ISSN 1010-9536

EXPORT POTENTIAL OF BANGLADESH IN BIMSTEC

197 Export Potential of Bangladesh in BIMSTEC Free Trade Area: Evidence from Gravity Model Ishtiaque Selim

211 Challenges of India’s Global Emergence Abu Salah Md. Yousuf Mohammad Jasim Uddin

226 Maritime Verdicts and Avenues of Resource Exploration for Bangladesh Md Shahidul Hasan

241 Recent Security Scenario in Afghanistan: Roles and Impacts of the ISAF and the Way Forward M Ashique Rahman

262 Climate Change – A Security Threat for Bangladesh: The Role of Armed Forces Mostaque Ahmad

Volume 35 Number 3 2014 I Contacts Designation Telephone (O ce) E-mail Chairman, Board of Governors 88-02-9347914 [email protected] Director General 88-02-8312609 [email protected] Research Director-1 88-02-9331977 [email protected] Research Director-2 88-02-8360198 [email protected] VOLUME 35 NUMBER 3 JULY 2014

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TABLE OF CONTENT VOLUME 35 NUMBER 3 JULY 2014

Ishtiaque Selim Export Potential of Bangladesh in BIMSTEC Free Trade Area: Evidence from Gravity Model 197

Abu Salah Md. Yousuf Mohammad Jasim Uddin Challenges of India’s Global Emergence 211

Md Shahidul Hasan Maritime Verdicts and Avenues of Resource Exploration for Bangladesh 226

M Ashique Rahman Recent Security Scenario in Afghanistan: Roles and Impacts of the ISAF and the Way Forward 241

Mostaque Ahmad Climate Change – A Security Threat for Bangladesh: The Role of Armed Forces 262

BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014: 197-210

Ishtiaque Selim EXPORT potential of bangladesh in bimstec free trade area: evidence from gravity model

Abstract

Bangladesh has been striving hard to exploit SAFTA for boosting its trade and economic relations with the South Asian neighbours. But this free trade agreement is yet to bring sufficient dividends for Bangladesh. While the role of regional integration in the development process is undeniable, the slow progress of SAFTA in South Asia is a source of frustration for a developing nation like Bangladesh. Accordingly, in an effort to yield trade and economic gains, Bangladesh has become a member of BIMSTEC-FTA. This article uses augmented gravity equation to estimate Bangladesh’s export potentials in BIMSTEC-FTA. It estimates an export equation for Bangladesh taking some relevant variables into account. Also, the model undergoes some diagnostic tests. On the basis of the tests the model is cleared of multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity problems. The results from the estimations show that Bangladesh has export potentials in BIMSTEC-FTA. Therefore, the country’s economy might take advantages from boosting exports to developing economies of BIMSTEC, namely, India and Thailand.

1. introduction

Regional integration, over the last few years, has occupied an important place in the development strategies and the policy debates. As an integral part of the overall integration process, regional trading agreements (RTAs) have also proliferated in the past few decades. Most of the countries of the world being members of such arrangements, it is obvious that an enormous amount of trade has taken place under RTAs. In fact, these agreements govern literally two-thirds of global trade.1 Countries, in order to reap benefits from regional integration, are increasingly getting more inclined to be a part of such RTA. This trend leaves hardly any nation beyond such arrangements.

With its active engagement in South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) – a multilateral intra-regional agreement in South Asia – Bangladesh is no exception in this regard. However, SAFTA has been subject to discussions, debates and criticisms

I shtiaque Selim is Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Jagannath University, Dhaka. His e-mail address is: [email protected] © Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2014. 1 M. Schiff and L. A. Winters, Regional Integration and Development, World Bank and Oxford University Press: Washington DC, 2003, p. 1.

197 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014 from academia and intelligensia in South Asia ever since its ratification in 2006. While a growing body of literature suggests that trade liberalisation under the framework of SAFTA would generate welfare and trade gains in South Asia, many still remain sceptical about the success of this RTA.2 The fact is that progress of SAFTA has not gained much pace since its inception owing to some challenges – ranging from political to institutional - that encircled this trading bloc.

Hence, some South Asian countries have opted to follow the bilateral route in the form of India-Sri Lanka or Pakistan-Sri Lanka FTA deal. Formation of multilateral organisations such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) is also marked as an effort to boost trade and economic relations in the region and beyond. As a party to BIMSTEC, Bangladesh is also trying to make headway in negotiating trading arrangements regionally in order to intensify cooperation with the neighbouring nations.

Established in 1997, BIMSTEC is a multilateral sub-regional body, which is comprised of five South Asian nations, namely, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka and two Southeast Asian nations, namely, Myanmar and Thailand. The sub- regional organisation, thus, literally connects South Asia with Southeast Asia - one of the most rapidly growing regions in the world. BIMSTEC has a combined GDP of US$ 2,454 billion, accounts for a trade volume worth US$ 1,154 billion and brings roughly 1.5 billion people under the same umbrella.3 The organisation is aimed to foster cooperation in a number of areas and trade is one of those. To deepen the trade relations, BIMSTEC nations signed a free trade deal, known as BIMSTEC-FTA, in 2004. The agreement is expected to be implemented by the middle of 2023. Bangladesh as a party to BIMSTEC-FTA is likely to achieve trade gain, especially export. As such, studies on the impacts of BIMSTEC-FTA on Bangladesh trade are of great importance.

It needs to be noted that there is a relative dearth of literature on BIMSTEC-FTA. However, some studies resort to quantitative technique to measure the effect of this free trading area. Rahman and Rahman (2004)4, in one of the early studies on BIMSTEC- FTA, reported untapped trade potentials amongst the BIMSTEC trading partners. The study calculated a gravity equation by using a set of pre-estimated parameters.5 Banik

2 See, for example, S. J. Bandara and W. Yu, “How Desirable is the South Asian Free Trade Area? – A Quantitative Economic Assessment”, SJFI-Working Paper No. 16, 2001, available at http://www.foi.life.ku.dk/ publikationer/~/media/migration%20folder/upload/foi/docs/publikationer/working%20papers/2001/16. pdf.ashx, accessed on 25 May 2014. Also see, U. Wickramasinghe, “Operationalizing SAFTA: Issues and Options”, South Asian Yearbook on Trade and Development, Center for Trade and Development, New Delhi, 2006, pp. 389-414; S. M. Hossain and I. Selim, “Regional Cooperation in South Asia: Future of SAFTA”, BIISS Journal, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2007, pp. 163-183. 3 T. K Premadasa, "BIMSTEC: Srilanka's next FTA?", 20 March 2014, available at www.ft.lk/2014/03/20/ bimstec-sri-lankas-next-fta, accessed on 05 June 2014. 4 AKM A. Rahman and S. Rahman, “Potentials of Trade Cooperation among the BIMST-EC Countries”, BIISS Journal, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2004, pp. 140-158. 5 These parameters were estimated by International Trade Commission’s (ITC) market analysis section using export data from developing economies. 198 EXPORT POTENTIAL OF BANGLADESH IN BIMSTEC

(2007)6 estimated both export demand and export supply functions by using two stage least square (2SLS) and three stage least square (3SLS) methods. The study taking some geographical characteristics into account reveals that the prospect of intra-BIMSTEC trade is quite bright. Another study, by Kabir and Salim (2010)7, applied augmented gravity model to analyse trade pattern among BIMSTEC members. The authors claimed that the member economies’ exports would be positively affected by this sub-regional bloc. Also, Hossain (2012)8 used computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to identify considerable welfare gains of BIMSTEC-FTA members. Some other notable studies have been conducted by Bhattacharaya (2007)9, Chakraborty (2007)10, Gilbert (2008)11 and Strutt (2008)12. These studies generally depict positive gains from BIMSTEC-FTA.

This paper makes an attempt to examine the potential exports of Bangladesh in BIMSTEC-FTA. The paper, in deriving the trade potential, computes a typical gravity model by using ordinary least square (OLS) method of multi-variable regression analysis. The paper is divided into four sections. Section one is the introduction. Section two, gives a background of BIMSTEC-FTA. Section three estimates trade potentials of Bangladesh in the trading arrangement. In doing so, this section provides a theoretical background of gravity model and then covers the issues of estimation of gravity model. Finally, section four concludes.

2. bimsTEC-FTA: A Brief Background

BIMSTEC has been regarded as the outcome of Thailand’s “Look West” policy and India’s “Look East” policy.13 These policies were meant to extend extensive cooperation in some important areas between South Asia and Southeast Asia. BIMSTEC, therefore, as mentioned earlier, had bridged these two regions. The idea of forging economic ties between these two regions was first mooted by Thailand back in 1994. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) also came forward to assist

6 N. Banik, “BIMSTEC-FTA and Its Relevance”, Discussion Paper No. 36, Kolkata: Centre for Studies in International Relations and Development (CSIRD), 2007. 7 M. Kabir and R. Salim, “Can Gravity Model Explain BIMSTEC’s Trade?”, Journal of Economic Integration, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2010, pp. 143-165. 8 S. M. Hossain, “Impacts of BIMSTEC Free Trade Area: A CGA Analysis”, Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, Vol. 4, No. 13, 2013, pp. 16-27. 9 S. K. Bhattacharya, “Does BIMSTEC-Japan Economic Cooperation Promote Intra-Regional Trade? The Case for Free Trade Arrangement”, Discussion Paper No. 23, Kolkata: CSIRD, 2007. 10 D. Chakraborty, “Trade Performance and Integration Experience of BIMSTEC: A Review of Issues”, Discussion Paper No. 30 Kolkata: CSIRD, 2007. 11 J. Gilbert, “BIMSTEC-Japan Trade Cooperation and Poverty in Asia”, Discussion Paper No. 41, Kolkata: CSIRD, 2008. 12 A. Strutt, “Quantitatively Assessing a BIMSTEC-Japan FTA: A CGE Analysis”, Discussion Paper No. 40, Kolkata: CSIRD, 2008. 13 See, Official Website of BIMSTEC, available at www.bimstec.org, accessed on 25 May 2014. 199 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014 the initiative of establishing this sub-regional platform.14 On 6 June 1997, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand formed BIST-EC after a meeting held in Bangkok. A few months later on 22 December 1997, Myanmar became a new party to this organisation; thereafter it was renamed as BIMSTEC and in 2003, two other countries of South Asia, Nepal and Bhutan, joined the organisation.

The main objective of BIMSTEC is to create a conducive environment for fostering cooperation among the members in order to work on issues of mutual interests. It would enable the BIMSTEC countries to reap benefits from various areas ranging from trade and investment to tourism and agriculture. As many as six areas, namely, trade and investment, transport, energy, technology, fishery and tourism, were earmarked for cooperation.

The idea of launching a free trade area within the BIMSTEC region was proposed in its first meeting of economic and commerce ministers held in Bangkok in August 1998. On 8 February 2004, BIMSTEC nations signed the framework agreement on FTA. Bangladesh signed the pact on 25 June 2004. The FTA agreement encompasses three areas, namely, trade in goods, trade in services and agreement on investment. Although agreement on goods is finalised, the member nations are yet to conclude the agreement on trade in services and investment.

The BIMSTEC members also agreed on a trade liberalisation schedule, which pointed out that full implementation of the FTA will be realised by 2017. The elimination of tariff will follow two tracks, namely, the fast track and the normal track. Products included in the fast track are roughly 10 percent of all products. The normal track products are divided into normal track elimination (NTE) and normal track reduction (NTR). The tariff will be completely eliminated in NTE, whereas tariff will be reduced to 1 percent to 5 percent in NTR.15 The FTA agreement provides the least developed countries (LDCs) of BIMSTEC, which are Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar and Nepal, with the much needed “breathing space”16 for they have to reduce tariffs at a slower rate than that of the developing nations.

The initial date to commence the liberalisation procedure had been set on 1 July 2006; however, it was missed due to some divergence among the BIMSTEC members on some pertinent issues such as negative list and rules of origin.17 The launching of FTA in the subsequent years did not receive much impetus owing to unfavourable political developments in Thailand, Nepal and Bangladesh. It was in

14 R. Mehta, “Establishing of Free Trade Arrangement among BIMST-EC Countries: Some Issues”, RIS Discussion Papers No. 23, Research and Information System for the Non-aligned and Other Developing Countries, New Delhi, 2002, p. 1. 15 See, “Framework Agreement on BIMSTEC Free Trade Area”, available at www.thaifta.com/Engfta/Portals/0/ File/fa_bimstec.pdf, accessed on 26 April 2014. 16 A. R. Khan, “Introduction”, in A. R. Khan (ed.), Towards BIMSTEC-Japan Comprehensive Economic Cooperation: Bangladesh Perspective, BIISS, Dhaka and CSIRD, New Delhi: Bookwell, 2007, p. 4. 17 D. Chakraborty, op. cit., p. 23. 200 EXPORT POTENTIAL OF BANGLADESH IN BIMSTEC the 19th Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) meeting the members came up with a revised trade liberalisation schedule. Following this new schedule, complete tariff elimination will be achieved by 30 June 2023. The trade liberalisation programme for the non-LDCs and LDCs are presented in the following tables:

Table 1: Liberalisation Schedule for the Fast Track Products18 Countries For Non-LDC Members For LDC Members India, Sri Lanka and Thailand 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2015 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013 (Non-LDCs) Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2017 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2015 and Nepal (LDCs)

Table 2: Liberalisation Schedule for the Normal Track Products19 Countries For Non-LDC Members For LDC Members India, Sri Lanka and Thailand 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2018 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2016 (Non-LDCs) Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2023 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2021 and Nepal (LDCs)

The tables (1 and 2) depict that for products included in the fast track, most favoured nation (MFN) tariff is supposed to be reduced or eliminated by 30 June 2017 by the non-LDC members of BIMSTEC, while for products listed in normal track, the stipulated deadline for tariff elimination is 30 June 2023. During the 19th TNC meeting, each member agreed on a negative list including products which are 23 percent of the tariff lines. As far as rules of origin is concerned, the bloc members decided that at least 30 percent local value addition for developing economies would be required, while for LDC members it would be 35 percent. The FTA agreement also includes, among other things, dispute settlement mechanism, safeguard measures, a provision of cooperation and mutual assistance in customs matter.

3. Trade Potential of Bangladesh in BIMSTEC-FTA: Evidence from Gravity Model

This section makes an attempt to find out the export potential that Bangladesh can tap within the framework of BIMSTEC-FTA. In the process of doing so, it employs ‘gravity model’. Theories behind the model, before dealing with the issues of model specification and estimation, are presented first.

18 See, Report of the Nineteenth Meeting of the BIMSTEC Trade Negotiating Committee (BIMSTEC TNC) held from 21-23 February 2011 in Bangkok, Thailand. 19 Ibid. 201 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014

3.1 Gravity Model: Theoretical Foundation

In recent years, gravity model or equation has been used as an instrument by economists in the policy making process of international trade. The model is regarded as a work horse in quantitative technique used for trade analysis.20 Derived from Newton’s law of gravitation, gravity model was introduced by James Stewart in social sciences in the 1940s.21 The Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen (1962) first applied this model to international trade. The gravity equation, since then has become the focus of a vast body of literature on trade, migration and foreign direct investment (FDI).

Gravity model mainly calculates the potential trade flows between two trading partners on the basis of some relevant macroeconomic variables as suggested by Linnemann (1966). The two most important variables are GDPs of the respective nations and distance between these countries. The GDPs are in fact substitutes of demand and supply of importers and exporters respectively while the distance variable represents the transaction cost related to trade.22 These two key variables explain a fair share of trade between the two countries. Trade flows are directly related to the GDPs of both nations and inversely related to the distance between the two. This relationship can be expressed by the following equation for two trading partners i and j:

(Trade Flow)ij= k* (GDPi*GDPj/Distanceij), where k is a constant of proportionality.

To augment this model, some other variables such as population size, real exchange rate and tariff rate are frequently incorporated. The model also includes binary or dummy variables such as free or regional trading agreement, common border, common language, colonial past, governance, etc. To sum up, in the classical gravity equation, trade flows between the two nations are determined by their GDPs, distance between the nations, populations of the two nations and a number of dummy variables enhancing or restricting trade flows.

The original gravity equation was stated in a multiplicative form, but many empirical researches adopted the additive log-linearised form of the gravity model to estimate the necessary parameters. The preference of the latter design to the former could be attributed to the fact that in the 1960s, estimation of the multiplicative form was time consuming. Even with the advent of modern computing system in the form of software, the log-linearised structure of the gravity equation remained popular with the economists.23 The most common design of the gravity model is the following:

20 “Prospects for Greater Global and Regional Integration in the Maghreb”, Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) , 2008, p. 2. 21 S. R. Pradhan, “India’s Export Potential to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries: A Gravity Model Analysis”, Post Workshop Reports, Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade, 2006, pp. 1-33. 22 Ibid., p. 20. 23 B. Silverstovs and D. Schumacher, “Estimating Gravity Equations: To Log or Not to Log?”, Discussion Papers No. 739, DIW Berlin, 2007. 202 EXPORT POTENTIAL OF BANGLADESH IN BIMSTEC

Log(Xij)=a+βlog(Y*iYj)+γlog(Dij)+

Here, Xij= Trade flows between country i and j;

Yi and Yj= GDPs of country i and j respectively;

Dij= Distance between country i and j;

= Normal random error or disturbance term;

α = Volume of trade taken place between country i and j irrespective of the concerned variables.

It should be noted here that dummy variables explaining trade between the countries usually play a substantive role in explaining bilateral trade flows and hence are included in the standard gravity models.

Nevertheless, in its early stage, gravity model was characterised by its questionable theoretical basis.24 Only the empirical studies helped researchers to stress on GDP size and distance as the main explanatory variables which led to bias in the results from a computed gravity equation. Efforts were made during the 1970s to provide a theoretical foundation to this frequently used model.

Anderson (1979) could be regarded as the pioneer of giving theoretical justification to the gravity model. He related gravity model to product differentiation by the origin nation.25 Helpman and Krugman (1985) also provided a theoretical basis to the model by employing “a differentiated product framework with increasing returns to scale”.26 A connection between gravity models and monopolistic competition was established by Bergstrand (1989) and Helpman (1987).27 Various economists also deduced this model from different theory. For instance, Ricardian framework was used by Eaton and Kortum (1997) in deriving gravity equation. Deardroff (1998), on the other hand, produced it from the so-called Heckser-Ohlin theory.28

24 See, I. Martinez-Zarzoso and F. Nowak-Lehmann, “Augmented Gravity Model: An Empirical Application to Mercosur-European Union Trade Flows”, Journal of Applied Economics, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2003, p. 295. Also see, M. Rahman, W. B. Shadat and N. C. Das, “Trade Potential in SAFTA: An Application of Augmented Gravity Model”, Paper No. 61, Dhaka: Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), p. 3. 25 S. R. Pradhan, op. cit., p. 21. 26 I. Martinez-Zarzoso and F. Nowak-Lehmann, op. cit. 27 Ibid. 28 See for details, C. Carrillo and C. A. Li, “Trade Blocs and the Gravity Model: Evidence from Latin American Countries”, Discussion Paper, University of Essex, 2002, p. 8, available at https://www.essex.ac.uk/economics/ research/discussion-papers/papers-text/dp542.pdf, accessed on 26 May 2014.

203 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014

Theoretical ground of distance variable in the gravity equation was given by Frankel (1997) and Krugman (1991). Krugman showed that geographical proximity could lead to the rise of regional trade flows because the more closer the trading partner is the lesser would be the cost of transportation.29 In the same vein, Frankel postulated that geographical proximity and preferential trading agreements could explain higher trade flows.30

3.2 Methodology and Data

3.2.1 Specification of the Gravity Models

The study tries to calculate the potential export flows from Bangladesh, as indicated earlier, to the members of BIMSTEC-FTA. Here, efforts have been made to estimate an augmented gravity model for Bangladesh, which will be mentioned hereafter as the export model. The model is designed to calculate the potential export flows from Bangladesh in the economies belonging to BIMSTEC-FTA. The export equation has taken into consideration the GDPs and distance variable and a dummy variable (RTA). It also includes exchange rate, tariff rate and population variables. The article considers the real effective exchange rate (REER) and weighted average Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff rate for the trade. The export model is specified by the following equations:

log(Expij)= a+βlog(GDPi*GDPj)+γlog(Distij)+θlog(REERi*REERj)+φlog(MFNTrfi*

MFNTrfj)+ +δlog(POPi*POPj)+ΨRTAij+ (1)

Here, Expij= Potential exports from Bangladesh (denoted as i) to partner country j;

GDPi= GDP of Bangladesh;

GDPj= GDP of partner country j;

Distij= Distance between Bangladesh and partner country j;

REERi= Real Effective Exchange Rate of Bangladesh;

REERj= Real Effective Exchange Rate of partner country j;

MFNTrfi= MFN Tariff (weighted average) Rate of Bangladesh;

29 Ibid. 30 Ibid.

204 EXPORT POTENTIAL OF BANGLADESH IN BIMSTEC

MFNTrfj= MFN Tariff (weighted average) Rate of partner country j;

POPi= Population of Bangladesh (in millions);

POPj= Population of partner country j (in millions);

RTAij= Dummy for RTA between Bangladesh and country j (partner country);

RTAij = Taking the value of 1 if Bangladesh and its trade partner are members of BIMSTEC

= Taking the value 0, if otherwise;

= Stochastic disturbance term.

As mentioned earlier, GDPs of country i and j in the above equation is the proxy variable of income or economic size. On the other hand, distance between Bangladesh and its trade partner is the proxy variable of transportation cost involved with trade.

3.2.2 Expected Sign of the Coefficients

The coefficients of the explanatory variables, namely β, γ, θ, Ф, ψ and δ will respectively measure the ceteris paribus effects of product of GDPs, distance, product of exchange rate, product of MFN tariff rate, RTA and population on natural log of export. In other words, keeping the effects of other variables unchanged what would be the increase of product of Bangladesh and partner nation’s GDPs on the former’s exports and so on. The first coefficient β of all three models is expected to attain positive sign indicating that with the rise of GDP in Bangladesh and its trade partners, more exports from Bangladesh will take place. It is obvious that high level GDP or income can attract more import or can lead to the supply of more exportable production from Bangladesh. Conversely, distance, the second explanatory variable, is predicted to have a negative sign. Naturally, Bangladesh supposes to maintain higher trade with its neighbours due to lower transportation cost vis-à-vis those countries which are far away from the former. The coefficient of third explanatory variable (real effective exchange rate)θ , is expected to obtain positive sign. REER is an index of real exchange rate basically showing how domestic currency performs in relation to the rest of the world as a whole. As such, an increase in the REER index implies devaluation of local currency which would spur exports. The fourth explanatory variable, MFN tariff rate is supposed to have a negative effect on export, because, if Bangladesh and partner nations hike its MFN tariff rate, then exports from Bangladesh would be hampered. Increase of population in both Bangladesh and partner nations

205 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014 would positively impact the exports from Bangladesh, thereby δ is expected to take positive sign. Likewise, the RTA variable is likely to have a positive impact on trade. If Bangladesh and its partners are belonging to a same trading bloc which in this case is BIMSTEC-FTA, then trade between the two nations supposes to increase.

3.2.3 The Data

Cross-sectional data for 2012 have been used to compute the gravity model. The study considers 117 trading partners of Bangladesh, hence, the sample size is 117. The relevant data on exports, distance, GDP, tariff rate and exchange rate of these 117 countries are collected from various sources. Country-specific annual exports (in million US$) of Bangladesh, for example, are obtained from the IMF’s Yearly Direction of Trade Statistics. Bangladesh’s exports with all the BIMSTEC members have been incorporated. World Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank is the source of the GDP figures (in million US$). The same source has been explored for the exchange rate and MFN tariff rate, REER and population (in million) data. Distance data, measured by kilometre, were extracted from a website31. The paper takes into account the distance between capital of Bangladesh and that of its partner nations.

3.3 Estimation of the Gravity Models

The study had to drop both MFNTrf and RTA variables from the model as both of their impacts on Bangladeshi exports have been found statistically insignificant. Hence, the paper estimated the following export model:

log(Expij)=a+ log(GDPi*GDPj)+ log(Distij)+ log(REER *REER )+ β γ θ i j δ log(POPi*POPj)+ (2)

The estimation of the slope coefficients or the parameters,β , γ, θ, q, δ and intercept term, is based on a classical estimation procedure, namely ordinary least square (OLS) method. At first, the export model is estimated and then the estimated model is checked for heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity. Lastly, Bangladesh’s export potential with the BIMSTEC members are computed.

The summary results of the regression model are reported in Table 3. The results show that the variables in the models are statistically significant at 5 percent level and yield the expected signs. The values of coefficient of log(GDPi*GDPj) are estimated as 1.215116 implying ceteris paribus if, Bangladesh and its partner nations’ GDPs are increased by 1 percent, then Bangladesh’s potential export will also rise by 1.22 percent. The estimate of distance variable also has the desirable implications for

31 "Distance Calculator – How Far Is It"?, available at www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/distance.html, accessed on 12 December 2013. 206 EXPORT POTENTIAL OF BANGLADESH IN BIMSTEC

Bangladesh’s exports. The negative value of this variable indicates that a 1 percent decrease in transportation cost will have an incremental effect on the export from Bangladesh. For BIMSTEC-FTA, these results are of importance as they reveal that if the income rises in the member nations and transportation cost falls there, then Bangladesh’s bilateral trade will also increase. Similarly, it has been reported that real effective exchange rate would have desired effect on Bangladesh's exports. And, the positive coefficient values of population variable is in accordance with the expectation showing that rise in population in both Bangladesh and its trade partner would enhance potential of country's exports.

Table 3: Summary Results of the Gravity Models Models Explanatory Variables and R2 Values of Coefficients Constant -19.10758 (10.12568) * log (GDPi*GDPj) 1.215116 (0.109965)* log (Distij) -1.673857 (0.273529) * Export model with dependent log(REER *REER ) 0.429103 (0.203373)* variable log (Expij) i j

log(POPi*POPj) 1.169066 (0.531957)* R2 0.763405 Adjusted R2 0.746198 Source: Author's Own Calculation. *Statistically significant at 5 percent level. Figures in the parentheses are the standard errors of the respective estimated parameters. Next, the study looks into the issue of goodness of fit measured by 2R . Typically, R2 measures the percentage of variation in the dependent variable explained by the independent or the explanatory variables.32 In the current study, the R2s obtained from the gravity equations of export is quite impressive as it possesses a value of 0.76. Hence, the explanatory variables included here have been accounted for roughly 76 percent variations in Bangladesh export model.

The study also performed a couple of tests to detect whether these models have violated the assumption of no multicollinearity and no homoscedasticity. Perfect linear relations between all or some explanatory variables result in multicollinearity in a regression model. With the presence of multicollinearity, accurate or precise estimation becomes a troublesome affair.33 To check the presence of multicollinearity, the present study computes auxiliary regressions.34 The auxiliary regressions have been run by regressing each explanatory variables on the remaining explanatory variable(s) belonging to the model. For example, a model is specified as follows:

Y= α0+β1X1+β2X2+β3X3+U

32 See for details, D. N. Gujarati, Basic Econometrics, Fourth Edition, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003, p. 87. 33 Ibid., p. 350. 34 Ibid., p. 361.

207 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014

The auxiliary regressions of this model are:

X1= α0+β2X2+β3X3+U;

X2= α0+β1X1+β3X3+U; and so on.

Each auxiliary regression generates a R2, notified as Ri2, which is compared with the R2 of the original gravity equations. A higher Ri2 would indicate the presence of multicollinearity in the models. This very rule is known as Klien’s rule of thumb. The result of this test is reported in Table 4 in showing Ri2 of each auxiliary regression is smaller than original R2 and hence, the gravity models in question do not suffer from the multicollinearity problem.

Table 4: Results of Klien’s Rule of Thumb to Detect Multicollinearity Ri2 of Auxiliary R2 of Original Model Dependent Variables Conclusion Regression log (GDPi*GDPj) 0.56242 R2> Ri2 log (Distij) 0.138770 0.763405 No multicollinearity log(REER *REER ) 0.189409 i j problem log (Distij) 0.093444 Source: Author's Own Calculation

Table 5: Result of Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Test to Detect Heteroscedasticity Model F-Statistic Probability Conclusion Export Model 2.580901 0.041173 No heteroscedasticity problem Source: Author's Own Calculation Finally, the results are checked for heteroscedasticity, which is a problem that arises when the variance of residuals of disturbance terms is not same across individual. The presence of heteroscedasticity results in misleading inference with biased and inconsistent OLS estimators and invalid t-and F-tests.35 The present study employs the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (BPG) F-test to find out whether the models suffer from heteroscedasticity. To run this test, the squared residual needs to be regressed 2 on the explanatory variable. For a model, Y= α0+β1X1+β2X2+β3X3+u, u is regressed on X1, X2 and X3 to find the existence of heteroscedasticity. Then one needs to test the overall significance with an F-test. If the probability of F statistic is higher than the F-statistic itself, then, it can be inferred that the model does not suffer from heteroscedasticity problem. The BPG test results for this study are presented in Table 5. The results reveal in all three models probability of F statistic is greater than F statistic, which indicates that the gravity models do not have heteroscedasticity problem.

35 Ibid., p. 399. 208 EXPORT POTENTIAL OF BANGLADESH IN BIMSTEC

3.4 Trade Potential in BIMSTEC-FTA for Bangladesh

The current sub-section of the paper computes potential export of Bangladesh to the BIMSTEC nations, from the gravity equations. By plaguing the values of the slope coefficients in the gravity models stated by equation 2, one can get Bangladesh’s potential export flows to the BIMSTEC members. In other words, potential figures are simply the forecasted values of export from the gravity equations. However, the gravity model is estimated for 117 trading partners for most of which Bangladesh has tariff in place; hence, putting in GDP and distance for the BIMSTEC partners do not provide an estimate for potential exports once trade barriers are removed. Instead, what one gets is an estimate for potential exports once trade barriers are lowered to the same level as for the average of the rest of the world. Keeping this in mind, one can safely say that even if the actual exports exceed the computed potential trade, one might see an increase in an FTA, because by definition, trade barriers would eventually become zero in this arrangement.

Table 4 presents the potential and actual figures of trade, export and import and ratio of potential to actual trade of Bangladesh within BIMSTEC. This ratio is an important indicator for making an evaluation of a trade partner or a trade bloc. One can intuitively figure out that if a nation’s ratio of potential to actual trade is greater than unity for a trading partner then there remains untapped trade potential for that nation with this partner country. Conversely, with a ratio less than unity, one can infer that the nation has already exceeded the potential trade level with the partner. But for the reason mentioned above, potential trade could turn out to be greater than the actual trade if the countries’ trade is governed by FTA. For export and import, the ratio gives the similar interpretation. It is more viable for a nation to join an RTA that clubbed those nations with which its potential to actual ratio is greater than one.

Table 6: Bangladesh’s Export Potential in BIMSTEC-FTA BIMSTEC Partners Actual Export (in mil- Potential Export Potential: Actual lion US$) (in million US$) Bhutan 1.82 1.26 0.69 India 563 1808.04 3.21 Myanmar 13.67 12.30 0.90 Nepal 26.41 40.7 1.54 Sri Lanka 23.69 19.29 0.81 Thailand 51.43 280.03 5.44 Total 680.02 2161.62 3.17 Source: Author's Own Calculation From Table 4, it is observed that Bangladesh’s potential exports with the BIMSTEC members have gone beyond the actual volume. However, it has limited

209 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014 export potentials in economies like Bhutan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. That does not mean that Bangladesh has little scope to further the existing export to these BIMSTEC members. When the BIMSTEC-FTA would be fully implemented, Bangladesh’s expected export to these economies could well exceed its actual level.

By contrast, export potentials to two of bigger economies, namely, India and Thailand, are quite substantial for Bangladesh. In fact, potential export volume is literally three times and five times higher than the actual exports to Indian and Thai economies respectively. The result reflects the fact that current Bangladeshi exports to these two markets have been by and large under-explored. Therefore, both India and Thailand, as the results suggest, would be the two prominent destinations of Bangladeshi exports. As a result, total BIMSTEC exports are likely to be hiked by nearly three folds.

4. concluding Remarks

The present paper has applied augmented gravity equations to estimate Bangladesh’s export potentials in BIMSTEC-FTA. The results from the gravity models have been found quite reasonable with the included variables being statistically significant. Also, a couple of diagnostic tests have been applied to detect whether the models suffer from multicolliniearity and heteroscedasticity. The tests confirm that the models do not violate the assumptions of no multicolliniearity and no heteroscedasticity. Finally, the export potential for Bangladesh in BIMSTEC has been found quite encouraging, with the overall flows of Bangladeshi exports are predicted to increase quite significantly to the BIMSTEC countries. The relatively affluent economies of BIMSTEC, namely, India and Thailand, are likely to be accounted for a larger chunk of Bangladesh’s exports. Hence, the country might gain considerably from its exports to this bloc as big opportunities could be tapped by exporting more to economies like India and Thailand.

210 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014: 211-225

Abu Salah Md. Yousuf Mohammad Jasim Uddin CHALLENGES OF INDIA’S GLOBAL EMERGENCE

Abstract

India is emerging as a global economic power and expanding its military capabilities. Its maritime posture in the Indo-Pacific has made it an important stakeholder in the Asia-Pacific strategic ambiguity. The country is invited in almost all global forums and encouraged to play active role in the international affairs. These are some of the key indicators of India’s global emergence. By contrast, India is yet to take strong footholds in several global issues, while negotiating with international powers e.g. the USA and China. Some major challenges of the global emergence of India are its foreign policy predicaments, neighbourhood compulsions and China bogey, compulsions of energy import, limits of its soft power capabilities, internal security threats and domestic underdevelopment. In this context, the two important research questions of this paper are: which factors indicate India as an emerging global power? And, what are the challenges for India’s global emergence? The paper concludes that due to emerging economic and military power, India’s role in the international arena are increasing, but the country faces both internal and external challenges to project itself as a global power.

1. Introduction

After 1990s, economic liberalisation involving globalisation process helped India to strengthen its engagement in the international affairs. During the Cold War, India played an important role to unite global South against imperialism and colonialism. India’s global role was based on five principles, famously known as Pancha-shila : (a) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty (b) non-aggression (c) non-intervention in other’s domestic affairs (d) mutual respect and equality and (e) peaceful co-existence.1 In the post-Cold War era, India’s role in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and global climate change negotiation shows its keenness to uphold interests of the developing world. Concurrently, India is emerging as an economic power globally. India’s maritime posture in the Indo-Pacific has made it an important stakeholder in the global politics. Yet, India is facing some precarious challenges for its global emergence. These include India’s foreign policy predicaments,

Abu Salah Md. Yousuf and Mohammad Jasim Uddin are Research Fellows at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). Their e-mail addresses are [email protected] and [email protected] respectively.

© Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2014.

1 N. Jayapalan, Foreign Policy of India, New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 2001, p. 54.

211 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014 neighbourhood compulsions and China bogey, compulsions of energy import, limits of its soft power capability, internal security threats and domestic underdevelopment. Understanding the challenges and realising the emerging scenario are crucial in order to trace out where India is heading now.

It is in this context, the two important research questions of this paper are: which factors indicate India as an emerging global power? And, what are the challenges that may impede India’s global emergence? In order to answer the questions, this paper reviews existing literature i.e. books, journal articles, reports, documents, formal studies or evaluations, newspaper clippings and reports appearing in the mass media. The paper is structured with four sections. Section one covers the introduction while section two elaborates the factors indicating India's emargence as global power. Section three identifies the challenges for India and Section four covers the concluding remarks.

2. Indicators of India’s Global Emergence

India’s global emergence in the twenty-first century has been envisaged by many scholars. For example, considering India’s large population, expanding military power, spreading industrialisation, economic growth and insatiable desire for scientific knowledge, Johan Galtung envisages that India is on its way to super power status.2 Henry Kissinger predicts that in the twenty-first century, international system will be dominated by six powers: the USA, Europe, China, Japan, Russia and probably India.3 He identifies that the large size of India and its “experience with the multistate system”, e.g. India’s ancient culture and experience of British rule, will help the country to induce a foreign policy which can enhance its image globally.4 Samuel P. Huntington foresees that in the coming decades, “India could move into rapid economic development and emerge as a major contender for influencing the world affairs.”5 Stephen P. Cohen identifies that India’s economic development, democratic political system, cultural influence, geostrategic position and nuclear power indicate that it “has begun to overcome its many deficiencies and has discovered new strengths”.6 Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul have analysed India’s foreign policy behaviour to be a major power and the emerging conflict between India and major powers.7 They conclude that India’s desire to be a global power is a “long but unfinished journey”. A study by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, with a purpose of understanding

2 Johan Galtung, “On the Way to Superpower Status: India and the EC Compared”, Future, Vol. 24, No. 9, November 1992, pp. 917-929. 3 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, pp. 23-24. 4 Ibid. 5 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996, p. 121. 6 Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power, Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institute, 2001, p. 298. 7 Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for the Major-Power Status, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 108.

212 CHALLENGES OF INDIA’S GLOBAL EMERGENCE

India’s potentials to become a global power, identifies that India’s extensive military modernisation, regional security concerns and great power relations project it as an emerging global power.8

However, the components to be a global power are multidimensional. A number of indicators are underlined to measure India’s global emergence by different scholars. In this section, the paper concentrates on four common factors to assess India’s global emergence. These are India’s economic power, expansion of military capability, maritime posture in the Indo-Pacific and its emerging role in international politics.

2. 1 Emergence of India as a Global Economic Power

As an important economic power of Asia, India’s contribution to the world gross domestic product (GDP), international goods and services trade as well as foreign direct investment (FDI) are recognised. As Figure 1 shows, in 2011 while India contributed only 7 percent of global GDP growth, in 2030 it could contribute 11 percent and in 2060 it could reach up to 18 percent.

Figure 1: Percentage of Global GDP9 in 2005 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 2011 2030 2060 India 7% United United India 11% United States 18% India 18% States 16% China States 23% 17% Japan 3% China28% Japan 4% Euro Japan 7% Area 9% Font Euro Area 12% 11% China28% Other Euro Area 17% Other Other OECD 15% OECD 14% Other OECD 18% Other Non-OECD 12% Non-OECD 12%

Source: Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2012.

India is also being globally accredited by its growing contribution to large- scale human capital as well as inclusive research and development (R&D). India has been a dominant member of BRICS10. The economic development has given India a new extra-regional height to its other Asian competitors. Moreover, the growing presence of multi-national companies (MNCs) and middle-class in India has accelerated its goods and services demands. It has created an opportunity for India

8 “India and the Future of Global Order”, Ministry of Defence, Norway, 2009, available at http://www. regjeringen.no/upload/FD/Dokumenter/India-studie_ssek_301109.pdf, accessed on 15 June 2014. 9 Global GDP is taken as a sum of GDP for 34 OECD and 8 non-OECD G20 countries. 10 BRICS consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa; it is an association of these five major emerging economies. BRICS members are developing and newly industrialising countries; they are distinguished by their large, fast-growing economies and significant influence on regional and global affairs. All the five countries are G-20 members. 213 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014 to strengthen its global engagement and boost up economic specialisation both in advanced and developing states. In the first decade of twenty-first century, the Indian economy grew at an average rate of 7 percent yearly which helped the country to emerge as an important stakeholder in the global economy.

There are apprehensions that the European and the North American economic growth are going to be constrained by their fluctuating productivity, increasing debts, decelerating growth of labour force and aged populace. On the other hand, in line with the generalisations of Goldman Sachs, the Indian economy is growing more rapidly.11 Goldman Sachs also expects India to be the third largest economy of the world, behind China and the USA, by 2050.12 Ever-increasing MNCs and middle-class, encouraging demographics, both human and physical capital growth, flourishing information technology (IT) and service sector as well as economic specialisation would create prospects for sustainable economic development and growth in India. And it would, therefore, reduce per-capita income level gap between India and the developed economies.

2. 2 Modernisation of Military Capability

With 1.3 million soldiers, the Indian army demonstrates remarkable power to protect the country from any external attack.13 In recent times, the Indian army is not only defending the country from the external threats, but also internally fighting against insurgency and terrorism. India is now more capable to face its external and internal security challenges. At present, India stands as the third largest standing military of the world (Table 1).

Table 1: Defence Spending and Military Capability of Selected Countries Country Defence Defence Defence Number Estimated Paramilitary Spending Spending Spending in Armed Reservists (000), US $ in Per Capita, % of GDP, Forces (000), (000), 2014 millions, 2013 2013 2013 2014 2014 The USA 600,400 1,896 3.70 1,492 844 0 China 112,173 83 1.24 2,333 510 660 India 36.297 30 1.84 1,325 1,155 1,404 Source: IISS Military Balance, 2014.

The modernisation process of the Indian army is multidimensional. Lieutenant General J. P. Singh, former Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, has described the modernisation of the Indian defence forces as:

11 Goldman Sachs, “India Revisited”, White Paper, June 2010, available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/ gsam/docs/instgeneral/general_materials/whitepaper/india_revisited.pdf, accessed on 11 June 2014. 12 Ibid. 13 India faced war with Pakistan for four times: 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999 and with China for once: 1962.

214 CHALLENGES OF INDIA’S GLOBAL EMERGENCE

the critical capabilities that are being enhanced to meet challenges across the spectrum include battlefield transparency, battlefield management system, night-fighting capability, enhanced firepower, including terminally guided munitions, integrated manoeuvre capability to include self-propelled artillery, quick reaction surface-to-air missiles, the latest assault engineer equipment, tactical control systems, integral combat aviation support and network centricity.14

Since 2000 to 2012, India increased its military expenditure by 75 percent as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Military Expenditure Increase of Selected Countries: 2000-2012

300 350% 275 325% 250 300% 250% 200 216% 179% 200% 150 212 150% 100 98% 75% 100% 58 57% 70% 50 27 21 25% 46% 50% 12 11 12 6 1 1% 0 0% USA China Russia Saudi IndiaUKSouth BrazilAlgeria France Arabia Korea Dollar Increase (billions) Percentage Increase

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2013.

Recently, India has commissioned aircraft-carrier INS Vikramaditya15 and Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas. The former is the latest acquisition of the Indian Navy. INS Vikramaditya consists of “24 MiG-29K fighter jets and mix of 10 helicopters that might include Ka-28 helicopters ASW, Ka-31 helicopters AEW, ALH Dhruv choppers and SeaKing helicopters”16. On the other hand, Tejas is the first local light combat aircraft of India. With latest technology, it is a 4th generation aircraft which will be attributed in future by a stealth fighter as well as “digital fly-by-wire control system with glass cockpit

14 “Modernisation Thrusts of Indian Army: Interview with Deputy Chief of Army Staff”, CLAWS Journal, Winter 2010, available at http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/826070326_JPSinghCJWinter2010. pdf, accessed on 15 June 2014. 15 India’s first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. 16 Aditya Bhat, “To 10 Achievements and Developments of Indian Military in 2013”, International Business Times (India Edition), 13 December 2013, available at http://www.ibtimes.co.in/top-10-achievements-and- developments-of-indian-military-in-2013-photos-532404, accessed on 29 June 2014, p. 1.

215 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014 having real-time information displayed on it.”17 The LCA Tejas will also be equipped with BVR18 missiles in future. Earlier, the government of India had commissioned INS Arihant (its updated version is INS Vikramaditya) to increase nuclear triad capacity and has currently added INS Vikrant, a local aircraft carrier equipped “with a 37,500 tonner with STOBAR feature with a ski-jump”19. It marked India’s capacity to assemble its own aircraft carrier. The INS Vikrant will be consisted of “12 Mig-29K and 8 LCA Tejas with other Ka-31 helicopters”20. India has deployed roughly fifty thousand Mountain Strike Corps, headquartered at Panagarh in West Bengal, along the entire LAC21 with China, to rapidly strike nearby Tibet in case of any attack by China in Arunachal Pradesh. Besides, India has tested its more than 5000 km IRB22 missile Agni V23 nearby the coast of Odisha.

India has tested K-15 Missile24, while BrahMos SLBM25 is on board to facilitate INS Arihant. Both India and Russia are jointly working on the BrahMos in developing the world’s fastest supersonic cruise missile. It is expected that such developments would strengthen naval ships as well as submarines of India. Again, Dhruv, a modern light helicopter squad, has been commissioned by the Indian Navy. Dhruv is to be used for multi-purposes (e.g. reconnaissance, transport, evacuating medical role, utility, etc.) Besides, India has effectively tested 130 mm canon and several systems like Arjun Catapult, whereas its military science is now in a position to offer local way out to keep its armed forces acknowledged with modern armaments, apparatus and technology. Furthermore, India is going to be rich in defence research institutes working on how to collaborate with global military organisations in order to modernise its armed forces. These have increased Indian indigenous military capability and scopes for strengthening strategic partnership with the USA and Russia. However, the Indian official view is that “all its defence-related developments are for peaceful measures and not to outdo anyone”26, but such military expansion enhances its position in the global power structure.

2. 3 India’s Maritime Posture in the Indo-Pacific

There are different strategic and geo-political interests for major powers between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Accordingly, India thinks that the major

17 Ibid., 18 Beyond Visual Range. 19 Aditya Bhat, op. cit., 20 Ibid., 21 Line of Actual Control. 22 Intermediate Range Ballistic. 23 Including various local technologies; e.g. composite rocket motor, state-of-the-art avionics, 5th generation on-board computer distributed architecture, laser gyro-based inertial navigation system, micro-navigation system, re-entry kit shield, etc. 24 A nuclear-capable submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with a range of 700 km. 25 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM). 26 Aditya Bhat, op. cit., 216 CHALLENGES OF INDIA’S GLOBAL EMERGENCE concerns in the India Ocean Rim (IOR) are asymmetrical in nature and these should be handled through regional and multiparty cooperation.27 The Pacific is observed as a domain of strategic and political dissonances. However, the Indian Ocean is being challenged by increasing non-traditional threats – maritime terrorism, humanitarian crises, piracy, trafficking, etc. China is promoting the idea of maritime silk route, building up of maritime infrastructure and port facilities in South Asia and along the east coast of Africa.28 India is equally cautious about how to respond to the Chinese maritime posture in the Indo-Pacific.

The Indian Navy is now more responsive to its key mandate of protecting India’s interest. It is keen to increase its functional collaboration with the East and Southeast Asia, as well as expand organisational entrance to refill and refurnish resources in the Indo-Pacific littorals. India is trying to have a role of stabiliser in the IOR and the Pacific. It has also been partaking actively in the maritime and political security discourses in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Shangri-La Dialogue, the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) Plus29 and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF). Simultaneously, the government of India continues to expand its trilateral and summit diplomacy in the IOR and the Pacific. Another issue is whether maritime security, encompassing the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, is a key irritant of India. The extended "maritime" zone30 for India is very important route for the world trading of oil and raw materials, the two factors that are important to the country's steady economic growth as well as economic security. These are pushing India to undertake maritime strategy and neutralise asymmetrical stances that could undermine its regional dominance.

2. 4 India’s Role in International Politics

In the early 1990s, India started its economic liberalisation. Since then, the country was more visible globally. The visibility is guided by its democratic consolidation and economic steadiness. It has adopted soft diplomacy e.g. actively engaging with global institutes like the United Nations (UN) bodies and leadership role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). India's increasing socio-economic development and being a nuclear power helped the country to enhance its importance in the global negotiation meetings. Immediately, after the 9/11, India offered “over-flight rights and bases to the US.”31 This hinted India’s new intention in its overseas policy and the offer

27 Ellen Laipson and Amit Pandya, “The Indian Ocean: Resource and Governance Challenges”, The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2009. 28 For example, Gwadar, Hambantota and Sittwe in South Asia and Mombasa, Dar-e-Salam and Bagamoyo. 29 ADMM Plus is a platform for ASEAN and its eight Dialogue Partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Russia and the United States) to strengthen security and defence cooperation for peace, stability and development in the region. 30 It extends from the Gulf of Hormuz in West Asia to the Straits of Malacca in Southeast Asia. 31 Ummu Salma Bava, “New Powers for Global Change? India’s Role in the Emerging World Order”, FES Briefing Paper No 4, March 2007, available at library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04372.pdf, accessed on 30 June 2014, p. 2. 217 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014 signalled that the country was engaging the US differently. The global and regional engagements of India are guided by different clusters of relations: (a) with the South Asian neighbours, instituting South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC); (b) with five major global powers (the US, the EU, Russia, Japan and China) – two of the five, the US and China, are crucial actors in South Asia influencing strategic and political dynamics in the region and so the first two sets of relations are interlinked; (c) with the Southeast Asian states to increase trade and economic relations as well as the West and Central Asian states to secure energy demands – this cluster also pays due attention to the Indian Ocean and littorals and (d) with the states of Latin America and Africa aimed at securing energy demands.

Overseas strategy of India seems to be introducing and continuing a strategy of neo-nonalignment e.g. many to engage at different levels to secure diverse requirements.32 India bilaterally and also through regional framework in South Asia is pursuing its neighbourhood policy not only securing regional stability but also ensuring economic diplomacy goals. Seeking India’s existence in and facilitating its alliance building with the regions are guided by both economic and political viewpoints. The Look East Policy of India, particularly engaging with the ASEAN and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) has taken the country forefront in Southeast Asia. This is, in a sense, a welcome move by both parties to be economically benefited.

Besides, Indian Diaspora is socio-economically and politically strong worldwide; they are getting influential in the west which earns significant politico- economic benefits for India. On the other hand, India continues to demand for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), where the country expects support from the developing world. India is keen to establish a new multilateral global order and to promote South-South cooperation on trade and economic development, which indicates a unique global vision of the country.

3. The Challenges of India’s Global Emergence

India’s role and influence in the international arena are visible. The country has potential – and also the ambition – to become a global power. However, India’s path to global power status is not easy. It is constrained by external and internal challenges. Any country’s global status does not depend only on its external posture; its internal development and stability help the country to make its position and status sustainable. Though India is modernising its military capability and expanding its role regionally and internationally, the country’s economic and security challenges are considered as constraints for its global emergence. India’s foreign policy and diplomacy face challenges to enlarge its influence in the global affairs. There are

32 Ibid. 218 CHALLENGES OF INDIA’S GLOBAL EMERGENCE sceptical opinions about India’s global rise. India’s former permanent representative to the UN, Arundhati Ghose, is less sanguine about India’s rise:

What seems to have caught global attention on this occasion is India’s rapidly growing market, and the west, characteristically specific, has clubbed India with other emerging markets, when the rate of growth and size, both actual and potential, of her market, seemed to merit putting India in a separate category of developing countries. In my view, emergent India is basically an India in transition and her strategic options are accordingly either constrained or open possibilities for previously closed course of action.33

Several scholarly works identify different internal and external challenges for India to be a global power.34 In 2013, a distinguished group of India’s leading academics, heads of think tanks, economists, former diplomats, military and naval commanders, business entrepreneurs and journalists published a report on the country's internal and foreign policy challenges. The report concludes as:

Under no circumstances should India jeopardise its own domestic economic growth, its social inclusion and its political democracy…a range of factors – demography, the unleashing of domestic entrepreneurship, the rising aspirations and innovation of millions of marginalised people, technology – give India’s growth prospects a sound foundation and provide competitive advantage that could sustain for some time to come. There is widespread consensus that the main thing that can hold India back is India itself.35

The above mentioned scepticism among the scholars and government representatives elucidates India’s challenge to be a global power. With 1.1 billion population, India is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-cultural country. For near about two hundred years, the country was ruled and exploited by the British Empire. After its independence in 1947, the idea of self determination helped India to consolidate new visions for its progress and development. During the Cold War era, India always opted for a non-alignment policy in the international arena and concentrated to its internal development and progress.36 Till 1990s, India followed

33 Arundhati Ghose, “Emerging India: Strategic Challenges and Opportunities”, K. Subramanyam Memorial Lecture, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore: Aditi Enterprises, 2011, p. 9. 34 See, for example, Katherine Book, Beyond the Beautiful Forevers, London: Grana Books, 2012; Gurucharan Das, The Elephant Paradigm, New Delhi: Penguine Books, 2002; Stephen Chohen, Emerging Power: India, Washington: Brookings Institutions Press, 2001; Edward Luce, In Spite of the Gods: the Strange Rise of Modern India, New York: Doubleday, 2006; Barbara Harriss-White, India Working: Essays on Society and Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; and Rajeev Bhargava, The Promise of India’s Secular Democracy, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010. 35 Sunil Khilani, et. al., Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century, New Delhi: National Defence College and Centre for Policy Research, 30 January 2012, p. 7. 36 M. Srinivas Chary, The Eagle and the Peacock: U. S. Foreign Policy toward India since Independence, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995, p. 66.

219 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014 a regulated and controlled economic system.37 India’s growth rate was poor and it was known as a post-colonial developing country. However, India maintained a democratic system, which helped it to build an image of the largest democracy of the world. After the Cold War, India opened its market and increased its engagement in the international forums. India’s growing ties with the global powers and its economic boom helped the country to increase its acceptance to the international forums.38 India is likely to play an active role in the international arena. But, some of the domestic and external challenges still are considered as hindrances to India’s global emergence.

3. 1 Foreign Policy Predicament

Since independence, Indian foreign policy faced periodic alteration triggered by the failure to harmonise the civilisational, idealist legacy with realist aspirations to be a global power. The Nehruvian foreign policy maintained a non-aligned policy but was tilted to socialism. Nehru also promoted the idea of Afro-Asian solidarity and desired to lead the developing world. Idealism remained one of the principles of India’s foreign policy, but in many cases, India adopted realist policies. In the post-Cold War era, after the liberalisation of India’s economy, “India’s foreign policy establishment is in the process of disinterring a long dead grand strategy from its Cold War grave”39. Asley Tellis describes non-alignment as “unrealistic” and “dangerous” for a variety of reasons: first, India cannot rely on an ideal world or players that respect its attempt as a power of example in pursuing development; second, the quest for strategic autonomy is misplaced in an economically interdependent world with ongoing, fast- shifting political competition as strategic alliances; third, India lacks both material and political resources to chart an entirely independent foreign policy; and fourth, New Delhi should thus enter into preferential strategic partnership taking the form of high quality trading ties, robust defence cooperation and strong diplomatic collaboration into consideration.40 However, Raja Mohan has endorsed India’s foreign policy moving closer to the USA, but it is not a reverse back to the Nehruvian policy.41 He says that Indian policies have turned from “idealism to pragmatism” and “India has moved from its past emphasis on power of the argument to the argument of power”42. In the contemporary times, India is invited in all international forums. Accordingly, India is keen to deepen its bilateral relations with the international powers.

37 Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan, Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 110. 38 Uma Kapila, India’s Economic Development Since 1947, New Delhi: Academic Publications, 2008, p. 155. 39 Ashley J. Tellis, “Can India Revive Nonalignment?”, Yale Global Online, 28 August 2012, available at http:// yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/can-india-revive-nonalignment, accessed on 10 June 2014. 40 Ibid. 41 C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s Foreign Policy, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, pp. xxi-xxii. 42 Ibid. 220 CHALLENGES OF INDIA’S GLOBAL EMERGENCE

3. 2 Neighbourhood Compulsions and China Bogey

India’s intricate relationship with its neighbours has always been a challenge for the country to enhance its position in the international arena. Bilateral tensions, territorial conflicts and political differences underpin India’s neighbourhood compulsions and are inimical to its global aspirations. India’s historical rivalry with Pakistan as well as the nuclearisation of India and Pakistan affected the former’s image regionally and internationally. India’s immediate neighbours have changed significantly in terms of social and political landscape. The simultaneous rise of India and China has increased a competition between the two countries to enlarge their sphere of influence, which enhances India’s concerns regarding the Chinese influence in the region. In one way, India is eager to engage its neighbours by strengthening connectivity and trade.43 On the other hand, India has security concerns from its neighbours e.g. cross border issues – migration, water sharing, transportation, trade, etc.44 The neighbourhood policy needs to be integrated with India’s development and security policies, which is a challenge for the country. Moreover, India’s increasing presence in Afghanistan is not seen positively by Pakistan.45 Both Pakistan and China want to ensure their presence strongly in Afghanistan.46 India’s other neighbours like Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka criticise India’s big brother attitude in the region.47 To be a global leader, India needs to take these countries in its confidence.

India’s relations with China are important for its economic and security interests. The 1962 War between the two countries made them continuous rival. But, the trade and investment between the two countries increased their dependency on each other. Bilateral trade reached nearly US$ 80 billion and is projected to reach US$ 100 billion by 2015, although largely favouring China. On the other hand, China’s encirclement of India by building ports in India’s neighbouring countries, known as “strings of pearls”, makes India confused about China’s intentions in the region. India’s increasing relations with the USA is likely to contain China to some degree. The

43 Rumel Dahiya and Ashok K. Behuria, “Introduction”, in Rumel Dahiya and Ashok K. Behuria (eds.), India’s Neighbourhood: Challenges in the Next Two Decades, New Delhi: Institute of Defence and Strategic Analysis (IDSA), 2012, p. xix. 44 Ibid. 45 Larry Hanauer and Peter Chalk, “India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region”, RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy, 2012, available at http://www.rand.org/ content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP387.pdf, accessed on 12 May 2014. 46 Smruti S. Pattanaik, “Afghanistan and Its Neighbourhood: In Search of a Stable Future”, PRIO Paper, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 2013, available at http://file.prio.no/publication_files/Prio/Pattanaik,%20 S%20%282013%29%20Afghanistan%20and%20Its%20Neighbourhood,%20PRIO%20Paper.pdf, accessed on 23 June 2014. 47 Madhavi Bhasin, “India’s Role in South Asia – Perceived Hegemony or Reluctant Leadership?”, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol. 3, No. 4, October-December, 2008. 221 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014

Chinese sphere of influence in India’s neighbouring countries challenges the latter’s predominance in the region.

3. 3 Maritime Power and Energy Security

In the modern age, maritime power is an important factor for a country’s global emergence. The twenty-first century is known as “Asian Century”, where the Asia-Pacific is becoming the most important area to ensure a country’s global dominance. The USA, China, India and Japan are important stakeholders in the region. India is keen to ensure a strong presence in the Indo-Pacific. India is strengthening its presence in the region, but if it is compared with other actors, India needs more capability to substantiate its footholds in the maritime zone.48

In April 2004, India officially declared its “Maritime Doctrine”. The doctrine identified four major roles for Indian Navy: sea based deterrence, economic and energy security, forward presence and naval diplomacy.49 Maritime power is also linked with India’s uninterrupted oil supply. India is an energy deficit country. About 70 percent of its imported oil is coming from the West Asia.50 India’s foreign policy is influenced by its dependency on its energy import.51 India maintains a good relation with Iran and West Asian countries to secure its energy import. India differs in many cases with the US policies regarding Iran and Central Asia to ensure its stable relations in the region. However, if India wants to fulfil its desire to be a global power, it is necessary for the country to secure uninterrupted oil supply for its development.

3. 4 Limits of India’s Soft Power

Since 2000, reckoning India’s desire to be a global power, the country’s scholarly and diplomatic communities are focusing on soft power capabilities. Placing India as a potential civilisational power and considerable resources arising from its culture, domestic ideology and diplomacy, the country is projected to attract global attention. Such soft power resources are multi-faceted – which include sports, music, art, film, literature and even beauty pageantry. To this list, others have added India’s anti-colonial history, democratic institutions, free press, independent judiciary, vibrant civil society, multi-ethnic polity, secularism, pluralism, skilled English-speaking

48 See, Sam Bateman and Joshua Ho, South East Asia and the Rise of Chinese and Indian Naval Power: Between Rising Naval Powers, USA: Routledge, 2010, p. 238 and Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit and V. Krishnappa, India’s Grand Strategy: History, Theory and Cases, New Delhi: Routledge, 2014, p. 350. 49 Andrew C. Winner, “India As A Maritime Power”, in Toshi Yoshihara, James R. Holmes (eds.), Asia Looks Seaward: Power and Maritime Strategy , Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008, p. 133. 50 US Energy Information Administration, 26 June 2014, available at http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/ India/india.pdf, accessed on 15 April 2014. 51 Anna Rulska and David Jackson, “At the Crossroads of Foreign Policy Decision: India in the Middle East”, in Jack Covarrubias and Tom Lansford (eds.), Strategic Interests in the Middle East: Opposition or Support for US Foreign Policy, Hamshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007, p. 109.

222 CHALLENGES OF INDIA’S GLOBAL EMERGENCE workers, food, handicrafts, yoga, India’s status as a responsible nuclear power, the rapid growth of the IT sector in places such as Bangalore and the existence of a large Indian diaspora in western countries.52 However, some scholars argue that India is yet to capitalise its soft power capabilities for three reasons: first, the overestimation of these resources by the analysts; second, India lacks sufficient hard power to capitalise its soft power ambitions; and finally, unresolved elements of India’s identity that tend to undermine its efforts at soft power projection through public diplomacy.53 In this respect, it is a challenge for India to utilise its soft power capabilities for enhancing its image at the global level.

3. 5 Internal Insecurity

As a vast mosaic of ethnicities, languages, cultures and religions, India can be difficult to govern. India’s decade – long Kashmir issue, the Maoist and Naxalite movements in different parts of India, the resurgent movements in the north- eastern states, the fear of terrorism and religious extremism, etc. are at times untying India’s national integration and progress. The functioning of democracy and regular elections creates opportunity to choose an elected government. But still, Indian democracy fails to include all the sections of the society. The Kashmir issue remains a longstanding source of conflict between India and Pakistan. Both countries fail to reach in any solution on Kashmir. The long rivalry between the two countries pushed them towards conflict, where India alleges that Pakistani sponsored terrorism has created security threats for the country.54 Besides, Naxalite movements are considered as the largest and the most organised security threat for India.55 India remains busy to deal with its internal security challenges. Such issues undermine India’s global leadership. When allegation comes that the country is not able to manage its internal security, its global influence is questioned.

3. 6 Domestic Underdevelopment

Domestic underdevelopment is a challenge for India’s global influence.56 There are criticisms that India’s neo-liberal economic policies adopted in post-1991 have failed to include marginalised people in its development process.57 Economic

52 Rohan Mukherjee, “The False Promise of India’s Soft Power”, Geopolitics, History, and International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2014. 53 Ibid. 54 Daniel Markey, “Terrorism and Indo-Pakistani Escalation”, Council on Foreign Relations, January 2010. 55 Sandeep Kumar Dubey, “Maoist Movement in India: An Overview”, Institute of Defence and Strategic Analysis (IDSA), 06 August 2013; and Jennifer L. Oetken, “Counterinsurgency against Naxalites in India”, in Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (eds.), India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 128. 56 Jayati Ghosh, “Is India Still a Developing Country”, The Guardian, 01 April 2014. 57 Bhabani Shankar Nayak, “Need Based Development to ‘Desired’ Development: Locating the Freudian Idea in Social and Economic Development of Tribals after the New Economic Reforms in India”, Journal of Arts and Humanities, Vol. 1, No. 2, October 2012. 223 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014 inflation in recent past also pushed the marginalised people below the poverty line. India’s impressive economic boom has not been country-wide and created disparity in some of its regions. It is argued that the way Maharashtra, Gujarat, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Delhi have been developed; India’s north-eastern states were not developed equally. Such regional disparity has created grievances in different parts of India.58 India’s development process is criticised for regional, social and economic disparities. Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen in his book Development as Freedom, linked human freedoms with economic poverty that erodes freedom and has argued that “development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or over activity of repressive states”59. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has ranked India 135th out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI) of 2014 based on life expectancy, educational attainment and command resources. Also, India’s governance system is criticised for corruption and inefficiency. In 2013, India ranked th94 among 176 countries in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI). It has identified challenges of good governance in India.

Besides, infrastructure is one of the most important factors for development. According to a US state department official, “India will need to invest US$ 1.5 trillion in energy management, US$ 392 billion in transportation infrastructure, and US$ 143 billion in health care by 2030 to support its rapidly growing population”60. Poor infrastructure costs India an estimated 2 percent in annual economic growth.61 India ranked 85th out of 148 countries for its infrastructure in the World Economic Forum’s recent Global Competitiveness Report.62 The rapid growth of Indian economy in recent years has placed increasing stress on physical infrastructure; Indian government and private investors are working together on it. On the other hand, the increasing import dependency on energy exposes India to greater geopolitical risks, fluctuating world market prices and intensifying international competition. India’s energy policy cannot be set in isolation and needs to account for rising global interdependence, while simultaneously communicated appropriately to the public and reflected in policy debates.

In brief, India’s economic booming, military expansion, demographic strength, large territory and geo-strategic position uplift India’s position to be a global power. But, India is yet to integrate fully its internal developments to raise its voice in the international arena. Economic disparity, poor infrastructure, inefficient management

58 Praful Bidwai, “Shining and Starving”, Frontline, 13 August 2011. 59 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 3-4. 60 Geoffrey Pyatt, “The Importance of U. S.-India Business and Economic Relations”, State Department Transcript, 24 June 2011. 61 Beina Xu and Eleanor Albert, “Governance in India: Infrastructure”, Council on Foreign Relations, 01 October 2014, available at http://www.cfr.org/india/governance-india-infrastructure/p32638, accessed on 10 June 2014. 62 World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014, 2013.

224 CHALLENGES OF INDIA’S GLOBAL EMERGENCE of energy system, poor human development record and endemic corruption are likely to weaken India’s image and prevent the country to claim its global power status.

4. Concluding Remarks

After independence in 1947, the Nehruvian foreign policy was keen to follow a non-aligned approach in India’s international posture. Moreover, the country’s “closed economy ...leaning towards Soviet Union”63 hampered India’s engagement in the international arena. India’s GDP growth remained poor, which was nearly 3 percent and it had stagnated the country's economic development. In the beginning of the 1990s, India reformed its economic policies and invited foreign investors in its market. This has helped the country to explore its economic and development potentials. Within one decade, India’s economic growth attracted global attention and foreign investors took huge interest to invest in the country. Such economic boom raised the desires of Indian leaders to expand its role in international affairs. Nevertheless, India’s historic rivalry with Pakistan and China influenced the country to strengthen its military capability. Accordingly, it has developed nuclear capability to secure its strategic position in the region.

The developing relations with the USA gave India a new status in the international forums. Relations with the USA and the West enhanced Indian image. The country’s historic relations with Russia helped to strengthen its military capability. Trade relations with China and Southeast Asia facilitated India’s economic booming. Besides, owing to its traditional relations with the developing countries, India tries to lead the developing world. India is keen to lead G-77 in the global trade and climate change negotiations. Such role of India helps to project itself as a global power. Moreover, India’s military modernisation and posture in the Indo-Pacific have enhanced its image from a regional power to a global stakeholder.

However, India’s global emergence is challenged by the external and domestic factors. India’s foreign policy formation, relations with neighbours and compulsions of energy import negatively affect its global influence. Internal insecurities and domestic underdevelopment are also considered as important backlogs to project India as a global power. Nevertheless, nowadays, India is invited in all high level international forums and as a leader of the developing world. But, its global influence yet depends on the support from other global powers. To influence global affairs, India is still far behind and needs to improve its external and internal capabilities.

63 D. S. Rajan and Raakhee Suryaprakash, “Implications of the East Asia Summit: An Indian Perspective” in Daljit Singh, Political and Security Dynamics of South and Southeast Asia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007, p. 20.

225 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014: 226-240

Md Shahidul Hasan MARITIME VERDICTS AND AVENUES OF RESOURCE EXPLORATION FOR BANGLADESH

Abstract

The recent settlement of long-standing maritime boundary dispute with India and Myanmar ushers a new horizon for economic development for Bangladesh through utilising the sea and its marine resources. The judgment, not to mention, bears huge implications in many dimensions. Both the verdicts have removed all encumbrances to go ahead with oil and gas exploration in the blocks therein. This will enable Bangladesh to establish ‘Blue Economy’, an alternative economic model, utilising all its marine resources. The concept of ‘Blue Economy’, can significantly contribute to the economic development of Bangladesh. There is no doubt that sea-related issues like expansion of international trade, use of marine mineral resources for long-term energy security, proper management of marine fish resources and protection of marine environment and bio-diversity would determine Bangladesh’s future development and economic growth. Bangladesh can be benefited only when it can explore and utilise those resources from the sea. Given this backdrop, this paper attempts to discuss maritime dispute and verdict of Bangladesh in a nutshell, analyse the Bay of Bengal as a hub of huge exploration, challenges therein and finally put forward suggestions for exploring enormous opportunities in the newly settled maritime area.

1. Introduction

South African scholar Marie Muller said - “relations with one’s neighbour are usually most immediate, as these will have a direct effect on how a country is otherwise able to function in the international community”.1 Proximity may breed contempt, suspicion and not infrequently frictions. But, the compulsion of proximity is that, unless a relation of trust and cooperation evolves, an element of insecurity remains at one’s doorstep. And this problem gets more acute when a country is neighboured by big countries. Bangladesh is on the same footing. The country is located at the northern limit of the Bay of Bengal in a broad and deep concavity between Myanmar in the east and India in the west. However, the combined effect of the equidistance lines claimed by its neighbours prevented Bangladesh from reaching 130 nautical miles (nm) from its coast, even leaving it with a narrow wedge of maritime area.

Md. Shahidul Hasan is Lieutenant Colonel of Bangladesh Army. His e-mail address is [email protected]

© Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2014.

1 Marie Muller, “Hydro political Hotspots in Southern Africa: Will There be a Water War?”, available at http:// www.greencrossinternational.net, accessed on 10 September 2014.

226 MARITIME VERDICTS AND AVENUES OF RESOURCE EXPLORATION

Furthermore, the sudden emergence of ‘South Talpatti Island’ (‘New Moore’ as addressed by India) in 1971 in the southern Bay of Bengal had worsen the relation more between Bangladesh and India.2 Bangladesh tried to solve the problem amicably several times but failed to get much response from the neighbours. Finding no other way, Bangladesh launched its legal claims to International Tribunal for Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in the year 2009. Bangladesh got verdict against Myanmar on 14 March 2012 and against India on 7 July 2014. The verdicts cannot be appealed as was agreed by the three nations.3

Bangladesh has now got 1,18,813 sq km of territorial sea, 200 nm of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and a substantial share of the extended continental shelf vis- à-vis Myanmar and India .Thus, Bangladesh has maritime zone almost the size of the country itself. It has created a scope for huge economic opportunities for Bangladesh basing on the sea. Now, ocean can provide potential food security, aquaculture, biotechnology, alternative energy source (oil and gas), tourism, marine transportation and shipbuilding, eco-system services, etc. – utilising sustainable economic opportunities under the banner of ‘Blue Economy’. The role of marine resources in self-sufficiency in food production, protecting environmental balance, facing adverse impacts of climate change and other economic activities is unlimited. However, Bangladesh is not ready to explore these marine resources yet. It lacks adequate expertise and technology to exploit these resources. There was no survey carried out even in the recent past to know as to how much resources are reserved within its stipulated maritime boundary. But, as a coastal developing country, Bangladesh has remained at the forefront of this ‘Blue Economy’ advocacy, recognising that the oceans have a major role to play in poverty alleviation and economic emancipation. According to Professor Kausar Ahmed, “wining maritime dispute is not ultimate solution to the problem. Rather; the country needs a co-ordinated effort and expertise to utilise the sea sources”.4 He said it was good that the country has settled its sea boundary dispute with India and Myanmar. But, the country would have to make a quick survey to know as to how much resources are reserved within its maritime area. According to that, necessary action plan has to be taken at the national level immediately.

In such backdrop, this paper attempts to identify probable sectors in which Bangladesh can establish sustainable ‘Blue Economy’. For that, methodologically, the paper is based on secondary sources; such as journal articles, booklets, newspaper clippings, concept paper of various Ministries, etc. In addition, primary data has been collected through several interviews with the concerned ministries, like Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources and Ministry of Fisheries and Live Stock. The paper is divided into six sections including introduction as section one. Section two

2 “Sovereignty of South Talpatti Island”, The Daily Star, 01 October 2013. 3 “Varoter Shateo Shomudro Joy”, Prothom Alo, 09 July 2014. 4 Arifur Rahman and Rafiqul Islam, “No Preparations to Exploit Huge Opportunities”, The Daily Sun, 09 July 2014. 227 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014 discusses the conceptual issues of ‘Maritime Boundary’ and ‘Blue Economy’. Section three deals with maritime boundary issues and the verdicts of the claim. Section four consolidates the Bay of Bengal as the source of ‘Blue Economy’. Section five highlights the probable challenges therein. Basing on that, section six suggests relevant recommendations along with conclusion.

2. maritime Boundary and Blue Economy: Conceptual Issues

‘Maritime Boundary’ and ‘Blue Economy’ are complementary to each other because unless a defined boundary is earmarked, other can not be planned. For Bangladesh, it is more applicable. Maritime boundary is a part of the earth’s water surface areas using physiographic and geopolitical criteria.5 As such, it usually includes areas of exclusive national rights over mineral and biological resources encompassing maritime features, limits and zones. It is regarded as a legal tool to divide the earth’s water surface into maritime areas based on physical or political geography. The concept of boundary maintenance can be well analysed as per the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) I of 1958, UNCLOS II of 1960 and UNCLOS III of 1982.6 According to Articles 3 and 15 of UNCLOS III, every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nm, measured from baselines in the line of low water tide along the seashore of a state.7 As per Article 17, ships of all states, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. Article 33 gives authority of a state on certain other matters to further 12 nm called as contiguous zone. Article 55 allows an EEZ, an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, where the coastal state has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources.8 As per Article 57, this EEZ shall not extend beyond 200 nm from the baselines.9 UNCLOS III of 1982 in its Article 76 gives rights to the coastal states to own some more areas beyond the EEZ called the continental shelf.10 Figure 1 shows the graphical classification of maritime zone of a coastal country as per UNCLOS 1982.

5 United Nations, “Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea”, Maritime Boundary Agreements (1970- 1984), New York, Vol. XVIII, No.1987, p. 297. 6 M. D. Spalding, “Marine Eco regions of the World: A Bioregionalization of Coastal and Shelf Areas”, Bioscience, Vol. 57, No. 7, 2007, pp. 573-583. 7 K. J. Houghton, “Maritime boundaries in a Rising Sea”, Nature Geosciences, Vol. 3, No.12, 2010, pp. 813-816. 8 Shabbir Ahmed Chowdhury, “Delimination of Maritime Boundaries of Bangladesh: Problems and Prospects”, NDC Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1, June 2008, pp. 185-201. 9 Harun ur Rashid, “Law of Maritime Delimitation”, Dhaka Courier, Vol. 24, No. 39, 18 April 2008, pp.18-19. 10 T. L. McDorman, “Towards the Conceptualization of Maritime Delimitation: Legal and Technical aspects of a Political Process”, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2004, p. 384.

228 MARITIME VERDICTS AND AVENUES OF RESOURCE EXPLORATION

Figure-1: Graphical Representation of Maritime Zones

Maritime zones

Baseline High seas (Wa ter column) Scienti€c Continen t continental shelf Slope

Territorial Sea Rise Contiguous zone Exclusive Econimic Z Abyssal Plane one Outer continental shelf 0 12 24 T he Area (seabed) 200 Full sovereignty Legal continental shel f Nautical miles (M) No sovereignty Source: Ricardo Privation, UNEP/GRID-Arundel, 2009.

On the other hand, the ‘Blue Economy’ is a design theory initiated by Gunter Pauli. It does not solely mean marine fishing but also sustainable economic development, taking into account the advantages of managing the resources of the blue ocean. The ‘Blue Economy’ principles permit to respond to the basic needs of all with what a country possesses. It stands for a different way of designing business by using the resources available in cascading system, where the waste of one product becomes the input to create a new cash flow. It aims at creating jobs, building up social capital and rising income while saving the environment. An international community of companies, innovators and scientists support the concept as prosperous business model which targets to improve natural eco-systems and quality of life. One of the Rectors of the UN University, Professor Heitor Gurgulino de Souza, also commemted that the ‘Blue Economy’ generates excellent ideas that will help entrepreneurs and consumers to significantly impact the economies of the world, while earning money, generating jobs and protecting the environment.11 ‘Blue Economy’ concept has ushered a new horizon for economic development of the coastal countries like Bangladesh through utilising the sea and marine resources at national and international level.12 Bangladesh can be a model for development of Blue Economy, like the European Union, Canada, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Brazil, etc.13 The 'Blue Economy' is exactly that kind of model what Bangladesh needs to ensure a sustainable economy. The new ideas and innovative thinking are compiled here to give new options about how to transform the economy, so that, it can generate new jobs and sustain healthy and happy community in the future.

11 “The Blue Economy: Design Theory”, available at http://www.theblueecnomy.org, accessed on 10 September 2014. 12 “PM for tapping other countries’ expertise”, The Independent, 02 September 2014. 13 Sumon Mahbub, “Blue Economy Boon for Bangladesh”, available at bdnews 24.com, accessed on 01 September 2014.

229 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014

3. Maritime Boundary Issues and Verdicts with Neighbours

Both Myanmar and India followed equidistance principle while delimiting their maritime boundary which would have converged into a short distance in front of Bangladesh coast. These two lines would have created a “Cut-off” effect that deprived Bangladesh of the overwhelming majority of its maritime entitlement.14 The combined effect of the equidistance lines truncated Bangladesh’s maritime entitlement, leaving it with a narrow wedge of maritime space in such a way, not withstanding country's substantial 421 km coastline.15 In addition, India claimed 10 blocks and Myanmar claimed 17 blocks out of Bangladesh’s claim of 28 blocks.16

3.1 Bangladesh-Myanmar Maritime Boundary Issue

A few years back, tension between the two neighbouring nations mounted after Myanmar’s warships and oil and gas exploration rigs intruded into Bangladesh waters in the Bay of Bengal.17 Bangladesh’s accusation was – Myanmar had violated its sovereign maritime jurisdiction which was the first sign of serious diplomatic spat between the two nations. Two days later, Myanmar withdrew their vessels under diplomatic pressure of Bangladesh.18 Bangladesh instituted arbitral proceedings against Myanmar in International Tribunal for Law of the Sea (ITLOS) located in Hamburg, Germany under Annex VII of UNCLOS 1982 on 8 October 2009. The purpose was to secure a maritime delimitation for its territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf.19 Bangladesh requested the tribunal to adjudge the maritime boundary of the territorial sea as a line agreed by the states in 1974 and reaffirmed in 2008. ITLOS found that both 1974 and 2008 minutes did not constitute an agreement within the framework of UNCLOS Article 15.

Again, Myanmar wanted St. Martin’s Island to generate a territorial sea of just 6 nm, rather than the 12 nm to which Bangladesh is entitled under Article 15 of UNCLOS. Myanmar argued that the island could not be described as a “costal island” because, it lays in front of the coast of the country. Bangladesh argued that St. Martin’s Island should be given full effect because international law demanded it. In prior cases, International Tribunals awarded ‘islands’ with territorial sea of less than 12 nm only when they were barren and uninhabitable. In contrast, Bangladesh stressed that St. Martin’s Island, in addition to being an important base for naval operations for the Bangladesh Navy, has a permanent population of about 7,000. The Tribunal agreed with Bangladesh’s claims and gave full effect to St. Martin’s Island.20

14 Bishwajit Datta, “Equity Over Equidistance: A New Hope”, The New Age, 21 July 2014. 15 R. Jones, “Sovereignty and Statelessness in the Border Enclaves of India and Bangladesh”, Political Geography, Vol. 28, No. 6, 2009, pp. 373-381. 16 I. Hossain, “Bangladesh-India Relations: Issues and Problems”, Asian Survey, Vol. XXI. No. 1981, p. 274. 17 Adnan Firoze, “Bangladesh-Myanmar Maritime Dispute: What Actually Happened?”, Dhaka Courier, Vol. 28, No. 36, 23 March 2012, pp. 12-13. 18 Md Khurshed Alam, “Maritime Boundary Issues Between Bangladesh and Myanmar”, Paper presented in the Seminar on Maritime Boundary Issues Between Bangladesh and Myanmar’, organised by BIISS, 28 February, 2012. 19 Ibid. 20 Shamim Ahmed, “Winning the Bay”, Dhaka Courier, Vol. 28, No. 36, 23 March 2012, pp.12-13. 230 MARITIME VERDICTS AND AVENUES OF RESOURCE EXPLORATION

3.2 Bangladesh-India Maritime Boundary Issues

Geologically, Bangladesh and India co-occupy approximately 180 km of maritime border line. However, both nations claimed overlapping maritime boundary due to constantly changing river courses from soil erosion and frequent floods. A small island unexpectedly emerged in the Ganges Delta region of the Bay of Bengal during the aftermath of the Bhola Cyclone in 1971 which now serves as the river border between Bangladesh and India; its geological location prompted both nations to claim the island under their jurisdiction.21 Figure-2 shows the claim of both India and Myanmar on equidistance principle. Whereas, Bangladesh urged that principle of equity should be followed while delimiting the boundary.

Figure-2: Bangladesh’s Low Water Baseline Perceived by India and Myanmar

Source: Google Maps, Nahar, 2009. Bangladesh’s objection to Indian claim was filed with the UN’s Permanent Court of Arbitration based in the Hague, Netherlands as per Article 287(c). India applied the ‘equidistance principle’ while Bangladesh went for ‘equity principle’ to delimit their maritime boundary.22 There were largely three issues in this maritime boundary dispute with India. Major among those was the determination of the Hariabhanga River border boundary, where the ownership of the South Talpatti (New Moore) Island became a center of dispute mentioned earlier. The second issue was determination of

21 Saleh Akram, “Bangladesh and Changing Neighbourhood”, The Daily Sun, 09 July 2014. 22 W. M, Reisman and G. S. Westerman, “Straight Baselines in Maritime Boundary Delimitation”, St Martin Press, Vol. XVI, 1992, p. 242. 231 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014 territorial water boundary up to 12 nm. The third issue was determination of the EEZ boundary of a further 188 miles from the end of territorial water.23

3.3 Verdicts of the Claims

Bangladesh could finally establish its sovereign rights on more than 118,813 sq kms of territorial sea (both verdicts from the Hamburg Court and Hague Court), 200 nm of EEZ and all kinds of animal and non-animal resources under the Continental Shelf up to 354 nm from the Chittagong coast.24 Bangladesh has settled its maritime dispute with Myanmar through a judgment by the ITLOS in Hamburg, Germany on 14 March 2012. 25 The judgment was according to Article 287 of (UNCLOS III) of 1982.26 In this regard, the then Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, Dr. Dipu Moni said “This is a great day for Bangladesh. All our strategic objectives were achieved”. Through a landmark verdict by the PCA, Bangladesh has finally rightfully gained an area of 19,467 out of total 25,602 sq km in the Bay of Bengal with India.27 The Hague based permanent court of arbitration delivered the verdict on 7 July 2014 after around five years of argument and counter argument by the two nations. Bangladesh has got all 10 oil and gas exploration blocks that claimed by India. Nevertheless, Bangladesh will have to redesign six blocks before going for a fresh bid (details have been shown in Table1). There is no existence of South Talpatti Island in the Bay as the island had been washed away two decades back which falls under Indian territory.28

Table 1: Key Features of Maritime Gains for Bangladesh Key Features29 Serial Maritime Gains in Respect to India Maritime Gains in Respect to Myanmar No 1. Tribunal awarded Bangladesh 19,467 Bangladesh got around 70,000 sq km out of sq km maritime area out of total dis- the total 80,000 sq km of disputed waters in puted 25,602 sq km. the eastern part of the Bay, including access to outer continental shelf beyond 200 nm. 2. Bangladesh owns an EEZ extended to Court delimited a 41 sq km territorial sea 200 nm. around St. Martin Island. 3. Bangladesh now owns 1,18,813 sq km ITLOS has demarcated an EEZ of 685 sq km as territorial sea. well as full access to outer continental shelf. 4. Tribunal agreed with Bangladesh’s eq- Tribunal agreed with Bangladesh’s equitable uitable solution on disputed waters. solution on disputed waters.

23 K. J. Houghten et. al., “Maritime Boundaries in a Rising Sea”, Nature Geoscience, Vol. 3, No.12, 2010, pp. 813-816. 24 Sharier Khan, “Verdict Brings New Hope”, The Daily Star, 09 July 2014. 25 "Burma, Bangladesh Maritime Dispute Ends", available at http://sasba.net/news/burma-bangladesh-maritime- dispute-ends, accessed on 10 June 2014. 26 Luther Rangreji, “Bangladesh-Myanmar Maritime Boundary Delimitation Dispute”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 16, No.1 and 2, 2012, pp. 33-58. 27 “Cheers, Bangladesh”, The Daily Star, 09 July 2014. 28 “Sea Limit Row with India”, The Daily Star, 09 July 2014. 29 Ishfaq Ilahi Choudhury, “A New Horizon of Cooperation”, The Daily Star, 10 July 2014. 232 MARITIME VERDICTS AND AVENUES OF RESOURCE EXPLORATION

5. No existence of New Moor/Talpatti Is- ---- land. The area went to Indian territory as per Radcliffe map. 6. Tribunal awarded Bangladesh all the10 Tribunal awarded Bangladesh 12 out of 17 blocks claimed by India. blocks as claimed by Myanmar. Source: “A Historic Win for Bangladesh”, The Daily Sun, 09 July 2014.

The PCA and ITLOS have awarded Bangladesh total 1,18,813 sq km of territorial sea in the Bay of Bengal. Total area gained by Bangladesh from both the verdicts is shown as below:

Figure-3: Map Showing Maritime Boundary and Area Based on the Verdicts.

N

W E INDIA

S BANGLADESH

INDIA

Delim -1 Delim -2 Delim -3 MYANMAR

y

Deimltation Line

B an gl ad Bangladesh-Myanmar bourdar esh 20 0 nm

India 200 nm

Bay of Bengala myanmar Legend 200 nm Excutive Economics 200nm Mils Myanmar Deimltation Line Deimltation Port

Source: The base map is taken from ETOPO2. This map is for illustrative purpose only.

4. bay of Bengal: Source of ‘Blue Economy’

The Bay of Bengal is considered as the largest Marine Ecosystem (LME) among such 64 LMEs of the world.30 Many economic activities can be launched in

30 “Concept Paper on Ocean/Blue Economy-Modern Economic Vision”, Paper presented by Ministry of Foreign Affairs in International Seminar on Ocean /Blue Economy, February 2014, Dhaka. 233 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014

Bangladesh which is based on the sea under ‘Blue Economy’. Economy is the chief determining factor in the present world of power politics. The EEZ can provide substantial contribution to the food supplies, especially the protein supply. Sea weeds are exploited by men for food, animal feed, energy, fertilisers and for chemical and pharmaceuticals purposes. Some probable area where ‘Blue Economy’ can be explored fields are mentioned below.

4.1 Fisheries, Aquaculture and Eco-system Services

The Bay of Bengal is the silver mine of Bangladesh. In 2012-13, a quantity of 5,88,988 tones of sea fish was collected from Bangladesh’s sea area, which is 17 percent of annual fish collection. Total Hilsha production in 2012-13 was 3,51,223 tons, 72 percent of which came from sea areas. In the same manner, export of fish and fish products during 2012-13 fiscal years was 84,905 tons worth Tk. 43.13 billion, which is 2.01 percent of country’s export earnings.31 In the Bay of Bengal, yearly fish catch is 6 mt, while Bangladesh catches only 0.29 mt. Globally, 350 million jobs are linked to marine fisheries. Marine bacteria are a rich source of potential drugs. In 2011, there were over 36 marine derived drugs in clinical development, including 15 for the treatment of cancer. The Bay of Bengal has a special tropical marine eco-system and an abundance of wetlands, marshes and mangroves which may help increase the productivity of near-shore fish species. The major coastal species like shrimp, tuna, billfish, croakers, snappers, skates and grunts can be sold on commercial basis. Experts said, there are at least 30 varieties of shrimps available in the sea. Besides, there are at least 15 types of crabs; 300 kinds of mollusks and 13 varieties of corals. All these have substantial commercial value.

4.2 Source of Energy

Experts believe there is a huge reserve of oil and gas under the sea area of Bangladesh. Lifting and transmission to the national grid of gas from the Sangu basin is a glaring example to this effect. Because of financial and technological limitations, proper exploration work could not be undertaken so long to locate and assess reserve of the undersea resources. At present, the proven gas reserve is about 11Tcf. According to USCG and joint Petrobangla report, the possibility of getting 60/70 Tcf gas in Bangladesh is only about 5 percent, possibility of 32 Tcf is about 59 percent and there is a 95 percent possibility of getting 8 Tcf of gas.32 In that case, energy resources are not enormous in Bangladesh. At the 10th World Energy Conference, the delegates also forecasted that 45 percent of the total world oil and gas reserves would come from offshore. Heavy minerals were discovered in the beach sands of the coastal

31 Saleh Akram, “Survey of Marine Resources Brooks No Delay”, The Financial Express, 20 July 2014. 32 Sharif Hasan, “Judgment at the Hague and Future Prospects”, The Dhaka Tribune, 18 July 2014. 234 MARITIME VERDICTS AND AVENUES OF RESOURCE EXPLORATION region of Bangladesh in 1961 which are yet to be extracted. Méthane hydrates, a potentially enormous source of hydrocarbons, are now being explored and tapped from the seabed. Manganese nodules are widespread in the ocean depths beyond the continental shelf. These are the most important resources of deep sea deposit. The nodules contain 40 different materials including copper, aluminium, nickel, iron, cobalt and manganese. The most important components are manganese (29 percent), iron (6.3 percent), nickel (1.28 percent), copper (1.07 percent) and cobalt (0.25 percent).33

4.3 Maritime Transportation and Shipbuilding

The Bay of Bengal has been used as a trade route for centuries by several nations of the world. The Greeks, in their sailing manual the Periplus Maris Erythraei as early as the 1st century A.D., wrote that the route to India from the Red Sea was along the Arabian Sea and along the Bay of Bengal to eastern India.34 In the 2nd century, Ptolemy referred to the voyages from Ganges across the Bay of Bengal to the Strait of Malacca for trade and development.35 So, the Bay has been an important crossing point for international trade from time immemorial. Today, the Bay still continues to be an important route in trade between South Asia and the South East Asian countries. It can also be said that this important route will flourish further in future.

According to a research by the Bangladesh Ministry of Foreign Affairs, transportation is increasing in the sea day by day. Some 90 percent of overall foreign trade is taking place at the Chittagong and the Mongla ports by ships. Majority of 2500 commercial vessels come to Bangladesh every year from different countries of the world. The number of non-government sea vessels was 26 in 2008, later it increased to 70 due to increasing demand of maritime transportation. A number of shipping agencies have also grown up. It creates big employment opportunities and contributes huge foreign currency to the national economy.

4.4 Source of Eco-Tourism

The marine and coastal environment constitutes key resources for the important global tourism industry. In 2012, tourism supported 9 percent of global jobs and generated US$ 1.3 trillion or 6 percent of the world’s export earnings.36 Bangladesh government is also planning to establish a 'Sea Tourism Belt' in around Cox’s Bazar, Teknaf, Kutubdia, Moheskhali, etc. This can attract lots of tourists and

33 Ibid. 34 Ashfaqur Rahman, “Our wonderful Bay”, The Daily Star, 13 July 2014. 35 Ibid. 36 “The foundation of a Blue Economy”, Center for American Progress (CAP), available at http://www. americanprogress.org/issues/ green/report, accessed on 12 August 2014. 235 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014 earn huge foreign currency. This will also strengthen country’s economic condition. Bangladesh, Maldives, India and Sri Lanka are taking a joint initiative for developing sea tourism in this region. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has given emphasis on establishing a ‘Sea Aquarium’ and an academy for ‘Tourism and Research’ in this area. Describing the Bay of Bengal as Bangladesh’s ‘third neighbour’, she said, “There is no doubt that sea-related subjects like expansion of international trade, use of mineral resources for long-term energy security, proper management of marine fish resources and protecting marine environment and bio-diversity would determine Bangladesh’s future development and economic growth.”

5. Key Challenges

Despite of having enormous resources, Bangladesh does not have well coordinated action plan to explore those. Following are the key challenges to harness maritime resources:

 There is no separate commission/directorate which can plan and coordinate the whole maritime affair among the stake holders;

 Absence of specific 'National Maritime Policy' is another drawback of Bangladesh. Without specific policy, initiatives regarding maritime issues will be disjointed and futile. Specific policy will ensure ‘Economy of Effort’ and reduce redundancy in accomplishing the task. Also, there is no short term, medium term and long term plans to explore the sea resources;

 Survey of maritime areas also carried out much before. An updated data is essential to go for any exploration;

 There is no modern equipment for fishing in Bangladesh. Still people have to rely on old country boats to go for fishing. These boats do not allow them to go deep inside the sea. In this regard, technical and technological assistance is also absent from concerned authority;

 There is no ‘Research Centre’ for fisheries established yet in Bangladesh;

 Bangladesh could not attract foreign companies so far bidding probable gas and oil blocks due to dispute in maritime areas. After verdicts, lots of foreign companies are eager to go for fresh bidding. No step has been taken yet to explore the other non-living minerals like metal bearings, nodules, hydrocarbons, etc. There is lack of research facility in Bangladesh to handle with these minerals;

 Maritime area has been expanded in number of times. But it is not possible for the Bangladesh Navy and the Coast Guard to have vigilance to the vast

236 MARITIME VERDICTS AND AVENUES OF RESOURCE EXPLORATION area with the existing manpower and patrol boats. At present, it is a big challenge for Bangladesh to equip the forces because it requires huge monetary involvement;

 Tourism has remained untapped in Bangladesh, attracting less number of tourists arrival in the country. There is no academy for ‘Tourism and Research’ in Bangladesh. Tourist spots could not be made lucrative and glaring one. And finally;

 Lack of skilled manpower employment of modern technologies along with is still a big challenge for the country. There is scarce of ‘Oceanology Department’ in the universities of Bangladesh.

6. conclusion and Recommendations

In present days, countries are concerned about their sovereignty which is not limited to territorial jurisdiction only, but also extended to include jurisdiction over air, space or sea. The marine resources that Bangladesh possesses are still undiscovered and the verdicts delivered by ITLOS and PCA are the means which allow the country to utilise those resources. Before anything, what Bangladesh needs is to carry out a comprehensive and pragmatic survey of marine resources. That will unveil the vastness of marine resources to the whole nation. It is firmly expected that the government will immediately conduct researches, employing modern technology and knowledge. The experts surfeited that the country should develop skilled manpower, adapt modern technologies and procure necessary equipment immediately.

It is worth to mention again that the oceans provide a substantial portion of the global population with food and livelihoods, means of transportation for 80 percent of global trade, support all life today by generating oxygen, absorbing carbon dioxide, recycling nutrients and regulating global climate and temperature. The emergence and recent evolution of the concept of the ‘Blue Economy’ in several forums bear testimony to its importance as an alternative economic model for sustainable development that acknowledges country’s growing dependency on the oceans and seas. A science-based approach is essential to the development of the ‘Blue Economy’ commencing with the initial assessment and critically valuating of the blue capital at the country’s disposal. This will provide a basis for decision-making and adaptive management. With a view to improving food security, eradicating poverty and delivering shared prosperity, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh along with the representatives from other Ministries of government, business leaders and international organisations should initiate investment frameworks to facilitate the ocean’s enormous potential for renewable energy generation, ports and shipping, fishing, biotech, mangrove and other resources of the sea for the nation’s economic emancipation. To derive maximum benefit out of ‘Blue Economy’, other relevant suggestions are also appended below:

237 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014

Bangladesh needs to consolidate its maritime gains within the shortest possible time. It should start planning about the resources, prospects and management of maritime resources under the banner of ‘Blue Economy’. For that, a coordinated effort and planning is required to utilise the sea resources. There can be a separate commission/directorate with requisite budget that can coordinate the whole affair. A functional national maritime policy will be essential to derive maximum benefit out of newly acquired maritime territories.37 It ought to make a quick survey to map out how much resources are reserved (both living and non-living) in the sea areas. It has to prepare short-term, medium-term and long-term plans to explore the sea resources. In this regard, Prime Minister also urged upon different concerned ministries and divisions to conduct separate survey and research in both shallow and deep sea areas and procure necessary suitable equipment for that purpose.

Fisheries, aquaculture and eco-system services have to be cultured for harvesting sustainable blue opportunities. Aquaculture is projected to soon surpass capturing of fisheries as the primary provider of such protein. Dependency on sea food has to be increased for primary source of protein as one billion people worldwide fill up their primary protein from the sea. The country has no modern equipment for fishing. In this regard, technical and technological assistance can be shared with coastal countries. A survey needs to be carried out to determine new fishing ground as well as reserve. For that reason, Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock is going to procure survey ship soon.38 Export of fish and fish products need to be increased in many fold. This will contribute directly to the annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The major coastal species like shrimp, tuna, billfish, croakers, snappers, skate and grunts can be sold on commercial basis. These have huge demand in the foreign countries.39

Energy sector needs to be explored scientifically and commercially to the extent that it can become a treasure trove of future energy resources. Wherever there is natural gas, there should also be oil in the lower stratum, provided some geological conditions prevail to allow accumulation. Geologists believe that the Bangladeshi territory in the Bay holds the biggest oil and gas prospect 40 since gas and oil is found in the adjacent blocks of India and Myanmar.41 Therefore, it is expected that there is huge gas and oil deposition in the blocks of Bangladesh. Bangladesh should go for fresh bidding of all its blocks. Incentive package can be offered to attract new bidders. In this regard, Petrobangla can be strengthened to find out ways and means to explore the blocks and reduce dependency on foreign companies. Concophillips,

37 “No Preparations to Exploit Huge Opportunity”, The Daily Sun, 09 July 2014. 38 Interview with Dr Shelina Afroza, Secretary, Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock, Govt. of People’s Republic of Bangladesh. 39 Kaniz Fatima, “Untapped Seabed Resources”, The Independent, 20 July 2014. 40 Nirvik Samudrogupto, “Maritime Security for Energy Security”, Bangladesh Defense Journal, Vol. 1, No. 43, 2011, pp. 33-35. 41 Ibid.

238 MARITIME VERDICTS AND AVENUES OF RESOURCE EXPLORATION an America based exploring company already showed its keen interest to explore the blocks.42 Bangladesh should take venture to explore minerals like limestone, monazite, zircon, chromites, etc. which has immense economic value.43 Metal bearing deposits can be sold outside which will contribute to a great extent to the economy. Méthane hydrates, a potential source of hydrocarbon, can be explored commercially from the sea bed also.

The container traffic is projected to rise three times by 2030. Coastal country like Bangladesh needless to position itself in terms of facilities and capacities to cater for this growing trade and optimise the benefits. Endeavour has to make to establish more ‘Deep Sea Ports’ in the coastal area. Venture has been taken to make two ‘Deep Sea Port’ in Sonadia and Piara of Potuakhali. All these will assist to concretise the Japanese proposal of ‘Industrial Growth Belt’ (BIG-B) in the Bay of Bengal among Bangladesh, India and Myanmar which was discussed in Prime Minister’s recent visit in Tokyo, 2014.

To promote Bangladesh as an attractive tourist destination, joint efforts are required in areas such as upgrading infrastructure, improving air linkage and developing human resources and joint marketing. Bangladesh should take a joint initiative with these countries for developing sea tourism in this region. The country should establish an ‘Academy for Tourism and Research’ and ‘Sea Aquarium’ in near future. Bangladesh has the longest beach of the world. It must derive maximum benefit out of it making tourism more attractive.

Naval force and the Coast Guard should be strengthened to raise the level of vigilance in the maritime boundaries. This entails monitor against illegal fishing, smuggling, drug trafficking, piracy, exploration of illegal oil and gas, extraction of minerals, deliberate pollution of maritime environment, etc.44 The trafficking of small arms, drugs, contraband goods, etc. has entered the list of criminal activities in Bangladesh’s maritime waters in recent times. According to the Navy’s master plan, it will need to build a well equipped naval force to ensure security in the sea and coastal areas and uphold the country’s sovereignty. The plan envisages purchase of naval war ships, vessels, helicopters and equipment within six to eight years.45 The government has signed an agreement with China under a state-to-state deal to purchase two Ming- class submarines by 2016 to make the Navy a part of a three-dimensional force to

42 Interview with Mr. Md. Abu Bakar Siddique, Secretary (Energy and Mineral Resources Division), Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources, Govt. of People’s Republic of Bangladesh. 43 S. Devare, “A New Energy Frontier: The Bay of Bengal Region”, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. XIX, 2008, p. 205. 44 Abul Kalam Azad, “Maritime Security of Bangladesh: Facing the Challenge of Non-Traditional Threats”, BIISS Journal, Vol. 30, No. 2, April, 2009, p.131. 45 Rashid Askari, “Conquests of The Bay: The Herald of a New Maritime Era”, Dhaka Courier, Vol. 31, No.1, 18 July 2014, pp.14-17.

239 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014 protect the country’s maritime resources and territorial waters.46 Altogether, 17 naval officers have been trained to operate submarines. The Navy has acquired land on Kutubdia Island in southwest Cox’s Bazar to set up a submarine base. The government has already ordered buying of two modern helicopters for Bangladesh Air Force to carry out Search and Rescue Operations (SAR) and other utility missions in the Bay of Bengal. The Directorate of Survey is responsible for preparation, preservation and distribution of records of land, water and aerial boundaries. The Bangladesh Navy, the Coast Guard and concerned academic and research organisations should extend full cooperation in this regard.

Procurement and utilisation of untapped marine resources will not be possible without human resource development at the national level. Therefore, in order to utilise sea resources for the economic development of the country, higher education and better research facilities are essential. The Institute of Marine Sciences and Fisheries at the Chittagong University has been generating efficient manpower over the years. They are now manning the marine affairs departments at the Khulna University, the Noakhali Science and Technology University and the Sylhet Agriculture University. These institutions should now be further strengthened with increased fund allocation for research. Bangladesh should also try to build a sea-based scientist community and enhance the capacity of our existing workforce. Example of Thailand can be cited in this context. The country has excelled in sea management and exploitation of marine resources. It has joined hands with ten other South-East Asian countries to set up the ‘South East Asian Fisheries Development Centre’ where people from other member-countries are imparted training. The first ‘National oceanographic Research Institute’ is being established at Ramu to create marine scientific community for research.

Finally, the importance of having a satellite for maritime survey and research is of utmost requirement. Bangladesh should have plan to procure/install the country’s own satellite for maritime survey along with other expedition. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina also stressed regarding the issue and hoped that ‘Bangabandhu Satellite’ will be launched by 2017. If all these initiatives can be implemented successfully, Bangladesh could harness its maritime resouress in the years to come.

46 Deepak Acharjee, “Navy Seeks Tk 14,000 cr to Strengthen Force”, The Independent, 09 September 2014.

240 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014: 241-261

M Ashique Rahman Recent Security Scenario in Afghanistan: Roles and Impacts of the ISAF and the Way Forward

Abstract

Contemporary security scenario in Afghanistan appears remote from achieving peace, security and stability in a country that has had been experiencing decades-long armed conflict, insurgency, extremism, terrorism and violence of all kinds. Lately, incidences of armed conflicts, insurgent and terrorist activities are on the rise leading to increased casualties and deaths of the civilians. Principal factors responsible for undermining security and stability in Afghanistan include, but not limited to the continuing insurgency by the Taliban fighters and the terrorism perpetrated by various militant armed groups based both in Afghanistan and across the border. The United States-led International Security Assistance Force, a multinational stabilisation force, on the other hand, is responsible to provide security and stability in Afghanistan since its deployment in 2001. After thirteen years of prolonged counter insurgency and counter terrorism efforts of the ISAF, Taliban insurgency is still showing remarkable strength and little sign of receding shortly making prospects for peace and security in Afghanistan very much obscure. After reviewing the recent security situation in Afghanistan, questions can be raised as to the roles of ISAF in Afghanistan and what are the impacts of their initiatives as insurgency and terrorism continue to bleed the country. The paper argues that lack of success on the part of ISAF in achieving its objectives in Afghanistan is explicitly evident given the rising state of insecurity and instability in recent times. The paper, however, also discusses the various challenges confronted by ISAF in continuing its operations in Afghanistan. At the end, the analysis exhibits some ways forward in achieving peace and security in Afghanistan and establishing sustainable democratic governance in the country.

1. Introduction

Contemporary security scenario in Afghanistan is one of the worst in its complicated and equally conflict-ridden modern history. After thirteen years of the United States (US) and International Security Assistance Forces’ (ISAF) prolonged counter insurgency (COIN) and counter terrorism (CT) efforts, prospects for peace and security remain elusive in Afghanistan. Compelled by the intense pressure from domestic support base due to the agonising costs both in terms of loss of life and colossal financing, the US and its allies chalked out a withdrawal plan from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. And the plan is proceeding rapidly even ahead of the schedule.1 M Ashique Rahman is Research Fellow at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), Dhaka. An earlier version of this paper was presented in a Seminar on “Afghanistan: Security Scenario Post-withdrawal of ISAF and Impacts on the Region”, jointly organised by National Defence College, Dhaka, BIISS and Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) on 24 August 2014. His e-mail addresses are: [email protected] and [email protected] © Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2014. 1 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan in 2013: On the Cusp…or on the Brink?”, Asian Survey, Vol. 54, No.1, 2014, p. 165. 241 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014

The transition process is also moving forward at an accelerated pace as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) already took over principal responsibility for security throughout the country. On the political development and governance front, the country has been able to conduct the 2014 Presidential election amid serious tension created by the overt Taliban threats. Although, the post-election allegations of vote- rigging are delaying the sworn-in of a new President. However, these few positive developments are largely frustrated by the continuing insurgency of the Taliban and the terrorism perpetrated by militant armed groups based both in Afghanistan and across the border. In spite of more than a decade long COIN efforts by the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)-led ISAF and also recently in collaboration with the ANSF, the Taliban insurgency is showing remarkable resilience and little sign of receding shortly. Therefore, security scenario in contemporary Afghanistan continues in a war-like situation causing death of the civilians and upsetting global efforts in bringing normalcy and stability to the Afghan imbroglio.

The US led multilateral efforts in Afghanistan commenced following the catastrophic incident of 9/11. The US invaded Afghanistan with the objective of eradicating the Taliban regime that was harbouring the transnational terrorist network al-Qaeda supreme commander Osama bin Laden. While the Taliban regime had dismantled rapidly, the US military failed to kill or apprehend Osama. The US forces remained in Afghanistan and also brought-in the multinational stabilisation force under the rubric of ISAF and combinedly sought to eliminate Taliban and al- Qaeda remnants from the country. After thirteen years of the US-led NATO/ISAF counter insurgency and CT efforts, Taliban insurgency still holds strong grounds in Afghanistan especially in the eastern and southern part of the country. Terrorist attacks are also regularly carried out by various militant groups including al-Qaeda. Questions, therefore, can be raised as to what is the current security scenario in Afghanistan? What are the factors/issues hampering Afghanistan’s security? What have been the roles of ISAF in Afghanistan and what are the impacts of their initiatives as insurgency and terrorism continue to bleed Afghanistan? What are the challenges? And finally, the way forward? The paper aims to seek answers of these questions. First, in section two, the paper elaborates the present security scenario in Afghanistan in terms of increasing death of civilians and casualties as well as increasing incidences and intensities of insurgency and terrorism in the country. Section three highlights the mandates and roles of the ISAF in Afghanistan. Section four provides a brief review of the impacts of ISAF operations in Afghanistan as lack of success on ISAF’s part is explicitly evident. Section five makes an effort to understand the reasons for such deficits in attaining the objectives. Challenges currently faced by the US-led NATO/ ISAF forces in realising its objectives and the way forward are discussed in section six followed by conclusion in section seven.

242 RECENT SECURITY SCENARIO IN AFGHANISTAN

2. Recent Security Scenario in Afghanistan

The present security scenario in Afghanistan is such that the prospects for peace and stability appear elusive at the moment. As mentioned in the United States’ Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, Afghanistan continued to experience aggressive and coordinated attacks by the Afghan Taliban and other insurgent and terrorist groups, severely impacting security and stability in the country.2 According to the report, in 2013, 1,144 terrorist attacks (12 percent of the world) occurred in Afghanistan causing 3,111 deaths (17 percent of the world) while 3,717 persons (11 percent of the world total) were wounded (see Table 1).

Table 1: Terrorist Attacks in 2013 Total % of the Total % of the Total % of the Attacks World Killed World Wounded World Iraq 2,495 25.70 6,378 35.65 14,956 45.77 Pakistan 1,920 19.78 2,315 12.94 4,989 15.27 Afghanistan 1,144 11.79 3,111 17.39 3,717 11.37 World Total 9,707 100 17,891 100 32,677 100 Source: Annex of Statistical Information to the United States’ Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, p. 4. According to the Afghan Ministry of Interior data, the insurgents, on the other hand, during April-October 2013, mounted 6,604 attacks in 30 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, including 50 suicide bombings, 1,704 shootings and shellings, 1,186 bombings and 920 ambushes.3 To safeguard morale, the Afghan military did not disclose the casualty rates for the Afghan army. The Interior Ministry, however, revealed that 2,052 members of both the Afghan national and local police were killed and more than 5,000 wounded during 2013.4 The numbers of civilian casualties are also staggering. According to the United Nations’ Annual Report,5 armed conflict in Afghanistan took an unrelenting toll on Afghan civilians in 2013. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 8,615 civilian casualties (2,959 deaths and 5,656 injured) in 2013, marking a 7 percent increase in deaths, 17 percent increase in injured and a 14 percent increase in total civilian casualties compared to 2012. The report depicts similar rising trend since 2009 (see Figure 1). The midyear report of the United Nations for the year 2014 depicts a further degrading scenario as it shows during January-June 2014, 4,853 civilian casualties occurred (1,564 civilian deaths and 3,289 injured), recording a 17 percent increase in

2 Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, United States Department of State, April 2014, available at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/, accessed on 15 August 2014, p. 179. 3 Cited in Patrick Quinn, “Fighting Alone, Afghans Said to Hold Taliban Back”, Associated Press, 03 November 2013, available at http://news.yahoo.com/fighting-alone-afghans-said-hold-taliban-back-141944175.html, accessed on 13 August 2014. 4 Vanda Felbab-Brown, op. cit., p. 167. 5 United Nations, “Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict”, Annual Report 2013, Kabul, Afghanistan: UNAMA and UNHCR, February 2014, p. 1. 243 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014 civilian deaths and a 28 percent increase in civilians injured for a 24 percent overall increase in civilian casualties compared to the first six months of 2013.6 So, casualties in Afghanistan are on a rising trend in 2014 compared to the years 2012 and 2013.

Figure 1: Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan (2009-2013)

Civilian Deaths and Injuries January to December: 2009-2013 5656 6000 4706 4821 5000 4368 3556 4000 3133 2792 2768 2959 3000 2412 2000 1000 0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Deaths Injuries Source: UN Annual Report 2013 on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.

The factors causing this insecurity include, but are not limited to the continuing insurgency by the Taliban fighters, terrorism perpetrated by the terrorist groups i.e., the Haqqani Network, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), Islamic Movements of Uzbekistan and by al-Qaeda. Some terrorist groups based in Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas and in Pakistan, having interests in Afghanistan are also involved in mounting terrorism in Afghanistan viz, the Lashkar-e-Tayiba, Therik- e-Taliban, Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-i-Jangvi, etc. For few details about these insurgent and terrorist groups currently active in Afghanistan see Table 2. Following discussion also reviews these insurgent and terrorist groups functioning in Afghanistan and how they are impacting its peace and security scenario.

Table 2: Militant Groups Active in Afghanistan and Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Regions 1. Afghan Taliban Leader: Mullah Mohammad Omar; Established: Kandahar, Afghanistan, mid-1980s; Estimated Strength: 30,000 Notable Attacks: Major attack on town Mosa Qala, Helmand, May 2006, numerous attacks on NATO supply convoys and NATO bases. 2. Al-Qaeda Leader: Ayman al-Zawahiri Established: Peshawar, Pakistan, 1988; Estimated Strength: 500-1,000 Notable Attacks: World Trade Center bombing, February 1993; 9/11/2001 attacks in New York, Washington DC and Pennsylvania

6 United Nations, “Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict”, Midyear Report 2014, Kabul, Afghanistan: UNAMA and UNHCR, July 2014, p. 1. 244 RECENT SECURITY SCENARIO IN AFGHANISTAN

3. Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) Leader: Gulbuddin Hekmatyr Established: Eastern Afghanistan, 1977; Estimated Strength: 5000-7,000 Notable Attacks: Attack on US forces in Khost, Afghanistan, February 2009; murder of a foreign medical team in Badakhshan, August 2010. 4. Haqqani Network Leader: Sirajuddin Haqqani Established: Khost, Afghanistan, 1980s; Estimated Strength: 5000-7,000 Notable Attacks: Assassination attempt on President Hamid Karzai, April 2008; various suicide attacks in Kabul (on 5-star hotel Serena, January 2008; on Indian Embassy, July 2008; on UN guesthouse, October 2009). 5. Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LET) Leader: Hafiz Mohammed Saifullah Saeed (under house arrest in Pakistan) Established: Muridke, near Lahore, Pakistan, 1989; Estimated Strength: 300-1,000 Notable Attacks: Mumbai attacks, India, November 2008; Lahore attack on Pakistan cricket team, March 2009. 6. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Leader: Hakimullah Mehsud Established: Northwest Pakistan, 2007; Estimated Strength: 20,000-25,000 Notable Attacks: Suicide attacks on mosque in Lahore, killing 80, May 2010; suspected in the assassination of Pakistani presidential candidate Benazir Bhutto, December 2007. 7. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Leader: Abu Usman Adil Established: 1998; Estimated Strength: 2,000-4,000 Notable Attacks: Several attacks on the new NATO supply route from Tajikistan through the province of Kunduz and Baghlan. 8. Tehrik-e-Nefaz-e-Shariat-Mohammadi (TNSM) Leader: Sufi Mohammad Established: Pakistan, 1989; Estimated Strength: 5,000-6,000 Notable Attacks: Suicide attack on an army convoy in Mingora, Swat, Pakistan, Dec., 2007. Source: Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman (eds.), Afghanistan: To 2015 and Beyond, Adelphi 425-426, London: Routledge and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011, p. III.

2.1 The Taliban Insurgency

Afghanistan’s Taliban is probably the only armed group that, having gained command and complete control all over a country, Afghanistan, lost it because of its abstinence to the urges of the US to end its protection of al-Qaeda and its supreme commander Osama bin Laden.7 Following the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, most of the Taliban either hid or disposed of their weapons and returned to their homes whereas Taliban commanders and other high-profile figures fled to Pakistan8 or to the

7 Kristian Berg Harpviken, “The Transnationalization of the Taliban”, International Area Studies Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2012, p. 203. 8 Theo Farrell and Antonio Giustozzi, “The Taliban at War: Inside the Helmand Insurgency, 2004-2012”, International Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 4, 2013, p. 847. 245 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014

Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas to be more specific. However, since mid-2006, the Taliban rebounded and commenced relentless insurgency against what they consider the foreign occupation by the US and the NATO/ISAF. Today, the core insurgent faction in Afghanistan remains the Taliban movement, much of which remains at least nominally loyal to Mullah Muhammad Umar, the supreme Taliban leader. He and his subordinates reportedly still operate from Pakistan, probably areas near the border or near the Pakistani city of Quetta.9 This accounts for the term usually applied to Umar and his aides: “Quetta Shura Taliban” (QST). In recent years, Umar has lost some of his top aides and commanders to combat or arrest, including Mullah Dadullah, Mullah Obeidullah Akhund and Mullah Usmani. Nevertheless, some of Umar’s inner circle has remained intact. Mullah Umar, however, over the years, shows signs of pragmatism as he has on many occasions, signals potentials for compromise by making several statements including one on 24 October 2012, that the Taliban does not seek to regain a monopoly of power. He is now believed to be surrounded by other pragmatists as well including Noorudin Turabi, logistics expert Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor and head of the Taliban’s senior shura council Shahabuddin Delawar. He also was reportedly pivotal in reaching final agreement in the 31 May 2014 release of ‘prisoner of war’ Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl.10 The pragmatists, nevertheless, are facing strong opposition from younger and reputedly hardline, anti-compromise leaders such as Mullah Najibullah (A.K.A. Umar Khatab) and Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir, who purportedly believes that outright Taliban victory is possible after 2014.11

2.2 Terrorism by al-Qaeda, HiG and Haqqani Network

For some time now, al-Qaeda has been considered to have a minimal presence in Afghanistan itself and to act there more as a facilitator rather than active fighting force. Analysts have put the number of al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan at between 500-1000, who operate mostly in provinces of eastern Afghanistan such as Kunar. Some of these fighters belong to al-Qaeda affiliates such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which are active in Faryab and Konduz provinces. Still, there are concerns that al-Qaeda could regroup in Afghanistan in the post-2014 period. According to a press report, a key al-Qaeda operative, Faruq a-Qahtani al-Qatari, is working with Afghan militants to train a new generation of al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan.12 Nevertheless, the al-Qaeda in recent years have also suffered heavy loss since the killing of Osama bin Laden and is considered now as an organisation enduring leadership decapitation. The US has been able to kill numerous senior al-Qaeda operatives in recent years primarily through drone operations. In August

9 Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy”, CRS Report RL30588, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 11 July 2014, p. 13. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid., p. 14. 12Kimberly Dozier, “Officials: Al-Qaida Plots Comeback in Afghanistan", 28 February 2014, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20140228/us--afghanistan-al-qaida/?utm_hp_ ref=homepage&ir=home page, accessed on 14 August 2014. 246 RECENT SECURITY SCENARIO IN AFGHANISTAN

2008, an airstrike was confirmed to have killed al-Qaeda chemical weapons expert Abu Khabab al-Masri.13 Three top leaders, Ilyas Kashmiri, Attiyah Abd al-Rahman and Abu Yahya al-Libi were also killed in Pakistan by reported US drone strikes in June and August 2011 and June 2012, respectively.14 Nevertheless, some senior al-Qaeda leaders are said to be in Iran, including Sayf al Adl. Sulayman Abu Ghaith, son-in- law of bin Laden.15 The new supreme leader of al-Qaeda Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is presumed to be living on the Pakistani side of the border also remain functional in abating and assisting the Taliban insurgency.

HiG of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a former mujahedeen, is also a significant armed group involved in insurgency in Afghanistan and committing terrorism especially in the northern part of the country. HiG is particularly involved in high-profile attacks. A suicide bombing on 18 September 2012, which killed 12 persons, including eight South African nationals working for a USAID-chartered air service, was allegedly carried out by a female HiG member. HiG claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Kabul on 16 May 2013, that also killed six Americans.16

The “Haqqani Network,” founded by Jalaludin Haqqani is also posing severe threat to security and stability in Afghanistan. The US Department of Defense report on Afghan security calls the faction “the most virulent strain of the insurgency, the greatest risk to coalition forces, and a critical enabler of al-Qaeda”.17 The Haqqani Network is believed closer to al-Qaeda than to the Taliban. Sirajjudin Haqqani now believed is the key leader of the network and operates in the areas of Paktia, Paktika and Khost provinces. The network has also targeted several Indian interests in Afghanistan viz, attacks on India’s embassy in Kabul (July 2008 and October 2009). The US officials also attributed to the group the 10 September 2011 truck bombing in Wardak Province that injured 77 US soldiers and attacks on the US Embassy and ISAF headquarters in Kabul on 13 September 2011.18

2.3 Cross-border Terrorism

There are few militant armed groups who originally based in Pakistan and having different political objectives related to Pakistan and India, also support the Taliban insurgency and commit acts of terrorism in Afghanistan impacting peace and security in the country. Pakistani Taliban or the TTP is a major such group which, primarily challenges the government of Pakistan and supports the Afghan Taliban. Some TTP fighters reportedly operate from safe havens in Taliban-controlled areas on the Afghan side of the border. The US State Department designated the TTP as an Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) entity on 02 September 2010.19

13 Kenneth Katzman, op. cit., p. 14. 14 Ibid., p. 15. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Quoted in ibid. 18 Ibid., p. 16. 19 Ibid., p. 17 247 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014

Another Pakistani Islamist militant group said to be increasingly active inside Afghanistan is LET, or Army of the Righteous. LET was initially focused on operations against Indian control of Kashmir, but reportedly is increasingly active in Afghanistan. The State Department has stated that the group was responsible for the 23 May 2014 attack on India’s consulate in Herat.20 The other Pakistan-based group that is said to be somewhat active in Afghanistan is Lashkar-i-Janghvi - it was accused of several attacks on Afghanistan’s Hazara Shiite community during 2011-2012.21 All the active militant groups including Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, al-Qaeda, HiG and Haqqani Network and their strongholds in Afghanistan are depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Militant Groups Active in Afghanistan

Islamic Mov. of Uzbekistan

Pakistani Taliban (TTP)

Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG)

Lashkar -e-Tayiba

Al-Qaeda

Afghan Taliban

The Haqqani Network

Source: Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman (eds.), op. cit., p. III

All these insurgent and militant groups originating from different tribal ethnicity engaged in both insurgency and terrorism are posing severe challenges for the US-led coalition and NATO/ISAF forces in Afghanistan. The ISAF, therefore, has critical role to play in securing peace and stability in Afghanistan and any failure on its part in achieving this daunting responsibility will engender disaster for Afghanistan.

3. The ISAF Mission in Afghanistan: Mandates and Roles

ISAF in Afghanistan operates under a peace enforcement mandate pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. ISAF’s creation was authorised by the UN Security

20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 248 RECENT SECURITY SCENARIO IN AFGHANISTAN

Council in December 2001, two months after the US’ Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan.22 UNSC Resolution 1386 deployed ISAF for 6 months and laid out its objectives as “to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment”.23 ISAF’s responsibility also included “to provide assistance to help the Afghan Interim Authority in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces”.24

In August 2003, on the request of the Government of Afghanistan and the UN, NATO took command of ISAF and subsequently ISAF’s areas of responsibility also extended all over the country. As of 04 August 2014, the ISAF force comprised approximately 44,299 soldiers from 47 Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) (see Table 3), organised in six regional commands plus ISAF Headquarters in Kabul.25

Table 3: ISAF Troops No. and Contributing Nations (as of 04 August 2014) No. of No. of No. of Sl. Country Sl. Country Sl. Country Troops Troops Troops 1 United States 30,700 17 Croatia 157 33 Estonia 19

2 United Kingdom 3,936 18 The former Yugoslavia 152 34 Ukraine 12

3 Germany 2,250 19 Armenia 121 35 Sweden 12 4 Italy 1,653 20 United Arab Emirates 118 36 Latvia 11 5 Jordan 1,066 21 Hungary 100 37 Luxembourg 10 6 Romania 921 22 Azerbaijan 94 38 Greece 10 Bosnia & 7 Georgia 755 23 France 88 39 8 Herzegovina 8 Turkey 392 24 Finland 88 40 Ireland 7 9 Poland 322 25 Lithuania 80 41 Tonga 7 10 Bulgaria 318 26 Denmark 75 42 New Zealand 4 11 Slovakia 277 27 Albania 72 43 El Salvador 4 12 Australia 272 28 Norway 66 44 Austria 3 13 Czech Republic 224 29 Republic of Korea 50 45 Iceland 2 14 Netherlands 200 30 Portugal 50 46 Slovenia 2 15 Spain 184 31 Mongolia 40 47 Malaysia 2 16 Belgium 161 32 Montenegro 25 Total 44,299 Source: ISAF official website, available at http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index. php, accessed on 13 August 2014.

22 See, the UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001). The Security Council has extended ISAF’s mandate on an annual basis since 2001, most recently in October 2013. See, the UN Security Council Resolutions 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776, 1833, 1890, 1943, 2011, 2069 and 2120. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 The six Regional Commands (RCs) are: RC South, RC North, RC Capital, RC West, RC East and RC Southwest - and different TCNs are in charge of individual regional command. The US is in charge of RC (SW) and RC (E), Britain holds RC (S), Germany RC (N), Italy RC (W) and Turkey is in charge of RC (C). 249 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014

Since November 2008, the Commander of ISAF has served as Commander of the US Forces in Afghanistan (joint hating), although the chains of command has remained separate. The UN Security Council Resolution 2120 (2013) reaffirms previous resolutions on ISAF and extends the authorisation of ISAF for another 14 months until 31 December 2014. However, ISAF’s activities in Afghanistan include counter insurgency and counter terrorism roles, building the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and nation-building roles in terms of reconstruction and development and promoting governance in the country.

3.1 Counter Insurgency and Counter Terrorism Roles

ISAF in Afghanistan carries out COIN efforts commensurate with its mandated roles and responsibilities. In pursuant with the strategic goals of the US and international community that Afghanistan is: 1) never again a safe haven for terrorists and is a reliable, stable ally in the War on Terror; 2) moderate and democratic, with a thriving private sector economy; 3) capable of governing its territory and borders; and 4) respectful of the rights of all its citizens, ISAF and the US are pursuing allegedly a comprehensive COIN strategy that brings together all military, diplomatic and economic assets.

Figure 3, depicts the comprehensive COIN strategy of the ISAF. The ISAF Joint Command (IJC) carries out the COIN throughout Afghanistan. The reconstruction and development responsibility is carried out by the ISAF through its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) employed currently at 28 provinces of Afghanistan.

250 RECENT SECURITY SCENARIO IN AFGHANISTAN

Figure 3: ISAF’s Comprehensive COIN Strategy

Achieving Strategic Goals in Afghanistan

Comprehensive COIN Strate gy

Reconstruction Governance Security and Development

Degrading Insurgent Infrastructure Rule of Law Capacity

Developing the Social Sector Policy Development, Policy ANSF Development Implemention and Public Service

Agricultural and Border Government Management Rural Development Accountability

Private Sector Democracy and Counter- Development Human Rights terrorism

Source: Author’s own depiction after reviewing relevant literatures. However, to counter the rebounding Taliban insurgency since 2007, the leading partner of the ISAF, the US decided in late 2009 for a ‘surge’ in its COIN strategy through increasing its troops’ contributions by 40,000 in 2009 and later upto 60,000 during 2010-11.26 Other TCNs also followed the lead. During the same period, the Obama administration also declared the phased withdrawal from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. According to the June 2011 announcement by President Obama, 10,000 of the US forces had been withdrawn by the end of 2011 that brought the US force levels in Afghanistan down to 90,000. By September 2012, 23,000 forces had also been withdrawn bringing the US force levels to 68,000. The US forces level dropped to 34,000 by February 2014 and in August at 30,000.

26 Kenneth Katzman, op. cit., p. 21. 251 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014

3.2 Building the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)

ISAF’s responsibility to build the ANSFs dates back to the UNSC Resolution 1386. However, the withdrawal plan necessitated and emphasised rapid building of the ANSF for ensuring peace and security in the post-withdrawal Afghanistan. The ANSFs include Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Army Air Force (ANAAF) and Afghan National Police (ANP). On 21 January 2010, the joint UN-Afghan “Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board” (JCMB) agreed that, by October 2011, the ANA would expand to 171,600 and the ANP to about 134,000, (total ANSF of 305,600). Both forces reached that level by September 2011. In August 2011, a larger target size of 352,000 was set, to be reached by November 2012. The gross size of the forces reached approximately that level by the end of September 2012. This figure, however, does not include the approximately 30,000 local security forces active at the provincial level. About 1,700 women serve in the ANSF, of which about 1,370 are in police.27 ISAF along with the US forces and contractors, continue to train the ANSF.

Funding for the ANSF is also provided by the ISAF. Assuming that the post- 2014 ANSF force would shrink to 228,000, it was determined that sustaining a force of that size would cost US$ 4.1 billion annually. The US pledged US$ 2.3 billion yearly; the Afghan government pledged US$ 500 million yearly and allied contributions constituted the remaining US$ 1.3 billion.28 In 2007, ISAF set up a trust fund for donor contributions to fund the transportation of equipment donated to and the training of the ANA. As of March 2014, donor contributions and pledges to the ANA Trust Fund totaled about US$ 855 million. The US funding for the ANA is provided separately. There is also a separate “Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan” (LOTFA)29, run by the UN Development Program (UNDP), that is used to pay the salaries of the ANP and other police related functions. From 2002 to 2012, donors contributed US$ 2.75 billion to the Fund.

3.3 Nation-building Roles and the PRTs

Through its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), ISAF supports reconstruction and development (R&D) in Afghanistan. It also carries out the governance related functions that broadly falls within the purview of the larger objective of building the Afghan nation. Major responsibility of the PRTs is to secure areas in which reconstruction work is conducted by other national and international actors. Where appropriate and in close cooperation and coordination with Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and UNAMA, ISAF also provides practical support for R&D and humanitarian assistance efforts conducted by Afghan government organisations, international organisations and NGOs. ISAF, through its

27 Ibid., p. 28. 28 Ibid., p. 29. 29 James Sperling and Mark Webber, “NATO: from Kosovo to Kabul”, International Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 3, 2009, p. 502. 252 RECENT SECURITY SCENARIO IN AFGHANISTAN

PRTs also helps the Afghan authorities strengthen the institutions required to fully establish good governance and rule of law and to promote human rights. Among the 28 PRTs, the US provides leadership to 11 PRTs whereas the remaining 17 PRTs functions under the authority of ISAF.

4. impacts of ISAF’s Efforts in Afghanistan

While the international community, the US and the ISAF carries out multifarious roles ranging from counter insurgency and counter terrorism to building the state of Afghanistan, the present security scenario in Afghanistan testifies little to the success of the ISAF’s efforts. There is no denying to the fact that as a stabilisation force, ISAF has been instrumental in generating and maintaining sufficient security in Kabul and its immediate environs for more than a decade. It has been also enabling the processes of Afghanistan’s political and economic reconstruction to commence and move forward.30 In fact, “It has served virtually as the security backbone for the internationally backed post-Taliban administration of President Hamid Karzai, enabling it not only to consolidate its writ over the capital, but also to expand its influence gradually into some other parts of the country”.31 Nevertheless, in any dispassionate account, the impacts of ISAF’s operations and R&D efforts remain mixed. While some successes have been achieved in the areas of R&D and governance, failure in ensuring peace and security keeps ISAF’s roles and activities well within the scope of debate and deliberation.

4.1 ISAF’s Earlier COIN has been Counterproductive

The counter insurgency and counter terrorism strategy pursued by the ISAF during 2002-2006 remained counterproductive. The Taliban, who gave up arms and fled Afghanistan, regrouped and rebounded and mounted extreme insurgency against the ISAF and ANSF forces severely impacting peace and security in Afghanistan. Intensity of insurgency increased in the southern part of Afghanistan especially the Helmand province, which Farrell and Giustozzi32 ascribed to misplaced and wrongly conceived British COIN strategy in the region.

4.2 Emergence of the Neo-Talibans

ISAF’s failure in eradicating Taliban insurgency and terrorism by the militant armed groups have contributed to the emergence of a new Taliban force often termed as ‘neo-Taliban’. The indiscriminate use of violence by the counter insurgency forces is also held responsible in providing conducive environments to the Taliban to regroup

30 See, Amin Saikal, “Afghanistan’s Transition: ISAF’s stabilisation role?”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 525-26. 31 Ibid, p. 526. 32 Theo Farrell and Antonio Giustozzi, op. cit., pp. 847-49. 253 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014 and rebound. In the process, as Farrell and Giustozzi noted, they have brought with them large numbers of ‘foreign’ fighters.33 They also noted that after returning back in 2006, the Taliban as an insurgent organisation had undergone tremendous transformations during 2006-2011. Three aspects of such transformation were remarkable: first, at the strategic level, the Taliban had strengthened a centralised command and control of field units. Second, they have been able to establish shadow governments in local areas of Afghanistan especially in Helmand province, resulting in a gradual militarisation of Taliban administration. Third, at the tactical level, the Taliban has improved the professionalism of its field units in order to facilitate a shift in tactics. The changes have occurred in the context of growing Taliban appreciation of the need to wage guerrilla warfare against the foreign occupation forces.

It is believed that the Taliban military structure since 2007 has also been centred on two military commissions, both based in Pakistan: one in Quetta and the other in Peshawar. In principle, these two commissions have divided territorial responsibility between themselves, with Quetta being in charge of the west, south and the north and Peshawar of the south-east, east, north-east and the Kabul region.34 This regrouping of Taliban with centralised organisation and professionalism of the field level operatives transformed it into a formidable insurgent entity in contemporary Afghanistan. Therefore, any reasoning of Taliban emerging as an unrestrained insurgent force in the post-2014 period has strong grounds thereby rendering whatever success achieved by the ISAF as ineffective and irrelevant.

5. Reasons for the Lack of Success

A number of factors can be identified as instrumental in effecting lack of success on the part of the ISAF in realising its objectives in Afghanistan. Some of these are: pursuing a wrong or at least half-hearted strategy as far as COIN is concerned, flawed state-building approach, failure in negotiating peace with the Taliban and last but not the least, the ‘policy-making errors’ by the US, the leading partner of the ISAF.

5.1 Wrong Strategy

An effective COIN campaign must include all military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions undertaken by a government or the counter insurgency force. Counter-insurgents need to use all instruments of national power to sustain the established or emerging government. Long-term success in COIN requires diminishing the capacity of insurgent organisations to undertake operations and enabling the country to provide for its own security, social services and economic growth and cannot be accomplished by military means alone.

33 Ibid., p. 847. 34 Ibid., p. 855. 254 RECENT SECURITY SCENARIO IN AFGHANISTAN

5.1.1 Military Solution to the Insurgency

Since commencement of the operations till 2007-08, ISAF followed a COIN strategy mostly based on military solutions i.e., eradicating and eliminating insurgent and terrorist entities. It is only very recently that the ISAF adopted the comprehensive COIN approach including DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration). Earlier, UNAMA was the entity mostly carried out the DDR activities in Afghanistan. Historical facts also show that reliance on military solutions alone has been less successful. The Watson Institute of Brown University, USA, carried out a comprehensive research in examining 268 cases of insurgencies that had used terror tactics. The findings of the research show that only 7 percent of the insurgencies had been militarily defeated whereas successes by employing peaceful political accommodation had been achieved in 43 percent of the cases (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Success Rate of Methods Used against Insurgents Militaty defeat Success of Various Group achieved its 7% Methods Used objectives by violence 10% and ceased its Using Terror Tactics activity. in 268 Cases, Peaceful political 1968- 2006 accomm- Intelligence odation and policing 43% methods 40%

Source: Watson Institute, Brown University, available at http://costsofwar.org/article/alternatives-military- response-911, accessed on 17 August 2014.

5.1.2 Flawed State-building Approach

Afghanistan is a state artificially carved out by the big powers in late nineteenth century.35 In 1885, Czarist Russia occupied Afghan territory, north of Oxus River and established the new northern boundary for Afghanistan. A decade later, the British-Indian Empire drew the Durand Line, which divided Pashtun areas between British-India (now parts of Pakistan) and Afghanistan.36 The state-building in Afghanistan, therefore, is a daunting business. The 2001 intervention, being largely retaliatory, lacked a clear, coherent and long-term plan. The Bonn Agreement and subsequent international plans envisioned the swift establishment of a highly

35 Kaushik Roy, “Introduction: Warfare and the state in Afghanistan”, International Area Studies Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2012, p. 195. 36 Colonel TX Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, St Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006, p. 157, quoted in ibid. 255 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014 centralised democratic state and set over-ambitious modernising goals.37 Despite immense needs resulting from two decades of war and mis-governance, initially only limited resources or energies were devoted to state-building and reconstruction.38 By the mid-2000s, the US assistance had brought substantial improvements, but much of this assistance was ineffective, wasteful or exploited by the local power-holders. The subsequent significant expansion of financial resources inadvertently compounded corruption and reinforced criminal and patronage networks.39

According to Arreguin-Toft, state-building attempts by the US and NATO in Afghanistan are bound to fail.40 The geography, climate, history, economy and culture of Afghanistan have all militated against the formation of a centralised Western-style nation-state in the country.41 Moreover, there is a lack of demand among the public in Afghanistan for a centralised state with its capital in Kabul. Construction of a state requires indigenous human capital, especially public servants imbued with specialised skills and a sense of ‘national’ public values. Unavailability of skilled national minded Afghan public servants is hampering the Western state-building project.42

5.2 The US Policy-making Errors

As highlighted by Waldman, some fundamental, pre-existing or structural policy-making errors by the US in formulating its Afghanistan policy have contributed to the continuing instability in Afghanistan and thwarting ISAF’s efforts in the country. One such error has been extensive reliance on the northern warlords and regional strongmen alone, many of whom are reviled by ordinary Afghans. The Pashtuns in the process have been marginalised.

Other policy-making errors are misreading the history and false analogies and lack of unity of efforts and resources. Afghanistan’s history was oversimplified. Lessons from America’s own military history, such as the Vietnam War, were overlooked rather, examples of Germany and Japan were perhaps compared. The Iraq analogy as far as the ‘surge’ is concerned also produced mixed results. As Waldman quoted a US intelligence official as saying, “lessons were applied arbitrarily. We carried all the Iraq lessons to Afghanistan. Some were applicable, many were not. No one was looking and saying, are these the right lessons or not?”43 One notable example is that from

37 Matt Waldman, “System Failure: The Underlying Causes of US Policy-making Errors in Afghanistan”, International Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 4, 2013, p. 826. 38 For detail discussions see, James Dobbins, After the Taliban: Nation-building in Afghanistan, Washington DC: Potomac, 2008. 39 See, Astri Suhrke, When More is Less: The International Project in Afghanistan, London: Hurst, 2011; Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War within the War for Afghanistan, New York: Knopf, 2012. 40 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “The meaning of ‘state failure’: Public service, public servants, and the contemporary Afghan state”, International Area Studies Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2012, pp. 263-278. 41 Ibid., p. 265. 42 Ibid. 43 Matt Waldman, op. cit., p. 835. 256 RECENT SECURITY SCENARIO IN AFGHANISTAN

2006 ISAF has been making concerted efforts to establish pro-government militias, after having spent millions of dollars if not billions in the first five years of intervention in Afghanistan, trying to dismantle and occasionally eliminate the same forces.

Lack of self-evaluation mechanism has also hindered formulating appropriate policies for Afghanistan. The US oversight bodies, such as the Government Accountability Office or Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, have developed tools for monitoring and evaluating a range of the US activities in Afghanistan. But too many project indicators are skewed towards showing progress, by quantifying direct inputs or outputs rather than rigorously measuring quality, utility or impact. The pouring of excessive money in the country caused the emergence of rampant corruption. According to one estimate, US$ 55 billion in assistance have been provided to Afghanistan during 2009-2013 which is more than seven times of the total Afghanistan government’s revenue over this period. Excessive corruption taking root in Afghanistan is a formidable reason for governance failure in the country.

5.3 Failure of the Peace Initiative

Whoever is responsible, the failure of the Peace Initiative i.e., a negotiated settlement with the Taliban can naturally be considered as a prime reason for continuing insurgency in Afghanistan. It can be claimed that here, the US lacked a political strategy in Afghanistan with regard to Taliban, the Karzai government and/or regional actors. The first high-level US-Taliban dialogue took place in November 2010, nine years after the October 2001 intervention by which point mistrust between the parties was acute and the commencement of the US withdrawal was only eight months away. Failure to reach a negotiated peace with the Taliban appeared as one of the key factors constraining ISAF’s stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan.

6. challenges and the Way Forward

Apart from the factors that are responsible for lack of success of the ISAF and the US, there are few other challenges that the multinational security assistance force in Afghanistan has to endure and overcome to achieve its desired objectives.

6.1 Challenges

6.1.1 Countering Taliban Insurgency

Countering Taliban insurgency and terrorist activities of the armed groups operating both within Afghanistan and from across the border, in any account remains the most formidable challenge for the US-led NATO/ISAF. For long, ISAF’s COIN goal has been eliminating and subjugating the Taliban, which backfired and

257 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014 remain counterproductive. Even when the COIN strategy adopted ‘wining hearts and minds’ approach, in many cases, coalition operations were seen as invasive, unjustified or as expanding the authority of a centralised and illegitimate regime. This perception is excessively prevalent in remote tribal areas of Afghanistan as far as the centralised Karzai government is concerned. Moreover, the ‘surge’ of 2009- 2010 also lacked appropriate understanding of the impact of the surge. Given the existence of insurgent sanctuaries as discussed above in Pakistan including major training, operations and logistical bases, the capacity for strategic adaptation and a continuous stream of recruits, the Taliban not only survived the surge but also, as discussed above, emerged even stronger.

6.1.2 Building an Effective Afghan National Security Force (ANSF)

Construction of effective ANSFs also remains as a major challenge for the ISAF. The ANSF comprised of the ANA, the ANP and the ANAAF. The army is generally considered more effective than the police. However, in spite of some advances made, challenges persist as to the building of an effective Afghan security forces within the stipulated deadline. These challenges are: (a) Shortfall of trainers: There is a severe lack of trainers. As estimated, by March 2012, some 1,000 training positions remained unfulfilled44; (b) High attrition: The desertion from the army is very high plaguing the establishment of an adequate security force. Of 111,000 recruits in 2010, only 79,000 stayed with the force. As many as 50,000 desertions are haemorrhaging ANSF every year45; (c) Low Literacy: Only 14 percent of recruits can read; (d) Lack of leadership skills: 26 percent of NCO positions remain unfulfilled; and (e) Drug Abuse: 30 percent applications have been rejected because of their drug abuses.46

Defection and the insider attacks are two more crucial challenges. Leaving the ANSF and joining the Taliban remain as a crucial challenge. The latest high-profile defector was a Special Forces Commander, Monsif Khan who joined the Hizb-e-Islami organisation, a Taliban-affiliated group, taking with him guns and high-tech military equipment.47 Similarly, the insider attack, often referred to as ‘green on the blue’ poses another significant challenge in building the ANSF. The most recent incident of the death of a two star US General, General Green, the first such high level military personnel of the US army’s death since the Vietnam War caused serious concern for both ANSF and the ISAF as the incident have definitely emboldened the insurgents.

44 “Strategic Geography”, in Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman (eds.), Afghanistan: To 2015 and Beyond, Adelphi 425-426, London: Routledge and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011, p. XX. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47“Afghan army commander defects to rival side”, Aljazeera, 21 October 2013, available at http://www. aljazeera.com/news/asia/2013/10/afghan-army-commander-defects-rival-side 20131021103222455867. html, accessed on 14 August 2014. 258 RECENT SECURITY SCENARIO IN AFGHANISTAN

6.1.3 Narcotic-economy and the Insurgent Financing

Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is a significant destabilising factor that affects the security, governance and reconstruction and development of the entire country. As can be seen from Figure 5, poppy is cultivated in Afghanistan mostly in the Southern part of the country but also in the upper northern areas. 15 of 34 Afghanistan provinces are considered “poppy free”. However, the poppy production in the country amounts to nearly 3500 tonnes generating 11 percent of the GDP in 2010. Helmand province is the most densely cultivated poppy area producing 1,933 tonnes of poppy that is 55 percent of the country’s total production.

Figure 5: 2010 Opium Cultivation and Production by Region 2010 opium cultivation and production by region Opoum cultivation 2010 thctares Poppy tree Less than 1,000 1,000- 10,000 10,000- 30,000 Metric tonnes 20,000 Opium production, metric tonnes

AlternativeAlternative crops?crops? Farmers gave not easilyeasily beenbeen presusdpresusd ttoo swetchswetch ffromrom oopiumpium (34,900(34,900 perper he)he) to whestwhest ($770 perper ha) (up(up toto $12,000 perper hha)a) iiss dicultdicult to grow, and onlyonly some 300he hhaveave beenbeen planned in Afgha iinstan.nstan. HELMAND 1,933

Source: “Strategic Geography”, op. cit., p. XIV.

The trade in opium provides tremendous resources to insurgents and criminals, promotes corruption among public officials and discourages participation in the licit economy. The mere existence of the narcotic-economy, therefore, posing severe challenges to the ISAF efforts in Afghanistan. All of the insurgent groups in Afghanistan benefit from narcotics trafficking. According to an UN estimate, narcotics generates US$ 70-100 million per year for insurgents – about 25 percent of the insurgents’ annual budget of US$ 400 million.48 The ISAF has undertaken some initiatives to address poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. It, however, shifted from its earlier policy of eradicating poppy cultivation since July 2009 as that kind of measures were driving Afghans to support the Taliban as protectors of their livelihood.

48 Kenneth Katzman, op. cit., p. 18. 259 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014

Continuation of poppy production with no sign of serious reduction in the production level and persistence of narcotics trade pose a major challenge for ISAF.

6.2 Way Forward for Security and Stability in Afghanistan

6.2.1 A Negotiated Settlement with the Taliban

Achieving a negotiated peace settlement with the Taliban would be a significant advancement for the ISAF. In fact, given the current strength of Taliban movement and the phased withdrawal plan of ISAF and the US forces, make it absolutely essential that the ANSF is not left with the neo-Talibans created by the ISAF and the US forces.

6.2.2 Power Sharing Formula and the Decentralised Security System

The very nature of the factionalised Afghan society though created by the decade long conflicts between the ISAF and the Taliban and other insurgent and terrorist groups, an appropriate power sharing formula need to be devised to establish stable governance mechanism in the country. A centralised system of governance appears untenable given the divisive nature of the Afghan society. A power-sharing with the centre can only satisfy the local warlords to give up their support for violence against the central government.

Prior to the implementation of the US “surge”, the Afghan Interior Ministry estimated in August 2009 that the Karzai government controlled about 30 percent of the country, while insurgents controlled 4 percent (13 out of 364 districts) and influenced or operated in another 30 percent.49 Tribes and local groups with varying degrees of loyalty to the central government controlled the remainder. The Taliban had named “shadow governors” in 33 out of 34 of Afghanistan’s provinces, although many provinces in northern Afghanistan were assessed as having minimal Taliban presence. A decentralised security system i.e., sharing security responsibilities with the local leaders can be one solution to the power seeking ethnic and tribal entities.

6.2.3 Overseas Financial and Development Assistance

The economy of Afghanistan remains poor in terms of productivity and industrialisation. The economy is mainly agrarian; again, poppy cultivation dominated that agrarian economy. At present, the country is receiving tremendous amount of foreign aid both in the form of economic and security assistance. In the post-2014 period, which may experience massive contraction of security assistance, the country should not be deprived of the much needed development assistance. 49 Ibid., p. 21. 260 RECENT SECURITY SCENARIO IN AFGHANISTAN

The international community should make all the efforts possible to construct a productive and resilient economy in Afghanistan, not one dependent on poppies or transnational illicit networks. The natural and mineral resources extraction and exploitation in this context can be of immense support to the economy. Recent studies explored enormous mineral wealth of Afghanistan, which is estimated at almost a trillion dollar worth.50 Gradual insertion of dollars in the Afghan economy earned from selling these natural resources will ease the difficulties of looming fiscal contraction in the post-2014 period.

7. Conclusion

A review of recent security scenario in Afghanistan in terms of casualties and deaths of the civilians as well as continuing insurgency, terrorism and extremism by the Taliban and other militant groups including al-Qaeda, adequately testifies to the claim that security situation deteriorated in 2014, compared to 2012 and 2013. Data shows increasing trend of civilian casualties, while armed insurgent and militant groups exhibiting remarkable resilience against the COIN and CT efforts of ISAF and ANSF. ISAF’s efforts, whose principal objective is to stabilise Afghanistan and ensure peace and security in the country, therefore, can be argued exhibiting explicit lack of success in achieving them. Many challenges remain instrumental: building effective ANSF, moving beyond narcotics economy, negotiated settlement with the Taliban and the most important flawless state-building approach.

Afghanistan is a country that has long been considered to be ‘a graveyard for empires’. Prime reason for this lies with the fact that the ethnic and tribal people of Afghanistan boast deep aversion to foreign occupation and intervention. While the US sponsored international community’s nation-building efforts in specific directions, inspired and modelled by the Western political thoughts and ideas, might appear inevitable for the US and its allies, a re-think for Afghanistan, given the present context seems essential. While the Afghan people and the Afghan society are exhibiting all signs of traditionalism and tribalism, building an Afghan state in line with democratic principles and values which theoretically dependent on the processes of political modernisation, can be, as experience shows in Afghanistan, counter-productive. A balanced approach between traditionalist and modernist goals need to be followed as far as nation-building in Afghanistan is concerned.

Moreover, for success in eradicating insurgency and terrorism, the international community, again, needs to re-think their policy approach in formulating strategies that are pro-active rather than reactionary. Unless the reasons breeding insurgencies and terrorism are addressed with appropriate policy initiatives, success in COIN and CT in Afghanistan will remain unattainable thereby keeping prospects for peace, stability and security in Afghanistan elusive for the moment. 50 “Strategic Geography”, in Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman (eds.), op. cit., p. XVII. 261 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014: 262-275

Mostaque Ahmad CLIMATE CHANGE – A SECURITY THREAT FOR BANGLADESH: THE ROLE OF ARMED FORCES

Abstract

Climate change is a serious and inevitable threat for Bangladesh. The country faces significant challenges to its overall development due to frequent flooding, tropical cyclones, droughts and other natural calamities, all of which deplete a significant amount of the annual national budget. Researches show that climate change has increased the frequency of the natural disasters and is likely to intensify further in the future. It is estimated that, climate change combined with the threat of sea level rise, would cause forced-displacement of millions of people from low-lying and coastal areas of densely populated Bangladesh. The paper reveals that climate change has severe impacts on Bangladesh due to its unique geographical location and socio-economic characteristics. This suggests that climate change poses security threats for Bangladesh in terms of weakening the elements of national power and generating violence in the society. The paper also explored that though Bangladesh is making all out efforts to face climate change, but for obvious reason the role of armed forces has not yet been emphasised at the national strategic level. As such, this paper suggests for the incorporation of Bangladesh armed forces in the national response plans on climate change issues.

1. Introduction

Bangladesh is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change due to its unique geographical location, dominance of floodplains and low elevation. The socio-economic characteristics of the country such as higher population density, poor social and economic capacity, inadequate infrastructures, overwhelming dependence on nature and nature-based livelihood also contribute to this vulnerability.1 Bangladesh faces hard challenges to its overall development due to frequent floods, tropical cyclones, droughts and other natural calamities, which deplete significant amounts of the annual national budget. Researches show that climate change has already increased the frequency of natural disasters and is likely to intensify further in the near future. It is estimated that these environmental threats, combined with the sea level rise induced by global warming, will displace millions of people from

Mostaque Ahmad, awc, psc, is Group Captain serving in Bangladesh Air Force. His e-mail address is: [email protected]

© Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2014. 1 Fahmida Khatun and AKM Nazrul Islam, “Policy Agenda for Addressing Climate Change in Bangladesh: Copenhagen and Beyond”, Occasional Paper No. 88, Dhaka: Centre for Policy Dialogue, 2010, p. 8. 262 CLIMATE CHANGE – A SECURITY THREAT FOR BANGLADESH

low-lying and coastal regions. Hence, this presents a serious challenge to densely populated Bangladesh.

Bangladesh is vulnerable to different non-traditional security issues, out of which climate change is likely to become a major threat to national security. The security experts in Bangladesh believe that climate change will exacerbate other non- traditional security issues such as food and water security, environmental and health security, illegal migration and human trafficking, transnational crime and terrorism, by increasing the intensity and duration of natural disasters and other environmental hazards.2 Richard A. Matthew finds that climate change poses challenges to national security; negative impacts of climate change may weaken the elements of national power, contribute to state failure and generate violence in the society.3 The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) realises that the climate change, an unfolding physical phenomenon with very drastic and adverse environmental, economic, social and human consequences, will infuse all sectors and human endeavours.4 Therefore, climate change management demands whole-of-government approach.

However, the paper reveals that the role of Bangladesh armed forces, an important tool of national power, in dealing with security threats of climate change is yet to receive adequate attention at national strategic level. As such, the objective of this paper is to analyse the role of Bangladesh armed forces in minimising the security threats of climate change and helping the nation adapting to climate change. The paper is organised in four sections. After introduction, the second section focuses on the climate change impacts on Bangladesh and its security implications. The role of Bangladesh armed forces in fighting security threats of climate change is discussed in the third section. In doing so, the paper suggests innovative/humanitarian use of the military, within the framework of ‘in-aid to civil power’, in helping the vulnerable population to adapt to climate change and uphold the social stability of the country. In the final section, the paper concludes with a set of recommendations for capacity building of Bangladesh armed forces to be able to fight security threats of climate change effectively.

2. climate Change Impacts and Security Threats for Bangladesh

The impact of climate change on the developing countries, particularly on low-income countries like Bangladesh, is compounded by high population density, low resource base, high incidence of natural disasters, salinity intrusion and submergence of land due to sea level rise. The situation would 2 Farooq Sobhan, President Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI), stated during his speech on “Non- Traditional Security Threats to Bangladesh” at National Security Intelligence (NSI), Bangladesh on 10 July 2012, available at http://www.bei-bd.org/teamdetails.php?tid=1, accessed on 30 November 2013. 3 Richard A. Matthew, “Is Climate Change a National Security Issue?”, Issues in Science and Technology, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2011, p. 3. 4 Ministry of Environment and Forest (MOEF), Bangladesh, Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009 (BCCSAP 2009), Dhaka: MOEF, 2009, p. 25. 263 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014

become disastrous with even a meter rise of sea level due to global warming, as it would inundate a fifth of Bangladesh, displacing nearly thirty million people and leading to mass movement of people.

- Sheikh Hasina, Honourable Prime Minister of Bangladesh5

Bangladesh is one of the countries where millions of people are vulnerable to climate change. The country is geographically vulnerable to natural hazards; climate change exacerbates these hazards by increasing their intensity and duration. The disadvantageous socio-economic characteristics of the country such as poor social and economic capacity, poor provision of health care, inadequate infrastructures, higher density of population and higher rate of poverty, etc. make Bangladesh vulnerable to climate change. Now, it is undeniable issue that climate change poses threat to national security with increased risk of poverty, infectious diseases, mass migration, food shortages, etc.

To people of Bangladesh, climate change is real and it is happening now. Sea level rise is identified as a matter of grave concern for Bangladesh. Danish Climate Minister Connie Hedegaard while visiting Bangladesh in 2009 said, “It’s not a distant fury, it’s not a distant future. During my visit I saw people are struggling with climate change. It is already here.”6 Experts in Bangladesh believe that climate change is expected to have major physical impacts on agriculture, industry, infrastructure, health and energy and consequently on people’s livelihood.7

2.1 Impacts of Climate Change

Bangladesh is a South Asian country surrounded by India to the West, North and East; Myanmar in the Southeast and the Bay of Bengal in the South. The size of the country is 147,570 sq km (9.6 percent water) consisting mostly of flat lowlands.8 The elevation of the two-thirds of land area of the country is less than 5 meter and is susceptible to river and rainwater flooding.9 The country is one of the largest deltas in the world, formed by the dense network of the distributaries of the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna rivers (GBM system).10 Millions of people of Bangladesh are dependent on these trans-boundary rivers for their livelihood. The climate change will cause heavier and more erratic rainfall in the GBM system, including Bangladesh.11 5 Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s Remarks on Climate Change, Asia Society New York, 26 September 2012, available at http://asiasociety.org/new-york/bangladeshi-prime-minister-sheikh-hasinas- remarks-climate-change, accessed on 13 December 2013. 6 Interview with Maruf Mallick, “Climate Change: Not a Distant Fury”, bdnews24.com, 04 February 2009, available at http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2009/02/04/interview---climate-change-not-a-distant-fury, accessed on 14 December 2013. 7 MOEF, National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), Dhaka: MOEF, November 2005, p. 16. 8 Ibid, p. 1. 9 MOEF, BCCSAP 2009, op. cit., p. 7. 10 MOEF, NAPA 2005, op. cit., p. 1. 11 MOEF, BCCSAP 2009, op. cit., p. 14. 264 CLIMATE CHANGE – A SECURITY THREAT FOR BANGLADESH

During the monsoon, heavier rainfall results in higher river flows, causing over- topping and breaching of embankments and widespread flooding in rural and urban areas. The higher flows will also cause river bank erosion resulting in loss of homes and agricultural land to the rivers; increased sedimentation in riverbeds leading to drainage congestion and waterlogging.

The coastal area of Bangladesh and the Bay of Bengal are located at the tip of northern Indian Ocean, which has the shape of an inverted funnel.12 This shape, along with the shallowness of the Bay itself, makes the coastal areas of Bangladesh more vulnerable to frequent hit by severe cyclonic storms, generating long wave tidal surges.13 The frequency and severity of cyclones and storm surges would increase with climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) forecasted (2007) that a mere 1 meter rise in sea level will inundate 20 percent landmass of Bangladesh resulting in loss of much of its coastal regions permanently.14Therefore, the unique geographic location makes Bangladesh one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change.

The increased intensity of natural disasters due to climate change implies major constraints to the country’s social and economic development.15Bangladesh has a population of 156.6 million (2013 estimate).16 With over 1200 people per sq km, the country is one of the most densely populated in the world.17 About 21 percent of the population lives in the coastal districts are vulnerable to rising sea level.18 Though still most people live in rural areas, urbanisation is growing rapidly due to irregular migration from low-lying and coastal areas. These ‘climate migrants’ find their place in urban slums, often away from city services. On the health sector, the GoB expends US$ 12 per person per year, a figure well below the US$ 21 spent in low income countries in general.19 It is natural that poor people spend their household income for food first, then for health care, education, etc. As a result, the poor people in the rural areas as well as in the urban slums are vulnerable to health hazards and environmental hazards.

The economy of Bangladesh is also under tremendous threat emanating from climate change. The country has a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US$ 129.9 billion (2013 estimate) and has a low per capita GDP of US$ 829.20 The standard of living varies in different parts of the country. The disparity between the rich and

12 MOEF, NAPA 2005, op. cit., p. 13. 13 Ibid. 14 Fahmida and Nazrul, 2010, op. cit., p. 10. 15 MOEF, NAPA 2005, op. cit., p. 13. 16 The World Bank Data, available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bangladesh, accessed on 08 July 2014. 17 Ibid. 18 MOEF, NAPA 2005, op. cit., p. 2. 19 Ibid., p. 16. 20 The World Bank Data, op. cit. 265 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014 poor is also growing.21 NAPA team estimates that still about 36 percent of the people of Bangladesh are living on a dollar per day or less.22 The country has 5 percent unemployment but about 40 percent of the population is underemployed.23 Though the service sector and readymade garment industries are growing, agriculture is still a major economic sector of Bangladesh. Over 60 percent of the people depend on agriculture directly or indirectly for their livelihoods.24 The impacts of climate change on agriculture sector will result in more unemployment and pose a threat to food security. Droughts and crop failures due to erratic weather pattern would leave millions of people of Bangladesh without their lifeline, which may trigger waves of mass migration to urban areas.

From the above discussion, it is evident that climate change will disrupt economic element of national power of Bangladesh because a great deal of the development budget will have to be diverted to minimise its impacts.25 The cost of each major cyclone and flood is more than a billion dollars to the economy of Bangladesh. For example, Table 1 summerises damages to our national economy from major floods in last 25 years.26

Table 1. Impacts of Major Floods on Bangladesh Events Impact 1984 Inundated over 50,000 sq km, estimated damage worth US$ 378 million Inundated over 50,000 sq km, estimated damage worth US$ 1 billion, 1987 caused 2055 deaths Inundated 61 percent of the country, estimated damage worth US$ 1.2 billion, 1988 rendered more than 45 million people homeless, caused 2,000-6,500 deaths Inundated nearly 100,000 sq km, rendered 30 million people homeless, 1998 damaged 500,000 homes, heavy loss to infrastructure, estimated dam- age worth US$ 2.8 billion, caused 1,100 deaths Inundated 38 percent of the country, damage worth US$ 6.6 billion, af- 2004 fected nearly 3.8 million people, caused 700 deaths Inundated 32,000 sq km, destroyed over 85,000 houses and partially damaged almost another 1 million, destroyed or partially damaged ap- 2007 proximately 1.2 million acres of crops, estimated damage worth over US$ 1 billion, caused 649 deaths Source: MOEF, BCCSAP, Dhaka: MOEF, September 2009, p. 9.

21 MOEF, NAPA 2005, op. cit., p. 2. 22 Ibid., p. 3. 23 Bangladesh Unemployment Rate, index mundi, available at http://www.indexmundi.com/bangladesh/ unemploy -ment_rate.html, accessed on 20 December 2013. 24 MOEF, BCCSAP 2009, op. cit., p. 14. 25 In this regard, Dr. Dipu Moni, the then Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, made similar statement at the Climate Vulnerable Forum held in the Maldives in November 2009. “…The interruptions caused by climate change have eroded our development gains made in previous decades; slowed down the attainment of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of the United Nations…” For details, see, “Statement of Dr Dipu Moni, the Hon’ble Foreign Minister of Bangladesh”, at the Climate Vulnerable Forum, Maldives, 09 November 2009, available at www.climatevulnerableforum.gov.mv/?page_id=45, accessed on 15 December 2013. 26 MOEF, BCCSAP 2009, op. cit., p. 18. 266 CLIMATE CHANGE – A SECURITY THREAT FOR BANGLADESH

Several studies by IPCC and others indicate significant changes in local climatic conditions and sea level of Bangladesh which are devastating consequences of climate change. Table 2 shows estimated changes in temperature and rainfall. The projected changes in climatic conditions are expected to exacerbate many of the current problems and natural hazards that Bangladesh experiences. The erratic changes in temperatures will cause warmer and more humid weather leading to increased prevalence of disease and disease vectors.27 The melting of Himalayan glaciers due to global warming will lead to higher river flows in the warmer months of the year, followed by lower river flows and increased saline intrusion after the glaciers have shrunk or disappeared. Again the climate change will cause the lower and more erratic rainfall, resulting in increased droughts especially in drier northern and western regions of the country.28

Table 2. Projected Changes in Climatic Conditions of Bangladesh Year Mean Temperature (°C) Mean Rainfall Change (mm) December- December- Annual June-August Annual June-August February February Baseline 2030 +1.0 +1.1 +0.8 +3.8 -1.2 +4.7 2050 +1.4 +1.6 +1.1 +5.6 -1.7 +6.8 2100 +2.4 +2.7 +1.9 +9.7 -3.7 +11.8 Source: Fahmida Khatun and Nazrul Islam, “Policy agenda for Addressing Climate Change in Bangladesh: Copenhagen and Beyond”, Occasional Paper No. 88, Dhaka: Centre for Policy Dialogue, March 2010, p. 9. Table 3 shows the estimated changes in sea level rise. Sea level rise due to global warming will lead to the submergence of low-lying coastal areas and saline water intrusion in coastal rivers and into groundwater aquifers, reducing fresh water availability.29

Table 3. Projected Changes in Sea Level Rise and Sediment of Bangladesh Year Sea Level Rise (in cm) Sediment (area in sq km) 2030 14 325 2050 32 700 2100 88 1350 Source: Fahmida and Nazrul, 2010, op. cit.

2.2 Security Threats of Climate Change

The climate change is now considered as a threat to national security at least by 110 countries of the world.30 In Bangladesh, climate change will exacerbate other

27 Ibid., p. 14. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 William Fassuliotis, “The Key facts: Climate Change”, American Security Project, 22 September 2014, available at https://www.americansecurityproject.org/the-global-security-defense-index-on-climate-change-2/, accessed on 24 September 2014. 267 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014 non-traditional security issues such as food and water security, environmental and health security, illegal migration and human trafficking, transnational crime and terrorism by increasing the intensity and duration of natural disasters and other environmental hazards. These non-traditional security issues are the possible vectors through which climate change will impact national security.

As shown in Table 4, Richard A. Matthew finds relationship between climate change and national security and categorises challenges to national security into three groups: “anything that weakens the elements of national power, contributes to state failure, or leads, supports or amplifies the causes of violent conflict.”31 He observed that climate change has the potential to have a negative impact in each of these domains.32

Table 4. Climate Change and National Security Relationship National Secu- Weakening of Ele- rity Concerns Disruption and Vio- ments of National State Failure Climate Change lent Conflict Impacts Power Changes in water Job loss in rural Reduce agriculture out- Increased competition distribution areas puts, basic needs unmet for water Funds diverted to di- Displaced people into Severe weather Undermine econom- saster relief, away from areas where they are events ic strength infrastructure, etc. not welcome Greater demands to Heat waves Pandemics Riots in urban area meet basic needs Deepen social inequal- Displaced people into Undermine econom- Drought ity as some groups areas where they are ic development control food and water not welcome Destroy coastal Put the survival of military bases (also Increase inequality and states such as the Mal- Sea level rise national economic promote extremism as dives and Bangladesh development infra- some people lose land are at risk structure) Reduce military Destroy critical infra- Flooding effectiveness in the Increase urban strife structure field Source: Richard A. Matthew, “Is Climate Change a National Security Issue?”, Issue in Science and Technology, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2011, p. 4.

Displacement of people from low-lying and coastal areas is a matter of security concern for Bangladesh. Millions of people living in the coastal areas at less

31 Richard A. Matthew, 2011, op. cit., p. 3. 32 Ibid. 268 CLIMATE CHANGE – A SECURITY THREAT FOR BANGLADESH than 1 meter elevation are vulnerable.33 The large-scale migration from affected areas to the cities and towns may disrupt public service systems leading to violence. The poor in rural areas and the poor who live in urban slums, often in low-lying areas away from city services, are more vulnerable to endemic disease. The GoB estimates that by 2050, the country will have more than 200 million people with almost half living in the cities and towns, many as ‘climate migrants’ from rural areas.34 These cities and towns are ill-equipped and already struggling to meet demands from growing population.

City administrations will struggle and likely fail to provide basic public services leading to public agitations against the state. Bangladesh already experienced such social agitation in recent years. In September 2006, thousands of people, infuriated by severe power crisis, set fire to power distribution offices in some parts of the capital and elsewhere in the country.35 In another instance, the GoB had to deploy army to manage water distribution in the capital following public demonstrations at water treatment plants.36 Unwelcomed migration of climate change victims is another cause for internal conflict. In the 1980s, people in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) experienced internal conflict over the influx from low-lying areas. Therefore, threats of climate change may put negative impact on livelihoods of people in rural areas as well as those in urban areas. In such a situation, the state’s failure to fulfil basic needs is likely to trigger public anger and violence. The resulting civil unrest may lead to social instability. Security experts predict that this type of instability may provide space for extremist forces which may further contribute to political instability and weaken national powers.37

Damage to the different infrastructures and resources is another security concern for Bangladesh. Most parts of the coastal region in Bangladesh are economically productive. Loss of international and domestic airports, military bases, ports, industries, tourist attractions, etc. to sea level rise will greatly hamper the economy. The cost of rebuilding of such infrastructures will be high, although rebuilding may not be possible due to land scarcity. Further, any constraint on natural resources like oil and natural gas fields, marine fisheries, etc. in the maritime area is also critical. Sea level rise may again aggravate maritime boundary disputes in regards to new calculation of territorial water, continental shelf or exclusive economic zone, etc. Bangladesh may be drawn into maritime boundary tensions again with neighbouring countries, as did in the past.38

33 MOEF, NAPA 2005, op. cit., p.1. 34 Ibid., p.16. 35 "City bursts into violence to protest power cuts," The Daily Star, 29 September 2006. 36 Radio Australia website, posted 08 April 2010, available at http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/ international/2010-04-08/bangladesh-army-deployed-over-water-shortage/193230, accessed on 25 November 2013. 37 Paul J. Smith, “Climate Change, Weak States and the ‘War on Terrorism’ in South and Southeast Asia”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2007, p. 277. 38 In November 2008, tension mounted over the intrusion of Myanmar vessels into Bangladesh territorial waters with intention of illegal exploration of oil and gas in deep-sea blocks in the Bay of Bengal. When Bangladesh asked immediate withdrawal, Myanmar refused and that led to military alert between both 269 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014

Another security concern from climate change impacts is likely regional tension over migration out of the country. Security experts claim that the Indian government has started building an 8-foot-high barbed wire fence along the length of its 2,500-mile frontier with Bangladesh to stop potential ‘climate migrants’.39 However, there is no evidence of such trans-boundary migration from Bangladesh due to climate change. But without serious attention to climate change impacts on Bangladesh, this potential migration problem is expected to become a regional as well as a global issue.

Water security is a serious security concern for Bangladesh. Climate change impact may exacerbate this concern in the future. Water flow of the GBM system is regulated by upstream countries. Their ‘climate change adaptation’ such as diversion of water from trans-boundary rivers may adversely impact millions in Bangladesh. The Farakka barrage dispute between Bangladesh and India led to considerable tensions in the 1980s.40 The Ganga Water Treaty of 1996 helped reduce the tensions somewhat, but the dispute continues over the issue of water sharing. It is likely that upstream countries will respond to the forecasts of more erratic water flows in all major river basins by building new upstream dams and water storage.41 The security experts opined that such “‘climate change adaptation’ will drive cross-border tensions in the next decade, including the potential for armed inter-state conflict.”42 Any unilateral decision of water sharing by upstream countries would have a devastating impact on millions in the region and in Bangladesh.

The security implications discussed above are not likely to lead Bangladesh to become a failed state. It may, however, weaken the economic element of national power and disrupt and hurt social stability of the country. However, these changes need not cause societies to fall into conflict if, with reasonable foresight, Bangladesh can adapt to the effects of climate change. The country needs to use Bangladesh armed forces to prevent the security problem of climate change before it is too late.

3. The Role of Bangladesh Armed Forces in Dealing with Security Threats of Climate Change

The role of military is to fight a war, not to fight climate change – it is the general perception. However, the use of military does not mean ‘militarising’ the climate change issue. The results of the Global Security Index published recently show the countries. However, Bangladesh could resolve maritime boundary issue with Myanmar in subsequent moves. Maritime boundary dispute with India has been resolved in 2014 as well. 39 Daniel Moran (ed.), Climate Change and National Security: A Country-Level Analysis, Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2011, p. 108. 40 Ashok Swain, The Environmental Trap: The Ganges River Diversion, Bangladeshi Migration and Conflicts in India, Uppsala: Uppsala University Press, 1996, p. 80. 41 Nick Mabey, “Delivering Climate Security – International Security Responses to a Climate Change World”, RUSI Whitehall Paper, No. 69, Philadephia: Routledge Journals, 2008, p. 4. 42 Ibid. 270 CLIMATE CHANGE – A SECURITY THREAT FOR BANGLADESH that almost all nations consider missions like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as critical responsibilities of their armed forces.43 The Bangladesh armed forces are organised, equipped and trained to fight wars against adversaries (external/ internal) and protect the hard-earned sovereignty of the motherland. In peace time, the armed forces participate, within the framework of ‘in-aid to civil powers’, in nation building activities and also quick responses to any disasters or other emergencies. Since transitioning to democracy in 1991, institutionalisation of democracy in Bangladesh is progressing. Similarly, Bangladesh armed forces also have developed in great extent. Now Bangladesh is proud to have an army, a navy and an air force, all of which possess world standard and capable to fight against any threats, as three components of its armed forces. These forces have skill and experiences to participate in any disaster operations as well as in national development activities. However, it is not to suggest that the armed forces will solve entire problem of climate change but it is suggested that if they are tasked they can and should be ready to deal any security challenges that are created or exacerbated by climate change. It is required that the GoB utilises its armed forces in a proactive way to prevent threats of climate change.

Opinions are growing in favour of humanitarian use of the military to help poor people adapt to climate change. Bangladesh should use its experienced military to help poor to adapt to climate change. Major General Muniruzzaman (Retd) also thinks that “in various ways military can contribute to face climate change. The military can handle situations that involve migratory patterns of people due to climate conditions. When there is a disease pandemic, or when emergency shelter and water is needed, there are a host of things that can best be handled by the military. They can also prevent conflict in destabilized areas.”44

3.1 Disaster Operations and Nation Building

In any natural calamity, the Bangladesh armed forces quickly responses to assist the GoB in helping people under distress. They play a very important role in evacuation, rescue, relief and rehabilitation operations during disasters. As an organised force, the armed forces can quickly respond to provide important logistical and command-and-control resources during any disasters and other emergencies. The Bangladesh armed forces has played a vital role in the responses to a number of recent disasters at home and abroad including the 2004 Indian tsunami, the 2007 cyclone Sidr and the 2013 Rana Plaza disaster, etc. It is a reality that only armed forces can marshal the resources required to respond to these events on such short notice.

The Bangladesh armed forces also have nation-building experiences at national and international levels. They are involved in numorous infrastructure

43 William Fassuliotis, 2014, op. cit. 44 Isabel Hilton, “Militarizing Climate Change”, Interview with Major General Muniruzzaman, China Dialogue, 04 July 2011, available at https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4388-Militarising- climate-change, accessed on 12 November 2013. 271 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014 development projects. The constructions of roads, flyovers and overpasses, projects like Hathirjheel, are some of the success stories of Bangladesh armed forces. Bangladesh Army is now a proud partner in Padma bridge construction, a high value mega project of Bangladesh. The armed forces are working with other civil agencies as a team for successful implementation of different projects undertaken by the GoB. It is seen that, damage to the important infrastructures like airports, military bases, ports, industries, tourist attractions, etc. due to cyclones and other natural calamities greatly hamper the country’s economy. Employment of armed forces in restoring these facilities can rapidly augment the repair/rebuilt capability in shortest possible time.

3.2 Adaptation Projects

The GoB has taken various steps to adapt to climate change. They formulated the NAPA 2005 and BCCSAP 2009. The actions of GoB indicate its seriousness in protecting citizens from the dangers of climate change. Thanks to the resilience of Bangladeshi people, they have adapted over generations to the risks of floods, droughts and cyclones.45 But the predicted massive impacts of climate change will overwhelm this ability of the poor people. In this situation, they need support from the state mechanisms.

The Bangladesh armed forces have experiences of participating in various environmental adaptation projects undertaken by the GoB. Bangladesh Navy and Bangladesh Air Force have played pivotal role in the coastal ‘greenbelt’ projects, involving mangrove planting along nearly 9,000 km of the shoreline.46 The armed forces have undertaken ‘Ashrayan’ and ‘Barack House’ construction projects for providing shelter to the poor.47 The ‘Marine Drive’ project, an 80 km long road-cum- embankment on sandy beach from Cox’s Bazar to Teknaf is another milestone project of armed forces.

3.3 Breaking the Link between Climate and Conflict

The Bangladesh armed forces provide a very significant resource base to the GoB in breaking the link between climate and conflict. It is estimated that millions of people of coastal and low-lying areas of Bangladesh would be victims of forced- displacement due to climate change and sea level rise. Without serious attention this potential migration problem is expected to destabilise the society, intensify resource conflicts and also become a regional/global issue. The Bangladesh armed forces have a crucial role to play in preventing such security threats. For example, for last three

45 Ibid. 46 MOEF, BCCSAP 2009, op. cit., p. 19. 47 Bangladesh Government, Ashrayan-2 Project, available at http://www.ashrayanpmo.gov.bd, accessed on 09 December 2013. 272 CLIMATE CHANGE – A SECURITY THREAT FOR BANGLADESH decades, the Bangladesh armed forces are working in the (CHT) to maintain peace and stability and support developmental activities. The GoB is using armed forces to ensure that any development projects in this resource-rich land area are done without endangering forestry, eco-system and livelihood of the indigenous people of the area. The Bangladesh armed forces have material capability to protect and develop any new reclamation land area ‘chars’ as a result of climate change, as well as to help people living near river banks through protection of river erosions.

3.4 Challenges to the Role of Bangladesh Armed Forces

The GoB has taken various steps to adapt to climate change. As mentioned earlier, they formulated the NAPA 2005 and BCCSAP 2009. At the local level, Bangladesh has developed various plans on mitigation and adaptation to climate change. The GoB has established a National Climate Change Fund with US$ 100 million for adaptation to climate change.48 At the diplomatic level, Bangladesh is doing all it can to mitigate carbon emissions and to find better opportunities to adapt to climate change. Since the inception of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, Bangladesh has actively participated and demonstrated its willingness and sincerity for a proper solution to the problem of global warming and climate change.49 The country strongly supported the Kyoto Protocol which entered into force in 2005. Bangladesh is also trying to find common cause with its neighbours to manage climate change impacts through regional action plans.50

The actions of GoB indicate its seriousness in protecting citizens from the dangers of climate change. But danger posed by climate change is likely to overwhelm Bangladesh’s capacity and capability to adapt. Another challenge for the GoB is the efficient utilisation of UNFCCC’s Green Climate Fund (GCF).51 It is likely that by 2016, Bangladesh will start receiving financial support from this fund for climate change adaptation programme. As such, Bangladesh needs a greater engagement of its armed forces in fighting the threats of climate change. However, due to misperception, e.g. ‘militarisation’ or ‘securitisation’ of climate change, on the use of military to fight threats of climate change people tend to keep military away from it. The policy makers at national strategic level yet to emphasise incorporation of Bangladesh armed forces in national climate change strategy. Due to this inadequate attention, the progress of the readiness of the armed forces, in terms of man and materials, to respond to climate change is slow.

48 MOEF, BCCSAP 2009, op. cit., p. 24. 49 Fahmida and Nazrul, 2010, op. cit., p. 17. 50 MOEF, BCCSAP 2009, op. cit., p. 24. 51 “The Green Climate Fund is a proposal by Parties to the UNFCCC to establish an international financial institution to assist developing countries in their efforts to combat climate change.” For details, see, White House, National Security Strategy, May 2010, p. 273 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014

4. conclusion and Recommendations

Bangladesh is a disaster prone low-lying country. Climate change is causing erratic weather patterns and may further increase both intensity and duration of natural disasters such as tropical cyclones, storm surges, floods and droughts. All of these disasters cost a significant amount to the national economy. The threats of climate change, combined with the threat of sea level rise, would bring devastating impacts on the livelihoods of millions of people of Bangladesh. The serious consequences of climate change would weaken the elements of national power and generate violence in the society, results of which are threats to national security.

The GoB is working seriously to mitigate the security implications of climate change. The country has developed a national climate change strategy. The effective implementation of these national plans requires integration of diplomatic, economic and military instruments of national power of Bangladesh. A whole-of-government approach along with concerted approach from civil society, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the international community is important in facing this non-traditional security threat. The activation of wider state mechanisms including the innovative use of the military is now the necessity to fight climate change threats. The armed forces can participate in the framework of ‘in-aid to civil power’ to prevent climate change threats and quickly response to any disasters.

The economy of Bangladesh alone cannot support such a massive burden of climate change. Bangladesh is working closely with the international community to find a global solution and also is working within regional cooperation mechanisms to find a regional solution to climate change. Bangladesh is willing to protect its citizens from the dangers of climate change and the world community should stand beside it in this regard. However, Bangladesh must take charge of its own problems and cannot afford to allow the situation to go out of control. Therefore, the climate change issue must advance to the rank of top priorities at the national strategic level. The GoB should plan to integrate all the instruments of national power including its armed forces in facing this climate change. The policy makers of Bangladesh should now realise that armed forces is not the tool only to respond to disasters but it is a tool in their hand to prevent those disasters.

Now most of the countries are considering the use of their military to fight against the threats of climate change. It is time to take political decision to use all of national assets including Bangladesh armed forces against climate change issue. In this regard, following are recommended:

 Necessary steps may be taken for a participatory approach to share the burden of huge tasks to face climate change. Bangladesh armed forces should be better prepared to face climate change and utilised for rescue, relief, evacuation and rehabilitation operations during any disasters. The GoB should mobilise Bangladesh

274 CLIMATE CHANGE – A SECURITY THREAT FOR BANGLADESH armed forces along with other elements of the government, NGOs, civil society, etc. to fight the threats collectively;

 The armed forces should be prepared to participate in the framework of ‘in-aid to civil power’ to prevent climate change threats and quickly response to any disasters. A coherent civil-military relation should be established for proactive actions against the threats of climate change. Here, along with other agencies, the Bangladesh Armed Forces can play a vital role in innovative ways to help vulnerable people to adapt to climate change;

 The forces goals of the armed forces should address climate change strategy. A separate ‘directorate of disaster management’ may be created in all three services HQs for better civil-military coordination on the climate change issue. They are also to conduct research and development activities on mitigation of carbon emission and adaptation to climate change;

 Necessary steps may be taken to bring awareness within armed forces and prepared them through training, exercises, etc. to fight climate change. The military leaderships should design strategy for innovative use of their forces in helping poor people adapting to climate change;

 The GoB should increase military forces capabilities to undertake climate change adaptation projects through military-to-military bilateral training programme with the development partners;

 The Bangladesh Armed Forces should be tasked to protect the densely populated urban areas from floods, water logging, etc. emanating from climate change. They can also be deployed to build raised shelters for the people in coastal and low-lying areas to protect the poor from sea level rise and storm surge;

 Necessary steps may be taken to appropriately equip the armed forces to enhance their pre and post-disaster management capabilities. To minimise loss to the economy, the Bangladesh Armed Forces should be involved to repair and rebuild the damaged infrastructures caused by natural disasters;

 Necessary technology transfer and information exchange on climate change adaptation strategy may be included in the security assistance cooperation programme with the international partners;

 The Armed Forces should conduct study on survivability of their bases and facilities situated in coastal and low-lying areas; and finally,

 The armed forces should do needful to continue with national mitigation and adaptation responses to climate change.

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BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 3, JULY 2014

The Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS) is a statutory institution established in 1978 under the administrative control of the Ministry of Foreign A airs, Government of Bangladesh, for undertaking and promoting research and deliberation on international a airs, security and developmental issues. The priority areas of the Institute's research activities are: foreign policy, security and strategic issues with specic relevance for Bangladesh; regional, inter-regional and international cooperation, sustainable development with focus on resource management and environmental issues; conict studies, peace keeping, disarmament, non-proliferation and area studies. Contemporary issues of South Asian politics, security and development are the focus of research activities of the Institute. Ethno-religious issues, regional and sub-regional cooperation, globalisation and environmental issues are of special research interests. Problems of institutionalisation of democracy, economic liberalisation, trade and investment links, challenges of governance and strengthening the civil society receive signicant scholarly attention. The general guidance and superintendence of the Institute a airs is vested upon the Board of Governors, headed by Chairman and consisting of representatives of ministries, armed forces, academics and professionals. The Director General is the Member-Secretary of the Board and Chief Executive of the Institute. The main activities of the Institute are carried out by the Research Faculty consisting of a team of full-time researchers with varied social sciences background.

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