of the FPDA, the two dialogue channels between Singapore and Malaysia accommodated by the FPDA, moderated the bilateral relationship.22 Secondly, the large scale US military presence in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War might not have provided direct extended deterrence, but it secured regional stability and the freedom of navigation, which was necessary for Singapore’s economy. Accordingly, the Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, advocated the Vietnam War in 1967 and began to accommodate the visiting US naval vessels after the US naval office was set up in Singapore in 1969.23 Thirdly, the threats from the two large neighbouring countries were not clear. The separation treaty denoted Malaysia’s acceptance of Singapore as a sovereign state, and Indonesia also recognised the existence of the city state. In other words, since Singapore’s existence became the status quo for Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta, a challenge to the survival of the city state would be unlikely to come from the decision makers in both countries. Furthermore, Singapore developed a good relationship with Indonesia in the early 1970s, which paved the way for the bilateral maritime boundary agreement in 1973 and the first joint naval exercise in 1974.24 In contrast, Malaysia-Singapore relations were not smooth and produced a number of disputes, such as the split of the national airlines and currency control, but these quarrels did not lead to armed conflict.25 In terms of capability, it was difficult for Malaysia and Indonesia to launch a determined assault to invade Singapore. Kuala Lumpur had to respond to the resurgence of the CPM in the 1970s and an unstable situation in Sabah caused by

21 Although that the main withdrawal occurred in 1971, some British group units stayed in Singapore until 1976. C.M. Turnbull, A History of Singapore 1819-1975 (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 312. 22 Damon Bristow, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Southeast Asia’s Unknown Regional Organisation”, p. 5. 23 Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability, pp. 62-63; Pang Hee How, Singapore: From Hope to Certainty (Maroubra, New South Wales, Australia: Pang Hee how, 2003), p. 48. 24 Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability, pp. 2-3; Dwi Haryoko, SAFKAR INDOPURA, 1989 to 1998: a Decade of Training, a Lifetime of Friendship (Jakarta: TNI Angkatan Darat, 1999), p. 10 25 C. Mary Turnbull, A History of Malaysia Singapore and Brunei, pp. 273-274. 135 the territorial disputes with Manila and Jakarta.26 Moreover, the primary functions of the Malaysian forces, both the army and air force, were mainly for anti-insurgency and they lacked the training and equipment required for conventional warfare.27 As for Indonesia, due to inadequate funding and the poor relations with the Soviet Union, the large armed forces built during the Sukarno era were not operationally affective under Suharto’s governance.28 Singapore’s diplomatic capability has also played a critical role of solving a major problem with its neighbouring countries. In 1971, Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta’s collusion on the 12-mile water territory claim would have constrained innocent passage through the Malacca Strait and endangered SLOCs passing through Singapore. This represented the most severe threat to the city state during its first decade. The city state diplomatically responded with support for Indonesia’s archipelagic status in exchange for Jakarta’s abandonment of its claim over water territory.29 Fourthly, without an overt alliance with a superpower, Singapore enjoyed more flexibility in foreign affairs. In order to obtain wide recognition and support for the membership of major international organisations such as the United Nations, Singapore had to maintain a neutral position to gain support from the member countries of the non-aligned movement and the Communist bloc. Furthermore, Singapore was careful not to create enmity; an alliance under the bipolar international structure would easily provoke hostility from the other camp. In addition, trade and other commercial relations with the Communist countries were also in Singapore’s national interests.30 According to unclear threats and relatively strong military capability, Singapore, despite its tiny size, did not match a protégé role in an extended deterrence situation, but was more like a player in the balance of power. As the FPDA and the US military presence generally served the function of extended deterrence in the first decade of the city state, Singapore utilised diplomatic

26 Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta reached agreement about the territory of Sabah in 1967, but the Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman’s attitudes still concerned Indonesia. The territorial dispute between Kuala Lumpur and Manila was aroused by the Corregidor event in 1968. Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: the Transformation of a Security System 1957-1971, pp. 148-150; C. Mary Turnbull, A History of Malaysia Singapore and Brunei, p. 263; J. N. Mak, “The Modernization of Malaysian Armed Forces”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 19, No. 1, June 1997, p. 32. 27 Geoffrey Harris, “The Determinant of Defence Expenditure in the ASEAN Region”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 23 No.1, March 1986, pp. 43-44. 28 Phairoj Tanbanjong, “The Politics of Military Alliance among the Association of Southeast Asian Countries”, Diss. University of Houston, 1989, p. 148. 29 Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability, pp. 37-38, 73-74, 76. 30 Chan Heng Chee, “Singapore’s Foreign Policy, 1965-1968”, Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 10, No. 1, Singapore Commemorative Issue 1819-1969, March 1969, pp. 178-182. 136 leverage, including negotiation and international organisations such as the United Nations, to avert crisis and conflict through peaceful means, before extended deterrence or its own military capability were required.

II. General Deterrence The first decade of Singapore’s national building established a comprehensive foundation for general deterrence. Politically, the PAP won the general election in 1968 and occupied all seats in the parliament until 1981. As a result, the government had a firm political base and could fully pursue its policies without significant opposition or challenge. Furthermore, the PAP administration used crises to strengthen its power to pursue national goals. For instance, in 1968, London announced that the British garrisons in Singapore would be withdrawn in 1971. This event was a large shock to the PAP administration because British troops contributed 25% of the gross domestic production (GDP) and hired 25,000 local people. On the one hand, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew negotiated with Britain to delay the withdrawal schedule; on the other hand, the crisis was utilised by the Singaporean government to reach stronger social control through mobilising the people and weakening the trade unions with new regulations for economic growth.31 Thereafter, despite the oil crisis in 1973, Singapore achieved significant economic accomplishments.32 The city state made efforts to enhance economic independence. Apart from the British bases, Singapore’s pre-independent economy was highly reliant on entrepôt trade, which was mainly with the Malay Peninsula and other adjacent areas, with the import-substitution policy aimed at the whole of Malaysia. After separation from Kuala Lumpur, both policies were vulnerable to external factors because neighbouring countries successively built their own international ports in the 1960s and Malaysia became a foreign market. Therefore, the PAP administration adjusted the economy from entrepôt and import-substitution to an export-oriented manufacturing industry. This transformation was assisted by the foreign capital and technology from economic powers such as Japan, which posed no territorial or other threat. Following this pattern, oil refining boomed as a result of foreign petroleum corporate investments during the 1970s.33

31 Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: the Transformation of a Security System 1957-1971, pp. 137-142. 32 Less than 10 years after independence, Singapore no longer qualified to receive UN aid. Stephen Chee, “Malaysia and Singapore: Separate Identities, Different Priorities”, Asian Survey, Vol. 13, No. 2, February 1973, p. 158; Erik Paul, Obstacles to Democratization in Southeast Asia: A Study of the Nation State, Regional and Global Order (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 93. 33 Carl A. Trocki, Singapore: Wealth, Power and the Culture of Control (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 137

Undeniably, Singapore’s economy was still exposed to the external environment and this vulnerability could not be managed alone. Trade, export of manufactured products and foreign investment, were dependent on regional stability. Therefore, Singapore promoted the prosperity of neighbouring countries by investing in regional stability. Moreover, Singapore demonstrated its resolve to protect foreign investments by building up the SAF.34 Nevertheless, protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) was beyond the ability of the city state and an international power’s presence would be helpful to secure freedom of navigation and regional situation. The US military presence in Southeast Asia served these requirements and proved the importance that a benign international power could have for Singapore. Another strategic and economic issue for Singapore was water. Notwithstanding the fact that Singapore had to depend on Malaysian water supplies, the city state strived to raise the level of water self-sufficiency from rainfall by the enlargement of old reservoirs and the construction of new ones, as well as the arrangement of water catchment areas, including pools.35 In 1974 Singapore even established a pilot plant to convert used water to potable water, but the high cost and low reliability of this forced the project to be postponed.36 In order to attract foreign investment, a stable society was indispensable, but there were two obvious social challenges for Singapore: communists and racial harmony. Though the communist insurgency was weakened by the annihilation of the Indonesian Communist Party and the disharmony between the Soviet Union and China in the mid-1960s, Singapore’s government continued to target the pro-communist movement and neutralise other related student, labour and religious organisations, as well as initiating strict control of mass media.37 Furthermore, since most of the communists were the Chinese who promoted Chinese nationalism, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew insisted that English be used

165-169. 34 Martin Choo, The Singapore Armed Forces (Singapore: Public Affairs Department, the Ministry of Defence, 1981), p. 17; Stephen Chee, “Malaysia and Singapore: Separate Identities, Different Priorities”, pp. 160-161. 35 For instance, the Upper Peirce Reservoir was built by the existing dam near the Peirce Reservoir to expand the total amount in 1970. “Upper Peirce Reservoir Park”, National Parks (http://www.nparks.gov.sg/cms/index.php?option=com_visitorsguide&task=naturereserves&id=51&It emid=75) site accessed 29 September, 2011; Andrew B. Whitford, “Threats, Institutions and Regulation in Common Pool Resource”, Policy Science, Vol. 35, No. 2, June 2002, p. 133 36 “NEWater: History”, Public Utility Board (PUB): Singapore’s National Water Agency (http://www.pub.gov.sg/ABOUT/HISTORYFUTURE/Pages/NEWater.aspx) site accessed 29 September, 2011. 37 Joseph B. Tamney, The Struggle over Singapore’s Soul: Western Modernization and Asian Culture (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1996), p. 61; C.M. Turnbull London, A History of Singapore 1819-1975, p. 300. 138 instead of Chinese languages. As such, the Nanyang University, which once taught courses in Chinese, was forced to merge with the Singapore National University and began teaching in English.38 Besides the Internal Security Act, the PAP successfully established a set of tight social control mechanisms comprising of cultural and organisational factors. These could be used not only to counter communism but also to constrain other anti-government possibilities.39 Malays in Singapore also constituted a security dilemma due to several reasons. Firstly, the disharmonious cross-racial relationship had the potential to cause social disorders such as riots, for example, the Malay-Chinese riot in Malaysia in 1969 which spilled over to Singapore.40 Secondly, due to the mistrust and continuous disputes with Malaysia, the loyalty of Malay Singaporean citizens was doubted by the PAP administration, especially those in the military.41 Malays were excluded from recruiting for the SAF between 1968 and 1973. After 1973, although Malays were included in military recruitment, they were assigned to non-combat units. Prior to independence, as Malays made up a high portion of the military and other governmental positions, the questioning of their loyalty led to a structural unemployment problem for Malays. Such issues became the potential cause of conflict between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur.42 As to whether Chinese or Malay nationalism could be troublesome for the city state, a range of policies promoted the concept of a multi-cultural Singaporean made up various ethnic populations. English was adopted as the common language in order not to give preference to any specific community. The public housing policy, employment and national service ensured sufficient interactions between different communities. The government maintained a neutral role in front of all communities.43 The high priority of national investment in defence made the establishment of the SAF proceed swiftly.44 In October 1966, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew

38 Eugene K. B. Tan, “Re-engaging Chineseness: Political, Economic and Cultural Imperatives of National Building in Singapore”, The China Quarterly, No. 175, September 2003, p. 754. 39 Erik Paul, Obstacles to Democratization in Southeast Asia: A Study of the Nation State, Regional and Global Order, p. 93 40 Ron Matthews and Nellie Zhang Yan, “Small Country ‘Total Defence’: A Case Study of Singapore”, Defence Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3, September 2007, p. 377. 41 Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: the Transformation of a Security System 1957-1971, p. 117. 42 Joseph B. Tamney, The Struggle over Singapore’s Soul: Western Modernization and Asian Culture, pp. 99-104; Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore, pp. 102-103. 43 Joseph B. Tamney, The Struggle over Singapore’s Soul: Western Modernization and Asian Culture, pp. 92-93. 44 The military build-up once reached 10% of the GDP of Singapore in 1968. Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: the Transformation of a Security System 1957-1971, p. 147. 139 emphasised that “in the last resort it is power which decides what happens and, therefore, it behoves us to ensure that we always have overwhelming power on our side.”45 The strategic guideline for the development of the SAF in the initial phase was likened to ‘poisonous shrimp’ in the 1970s, which referred to an unacceptable cost to an aggressor.46 Before the announcement of the withdrawal of British forces in 1968, the expansion of the SAF was concentrated on the army, as the air and maritime defence were not given priority until 1968. From a beginning which involved two infantry battalions and a few signal units, the Singaporean government endeavoured to establish a complete army.47 After independence, the Singapore Armed Forces Training Centre was established in the following year, comprised of all the combat arms of an army, including artillery, armour and combat engineers.48 Subsequently, after an attempt to build a volunteer army in 1966, the Singaporean government adopted the conscript system for reasons of cost, sufficient manpower supply and the requirements of a large-sized army. However, the conscript system was incompatible with Chinese culture: Chinese parents did not like their sons being soldiers. While the British Colonial regime attempted to introduce conscription in 1954, a bid which ultimately failed, the PAP administration mobilised its political machine, including most members of the parliament, to persuade the majority of Singaporeans that it was required.49 The introduction of national service from 1967 led to a rapid expansion of the army, from 2,000 soldiers in 1967 to 14,000 in 1970, and then 25,000 in 1975.50 In addition to the expansion of the army, national service played a key role in nation building; it functioned as a means of socialisation in building national identity and in facilitating inter-racial interaction between male citizens.51 Following the conscript system the considerable problem of the short supply of senior officers arose, especially regarding the level of expertise required by the

45 Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability, p. 5. 46 Bilveer Singh, Arming the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF): Trends and Implications (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Australian National University, 2003), pp. 26-27; Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore, pp. 56-57. 47 Signal units were in existence during the British colonial period and in operation at the moment of independence. Martin Choo, The Singapore Armed Forces, p. 23. 48 Lisa Lim, “1966 – SAFTI – Singapore Armed Force Training Centre”, Ministry of Defence, Singapore (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_us/history/birth_of_saf/v01n06_history.html) site accessed 15 August, 2011. 49 Mickey Chiang, SAF and 30 Years of National Service (Singapore: MINDEF Public Affairs, 1997), pp. 18-20, 22-25, 46-47. 50 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance, Vol. 67, Issue 1, p. 44; Vol. 70, Issue 1, p. 69; Vol. 75, Issue 1, p. 59. 51 Adam Robert, Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), pp. 32-34. 140 navy and air force. To address this issue, contracted personnel and instructors were sourced from various Commonwealth countries, as well as Taiwan. After independence, the city state approached most potential suppliers of military expertise, including Taiwan. After withdrawal from China to Taiwan in 1949, the ROC regime in Taipei actively assisted Singapore in military development because it wanted to obtain Singapore’s support during its fight for diplomatic recognition with Beijing. Unlike the Commonwealth personnel, the officers from Taiwan were assigned to key positions.52 Simultaneously, a range of logistic units and industrial defence facilities were established or expanded by means of two systems: departments in the SAF for maintenance, repair and storage, and government-related companies for production and development for military supply. British military facilities established in Singapore, such as the workshops of the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, were taken over by the SAF as the foundation for its logistics services.53 Following independence, the SAF further reorganised these facilities into a number of bases, such as the ordnance supply base, and formed related training facilities.54 To achieve defence self-sufficiency, several military-associated companies were incorporated to supply a range of military needs during this period. Chartered Industries of Singapore (CIS) was created in 1967 for the production of firearms, such as authorised M-16S1 assault rifles and related ammunition. Apart from CIS, Singapore Shipbuilding & Engineering and Singapore Electronic & Engineering Limited were respectively established in 1968 and 1969. Singapore Automotive Engineering was formed in 1971, Ordnance Development and Engineering, Singapore Food Industry and the SAF Enterprise were founded in 1973, and the Singapore Aerospace Maintenance Company in 1975. Additionally, the Allied Ordnance Company, with authorisation from the Swedish Bofors Company, produced cannons and related shells. These companies came under the general control of the government’s Sheng-Li Holdings.55

52 Chen Jie, Foreign policy of the New Taiwan: Pragmatic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2002), p. 63; Martin Choo, The Singapore Armed Forces, p. 28. 53 “Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers”, National Malaya & Borneo Veterans Association UK (http://www.nmbva.co.uk/signals.htm) site accessed 1 November, 2011. 54 The weapon, ammunition and optical base and the general equipment base were set up in 1966. Maintenance training was begun in 1968. The ordnance supply base was opened in 1970. Andrew Chia et al, A Pillar of Confidence: Commemorating 25 Years of Army Logistics Excellence (Singapore: G4 Army, Singapore Armed Forces, 2001), pp, 7, 9. 55 “Building Our Army”, Army Museum of Singapore, SAFTI Military Institute, Singapore, August 7th, 2011; Avin Chua, “Singapore Technologies”, Singapore Infopedia, National Library Singapore (http://infopedia.nl.sg/articles/SIP_1042_2011-03-29.html) site accessed 1 November, 2011; Edwin 141

Overseas training commenced during the first decade in order to establish professional personnel or introduce new weapon systems. For example, A-4 Skyhawk attacker aircraft pilots were trained in the US.56 Additionally, the SAF also began to participate in joint exercises with other countries. For instance, the Exercise Bersatu Padu in 1970 was held by Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia, prior to the FPDA being formed.57 This emphasis on the army in the development of national defence altered the balance of power between Malaysia and Singapore in the latter’s favour. When Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965, the MAF enjoyed military superiority in quantity and quality. At the time, Singapore only had two incomplete infantry battalions, whereas Kuala Lumpur had nine complete battalions plus armed vehicles, artillery and other types of units.58 However, Singapore’s aggressive procurement of heavy equipment such as used French AMX-13 light tanks from India and Israel, American V-200 armoured personnel carriers (APC) and Israeli M-68/71 155 mm howitzers in the late 1960s and early 70s, shifted the balance of power between Malaysia and Singapore in just a few years.59 For example, the MAF possessed no tanks during this period.60 Although Kuala Lumpur still had a slight advantage in the total number of soldiers, Singapore quickly reduced this quantitative difference with the conscript system. Tactically, Israeli military advisors in Singapore revealed a preference for offensive mobile operations, which were used by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) to oppose their adversaries in the Middle East.61 Kuala Lumpur’s concern was amplified by Singapore’s procurement of other offensive equipment.62 In addition to tanks, APCs and howitzers, the Singapore Army also obtained combat support vehicles such as M-728 combat engineer vehicles and M-60 armoured vehicle launched bridges needed for

Lee, Singapore: the Unexpected Nation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 2008), p. 291. 56 The first six A-4 pilots were trained in Texas, US between 1973 and 1974. Super Skyhawks: the RSAF A-4 Story, pp. 18-19. 57 Derek Liew, “Exercise Bersatu Padu”, History Snippets, Ministry of Defence, Singapore (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_us/history/birth_of_saf/V10n4_history.html) site accessed 16 October, 2011. 58 The Malaysian soldiers of the two Singapore infantry battalions were transferring back to Malaysia. Thus these two battalions were not fully operational. Martin Choo, The Singapore Armed Forces, p. 17; IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 66, Issue 1, p. 38. 59 “Trade Registers”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php) site accessed 25 October, 2011. 60 IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 75, Issue 1, p. 57. 61 Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability, pp. 64-65; Florian von Alten, The Role of Government in the Singapore Economy (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1994), p. 65. 62 Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: the Transformation of a Security System 1957-1971, p. 172. 142 offensive operations in the early 1970s.63 Since the territory of Singapore was too small to deploy these mobile units, their possible use would be in the Malay Peninsula. The Singapore Air Defence Command (SADC), formed in 1968, was aimed at establishing an air force, including pilot training and aircraft purchase, as it lacked substantial capability of air defence in the initial years. At the same time, the air defence of Singapore relied on the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS)—established according to the FPDA—which integrated the air defence facilities in Malaysia and Singapore, including Australian Mirage III fighter squads.64 British assistance was significant for the growth of the SADC. The Royal Air Force provided comprehensive training for aero controllers, interception controllers, pilots and other technical personnel. London also permitted the sale of Hunter fighters, and transferred refurbished Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), Skyvan transport aircraft and Strikemaster training aircraft to the SADC.65 In addition to British sources, the SADC also acquired used Strikemaster aircraft from South Yemen and Oman, and purchased used A-4 Skyhawk attackers from the US, Alouette III helicopters from France and Oerlikon 35 mm flaks from Switzerland.66 The SADC modified the weapon and avionics systems of some of these aircraft. For example, the American A-4 attackers were equipped with British electronic parts and cannons which corresponded to the British Hunter fighters.67 The SADC also hired a number of foreign retired pilots and ground service personnel in 1974—as instructors or advisors—to improve their operational readiness.68 The overhaul needed by the Hunter and Skyhawk aircraft, before their operation, afforded the SADC an opportunity to develop a domestic aviation industry. On account of the withdrawal of the Royal Air Force, Lockheed Aircraft Service Singapore was formed in 1970 to address the technological vacuum and to

63 12 M60 AVLBs were delivered in 1970 and 8 M728s were put into service in 1972. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 25 October, 2011. 64 IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 71, Issue 1, pp. 43, 45. 65 Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: the Transformation of a Security System 1957-1971, p. 151. 66 40 used A-4s were selected by the SADC. In addition to 18 Strikemaster trainers from the UK, Singapore obtained 9 from South Yemen and 5 from Oman. Super Skyhawks: the RSAF A-4 Story (Singapore: Republic of Singapore Air Force, Tengah Air Base, 2006), p. 12; 40 Years of the RSAF: Our People, Our Air Force (Singapore: Republic of Singapore Air Force, 2008), pp. 9-18; The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 28 October, 2011. 67 John W. R. Taylor (Ed.), Jane’s All the World Aircraft 1977-1978 (London: Jane’s Yearbooks, 1977), p. 325. 68 Super Skyhawks: the RSAF A-4 Story, p. 23. 143 utilise the facilities left by the British in Singapore. This company mainly refurbished the Hunter, Skyhawk and Strikemaster aircraft. Furthermore, such facilities were also used to service commercial airliners, military aircraft from the US and the Indonesian air force in Singapore.69 The refurbishment of Skyhawks, and other subsequent aircraft, was carried out by the Singapore Aerospace 70 Maintenance Company in 1975 and the Singapore Aero-Engine Overhaul in 1978. The initial arms acquisition of SADC could be seen to demonstrate Singapore’s deterrence strategy. The SADC did not introduce any supersonic interceptors but the Skyhawk and Hunter sub-sonic multi-function aircraft had capabilities for ground attack as well as aerial combat. As the Australian Mirage fighter squads were deployed in the Malay Peninsula for regional air defence, supersonic interceptors with excellent air defence function were not a necessity for Singapore. Additionally, sub-sonic ground attack aircraft provided more flexibility for a variety of missions, such as supporting land warfare. Aside from the Skyhawk and Hunter, the Strikemaster trainers were able to function in ground attack operations as well.71 Singapore’s maritime defence arose from humble beginnings. The first department charged with maritime defence in Singapore was the Singapore Naval Volunteer Force—founded in 1966 with a mere three antique vessels. As Singapore still enjoyed the protection of the British Royal Navy, the seaward defence was not as urgent as the establishment of the army, and the naval military build-up was concentrated on patrol craft and an educational facility using talent from New Zealand and Taiwan.72 The naval volunteer force underwent organisational transformation to become the Maritime Command (MC) in 1968 with six British patrol craft. The scale of the MC further expanded in 1971with six German missile gunboats with Israeli Gabriel anti-ship missile and two ex-US Navy minesweepers. Finally, six ex-US landing ship tanks (LSTs) were obtained in 1975, when the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) was formally founded.73 With the benefit of the

69 Super Skyhawks: the RSAF A-4 Story, pp. 13-14; “Industry International: Products, Company News”, Flight International, 23 March, 1972, p. 421; John W. R. Taylor (Ed.), Jane’s All the World Aircraft 1977-1978, pp. 324-325. 70 “History Milestone”, ST Aerospace (http://www.staero.aero/www/aboutus_history.asp) site accessed 1 November, 2011; Avin Chua, “Singapore Technologies”, Singapore Infopedia, National Library Singapore (http://infopedia.nl.sg/articles/SIP_1042_2011-03-29.html) site accessed 1 November, 2011. 71 Peter R. March, Directory of Military Aircraft of the World (London: Cassel & Co, 2001), p. 48. 72 Martin Choo, The Singapore Armed Forces, p. 31; Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore, p. 75. 73 When the Singapore Naval Volunteer Force was formed, they only had an ex-Japanese minelayer, a large patrol craft and a police patrol boat, with low readiness. The Sea Defence Command was established in 1967 to replace the Naval Volunteer Force and was then renamed the Maritime 144 shipyard and other ship building facilities, patrol craft and missile boats were built locally and, in its first decade, Singapore began exporting a few vessels to regional countries such as Malaysia and the Philippines.74 Compared to the army and the air force, the expansion of the RSN during the first decade was relatively small with clear sea denial orientation. Firstly, sea denial is easier for a small state to pursue due to the low cost of building, personnel and other requirements. A sea-control-oriented navy relies on an ample budget to procure sufficient ships and other major systems, such as helicopters. It also requires a large number of professional personnel to operate and maintain equipment, and access to adequate facilities such as ports and dockyards. Thus, it was too expensive for Singapore to establish its sea control naval capability during the initial period. However, a few missile boats would pose a considerable threat to major surface ships, the main means of naval invasion, especially in the early 1970s when the technologies of counter anti-ship missiles were relatively undeveloped, and remained so until the late 1970s and early 1980s.75 Secondly, the purchase of minesweepers was perceived as Singapore’s attempt to procure sea control capability in order to preserve free navigation—the lifeline of the city state. Nevertheless, due to the small number acquired, these minesweepers might only endow the city state with the capability to cooperate with a maritime power’s operation or react to low-intensity situations. Finally, introducing LSTs was about more than simply transporting troops to overseas training sites, because LSTs were also able to project power to the Malay Peninsula or adjacent islands. However, it would be difficult to launch an amphibious operation as the capacity of Singapore’s LSTs was limited.

III. Immediate Deterrence The potential threats during this decade emerged from within the region, namely from the neighbouring countries of Malaysia and Indonesia. According to

Command (MC) in 1968. In the same year, the navy school was built when the 6 patrol craft equipped with guns were introduced into service. Peter H. L. Lim, Navy: the Vital Force (Singapore: Republic Singapore Navy, 1992 ), pp. 12, 25, 31, 34; “History”, Navy, Ministry of Defence, Singapore Navy(http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/mindef_websites/atozlistings/navy/about_us/histor y.html) site accessed 25 August, 2011. 74 2 of 6 British Vosper Class patrol boats were built in UK and rest were built locally. The project of German Sea Wolf Class Missile boats followed the same pattern. Singapore exported 1 diving tender to Malaysia in 1971 and 2 patrol boats to the Philippines in 1975. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 25 October, 2011. 75 Most countermeasures against anti-ship missiles, such as the Phalanx close-in weapon system, were matured in the late 1970s. David Kassing, “Protecting the Fleet”, in James L. George (Ed.), Problems of Sea Power As We Approach the Twenty-First Century (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), pp. 297, 316-317. 145 the international environment, before the end of the Vietnam War the large-scale US military presence in Southeast Asia prevented any extra-regional power from threatening Singapore. Within the region, as both distance and limited national power hindered other regional countries from being direct threats, Malaysia and Indonesia presented possible security problems. Indonesia had larger armed forces, especially the air force and navy, than Malaysia, and could pose threats across the sea to Singapore. The strength of Indonesian air and maritime power were improved by the massive Soviet supply in the early 1960s. While one Sverdlov Class cruiser, seven Skory Class destroyers, seven Riga Class frigates and six W class diesel-electronic submarines (SSK) were introduced into the Indonesian Navy, the air force and the naval aviation wing acquired 25 Tu-16 heavy bombers, 30 Il-28 light bombers and more than 100 jet fighters composed of Mig-15, 17, 19 and 21 fighters.76 With these Soviet vessels and aircraft, plus other earlier craft, Indonesia was potentially capable of conducting an amphibious invasion or naval blockade of Singapore. Furthermore, the Indonesian Navy and Air Force gained experience of invasive amphibious operations from counter-insurgency warfare in the 1950s and 60s. Apart from its regular forces, Indonesia could resume its campaign of sabotage by way of a commando-level insurgency, as it had during the Confrontation period, in order to coordinate with other military operations.77 The domestic political situation, the foreign military presence, and the strategic environment, made Jakarta’s military options unlikely. Indonesia’s armed forces were also involved in the country’s politically turbulent time, especially when power shifted from Sukarno to Suharto. As the new regime pursued economic growth and peaceful foreign relations, the cutting of the defence budget caused the navy and air force to struggle to maintain their large fleets and wings. Jakarta-Moscow relations also worsened after the new regime was founded and the number of Soviet advisors plummeted. Likewise, the Indonesian government called home its people who were training in Communist countries, and refused further spare parts from the Soviet Union.78 These measures resulted in a number of

76 The defence budget was decreased from 83 % of the total government budget in 1963 to 25% in 1970. Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996), pp. 97-98;IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 70, Issue 1, pp. 63-64. 77 Two Indonesian commandos were arrested in Singapore in 1965 for causing bomb blasts and sentenced to death. Damon Bristow, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Southeast Asia’s Unknown Regional Organisation”, p. 5. 78 When the political struggle occurred in Indonesia, the army supported Suharto and the Marine Corps advocated Sukarno. Finally, the army sent troops to occupy the area outside the Navy headquarters in 1966. The number of personnel in the Indonesian air force dropped from 35,000 in 1965 to 30,000 in 1973. Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, pp. 98, 104-106. 146

Soviet weapon systems going out of service, for instance, the Sverdlov Class cruiser which was sold in 1972.79 Internationally, before 1971, using force against Singapore would have led to direct engagement with Britain, Australia and New Zealand because of the military forces they had deployed in Singapore. A number of British Lightening supersonic interceptors, Hunter fighters, Canberra light bombers and Shackleton anti-submarine aircraft, plus New Zealand’s Canberra bomber squad stationed in Singapore, were aimed at the Indonesian air and naval power. These units decreased after 1969 due to a decrease in the Indonesian threat.80 Subsequently, since Australia and New Zealand continued to station military units in Singapore or the near Malay Peninsula, Australian novel Mirage III fighter squads replaced the British Lightening squad as the backbone of air defence in the Malay Peninsula.81 Whether the weakened Indonesian fighter wings could challenge these Mirage fighters was questionable. Furthermore, to attack Singapore would most likely have triggered external intervention, and Australia and New Zealand could assert strategic pressure either from the South or the East, on Indonesia. Finally, sabotage might possibly have caused some damage and casualties, but it would have failed strategically if there were no coordination with other operations. When the Singaporean Government successfully controlled most social groups, in addition to its other internal security measures, it was difficult to stir up rebellion. Without localisation, insurgency must cooperate with other external threats, but the domestic situation and the international environment highly excluded Jakarta’s military potential against Singapore. The MAF, consisting mainly of the army and paramilitary units of the police developed for counter insurgency, hardly posed any considerable threat to Singapore. In terms of military capability, owing to counter-insurgency characteristics, the Royal Malaysia Air Force (RMAF) and the Royal Malaysia Navy (RMN) were relatively neglected in Kuala Lumpur’s military build-ups in the 1960s, until the United Kingdom announced its military withdrawal.82 Thereafter, the Malaysian Army continued to dominate the main resource for military build-up and the RMN obtained a better share than the RMAF in terms of transportation concerns.83 Furthermore, the rebellion of the CPM, the unstable situation in East Malaysia and the border with Thailand, forced Kuala Lumpur to disperse ground

79 IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 73, Issue 1, p. 52. 80 IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 68, Issue 1, pp. 20, 35; Vol. 71, Issue, p. 16. 81 IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 71, Issue, p. 45. 82 Chandran Jeshurun, The Growth of the Malaysian Armed Forces, 1963-73 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975), p. 2. 83 J. N. Mak, “The Modernization of Malaysian Armed Forces”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, pp. 33-34. 147 troops, making it improbable for the MAF to concentrate troops in its Southern flank against Singapore. Finally, the Malaysian Army was short of offensive weapon systems, such as artillery or tanks. Since independence, the Malaysian Army obtained two regiments of Italian OTO Melara Model 56 105 mm howitzers and 600 British Ferret scout vehicles.84 Before the arrival of Singapore’s heavy equipment in the late 1960s, these howitzers and armoured vehicles endowed the MAF with superiority over the SAF. Thus, to invade Singapore between the mid to late 1960s was technologically possible for Kuala Lumpur, but politically infeasible due to British military deployment. After British withdrawal of its military, Kuala Lumpur resumed military build-ups of the army with 70 French AML-60 and 70 AML-90 armoured cars, 44 M-3 APCs, 100 American V-100 APCs, 12 British 5.5 inch and some 25 pound howitzers, 40 American M-102 105 mm howitzers, and a group of anti-tank and air defence weapon systems. 85 Despite the large scale of procurement, the Malaysian Army lacked tanks and heavy armoured vehicles and the fire power of its artillery was weaker than its Singaporean counterparts. While the 90 mm cannon of an AML-90 armoured car would be deadly to a Singaporean AMX-13 light tank, its weak armour (8-12 mm) was too vulnerable to be a vanguard, and other APCs or Ferret armoured cars with machineguns only were even more unsuitable.86 In the area of artillery, the MAF’s largest British 5.5 inch howitzers, with a maximum range of 16.4 km, were inferior to SAF’ M-68 155 mm ones which boasted a maximum range of 23.5 km, not to mention smaller 25 pound or 105 mm guns. Furthermore, Singapore possessed 45 M-68 howitzers before 1975, many more than Malaysia’s mere 12 5.5 inch ones.87 In other words, Malaysia would be disadvantaged during an artillery battle with Singapore.

84 Malaysia received 92 Model-56 105mm howitzers from the UK between 1963 and 1965. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 25 October, 2011; IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 66, Issue 1, p. 38; Vol. 71, Issue 1, p. 49. 85 The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 25 October, 2011; J. N. Mak, “The Modernization of Malaysian Armed Forces”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, pp. 32-33. 86 There was only one 7.62mm machinegun in the turret of the Ferret armoured car. Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Tank & Combat Vehicle Recognition Guide (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2002), pp. 252, 324. 87 The maximum range of the 5.5 inch howitzer was 18, 200 yards (16.653km). The maximum ranges of the 25pound guns, Model 56 and M-102 105mm howitzers are respectively 12.253km, 11.1km and 11.5km. Michael E. Haskew, Artillery: Compared and Contrasted (London: Amber Books, 2008), pp. 82, 143; Brain Blunt et al, Brassey’s Artillery of the World (Oxford, UK: Brassey’s Publishers Limited, 1981), p. 42; The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html ) site accessed 25 October, 2011; “5.5 Inch Field Gun (Howitzer)”, “B.L. 5.5-inch,” Royal New Zealand Artillery Association (http://riv.co.nz/rnza/hist/local/bl55in.htm) site accessed 11 May, 2012; “M-68/-71 155mm”, Global Security(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/israel/m-68.htm) site accessed 24 October, 2011. 148

As for air power, the RMAF’s procurement of fighters was slower than the SADC. While Singapore purchased 20 British Hunter fighters in 1968, and ordered an additional 25 in 1970, Malaysia had only received 20 Australian CA-27 Sabre fighters in 1969. Additionally, Singapore introduced 32 A-4 Skyhawks aircraft with aerial combat capability. Kuala Lumpur ordered two F-5B Freedom Fighters and 14 F-5E Tiger II supersonic fighters in 1972, but only the former were delivered in 1974, while the latter arrived in 1976.88 Moreover, the ground attack capability of the A-4 and Hunter aircraft made the balance of ground forces more favourable for Singapore. Regarding maritime power, the RMN was stronger than its Singaporean counterpart but had difficulty posing considerable threat against the city state. With a greater number of vessels including frigates, the RMN adopted a balanced approach between sea control and denial: the two frigates and six minesweepers for sea control, and the eight missile boats for sea denial. However, this force was insufficient to constitute a maritime threat to Singapore. As the number of Malaysian capital warships was too small to blockade, their only options were to deny the SLOCs with mines and anti-ship missiles. Mine warfare presented a dilemma. If conducted too far from Singapore it would affect international sea transportation, including Indonesia’s. Conversely, if conducted too close to Singapore it would be susceptible to fire power from ashore. Additionally, Malaysian vessels laying mines with only limited protection from two frigates would be easy targets for Singapore’s missile boats or its combat aircraft. Kuala Lumpur possessed two types of anti-ship missiles: French MM-38 Exocets with a range of 40 km and SS-12s with a 6 km range. Obviously, MM-38s would be more suitable for interfering with SLOCs but they only had 16 in storage.89 Moreover, the 40 km range was still easy for Singapore to counter using various means such as intercepting vessels equipped with anti-ship missiles or attacking naval bases from the air. Internationally, whereas Malaysia relied on British protection and support for its territorial disputes with other regional countries, it was almost impossible for

88 Chandran Jeshurun, The Growth of the Malaysian Armed Forces, 1963-73, pp. 19-20. 40 Years of the RSAF: Our People, Our Air Force, p. 12; IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 75, Issue 1, pp. 57, 59; The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 25 October, 2011. 89 Malaysia purchased 16 MM-38 Exocet missiles in 1970 and 64 SS-12 missiles in the next year, with further procurement of Exocet missiles in 1976. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 25 October, 2011; “MM-38 Exocet”, MissileThreat.com (http://www.missilethreat.com/cruise/id.9/cruise_detail.asp) site accessed 25 October, 2011; Guillaume Belan and Patrick Mercillon, 1945-2005 The European Missile Success Story (Paris : TTU, 2006), p. 37. 149

Kuala Lumpur to consider using force as long as the United Kingdom’s military presence remained in the Malay Peninsula.90 After the withdrawal of British forces, Singapore quickly established considerable military capabilities. Moreover, the continuous military presence of Australia and New Zealand in the Malay Peninsula would effectively prevent Malaysia from using force. Therefore, the only available threats from Malaysia were sabotage and cutting the water supply. Singapore’s “nightmare,” that is, having its water supply cut off, was the most feasible approach for Kuala Lumpur. After the British withdrawal, while the SAF had military superiority in armour and air power, the MAF could hold the water source in Johor with proper preparation for defence. It was still possible for a defender with inferior military strength to hold the area in the face of superior invasion forces, even without air cover. The measurement, construction and management of defence works and positions could be prepared in advance by the Malaysian Army. For example, the MAF could build shelters and measure the impact zone for its howitzers to increase their survivability and accuracy, as well as to decrease reaction time. Furthermore, Singaporean AMX-13 light tanks with gasoline engines and thin armour (25 mm) were vulnerable to artillery fire and most anti-tank weapons.91 The soldiers and other personnel of the SAF, without real combat experience, also made the outcome of the offensive operation uncertain. Finally, the position of the defender gave Kuala Lumpur a better chance for international propaganda, which was used to win over international support and to inflict international pressure on Singapore. While the scenario of cutting Singapore’s water supply was a possible option to Malaysia, internal insurgency, territorial disputes with neighbouring countries and the high cost of engaging in warfare on its own territory constrained Kuala Lumpur from taking this option. Notwithstanding the fact that its two large neighbours had superior military capability in 1965, the rapid growth in military capability of the SAF under British protection allowed Singapore to pass safely through its most vulnerable post-independence years. Since British military withdrawal, the SAF had already become somewhat forceful in order to deter most military options available for Malaysia, at a time when the FPDA, in addition to the military deployment of Australia and New Zealand, also decreased Kuala Lumpur’s options for using force. With regards to Indonesia, the shifting of internal political power and changes to its international position seriously diminished the capability of its armed forces,

90 During the dispute of Sabah with the Philippines in 1968, Malaysia looked forward to Britain’s help, including naval and aerial patrol. Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: the Transformation of a Security System 1957-1971, pp. 157-158. 91 Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Tank & Combat Vehicle Recognition Guide, p.26. 150 especially the navy and the air force which were the mainstay of projecting power across the sea to Singapore.

3. The Cold War Period (1975-1990) I. Extended Deterrence and the International Environment When the Vietnam War ended on April 30, 1975, the Cold War became a dominant factor across Southeast Asia. Hanoi’s introduction of a Soviet military presence in 1977, and its intrusion in Cambodia in 1979, reshaped the regional balance of power.92 Although the US continued maintaining military bases in the Philippines, the units there might be pinned down by the newly-arrived Soviet forces. Concurrently, the United Kingdom had already withdrawn most of its Far East military capacity and Australia and New Zealand were unable to completely fill the vacuum left by Britain, despite their constant deployment in Malaysia and Singapore.93 As for China, despite a war with Vietnam in 1979, the best it could do was to pin down part of Vietnam’s military power near the Vietnam-Sino borders, because Beijing also had to face heavy strategic pressure from the Soviet Union on its Soviet-Sino border. Therefore, the countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had to rely on themselves more than ever before, thus reducing the possibility of regional conflicts among ASEAN members were reduced in view of the increase in external threats. The extra-regional threat did not cause Singapore to seek out a power to provide extended deterrence, but it did make an effort to maintain a regional balance of power in several ways. Firstly, the threat was not sufficiently imminent. If Vietnam were to directly attack Thailand, a US intervention was expected to counter the Vietnamese aggression. In addition, Vietnam’s actual military capability for invasion was questionable, especially after the invasion of Cambodia in 1978, where Vietnamese counter insurgency operation was unsuccessful. Although the threat of the Communist bloc had the potential to take a similar route regarding invasion to that of Japan in 1941, Thailand was not an ally of Vietnam or the Soviet Union. Conversely, Bangkok prepared to defend itself and declined to allow the Communist forces to freely pass through.94 In addition to Thailand,

92 Mark G. Rolls, The ‘Arms Dynamic’ in South-East Asia During the Second Cold War, pp. 10-11. 93 Australia already deployed two of its three Mirage III fighter squads in the Malay Peninsula, and New Zealand stationed one of its two infantry battalions in Singapore. In other words, Australia and New Zealand had almost no further forces to supplement the gap left by the Britain. IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 78, Issue 1, pp. 58-59, 66. 94 The military modernisation of the Thai army was to counter Vietnamese superiority in armoured units. Tim Huxley, Recent Military Developments in Southeast Asia: Their Implications for Australia’s Security, pp. 5-7. 151

Malaysia had also invested significant resources in its defence. Thus, Thailand and Malaysia served as a buffer for Singapore against invasion from Vietnam, and as such Singapore supported these two countries.95 In other words, Vietnam could not repeat the blitzkrieg that Japan had carried out at the beginning of the Pacific War. Additionally, Singapore used diplomatic tools to counter Vietnam’s military presence in Cambodia through lobbying the US and campaigns in the UN.96 Secondly, Singapore strengthened its relations with the countries that had motives to intervene during a crisis. While remaining unaligned in an international sense, Singapore strengthened its strategic ties with the US through arms sales, as well as providing facilities and technological cooperation.97 Apart from the US, the first FPDA naval and land exercise was held in 1981 with the agreement of Singapore and Malaysia, in addition to existing air defence exercises and conferences.98 Despite non-alliance and limited military capability, the FPDA military exercise maintained military ties with the three extra-regional countries and increased the posture of extended deterrence to any potential enemy. Thirdly, as the Communist threat was also to other regional countries, Singapore attempted to reinforce the security function of ASEAN and build additional security ties with regional partners. However, the consensus was not firm enough to transform ASEAN into a collective security or alliance. Concurrently, Singapore also reinforced bilateral security ties with other Southeast Asian countries, especially Thailand. Singapore, with Malaysia and Indonesia, pledged to provide ammunition and other logistic supplies to Thailand in case of Communist invasion, and did so without ASEAN approval. 99 Moreover, the city state strengthened the bilateral military cooperation with Brunei, Indonesia and other regional countries during this period, using the functions of diplomacy and regional stability.100

95 Between 1979 and 1983, Malaysia increased its defence budget by about 100%. Geoffrey Harris, “The Determinant of Defence Expenditure in the ASEAN Region”, p. 43. 96 Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability, p. 104. 97 It was published that the US Navy already made use of Singaporean air ports for patrol flights in the Indian Ocean. Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore, pp. 35-36, 208-209. 98 Tim Huxley, Recent Military Developments in Southeast Asia: Their Implications for Australia’s Security (Canberra: Department of the Parliamentary Library, 1983), pp. 26, 35-36. 99 Amitav Acharya, “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: ‘Security Community’ or ‘Defence Community’?” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 64 No. 2, Summer 1991, pp. 160-164; Phairoj Tanbanjong, “The Politics of Military Alliance among the Association of Southeast Asian Countries”, pp. 52, 59. 100 Examples of these include military cooperation with Brunei including training from the late 1970s with the SAF establishing a helicopter detachment in Brunei in 1978. This cooperation might pin down some of the Malaysian forces and place attention on Sabah and Sarawak. The military cooperation with Indonesia began in 1974 as joint naval exercises, with joint army exercises commencing in 1989 after the joint air force exercises of 1980. Lim Kok Kheng, “RSAF Helicopters in Overseas Operations”, 152

Finally, its ongoing non-aligned status gave Singapore a better economic outlook. Regardless of trade or finance, Singapore’s economy has depended on relations with other countries. To choose one camp in the bipolar system of the Cold War would bring about a loss of trade, financial, and other economic opportunities. For example, Singapore’s repair service for Soviet merchant vessels and supplies for auxiliary ships in the Pacific Fleet of the Red Navy illustrated how desperately the city state wanted to hold on to every commercial opportunity.101 Finally, when neighbouring countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia insisted on their non-aligned positions, to endeavour to strike an alliance would alienate Singapore from the region. In brief, Singapore gradually formed its international security network with the US, the FPDA members and regional countries.102 Within this network, any potential threat would be relatively isolated and subsequently deterred as a result of the uncertainty of using force against the city state.103 Furthermore, Singapore also attempted to defuse any potential threat such as Vietnam’s military presence in Cambodia.

II. General Deterrence Politically, although few parliament seats were won by the opposition parties in the early 1980s and the PAP had received fewer votes, the power of the PAP was still unchallengeable.104 After the Communist victory in Indochina, the Communist movement resumed, but due to the strict internal security system, these activists did not represent a substantial threat to the government. The Communist network in Singapore was generally eradicated in the late 1970s. 105 The PAP’s administration including national defence policy was thus implemented without

Pointer, Supplement (Sep. 1999) (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/suppleme/1999/Sep/2.htm) site accessed 15 October 2011; Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore, pp. 61-62; Bilveer Singh, Singapore-Indonesia Defence Cooperation: A Case Study of Defence Bilateralism within Asean (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies Malaysia, 1990), pp. 10-12. 101 Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability, p. 103; Derek da Cunha, Soviet Naval Power in the Pacific (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), p. 156. 102 Andrew T. H. Tan, “Punch Above Its Weight: Singapore’s Armed Forces and Its Contribution to Foreign Policy”, Defence Studies, Vol. 11, No. 4, December 2011, p. 674. 103 Bernard Lo, Personal Interview, 8 August 2011. 104 The Workers’ Party candidate J. B. Jeyaretnam won the first opposition seat in the parliament in 1981 and Singapore Democratic Party candidate Chiam See Tong won the second in 1984. In 1991, the opposition obtained four seats and the PAP only received 61% votes. Kenneth Paul Tan, “The People’s Action Party and Political Liberalisation in Singapore”, in Liang Fook Lye and Wilhelm Hofmeister (Ed.), Political Parties, Party Systems and Democratization in East Asia (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2011), p. 111. 105 “Countering Threats”, Internal Security Department (http://www.mha.gov.sg/isd/ct.htm) site accessed 13 October, 2011. 153 considerable domestic challenge.106 Singapore published a total defence strategy combining psychological, social, economic, civil and military defence in 1984, based on Swedish, Israeli and Swiss experience. 107 The total defence strategy demonstrated the Singaporean government’s perception of the value of non-military sectors in general deterrence. Economic defence had three parts: firstly, being economically competitive is necessary for Singapore to survive among its global competition and to withstand crisis. Secondly, sufficient strategic material must be stored in advance for any crisis and, lastly, saving water, electricity and other environmentally-friendly measures are beneficial for the future.108 The first two points denote a strong mechanism for mobilisation during wartime and a robust link between the economy and military sectors.109 The last part not only focuses on environmental issues, but also addresses water consumption which is helpful in lowering Singapore’s reliance on Malaysia. Aside from policy, stable management of its macro-economy, statutory boards with regulations, as well as Governmental Linked Companies (GLCs), all contributed to supporting general deterrence. These systems endowed the government with a comprehensive power to maintain a stable society, to reduce the effects of hostile economic leverages and control any potential economic upheaval. In addition, the GLCs provided the PAP administration with considerable non-tax revenue.110 Psychological defence is a matter of the people’s resolve to defend their country, and is thus related to the identity and pride of the Singaporean people.111 The PAP administration had a range of policy tools, including public education, national service and mass media, to be used in the formation of national identity. Furthermore, the Singaporean government often claimed various national achievements, one being national pride.112 However, the city state, with its short

106 Narayanan Ganesan, “Singapore: Realist cum Trading State”, in Muthian Alagappa (Ed.), Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational influence (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 580-581. 107 Civil Defence in Singapore, 1939-1984 (Singapore: Singapore Civil Defence Force, 1985), p. 113. 108 “What is Total Defence”, Total Defence (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/totaldefence/about_td/5_Pillars.html) site accessed 13 September, 2011. 109 Philippe Regnier, Singapore: City-State in South-East Asia (London: Hurst & Company, 1987), p. 260. 110 Florian von Alten, The Role of Government in the Singapore Economy, pp. 170-172, 194-196, 210-212. 111 “What is Total Defence”, Total Defence (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/totaldefence/about_td/5_Pillars.html) site accessed 13 September, 2011. 112 Kenneth Paul Tan, “The People’s Action Party and Political Liberalisation in Singapore”, pp. 112-114. 154 history and distinct ethnic groups, lacked salient and common cultural characteristics. To deal with this problem, Chinese culture such as Confucianism and Mandarin was promoted in the 1980s, but it had the potential to jeopardise social defence. Social defence emphasised the multi-ethnic character of Singaporean society as seen in linguistic, accommodation and other policies established previously, but several new policies introduced during this period ran counter to the previous ones. In order to preserve traditional merits such as diligence and to build commercial ties with China, Mandarin was reintroduced into public education for Chinese-ethnic students in 1979. Later, Confucianism was also promoted by the government. This was possible as Singapore was more confident on its survival, unlike in the initial phase shortly after independence. These policies aided in unifying and consolidating various linguistic groups using different dialects within the Chinese community. However, the cultural campaigns may have enhanced national identity among the Chinese community, whilst at the same time possibly alienating the minor Malays and Indian ethnic groups thus having a deleterious overall effect on social harmony.113 Highlighting Chinese characteristics of its culture also had the effect of estranging Singapore from neighbouring countries. In short, promoting Chinese culture led to both positive and negative effects on general deterrence. Civil defence is a matter of rescue and shelter management conducted by the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) and related volunteers. The concept of civil defence was introduced to Singapore in 1971 and through several organisational transformations the independent SCDF was established in 1986.114 On account of the crowded territory of Singapore, with civil and military facilities found in close proximity, the whole island would become a battlefield during wartime and there would be no space for evacuation or refuge. Consequently, the survival of local people during wartime or disaster is a matter for civil defence policies, and is also critical for the credibility of Singapore’s deterrence.115 Although the efficiency and preparation of civil defence must be confirmed in real situations, the emphasis on civil defence is beneficial for general deterrence by sending a clear message of preparedness for war to potential enemies. In terms of military defence, the main focus areas were the general strategy,

113 Eugene K. B. Tan, “Re-engaging Chineseness: Political, Economic and Cultural Imperatives of National Building in Singapore”, pp. 754, 760-763. 114 In 1989, the Singapore Fire Service was merged into SCDF. “About us”, Singapore Civil Defence Force (http://www.scdf.gov.sg/content/scdf_internet/en/general/about-us.html) site accessed 13 September, 2011. 115 Civil Defence in Singapore, 1939-1984, p. 62. 155 international interactions, and the defence industry. SAF’s development of a strong offensive capability implied that the ‘poison shrimp’ strategy might be replaced by a pre-emptive strike strategy. A concentration of SAF units on the tiny territory would be easy targets for an enemy’s first strike because of the lack of strategic depth. Hence, first strike would be a possible strategy for the SAF due to the strategic conditions and its military structure.116 During this period, the increasing international interactions of the SAF served the demands for training and diplomacy. Regarding the matter of training, the operation of sophisticated weapon systems or large units, such as brigades, was unlikely in the tiny territory of Singapore during peace time. Therefore, the SAF gradually expanded overseas training programs—mostly for the air force and the army—from sites in Australia, Taiwan, Brunei and Thailand in the 1970s, to the ones in Indonesia and other countries in the 1980s.117 In addition to this, the SAF also joined more bilateral and multilateral exercises with regional countries, FPDA members, and other countries such as the US.118 The joint exercises among regional countries became more frequent in the 1980s and gave the SAF experience in coordinating with neighbouring countries against common threats, and fostered mutual understanding among the armed forces of different countries.119 The exercises with countries that possessed stronger military capability than Singapore provided valuable opportunities to learn advanced tactics and experience from its foreign counterparts.120 Lastly, the training and exercises also substantially improved Singapore’s diplomacy, especially its international security network. The defence industry of the city state experienced some structural changes during this period. Throughout the 1980s the various companies in the defence industry under Sheng-Li Holdings had gradually been incorporated under Singapore Technologies (ST). The defence industry spilled over into non-military sectors such as infrastructure and manufacture, and these non-military sectors

116 Bilveer Singh, Arming the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF): Trends and Implications, p. 27. 117 From 1975 the SAF has trained in Taiwan. Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore, pp. 198, 202, 214-218; Dwi Haryoko, SAFKAR INDOPURA, 1989 to 1998: a Decade of Training, a Lifetime of Friendship, pp, 10, 15; Ernest Z. Bower and Charles Freeman, “Singapore’s Tightrope Walk on Taiwan”, ABSCBN News, Aug. 19, 2010 (http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/insights/08/18/10/singapores-tightrope-walk-taiwan) site accessed 16 October, 2011. 118 The RSAF first joined the US “Red Flag” exercise in 1982. 40 Years of the RSAF: Our People, Our Air Force, p. 49. 119 Su Poon Ghee, “Armed Forces’ Contributions to National and Regional Security: A Singapore Perspective,” p. 149; Amitav Acharya, “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: ‘Security Community’ or ‘Defence Community’?” pp. 166-167. 120 Bernard Lo, Personal Interview, 8 August 2011. 156 were subsequently commercialised.121 Parallel with those organisational changes, the growth of the Singaporean defence industry was concentrated around three areas: firstly, indigenous design and production of army equipment were adopted by the Singapore Army, examples being the Ultimax-100 light machinegun and the FH-88 howitzer.122 Secondly, foreign-designed and locally-built weapon systems comprised of the M-16S1 assault rifles, the Bofors authorised 40 mm flak, and the German designed Victory Class corvettes. Thirdly, local upgrade and overhaul capacity continued with the upgrade of AMX-13 light tanks and A-4 Skyhawk attacker aircraft. The defence industry also expanded its international market through its own products and retired equipment from the SAF. Vessels were still the main export of the defence industry and since the late 1970s the types were broadened to include landing crafts, tankers and support ships. The customers were located across the world, from regional countries such as Brunei and Thailand, to more distant ones like Kuwait and Oman. Next, retired aircraft with refurbishments also became a major form of export. For instance, seven ex-RSAF SA-316B Alouette-III light helicopters were sold to Malaysia in 1978.123 The development of the army was still geared towards an offensive strategy with the introduction of major weapons systems, such as the used Centurion main battle tank (MBT) from India, additional AMX-13 light tanks from Switzerland, and the M-113 APC from the US.124 From 1988, the existing AMX-13 light tanks received upgrades with diesel engines, and new electronic and transmission systems in order to increase their fire power, communication and radius.125 Additionally, artillery regiments were strengthened by indigenous FH-88 howitzers. A number of land warfare-oriented helicopters were introduced during this period. 28 UH-1/Bell-205 and 22 AS-332 utility helicopters joined the service in 1977 and

121 Avin Chua, “Singapore Technologies”, Singapore Infopedia, National Library Singapore (http://infopedia.nl.sg/articles/SIP_1042_2011-03-29.html) site accessed 1 November, 2011. 122 Ultimax-100 machinegun and FH-88 were respectively introduced into service in 1982 and 1988. IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 88, Issue 1, p. 153; “STK/CIS Ultimax-100 light machine gun (Singapore)”, Modern Firearms (http://world.guns.ru/machine/sing/stk-ultimax-100-e.html) site accessed 3 November, 2011. 123 The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 28 October, 2011. 124 The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 28 October, 2011; Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore, pp. 131. 133. 125 Vickna S. K. Anandarajah, “Rumble in the City: Armoured Vehicles on Parade”, History: Military Heritage, Vol. 11, Issue 8 (Aug., 2007), p. 1; AMX-13SM1 (Singapore: Singapore Technologies Kinetics, 1999), p. 1. 157

1985, respectively.126 These helicopters were able to transport approximately one battalion of troops and were valuable for raid, surround, and other land warfare tactics. In 1978, the army started to notice the tactical value of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). It procured the Israeli Mastiff UAV and then the Israeli Scout UAV in 1984, and shifted the service of UAVs to the RSAF in 1988.127 During this period the RSN gradually shifted its strategy to sea control and strengthened its sea denial capability. In the 1980s, securing SLOCs was proposed as the RSN’s primary strategic goal, for which six Victory Class corvettes were procured.128 These corvettes had larger displacement than previous vessels and demonstrated the RSN’s concerns over sea control, as they were equipped with better weapon systems for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) such as torpedos, variable depth sonar, and air defence such as the Barak short-range SAMs.129 Concurrently, the RSN’s major improvement of sea denial capability was the service of Harpoon anti-ship missiles with increased ranges on various vessels. The RSAF’s introduction of E-2C air warning and controlling systems (AWACS) in 1987 effectively increased the long-range target search and guidance capability of the Harpoon missiles.130 The AGM-65 air-to-surface missiles launched from F-5E/F and A-4S aircraft also provided additional airborne anti-ship capabilities.131 However, the RSN’s sea control capability was still insufficient. Although the new corvettes had limited ASW and air defence capability, these simple short-range weapon systems were for self-defence purposes rather than escort. Their variable depth sonar system had traced Soviet submarines, but lack of ASW helicopters constrained the ASW performance of these corvettes.132 As for their defence against air raid or anti-ship missiles, the short range SAMs, such as the Barak and Mistral systems, they were mainly for self-defence rather than to escort merchant vessels.133 That is, the RSN was unlikely to effectively protect SLOCs or cover its LSTs to launch amphibious operations. Thus, the RSN’s LSTs might merely be a means of transport, with limited potential for other missions. Finally, a large number of Vietnamese refugees fled seeking asylum after the

126 40 Years of the RSAF: Our People, Our Air Force, pp. 31, 41. 127 John Low Kian Wai, “Managing the Challenges of the UAV Business: An Air Force Engineer’s Perspective”, Focus: RSAF safety Magazine, Issue 64 (Jul. 2010), p. 7. 128 Peter H. L. Lim, Navy: the Vital Force, pp. 37, 41. 129 Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005-2006(Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2005), p. 672. 130 Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005-2006, p. 675. 131 200 AGM-65 missiles were purchased in 1981. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 28 October, 2011. 132 Mark G. Rolls, The ‘Arms Dynamic’ in South-East Asia During the Second Cold War, pp. 55-56. 133 The range of Mistral SAMs is 4 km and Barak SAMs is 10 km. Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005-2006, pp. 672, 674. 158 fall of South Vietnam, and the RSN, cooperating with the RSAF’s Skyvan aircraft, had to prevent them from reaching Singapore by intercepting their boats and supplying them. This task not only kept the RSN too busy to maintain normal training, but was also a good indicator of the variety of maritime challenges that can exist.134 The RSAF focused on developing greater operational range by acquiring several new types of fighters and supplementary aircraft, in addition to upgrading the A-4. The RSAF acquired its first supersonic fighter, the F-5E Tiger II, in the late 1970s and followed up with the F-16A/B Falcon in the 1980s. In order to improve the operational performance of these combat aircraft, the RSAF obtained KC-130B Hercules aerial refuelling tankers and E-2C AWACS.135 The former extended their combat radius and the latter improved combat efficiency. As for the A-4 Skyhawks, they suffered a series of accidents in 1985 due to malfunctioning jet engines. In order to solve this problem, the RSAF comprehensively overhauled the A-4 aircraft by upgrading their avionics, and replacing their old J-65 jet engines with advanced F-404 engines. This project was not only good for ensuring reliability, but also an excellent example of the local aviation industry’s ability to upgrade other military aircraft.136 By and large, the quantity and quality of the RSAF aircraft was expanded. The RSAF could independently deter an invasion from a distance, rather than relying on the Australian Mirage fighter squadrons.

III. Immediate Deterrence The threats to Singapore during this period were both regional and extra-regional, namely Vietnam plus the Soviet Union, in addition to neighbouring countries. The threats from Vietnam could be divided into two types: landward, and from the air. Regarding land invasions, Singapore’s support of Thailand would be via logistic supply and air support due to the political difficulties of transporting ground troops through Malaysia. If the Vietnamese or other Communist forces approached Singapore through the Malay Peninsula, the SAF would be likely to engage before they arrived at the border. In fact, the Vietnamese threat on land was questionable due to several factors: the extent of Thai and Malaysian defence; Beijing’s strategic pressure on Hanoi; the type and level of Soviet support, and the

134 Peter H. L. Lim, Navy: the Vital Force, pp. 35, 37. 135 KC-130B and E-2C were introduced in 1986 and 1987 respectively. 40 Years of the RSAF: Our People, Our Air Force, p. 57. 136 The crashes of the A-4 in 1985 firstly pushed the RSAF to improve the management of spares. However, it did not effectively solve the problem and a larger upgrade project to replace the engine was adopted. The avionics were modified to two air-to-air and air-to-ground combat models. Super Skyhawks: the RSAF A-4 Story, pp. 46-53. 159

US response. Although Singapore estimated that no ASEAN member country was capable of matching Vietnam’s armed forces, in the case of landward invasion, Vietnam would not proceed as smoothly as Japan did in World War II.137 Firstly, Thailand was not a passage or place for forward deployment as it was in 1941, and it would retard the Vietnamese invasion, as would Malaysia. In other words, Vietnam would have to take a longer route than Japan had. Secondly, the feeble landing capability of the Vietnamese navy and the threats of anti-ship missiles made it unlikely that Hanoi would copy the Japanese flanking tactic through amphibious operations. Thus, Vietnamese troops would have to go over-land and cover a greater distance, taking a lot and requiring more difficult logistic supplies. Lastly, the supply line of Soviet weapon systems, parts and other logistical needs from Russia was mainly by sea transport which would be very vulnerable during wartime. As a result, the Vietnamese threat was limited and further weakened by arduous garrisoning in Cambodia in the mid-1980s.138 Furthermore, the SAF, mainly the RSAF, could assist the resistance of Thailand and Malaysia to halt the progress of Vietnamese troops, well before they arrived in Singapore. The air threats were composed of Vietnamese and Soviet strike aircraft such as the Su-22.139 Actually, the distance between Southern Vietnam and Singapore is about 1,000 km, which leaves the RSAF some time to alert and react. In addition, unless there had been a dramatic detour, the invasive route would be through the South China Sea, where the sea surface is too flat to sufficiently hide low-altitude flights. However, a group of Soviet long-range air-to-surface missiles, such as the KSR-5 missile (NATO code: AS-6 Kingfish), might be equipped with large bombers such as the Tu-16.140 In order to cope with these aerial threats, the RSAF’s AWACS were able to detect approaching aircraft early and offer more response time, meanwhile, the air refuelling tankers enabled the fighters to intercept aircraft as remotely as possible. Furthermore, several SAMs, such as the I-Hawk and the Rapier, were introduced to engage with the enemy airplanes which penetrated into the interceptions.141 The seaward threats of the Communist bloc were relatively trivial. The Vietnamese navy, despite a certain level of expansion after the unification in 1975,

137 Amitav Acharya, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Regional Order (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2008), p. 43. 138 J. N. Mak, “The Modernization of Malaysian Armed Forces”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, p. 36. 139 Before the end of the Cold War, there were about 40 Su-22s in the Vietnamese air force plus 30 Su-7Bs and 30 Su-17s. IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 90, Issue 1, p. 181. 140 Derek da Cunha, Soviet Naval Power in the Pacific, p. 168. 141 Mark G. Rolls, The ‘Arms Dynamic’ in South-East Asia During the Second Cold War, pp. 34-35, 53-54. 160 was oriented to a sea denial strategy with small missile boats and frigates, and lacked useful means such as submarines to pose any considerable threat to Singapore. As the Cam Ranh Bay merely served the role of a supply station rather than an overseas base for the Soviet Pacific Fleet, Moscow’s naval power in Southeast Asia was limited.142 This limited power was further constrained by its remote distance from home bases such as Vladivostok, and the adjacent US bases in the Philippines. Thus, the seaward threats to Singapore would be a disturbance in the SLOCs. According to the RSN’s limited ASM capability, the city state was incapable of dealing with Soviet submarines alone, but some factors significantly lessened these threats. Firstly, the US and its allies would conduct ASM escort operations in the SLOCs to protect their own national interests, and Singapore would have a free ride. Secondly, despite the large number of Soviet submarines, consideration of naval warfare in many areas under the bipolar power structure during the Cold War could force Moscow to retain only a few submarines in Southeast Asia, thus limiting their sea denial capability in the region. Regionally, the threats from Indonesia became improbable and Malaysia was still inferior in terms of military strength. Due to the isolated geographical surroundings, the threats from Vietnam did not inspire Jakarta to accelerate military modernisation, and consequently the scale of the Indonesian air force and navy could still not compare with that of the Sukarno period.143 Regardless, the navy, composed of a dozen frigates, was much larger than the RSN, but the air force with only a few combat aircraft was far inferior to the RSAF. The surface ships, without air superiority, could not constitute a serious threat to Singapore. The only feasible threat from Jakarta was two German Type 209 SSKs because of the limited ASM capability of the RSN. However the number of Indonesian SSKs was too small to conduct a blockade. Furthermore, the SAF’s relationship with its Indonesian counterpart—built through training, joint exercises, information sharing and other interactions during this period—reduced the possibility of the use of force. The MAF’s expansion did not challenge the SAF’s superiority. Prompted by the Communist expansion in Indochina, Kuala Lumpur took significant measures to strengthen its armed forces, but this was postponed in 1985 due to the economic recession. As a result, the military balance between Singapore and Malaysia was

142 Derek da Cunha, Soviet Naval Power in the Pacific, p. 171. 143 In 1966, the Indonesian navy owned 1 cruiser, 8 destroyers, 10 frigates and 12 SSKs, but by 1990 it only had 16 frigates and 2 SSKs. The Indonesian air force maintained more than 60 jet fighters (MIG-21 and other types) and at least 25 jet bombers (Tu-16 and IL-28) in 1966 but only 26 jet fighters (12 F-16A/B and 14 F-5E/F) and 28 A-4 attackers in 1990. IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 66, Issue 1, p. 37; Vol. 90, Issue 1, p. 164; Mark G. Rolls, The ‘Arms Dynamic’ in South-East Asia During the Second Cold War, pp. 36-37. 161 not significantly skewed in the latter’s favour.144 In terms of air power, the fighter wings of the RMAF were still inferior to their Singaporean counterparts both in the number and type of aircraft. After the first batch of 14 F-5E/Fs in the 1970s, the RMAF purchased an additional 12 Italian MB-339 attackers/trainers, five F-5F and two RF-5E aircraft, and in the early 1980s ordered 88 A-4 attackers. This move could have challenged Singapore’s air superiority, but only 40 of those A-4 aircraft were actually delivered.145 It must be noted that Malaysian Skyhawk aircraft also suffered mechanical failures, similar those of the RSAF, but no decisive measures, such as the replacement of engines, were adopted.146 Thus, the operational readiness of the Malaysian A-4 fleets would have been lower than that of Singapore. Compared to the RSAF’s new F-16 Falcon fighters, 75 upgraded A-4 attackers, 35 F-5E/F and 24 Hunter fighters, the RMAF was unlikely to be able to gain air control.147 Malaysia had no SAMs to neutralise the dominant RSAF until the first introduction of Javelin and Rapier short-range SAMs in 1991.148 Generally, the Singapore Army’s equipment was still superior to that of its Malaysian counterpart amidst the wave of regional military expansion.149 Despite possessing a larger number of soldiers, the Malaysian Army was disadvantaged in armour and artillery. Kuala Lumpur’s attempts to strengthen the armour units with British Scorpion light tanks and Belgian SIMBAS armoured vehicles equipped with 90 mm guns would most probably have been insufficient to challenge Singapore’s armoured units due to their mechanical constraints. Firstly, the Cockerill 90 mm gun with a penetration capability of 100 mm steel armour, equipped on Malaysian armed vehicles, was unable to perforate the six inch (152 mm) armour of Singaporean Centurion MBTs.150 Secondly, both Scorpion and SIMBAS, as light armoured vehicles, were weak in their protective capability. The armour of SIMBAS was only proof against 7.62 mm rifle/machinegun bullets and a Scorpion could

144 J. N. Mak, “The Modernization of Malaysian Armed Forces”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, pp. 36-37. 145 The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 25 October, 2011. 146 J. N. Mak, “The Modernization of Malaysian Armed Forces”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, p. 40. 147 In 1990, the Malaysian air force had 14 F-5E/Fs and 35 A-4s,whilst the RSAF possessed 31 F-5E/Fs, 12 F-16A/Bs, 75 A-4s plus 24 Hunters. In addition, Singapore’s A-4s were better than Malaysian ones with both new engine and avionics. IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 80, Issue 1, p. 72; Vol. 90, Issue 1, pp. 170, 176. 148 IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 80, Issue 1, p. 171. 149 Mark G. Rolls, The ‘Arms Dynamic’ in South-East Asia During the Second Cold War, pp. 52-53. 150 “The Proven Reference of 90 mm Gun”, Cockerill Maintenance & Ingénierie (http://www.cmigroupe.com/en/p/mk3http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 23 October, 2011; “Cruise Tank (A41) Centurion”, Tanks in World War 2 (http://www.tanksinworldwar2.com/uk-cruiser-tank-centurion.phphttp://www.sipri.org/contents/arm strad/at_data.html) site accessed 23 October, 2011. 162 only resist the attack of 14.5 mm machineguns.151 In other words, all anti-tank weapon systems, main guns of tanks and artillery fire, could easily counter Malaysia’s armoured vehicles. Finally, the Malaysian Scorpion light tanks with special modifications suffered from lowered mobility and firing performance.152 Hence, the Malaysian Army still had no adequate armoured vehicles for offence. As for artillery, after the retirement of 5.5 inch howitzers in 1985, the Malaysian artillery regiments were entirely composed of 105 mm guns until the introduction of nine British FH-70 155 mm howitzers in 1990.153 Comparatively, through this period, the Singapore Army possessed more than 50 155 mm howitzers with longer range and larger projectiles than the 105 mm howitzers and additional 24 indigenous FH-88s which went into the service between 1988 and 1990.154 Furthermore, in 1976 the Singapore Army introduced artillery-locating radar, which Malaysia did not possess until 1999.155 Thus, the gap in firepower between Singaporean and Malaysian artillery regiments continued to expand throughout this period. Malaysian FH-70 howitzers with a 24 km maximum range somewhat reduced this gap, but the reduction was limited.156 Owing to the deficiencies in armour and artillery, offensive threats from the Malaysian Army towards Singapore were improbable during this period. It was also more unfavourable for Kuala Lumpur to defend the water source in Johor than it had previously been. Indeed, Malaysia acquired some air defence and anti-tank weapon systems such as Swiss GDF 35 mm flak and French SS-11 anti-tank missiles; however, the number of the former was too small to neutralise the RSAF’s air superiority and Singapore’s army could swiftly cross the Malaysian defence line using the airlift capacity of its UH-1 and Puma helicopters. Kuala Lumpur lacked effective countermeasures such as SAMs against a multi-dimensional offence.157

151 “SIMBAS”, Global Security.Org (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/sibmas.htm) site accessed 23 October, 2011 ; “SIMBAS”, Army Guide (http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product1144.html) site accessed 27 October, 2011; “Scorpion Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle”, Military History Encyclopaedia on the Web (http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/weapons_scorpion.html) site accessed 27 October, 2011. 152 Mat Salleh, “Graft in Malaysia’s Defence Ministry”, Asia Sentinel (http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?Itemid=178&id=720&option=com_content&task=view) site accessed 23 October, 2011. 153 IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 84, Issue 1, p. 105; Vol. 85, Issue 1, p. 129; Vol. 90, Issue 1, p. 154. 154 Before the service of FH-88, there were 54 155mm howitzers composed of 16 M-114s and 38 M-71s. Between 1988 and 1990, additional 24 FH-88s were put into service. IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 87, Issue 1, p. 171; Vol. 90, Issue 1, p. 176. 155 The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 25 October, 2011. 156 Michael E. Haskew, Artillery: Compared and Contrasted, p. 149. 157 The first SAMs introduced into Malaysia were British Rapier and Javelin systems in 1991. IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 91, Issue 1, p. 155. 163

The RMN’s expansion of two German FS-1500 corvettes and six Swedish Spica-M missile boats in the late 1970s and 1980s strengthened its superiority over the RSN, but this superiority was not significant.158 Firstly, the weak capability of air defence without SAMs, as well as the RSAF’s air superiority, would neutralise the Malaysian naval vessels during wartime. 159 Secondly, the introduction of American RGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles with double the range (130 km) of the MM-38 Exocet missile, served to endow the RSN with a tactical initiative for engagement. This advantage was expanded by the search capability of the RSAF’s E-2C AWACS.160 Thus, Kuala Lumpur’s naval investment did not create maritime superiority over the RSN. With considerable military build-ups, the SAF not only enjoyed superiority over the neighbouring countries but also developed the potential of deterring some threats beyond the boundary. However, the Malaysia-Britain Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on defence, signed in 1988, transformed the strategy and military structure of the MAF and challenged Singapore’s military superiority over the course of the following period.161

4. The Post-Cold War Period (1990-2008) I. Extended Deterrence and the International Environment The end of the Cold War reshaped the strategic surroundings of Singapore but did not significantly change the security perception of the city state. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union occurred in 1991, a strategic change in Southeast Asia had commenced slightly earlier, at the time of Vietnam’s withdrawal of troops from Cambodia and Singapore’s signing of the memorandum of understanding with Washington—for continuous military presence—in 1990.162 The former meant that threats from Hanoi almost vanished, despite the Cam Ranh Bay naval base still being accessible to the Russian Navy until 2002.163 The latter event implied a different strategic circumstance, that is, that Washington might withdraw its

158 The Swedish designed Handalan fast attack craft were introduced between 1976 and 1979. The two German FS-1500 frigates were put into service between 1981 and 1984. This wave of expansion was driven by the convention on the law of sea. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 25 October, 2011; J. N. Mak, “The Modernization of Malaysian Armed Forces”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, p. 37. 159 There were no SAMs on either Swedish missile boats or German frigates. Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005-2006, pp. 465, 469. 160 Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005-2006, pp. 674-675. 161 J. N. Mak, “The Modernization of Malaysian Armed Forces”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, p. 39. 162 Pang Hee how, Singapore: From Hope to Certainty, p. 48. 163 “Vietnam's Cam Ranh Base to Welcome Foreign Navies”, the Washington Post, 2 Nov. 2010 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/02/AR2010110200139.html) site accessed 2 October, 2011. 164 military presence in Southeast Asia. It also revealed Singapore’s efforts to keep a US military presence in the region. For Singapore, Vietnam’s fading threats did not bring a completely peaceful regional situation for several reasons. Firstly, the emergence of other regional disputes such as that of the South China Sea and the involvement of other new rising powers, such as China, made most Southeast Asian countries continue their military modernisation efforts despite the end of the Cold War. Secondly, within this trend of military expansion, the MAF’s development began to challenge the SAF’s superiority and offensive strategy. Thirdly, unconventional threats such as the financial crisis and terrorism appeared. The regional financial crisis happened in 1997 and followed the political disorder occurring in neighbouring countries, particularly Indonesia, which affected the security of the city state. Moreover, terrorist attacks, were proven to be as destructive as conventional military threats, as in the incident of September 11, 2001. Singapore became a possible target at this time due to its being surrounding by Islamic countries as well as the close relations it held with the US, for example, its support for the war on terror. Singapore’s responses to the transformations of the post-Cold War era were to strengthen its existing security network with the US, FPDA members and other countries. In spite of a non-aligned position, Singapore supported the US military presence in the region by facilitating logistical accommodation and strengthening military cooperation with Washington. Additionally, Singapore substantially supported US policies such as Operation Iraqi Freedom.164 This relationship was upgraded in 2005 with the signing of the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defence and Security, and the extension of US accessibility to the military facilities in Singapore.165 The improved Singapore-US relationship during the post-Cold War era was sometimes seen as a ‘quasi-alliance’ and was certainly a means of deterring potential enemies.166 In spite of this high-level relationship, Singapore showed no attempt to form a real alliance with the US and this was probably due to the concerns of its neighbouring countries.167 Furthermore, Singapore made efforts in its relations with China and India to achieve a regional balance of power. After Russia withdrew from Southeast Asia,

164 “Since 2003, Singapore has sent police trainers, a C-130, three deployments of a KC-135 and three deployments of a Landing Ship Tank (LST) in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.” “Singapore,” United States Central Command (http://www.centcom.mil/singapore/) site accessed 3 October, 2011. 165 “Fourth U.S.-Singapore Strategic Security Policy Dialogue Concludes”, News Release, U.S. Department of Defence (http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=13468) site accessed 3 November, 2011; Amitav Acharya, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Regional Order, pp. 101-102. 166 Bilveer Singh, Arming the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF): Trends and Implications, p. 10. 167 Amitav Acharya, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Regional Order, p. 102. 165

China and India became the next candidates with the potential to fill the vacuum of power. Due to their political systems, ideologies and territories China and India presented new issues to the region. After settling the recognition of the Cambodian regime, New Delhi had no dispute with any Southeast Asian country, but Beijing had a dominant claim on the water territory of the South China Sea. That is, China had more potential to perturb the regional situation than did India. Consequently, Singapore interacted more closely with India regarding security issues than it did with China. India-Singapore bilateral joint exercises comprised of three services of their armed forces. Further, their naval exercises moved from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea since 2005. By contrast, there were only conferences, dialogues and limited-scale exercises between Singapore and China during this period.168 Aside from India, Singapore maintained a flexible approach to the Taiwan issue. The city state held military ties with Taiwan for training purposes and contacts visits between the high officials, but it was also able to uphold a friendly relationship with China by issuing statements such as its support for the one-China policy. In other words, the “Taiwan card” was another bargaining chip for dealing with Beijing.169 Singapore utilised international organisations and forums, both global and regional, to promote a peaceful environment. The city state became a non-permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations and contributed to some measures for peace building, such as forming a working group on peace keeping operations.170 Regionally, from 1994, Singapore supported the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for dialogue and cooperation regarding security issues.171 In cooperation with the International Institute of Strategy Study (IISS), since 2001 the city state has also hosted the Asian Security Conference, also known as the Shangri-La Dialogue.172

168 “India, Singapore Review Defence, Military Cooperation”, Oct. 10th 2008, India Defence, (http://www.india-defence.com/reports-4046) site accessed 13 November, 2011; Amitav Acharya, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Regional Order, pp. 106-107. 169 Michael Leifer, “Taiwan and South-East Asia: the Limits of Pragmatic Diplomacy”, the China Quarterly, Vol. 165, Taiwan in the 20th Century (Mar., 2001), p. 177; Teo Kah Bang, “Singapore in 2004: Vigilance amid Growing Uncertainty”, Southeast Asian Affairs, 2005, p. 344; Ernest Bower and Charles freeman, “Singapore’s Tightrope Walk on Taiwan”, Southeast Aisa from the Croner of 18th & K Street, Vol. 1, Issue 26 (August 17, 2010), p. 2; Acharya, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Regional Order, pp. 104-105. 170 Amitav Acharya, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Regional Order, pp. 70-71. 171 K.S. Nathan, “Malaysia-Singapore Relations: A Bilateral Relationship Defying ASEAN-style Multilateralist Approaches to Conflict Resolution”, in N. Ganesan and Ramses Amer (Ed.), International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and Multilateralism (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), p. 256. 172 Damon Bristow, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Southeast Asia’s Unknown Regional Organisation”, p. 6. 166

The city state also contributed its military capabilities to international issues during peace time, including counter terrorism and peace-keeping operations, and disaster relief. As well as supporting the war on terror, the RSN played an active role in a multi-national framework for preventing maritime terrorist attacks such as the incident involving the MV Limburg in 2002.173 Singapore attained 15 peace-keeping and observer missions after 1989 and SAF personnel were the mainstay of such task forces. 174 SAF’s transportation and other logistical capabilities were also utilised in natural disasters such as the Asian Tsunami in 2004 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005.175 In terms of its relations with neighbouring countries, Singapore maintained a better relationship with Indonesia than it did with Malaysia. During the early 1990s, the city state improved its relations with Indonesia, especially regarding defence and economy. Despite the political turmoil after Suharto and Jusuf Habibie’s provocative statement describing Singapore as a “dot”, after Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono took over the Presidency, the cooperation between the two countries continued to strengthen across the arenas of anti-crime, economy and defence.176 As for Malaysia, there were both positive and negative developments. After some quarrels around rhetoric in the 1990s, the peaceful settlement of water territorial disputes, the maritime boundary agreement, and the increasing bilateral economic interdependence were auspicious events. 177 However, ‘action-and-reaction’ competition of arms procurement occurred on both sides of the Johor Straits. In order to maintain superiority over the expanding MAF, Singapore purchased specific weapon systems to counter Malaysian military build-ups. For instance, RSAF’s AH-64 Apache attack helicopters were aimed at Malaysian PT-91M MBTs.178 Owing to Kuala Lumpur’s lesser financial capability and lack of investment, and Singapore’s superior base of existing conventional warfare capability, the SAF seemed to be ahead of the MAF. Meanwhile, the military

173 The Republic of Singapore Navy, Onwards and Upwards: Celebrating 40 Years of the Navy (Singapore: The Republic of Singapore Navy, 2007), pp. 85, 87. 174 “International Issues”, “Foreign Policy”, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore (http://app.mfa.gov.sg/2006/idx_fp.asp?web_id=10#int) site accessed 25 December, 2011. 175 “Kinetic Sculpture”, Singapore Discovery Centre, SAFTI Military Institute, Singapore, August 7th, 2011; “RSAF Helicopters Complete Hurricane Katrina Relief Operations”, MINDEF News Release, Ministry of Defence (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/katrina.html) site accessed 25 December, 2011. 176 Jusuf Habibie called Singapore “just a dot” in 2002. Amitav Acharya, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Regional Order, pp. 108-109. 177 K.S. Nathan, “Malaysia-Singapore Relations: A Bilateral Relationship Defying ASEAN-style Multilateralist Approaches to Conflict Resolution”, pp. 260-262, 265, 274. 178 Bilveer Singh, Arming the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF): Trends and Implications, p. 46. 167 modernisation of other regional countries was not as alarming to Singapore as was Malaysia’s. This was due to the close proximity that Malaysia has to the city state. Finally, the SAF still played a significant role in widening the military ties with its counterparts of other countries, and this was achieved by means of exercises and training. The exercises and training could be classified into two types: bilateral and multilateral exercises. The former was usually related to the overseas training of the SAF, for instance, the joint army exercise with Indonesia.179 The latter comprised of some existing international arrangements during the Cold War era, such as the FPDA and some new exercises such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercises.180 Regarding the existing FPDA, the respective land, sea and air exercises of the FPDA were connected in 1991 and further merged to become one in 1997.181 According to Singapore’s international efforts on security, its network evolved from a tactic of isolating and deterring any potential enemy to preventing conflict through communication and dealing with unconventional threats.

II. General Deterrence The conditions of general deterrence in Singapore were steady. As it continued to hold the majority of votes and seats in the parliament, the long-term ruling PAP had not sustained any considerable challenged from an opposing party or social organisation.182 The shift from Goh Chok Tong as Prime Minister, to Lee Hsieng Loong in 2004produced no disruption either. The number of politicians and officials with military backgrounds was also increasing—even the Prime Minister Lee Hsieng Loong had served as a SAF brigadier general. On the one hand, this trend might have been helpful for the SAF—enabling them to secure a firm share of the governmental budget.183 On the other hand, the absorbability of a number of high-ranked officers—invaluable human power assets for the SAF—had a negative impact on the accumulation of a defence talent pool.184 Despite a series of incidents, such as the regional financial crisis in 1997, the September 11th terrorist attack in 2001, and the Severe Acute Respiratory

179 Dwi Haryoko, SAFKAR INDOPURA, 1989 to 1998: a Decade of Training, a Lifetime of Friendship, p. 15. 180 The RSN participated in the PSI since 2005. The Republic of Singapore Navy, Onwards and Upwards: Celebrating 40 Years of the Navy, p. 98. 181 Damon Bristow, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Southeast Asia’s Unknown Regional Organisation”, p. 7. 182 The election system helped the PAP to amplify the number of seats in the parliament. For instance, the PAP won 95% of seats from only 61% of total votes cast in 1991. Kenneth Paul Tan, “The People’s Action Party and Political Liberalisation in Singapore”, pp. 107, 112-115. 183 Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore, pp. 233-235. 184 Bernard Lo, Personal Interview, 8 August 2011. 168

Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003, all of which provided considerable disruption to the city state during this period, the city state’s economy was still robust enough to afford major arms procurements.185 In addition to this, the Singaporean government could maintain a comprehensive influence on the economy with a range of administrative measures for anti-terrorism, and decrease the exposure of the city state’s economy to the international environment.186 Similarly, the improved capability of the RSAF and RSN, such as sea control and rapid deployment, provided Singapore with some options of deterring the threats to its economy. The frigates, maritime patrol aircraft, and other ASW vessels, enhanced their capability of protecting the SLOCs. The rapid deployment troops, combined with light-weight weapon systems, transport aircraft, and air refuelling planes, could all contribute to shielding Singaporean investments or stabilising the regional situations.187 On account of its water reliance on Malaysia, the Singaporean government adapted several policies to reduce this strategic vulnerability. Firstly, with matured technology, a new water project started in 1998 and saw the erection of four new plants to reclaim used water as potable water. In addition, the six existing sewage treatment works were modified to provide non-potable water.188 Secondly, the rearrangement of water catchment areas in 2002 enlarged the capacity of water supply from rainfall. Thirdly, the construction of a desalination plant in 2004 turned seawater into another major source of portable water.189 The diminution or elimination of the water reliance on Malaysia could lower or defuse any motive for an offensive strategy to secure a water source. Regarding social aspect of general deterrence, Singapore faced three contributing factors affecting social harmony, during this period: Chinese immigrants, the expanding gap between the rich and the poorer classes, and the internet. Firstly, since the 1990s a number of Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong, China, and Taiwan had been introduced to supplement an insufficient labour force and maintain the Chinese majority population that was decreasing as a result of a

185 Hussin Mutalib, “The Socio-Economic Dimension in Singapore’s Quest for Security and Stability”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1, Spring 2002, p. 47. 186 Carl A. Trocki, Singapore: Wealth, Power and the Culture of Control, pp. 178-179. 187 Bilveer Singh, Arming the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF): Trends and Implications, p. 41. 188 The four plants of the new water project supply 30% of water demand and the supply will be raised to 50% in 2060. “NEWater,” Public Utility Board: Singapore’s National Water Agency (http://www.pub.gov.sg/about/historyfuture/Pages/NEWater.aspx) site accessed 18 October, 2011. 189 “Tuas Seawater Desalination Plant”, Water Technology Net (http://www.water-technology.net/projects/tuas-seawater-desalination/) site accessed 18 October, 2011. 169 relatively low birth rate.190 However, these new citizens and permanent residents brought a series of additional issues. Not only did some have problems getting along with the original Chinese communities, but they also incited discontent amongst the minor ethnic groups such as the Malays for perpetuating their minority status.191 Furthermore, this immigration, in addition to the sinicisation policies which came into effect in 1979, continued to alienate Singapore from its neighbouring countries. Secondly, the gap between rich and poor became wider during the 1990s, largely due to the education system, living costs, as well as cultural and other structural factors. The PAP took some measures to regain the support of the poor, but these measures may not have to be sufficient to solve the structural problems which may have undermined social harmony as factors based on ethnicity were also in operation. The poor Chinese blamed the popularity of the use of English as the cause of their impoverishment. Conversely, incompatibility with Chinese culture was seen by the Malays as one of the reasons for their weak economic position.192 In brief, without a general solution for expanding differences between rich and poor, blame and distrust among the diverse ethnic groups came to the fore. Finally, the internet was a potential medium for undermining social control. In fact, the Singaporean government wary of the influence of the internet from the moment of its introduction. In the late 1990s, the police monitored private email accounts, an act which initiated internet censorship. Thus the function of the internet to challenge the governmental policy was limited using several measures: self-censoring by internet providers, the possibility that the government continue to monitor the internet, and the ban of political campaigns running on the internet. The traditionally apolitical culture also contributed to creating a tamer role for the

190 The fertility rates of the Chinese ethnic group have dropped more rapidly than other ethnic groups in Singapore. Peggy Teo, “Population Planning and Change in Singapore”, Population and Environment, Vol. 16, No. 3, January 1995, p. 244; Linda Low, “Population Movement in the Asia Pacific Region: Singapore Perspective”, International Migration Review, Vol. 29, No. 3, Autumn 1995, pp. 757-758; Eugene K. B. Tan, “Re-engaging Chineseness: Political, Economic and Cultural Imperatives of National Building in Singapore”, pp. 752-753; Hussin Mutalib, “The Socio-Economic Dimension in Singapore’s Quest for Security and Stability”, pp. 45-46. 191 Eugene K. B. Tan, “Re-engaging Chineseness: Political, Economic and Cultural Imperatives of National Building in Singapore”, p. 772; Joseph B. Tamney, The Struggle over Singapore’s Soul: Western Modernization and Asian Culture, p. 97. 192 Poor families cannot usually afford tutoring for their children, an important aid to academic performance, and, as a result, the children from poor families have difficulty in changing their socio-economic status. Erik Paul, Obstacles to Democratization in Southeast Asia: A Study of the Nation State, Regional and Global Order, p. 96; Joseph B. Tamney, The Struggle over Singapore’s Soul: Western Modernization and Asian Culture, pp. 78-80, 100. 170 internet.193 In short, these three factors of social defence had potentially negative influences on general deterrence, but the government’s firm social control measures constrained these effects. As long as the PAP administration was able to maintain comprehensive control, the social conditions in general deterrence would remain steady. In terms of military defence, Singapore endeavoured to keep a balance between preventing a regional arms race and maintaining military superiority in the post-Cold War era. In order to avoid an arms race in the region, Singapore carefully adjusted the lead it had. For example, the Singapore Army did not purchase any multi-launch rocket system (MLRS) until its Malaysian counterpart had done so.194 Concurrently, the SAF obtained several new types of major weapon systems for more strategic functions. For instance, the frigates significantly enhanced Singapore’s sea control capability.195 Furthermore, the SAF also placed emphasis on the revolution of military affairs (RMA) for continuing its military superiority, after the RMA displayed in Operation Desert Storm in 1991. The RMA effected dramatic changes in warfare as a result of the integration of command, control, communication and computers (C4), as well as other applications of new technologies, proving that knowledge and information can determine the outcome of war.196 The SAF pursued its own RMA for a range of reasons. Firstly, as the SAF could not maintain quantitative superiority over the armed forces of the neighbouring countries, due to the limited population, lack of national resources and lack of strategic depth, the RMA provided a qualitative approach to increasing military capability. Operation Desert Storm proved that the improvement of C4ISR capability strengthened the military capability of the armed forces, and thus, several new means of reconnaissance such as satellite were integrated into the intelligence operations of the SAF during the late 1990s. A computerised nation-wide military network, and the INSIGHT system for collection, processing,

193 Terence Lee, The Media, Cultural Control and Government in Singapore (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 107, 110-123; Erik Paul, Obstacles to Democratization in Southeast Asia: A Study of the Nation State, Regional and Global Order, p. 94. 194 Singapore considered purchase of MLRS in the 1990s but actually only ordered them in 2007 after Malaysia had introduced them in 2002. Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore, p. 130; IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 102, Issue 1, p. 157. 195 Richard Scott, “Singapore builds up formidable force”, Oct. 11th, 2005, p. 14. 196 Lim Seng Hock, “Revolution In Military Affairs And Command, Control, Communications And Computers (C4): Are We Ready?”, Pointer, Vol. 24, No. 2, April-June 1998 (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/1998/Vol24_2/1.htm) site accessed 25 January, 2012. 171 and dissemination of information, was simultaneously established.197 The SAF created their own term, ‘IKC2’, which referred to “integrated knowledge, command and control”. IKC2 was part of a wider military modernisation plan during the late 2000s, the third generation (3rd G) SAF.198 Secondly, Singapore was suited for RMA due to national conditions in industry and education. The booming information technology (IT) industry, coupled with a steady supply of talent from domestic universities and other education institutions formed a sound basis for RMA.199 Furthermore, based on the established defence industry, the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) invested about 10% of the defence budget into the research and development (R&D) of defence technology, including civil/military dual-use technologies.200 This investment was made in the form of funds provided to domestic research institutions and the defence industry, and also to build bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the US, France, Australia, Sweden, South Africa and other countries.201 Among these partner countries, the US was the main source and paradigm for the RMA of the SAF.202 Thirdly, the RMA was relevant to the special conditions regarding human resources in the SAF. For one, the increases in the level of education of servicemen would be beneficial for the RMA, and as such, training and assignment were adjusted to optimise servicemen’s potential.203 For example, GPS and digital maps became popular in the SAF, even for individual soldiers.204 The RMA also presented a further solution to the decreasing number of servicemen due to the low birth rate since the 1970s. In order to improve the use of limited human resources, computerisation and automation were used throughout the SAF. For instance, UAVs can replace certain manned aircraft and scout trooper missions.

197 Tim Huxley, “Singapore and the Revolution in Military Affairs”, in Emily O. Goldman and Thomas G. Mahnken (Ed.), The Informational Revolution in Military Affairs in Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 195-197. 198 Ministry of Defence, Singapore, Report of the Forth Committee to Recognise the Contribution of Operationally Ready NSmen to Total Defence Record IV (Singapore: Ministry of Defence, 2006), p. 8. 199 Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), The Revolution of Military Affairs for Small States (Singapore: IDSS, 2004), pp. 1, 5-6. 200 Ron Matthews and Nellie Zhang Yan, “Small Country ‘Total Defence’: A Case Study of Singapore”, pp. 388-390; IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 106, Issue 1, p. 259. 201 Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore, pp. 183-184. 202 Michael Raska, “The Five Waves of RMA Theory: Processes and Debate”, Pointer, Vol. 36, No. 3, March 2011, p. 10. 203 Army 21: The Decisive Force (Singapore: the Ministry of Defence, 1999), pp. 14, 20-21. 204 Teo Chee Hean, “Defence Budget at the Committee of Supply Debate”, the Committee of Supply Debate. Ministry of Defence, Singapore. 29 Feb., 2008 (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2008/feb/29feb08_nr/29feb08_speech/29f eb08_speechB.html) site accessed 17 October, 2011; 40 Years of the RSAF: Our People, Our Air Force, p. 75. 172

Apart from the combat units, most logistical facilities such as the ones at the Changi Naval base were fully automated to save on manpower.205 Therefore, IKC2, the Singaporean edition of the RMA, was implemented in the SAF and the concept of its network operations was also generally influential in each of the services.206 In addition to intelligence integration, a range of precise guided weapon systems such as the AGM-154 joint standoff weapon equipped for F-15SG Strike Eagle fighters were procured in the late 2000s as the primary strike means of the RMA.207 Although the effect of the efforts on the RMA in real battlefields would be arguable, these RMA programs certainly conveyed a clear message of determined deterrence to potential enemies. In the meantime, the reform and further expansion of the Singaporean defence industry was also in process. In 1995, the defence-oriented companies under ST Holdings were initially integrated into four major companies: ST Aerospace, ST Automotive, ST Marine, and ST Electronics. Additionally, in 1997, these four companies merged to form a single company, ST Engineering, each as one of four main arms.208 Irrespective of any organisational changes, the defence industry was working to meet the SAF’s requirements, and had attracted foreign customers, as per the previous period, in the following three categories of products and services: locally designed and produced weapon systems, foreign designed and locally produced weapon systems, as well as overhaul and upgrade services. The first type was mainly for ground troops and included armoured vehicles such as the Bionix, Bronco and Terrex series armoured vehicles, artillery systems such as the FH-2000 howitzer, infantry weapons such as the SAR-21 assault rifle, and landing ships such as the Endurance Class LST.209 The second type related mainly to naval vessels, such as the Swedish-designed Bedok Class mine hunter, the French-designed Formidable Class frigates, and Russian Igla SAMs.210 The final type aimed to

205 Spirit of Navy (Singapore: Republic of Singapore Navy, 2005), pp. 26-27. 206 IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 108, Issue 1, p. 363; “The 3rd Generation SAF”, Ministry of Defence, Singapore (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/3g/home.html) site accessed 17 October, 2011. 207 IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 107, Issue 1, p. 336 208 “Milestones”, ST Engineering (http://www.stengg.com/aboutus/milestones.aspx) site accessed 6 November, 2011; Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore, pp. 186-187. 209 “Products”, ST Engineering (http://www.stengg.com/CoyCapPro/listing.aspx?pdtypeid=1) site accessed 6 November, 2011. 210 The first vessel of the Bedok Class (Swedish Landsort Class) mine hunter was launched in the Kockums shipyard in Sweden and the rest were built in Singapore. The first ship of the Formidable Class (French La Fayette Class) was also launched in Lorient, France and the rest were built in Singapore. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 28 October, 2011; Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005-2006, pp. 673, 675. 173 extend the life span of existing weapon systems, such as the M-113 Ultra APCs and the Sea Wolf Class missile boats of the 1990s.211 Export of defence industry products varied from upgrade and overhaul services, participation in international projects, and selling or transferring retired SAF equipment, to sales of indigenously designed/produced weapon systems. After the domestic upgrade of RSAF F-5Es to F-5Ss, several air forces, such as the Brazilian Air Force which possessed the similar type of aircraft, signed upgrade contracts with ST Aerospace.212 Further, Singapore participated in the system design and development phase of the F-35 program as a security cooperation participant in 2003.213 Additionally, in 2003 Singapore sold seven modernised Bell 205 helicopters to the Philippines and in 2004 transferred the seven F-16 A/B fighters to Thailand. As for indigenous weapon systems, Indonesia ordered FH-88 howitzers in 1997, Britain purchased Bronco all-terrain tracked vehicles in 2008 for use in Afghanistan, and Thailand also ordered an Endurance Class LST in the same year.214 The domestic defence industry contributed to general deterrence for several reasons. Firstly, the indigenous weapon systems would address local concerns and would, therefore, be more suitable for the SAF than foreign counterparts. Furthermore, the rapid response to users’ opinions—from the local manufacturers—would strengthen the fitness of domestic weapon systems. For instance, Bionix armoured vehicles were designed specially for Singapore’s needs, as its counterparts in the international arms market did not particularly take the tropical weather and the jungle environment in Southeast Asia into account. In addition to the editions of basic APCs and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), several variations can further satisfy the Singapore Army’s tactical requirements for mobile operation. Secondly, the appearance of indigenous weapon systems served as a strong image of national power and glory, which was positive for psychological defence. For example, the Formidable (La Fayette) Class frigate was the first major vessel built in the region, and contributed to a sense of national pride for the city

211 Matra Simbad short range SAMs were equipped on the Sea Wolf Class missile boats in the 1990s. Vickna S. K. Anandarajah, “Rumble in the City: Armoured Vehicles on Parade”, p. 1; 40 Years of the RSAF: Our People, Our Air Force, p. 91; Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005-2006, p. 674. 212 “ST Aerospace Partners in Brazilian F-5 Upgrade”, Media Releases, ST Aerospace, 5 Jan., 1999 (http://www.staero.aero/www/mediacentre_newsarticle.asp?newsid=OTAwMDAwMDAwMA&sel=b2 xk&yname=MTk5OQ&arc=bm8) site accessed 6 November, 2011. 213 Ron Matthews and Nellie Zhang Yan, “Small Country ‘Total Defence’: A Case Study of Singapore”, pp. 387-388; Wendell Minnick, “Singapore Interested in F-35?” Defence News, 11 Jul. 2011 (http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3620542) site accessed 22 November, 2011. 214 The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 28 October, 2011. 174 state. Thirdly, the defence industry creates some economic benefits. Without a domestic defence industry, a great deal of the defence budget would be directly spent on foreign providers and do almost nothing to assist the domestic economy. Through the defence industry, a certain portion of the defence budget has been spent domestically to benefit Singapore’s economy. The high number of armoured and related vehicles required by the Singapore Army enabled the indigenous Bionix project to save on defence expenditure and create domestic jobs. Furthermore, the defence industry creates profits through export, civil business, and dual-purpose technologies. However, the defence industry may have some limitations. Based on the size of Singapore, the factories and other defence industry facilities could have easily suffered from hostile firepower, and would probably not have been able to keep functioning well during wartime. In other words, storage and other logistical preparations were more valuable than the production of the defence industry to the general deterrence of the city state. While Singapore endeavoured to develop its defence industry, some critical weapon systems for defence, such as fighters, were still beyond Singapore’s capability. If Singapore was isolated from the source of major weapon systems, the domestic defence industry was unable to make up for any shortfalls. Similarly, some indigenous designed and produced weapon systems were composed of critical parts acquired from foreign sources. For example, the engine of the numerous Bionix armed vehicles was an American Detroit 6V-92 diesel engine.215 Hence, domestic products were not free from the effect of isolation either. In terms of the army, its development can be divided into two phases: the 1990s and the 2000s. The main projects of the former stage were to retain Singapore’s military lead, and the focal points of the latter stage were to partly react to the build-up of the Malaysian Army. In the 1990s, although Kuala Lumpur conducted some military development projects, the Malaysian Army had not acquired specific weapon systems such as long-range artillery to constitute a clear threat to the city state. Thus, Singapore’s army could concentrate on upgrading the weapon systems already in service or on replacing the old with the new. In the early 1990s, the army additionally imported a few used Centurion MBTs, a small number of new French AMX-10C APCs, AMX-10 PAC-90 reconnaissance vehicles and LG-1 105 mm howitzers.216 Later, the indigenous defence industry became the

215 Singapore purchased 500 6V-92 engines between 1997 and 2004 for the Bionix vehicles. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 28 October, 2011. 216 Michael E. Haskew, Artillery: Compared and Contrasted, p. 206; IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 92, Issue 1, 175 main source of upgrades and the production of weapon systems. The most salient example was the domestically designed Bionix armoured vehicle series which comprised a range of variations including APCs, IFVs, armoured recovery vehicles, mine sweepers and armoured vehicle launched bridges.217 In addition to vehicles, a range of indigenous ordnance, firearms and their ammunition, such as FH-2000 155 mm howitzers and SAR-21 assault rifles were introduced into the army.218 Following AMX-13 light tanks, some weapon systems in service were upgraded to increase their life span and improve performance. For example, M-113 APCs were modified to M-113 Ultra with better fire power.219 The list of indigenously designed and produced weapon systems was further expanded in the 2000s with a group of howitzers and vehicles.220 However, both the new weapon systems in the Malaysian Army as well as major terrorist attacks influenced the development of the Singapore Army. After recovering from the financial crisis, Kuala Lumpur ordered MBTs, MLRS and long-range howitzers, capable of challenging the Singaporean artillery and even projecting direct fire power on the city state. In response, the Singapore Army also obtained some weapon systems to counter the Malaysian military build-ups and to maintain the military balance in favour of Singapore. The Polish PT-91M MBTs purchased by Kuala Lumpur in 2005 presented a formidable challenge to all existing Singaporean armoured vehicles, both in protection and fire power.221 While these tanks might not directly threaten the Singapore homeland, they could

p. 140; Vol. 93, Issue 1, p. 148; Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore, p. 131. 217 “Bionix Infantry Fighting Vehicle”, Singapore Technologies Kinetics (http://www.stengg.com/upload/994DoCn4Q91NXLbX86E.pdf) site accessed 6 November, 2011. 218 The FH-2000 began production in 1995 and the SAR-21 was introduced in 1999. Aside from howitzers and assault rifles, the Singapore Army had 7.62mm machineguns, 40 mm grenade launchers, the 40/50 Cupola Weapon system and the 40mm L70 flak system going into the service. IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 92, Issue 1, p. 140; vol. 95, Issue 1, p. 194; “FH-2000”, Federation of American Scientists (FAS) (http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/fh2000.htm) site accessed 6 November, 2011.; “ST Kinetics SAR-21”, Military-Today (http://www.military-today.com/firearms/sar_21.htm) site accessed 6 November, 2011. 219 Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore, p. 133; “HAX-1100 Upgrade Kit”, ST Engineering (http://www.stengg.com/upload/781gMcPhG5VhGFT5QRc.pdf) site accessed 6 November, 2011. 220 The Pegasus 155mm light weight howitzer, the Primus 155mm self-propelled howitzer, the Spider light strike vehicle, the Bronco all terrain tracked carrier and the Terrex 8x8 armoured vehicle were issued after 2000. “Products”, ST Engineering (http://www.stengg.com/kinetics/productlisting.aspx) site accessed 20 November, 2011. 221 The PT-91M MBTs were based on the design of the Soviet T-72 MBTs in the 1970s with modifications using technologies of the 1990s, but Singapore’s Centurion MBTs were designed in the final phase of World War II. Although Singapore’s Army modernised the Centurion MBTs, they were still very outdated compared to the PT-91M. Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Tank & Combat Vehicle Recognition Guide, pp. 56-57, 66, 98-99. 176 obstruct the offensive strategy held by the Singapore Army for decades. Hence, apart from the RSAF’s Apache attack helicopters already mentioned, Singapore’s Army procured used German Leopard II MBTs at twice the number of their Malaysian counterpart.222 The threat to Singapore from Brazilian MLRS and South African long-range howitzers was strategic rather than tactical due to their wide coverage.223 This kind of threat was an important concern of the city state. An underground ammunition facility began construction in the late 1990s and some storage of strategic material was also moved underground.224 Additionally, the Israeli Iron Dome anti-missile system is currently also under consideration by Singapore.225 Moreover, in 2007 the army purchased counterattack capabilities, for example, the US High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) with guided projectiles.226 In addition to its responses to Malaysia, the Singapore Army developed new offensive capabilities. Its artillery fire power was reinforced with the Primus self-propelled 155 mm howitzers and the Pegasus light-weighted 155 mm howitzers from a domestic source. The former was able to more closely follow the advancing armour and infantry units, and respond to the requirement for fire power support more rapidly than towed guns.227 The latter was designed for the rapid reaction division because it could be deployed by air transport via the Chinook helicopter and C-130 aircraft.228 The domestically produced Bionix II

222 Ong Hong Tat, “SAF Armour marks 40 years with inauguration of new Leopard tanks”, Cyberpioneer: Web Publication of the Singapore Armed Forces, Jun. 26,2009 (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/cyberpioneer/news/2009/June/26jun09_news2.htm l) site accessed 6 November, 2011; IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 108, Issue 1, p. 364. 223 The range of G-5 howitzers was up to 39 km and the ASTROSII has a potential range of 90km. M. Jeffri Razali, “Malaysia buys artillery guns, rocket system”, New Straits Times, Nov. 27, 2000 (http://www.singapore-window.org/sw00/001127ns.htm) site accessed 6 November, 2011. 224 Andrew Chia et al, A Pillar of Confidence: Commemorating 25 Years of Army Logistics Excellence, p. 128; Liz Neisloss, “Singapore Finds Space Going Underground”, CNN, Apr. 21, 2011 (http://edition.cnn.com/video/#/video/business/2011/04/21/neisloss.singapore.oil.cave.cnn?iref=alls earch) site accessed 6 November, 2011. 225 “Singapore to ‘Get Israel’s Iron Dome’”, UPI. Com, Apr. 2, 2010 (http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2010/04/02/Singapore-to-get-Israels-Iron- Dome/UPI-11461270226828/) site accessed 29 January, 2012. 226 Singapore only purchased XM-31 guided high-explosive warheads for the HIMARS. Thus, the function of HIMARS in the army is different from the regular MLRS which is usually equipped with unguided projectiles. “Singapore Finalises HIMRS Buy”, Military Technology MILTECH, Nov.2007, p. 125. 227 “DSTA Shares Experience and Challenges of Developing the Primus”, DSTA in the News, Defence Science and Technology Agency (http://www.dsta.gov.sg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3220&Itemid=401) site accessed 25 December, 2011. 228 “Army Unveil Locally Designed and Built Light Weight Howitzer”, News Releases, Ministry of Defence, (http://www.nexus.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2005/oct/28oct05_nr.html) site accessed 25 December, 2011. 177

IFVs, Terrex wheeled armoured vehicles and Bronco all terrain vehicles improved the mobility of infantry and other units. The new armoured vehicles were integrated into the combat network and could directly communicate with the UFVs, artillery and other related units, as well as having stronger fire power.229 The Bronco, with its amphibious capability and light armour, was able to provide better logistical supplies than trucks, especially where roads were in poor conditions or unavailable.230 All these new systems which add value to mobile warfare implied that offensive operations were still a basic strategic concern for the Singapore Army. Apart from conventional functions, after the September 11th terrorist attack and the Bali bombings on October 2nd in 2002, the Singapore Army was assigned to be more involved in homeland security, because Singapore might be targeted by terrorist attacks due to its importance in the area of transportation and its close relationship with the US. 231 The army has previously participated in anti-terrorism operations, such as the anti-hijack operation of Singapore Airlines Flight 117 in 1991, and defusing the pipe bomb in the US embassy in 1998.232 The missions assigned to the army were consisted policing, countering chemical weapons, providing medical responses to biological threats, and managing civilians, as well as the removal of explosives and assault.233 On the one hand, because relative capabilities had already been established in the army, military assistance would lower the cost of anti-terrorism affairs. This assistance would also enhance the cooperation between civil and military sectors, a point which is highlighted in the total defence strategy. On the other hand, the army was challenged by these new missions and had to adjust its training programs to cater for the acquisition of special new skills, for example, in the area of negotiation. Additionally, some modifications were needed to cater for the existing personnel. Most units in the army were made up of national servicemen, who had a range of limitations such as unsuitability for overseas deployment and relatively short terms of service. Some adjustments would therefore be necessary to suit anti-terrorism operations. In

229 Ong Hong Tat, “Networked Infantry Carrier Vehicle Gives Sharper Edge in Urban Warfare”, Cyberpioneer: Web Publication of the Singapore Armed Forces, Sep. 3, 2009 (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/cyberpioneer/news/2009/September/03sep09_n ews.html) site accessed 4 February, 2012; “About Bionix II,” Ministry of Defence, Singapore (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/Weapons/bx2/about.html) site accessed 25 December, 2011. 230 Kinetics Marketing Group, Bronco All Terrain Tracked Carrier (Singapore: ST Kinetics, 2008), pp. 1-2. 231 Kee Nguan Goh, The Singapore Army Moving Decisively beyond the Conventional, p. 1. 232 “Our Army Today”, Army Museum of Singapore, SAFTI Military Institute, Singapore, August 7th, 2011. 233 “Crisis Simulation Theatre”, Singapore Discovery Centre, SAFTI Military Institute, Singapore, August 7th, 2011; IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 103, Issue 1, pp. 147-148. 178 order to best suit these requirements, the sixth battalion of Singapore Infantry Regiment, the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Explosives defence group, and the Medical Response Force were assigned to homeland security missions.234 The RSN’s ongoing development saw it gradually realise its sea control strategy. Domestically, after decades of economic growth, Singapore’s finances were able to support the high cost of a sea-control oriented navy, composed of major surface ships.235 Proceeding from patrol boats to gunboats, and then corvettes, the RSN gradually developed the personnel, experience, and infrastructure conditions needed for larger vessels. Internationally, since the threats from the Communist bloc had vanished, the most probable maritime threats to Singapore would be from neighbouring countries. To deter regional threats of sea denial was a feasible goal for the RSN’s sea control strategy. Following the Victory class corvettes, the Fokker 50 maritime patrol aircraft, Swedish mine hunters and used Swedish Challenger (Sjöormen) Class SSKs were introduced into the RSN from the mid-1990s.236 Then, the French-designed Formidable Class frigate, including ASW helicopters, joined the service in the second half of the 2000s.237 The maritime patrol aircraft were valuable for regional monitoring and information collection, in addition to their limited ASW capability.238 The mine hunters were necessary for keeping the SLOCs open. Although SSKs were unsuitable for escorting merchant vessels, they could play the role of adversary SSKs for ASW training during peacetime, and also hunt an enemy’s counterpart during wartime. Moreover, if the country interrupting the SLOCs was confirmed, SSKs could be assigned for retaliation missions such as blockades or hunting adversary vessels. The Formidable frigates, with extended air defence and ASW capabilities as well as greater displacement, were able to perform sea control missions such as escorting over longer distances and had more endurance than the corvettes. Moreover, with their stealth designs and advanced

234 Felix Siew, “SAF unveils dedicated battalion for homeland security”, Cyberpioneer: Web Publication of the Singapore Armed Forces, 19 Nov. 2004 (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/cyberpioneer/news/2004/November/19nov04_news 1.html) site accessed 6 November, 2011. 235 IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 106, Issue 1, p. 254. 236 The Fokker 50 aircraft were delivered in 1995; the Bedok (Landsort) Class mine hunters were commissioned between 1995 and 1996; the Challenger Class SSKs were commissioned between 1997 and 2004. Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-2008 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2007), p. 698; Jane’s Fighting Ships 2006-2007 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2007), p. 692. 237 S-70B Seahawk ASW helicopters were equipped with the Formidable Class frigates. Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-08, p. 696; “Frigate”, Navy, Ministry of Defence, Singapore (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/atozlistings/navy/assets/vessels.html) site accessed 8 November, 2011. 238 There is no ASW sensor on the Fokker 50 but they are capable of carrying torpedoes. Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-08, p. 698. 179 systems, such as the knowledge-based command and control network, these ships provided the RSN with a maritime superiority over the RMN and other regional counterparts.239 The RSN’s capacity might still be too small to fully protect all sea transport passing through, or nearby Singapore, but the regional threats were no longer too big to encounter and to secure the freedom of navigation would be a relatively achievable goal. Additionally, sea control strategy might be used to cover an amphibious operation. The domestically-built Endurance Class LSTs took the place of the antique ones in the mid-1990s. These new landing ships were more adequate for landing operations as they also carried helicopters.240 They were also of great value in humanitarian relief missions such as delivering aid to Indonesia after the tsunami in late 2004.241 Furthermore, the RSN attempted to introduce hovercraft landing capability during this period.242 Using several approaches, the development of the RSAF concentrated on quality rather than quantity. Firstly, the RSAF kept upgrading existing aircraft and introducing new planes in order to maintain air superiority and strike capability. In the early 1990s, following the A-4 upgrades, the F-5 fleets received domestic modifications, particularly in the area of avionics, to extend their life span and improve performance.243 With the successful operational experience of the F-16 A/B Falcon fighters, newer versions of F-16s such as the C/D, and then the block 52, subsequently entered into service instead of the aging Hunter aircraft. As a result, the RSAF possessed the largest fleet of F-16s in Southeast Asia, with a total of 60 of these aircraft.244 Perhaps responding to the Malaysian procurement of Russian Sukhoi Su-30 MKM multirole fighters, the RSAF purchased the American F-15SG Strike Eagle multirole fighters to replace the A-4 attackers in the late 2000s.245 Moreover, the RSAF expressed an interest in the F-35 for the next generation of

239 “Singapore's Formidable-class Frigate Squadron Fully Operational”, Ministry of Defence, Singapore (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2009/jan/16jan09_nr2.html) site accessed 8 November, 2011. 240 Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-08, p. 696. 241 Derek Liew, “2000-the LSTs of 191 Squadron”, Mindef, Singapore, Mar. 7, 2006 (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/about_us/history/maturing_saf/v10n03_history.print.html? Status=1) site accessed 28 January, 2012. 242 The RSN learned operations from the US navy and purchased one hovercraft to test. Melinda Larson, “Singapore Sailor Experience LCAC Operations”, Navy.mil: Official Website of United States Navy (http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=18637) site accessed 8 November, 2011; Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-08, p. 699. 243 “SA (Northrop) F-5 Upgrade (Singapore)”, Jane's All the World's Aircraft, Jul 15, 1994 (http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-All-the-Worlds-Aircraft/SA-NORTHROP-F-5-UPGRADE-Singapo re.html) site accessed 22 September, 2011. 244 In 2008, Thailand had 50 F-16A/B and Indonesia had 10. IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 108, Issue 1, pp. 382, 402, 407. 245 “S'pore to buy 12 F-15 fighter jets”, Agence France Presse, Dec. 12, 2005 (http://www.singapore-window.org/sw05/051212af.htm) site accessed 8 November, 2011. 180 fighters.246 From these procurements a trend towards all RSAF’s fighters being American was formed, and this was beneficial for logistics and maintenance. Secondly, the number of transport helicopters was increased—probably in consideration of land warfare. In addition to the AS-332 Puma already in service, the AS-532 Cougar and CH-47SD Chinook were added during this period. The armada of Puma and Cougar helicopters could embark a total of more than five hundred soldiers, and the Chinook was capable of hanging howitzers or vehicles.247 It should be noticed that the RSAF only expanded the transport capacity of helicopters, not fixed-wing transporters.248 This measure indicated that Singapore did not plan to project its forces remotely, and thus the most likely strategic purpose of these transport helicopters was to assist with an offensive strategy using group troops. Thirdly, responding to the RMA, the RSAF started to spend considerable resources on UAVs after taking over from the army in 1988. Unlike piloted aircraft, the costs of operating UAVs are much lower. UAVs can optimise space and weight which are required for pilots and related facilities to store payload or fuel, as training a remote controller is easier and has a higher survival rate than that of a pilot. The low visibility of UAVs makes them difficult targets for air defence or air-to-air weapon systems and UAVs are capable of replacing some functions of manned aircraft, particularly reconnaissance, conserving the manned craft for other more important missions. UAVs can even commit direct “kamikaze” attacks where there are high-value targets.249 The RSAF focused on long endurance UAVs from Israeli sources for monitoring and reconnaissance. Two squads of Searcher UAVs were introduced in 1998 to replace the aging Scout UAV.250 Hermes-450 UAVs were purchased in addition in 2006 to form the third squad. Concurrently, the establishment of the UAV command in 2006—as high as other commands for air defence and joint force operation—confirmed the RSAF’s emphasis on UAVs.251

246 The number of purchase may be up to 100. However, there has not been officially confirmed. Wendell Minnick, “Singapore Interested in F-35?” 247 The capacity of the AS-332 and the AS-532 is 24 and 29 soldiers respectively. There are 18 AS-332s and 12 AS-532s in the RSAF and they can transport a total of 780 soldiers in a single flight. Peter R. March, Directory of Military Aircraft of the World, pp. 93, 157, 160; IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 107, Issue 1, p.371. 248 In 1991, the fix-winged transporters of the RSAF were 10 C-130s, including tankers, and 6 Skyvans. In 2008, the RSAF C-130 fleet was still 10 and 6 Skyvans were replaced by 4 Fokker 50s. Military Balance, Vol. 91, Issue 1, p. 179; Vol. 108, Issue 1, p. 402. 249 David Glade, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Implications for Military Operations (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, Air University, 2000), pp. 17-21. 250 40 Years of the RSAF: Our People, Our Air Force, pp. 98-99. 251 “RSAF Today”, RSAF Museum, 400 Airport Road, Singapore, August 6th, 2011; “Singapore Adds Hermes 450 UAVs, Stands Up Joint UAV Command”, Defence Industry Daily, May 29, 2007 181

However, the limited payload of these UAVs constrained the possibility of other missions such as attack. Since 2006, the army resumed its own UAV program, and focused on close-range surveillance mini UAVs such as the indigenous Skyblade UAV.252

III. Immediate Deterrence Due to its close distance and considerable military modernisation, Malaysia became a major security concern to Singapore. Other countries, both regional and extra-regional, could not constitute a similar threat. For example, regional countries such as Indonesia were unlikely to project sufficient national power over the sea to the city state. In addition, rising powers such as China were still too remote for their military capability to directly affect Singapore’s sovereignty or other national interests during this period. For various reasons, neither China nor India was able to pose a security threat to Singapore. While Singapore is indeed a choke point on China’s SLOCs for petroleum supply and commercial trade, China’s blue-water navy can only be a peacetime visitor to Singapore because the dominant US Navy and the prevailing issues in the South China Sea would constrain its movement. Without a naval presence or acquisition of forward bases, Singapore was too remote for Beijing to project their military power. Several reasons also impeded India from being a source of threat. Without territorial or any other major dispute, New Delhi did not possess any motive or legitimacy for using force against Singapore, especially as defence cooperation was increasing. The strategic pressure from China and Pakistan also constrained the resources and attention of Indian decision-makers, despite the considerable fleets of the Indian navy.253 Lastly, similar to China, lack of forward bases made any real threat unrealistic. For various reasons Indonesia did not constitute any considerable threat during this period. A series of economic and political crises, including the collapse of the Suharto regime and the independence of East Timor in the late 1990s and early 2000s, depleted Jakarta’s resources and with it any potential to use force against Singapore. Additionally, the tight military cooperation between Singapore

(http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/singapore-adds-hermes-450-uavs-stands-up-joint-uav-comma nd-03328/) site accessed 6 November, 2011; IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 108, Issue 1, p. 402. 252 Mark Daly (Ed.), Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets(Coulsdon : Jane's Information Group , 2008) Issue 31 (Nov. 2008), pp. 25, 91, 95, 97, 105-106, 171,203-204. 253 In 2008, India possessed 16 SSKs, 1 aircraft carrier with 37 aircraft on board, 8 destroyers, 15 frigates and a range of amphibious vessels led by a landing platform dock (LPD). IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 108, Issue 1, pp. 342-343. 182 and Jakarta decreased the possibility of misunderstanding or misjudgement, especially between the armed forces of both countries. Furthermore, the Indonesian armed forces lacked major weapon systems capable of threatening Singapore. Although the Indonesian air force possessed some advanced fighters, such as F-16s and Su-27s, they had far fewer than their RSAF counterparts. While the RSAF had already been operating E-2Cs since the late 1980s, Indonesia still had no AWACS to improve the efficiency of its fighters.254 As a result, without air cover, Jakarta’s large naval fleets of surface ships could not pose any considerable threat to Singapore. Indonesian SSKs might be able to disturb the SLOCs to and from the city state, but their number was still too small.255 In brief, Indonesia did not possess any capability to significantly threaten Singapore’s national security. SAF’s superiority over the MAF since the early 1970s was concentrated on the army and air force, and related parts of Malaysia’s military modernisation were designed to challenge this military superiority. With regard to the air force, the RMAF constituted beyond-vision-range (BVR) air combat capability with the MIG-29N and F-18D fighters, in addition to respective mid-range air-to-air missiles in the 1990s, slightly earlier than the RSAF in the mid-1990s.256 However, the number of Malaysia’s new fighters was much smaller than the RSAF’s F-16 fleets. Furthermore, the BVR combat capability of Malaysian fighters was constrained due to there being no AWACS. The procurement of Su-30MKMs in 2003 created a more serious threat because of their large payload, aerodynamic performance, and formidable test record.257 These Su-30MKM fighters loaded with plenty of ammunition and high mobility would increase the difficulty of interception from the RSAF. Moreover, their collocated Kh-31P anti-radar missiles with a range of 110 km could suppress the air defence system by attacking the ground radar in Singapore, and even the AWACS.258 This unprecedented threat directly challenged

254 Until 2008, Indonesia only had 2 Su-27SKs, 2 Su-30MKMs, 10 F-16A/Bs, 12 F-5E/F fighters. Other attackers might be able to conduct air combat but were unsuitable to challenge the air superiority other countries. At the same time, the RSAF owned 60 F-16C/Ds and 28 F-5Ss (upgraded). IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 108, Issue 1, pp. 383, 402. 255 The Indonesian navy owned 11 frigates and 18 corvettes, but most of them were not equipped with sufficient air defence or electronic warfare systems. Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, pp. 99, 101; IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 108, Issue 1, p. 383. 256 Malaysia acquired ex-Soviet R-27 mid range air-to-air missiles from Ukraine in 1995, but Singapore obtained American AIM-7M counterparts from the US in 1997. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 28 October, 2011. 257 The maximal payload of Su-30MKMs was 8000kg and its normal range is 3000km (maximal: 5200km). The Indian Su-30MKs “defeated” US Air Force’s F-15Cs in a joint exercise in 2004. “Su-30(Su-27P)”, FAS (http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/row/su-30.htm) site accessed 9 November, 2011; “Su-30 FLANKER (SUKHOI)”, Global Security (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/su-30.htm) site accessed 9 November, 2011. 258 Two types of Kh-31 missiles, the Kh-31A for anti-ship purpose and the Kh-31P for anti-radar, were 183 the RSAF’s air superiority. However, Malaysia lacked pilots to operate all these advanced fighters; some pilots of MIG-29 were transferred to receive SU-30MKMs and this affected the operation of MIG-29 squads.259 In addition, the total number of advanced fighters was much smaller than that of the RSAF and this quantitative disadvantage was amplified by traceability, the logistical burden and lack of AWACS. As the total number of Malaysian advanced fighters was small, Singaporean AWACS and other radar systems could trace the movements of these aircraft so as to prevent surprise attacks. Maintainability of the diverse types of Russian and American fighters would be more difficult than the US combat aircraft of the RSAF.260 This logistical defect would gradually expand due to the aging of the aircraft and subsequently affect the MAF’s operational readiness. Similar to the RSN, the RMN’s development was also toward greater consideration of sea control, as well as strengthening sea denial capability. Two British Frigates and four Italian Corvettes joined the service in the 1990s plus six German corvettes in the 2000s. The new vessels furnished with SAMs, anti-ship missiles with longer ranges and countermeasures such as close-in weapon systems (CIWS) against anti-ship missiles, made the maritime security of the city state complicated.261 On the one hand, the strong sea denial power of the RSN and the RSAF gave Singapore the opportunity to prevent Malaysian vessels from fulfilling threats of sea control, such as amphibious invasion or blockade. On the other hand, RMN’s increasing capability for sea denial using a range of anti-ship missiles also challenged the RSN’s goal of maintaining sea control. In the 1990s, Kuala Lumpur acquired American air-launched AGM-84A Harpoon missiles for F-18D fighters and British Sea Eagle missiles for Hawk attackers. Additionally, Malaysia upgraded some ship-based Exocet anti-ship missiles from MM-38s with a 40 km maximum range to MM-40s with a 70 km range and purchased ship-based Italian Otomat Missiles with a 180 km maximum range. These ship-based anti-ship missiles were assisted by the British Lynx helicopters introduced during the 2000s in searching for and locating over-horizontal targets. The Lynx helicopters also provided direct

introduced into Malaysia. “AS-17 Krypton / Kh-31 Family”, Warfare. RU: Russian Military Analysis (http://warfare.ru/?linkid=2110&catid=263) site accessed 29 October, 2011; The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 29 October, 2011. 259 IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 107, Issue 1, p. 336. 260 The Malaysian air force had 18 MIG-29Ns, 8 F-18Ds, 18 Su-30MKMs, 13 F-5E/F fighters and 23 Hawk attackers (MK-108 and MK-208) in 2008. At the same time, the RSAF owned 60 F-16C/Ds and 28 F-5Ss (upgraded). IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 108, Issue 1, pp. 394, 402. 261 2 British Leiku Class frigates were commissioned in 1999, 4 Italian corvettes designed for Iraqi orders were delivered in 1997 and 1999, and 6 German designed, Malaysia built corvettes were commissioned between 2004 and 2008. All of them were equipped with short range SAMs and longer range anti-ship missiles. Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005-2006, pp. 464, 466-467. 184 sea denial capability for their air-launched Sea Skua missiles.262 In addition, the Russian supersonic Kh-31A missiles with a 50 km maximum range for Su-30MKM introduced in 2007 present another threat to Singapore’s sea control.263 The threat of these various anti-ship missiles on Singapore’s sea control is uncertain. If the SAF could neutralise the majority of these missiles and platforms in the initial phase of battle, then those remaining would not significantly impede the RSN’s sea control. Conversely, if Kuala Lumpur preserved a number of the vessels and other platforms equipped with anti-ship missiles by evacuation or other tactics, Singapore’s sea control would be threatened. The reform of the Malaysian Army since the early 1990s also affected Singapore. With British assistance, the Malaysian Army reformed its doctrines and development plan from infantry-dominated to a more balanced structure in the late 1980s and early 90s. Thereafter, a new list of military procurement, including MBTs, was issued but then postponed by the financial crisis.264 After recovering from the crisis South African G-5 howitzers with a 40 km range, and Brazilian ASTROS II MLRS with a 60km range were introduced into the Malaysian Army in the early 2000s—their fire power could cover the whole Singapore territory. Unlike previous Malaysian artillery, the MLRS and long range howitzers could launch first strikes from farther distances, meaning that there would be less time for Singapore to issue alerts thus making it difficult for the SAF to intercept, unless they forestalled or retaliated. Singapore would be able to adopt a punishment strategy using similar weapon systems, but the retaliation effect would be doubtful because of Malaysia’s border territory, and its ability to disperse political, economic, and other sectors, to areas beyond the range of Singaporean artillery. Although the RSAF could also be used for retaliation, their air bases would be the targets of first strikes and the efficiency of the RSAF would therefore be affected to some extent. If the RSAF attempted to neutralise the Malaysian rocket launchers as the allied air forces did in Operation Desert Storm, efficiency would be low due to large areas of jungle, hills, and buildings in Malaysia available to hide launchers. The hunting mission could also consume the RSAF’s strike capability which could be used for other targets. Furthermore, assuming that Singapore were to take the first strike, those artillery pieces might not all be neutralised because they may move between different positions or hide in fortified emplacements. Hence, the increasing

262 Ibid, pp. 465, 467-468. 263 Kh-31A missiles were delivered in 2003. Rosoboronexport State Corporation, Aerospace Systems Export Catalogue (Moscow: Rosoboronexport State Corporation, 2005), pp. 24, 123; The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 28 October, 2011. 264 J. N. Mak, “The Modernization of Malaysian Armed Forces”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, pp. 43-45. 185 importance of the absorbability of a first strike where underground constructions and other related measures, such as the utilisation of highways as alternative runways, reflected Singapore’s preparation for hostile first strikes.265 As for the total eradication of this threat, building a buffer zone longer than the Malaysian artillery range might be required, a task which would form part of an offensive strategy toward the Malay Peninsula. For decades, using offence to secure the water source in the Malaysian territory had been an important mission for the SAF, but the modernisation of Malaysian ground troops may have challenged this offensive strategy. When comparing major weapon systems, the SAF generally still held superiority over the MAF, but this did not indicate that Kuala Lumpur had no chance of defying a Singaporean offence. Since swift and decisive victory was a central strategic objective of the SAF, to prolong warfare would be a useful countermeasure for the MAF.266 Since the 1970s, defence-oriented military technologies, such as anti-tank missiles and SAMs, had become abundant thus giving the inferior defence side advantages over the offence side. Since the 1990s, the Malaysian Army had introduced French Eryx, Pakistani Baktar Shikan and Russian 9M-131 anti-tank missiles, plus RPG-7 anti-tank rockets to replace the older systems such as the M-20 Bazooka.267 These anti-tank weapons might slow down or halt the progress of the SAF’s armoured spearheads. The introduction of British Javelin, Starburst, Rapier-2, Pakistani Anza-2, and Russian Igla-1 short range SAMs, was unable to challenge the RSAF’s air superiority but was a valuable countermeasure against air strike.268 Moreover, the Polish MBTs and artillery batteries could also contribute to the defence capability. Finally, rapidly developing urbanisation in the Johor State during this period provided plenty of obstruction, shelter, and concealment for defence.269 The constrained vision, mobility and fire power of mechanised troops

265 Alternative runway exercises transforming the highway into runway have been held since 1986. “Fact Sheet: The Alternative Runway Exercise”, Ministry of Defence, Singapore, 30 Nov. 2008 (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2008/nov/30nov08_nr/30nov08_fs.html) site accessed 18 October, 2011. 266 Kee Nguan Goh, The Singapore Army Moving Decisively beyond the Conventional, p. 6. 267 Malaysia imported 274 Eryx missiles in 1996-1997 and 2000, 450 Baktar Shikan missiles between 2002 and 2003, and 100 9M-131 missiles between 2001 and 2002. After 573 RPG-7s were put into service in the Malaysian Army in 2004, and the outdated M-20 3.5inch rocket was retired. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 28 October, 2011; IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 103, Issue 1, p. 163; Vol. 104, Issue 1, p. 182. 268 60 Javelin missiles were delivered in 1991, 504 Starburst missiles between 1995 and 1997, 160 Anza-2 missiles from 2002 to 2003 and 382 Igla-1 missiles in 2002. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 28 October, 2011; IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 108, Issue 1, p. 393. 269 Since 1991, the speed and scale of urbanisation in Johor is only second to Selangor in Malaysia. Jamaliah Jaafar, “Emerging Trends of Urbanisation in Malaysia”, Journal of the Department of Statistics, 186 in the urbanised area would be disadvantageous for an offensive strategy.270 In order to create strategic surprise for swift and decisive victory, the SAF might outflank its enemy using helicopter transport or amphibious operations, or a combination of both. Under air cover provided by the RSAF, a considerable number of helicopters, numerous small and medium landing craft as well as LSTs with helicopter decks, would make these operations workable. 271 Moreover, the Singapore Army could organise a rapid deployment unit with light-weight weapon systems, such as Pegasus howitzers, which are suitable for the embarkation of transporter aircraft, helicopters, and LSTs. Finally, this kind of operation could be used as a diversionary tactic because Kuala Lumpur would have to spare some forces to defend its coastlines. However, an outflank operation would be very risky because these transport vehicles would make easy targets for missiles and gunfire. Incomplete neutralisation of enemy fire would lead to a military disaster. It could come as no surprise to Singapore that Malaysia would want to keep up its military capability by purchasing specific weapon systems such as MBT and MLRS that had been available in international markets for decades.272 As a result, some contingency plans would have been put in place by the SAF. However, as Singapore has enjoyed general superiority, the possibility of a first strike by Malaysia using these weapon systems has been limited due to the foreseeable retaliation that would occur.

5. Conclusion Since independence, Singapore has comprehensively and systematically pursued national defence as a major strategic objective. The core value of their approach is for the sovereignty of the city state. Singapore has striven to achieve legitimacy existence in the international community by participating in a range of international organisations, such as the United Nations. Accordingly, the city state with its non-aligned position has developed a broad set of relationships with a diverse set of countries, from small nations such as Brunei, to super powers such as the United States. This extensive diplomatic network aids not only in preventing

Vol. 1, 2004, pp. 49-52 270 Urban areas significantly limit the vision and mobility of mechanised units. United States Marine Corps, Student Handout: Urban Warfare (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Crops University, 1999), pp. 2-3. 271 The RSN owned 34 landing craft utility (LCU), 100 landing craft vehicle and personnel (LCVP) and 450 landing craft assault (LCA), plus 4 Endurance Class LSTs in 2007. Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-08, pp. 699-700. 272 G-5 howitzer was put into production in 1982 and ASTROS II was operational in the Brazilian army in 1983. “Astros II”, Military Technology.com (http://www.army-technology.com/projects/astros/) site accessed 18 October, 2011; I B Greef, “South Africa’s Modern Long Tom”, Military History Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, June 1992 (http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol091ig.html) site accessed 18 October, 2011. 187 any hostility against Singapore from emerging, but also works toward building security during peace time. Although no military alliance can provide extended deterrence, the international security network with the US, the FPDA members and other countries might deter potential enemies. Secondly, the whole city state is integrated into a total defence strategy. Total defence comprises a number of factors which affect national defence, including economic support, the stability of domestic society with diverse ethnic groups, the preservation of strategic material such as water, and the establishment of a national identity. In support of the total defence, the dominant PAP has planned and executed defence affairs on a political level with very little opposition. In brief, it is not just the military in Singapore which has significantly contributed to national defence. Thirdly, the PAP government established the SAF by taking appropriate planning measures. Whilst the British garrison provided air and maritime protection, Singapore concentrated its ground troops for operation in landward threats and for protecting their water source. After the announcement of the withdrawal of the British detachment, the city state began to establish its own air and maritime defence. Air defence was concentrated on the support of land warfare, as well as interception. Meanwhile, maritime defence was centralised on sea denial. Aside from forming combat units, other supportive areas such as education, training, logistics, and a defence industry were simultaneously developed. Adjustments have been made along the way in the formation of the SAF based on international environment, financial affordability, and the military build-up of countries in the region. During these adjustments, the SAF can be seen to have taken gradual steps to develop a new type of military capability. Small numbers of new or used major weapon systems were introduced for relatively low cost, personnel training, and with a low impetus on the arms race with neighbouring countries. Subsequently, larger scale procurement would follow.273 During this slow-paced process, the related domestic defence industry was established, and provided commercial benefit. Finally, the relatively inactive military development of neighbouring countries was also beneficial for Singapore’s national defence. Different internal problems constrained the military build-ups of both Indonesia and Malaysia. The strategy transformation of the regime shift in Jakarta ruined the large fleets and wings from the Soviet Union which were established in the initial phase of the

273 Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore, p. 78. 188

Sukarno period. Subsequently, the military modernisation of Suharto’s administration was slow and the political upheavals in the late 1990s and early 2000s were disruptive. Therefore, since the mid-1960s Indonesia had insufficient military means to threaten Singapore. Internal turmoil such as the CPM, and the rebellion in Sarawak, made the MAF focus on anti-insurgency, while lacking real capability to threaten Singapore. Conversely, the rapid expansion of the SAF from the late 1960s and early 1970s meant that they enjoyed superiority over the MAF. The gradual transition of the MAF from internal security to conventional warfare was conducted in the mid-1970s, but Kuala Lumpur’s investment in national defence has been smaller than Singapore’s. Although some of Malaysia’s military procurements, such as the MLRS, started to challenge Singapore’s military superiority, the MAF was still generally weaker than the SAF. Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur’s lack of investment in national defence explained an important part of Singapore’s deterrence. Diplomacy plays an indispensible role in shaping Singapore’s deterrence. The strategic surroundings of the city state, including neighbouring countries, are generally peaceful with no direct or obvious threat to its national survival. Thus, an over reliance or emphasis on deterrence for maintaining national security may result in a tense atmosphere in the region or unnecessary alarm in neighbouring countries. Based on this consideration, despite the SAF’s military superiority, Singapore carries out cautious and gradual military build-ups. Additionally, the city state is determined to address international issues through diplomatic approaches rather than coercion or threat. There remain three future challenges to Singapore’s national security: matters regarding the economy, politics and regional countries. Firstly, while Singapore’s wide distribution of trade and investment in the world prevents other countries from wielding economic leverage, international economic upheavals may still be able to seriously shock the city state. As the prosperous economy in Singapore provided funds to meet the SAF’s requirements and stabilise society, the sustainability of economic growth is critical to general deterrence. After the global financial crisis in 2008, another potential wave of economic recession may have undermined the general deterrence of Singapore. Based on Singapore’s performance in the previous economic crises, a brief recession would not have serious consequences. However, if the recession were to last for years, general deterrence would be adversely affected both on economical and social level. The social effects of an economic recession, such as high unemployment, may stir up popular discontent toward the government, causing the PAP to redistribute national expenditure. In addition, the national income from GLCs and tax would 189 also be reduced. As a result, the defence budget would be reduced. Some major military projects, such as additional submarines or newer fighter aircraft, as well as the defence industry, would be affected. Moreover, if the recession were to continue until the next general election, the PAP’s dominance might be weakened with possible political changes as the next challenge. Secondly, the development of the SAF might suffer from political compromises. If the political ascendency of the PAP did not last, some compromises with opposition parties or social organisations would be unavoidable. Correspondingly, the organisation, strategy, or finances of the SAF might suffer from potential political compromises, for example defence issues such as national service. If the PAP cannot maintain the majority in the parliament as it has now, governmental control of mass media, internet and other means of public opinion will diminish. Subsequently, a greater proliferation of news and issues detrimental to general deterrence may occur. For example, a cross-ethnic dispute, particularly one involving the Malays, would create distrust among different ethnic communities and harm Singapore–Malaysia relations. If the PAP were to lose the power, it would have an effect on general deterrence. The reduction in votes for the PAP in the 2011 general election implied a greater possibility of this scenario than ever before.274 Thirdly, the military development of neighbouring countries especially Malaysia will probably be the most likely challenge to the national defence of Singapore. There would be two kinds of military challenge: asymmetrical and conventional. The former denotes that weapon systems are difficult for the SAF to counter, or that Singapore must respond asymmetrically. For example, a situation where Malaysian MLRSs are able to strike Singapore and flying projectiles are unlikely to intercept. In order to eradicate this threat, the SAF would probably need to employ far greater resources than those of the MAF. Following the long range howitzers and MLRS, short range ballistic missiles or rockets might be the next to be purchased. First-strike threats would be able to compensate for the superiority of the SAF and inflict strategic pressure on the decision-makers in Singapore. A conventional military challenge involves major weapon systems, such as fighters, over which the SAF have enjoyed superiority to date. This approach is more costly for Malaysia and Singapore can respond with the procurement of counterparts. However, this sort of conventional military capability is useful for defence against Singapore’s offensive strategy, as well as other scenarios which might present in

274 “Singapore Opposition Made ‘Landmark’ Election Gain”, BBC News, 9 May, 2011 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13313695) site accessed 19 October, 2011. 190 the South China Sea, for example. Singapore’s improving water supply security may be of far less concern than the danger presented by the strategic concern of a first strike threat. For the city state, it is of greater urgency for the near future to develop counterattack capabilities against this type of threat rather than conventional ones.

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Chapter Five

The Comparison of National Defence between

Singapore and Taiwan

Following the review of the development of deterrence strategies in Singapore and Taiwan in the previous chapters, this chapter presents a comparison of the respective countries’ national defence policies in terms of the similarities, differences, and underlying factors. Consequently, their achievements of deterrence are also examined and evaluated. As small states in strategic maritime locations, both Singapore and Taiwan generally have developed their own capability of general deterrence and utilise diplomatic arrangements for potential extended deterrence. The comparison between their different efforts can be divided into two levels of deterrence: extended and general deterrence. Although both countries’ scenarios of immediate deterrence are too diverse to compare, they will be selectively discussed in the comparison of general deterrence.

1. Extended Deterrence The strategic maritime locations of Singapore and Taiwan have offered them the opportunity to achieve extended deterrence, of which they both display diverse types. Singapore manages an international network of security including the US, the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) and regional countries, while Taiwan, due to its unique international status, mainly relies on an opaque extended deterrence and military supplies from the US. According to the separation agreement between Malaysia and Singapore, Singapore’s sovereignty has been generally accepted. Following the agreement, Singapore’s existence was further recognised by a large number of countries and reinforced by its membership of the United Nations. Singapore’s clear status as a sovereign state not only makes it difficult for the neighbouring countries to find legitimacy for annexing or using force against Singapore, but also provides a legal base for creating a multilateral security network. In addition to its membership of the FPDA, Singapore’s location and facilities provide a range of substantial cooperative opportunities with the US with regards to security issues. After Vietnam emerged as a threat in Southeast Asia from 1975, the city state built a number of bilateral security ties with other member countries. While no clear threat currently presents itself to Singapore, the city state has various options, beyond forming alliances, in selecting flexible forms of security ties with other 192 counties. After the Cold War, Singapore had more space to develop its international network of security. The city state now not only could deter potential enemies but also contribute to efforts aimed at stabilising the region. From its endeavours in the UN Security Council, its hosting of security dialogues and conferences, to its wide participation in military exercises and humanitarian aid, Singapore has become comprehensively involved in a range of international security issues, rather than simply relying on its strategic maritime location for security. In so doing, Singapore has proven that a country’s role in the international community need not be proportional to its size. Taiwan also had the potential to establish an international network of security, but as of the early 1970s it has been restricted by its abnormal status. The Chinese civil war between the Nationalist and Communist regimes and their continuous hostility has led to instability in the Taiwan Strait. The hostility following the Chinese civil war gives the Communist regime of China, that is, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), legitimacy to use force for “unification”. Similarly, the Nationalist regime fled to Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China (ROC), and, until 1991, aimed to “retake the mainland”.1 Due to the huge gap between the two, such as size of territory, population, and economics, utilising extended deterrence to check China’s strategic pressure is crucial for Taiwan. However, the decision-makers in Taipei did not take diplomatic measures similar to those of Singapore, because their attention was dominated by China. Few opportunities to avoid international isolation were available to Taiwan but it failed to take advantage of them. Before the early 1970s, the ROC regime in Taiwan had enjoyed relatively normal participation as “Free China” in the international community.2 It was a member of the United Nations, as well as most other related international organisations, and also had formal relations with several major countries such as the United States. Taiwan was also involved in some regional security events such as the Vietnam War, during which time Taiwan received direct and clear extended deterrence from the US by way of the US-ROC defence treaty. Japan was another potential provider of extended deterrence, due to geopolitical interests and historical linkage, but after World War II its new peace-oriented constitution eliminated this possibility. As a result, Japan could not provide any extended deterrence to Taiwan, even in a symbolic manner, as the

1 Huang-Chih Chiang and Jau-Yuan Hwang, “On the Statehood of Taiwan: A Legal Reappraisal”, in Peter C. Y. Chow (Ed.), The “One China” Dilemma (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 61. 2 Chen Jie, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan: Pragmatic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2002), p. 6. 193

FPDA provided to Singapore. Taipei’s defective policy led to the international isolation of Taiwan. The ROC regime, despite the previous governance and official title of China, actually became a small state after losing most of its territory during the war with the Communists between 1945 and 1949. As a small country, its international position as a sovereign state, which was crucial to its national survival, should have been carefully conserved and protected at all costs. Nevertheless, during the diplomatic war, Taipei and Beijing stuck to the “one China” doctrine. This doctrine denoted that only one regime could represent China. Accordingly, as one side achieves a diplomatic relationship with a particular country, the other side actively severs its relationship with that country. By adhering to this zero-sum pattern, the outcome was eventually disadvantageous to Taiwan. In essence, the ROC’s bargaining chips were inferior to the PRC’s, because the former’s territory, population, and natural resources were much smaller than the latter’s.3 If Taipei had been able to consider the practical solutions to the situation and to promote “double recognition”, or other alternatives before its major defeat in the diplomatic war, that is the loss of its UN seat in 1971, a relatively stronger international position might have been secured. Had this loss not occurred, Taiwan would have had a chance of adopting a strategy which combined deterrence with diplomacy, similar to that of Singapore. Unfortunately, Chiang Kai-shek and other political elites in Taipei rigidly believed that the legitimacy of the ROC regime was unchallengeable or non-negotiable, and kept the diplomatic war to a zero-sum game pattern. As a result, Taiwan finally lost its UN membership in 1971 and began its growing isolation from the international community. Thereafter, Taiwan did lose all formal relationships with regional and major countries, including the US. Taiwan’s international isolation created a diplomatic dilemma. On the one hand, it was difficult for Taiwan to obtain stable or reliable extended deterrence due to a lack of formal relationships and alliances. As an example, the US, Taiwan’s most likely protector, has unilaterally handled its extended deterrence since the termination of the ROC-US defence treaty in 1979, due to China’s pressure within the three US-Sino communiqués. In other words, extended deterrence for Taiwan is uncertain. On the other hand, Taiwan’s effort to improve its international position may be treated as a challenge to the status quo. China has objected to all of Taiwan’s attempts to set up formal relationships with any other country, and other countries concerned about China’s possible reactions are unlikely to support any of

3 Ibid, p. 28 194

Taiwan’s movements toward its international status as a sovereign state.4 While Singapore and Taiwan have different situations of extended deterrence, both of them benefit from another form of extended deterrence—the Pax Americana. Both during and after the Cold War, US maritime hegemony has secured sea transport, which is the economic lifeline for Singapore and Taiwan. In terms of the naval capability of these two small states, it is impossible to protect their sea lines of communication (SLOCs) or to deter other countries from denying their SLOCs, thus emphasising their reliance on a maritime power.

2. General Deterrence The comparison between the general deterrence of Singapore and Taiwan illustrates that an appropriate policy and its implementation is likely to be more influential than natural conditions. Taiwan enjoys better geographic conditions than Singapore, but negative factors such as international isolation and political influences contribute to Taiwan’s underachievement. The Taiwan Strait and the Pacific Ocean would force any invader to prepare a difficult amphibious operation for substantial capture, and other types of attacks would merely be auxiliary or psychological. The weather, sea conditions and the limited number of beaches restrict the number of suitable landing locations.5 Additionally, the relatively flat sea surface makes approaching adversary aircraft and cruise missiles obvious on radar, meanwhile providing more reaction time than would be available on land. If an invader were to take an indirect strategy, such as a blockade, the considerable agricultural production on the island, in addition to the abundant water resources, would provide for basic needs and thus reduce the effect of the blockade. Furthermore, the mountainous terrain would give the defender some additional strategic depth for resistance after an invader had landed. Conversely, due to the narrowness of the Straits of Johor, there are more tactical options for invading Singapore. An adversary army could cross these straits with normal field engineering equipment, and conventional artillery would be sufficient to cover such an operation. Its small territory and insufficient domestic water supply also make Singapore vulnerable to indirect tactics such as being besieged. Moreover, the Malay Peninsula provides a useful cover for invading

4 Edward Friedman, “An End to Europe’s “One China” Policy?”, in Peter C. Y. Chow (Ed.), The “One China” Dilemma, pp. 150-153. 5 David Shambaugh, “A Matter of Time: Taiwan’s Eroding Military Advantage”, The Washington Quarterly, 23(2), Spring 2000, pp. 122-123.

195 aircraft and cruise missiles. World War II demonstrated the different conditions for defence in Singapore and Taiwan. In 1942, shortly after the start of the war, Singapore was captured by the Imperial Japanese Army and Marine Corps, which achieved this conquest with relatively poor equipment, whereas the stronger US Navy and Marine Corps bypassed Formosa and chose the smaller island of Okinawa to invade in 1945. Leaving aside the natural conditions, Taiwan’s political, economic, social, and military performance in general deterrence is poorer than that of its Singaporean counterpart. These two small states both began with authoritarian political systems, but in the 1990s Taiwan started its democratisation, which had an impact on general deterrence. The political outline of Singapore roughly resembles that of Taiwan during the authoritarian period with one ruling party having firm dominance over the country. Under this kind of political system, a government could mobilise all available resources to pursue its general deterrence without opposition. The tight control of public education and mass media, as well as other means of public opinion, left almost no space for defeatism or external adversarial propaganda. Furthermore, both countries had internal security mechanisms to prevent adversary penetration, insurgency and anti-governmental movements. 6 Additionally, as no significant opposition party or other form of political power was able to impede defence policy, sufficient resources were invested in defence, along with cooperation from other sectors of government. Unlike Singapore’s policy of total defence, Taiwan could not present a complete policy but its performance on general deterrence during its authoritarian period was comparable to that of Singapore. However, history of statehood marks a critical difference between Singapore and Taiwan, and has determined how they have dealt with the similar characteristics that they share, such as a fragmented population and a short national history. Since Singapore became an independent sovereign state clearly separated from Malaysia, the PAP government accepted the reality of a newly born small state with a diverse-ethnic population composed of various Chinese ethnic groups, Malays, Indians and Europeans. Through a range of socialisation policies geared towards building a nation, the PAP government not only accepted and respected the specific culture of each major community, but also consciously set out to build the statehood of Singapore with a multicultural identity. The

6 Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 49-50, 57-59; Joseph B. Tamney, The Struggle over Singapore’s Soul: Western Modernization and Asian Culture (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1996), p. 61. 196 multicultural characteristic has been considered a vital element of Singapore’s nation-building, and individual community differences were respected rather than suppressed. English was set as a common language and this helped to relieve tensions among the different communities, while also providing a great economic advantage. Although Singapore reintroduced Chinese culture, including Confucianism, to the Chinese community after 1979, this policy was carefully implemented by the PAP government in order to control any impact which it might have on the modern economy or national identity. After more than four decades Singapore may not have fully overcome the stigma of having a short national history, but its practical nation-building—which managed to integrate a diverse range of ethnic people—can, to some extent, be regarded as the genesis of a multi-nation state. During Taiwan’s authoritarian period, the solution to the problem of a fragmented population and short national history was exactly the opposite to that of Singapore: it was a coercive approach to nation-building and introduction of uniform measures with no concern for the differences between its peoples of various ethnic groups. After fleeing from China to Formosa in 1949, neither Chiang Kai-shek nor his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, formally accepted their defeat. Instead they insisted that the ROC regime in Taiwan was still the only legitimate government of China. The ROC regime endeavoured to uniformly sinicise the people of Formosa, regardless of their cultural and linguistic background, through public education, military service, mass media, and other means of socialisation with Mandarin as the sole language. The cultures and languages of various communities such as Formosan, Hakka, and aboriginal groups have thus been gradually eroding and vanishing over the course of the sinicisation measures.7 The legitimacy of the ROC regime in Taiwan became well established, especially amongst the younger generations, but the effects of the strict sinicisation measures include subsequent emergence of some defects. The nation-building approach of the ROC regime also caused some problems for general deterrence. Firstly, this regime, which represented China, was detrimental to the goal of maintaining a healthy relationship with the international community, and, since the early 1970s, has led to the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan. As a result, the Taiwanese people might doubt the ideology and legitimacy of the

7 Peter Harmsen, “Taiwan faces complex language legacy”, AFP News, 29 July, 2010 (http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hQCWYHB_dRgmHaQhraDTZksGfx1A), site accessed 3 August, 2010; Masahiro Wakabayashi, “Taiwanese’s Identity and the ‘unforgettable others’”, Edward Friedman (Ed.), China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas and International Peace (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 12-13. 197

ROC regime. Secondly, the uniform sinicisation, which was not totally accepted despite its effective implementation, provoked some antagonism from the native Taiwanese. This antagonism became one of the fundamental tenets of political opposition.8 Thirdly, nation-building focused on Sinicisation was a weakness that China could utilise through propaganda and other psychological tactics related to Chinese nationalism. Nevertheless, the negative effects did not emerge during the authoritarian period. At this time the authority in Taipei had sufficient power to control society, so that the people’s doubts and discontent were hidden or suppressed. Consequently, Beijing had difficulty in undermining Taiwan’s general deterrence through propaganda or the subversion of Taipei’s authority. However, it should be noted that these defects in general deterrence have appeared during the democratisation of Taiwan. The era of democratisation exposed issues which were previously hidden during the authoritarian period and Taiwan’s general deterrence began to fall significantly behind Singapore’s. Firstly, a key problem was that no common national identity has been built. The original statement, “the only legitimate regime of China,” gradually collapsed due to actual events and democratisation. Democratisation provided freedom for the politicians and the people of Taiwan to express diverse identities. Some believe themselves to be Chinese, others see themselves as Taiwanese or Formosan, while others prefer the status quo. The divergent identities do not correspond perfectly with the different ethnic groups, but the population remains fragmented based on differences in their political views. Undoubtedly, the issues related to having a short national history have not been dealt; this is evidenced by the fact that national identity is so diverse.9 This situation is unfavourable to general deterrence, because each group has its own idea of what national survival should mean. For people of Chinese identity, the national survival of Taiwan or the ROC regime might not be important because China’s annexation could be a path to the goal of a unified fatherland. This group therefore lacks the firm resolve to defend the status quo. In other words, there has been no clear political consensus to support national defence, a failing which has been amplified by the democratic mechanism. For instance, during the period of democratisation, defence budgets were suspended or slashed because national defence was not commonly supported by the majority of politicians or parties. Meanwhile military threats from China continued to accelerate. Secondly, Taiwan’s democracy leaves it open to a number of vulnerabilities

8 Masahiro Wakabayashi, “Taiwanese’s Identity and the “unforgettable others””, p. 13. 9 Shiau-chi Shen and Nai-the Wu, “Ethnic and Civic Nationalism: Two Roads to the Formation of A Taiwanese Nation ”, in Peter C. Y. Chow (Ed.), The “One China” Dilemma, pp. 118-119. 198 which Singapore does not have. The Constitution of the ROC regime was modified several times in the 1990s in pursuit of democratisation, but these modifications resulted in a minority government being formed between 2000 and 2008. The situation of the minority government and related political deadlock impeded both the development of a political consensus on national survival and agreement on the defence budget. In addition, through Taiwan’s freedom of speech and publishing policies, China’s propaganda has found an easy route into Taiwan and has had considerable impact. The effect of Chinese propaganda has been amplified by the fact communication being in Mandarin, and the growing economic ties across the Taiwan Strait.10 For a people without a clear national identity, these psychological tactics have gradually undermined general deterrence. It is unlikely that Singapore will face the same general deterrence problems as Taiwan once its democratisation occurs. While the PAP government’s dominance may hide imperfections related to nation-building, its goal is compatible with Singapore’s status quo and its domestic characteristics, such as having a multi-ethnic population. Additionally, the international status of the city state is universally recognised. Thus, if there were to be a domestic political change in Singapore, such as a strong opposition party or even a different ruling party, a political situation of split national identities would be unlikely to occur. For small states, particularly those with a low level of self-sufficiency, such as Singapore and Taiwan, the economy is a crucial factor in general deterrence. There are two economic dimensions to compare in general deterrence: peacetime and wartime. The former refers to the capability of responding to adversarial economic leverage in peacetime, such as boycotts or embargoes; and the latter denotes the capability of countering an opponent’s economic sanctions during wartime, such as blockade or other tactics which would seriously threaten national survival, for example, cutting the water supply to Singapore. Regarding the economy in peacetime, Singapore distributes its trade, investment and other forms of economic activities more evenly to various countries than Taiwan does. Despite its considerable amount of investment and trade with its neighbouring countries, the city state has developed its links with the global economy, rather than concentrating on any specific country.11 Thus, it is not easy for a specific country to use economic coercion against Singapore in

10 Masahiro Wakabayashi, “Taiwanese’s Identity and the “unforgettable others””, pp. 15-16. 11 According to the World Trade Organisation, Singapore’s highest trade is with Malaysia, which occupies less than 12%, but China shares more than 40% of Taiwan’s export and 14% of import. “Trade Profile”, World Trade Organization (http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/singapore_e.htm; http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=TW) site accessed 13 March, 2012. 199 peacetime. Furthermore, the Singaporean government’s comprehensive influence on the economy means that it can mobilise resources during an economic crisis. Indeed, Singapore’s comprehensive participation in global and regional economic organisations, in addition to its wide diplomatic network prevents an over-concentration of trade with or dependence on specific countries. The economic performance of Taiwan’s general deterrence has been undermined by its increasing economic ties with China. During the authoritarian period, Taiwan’s economy relied on domestic industries and trade with the US, Japan and other countries without territorial ambitions. On the one hand, the ROC regime strictly prohibited economic contact with China. On the other hand, Beijing—under the Maoist doctrine—was unable to receive foreign investment or practice other means of capitalist economic development. Thus, China could not utilise its cheap labour, the power of Mandarin, or any other advantages to establish Taiwan-Sino economic ties, nor could it manipulate or create any economic leverage against Taiwan. However, after democratisation, with the loosening of governmental control in Taiwan—owing to the socialisation efforts of Sinicisation and China’s intentional attraction—Taiwan’s overseas investments and trade have shifted, with growing concentration on China, despite the missile crisis of 1996 and other forms of coercion used by China. As a consequence of this shift, Beijing has developed the potential to manipulate Taipei: through business people, investment, trade and other economic means. Another method of strengthening a small state’s general and extended deterrence is to increase the stakes other countries have in it. This can be achieved by accumulating foreign investment from other countries without posing any survival threats. Singapore takes a lead in attracting foreign investment. The foreign investment in the city state is aimed at its proximity to foreign markets and the natural resources of its neighbouring countries. Additionally, foreign capital has been invested in a range of Singapore’s domestic businesses, such as its petroleum refineries. Moreover, the English-speaking government and people have had success in attracting foreign investment. Accumulating foreign investment increases the interests other countries have in Singapore and complicates the outcomes of using force there. The smaller scale of foreign investments in Taiwan is a result of both its location and its inadequate policies.12 Geographically, Taiwan has only three neighbouring countries: China, Japan, and the Philippines. As such, Taiwan is not a convenient regional business hub or bridgehead for neighbouring

12 Foreign investment did not reach 10% of Taiwan’s total investment until 2000. Cal Clark and Alexander C. Tan, Taiwan’s Political Economy: Meeting Challenges, Pursuing Progress (London: Lynne Rienner, 2012), pp. 13-27 200 countries who want to invest there, especially in light of its isolated international status. Additionally, a range of businesses, such as petroleum in Taiwan, has been nationalised or highly controlled by the ROC regime since they took over from Japan in the mid-1940s.13 Further, the non-English speaking community and the administration also contribute to difficulties in foreign investment in the country. With a relatively large territory, the self-sufficiency of Taiwan—for basic needs, such as food and water—is much better than Singapore. Further, the mountainous territory of Taiwan provides greater strategic depth. Finally, self-sufficiency can be further enhanced by use of the ethanol fuel from Taiwan’s sugar industry as a partial substitute for gasoline, as was done during the Pacific War.14 Singapore has acknowledged the defects of its geographic conditions, and consequently began to build underground bases, arsenals, and fuel tanks. Moreover, due to the military superiority of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) over its counterparts in neighbouring countries, Singapore can effectively launch retaliations or pre-emptive strikes to neutralise a number of threats. Additionally, the importance of its geographic location on the main SLOCs would cause unpredictable outcomes for naval blockades or other forms of maritime warfare against Singapore. Should such a blockade occur, the influence on the SLOCs in the strategic Strait of Malacca would be likely to invite one or more external powers to intervene. The closure or disruption of the Malacca and adjacent straits would disrupt the economies of East Asia, including China, Korea and Japan, as the majority of their petroleum supplies and trade pass through it. This economic shock would affect the US as well due to deepening global interdependency. Furthermore, a blockade in the Malacca Straits would present a challenge to US maritime hegemony, and Washington has already demonstrated its resolve to protect freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Sidra and the Strait of Hormuz.15

13 Denny Roy, Taiwan: A Political History (New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 63-64; “A Look at History”, State-Owned Enterprise Commission (http://www.sec.gov.tw/English/CNCAFRAME1.HTML) site accessed 25 February, 2012. 14 William Kovarik, “Ethanol's First Century: Fuel blending and substitution programs in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America”, the XVI International Symposium Alcohol Fuels, Rio de Janeiro, 26-29November, 2006 (http://www.radford.edu/wkovarik/papers/International.History.Ethanol.Fuel.html) site accessed 25 February, 2012. 15 James Gerstenzang, “U.S. Navy Ends Maneuvers in Gulf of Sidra”, Los Angeles Times, March 28, 1986 (http://articles.latimes.com/1986-03-28/news/mn-624_1_u-s-navy), site accessed 22 March, 2012; “World Oil Transit Chokepoint”, U.S. Energy Information Administration (http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=WOTC#hormuz) site accessed 22 March, 2012; “US Warns Iran over Threat to Block Oil Route”, BBC News, 28 December, 2011 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16348633) site accessed 22 March, 2012. 201

Taiwan’s situations in a wartime economy, on the other hand, would be a relatively disadvantageous one. Despite disputes with the Philippines and Japan regarding water territory, the blockade zone around Taiwan is much clearer. In other words, there is less complexity involved in a naval blockade or other type of naval operation against Taiwan than one against Singapore. Taiwan’s ambiguous relations with China also give Beijing some legitimacy in its military actions, or at least a reason to reject external intervention. Moreover, it is unlikely that Taiwan would be able to present a military capability that could neutralise the military assets of China for blockade, either retaliation or pre-emptive strike, due to its large territory and the size of China’s armed forces. A US intervention—due to a disturbance of SLOCs or a regional situation—could be a solution, but it would be a passive one with timing, method, and extent remaining uncertain. On the matter of military capability, Taiwan has larger armed forces than Singapore does, but Taiwan’s armed forces’ contribution to deterrence has been constrained for a number of reasons, including poor planning and management, and international isolation. It should be noted that Taiwan’s international isolation is a significant matter. It is impossible for small states to possess all the necessary military technologies, thus making foreign arms sources crucial. Based on its normal international status, as well as its security network, Singapore has a broad range of sources of foreign arms to serve its military needs. The city state also has the flexibility to obtain new and used weapon systems from different countries to fit in with its demands. In the initial decade of the SAF, the majority of weapon systems were second-hand acquisitions and sometimes a single type was obtained from various sources. For instance, the Strikemaster aircraft came from Britain, South Yemen, and Oman.16 Although Singapore’s economy is more supportive of its defence needs and many brand new weapon systems have been introduced, used ones, such as the German Leopard 2A4 main battle tanks (MBTs), continue to be an important source. Singapore’s international network also accommodates overseas training and joint exercises to supplement the SAF’s lack of training space and combat experience. This network has also helped to establish Singapore’s defence industry and provide export opportunities. Taiwan has not sufficiently accessed non-US arms sources. Except for a few projects such as Italian mini submarines, the Taipei authority did not make significant efforts to broaden its foreign sources of arms before falling into international isolation.17 Since the 1970s, some foreign technologies were adapted

16 The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 28 October, 2011. 17 William J. Durch, the Navy of Republic of China: History, Problems and Prospects (Arlington, Virginia: 202 by Taiwan in order to develop a domestic defence industry. For example, Israel provided Dvora missile boats and Gabriel anti-ship missiles in the late 1970s. A few breakthroughs in foreign procurements during international isolation, such as Dutch Zwaardvis Class diesel-electric submarines in the 1980s, were achieved, but they were too few and unstable to replace the scale and reliability of the American source. After the end of the Cold War, the situation was a little better, evidenced in the procurement of French Mirage-2000 fighters, Lafayette Class frigates, and German mine countermeasure ships. 18 However, while China’s diplomatic pressure remained significant, Taiwan has been unable to secure stable and continuous sources of military equipment and technologies. Taiwan’s most reliable arms source is the US, which has been prone to fluctuation depending on the US-Sino relationship. Before the termination of the formal relationship between Taipei and Washington in 1979, Washington had already been cautious about providing arms to Taiwan. For instance, the US refused some of Taiwan’s requirements for their offensive capability, such as F-4 Phantom fighters. After 1979, a range of American weapons sensitive to Beijing, such as F-16 Falcon fighters, were removed from the sales list. The alternatives that the US provided were older types of weapon systems, as well as support of an indigenous defence industry assisted by American technology. The former was often comprised of retired weapon systems from the US armed forces and its allies. For instance, the F-104 Starfighter aircraft which Taiwan received in the 1980s came from the US, Germany, and Japan. The latter comprised the indigenous defence fighter (IDF, later named the Ching-kuo fighter), a range of missiles, Perry Class frigates and M-48H MBTs. During the post-Cold War era, Washington has become more likely to sell major weapon systems to Taiwan since the F-16 deal in 1992, but the US still often denies Taiwan’s requests. Furthermore, domestic factors began to affect arms procurement from the US. While the Bush Administration added a few major weapon systems such as submarines on the sales list, Taiwan lost the purchase opportunity because the major defence budget for arms procurement was boycotted by the opposition parties in the parliament due to domestic political struggle. The unavailability of foreign arms sources has a serious and direct affect on the planning and execution of general deterrence. While Singapore has room to negotiate for the best deal according to its strategic planning, Taiwan is relegated to simply considering what is available—suitability or worthiness playing a

Center for Naval Analysis, 1976), p. 27. 18 The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html) site accessed 28 October, 2011. 203 relatively small part in Taipei’s considerations. For instance, when Taiwan considered the next generation of MBTs in the 2000s, the only feasible option was the American M1A1, but they were expensive—as was the high fuel consumption of their gas-turbine engines, and Washington’s wavering position presented an uncertainty. Other MBTs such as the German Leopard were not considered in Taiwan due to the difficulty of procuring them. However, when Singapore was faced with the same situation, the SAF was able to procure cheaper used Leopard 2A4s MBTs with more efficient diesel engines.19 International isolation has also suffocated Taiwan’s defence industry. Taiwan began developing its defence industry in the late 1960s aided by the US. After a few assembly projects, such as the UH-1 Huey helicopter and F-5E Tiger II fighter in the 1970s, Taiwan had the challenge of a high-technology-required aviation project—the indigenous defence fighter (IDF)—due to Washington’s unlikely sale of F-16s. Owing to the same difficulty of procurement, naval vessels, MBTs, and missiles had to be produced by Taiwan’s defence industry. After all, Taiwan’s defence industry comprised assembling, manufacturing, and partial design capabilities of aerial, maritime and land systems. However, these investments and accomplishments were uneconomical, due to limited access to international markets under the international isolation. Only a small quantity of indigenous firearms, ammunition, and retired aircraft were donated overseas, mainly to the countries which maintained formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. 20 Since military export has been restricted, several major manufacturers in the defence industry, such as the Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation, transferred their focus to civil sectors.21 In contrast to Taiwan, Singapore’s establishment of a defence industry was entirely its own decision. The city state did not immediately take on difficult projects, such as fighters or tanks, but commenced with licensed production, maintenance and overhaul projects. Later, Singapore invested significant resources in developing advanced land and maritime systems, such as howitzers and landing

19 Brian Hsu, “MND Said It Deed Ask US for M1 Tank”, Taipei Times, 7 Nov., 2001 (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2001/11/07/0000110451) site accessed 23 February, 2012; Greg Williams, the Army’s M-1 Tank: Has it Lived up to Expectation? (Washington D.C.: Project on Government Oversight, 1990), p. 2. 20 The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html; accessed 20111028); “UAE “Given Gun” for Chen Visit”, Taipei Times, 9 Oct., 2005 (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/10/09/2003275057) site accessed 24 February, 2012. 21 “Product & Services”, the Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (http://www.aidc.com.tw/enn/services-2.asp) site accessed 23 February, 2012. 204 platform docks (LPDs).22 While foreign sources were available, high cost projects such as an indigenous combat aircraft had not yet been included, nevertheless, as early as the 1970s Singapore’s defence industry began modifying foreign systems, such as the A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft, to suit its own needs. Although the share of Singaporean weapon systems within the global arms market is still limited, some successful deals, such as the Bronco All Terrain Tracked Carriers to Britain for use in Afghanistan and LSDs to Thailand, have demonstrated the economic potential of Singapore’s defence industry. Due to the difficulties Taiwan has procuring arms, its defence industry has contributed to its general deterrence more than Singapore’s. Without the Ching-kuo fighters or other indigenously designed, manufactured, or assembled weapon systems, Taiwan’s military capability would suffer as aging equipment were not replaced. However, insufficient investment and international isolation constrained the further development of Taiwan’s defence industry. In contrast, with the exception of a few foreign client projects, Singapore’s defence industry is not lucrative either, but the PAP government’s clear perception of increasing self-sufficiency and mastering military technology, plus allocating an adequate budget, has led to a considerable growth in its defence industry. As far as building and organising armed forces in a small state, a clear strategy is of the utmost importance, and this is something which Singapore managed better than Taiwan. The military structure of the SAF presents a clear strategy but their Taiwanese counterparts displayed an attitude of hesitation, at least until the reforms of the 1990s. From the beginning, Singapore had freedom to establish its own armed forces, as opposed to Taiwan, which inherited the defeated armed forces of the ROC regime that had fled from China. The city state initially developed its army with a range of weapon systems suitable for blitzkrieg in the Malay Peninsula. Next, it established its navy (the Republic of Singapore Navy, or RSN) for sea denial, transport of the army, and limited protection of SLOCs. The air force (the Republic of Singapore Air Force, or RSAF) was also formed for air defence and to support land and sea operations. The size and strength of these three services were controlled by the civil government, and aligned with its strategy. According to the development of military capability, Singapore evolved its strategy from the “poison shrimp”, to the “pre-emptive strike”, and then added more preparations for hostile first strikes. Taiwan, on the other hand, inherited army-dominated armed forces from

22 Although the RSN coded the Endurance Class as LST, those ships are actually LPDs. Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005-2006(Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2005), p. 676. 205 the ROC regime which fled from China in 1949. As such, it could not optimise its armed forces with a proper defence strategy due to political concerns. With regard to defending Formosa, the army (the ROC Army, or ROCA) would not be as important as the air force (ROCAF) and navy (ROCN). However, under the political guidelines “to retake the mainland”, the ROCA’s size had been large, albeit gradually decreasing. This army, plus the ROCN’s Marine Corps, were a crucial symbol of the ROC regime’s legitimacy for their potential use of force in China. With the same concerns, hundreds of thousands of soldiers were assigned to deploy to the islands close to the Chinese coast, which meant that the ROC regime still controlled a small piece of China’s territory. The ROCN and ROCAF were also required to support the offensive strategy with their considerable amphibious fleet and a significant number of transport aircraft.23 Compared with Singapore, these distinct strategic goals caused a number of difficulties for Taipei in maintaining its armed forces. Firstly, when the SAF developed its capabilities under a consistent strategy, its counterpart in Taiwan had to combine real defensive and virtual offensive strategies. Thus, the scale of the ROCA and other offensive troops was kept large so that the national resource of defence was not optimally distributed. Had the ROCAF and ROCN had more resources, they could have been better developed—this would have been in-line with a more realistic strategy of defence. Secondly, as a benefit from its relatively small size, the SAF was able to maintain a reasonable lifespan for its equipment. Since its establishment, the SAF has endeavoured to prevent obsolescence in its weapon systems by means of modifications prior to introduction, upgrades in the course of service and replacement with newer counterparts at the end of service. However, Taiwan has had difficulty maintaining a moderate service cycle for a major portion of its equipment, particularly within the ROCA and ROCN, due to Taipei being unable to afford a high level of expenditure due to the large size of its forces. This problem of outdated arms was amplified by an unstable arms supply from foreign sources and a defence budget that has been inadequate since the late 1990s. As a result, these antique vehicles, weapons and other systems from the Vietnam War era, even some from World War II, are in continuous service. The relatively poor performance, reliability, and safety of these outdated systems have a negative influence on general deterrence. The military reform during Taiwan’s democratisation was meant to fit its real needs, but it did not effectively strengthen Taiwan’s general deterrence.

23 In 1967, there were about 100 transporter aircraft comprising C-46, C-47, C-119 and C-123 under the ROCAF, as the ROCN possessed 27 tank landing ships (LST), 18 medium landing ships (LSM). The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance, 67 (1), 1967, p. 38. 206

Following the political changes, Taipei finally abandoned the offensive goals and focused on defence by reorganising the armed forces, including a massive reduction of its ground troops since the 1990s. However, there were several drawbacks to this reform. Firstly, new threats from China, such as ballistic and cruise missiles, require responses, however these responses seem insufficient at this stage as the related military capabilities are only partially built. After more than a decade of the missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1996, Taiwan has neither deployed a sufficient number of similar missiles for retaliation or pre-emptive strikes, nor introduced adequate anti-missile systems for denial—either from domestic or foreign sources. Comparatively, Singapore’s responses to Kuala Lumpur’s procurement of multi-launch rocket systems (MLRSs) were far more rapid and effective. After Malaysia’s introduction of MLRS in the early 2000s, Singapore took both punishment and denial approaches. The Singapore Army purchased the American MLRS equivalent, that is, high mobility artillery rocket systems (HIMARSs) with guided projectiles to balance the threat. The city state is also considering missile / rocket defence systems such as the Israeli Iron Dome system in parallel with continuous construction of its underground facilities. Secondly, the life cycle of weapon systems in Taiwan has not been improved. For example, the ROCN still possesses a number of landing ships built during World War II, while the RSN retired similar vessels in the early 2000s.24 Taipei has not expressed a clear solution to managing its outdated weapon systems which are indirectly affecting Taiwan’s general deterrence as well. After operating and maintaining these obsolescent weapon systems, it is difficult for Taiwanese conscripts to form a positive view of national defence, causing their confidence and resolve to ultimately deteriorate. The conscripts’ negative impressions then spill over into general society and undermine overall morale. In contrast, through using high-tech gear such as Global Positioning Systems during their military service, the Singaporean servicemen would gain a strong confidence in national defence which would then be passed on to society at large, as well as to any potential enemy. Thirdly, the conscription system in Taiwan has encountered a number of fundamental problems: public pressure to shorten the term of service, mobilisation, and low birth rates. Since democratisation, there have been strong public opinions voiced in Taiwan, demanding a transformation from conscription to a voluntary system. This pressure has pushed the government to shorten the service terms

24 IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 100 Issue 1, 2000, p. 184; Vol. 111, Issue 1, 2011, p. 404; Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005-2006, p. 742. 207 several times, and in 2013, male citizens will only be required to take four months of military training.25 Conversely, while the PAP has always maintained a dominant position, the public pressure on national service is relatively low and the two year period of national service is still in operation. In addition to providing manpower for regular troops, another important purpose of conscription is to mobilise reserve soldiers during a crisis—this is something Singapore has had more success with than Taiwan. The Singaporean reserve soldiers report to mobilisation with their personal equipment and uniform within 12 hours of being called, with related exercises often announced without advance notice.26 In contrast, the reserve command in Taiwan merely asks reserves to report with personal identification and identity seals, as exercises are announced in advance.27 In other words, the readiness of Taiwanese reserve troops is lower than that of their Singaporean counterparts. Considering the strategic relevance of the Taiwan Strait being wider than the Johor Straits, the lower level of readiness may indeed be more acceptable. Nevertheless, mobilising reserves after only four months of training will remain a serious challenge for the foreseeable future. This short period may lead to inadequate training and experience, especially for operations higher than battalion level. Another challenge to conscription, which both Singapore and Taiwan face, is a decreasing supply of soldiers due to low birth rates. The structural modification in Taiwan’s defence reform reduced the requirement for manpower, and shortening the terms of military service also lessened the demand for soldiers. However, the dramatically plummeting birth rate in Taiwan may still pose a challenge to human resources for the armed forces in the future, regardless of whether a conscription or voluntary system is in place.28 With regards to Singapore, due to the strategic

25 Lee Seok Hwai, “Taiwan to cut conscription to 4 months in 2013”, the Strait Times, 31 Dec., 2011, Asia News Network (http://www.asianewsnet.net/home/news.php?id=25731) site accessed 23 February, 2012. 26 “Mobilisation”, the NSMEN website, Ministry of Defence, Singapore (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/nsmen/opsready/Mobilisation.html) site accessed 8 January, 2012. 27 “ ♻楕岢傃 Jhao Ji Syunlian (Mobilisation training), the Reserve Command (http://afrc.mnd.gov.tw/Together/net_33000.htm) site accessed 8 January, 2012. 28 Luo Bing-Shiung 刔䍂楓 & Deng Shiue-Tsung 掶⸇⸦, “Guojiun Bingli Jiegou Jr Jengti Gueihua Goushiang ⦚慜␄┪俟㱚⃚㠃浣尞┒㱚㎂ ᧤The Plan of Arranging the Military Structure of the ROC Forces᧥”, in Luo Bing-Shiung, Li Cheng-Bau 㧝⩝≬ and Hu Ruei-fu 印䛭䰞(Ed.), Guojiun Tueidung Chiuan Mubingjr Mianlin Jr Kuenjing Yu Tsejin Fangan ⦚慜㘷╤⏷╮␄Ⓟ槱呷⃚⥿⬒咖 ䷥拁㡈㫗 ᧤The Difficulties and Solutions of the All Voluntarism System in the ROC Forces᧥(Taipei: Management College, National Defence University, 2008), pp. 9-10. 208 importance of its army, the SAF does not have much room to modify its structure so it instead took comprehensive measures to save human resources by using more automation and privatisation in the logistics departments. Furthermore, population policies against low birth rates, such as tax incentives to encourage procreation, have been taken. Fourthly, under its international isolation, Taiwan’s armed forces lacked interaction with its foreign counterparts in order to test its capabilities or adjust any imperfections of the reform. Except for the small-scale joint exercises with the Singapore Army’s training detachment in Taiwan, there was only a limited quota of personnel exchanges with foreign troops, mainly the US, and Taiwan received only a few inspections by the US experts.29 Without sufficient inspections or reviews, Taiwan’s armed forces have been unable to accurately identify the drawbacks and pitfalls of their tactics, strategies, and doctrines. Comparatively, the SAF have plenty of opportunities to learn from the experience of foreign armed forces. Moreover, the SAF’s opportunities for joint exercises, overseas training and personnel exchanges are growing in number and scale. Unlike Taiwan, Singapore has conducted major joint exercises with a large number of countries, such as Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, India and the US. Finally, an insufficient budget has impeded Taiwan’s military modernisation. While facing the expanding People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Taiwan did not respond sufficiently. The total defence budget had been roughly capped since the mid-1990s, and inflation has resulted in an actual decrease in the budget. During the period of the minority government of the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) between 2000 and 2008, the problem of an insufficient defence budget became worse and saliently impeded the procurement of major weapon systems. The other issues already mentioned are also partially related to an insufficient budget. Comparatively, Singapore’s defence budget has been approximately 6% of its GDP, and this amount continues to grow along with economic growth. Taiwan’s military reform, which began in the 1990s, should have brought a major improvement to its general deterrence, but its outcome has been limited due to a range of domestic and international factors. While the SAF further contributes to Singapore’s general deterrence by adapting its version of military transformation modelled after the RMA of the US, Taiwan’s military reform has been markedly inadequate in maintaining its general deterrence in the face of China’s military modernisation. While the defence ministry and other related

29 From September 1999 to early 2000, the Office of the Secretary of Defence laid out more than 300 recommendations for Taiwan. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 244. 209 departments may have had a comprehensive strategy for the RMA, its execution has been lacking. Given that an adequate budget had had been available, it remained questionable as to whether the US would supply appropriate technologies. Comparisons of each service are indispensable when elucidating how the armed forces contribute to general deterrence in Singapore and Taiwan. In terms of the army and other ground troops, Taiwan has a few advantages over Singapore—such as size and earlier introduction of a few capabilities—but the latter possesses superior equipment and foresight. Although the army is of greater strategic importance to Singapore than to Taiwan, the ROCA is much larger when compared to Taiwan’s overall population. Since Singapore’s independence, the Singapore Army has slowly expanded, but has never had more than 60,000 soldiers. However, in the 1960s the ROCA had 380,000 soldiers, and even after reforms, still maintained 200,000 soldiers in 2008.30 Taiwan’s large number of ground troops existed for three major missions: a potential offence to China (during the authoritarian period), to garrison the islands close to China’s coastlines, and to defend Taiwan, mainly in relation to anti-landing. While the Singapore Army only focuses on scenarios in its territory and the adjacent Malay Peninsula (it also began to support homeland security in the 2000s), Taiwan’s military reform of the 1990s saw the ROCA abandon its unrealistic offensive mission and gradually decrease deployment on the offshore islands due to the difficulty of defending them. Since these islands can easily be besieged by the PLA’s multiform firepower consisting of artillery, missiles, and naval mines, it would be futile for Taipei to squander limited forces to rescue these islands during wartime. Moreover, the troops on these islands are not likely to be able to counter any move by China to invade Taiwan. As a result, the military deployment on these offshore islands has been reduced to merely ‘symbolic’ levels, and their total withdrawal has been proposed.31 This strategic transformation helped the ROCA to cater to defence demands and redistribute resources to where they could be better utilised. However, as already discussed, the ROCA’s aging equipment continues to undermine its performance, and perpetuates the lag behind its Singaporean counterpart. The ROCA introduced a number of major weapon systems earlier than the SAF, such as MLRSs and attack helicopters, but the ROCA’s overall performance has

30 IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 65 Issue1, 1965, p. 33; Vol. 97 Issue1, 1997, p. 192; Vol. 108 Issue1, 2008, pp. 401, 403. 31 Flora Wang, Jimmy Chuang and Ko Shu-lin, “Official asks for Kinmen withdrawal”, Taipei Times, 20 Jun., 2008 (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/06/20/2003415245) site accessed 23 February, 2012; “Kinmen Defense Command”, Global Security.org (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/taiwan/kdc.htm) site accessed 23 February, 2012. 210 been poor due to the progressive aging of their equipment.32 After downsizing and restructuring, the management of equipment life cycles in the ROCA was still inadequate due to a limited budget and few international sources. For example, the ROCA’s MBTs and most armoured vehicles have problems with protection, because these vehicles lack modern reactive or multi-layered armour and as a result are vulnerable to anti-tank attacks, whether from armour-piercing shells or missiles.33 Although the ROCA’s main function is anti-landing, not decisive strikes like its Singaporean counterpart, the inadequate level of protection makes the vehicles vulnerable to destruction by China’s airborne troops or other special forces invading prior to an amphibious operation. Comparatively, the Singaporean Bionix IFVs are equipped with modular armour and the Leopard MBT with multi-layered armour, which endow them with much better survivability.34 The concurrent projects in Singapore and Taiwan for the development of wheeled armoured vehicles further demonstrate the ROCA’s lack of vigour in renewing its equipment and its lower degree of concern about the RMA than that of the Singapore Army. In the 2000s, the ROCA and the Singapore Army individually developed new eight-wheel armoured vehicles, from the same design source, to replace the aging American Commando wheeled armoured vehicles, but the Singaporean Terrex AV-81s went into the service earlier and were of better quality than the CM-32 of the ROCA.35 Furthermore, while the AV-81s were equipped with

32 The ROCA introduced the indigenous Kung-Feng multi-launcher rocket systems in 1979 and AH-1W attack helicopters in 1994. Singapore introduced the American HIMARS rocket system in 2007 and the AH-64 Apache attack helicopters in 1999. IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 79 Issue1, 1979, p. 65; Vol. 94 Issue1, 1994, p. 166; Vol. 99 Issue1, 1999, p. 182; 108(1), 2008, p. 364. 33 The armour on the three types of Taiwanese MBTs is only all- wielded steel. The other armoured vehicles are similar but thinner in nature. “CM-11 Brave Tiger (M-48H) Main Battle Tank”, Military Factory.com (http://www.militaryfactory.com/armor/detail.asp?armor_id=219) site accessed 24 February, 2012; “CM-21/AIFV”, Army Guide (http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product4202.html) site accessed 24 February, 2012. 34 “Leopard 2A4 Main Battle Tank”, Ministry of Defence, Singapore (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/Weapons/leopard/about.html) site accessed 24 February, 2012; “Bionix Infantry Fighting Vehicle, Singapore”, army-technology.com (http://www.army-technology.com/projects/bionix/) site accessed 24 February, 2012. 35 Both Taiwan’s CM-32 and Singapore’s Terrex wheeled armoured vehicles were designed by the Irish Timoney Company. Both were put into production in 2007. Terrex were already in service in 2009, but there were only 6 CM-32 produced by 2011 with few failures such as split armour reported. 䘚⸦攧 Wong Tsung-ming, “榁弈㒟曄㮉㧟᧻⦚棁捷᧶㟈⠓㈛䫻ㄵ㹣初慜浧 Yunpao Chen Tieguancai? Guofangbu: Gaishanhou Yingdu Bi Meijung Guo(Yunpao APC as Iron Coffin? The Defense Ministry: after Improvement, the Hardness of the Armour is Harder than the US One ”, Nownews, 9 May, 2011(http://www.nownews.com/2011/05/09/11490-2710999.htm) site accessed 23 February, 2012; Sheena Tan, “1st motorised infantry battalion combat ready”, Cyberpioneer, 31 May, 2011(http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/cyberpioneer/news/2011/may/31may11_news 2.html) site accessed 23 February, 2012; “CM-32 Yunpao”; “Terrex AV 81”, Military-Today 211 a network-centric warfare system, there was no equivalent system in the CM-32.36 Notwithstanding that the city state has a greater strategic motive to maintain a technologically advanced army compared to Taipei, the ROCA’s outdated equipment and lack of the RMA erode Taiwan’s general deterrence capabilities and credibility. If Taiwan were to encounter the threat of full annexation, the ROCA’s anti-landing and other strategic missions such as counter sabotage may not be the first line of defence but are crucial aspects of its national survival, especially if the air force or navy were to fail at their missions. On the one hand, the obsolete weapon systems may have the potential to work well on a battlefield; however, in terms of deterrence, their existence sends a massage of Taiwan’s inadequate capability to both Beijing and Washington. This message has a negative influence on Taiwan’s general deterrence. On the other hand, without a real combat record, there is no confirmation that the Singapore Army can indeed fulfil its strategic roles during wartime, but its endeavours in maintaining advanced capability inform any potential enemy of the high cost of using force against the city state. For several reasons, the ROCN is larger than the RSN. Due to its larger area, the offensive strategy towards China during the authoritarian period, and supporting remote military deployments in islands in the South China Sea and close to China’s coastline, Taiwan has maintained a considerable navy composed of second-hand American surface vessels, including a relatively large amphibious fleet. In the 1970s, the ROCN’s tonnage was expanded through the introduction of retired US destroyers. Conversely, the RSN, with its limited initial fleet, possesses fewer and smaller vessels than the ROCN. Despite its smaller size, the RSN has three advantages over the ROCN: greater freedom of development, more extensive foreign sources and superior domestic support. On account of having almost no heritage and clear sovereignty, the RSN’s expansion has been concentrated on its strategic goals, from missile boats for sea denial to frigates and mine hunters for regional sea control, as well as several LPDs to project its national power. Thus, the RSN’s vessels are introduced for their real strategic needs. Comparatively, the ROCN’s amphibious fleet, used for unrealistic offensive missions and on the remote islands, consumed a similarly large share of the resources which could otherwise have been used to strengthen other capabilities more valuable for defending Taiwan, such as for anti-submarine

(http://www.military-today.com/apc/cm32_yunpao.htm;http://www.military-today.com/apc/terrex_a v81.htm) site accessed 23 February, 2012. 36 “Fact Sheet: Terrex Infantry Carrier Vehicle”, Ministry of Defence, Singapore (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2011/may/31may11_nr/31may11_fs.html) site accessed 23 February, 2012. 212 warfare (ASW). Additionally, while the amphibious fleet is not as strategically crucial as frigates, destroyers and mine hunters, the allocated budget is not sufficient to replace a number of obsolete vessels built in the World War II era. As the naval vessels require high-technology, foreign sources of weapon systems and technology are important for small states. The RSN has a range of sources to choose from but the ROCN has very limited access to foreign maritime systems. Further, Singapore’s greater range of options is usually financially advantageous. For example, both Singapore and Taiwan purchased the French La Fayette Class frigates but the former acquired better deals. Taiwan made a deal to purchase six ships from France in 1992, but these were three times more expensive than those purchased by Singapore in 2000, and this deal eventually developed into an international scandal due to serious allegations of corruption. 37 Furthermore, Singapore’s Formidable Class frigates were equipped with better weapon systems than Taiwan’s Kang Ding Class. Regarding air defence capability, the Formidable Class’s mid-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), vertical launchers, large missile storage and sophisticate command system not only provide self-defence for the vessels but also regional air defence for escorts and other missions. The Kang Ding Class vessels, which are equipped with a small number of short-range SAMs, have no capability to carry out regional defence functions and are even unable to defend themselves from long-range anti-ship missiles or other types of air strike. Although Singapore took advantage of newer technology, there were already a number of naval SAMs available in the 1990s superior to the Chaparral SAMs on the Kang Ding Class, such as the RIM-7 Sea Sparrow SAMs.38 Sufficient domestic support is another of the RSN’s advantages. By allocating sufficient resources, since the mid 1990s the RSN has purchased different types of Swedish submarines, from retired ones to new ones, to establish its submarine capability. In contrast to the improvements in the RSN, the ROCN, due to insufficient domestic support, missed a rare opportunity to build up its small submarine flotilla. As a result, there is no schedule to retire the two American

37 Brian Hsu, “Navy Accuses France of Overcharging for Frigates”, Taipei Times, 15 March, 2000 (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2000/03/15/0000027885) site accessed 23 March, 2012; “La Fayette Scandal Funds Returned to Taiwan”, Taipei Times, 15 June, 2007 (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/06/15/2003365270) site accessed 23 March, 2012. 38 RIM-7 SAMs were introduced into the US Navy in the 1960s and became popular in the navies of NATO member countries in the 1970s. Andrea Parsch, “AIM/RIM-7”, Directory U.S. Military Rockets and Missile (http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-7.html) site accessed 9 April, 2012; Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005-2006, p.739; “Lafayette Scandal Funds Returned to Taiwan”, Taipei Times, 15 Jun,2007(http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/06/15/2003365270) site accessed 24 February, 2012; Jane’s Fighting Ships 2008-2009, p. 673. 213

Guppy II Class submarines launched in 1944, the oldest submarines in service at this point in the world.39 Currently, it seems that the ROCN faces a worsening strategic situation while the RSN faces an improving one. As the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) significantly expands its capabilities of sea denial and sea control, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the ROCN to maintain the original sea control strategy for protecting the SLOCs. Thus a shift in the strategic balance toward sea denial, to defend China’s invasion or disrupt China’s SLOCs, is becoming unavoidable. The biggest challenge for the ROCN is whether its sea denial ability is adequate. In addition to a lack of submarines, the ROCN must allocate an appropriate role to its sea-control-oriented major vessels, such as Kidd Class destroyers, for its sea denial strategy, as the difficulty of executing fleet-in-being tactics increases. Conversely, the RSN’s strategic environment is more favourable, because its capability is increasing and threats from neighbouring countries are relatively static. Thus, in terms of contributions to general deterrence, the ROCN cannot achieve as much as the RSN can because of its insufficient capability, the strategic adjustments required and the significantly larger enemy it must deter. On account of diverse strategic environments, the structure of the ROCAF is different from that of the RSAF. Since the scenarios in the Malay Peninsula and the adjacent sea areas are of significant concern to Singapore, the RSAF must provide air support, especially for operations on the ground, as well as air defence. Regarding air defence, the RSAF’s strength corresponds to that of its counterparts in neighbouring countries, especially Malaysia and Indonesia. The number of RSAF aircraft with combat capability, including attackers and fighters, has been roughly similar to or greater than that of the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) and the Indonesian Air Force.40 In terms of organisation, the RSAF has displayed a clear inclination for joint operations with other services. With the exception of the tiny close-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) belonging to the Singapore Army, the other Singaporean aircraft, including UAVs, utility and transport helicopters for ground operations, and ASW helicopters for naval frigates, have all been owned by the RSAF. The ROCAF also attempted to develop certain ground attack capabilities but the US controlled the supply of long-range aircraft with a large payload to lessen

39 One submarine was launched in 1943 and the other in 1944. Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005-2006, p. 735. 40 In the late 2000s, the sum of fighters in the Malaysian and Indonesian air forces was more than that of Singapore, but Singapore regained the lead later. Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2000), p. 143; IISS, Military Balance, Vol. 108 Issue 1, pp.383,394, 402; Vol. 112 Issue 1, pp. 250, 266, 279. 214 the tension in the Taiwan Strait. As a result, the ROCAF’s capabilities have been mostly restricted to air defence. The ROCAF’s strength is proportional to the adjacent deployment of China’s air forces. Although the ROCAF has missions to support other services such as ground attack, its organisational structure is more separate from other services, as the ROCA and ROCN possess their own aviation units. The ROCAF’s greatest disadvantage in comparison to the RSAF is Taiwan’s international isolation. Taiwan mainly depends on the US as a source of weapons and support, with the exception of the introduction of French Mirage 2000-5 fighters in the 1990s, and Washington often interferes in the development of the ROCAF. When the RSAF procured E-2C Hawkeye aircraft of air warning and control systems (AWACS) and F-16 A/B fighters from the US in the mid 1980s, the ROCAF’s demands for similar equipment were refused by Washington to avoid provoking China. Taiwan eventually received the F-16A/Bs and E-2T AWACSs in the mid 1990s, almost a decade later than the RSAF did.41 As for the IDFs, their performance was constrained by the US due to American technological involvement.42 Further, in the mid-2000s, the ROCAF planned to purchase F-16C/D fighters, which the RSAF acquired in 1994, to replace its existing F-5E/F fighters, but this project has been postponed for budgetary reasons and other concerns of the US.43 Hence, the continued use of aging F-5E/F fighters undermines the capability of the ROCAF, as well as the Taiwan’s general deterrence. Apart from the British aircraft and SAMs in the initial phase, the RSAF maintains a broad range of the American aircraft in its fleets. This decision is concerned more with the strategic relationship with the US and performance rather than a reflection of a lack of options. Additionally, although Singapore has uninterrupted access to foreign aviation suppliers, the RSAF chose to upgrade its F-5E/F wings to extend their lifespan. The Singaporean upgraded F-5S fighters are still in good condition and remain in service, unlike their Taiwanese counterparts, which have been involved in a series of accidents and have low operational availability.44

41Singapore received the first E-2Cs in 1985 and F-16 C/Ds in 1988, but Taiwan obtained E-2Ts in 1995 and F-16A/Bs in 1997. IISS, Military Balance, vol. 85 Issue1, 1985, p. 133; vol. 88 Issue 1, 1988, p. 153; vol. 95 Issue 1, 1995, p. 172; vol. 97 Issue 1, 1997, p. 168. 42 Peter R. March, Directory of Military Aircraft of the World (London: Cassell & Co, 2001), p. 11. 43 IISS, Military Balance, 112(1), 2012, pp. 205-206. 44 There were F-5 crashes in Taiwan in 2007, 2009 and 2011. In 2010, the operation availability of the ROCAF’s F-5 fleet was only 26%. Rich Chang and Chris Wang, “Lawmakers Spar over Military Crush”, Taipei Times, 15 Sep., 2011 (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/09/15/2003513294) site accessed 24 February, 2012. 215

In terms of air defence, both air forces have respective advantages. The RSAF benefits from their advanced fighters and the relatively weak potential enemy, but the geographic conditions leave shorter reaction time and fewer air bases for deployment. Vice versa, the ROCAF faces a much bigger opponent and suffers from its fleets of aging aircraft, but has been helped by the long-range SAM systems since the late 1950s, as well as its geographic conditions.45 Several types of long-range SAMs such as American Patriot and indigenous Sky-Bow systems were introduced to maintain the ROCAF’s air defence capability. In contrast, the RSAF’s retirement of the British Bloodhound long-range SAMs in the 1990s decreased the flexibility of its air defence operations, as it is difficult for the RSAF’s other mid and short range SAMs to engage approaching aircraft from greater than 100km in order to share the burden of the fighters.46 If the aerial threats posed by the RMAF or another air force reach a certain level, Singapore’s reintroduction of long-range SAMs would be expected. Another factor in air defence is survivability. Both the RSAF and ROCAF have faced the threat of realistic first strikes on their air bases from neighbouring countries, from Malaysia’s artillery fire and China’s ballistic missiles, respectively. Owing to the difference in geographic location, the period of warning for the Malaysian long-range shells and rockets threatening Singapore is shorter than that of the Chinese ballistic missiles threatening Taiwan. Further, there are more airfields in Taiwan and more space to build additional ones than in Singapore. However, through its military industrial complex China can readily increase the number of missiles and supplies and Malaysia must rely on Brazilian, South African and other foreign sources. Moreover, the number of Chinese aircraft which would have the advantage after a first strike is much larger than that of Malaysia. Both the RSAF and ROCAF are at the risk of being paralysed after a first strike. Therefore, tactics such as utilising highways as runways, strengthening aircraft shelters and other alternatives are adopted by both air forces; nevertheless the effect of their preparations is difficult to estimate due to the many factors involved. In general, the ROCAF has greater difficulty than the RSAF in carrying out its deterrence functions in relation to various threats. In addition to its initial quantitative superiority, China continues to build up its qualitative superiority, with more advanced fighters, including stealth fighters to be introduced in the foreseeable future. However, the ROCAF has not acquired equivalent weapon systems. In contrast, the RSAF maintains both quantitative and qualitative

45 2nd Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery (Taiwan) Association (http://www.2-71adataiwan.com/) site accessed 26 February, 2012. 46 Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore, p. 150. 216 superiority over the RMAF; unless Malaysia can issue a more overwhelming first strike than China, the RSAF holds a more effective deterrent role than the ROCAF. Based on this close analysis, it is clear that the answer to whether Singapore or Taiwan performs better in deterrence lies in Singapore’s favour. Since its independence, Singapore has received military assistance from Taiwan, but has gradually surpassed this provider in a range of capabilities and for a number of reasons, as mentioned during the discussion. An additional reason Taiwan could follow the example of Singapore is the way in which the city state predominantly established its deterrence strategy and capability through its government and people, rather than as a result of foreign aid or geographic conditions.

3. The Lessons for Taiwan Firstly, at the very core of the effective deterrence carried out by Singapore is a basic consensus concerning national survival. With this consensus, the city state has planned and executed a comprehensive effort, including the total defence doctrine, aimed primarily at ensuring its survival. This is the central goal that Taiwan should also aim to achieve. As Singapore’s statehood and nation-building have been led by the dominant PAP government, it is too early to tell if Taiwan’s democratic mechanisms play a positive or negative role in shaping such a consensus. On one hand, the democratic process may provide a commonly accepted consensus on statehood and national survival; however, it would take a time consuming process. While the PLA is rapidly developing a range of military capabilities that threaten Taiwan, Taipei must simultaneously maintain effective deterrence. Thus, achieving consensus through the democratic process may be too slow to support national defence. On the other hand, a continuous deadlock may be the result of the democratic mechanisms in place. The Chinese Nationalist Party (as known as Kuomintang, KMT) administration, which achieved a dominant political position with a majority in parliament from 2008, is ideally placed to form a consensus and then improve Taiwan’s deterrent position. Following the KMT’s political dominance, the biggest opposition party, the Democracy Progress Party, has hardly any legitimate grounds on which to obstruct a consensus on national defence. However, the KMT government seems not to afford national defence a high priority and a basic consensus on national survival has not yet been established. Regardless of the type of relationship Taipei wants to develop with Beijing, as long as Taiwan has sovereignty, effectual deterrence is necessary. If unification is the ultimate goal of the KMT government, deterrent capability is still significant to ensure the process is peaceful and to serve as an important bargaining tool. Secondly, another lesson Taiwan can learn from Singapore is the 217 broad-based diplomatic effectiveness of extended deterrence. Since its independence, the city state has diligently managed its international relations, including the Soviet Union (Russia) and India, and regional countries, rather than only the US and China. Taiwan, despite its international isolation, maintains unofficial but substantial relations with some countries and these relationships provide potential for further development. Taiwan certainly has difficulty being as active as Singapore in its exploration of foreign relations, but it is possible for Taiwan to work on its substantial relationships with regional countries, China’s neighbouring powers and other countries closely connected to the rise of China as an international hegemony. The regional countries would consist of Kazakhstan, Mongolia, the Philippines, Vietnam and other ASEAN as well as Central Asian countries; China’s neighbouring powers would be India, Russia, Japan and South Korea; other countries to consider would be France and Australia. Through functional cooperation, Taipei can strengthen these relations through second-track diplomacy, trade, investment and other means, in order to promote potential diplomatic support and other forms of security cooperation. The security ties between Singapore and Taiwan demonstrate that a formal diplomatic relationship is not indispensible in order to have a substantial relationship.As long as other countries recognise that Taiwan’s survival is of importance to them, their reactions to China’s using force against Taiwan would be internationally negative. In other words, although other countries may not directly intervene in Taiwan’s security as the US may do, their potential negative responses to China serve the function of extended deterrence. Thirdly, Singapore’s comprehensive approach to deterrence is instructional for Taiwan. As a small state with limited resources, the utilisation of all related sectors is necessary for general deterrence. The city state, through its total defence doctrine, integrated a variety of sectors from the economy to society to contribute to its general deterrence. It would be worthwhile for Taiwan to follow a similar path to improve general deterrence, particularly in relation to economic and societal issues, as China’s threats are carried out on levels other than merely military ones. Thus, Taiwan’s trade-oriented economy should embrace globalisation through diversifying its distribution of trade and investment rather than its present concentration on China. In terms of society, it is regarded as inappropriate for the government to adopt censorship and other extreme restrictions used in the authoritarian period, but expanding the vision of Taiwanese people beyond their largest neighbouring country would have a positive effect on general deterrence. Since the sole use of Mandarin can facilitate the infiltration of Chinese propaganda and is a major reason for over investment in 218

China, an increase in English usage can serve to broaden the vision of the Taiwanese people, especially those involved in business. Greater facility in English would bring an increase in international business opportunities and a diversification of the economy. More emphasis on the acquisition of English would open up a greater cultural and intellectual space for Taiwan, to enable the development of a broader worldview rather than the current more Sino-centric one. The final lesson from Singapore for Taiwan is the development of means of credibly deterring potential enemies. Taiwan’s deterrence is necessary to prevent China’s direct attack or coercion, ensuring that any political solution to the Taiwan Strait will take into account Taiwan’s interests. While the PLA has been expanding significantly since the 1990s, Taiwan’s inadequate responses have continuously eroded its general deterrence. Learning from the SAF’s development, Taiwan’s armed forces might be reinforced in several ways. At the outset, adequate resources need to be made available for defence. Despite never facing a direct or obvious threat to its national survival, Singapore has continued to maintain 6% of its GDP for national defence. In contrast, Taiwan’s paltry 3% GDP budget to deter the second-strongest military power in the world, which poses a clear threat to its national survival, is inadequate. In terms of the level of the threat posed by China, an increase in the defence budget to a rate even higher than 6% of GDP would not be excessive. It is then necessary to develop several credible means of deterrence. Unlike Singapore, Taiwan faces an imminent threat in the form of the huge and growing PLA, but to achieve military superiority over them, as the SAF has done, would be unrealistic. However, the “poisonous shrimp” strategy of the city state applied in the 1970s and ‘80s may be relevant to Taiwan. The “poisonous shrimp” strategy denotes an unacceptable cost for an invader who wants to capture Singapore, similar to the way a poisonous shrimp might deter its predators. As long as using force against Taiwan is too costly to be acceptable to Beijing, deterrence will be effective. In order to increase this potential cost to China, should it decide to use force, Taiwan needs to strengthen its resistance through a denial approach, in addition to the use of a punishment approach based on selective retaliation against high-value targets. Due to Taiwan’s strategic conditions, although some tactics would be different from Singapore’s, the basic elements required for effective deterrence would be similar. With the denial approach, Taiwan could create its own version of an anti-access strategy based around several deterrent considerations. Regardless of the tactics adopted, China would eventually have to cross the strait to capture it. If 219 the PLA were unable to occupy Taiwan at an acceptable cost and within a certain period, Beijing would be unlikely to challenge the status quo. For Beijing, a swift victory after a blitzkrieg would always be more favourable than a war of attrition. In a war of attrition, apart from the disruption to the economy, a considerable loss of combat aircraft and vessels would negatively affect China’s strategic standing in the region. A prolonged conflict would be likely to cripple the Chinese economy and lead to internal dissent against the government. Thus, the goal of Taiwan’s denial deterrence is not only to repel an invasion by China but also to ensure negative outcomes for Beijing, such as a weakening of its position due to the heavy military and economic losses. Those outcomes could influence the altitude of Chinese decision makers to favour the status quo and consequently increase the effect of deterrence. Several denial capabilities are necessary for Taiwan to strengthen its deterrence. Firstly, Taiwan needs to develop a long-range strike capability, mainly through cruise and air-to-surface missiles, to act as a threat to adjacent airports and seaports in China and a disruption to any preparations for landing operations. If China lacks the facilities to transport its troops to Taiwan, the prospects of effecting a successful invasion would be significantly lower. Taiwan’s defence industry could probably be self-sufficient in some types of missiles as they are already in production or development. 47 Secondly, sea and aerial denial capabilities are the second line of defence. Apart from a range of missiles, naval mines can be used to deny approach by sea, thereby preserving anti-ship missiles for more valued targets, such as capital warships. Furthermore, a range of civil resources can be applied to denial deterrence. For example, burning can create haze and vapour to impede enemy aerial operations due to poor optical and thermal visibility. 48 Lastly, a comprehensive system of mobilisation and distribution for a wartime economy needs to be put in place. Should China attempt a naval blockade of Taiwan or any other sort of attack, Singapore’s civil defence model is valuable for Taiwan, especially in its strategies to enhance the responsive capability of its non-military sectors during wartime. This civil defence system implies bombardment shelters, emergency medical treatment units, adequate stockpiles of fuel, food and other strategic materials as well as building redundancy of critical infrastructure such as power and water supplies. Moreover, regular civil defence exercises are necessary for the people to familiarise them with the civil defence system. These preparations and practices will fortify Taiwan’s deterrent

47 IISS, Military Balance, 108(1), 2008, pp. 361-362. 48 Smoke Operations (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, the department of the Army, 1990), pp. 6, 49. 220 capability and credibility. Apart from their usefulness during conflict, having such systems in place would also be helpful in dealing with other disasters such as floods and earthquakes. With the punishment approach, the options for Taiwan are more limited. Lacking weapons of mass destruction, it is not likely Taipei possesses the capability for counter-value retaliation but there are a few options available to put additional pressure on Beijing. Since economic growth is a major goal for China, a number of missiles covering Shanghai and Canton, two important economic hubs, can cause considerable disruption to China’s economy. Furthermore, if Taiwan can overcome the difficulty in procuring submarines and other means of effecting long-range maritime strikes, disrupting China’s SLOCs by attacking Chinese merchant vessels, particularly oil tankers, would put pressure on China’s petroleum stores. In such a scenario, Taiwan’s economy would have been devastated by the outbreak of conflict, so Taipei would have less to lose than Beijing. These economic costs alone may not be enough to deter China but they would have a cumulative effect when added to the effects of the denial approach. Accordingly, Taiwan’s punishment deterrence would the use of force by China too costly for it to adopt. In order to establish a deterrence strategy, Taiwan’s defence industry needs to play a more central role that takes into account Taiwan’s international isolation and uses Singapore as an example. While access to the international arms market is available, the city state has systematically and gradually improved its self-sufficiency and its related technological capabilities. As a result, Singapore not only locally designs and produces several major weapon systems but also adapts foreign weapon systems, including second-handed refurbished ones, to suit its local environment. Taipei needs to focus on its defence industry as it did during the Cold War era, but in addition, it needs to develop and put in place a long-term plan. This is essential in view of the fact that Beijing’s threat is unprecedentedly serious and that Washington is unlikely to satisfy all of Taipei’s requirements for defence. Taiwan’s defence industry needs to move beyond the completion of specific projects only, as it did in the 1980s, and set up long-term programs with goal of attaining sustainable capabilities. As sources of foreign technology can be unstable, a certain level of reverse engineering is crucial. In addition, civil technologies are needed because many civil technologies such as telecommunications have great military potential. Whilst the US does not sufficiently support Taiwan’s development of RMA, proper utilisation of civil communications and other related technologies may improve operational efficiency. Taiwan’s defence industry’s technological achievements may carry over to attract commercial interest for civil applications. 221

Rather than using the US or other larger power as a model, Singapore presents a more suitable example for Taiwan in that it is also a small state focusing on keeping the peace and its own survival through the use of appropriate measures of deterrence. The ultimate goal of Taiwan’s deterrence, similar to that of Singapore, is not to engage in war but to maintain the status quo in the short-term. Additionally, Taiwan’s deterrence would also improve Taiwan’s position vis-à-vis China in the long-term as well as bring an assurance that China’s approaches toward Taiwan are firmly based in negotiation and respect for Taiwan. The contribution of this study to the research on the security issues of small states is categorised into three areas: statehood, diplomacy, and military scenarios. As statehood determines the raison d'être of a country, and consequently its domestic and foreign affairs, a problematic statehood presents a perfect opportunity for a potential adversary to undermine it. Small states with unstable or poorly established statehood tend to face domestic and international challenges. Internally, a lack of legitimacy in statehood may be unable to consolidate national identity which is at the foundation of credible defence. Internationally, a less than legitimate statehood may lead to lack of recognition as a sovereign state which in turn may present an obstacle to the development of normal relations with other countries, including the pursuit of extended deterrence. This study also highlights a new form of relationship between diplomacy and deterrence, known as the “twin Ds”. Originally, diplomacy is aimed at strengthening cooperation, mainly regionally, in order to prevent conflicts, and forming alliances to create extended deterrence. In other words, diplomacy can decrease a potential enemy’s motives and increase the costs of challenging the status quo. However, based on Singapore’s practice, the twin Ds can be further integrated; with Singaporean diplomats working to form an international network of security, the SAF significantly supports diplomacy through bilateral and multilateral exercises, overseas training, humanitarian relief assistance, peace-keeping operations and technology collaboration. This integration demonstrates the effectiveness and necessity of using a more comprehensive approach in national defence. Deterrence is not sufficient by itself and it must be integrated with diplomacy to be effective. Through the examination of military scenarios, small states in strategic maritime locations may be in a better position than others in terms of using force. Geographically, unlike the Cold War era scenarios of the European small states facing the huge Red Army, a maritime location presents invaders with a significant barrier to attack. Moreover, with regard to the SLOCs, international powers, especially maritime ones, would be likely to intervene in a war or armed conflict 222 involving a maritime strategic location than in other circumstances. It is also convenient for maritime powers to intervene due to the access granted by the high seas. Finally, modern military technologies used in denial strategies such as anti-ship and surface-to-air missiles, mines and submarines can prevent a blockade or amphibious operations from succeeding. Thus, maritime small states have the potential to repel invaders. That is, the deterrence strategy of such small states may be more credible than that of others. Several topics could be explored following from this study. Firstly, the use of technological developments in aiding small states to better survive in an anarchic international sphere. Secondly, the means by which small states can establish networks of allies and partners in order to improve their deterrence capabilities. Thirdly, the means other types of small states use to manage their defence in strategic circumstances different maritime strategic locations. Finally, an examination of the factors that explain the survival of small states.

223

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