REPORT OF THE ALLIANCE

SUMMIT

3 - 7 APRIL 2002 Esselen Park Conference Centre, Kempton Park, Ekurhuleni ALLIANCE SUMMIT REPORT CONTENTS

Abbreviations

Introductory Note

1 Opening Remarks by the President 1

2 The Ekurhuleni Declaration 3

Consolidated report of commission discussions on the 10 3 NDR, Balance of Forces and Building the Alliance

Consolidated report of commission discussions on Growth 15 4 and Development

5 Discussion Document: Accelerating Growth & Development 17 APPENDIX ONE: A Summary Of Government’s Microeconomic Reform Programme APPENDIX TWO: Some Key Issues For Debate Around Growth And Development Raised By Cosatu

6 Resolution on Palestine 35

7 Closing Remarks by Deputy President Jacob Zuma 37

8 Alliance Secretariat Report (Presented to the Summit) 38

Summit Agenda 41

List of Attendees 43 ABBREVIATIONS

ANC African National Congress AU African Union BEE Black Economic Empowerment COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo ETC Economic Transformation Committee GDP Gross Domestic Product GDS Growth and Development Summit GEAR Growth, Employment and Redistribution HIV/AIDS Human Immuno-deficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. HRD Human Resource Development ICT Information and Communication Technology IDP Integrated Development Plan ILO International Labour Organisation IMF International Monetary Fund ISRDP Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme MDC Movement for Democratic Change MDM Mass Democratic Movement NDR National Democratic Revolution NEDLAC National Economic Development and Labour Council NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development NFA National Framework Agreement NGC National General Council NGO Non-Governmental Organisation POA Programme Of Action PPP Public Private Partnership RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme RSA Republic of South Africa SACP South African Communist Party SADC Southern African Development Community SDI Spatial Development Initiative SETA Sector Education and Training Authority SMME Small, Medium and Micro-Enterprises UN United Nations URS Urban Renewal Strategy WSSD World Summit on Sustainable Development WTO World Trade Organisation ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The Alliance Summit of the ANC, SACP, COSATU and SANCO, led by the leadership of the four organisations, met in Kempton Park, Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Council from the 4 – 7 April 2002. The delegations were made up of members of both the national and provincial/regional leadership of all the organisations.

The Summit agreed that in the coming weeks and months, we would brief our structures at all levels, about the discussions and outcomes of the Alliance Summit. The final plenary session of the Summit held on 7th April agreed that the Alliance Secretariat should prepare a report for distribution to structures and that this report should consist of:

§ The ‘Ekurhuleni Declaration of the Alliance’, which constitutes the agreement of the Alliance Summit (Document 2)

§ The consolidated report of commission discussions on the NDR, Balance of Forces and Building the Alliance (Document 3)

§ The consolidated report of commission discussions on Growth and Development Commissions (document 4), which includes as an addendum the discussion document presented to the Summit entitled ‘Accelerating Growth and Development’ (Document 5) and that document’s appendixes.

The Summit also agreed that the full reports from each commission and the issues raised in them would be processed by the Alliance secretariat. In this regard the Alliance Secretariat undertook to take forward these issues, through, amongst other mechanisms, meetings of the Alliance Officials, the Alliance Task Teams that would be established to take forward the Growth and Development process, and any other relevant structures.

The documents contained herein have been subject to minor editorial and layout changes since the plenary session (e.g. we have added paragraph numbers for ease of reference). In addition to the above mentioned documents we have included within this report, for the sake of comprehensiveness, a number of other documents: the resolution on Palestine, the report presented to the Summit by the Alliance Secretariat, the Summit Agenda and list of attendees as well as an edited transcript of the President’s Opening Remarks and the Deputy President’s Closing Remarks.

-1- OPENING REMARKS BY PRESIDENT THABO MBEKI

It has taken a long time to prepare for this Summit. The last time we met in this format was in 1998. We have correctly given ourselves a fair number of days to discuss the important matters on the agenda. Last week we were in Abuja, Nigeria in a meeting of the implementation committee of NEPAD [New Partnership for Africa’s Development]. It was convened to look at the programme of action that the Secretariat and Steering Committee of NEPAD had agreed on, and to look at what needed to be done. We took the opportunity to look at what needed to be done to achieve the objective of defeating poverty. That process will require the greatest possible cohesion of the African continent. In reality, that process will require the restructuring of global society. You cannot achieve a progressive transformation without a progressive movement leading the process. In Abuja we looked at how to mobilise all the forces on the continent to achieve this task. What emerged clearly from that meeting was that the progressive movement in Africa depends greatly on what the comrades in this room do! Because of its longevity and capacity, and on the basis of their experience of and interaction with the ANC over many years, many in Africa say it is necessary and inevitable that the South African democratic movement must lead the process. South Africa also has the level of economic development which other countries in Africa do not have. Of all countries and governments in Africa, South Africa enjoys significant respect in the world. We therefore cannot avoid being the spokesperson of the continent on many matters. The tasks we face on the continent are basically the same as those we face at home: poverty, underdevelopment, and marginalisation of the continent; illiteracy, disease, and technical backwardness. We face the challenges of building democratic societies and achieving peace, stability and economic development – of radically changing the quality of life of our people, as well as changing the relations between the nations on the continent and the rest of the world. This results, in part, in an obligation on us to provide advice, where asked, on matters that may arise in particular countries. For example, many countries are multi-ethnic and multi-cultural, and this has often been used as a source of instability. These countries therefore look to the South African experience. And they ask how our Alliance works. Partly as a consequence, we are involved in a number of countries on the continent to assist in addressing problems. Comrade Kgalema Motlanthe is currently involved in discussions between ZANU-PF and MDC in Zimbabwe. There are around 500 delegates from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) meeting at Sun City to resolve the political, economic and other problems in their country. We asked comrade Madiba to facilitate the resolution of the Burundi problem, where great progress has been made. We are therefore practically involved in the process of addressing the problems of the continent. There is a similar expectation in other parts of the world. We are in contact with the Palestinians and Israelis around the resolution of the problem there. Part of what results from this role, is that there are some people who have a vested interest in giving leadership on what we should be doing – here in South Africa and the

Alliance Summit/April2002 l PRESIDENT’S OPENING REMARKS PAGE 1 rest of the continent. These people do not like that we can think independently, that we can identify for ourselves what our interests are and what we need to do about them. These people are accustomed to dealing with a continent that can be told what to do. The more we are able to think and act independently, the more those forces will try to subvert that action. If we allow them to succeed, we will fail to achieve the transformation of South Africa and Africa.

We meet as revolutionaries who seek revolutionary change in our country and continent. It requires, among other things, that we think independently – that we study and understand the many challenges we face; that we discuss these challenges among ourselves very openly and frequently. Because there is no vacuum. There are people with opposing views to ours; and they are on a constant offensive to promote their views: what they think needs to happen in South Africa and the continent. We need to continually engage these views on an ideological level. As the Alliance we need to share views on all the things on the agenda of this Summit and come to common positions. Over the past years, all manner of tensions have arisen. The relationship has often been marked more by conflict than by cooperation. I hope we are over that period, and have learnt the lesson that such conflicts do not further the revolutionary transformation neither of South Africa nor of the continent. The unity of the Alliance is a strategic goal - which we need to work on all the time - to ensure that we have the cohesion to carry out the responsibilities that we have to carry out. We must defend the movement and the Alliance against a sustained offensive. By defending our unity, we defend the fundamental forces required to bring about that change. The bilateral interaction that has taken place over the last few months has dealt with a lot of the matters which resulted in public friction, which were undesirable. We still need to discuss many questions. In approaching those discussions, I hope that we are informed by the understanding that we belong to one movement, that we have an obligation to the masses of South Africans and Africans, and that we do not betray their confidence in the leadership that is sitting here. We are meeting here not to review the past, but to say where do we want the movement and the country to be tomorrow. What interventions do we need to make to ensure that we reach this goal? We need to look forward to the kind of transformation reflected in the agenda contained in the Freedom Charter and Reconstruction and Development Programme. There is all manner of speculation that we are meeting to fight. We meet to fight not one another, but the impoverishment of our people, unemployment and underdevelopment. We meet to fight for the dignity of our people. You have the minds capable of emerging from this process to provide hope to the people of South Africa and Africa that this movement remains loyal to the values and traditions it has stood for decades. Our deliberations must constitute a defeat to the forces that try to prevent the victory of this struggle.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l PRESIDENT’S OPENING REMARKS PAGE 2 -2- THE EKURHULENI DECLARATION

INTRODUCTION 1 The Alliance Summit of the ANC, SACP, COSATU and SANCO, led by the leadership of the four organisations met in Kempton Park, Ekurhuleni Municipality from 4 - 7 April 2002. The delegations were made up of members of both the national and provincial/regional leadership of all the organisations. 2 The objective of the Summit was to assess the current national and global situation, the progress we are making in building a better life for all South Africans and the challenges we face in leading and accelerating the process of social transformation. 3 This Summit has followed a period in which there were serious tensions within our Alliance through the latter half of 2001. We have been addressing these problems in a series of constructive bilaterals and tripartite meetings, and this Summit is, in part, the product of these engagements. It is noteworthy that the Summit was not at all dominated by these tensions. The Summit has been characterised by a spirit of open engagement and debate, and by our sense of responsibility to our mass constituency which deeply cherishes the unity of our historic Alliance. We have re-affirmed and consolidated our understanding of the profound strategic unity of our Alliance in this Summit.

THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 4 All components of the Alliance agree that the primary task of the current period is the implementation of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR). This common objective forms the foundation of the strategic relationship among our organisations. It is a perspective that has been forged in struggle over more than seven decades. The character of this NDR is articulated in key policy documents such as the Freedom Charter and the Strategy and Tactics of the ANC, the strategic objective of which is the creation of a united, non-racial, non-sexist, prosperous and democratic society. 5 The primary task of this epoch is the creation of a national democratic society. All the classes and strata which share this objective, as well as the schools of thought found in the democratic movement, see this as their current strategic objective. There is one NDR, at the core of which is the liberation of black people in general and Africans in particular. Among these classes and strata, the working class is the leading social motive force. 6 Informed by this perspective, the Alliance needs regularly to assess progress in the implementation of the Reconstruction and Development Programme, and devise ways in which we can accelerate the programmes aimed at eradicating poverty, speeding up economic growth and job-creation and introducing equity in all areas of life.

DOMESTIC BALANCE OF FORCES 7 The Summit agreed that we were meeting in a period in which immense opportunities had opened up for us to accelerate the implementation of our programmes. 8 The ANC-led Alliance has consolidated critical elements of democracy and it enjoys mass support among the majority of South Africans. There is appreciation among the

Alliance Summit/April2002 l EKURHULENI DECLARATION PAGE 3 overwhelming majority – poor and rich, black and white, women and men, young and old, urban and rural, and persons of all religious persuasions – that further decisive steps need to be taken to improve the conditions of life of all the people, especially the poor. This is in the interest of South African society as a whole. 9 This period is characterised, too, by a creative examination across most sectors of society of the challenge to pool the country’s resources, both public and private, in the effort to grow our economy at a faster pace and further improve the material conditions of the country’s citizens. The possibility of decisive movement forward is also reflected in the fact that South Africans are increasingly joining hands to affirm our democratic constitutional order and to find ways in which they can make a contribution to national reconstruction and development. 10 However, these national objectives are hampered by the legacy of concentration of wealth in a few hands and, in some instances, the negative impact of the global financial system on the domestic economy. A combination of these and other factors, including problems of resources and capacity within the state, affect the pace at which we are able to eradicate the conditions of poverty, inequality, acquisition of skills, unemployment, crime, communicable diseases, including HIV/AIDS and other social ills. 11 Critically, we undertake the project of social change in a situation in which the dominant platforms of social discourse, including the media, either do not share or do not fully understand the objectives of the NDR. 12 Combined with weaknesses in the organisational structures of the Alliance and mass democratic formations, and the tension that gripped the Alliance in the recent period, all these factors can undermine our joint efforts to restructure South African society.

INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF FORCES 13 The Summit noted that positive developments had taken place in the global arena in the last few years, allowing for greater assertion of the agenda of developing countries and the poor worldwide. This is however counter-balanced by many unfavourable factors, which we need to continue to engage in the interest of social progress. 14 The system of global capitalism, including patterns of investment and trade, is deepening the gap between the rich and poor both within and among nations of the world; and there are intermittent financial crises whose negative effect is felt most keenly within developing countries. While the tendency among the rich nations (in addressing these serious global problems) is to tinker with the margins of the system, there is a growing global movement of developing countries, the working people and progressive elements in all parts of the globe whose voice is starting to make an impact. 15 We are also encouraged by the new confidence and determination across Africa to mobilise for the reconstruction and development of the continent, improve capacity to carry out such programmes, resolve conflicts, and introduce democratic systems of governance. While there may be difficulties in this trajectory, we are convinced that this historical movement is on the ascendancy. 16 We recognise our responsibility as the Alliance and the country to assist in strengthening the forces geared towards this objective. In this regard, it is our responsibly to ensure that the influence and respect that our country enjoys is put to good use in promoting development in our own country, in Africa and among developing countries. At the same time, we need to protect our nation and our state against strategies aimed at subverting our programme of social transformation, and undermining our independent approach to critical global issues.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l EKURHULENI DECLARATION PAGE 4 CONSOLIDATING THE ALLIANCE 17 The Alliance Summit approached its discussion on the character and state of the Alliance fully aware of the critical responsibility we have to lead the process of transformation in our country and contribute to the strengthening of efforts to build a humane world order. Unity, a sense of common purpose, the depth of understanding of our historical mission, activism, loyalty to the people – especially the poor – and commitment to international solidarity and joint action are some of the critical attributes that have placed the Alliance at the head of the forces of change in our country. 18 We are duty-bound by the realities of our history, the yearning of our people for a better life and the confidence that they have placed in the ANC and other components of the Alliance to ensure that these qualities continue to characterise the relationship among ourselves and our interaction with the motive forces of change, and with society at large. 19 In elaborating our detailed programmes of action and in managing tensions that may arise among us from time to time, the Alliance partners proceed from the premise that ours is a strategic political Alliance founded on a common national democratic programme. All organisations that are part of the Alliance accept the ANC as the leader of the Alliance.

MANAGING INTRA-ALLIANCE RELATIONS 20 Our organisations, though profoundly inter-dependent, are separate organisational formations with their own identities, policy-making mechanisms and internal organisational arrangements. In this regard, each component respects the independence of its allies. 21 The summit discussed a range of challenges emerging out of managing intra-Alliance relations. In general it was agreed that none of these challenges, including the question of multiple mandates and overlapping membership, pose insuperable problems to the effective management and consolidation of the Alliance. It is a source of strength for the Alliance that many members of one partner are also members of other components. 22 Having examined the causes and the impact of recent intense public discord among some components of the Alliance, the Summit concluded that this was an unfortunate development which we should not allow to recur. We do acknowledge that it would be artificial to expect that tensions would not exist among and even within components of the Alliance. The challenge is how we manage them within our constitutional structures, and use them as a catalyst for the growth and maturity of our organisations. 23 There are, of course, some areas of economic policy in which debate will continue within and among components of the Alliance. These nonetheless should not detract from the substantive areas of agreement on accelerating growth and development. Where there are areas of difference, we are committed to resolving them through ongoing constructive debate and engagement within the context of our Alliance.

POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION 24 It is agreed that the strategic mandate to all our organisations in the current phase derives from our commitment to the NDR as enshrined in the Freedom Charter and the Strategy and Tactics documents of the ANC. Further, the ANC governs on the basis of a broad mandate elaborated in the RDP and Election Manifesto. 25 The policies and programmes of the Alliance are aimed to give expression to these objectives. It is critical that the process of policy development and implementation is informed on an on-going basis by this collective endeavour. It is agreed that more consistent discussion in the Alliance and tighter co-ordination is important to give effect to our common programme of social transformation. The Summit has directed the leadership of the Alliance

Alliance Summit/April2002 l EKURHULENI DECLARATION PAGE 5 to develop effective mechanisms to achieve these objectives. Guidelines will be developed to align these policy processes in a way which enriches, and does not impede, the decision- making processes of government. 26 Having reflected on all these matters, the Summit has elaborated the following Programme of Action for the coming period.

PROGRAMME OF ACTION (POA): ACCELERATING GROWTH & DEVELOPMENT

Core Principles 27 This Alliance Summit has agreed on a comprehensive programme of action for accelerating growth and development. The core principles of this POA are: 27.1 Accelerating growth and development in our country is a central task of the NDR in the present phase; 27.2 This POA needs to build on, and help to foster, the unity in action of our democratic government and our mass popular constituency. The resources, capacity and authority of government and the energies and aspirations of millions of South Africans need to be harnessed together, now more than ever, for accelerated socio-economic transformation; 27.3 The success of our growth and development strategy depends critically on the unity and mass base of our ANC-led Alliance. At the same time, our growth and development vision will be widely canvassed with a view to winning support and commitment from the widest range of forces, both domestic and international. 27.4 The imperative of mainstreaming gender into all aspects of our growth and development strategy, since women are the most severely affected by the poverty and inequality in our society, and can play a crucial role in accelerating growth and development. A core feature of our programme of action is also addressing other marginalised sectors, such as the youth and the disabled. Towards a Growth and Development Summit 28 Over the coming months the Alliance will play an active role in ensuring the eventual success of the Growth and Development Summit announced by the President. The Alliance is committed to leading the process to ensure positive outcomes. The Alliance agrees that such a Summit should deal with a limited number of key issues, and should focus on concrete measures and specific contributions that each of the eventual participants (government, labour, business and other civil society organisations) will make to growth and development. This will be located within the framework of a broadly agreed development strategy which integrates our approach to key areas of policy, and may need to be pursued through sectoral summits. 29 Among the key issues that we agree should be considered for the Growth and Development Summit are:

§ Job creation, § Economic Restructuring § Investment, § Greater social equity, § Price stability, and § Improved economic efficiency and productivity.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l EKURHULENI DECLARATION PAGE 6 30 In the coming period, the Alliance will take forward the discussions and emerging agreements we have reached on these and other key issues, with a view to presenting unifying perspectives into the Summit. We will also set up processes and task teams, and engage the widest range of MDM and other progressive formations. This could culminate in a forum, convened by the Alliance, of broad MDM and progressive civil society formations, to create the broadest popular unity in advance of the Growth and Development Summit. 31 Our POA for accelerating growth and development is not confined to preparations for, and the eventual convening by government and NEDLAC of, a Growth and Development Summit. Indeed, the success of this Summit itself depends on the ongoing mobilisation of government and popular forces around the following key areas: 31.1 Employment a) The Summit agreed that addressing the serious problem of unemployment would have to be at the heart of the Growth and Development strategy. b) We will develop more comprehensive strategies for employment creation. These need to be supported by more detailed analysis of the patterns of employment, job losses, and opportunities for job creation. c) We will integrate the ILO concept of “decent work” into our programmes. d) We will also intensify short-term programmes of employment creation. 31.2 Economic Restructuring In order to restructure the economy the Alliance will continue to elaborate the framework for collective economic action, including intensifying the efforts to reorient various sectors of our economy onto an employment-generating growth path, inter alia through the tripartite sector summits involving government business and labour. 31.3 Investment a) The Alliance is committed to ensuring that the resources in the retirement industry, the life assurance industry, and other forms of savings, are more effectively mobilised for the provision of social and economic infrastructure, and labour-absorbing economic activities. b) We will carry these perspectives through to the Growth and Development Summit, and into the Finance Sector Summit. c) We will also actively use the presence of labour representatives on the boards of many of these funds to ensure the more effective strategic use of worker funds. 31.4 Skills and human resource development a) The Alliance agrees that there is the need to intensify human resource development. b) Specifically, in the area of skills development, we will ensure through government and through the trade union movement that there is increased participation and the much more effective mobilisation of the SETAs. SETAs represent a major potential asset in our POA for accelerated growth and development. 31.5 Co-operatives a) The Alliance will play an active role in helping to build a strong co-operative movement, as a means of promoting employment, redistribution and local and community empowerment. b) Government needs to create a facilitative and supportive environment for the growth of co-operatives.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l EKURHULENI DECLARATION PAGE 7 31.6 Spatial and local economic development a) We will give high priority to the acceleration of the implementation of policy on urban, rural and local economic development strategies. b) The implementation of this policy will be directly linked to the ongoing programmes of action of our Alliance local-level structures. 31.7 The struggle for a more equitable global economic and social order a) Our POA for accelerating growth and development within our own country is inextricably linked to the broader struggle for a more equitable global economic and social order. b) This includes the struggle for:

§ More equitable global governance of international capital flows § Equitable global governance of the international trade system § The campaign for the concept of global public goods § Changing the system of governance of the environment to ensure that the needs of the South are more effectively accommodated; and § The principle of multi-lateral agreements, as opposed to persisting trends to unilateralism. c) The Alliance and government will pursue these and other goals in our engagements with the IMF, World Bank, WTO, ILO, the UN, in our inputs into the WSSD, and in the numerous international forums and contacts in which each of our different formations is involved. d) In this regard the summit noted the critical importance of the NEPAD initiative, and agreed that briefings and discussions should be held within the Alliance on NEPAD and the African Union, in pursuit of African development. e) The convening of the WSSD and the summit of the African Union (AU) in our own country presents, in particular, an important challenge and opportunity. The Alliance will engage actively to maximise the impact of our strategic vision on the WSSD and the AU Summit. 31.8 Linking our Growth & Development POA to local level mobilisational campaigns a) All of the areas above link directly, in one way or another, to the local concerns and aspirations of communities. b) The Alliance will actively link our Growth and Development POA to ongoing mobilisational campaigns. In particular, we will link and strengthen the ANC-led letsema campaign in this way. c) There are also many other Alliance and MDM campaigns around jobs, poverty, transforming the financial sector, and HIV/AIDS. We will link and strengthen these campaigns within the broader context of the struggle for growth and development. 31.9 Strengthening the unity and organisational capacity of our Alliance structures a) The success of all of the above depends critically on the unity and organisational capacity of our Alliance structures. b) This Summit has re-affirmed key decisions to ensure greater regularity of Alliance leadership inter-action, at all levels. c) We have also committed ourselves to improving the co-ordination of Alliance policy development and implementation.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l EKURHULENI DECLARATION PAGE 8 CONCLUSION 32 The Alliance Summit has placed the challenge of economic growth, development, job creation and poverty eradication at the centre of the challenges we face in the current period. Many other issues including the challenge of social delivery, capacity of the state, HIV/AIDS and the struggle of the Palestinian people for self-determination were also reflected upon. A resolution on the Palestinian question was adopted (see document 6) 33 On the issue of HIV/AIDS, in particular, the Alliance reiterates its commitment to a comprehensive programme for prevention, treatment and home-based care, and recommitted itself to the ABC campaign. Further engagement is required on the detailed aspects of the treatment component of this programme. 34 This Summit of the Alliance marks an important stage in the consolidation of the organised forces at the head of the NDR. We are at one that significant progress has been made since the last Alliance Summit, including the overwhelming victory of the ANC in both the national and local government elections and the growing role of South Africa in world affairs. However, as the Summit discussions and decisions have confirmed, many challenges remain. 35 In the coming weeks and months, we will be briefing our structures at all levels, about the discussions and outcomes of this Alliance Summit. Strengthened by our deliberations over these past five days, we will be mobilising all our forces and our broader constituency to ensure that there is a decisive acceleration of growth and development in our country.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l EKURHULENI DECLARATION PAGE 9 - 3 - CONSOLIDATED REPORT OF COMMISSION DISCUSSIONS THE NDR, BALANCE OF FORCES AND BUILDING THE ALLIANCE

INTRODUCTION 1 This report summarises discussion in all six commissions on the NDR, Balance of Forces and Building the Alliance. The comprehensive commission reports will form part of post-summit background information for utilisation at various levels of the Alliance. 2 The discussion document on “The NDR and Balance of Forces” (save for the issues flagged in this report and comments submitted by COSATU and SANCO) broadly captures the approach of the Alliance to these issues. However, all the Commissions agreed that the Discussion Document on “Building the Alliance” contained substantive issues on which there was no agreement*. 3 The discussions in all the commissions were informed by the commitment to ensure that the common strategic outlook of the Alliance on the NDR informs both our assessment of the balance of forces and the programme of the Alliance.

THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 4 All components of the Alliance agree that the primary task of the current period is the implementation of the NDR. This common objective is the strategic political and ideological foundation of the Alliance. The character of the NDR is articulated in key policy documents such as the Freedom Charter and the Strategy and Tactics documents of the ANC. 5 This characterisation is underpinned by the following key issues: 5.1 The NDR seeks to overcome the deep-seated legacy of apartheid by creating a united, non- racial, non-sexist, prosperous and democratic society. 5.2 At the core of the NDR is the liberation of black people in general and Africans in particular, and these therefore constitute the motive forces of the NDR. 5.3 Critical to the NDR is the fundamental altering of apartheid property relations. The NDR is not simply aimed at replacing a ruling white elite with a black elite. It is aimed at changing the material reality of apartheid colonialism, to change the conditions under which the majority of our people live. 5.4 The working class is the leading social motive force of the NDR. 5.5 The ANC is the unifying embodiment of the collective of organised forces that seek to resolve the national contradictions within South African society. It is, for this reason, the leader of the NDR, and leader of the Tripartite Alliance. 6 The NDR is aimed at building a national democracy. Socialists take part in the NDR because, in their view, this is the key national task facing us, and this project creates the most conducive conditions for socialism. The current task of socialists and non-socialists alike is the creation of a national democratic society.

* Two draft discussion documents were presented to the plenary of the Summit as a basis for debate: ‘The NDR and the Balance of Forces’ and ‘Building the Alliance’. Cosatu submitted substantive comments and redrafts of both; these were distributed to all delegates. SANCO also prepared a document for the summit reflecting on all the draft discussion documents. The SANCO document too was distributed to delegates. None of these documents have been included in this report, since they were inputs to, rather than outcomes of, the Alliance Summit. The Ekurhuleni Declaration and consolidated reports of commission are the Summit outcomes. Nevertheless, comrades wishing to obtain these documents should contact the relevant organisation.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l COMMISSION REPORTS PAGE 10 BALANCE OF FORCES 7 All components of the Alliance agree that regular review of the balance of forces is critical in determining the programmes that the Alliance needs embark on to attain the objectives of the NDR. Our task as revolutionaries is to constantly struggle to shift the balance of forces. 8 The Summit agrees that the balance of forces within SA has shifted fundamentally in favour of the forces of change, since the democratic breakthrough of 1994. Currently, many factors allow for decisive movement forward in implementing the objectives of the NDR. These include the following: 8.1 The ANC-led Alliance has consolidated critical elements of political power, and it is in a position to transform the state in the interest of all the people, and to use state power to introduce socio-economic programmes to the benefit primarily of the poor 8.2 The ANC-led Alliance enjoys mass support among the majority of South Africans, on account both of its transformation programmes and its programme of mass mobilisation 8.3 The programme of social transformation reflected in the RDP and Freedom Charter enjoys hegemony within South African society and insignificant forces openly challenge its essence 8.4 The democratic state and the motive forces control huge resources, or have the potential to do so, in the form of the fiscus, state capital and “social capital” including pension and provident funds 8.5 Business forces have different perspectives about the agenda they wish to pursue, and important sections are becoming sensitive to the threat which our social and economic problems pose to their interests. 8.6 Political representatives of the forces opposed to change have not developed a coherent and effective strategy to challenge the direction of social transformation 9 However, there are also negative features that need to be confronted, including the following: 9.1 The nature of the apartheid economic structure we inherited is such that a few conglomerates control major sectors of the economy; and combined with the operation of financial markets, these forces have attempted to destabilise and redirect the programme of economic change 9.2 Critical sectors of the means of public discourse, including the media and the cultural sector are either owned, or controlled in terms of editorial content by, forces which do not share or understand the objectives of the NDR 9.3 The conditions of poverty, inequality and unemployment – the eradication of which is a complex and protracted process – as well as the HIV/AIDS pandemic, weigh heavily particularly on the poor 9.4 The combination of weak structures of the Alliance and the divisions that have manifested themselves particularly in the recent past have weakened the capacity of the motive forces to take full charge of the process of change 10 While the international balance of forces is less favourable than the domestic balance, positive developments have taken place in the latter half of the 1990s allowing for greater assertion of the agenda of developing countries and the poor worldwide: 10.1 The difficulties faced by the global system of capitalism, including the growing gap between rich and poor within developed countries, and the occasional crashes of financial markets have created a basis for a re-examination of the “virtues” of unbridled market capitalism. However, the tendency in many instances is to tinker with the margins of the system in the interest of the rich. 10.2 The impact of global capitalism on the developing countries and the growing united voice against this afford progressive forces worldwide the space to posit new approaches to the global financial architecture and trade regimes. However, much more work needs to be done to unite developing countries around a different agenda. 10.3 There is a growing international movement against the rampant effects of global capitalism. However, the character of some of the forces campaigning against unbridled global capitalism

Alliance Summit/April2002 l COMMISSION REPORTS PAGE 11 and the counter-strategies of rightwing forces have the potential to undermine this movement, if this international terrain is not given direction by the democratic forces. 10.4 South Africa enjoys respect across the globe both for the nature of our programme of social transformation and the quality of interventions we are able to make on critical world matters. However, as a small open economy in the global sense, we are subjected to negative market dynamics and deliberate strategies to undermine our influence. 10.5 A new confidence and determination is emerging across Africa to mobilise for the reconstruction and development of the continent. However, capacity to implement these programmes is limited in many countries, many conflicts remain unresolved and the progressive movement in Africa is weak. 11 The constraints listed above, however, are not fixed. They are subject to ongoing contestation and mobilisation by ourselves, and other progressive forces. We therefore should adopt approaches which strengthen our capacity to engage. 12 What then are the challenges emerging from this characterisation of the NDR and the assessment of the balance of forces? 13 The Alliance needs to sharpen its tools of analysis of balance of forces, and how systematically to shift this balance in favour of social change. This should include an assessment of the impact of globalisation on the nation-state and our own democratic state in particular. 14 The Alliance, having analysed the balance of forces, needs to collectively assess how to move forward, and whether tactical shifts are required to deal with particular obstacles to the NDR. 15 At a strategic level, the challenge is to consolidate democratic control and use to maximum effect the various levers of power in order to accelerate change, and contribute to building a movement for a humane world order. This includes: 15.1 Utilisation of such instruments as social capital, the fiscus, parastatals, worker’s provident funds, trade union investments and co-operatives to speed up economic growth, job-creation and poverty-eradication. 15.2 Deepening and broadening democracy, in the implementation of people-centred and people- driven programmes, among others by improving our work in the legislatures and the state in general. At the core of this approach should be the mobilisation of the people to be actively involved in the programme of change. 15.3 Strengthening all components of the Alliance and re-building the MDM and ensuring that we give leadership to all the motive forces in active struggle for fundamental change. 15.4 Winning over other sectors of South African society, including the white community, behind a programme aimed at improving our economy, deepening democracy, eradicating poverty and ensuring safety and security for all South African citizens. 15.5 Briefings and discussions should be held within the Alliance on NEPAD and the African Union. This should be done with the view to consolidating the movement of progressive forces across Africa in order to mobilise for the implementation of programmes to reconstruct and develop the continent. 15.6 Consolidating alliances worldwide around the programme of poverty-eradication and development, and in pursuit of peace and humane world order. Alliance partners need to play an active role in various international fora together with other progressive forces. BUILDING THE ALLIANCE 16 The major issues discussed by commissions under this topic were:

§ The character of the Alliance; § Managing the challenges that arise out of intra-Alliance relations; § Strengthening the co-ordinating structures of the Alliance; § The role of the Alliance in policy development and implementation; and § Developing a common Alliance programme of mobilisation.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l COMMISSION REPORTS PAGE 12 17 Character of the Alliance 17.1 Commissions re-affirmed the broad perspectives of the discussion document characterising our Alliance. The Alliance is a political alliance founded on a common national democratic programme, based on the ideals of the Freedom Charter, and programmatically elaborated in the ANC’s strategy and tactics. All organisations that are part of the Alliance accept that the ANC is the leader of the Alliance. The Alliance consists of separate and independent organisations, with their own objectives, identities, policy-making mechanisms and internal arrangements. Each component respects the independence of its allies. The components are united, nonetheless, by their common commitment to a single NDR. 17.2 SANCO is participating fully in this Summit, and it has been involved in many Alliance structures and processes over many years. SANCO shall continue participating in the Alliance structures at all levels. However, the exact status of SANCO within the Alliance requires further clarification. The secretariat of the tripartite and the secretariat of SANCO must take this process forward, including the role of the Alliance to give political leadership to the entire MDM formations. 18 Managing challenges that arise out of intra-Alliance relations In general, commissions agreed that a variety of challenges, including multiple mandates, do not and should not present insuperable problems either to the effective management and consolidation of the Alliance, or to the independence of our separate formations. The perspectives elaborated in the discussion documents, and the lessons we have learnt over the last period, should be taken forward across the Alliance and, where more appropriate, within our individual formations. 19 Strengthening the co-ordinating structures of the Alliance 19.1 It was noted that there have been serious problems in the operation of the Alliance. It was agreed that the Alliance should not be reduced to crisis management mode, or to an electoral machine, and that it needs to proactively drive the transformation process. Managing intra- Alliance challenges can be greatly facilitated if there are effective and regular meetings of leading Alliance structures. Our previous agreement was that :

§ The Alliance secretariat should meet twice a month; § The extended secretariat plus Presidency should meet monthly; § The officials should meet every two months; § The Ten-a-Side should meet twice yearly; and § There should be one Alliance Summit annually. 19.2 This constitutes a framework within which we should endeavour to ensure consistency and regularity of Alliance meetings. We should also ensure that the Alliance co-ordinates effectively at all levels – provincial, regional and local- and that we establish these structures where they don’t exist. 20 Alliance Programme and role in policy development and implementation 20.1 It is agreed that Alliance involvement in policy development and implementation is of critical importance for taking forward the NDR and ensuring effective governance. It is also agreed that there are many challenges and shortcomings in this area, including on how best to co- ordinate this policy development and implementation. The structured mechanism, co- ordinated by the Alliance Office Bearers, will oversee this question. There is agreement that the Alliance has a critical role to play in policy development and implementation, and needs to develop a comprehensive programme in this regard. 20.2 The structured mechanism above should determine the modalities of these interactions; and develop guidelines and protocols on how to deal with these matters of Alliance co-ordination on policy questions. 21 Developing a common Alliance programme of mobilisation Commissions agreed that, in addressing the challenge of building the Alliance, we should increasingly move away from simply managing difficulties towards placing much greater emphasis on

Alliance Summit/April2002 l COMMISSION REPORTS PAGE 13 developing a common Alliance programme of mobilisation of the motive forces of the NDR. It was noted that, in recent years, our Alliance has often functioned most effectively during electoral campaigns. We need to build on this experience, and more effectively mobilise also for social and economic transformation. In doing this, we need to strengthen each other’s existing campaigns (for example the ANC’s letsema campaign), and we need, increasingly, to relate our campaigns to the challenge of accelerating growth and development, and to local level transformation. 22 The Alliance secretariat must take this work forward.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l COMMISSION REPORTS PAGE 14 - 4 - CONSOLIDATED REPORT OF COMMISSION DISCUSSIONS ACCELERATING GROWTH & DEVELOPMENT INTRODUCTION 1 It was agreed that the discussion of economic policy provided by the Summit was a historic opportunity. The Summit gave the opportunity for the Alliance to lead the country forward. This is an important step in our joint objective to accelerate growth and development. 2 The Summit considered a discussion document. There is general agreement that the document, “Accelerating Growth and Development” (see document 5) constitutes a basis for moving forward and the Summit raised a number of issues that are reported on here. We have agreed the processes to take these issues forward toward a Growth and Development Summit. 3 Comprehensive discussions were held in the commissions, and a report on these dealt with in the Plenary. The six commissions dealt with different matters, but all of them addressed four common questions. 4 In the section on general conclusions below, we summarise the responses of the commissions to the four common questions put to them. Secondly we identify important areas of agreement and further debate that arose in the commissions. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 5 Following the conclusion of commission discussions, the Summit considered and endorsed the following general conclusions in plenary: 5.1 There is general agreement that the document ‘Accelerating Growth and Development’ (see document 5) constitutes a basis for moving forward. A number of commissions identified areas where the analysis needed to be strengthened. Particularly important is the extent and nature of the unemployment crisis and the need for decent work as a focus of policy. All commissions felt that this was not adequately addressed in the document and needs to be elaborated. Other matters raised are set out below. The proposals contained generally form a basis to move forward. The headings in Appendix One of the Document (A Summary of Government’s Microeconomic Reform Programme) define the issues to be dealt with. These and additional issues that can be raised require further discussion as do the issues raised by COSATU in Appendix Two to the discussion document. 5.2 There was agreement on the need for a Growth and Development Summit (GDS). The commissions supported the areas for the summit to address and the process toward it that is outlined is acceptable. The Summit agreed on the need for a process for ongoing Alliance discussions, in order to develop a common Alliance position prior to the GDS. In addition, the Alliance should mobilise the broadest range of social forces in support of its position. At the point where the formal engagement with business, labour and communities begins the process would be dealt with by government through NEDLAC. FURTHER AREAS OF AGREEMENT 6 The Summit discussed and endorsed the following further areas of agreement. 6.1 Employment a) The need to develop more comprehensive strategies for employment creation was emphasised. These need to be supported by more detailed analysis of the patterns of employment, job losses, and opportunities for job creation. b) It was agreed that the ILO’s concept of decent work should be integrated by concrete actions into our programme to accelerate growth and development.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l COMMISSION REPORTS PAGE 15 c) Short-term programmes of employment creation must be intensified. 6.2 Investment a) There is general agreement on the need to mobilise resources in the retirement industry, the life assurance industry, and other forms of savings, towards

§ Provision of social and economic infrastructure, and

§ Labour-absorbing economic activities. b) Towards this end, many proposals such as prescribed assets and targeted investments were tabled. However, this is a matter that will need to be taken forward to define the mechanism to do this effectively. There was general agreement that the structure of the financial sector is in need of transformation. 6.3 Skills and human resource development a) There is agreement on the need to intensify human resource development. b) In the area of skills, the need to increase participation and the effective mobilisation of the SETAs was stressed. 6.4 Co-operatives a) There is a compelling need to build a strong co-operative movement, as a means of promoting employment, redistribution and local and community empowerment. It is therefore important that the Alliance should take a leading role in promoting such a movement. b) Government should create a facilitative and supportive environment for the growth of co- operatives. 6.5 Spatial and local economic development It was agreed that high priority be given to the acceleration of the implementation of policy on urban, rural and local economic development strategies. It is this that will have an immediate and direct impact on the lives of our people. 6.6 Global governance a) The Summit endorsed the active engagement by the Alliance and government, to bring about a more equitable global social order. This would enhance and support accelerated growth and development for the South. b) To this end, our engagements within and with the IMF, World Bank, WTO, ILO, and UN, and our inputs into the WSSD, should be directed to a concrete programme of action to achieve the goal of global equity. 6.7 Gender The Summit stressed the challenge of mainstreaming gender into all aspects of our growth and development strategy, since women often are the most severely affected by the poverty and inequality in our society, and can play a crucial role in accelerating growth and development. AREAS OF FURTHER ANALYSIS AND POLICY CLARIFICATION 7 A number of additional areas were identified where joint work should be done. Among these are:

§ Role of and transformation of the state and developing the capacity to place it at the centre of economic development. § The nature of capital and its role in the transformation. § The informal sector 8 Some of the theoretical concepts and formulations in the document need to be more rigorous, need to be debated and a common expression found where possible. 9 There is general agreement on the need to improve our statistics base and capacity to evaluate and monitor the effectiveness of interventions.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l COMMISSION REPORTS PAGE 16 - 5 - ALLIANCE SUMMIT DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ACCELERATING GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION 1 This document does not represent the position of the Alliance or any of its components. It is merely intended to provide a basis for debate at the forthcoming Alliance Summit. The aim is to set out a suggested Alliance approach to the economy and define areas of consensus as well as provide a solid foundation for further debate at the Summit. 2 Our approach aims to accelerate growth and development in the context of a longer-term perspective through to 2014. This approach builds on policies implemented up to now, but makes critical adjustments designed to raise the rate of growth, employment creation and development, narrowing inequalities in incomes and wealth as well as geographic social and economic disparities. This requires an integrated action plan that focuses on: 2.1 Intense efforts to develop our human resources and technology capacity 2.2 Enhancing the quality and accessibility of infrastructure 2.3 Strengthening our growth sectors in the context of a stronger knowledge economy 2.4 Substantially improving support for SMMEs, especially co-ops 2.5 Black Economic Empowerment and addressing inequalities in race, gender and geographic location. To achieve these aims, we will ensure more integrated and responsive economic policies, backed by improved monitoring and evaluation. 3 The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) constitutes the foundation of our programmes for the economic and social reform. It has shaped the first phase of the transformation, and will continue to undergird our approach to economic change. In 1996 the government introduced a macroeconomic programme – the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) program. This was essentially a macroeconomic stabilisation program. A lack of agreement on the GEAR policy caused significant tensions in the Alliance. These tensions need to be overcome if our strategy to accelerate growth and development is to be successfully implemented. 4 We propose that our strategy reflect a concrete analysis of the obstacles to growth and employment creation. For this reason, we start with a section on the historic challenges facing the democratic movement in restructuring the economy. We address some of the basic ideas for accelerating growth and development, and then look at some proposals for the Growth and Development Summit. In Appendix 1, we describe the current micro-economic reform programme announced by President Mbeki, and in Appendix 2 we outline the issues that COSATU believes should be discussed in order to reach agreement on our basic economic framework. OUR EXCEPTIONAL OPPORTUNITY 5 Our world is one in which the system of capitalism enjoys dominant sway over virtually the entire globe. But it is a world too in which the agenda of the working people and developing nations must find creative expression in pursuit of a humane, just and equitable world order. The world economy is in the midst of a major technological revolution, with information and communications technology

Alliance Summit/April2002 l DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT PAGE 17 (ICT) at the forefront of profound changes in production and distribution processes in all sectors. At the same time, the globalisation of economic relations is narrowing time and space among nations. In this context, the realities of inequality, poverty and under-development become more obvious and demanding of action in favour of justice and equity. The acute challenges of marginalisation and social exclusion associated with globalisation pose particularly severe challenges. 6 This volatile and globalising world presents South Africa with both opportunities and challenges. The opportunities arise from the possibility of engaging with the global economy in ways that enhance incomes and employment for our people. The challenges arise from the risk of being marginalised. 7 Within these realities, to ensure that the balance of forces favours our people, we need the maximum unity in action that is represented by our revolutionary Alliance, led by the African National Congress, and including the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions. This historic Alliance represents the organisational expression of the combination of motive forces in whose common interest sustained transformation is pursued. Ours is a powerful political movement that is capable of liberating the society from its past. This Alliance offers not only organisational strength but is also the key to mobilising a progressive alliance of the most significant class forces in society that can sustain economic and social reform. 8 It is only the maintenance of the cohesion of those progressive classes and fragments of classes under the leadership of the ANC and the Alliance that will enable us to direct the power of the international capitalist system toward development and equity in our political economy. Any division of these forces will weaken us and throw us onto the tides of globalisation, which can only benefit the economically powerful. In comparison to the majority of developing countries, the progressive forces in South Africa are favourably placed to achieve this historic opportunity and we must not squander it. Furthermore, the Alliance and the strength of the ANC as a popular movement are central to our ability to engage in the struggle for a more equitable global economy. The unity of the Alliance is fundamental to our ability to counter the all to often destructive effects of the markets and the power of unregulated capital. 9 The democratic breakthrough of 1994 heralded a historic departure from the vicious economic cycle of stagnation inherited from apartheid, and created a bridgehead for the fundamental transformation of the economy in favour of the formerly oppressed. In the recent past, shifting objective conditions and the role that both the democratic state and the democratic movement have played have resulted in circumstances that create the potential for a further shift of the balance of forces in favour of the NDR. At this moment, therefore, the unity in action of the Alliance is of critical importance. THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY 10 Since the democratic breakthrough in 1994 South Africa has grappled with a complex set of social, economic and political challenges. Historically, capitalism in South Africa was deeply conditioned by the imperatives of colonialism and apartheid, described by Colonialism of a Special Type. We can understand the resulting economic structure in terms of the nature of production, markets, spatial development and classes. Specifically: 10.1 Production structure: Dependence on mineral exports and an industrial strategy based on import-substitution industrialisation. This economy relied on cheap unskilled labour, limited the ability of the economy to create jobs, and fostered inequality in incomes and wealth. It meant that value chains were weak, necessitating imports of manufactures, especially capital goods. 10.2 Markets: Production of minerals largely for export and manufactures for the domestic high- income group, with little focus on supplying the basic needs of the poor. Low wages for the majority of workers meant a limited domestic market. 10.3 Spatial development: Vast disparities in economic, political and social terms between “homeland” areas and the “RSA,” and little economic integration within southern Africa. 10.4 Class structures: Capital was mainly in the hands of a few large, white-owned mining and financial houses, supported by the state through the repression of black workers, protectionism and high tariffs and parastatals. White-owned commercial agricultural also depended on a huge array of state supports. South Africa enjoyed high levels of foreign investment compared to the

Alliance Summit/April2002 l DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT PAGE 18 rest of Africa, particularly in mining, banking and parts of manufacturing. But it also had one of the most unequal distributions of income and wealth in the world. 11 This historical growth path began to fall apart from the mid-1980s. On the one hand, gold mining faced stagnant prices and rising costs. On the other, mass opposition by the people led to substantial capital flight. Then, after 1989, the rapid opening of the economy undermined local production in many areas, notably clothing and equipment, although it opened the door to exports for a few sectors. The result was pervasive economic weakness, especially after the debt standstill in 1985 – essentially a response by international banks to the 1984 uprising – led to a sharp drop in parastatal investment. 12 By 1994 South Africa’s economy was already in an advanced state of decline due to the effects of political and economic isolation and inward-looking economic policies (there is a debate on this particular point) and the legacy of racial exclusion. The weak state of the economy manifested itself in stagnant GDP growth until 1994, declining savings and investment rates, falling formal sector employment, a declining per capita GDP, and external vulnerability due to insufficient capital inflows and an unattractive investment climate. 13 This economic weakness resulted in declining living standards, high levels of racial, gender and geographical inequality, and high levels of absolute poverty. 14 In essence, the RDP aimed to address these problems by: 14.1 Prioritising government spending on infrastructure and services for the poor, including large- scale social service and public works programmes that can provide a basic income to households. Overall, this strategy would help equalise incomes as well as improve living standards. Higher productivity would result from improved education, health and security, as well as from the opportunities provided for home-based production by municipal infrastructure. At the same time, the strategy would enhance the domestic market for basic necessities, such as housing and food, providing a stimulus to investment. 14.2 Establishing an active industrial strategy to restructure production and ownership in order to enhance employment as well as growth and investment. The strategy would have to build on our strength in mining but aim for diversification and stronger domestic value chains. In the process, it would have to shift production to relatively labour-intensive sectors, based on consultation with organised business and labour and supported by well-defined government measures, including the allocation of infrastructure and massive investment in skills development. At the same time, it would grow production of both wage goods and services, in order to raise living standards and cut labour costs, and exports. Sectors that could meet these objectives include tourism, agriculture and food processing as well as other light industry; projects up- and downstream from mining; and public and private services. 14.3 Supporting new centres of capital and enhancing the access of the majority to productive assets and skills. Potential new centres of capital include small and micro businesses, the parastatals, which have historically played a leading role in developing industry, as well as producer co-ops. The expansion of labour-intensive sectors is critical to achieve these aims, as is the land reform programme. 14.4 Consistently strengthening democracy in both the state and the economy. That means ensuring a more open and responsive bureaucracy and generally more open policy processes, based on the development of appropriate consultative structures. In the absence of these democratic structures, the dominant centres of capital will otherwise block efforts to improve the position of the historically disadvantaged. 15 Since 1994, government has implemented these policies with varying degrees of success. The institutional and policy frameworks in which the economy operates have been fundamentally transformed. Furthermore, despite institutional bottlenecks, the RDP’s ambitious social and economic infrastructure roll-out programmes were to a large extent implemented, resulting in substantial improvements in access to infrastructure and services, including housing, water, sanitation, electricity and telephony, amongst others.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT PAGE 19 16 Certainly the institutional obstacles to the roll out of RDP programmes, especially in public works and the major social services, were underestimated. The shortcomings of government systems were aggravated by the failure of the Alliance generally to mobilise social forces in a creative unity in action with the state, hampering the potential for change. In the words of the ANC’s NGC: “We have made progress in setting up state institutions that can act as instruments of change and we have established policy frameworks that give direction to these instruments. However, we have failed to mobilise the motive forces around these programmes and they have not been empowered to engage with these instruments. This is a major cause for concern, especially since the affluent are well placed to engage with and influence government policy processes.” 17 Furthermore, the ANC government faced some difficult choices in its first six years and it had to make tough decisions in a challenging environment. This has included meeting the challenges posed by integration with a globalising world, while at the same time building a democratic and accountable state capable of meeting the challenge of reconstruction and development. 18 In 1994-’96, government cut tariffs in terms of the agreement with the WTO; replaced subsidies aimed at stimulating exports and growth in the “homelands” (the GEIS and RIDP) with supply-side measures designed to raise productivity at enterprise level; introduced a much stronger regime to enforce competition policy and set up new institutions to support small and micro enterprise; began to equalise major social services and infrastructure between communities; and initiated modern labour laws, bringing progressive labour rights to the majority of South African workers for the first time, and rapidly reducing labour conflict. In addition, the reform of agricultural support institutions and legislation was begun, together with a programme of land reform and restitution. 19 Government implemented a macroeconomic reform programme in an effort to stabilise major macroeconomic aggregates. It led to a reduced fiscal deficit, ended the financial rand and improved competitiveness (although some would debate this view). Inflation and real interest rates declined. Monetary policy shifted towards inflation targeting. Government reduced its debt, which it argued constrained our capacity for socio-economic delivery and increased our vulnerability to volatility in international capital markets. This affected social spending in real terms in the late 1990s. Now with reduced debt, falling inflation and interest rates, real increases in government spending have become possible. 20 The government embarked on a programme of restructuring state assets. It adopted the RDP guidelines that in “restructuring the public sector to carry out national goals, the balance of evidence will guide the decision for or against various economic policy measures. The democratic government must therefore consider:

§ increasing the public sector in strategic areas through, for example, nationalisation, purchasing a shareholding in companies, establishing new public corporations or joint ventures with the private sector, and

§ reducing the public sector in certain areas in ways that enhance efficiency, advance affirmative action and empower the historically disadvantaged, while ensuring the protection of both consumers and the rights and employment of workers.” (para 4.2.5) 21 Debates arose with labour, and in 1996 the NFA was negotiated. It aimed to facilitate negotiations with organised labour where restructuring would affect ownership. Nonetheless, the actual programmes of restructuring have caused debate. 22 New legislation and an institutional framework for skills development have been implemented, although there appears to be a failure on the part of firms to access funds for training. 23 In terms of the results, on the positive side, we have seen: 23.1 A rapid expansion in exports, with a shift toward higher value added and greater regional diversification. Raw and refined minerals now make up only just over half of total exports. 23.2 Labour productivity also rose substantially, and informal employment expanded, although the figures are somewhat debatable. Labour unrest has declined greatly compared to the years before 1994.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT PAGE 20 23.3 The level of skills in the population and the workforce is now considerably higher than it was even ten years ago. Some 72 per cent of people aged 15 to 35 have some secondary school, compared to around 51 per cent for those over 35. 23.4 Government debt and debt costs have declined, releasing funds for social and economic programmes. 24 On the negatives, we have seen: 24.1 At best slow employment growth and a shift to informal employment. Given the growth in the labour force, this has brought a steep rise in unemployment, especially amongst the youth – ironically, the most educated segment of the workforce. Moreover, the formal sector has probably lost jobs; and the new jobs in the informal sector have typically paid far less. In 2000, some 60 per cent of informal jobs paid less than R500 a month, compared to 11 per cent of formal jobs. 24.2 Inadequate and cyclical economic growth. This was associated with investment at under 20 per cent of the GDP – far too low to bring about rapid growth. Moreover, the investment rate declined in the late 1990s, after an increase in the first five years of democracy. In 2000, investment reached its lowest point since 1993. 25 Portfolio investment – that is, foreign financial investment in stocks and bonds – has made up the bulk of foreign investment. Still, where foreign companies have invested in production, their holdings have been of a high quality. Concerns have been raised about the listing overseas of some major South African companies. 26 There is no doubt that the cost of the restructuring has been felt particularly acutely by the poorest of the poor. A particular problem for labour has been the loss of formal jobs, which directly affects workers and, more broadly, virtually all the very poor, who ultimately depend on their wages for a significant share of their income. The ANC government aimed to redirect social services to meet the needs of the poor, but given the backlogs caused by apartheid and the limits on government spending, it has not always been possible to offer even a basic social safety net for all South Africans. 27 Of course, there has not been agreement within the Alliance on the measures taken. This has been partly due to genuine policy differences, but also to the fact that we have not managed the Alliance as well as we could have. 28 We can spend a lot of time debating whether the GEAR was necessary or appropriate, and whether the negatives outweigh the positives. We are now eight years into the democratic dispensation and all of us agree that it is imperative that we accelerate fundamental and sustained impact on the structures of the economy that we inherited from apartheid. TOWARD ACCELERATED GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 29 The following would be the essential elements we would envisage for the structure of the political economy in 2014: South Africa will have an adaptive economy characterized by high levels of growth, rapidly increasing employment and greater social and economic equity and integration, built on improved skills levels, broader ownership of productive assets, appropriate urban and rural development strategies, and improved access to basic services and infrastructure for workers and the self-employed. 30 The requirements to realise this vision include the following. All these dimensions are capable of more precise definition and measurement as to whether we are getting closer to them as the next years go by: 30.1 An increase in overall level of social and productive investment, within an appropriate spatial strategy 30.2 Increased social equity and reduced inequality based on

§ Reduced unemployment and underemployment, with rising skill levels § Improved and expanded social services and infrastructure in poor communities § Black Economic Empowerment

Alliance Summit/April2002 l DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT PAGE 21 30.3 More equitable ownership of agricultural land and productive capital, with an established co-op movement, and a greater diversity of enterprise type and size 30.4 An integrated manufacturing economy capable of high degrees of value added 30.5 An extensive ICT and logistics system capable of speed and flexibility, and a high degree of knowledge and technology capacity. 30.6 Improved public participation in the process of development and governance 30.7 An efficient, strong and responsive state structure 30.8 People who are skilled, informed and adaptable citizens 31 Achieving these objectives will take a number of years, and in different phases our policies and actions will have different emphases. Our policies must have real results, and accordingly a critical task is to develop a greater capacity to measure and monitor. Our progress cannot remain abstract. It has to be discernable in the changing structure of the economy and the lives of its people. 32 Our proposals here accord with the basic structure of the RDP – that is, a people-centred approach; meeting basic needs; developing our human resources; restructuring and rebuilding the economy; democratising the institutions of the political economy and achieving a high degree of coordination in governance within an overall macroeconomic balance. TOWARD A GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT SUMMIT 33 To meet these challenges demands that we mobilise and unite political, social and economic resources behind concrete programmes for growth and development. There is ample international evidence of the comparative advantage that clear agreements between government, business, labour and other civil society formations can afford countries that seek to drive growth and development. The challenge of realising our exceptional possibility for sustained economic and social transformation in a globalising world is essentially the challenge of building unity of purpose, and in action around growth and development 34 This is the context in which the proposed Growth and Development Summit will take place. The President has announced that there will be a Growth and Development Summit this year. Government, business, labour and other civil society organisations have welcomed this announcement and believe the summit could be an important moment in terms of these agreements, as they could be put in place in the run up to the summit or proceeding from it. 35 Such a summit should deal with a limited number of key issues rather than attempt to address the broad spectrum of government policy. The following areas are proposed as a basis for further debate within the Alliance. The specific content of any agreements obviously requires much further discussion. The specifics alluded to here are intended for illustrative purposes only. 35.1 Investment 35.1.1 Government has already committed to large increases in capital expenditure. This could be augmented through agreements on investment. For example, investment locally can be increased by business foregoing the increase in short-term earnings that can be made by investing offshore or in equities alone and investing in infrastructure, skills development and training and in venture capital projects for a longer-term return. An agreement on this would ensure that a proportion of pension and provident fund money is allocated to match government investment in infrastructure and in BEE, for instance. These investments could be co-ordinated around the rural and urban development strategies. We should also consider ways to use bonds to raise money for municipalities. We need also to look at how these proposals relate to the negotiations in the lead up to the Financial Sector Summit. 35.1.2 In addition, the question of mobilisation around infrastructure roll out and maintenance, for example building on the ANC’s Letsema campaign, requires further discussion and elaboration. 35.2 Promoting collective economic action

Alliance Summit/April2002 l DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT PAGE 22 35.2.1 In order to restructure the economy, the Alliance needs to take seriously the promotion of collective economic action. This can focus on different aspects of the economy, such as sectors and value addition chains. We need to develop tripartite processes to establish common strategies and actions to achieve growth, value addition, employment and improved equity. The state must play a leading role in dynamising such processes. The Growth and Development Summit could set a framework for these types of processes, to ensure that taken together they restructure the economy. 35.2.2 In this context, COSATU sees sector summits as particularly useful and important. 35.3 Job creation 35.3.1 Apart from the aspect of creating a climate for investment and other measures to ensure private sector job creation, government could create jobs directly through labour intensive infrastructure and service development programs. To achieve this it will require agreement on the nature of benefits for those involved, including allowances and skills, for instance along the lines of the Working for Water campaign. Projects could include ABET, home care for people with AIDS and other diseases, childcare and safety and security. 35.3.2 The use of labour-based methods should be revisited and reinforced. The approach to rural employment and the role that business and labour can play is a matter that requires analysis. The rapid implementation of the learnership program is a form of employment and income redistribution that could deliver quick results. 35.4 Greater social equity The Growth and Development Summit should help mobilise stakeholders to contribute more to programmes to improve basic social services and infrastructure as well as social security and other strategies that contribute to improved economic and social equity. Social security and basic services should be redesigned to maximise the impact on economic growth and employment as well as improving living standards. 35.5 Price Stability / Inflation. 35.5.1 This requires us to address the pricing practices of both the public and private sectors as the structure of our economy changes. The origins of price increases must be examined and dealt with in the context of increased productivity and competitiveness of the economy. In particular the prices of basic consumer commodities and inputs have to be assessed. 35.5.2 Systematic use of supply-side measures, improved efficiency in retail and government programmes to ensure price stability for basic wage goods, above all basic foods, can help hold down labour costs while improving labour standards for the poor. Key programmes include measures to ensure affordable maize, transport, housing and healthcare. 35.5.3 While external pressures – especially the depreciation of the rand – and concentrated markets are now the main factors behind inflationary pressures, the relationship between wage and price increases might be better managed through agreements between government, business and labour. One possibility would be multi-year agreements setting guidelines for collective bargaining on wages and benefits. Any such measure would have to ensure that wages that were artificially depressed by apartheid can be improved, and that the share of labour in the national income does not decline – that is, wage increases in real terms have to maintain labour’s gains from improved productivity. 35.6 Improved economic efficiency and productivity. 35.6.1 There have already been significant increases in labour productivity. The reorganisation of work and a commitment to management and work organisation practices that deliver further improvements is one way of approaching this. Increased expenditure on skills development, training and focussed areas of education can also help deliver these objectives but would require a real commitment form business and labour in terms of skills development. Government may have to add additional capacity in this are to ensure that results are achieved faster than at present

Alliance Summit/April2002 l DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT PAGE 23 35.6.2 Improving efficiency and productivity, could look at the role of workplace improvements and collective agreements in improving this dimension of the economy. The Workplace Challenge program could be extended. The Auto Collective agreement where wages are linked to skills could be considered. A crucial area here would be the uptake and use of the SETA funds. 35.7 Other issues There are other areas of agreement could create the climate for further agreements and could improve the partnership relationship between government, business, labour and civil society, as well as help to create a more caring, stable and predictable social and economic environment. Some of these are: 35.7.1 Strategies for ensuring accelerated local economic development and mobilisation of popular forces around the existing developmental frameworks (i.e. IDPs) 35.7.2 Joint campaigns with clearly specified roles on specific issues (e.g. crime reduction or HIV/AIDS) with clear roles for business and labour as well as government. These could build on the Letsema Campaign. For instance, COSATU could encourage shop stewards and members to support neighbourhood watch programmes and blow the whistle on corruption in provision of government services and traffic control. 35.7.3 Strengthening policy processes generally to ensure that these processes are more inclusive and more effective 35.7.4 Some challenges and other requirements are there for reaching the needed agreements and developing the growth and development strategy.

THE WAY FORWARD 36 The Alliance needs to finalise its approach to the growth and development strategy. It will need to mobilise the membership of the Alliance organisations in support of these agreements to ensure their success. 37 Given the urgent challenge of ensuring growth, development and job creation that will benefit the overwhelming majority of our people, all three components of the Alliance are agreed that they should work together to develop a series of key agreements for growth and development. Such agreements would be aimed at building unity of purpose among all South Africans around a common programme of development towards a better life for all, based on the principles of the RDP. 38 The purpose of the Alliance Summit in this regard should be to ensure that we forge a broad consensus on programmes to accelerate growth and development. The Summit could also agree on a limited number of joint actions to support this approach. However, any attempt to agree on every detail of this immense programme will be too exacting and obscure to provide the momentum and confidence that we need at the present time. 39 It is essential that considerable resources be directed towards narrowing as far as possible the differences within the Alliance on issues of socio-economic strategy. The Alliance Secretariat should establish an appropriate Alliance process to refine proposals for the Growth and Development Summit, possibly convened by the ANC ETC. Furthermore, agreement is required on timeframes and key milestones. The date for the proposed Growth and Development Summit needs to be finalised. 40 Detailed proposals must be worked out utilising the capacity of government primarily, but drawing in the resources, talent and energy of the social partners in the form of labour, business and other civil society organisations. 41 Engagement should take place with broader civil society - that is, labour, youth, women, communities of faith, progressive NGOs, the disabled and civics. At the same time, we would mobilise our people around our core campaigns and programmes outlined in a common Alliance programme of action.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT PAGE 24 APPENDIX ONE: ACCELERATING GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT A SUMMARY OF GOVERNMENT’S MICROECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAMME

INTRODUCTION 1 By the end of 2000 assessments made indicated that macroeconomic reform alone could not stimulate the levels of savings and investment needed to underwrite growth. The limits to growth persisted at the microeconomic level and inform our approach to accelerating growth and development. 2 These microeconomic constraints to growth exist in both the developed and underdeveloped aspects of the economy. In the developed economy there are impediments to cost competitiveness such as the tariffs charged by certain state-owned enterprises impeding the efficiency of supply chains. In the underdeveloped economy there is a lack of basic infrastructure, especially roads and communications. Impediments to cost competitiveness exist in the labour market as a result of a mismatch of labour demand and supply, the low levels of education and skills of the workforce, and the need for ongoing review of labour market regulation. There is also technological under provision: per capita expenditure on IT is low compared to South Africa’s competitors, investment in research and development is low, public science and technology infrastructure is weak, and there are low levels of public science awareness. Further, there are low levels of integration in the manufacturing process contributing to insufficient value addition, and there is inadequate investment in equipment and machine tools, knowledge and training. 3 Given that the RDP is basis of policy and having achieved a level of macro-economic stabilisation, we now need to enter a phase of intense microeconomic reform so as to consolidate development, growth and a better life for all by 2014. 4 In February 2001, President Mbeki announced an integrated action plan to address microeconomic constraints to growth. Approximately two-thirds of the concrete steps contained in the plan were implemented. Important lessons were learnt by the state through this process and consequently additional actions and areas for fine-tuning were identified in January 2002. Some of the lessons learned include:

§ The need for decisive, coordinated interventions to improve the state’s capacity to spend and deliver services. § The need to strengthen the cluster system in government to promote coordinated implementation § The need to specify the institutional role of the state in achieving our vision for 2014. § The need to identify and communicate short-term strategies to kick-start growth and employment creation. § The need to specifically include a geographical dimension to growth and employment. § Recognising the importance of policy stability and effective regulation for policy certainty and confidence in the economy. § The need to acknowledge and communicate the timing of the impact of policies. We have to recognize that HRD, skills and technology development are medium to long-term strategies. 5 The diagram on the next page provides and overview of the integrated action plan 6 The plan identifies six key performance areas, namely, growth, competitiveness, employment, small business development, black economic empowerment, and geographic spread. Specific strategies to address the last four of these are considered below.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT PAGE 25

INTEGRATED ACTION PLAN

Macroeconomic CROSS- KEY INPUT KEY Integration: Fine-tuning CUTTING SECTORS GROWTH Small business ISSUES SECTORS Value-addition ICT & business services Infrastructure Transport Exports Geographic Access to Telecomms Tourism region Finance Energy Agriculture

HRD ICTs

Technology Cultural

Equity Dimension – BEE, Gender

Geographic Dimension

Government’s Institutional Role

Government’s Offerings Policy instruments, products and services

Quantification, Monitoring and Evaluation

IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY

BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT 7 A four-pronged approach to black economic empowerment has been adopted. This will be elaborated in a comprehensive policy statement on the matter that will be released in May 2002. In summary, the strategy includes: a) The provision of an enhanced environment for Black Economic Empowerment. b) The introduction of new products by government to promote Black Economic Empowerment including the proposed integrated financing mechanism (see Access to Finance in point 20 below), further procurement reforms, opportunities created through the restructuring of state-owned enterprises, land reform, support to cooperatives, the development and implementation of sectoral BEE strategies, and business development support. c) The introduction of a partnership programme with the private sector d) The establishment of a non-statutory BEE advisory council

Alliance Summit/April2002 l DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT PAGE 26 SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT 8 A renewed small business development strategy is currently being finalised for publication in May 2002. The strategy will represent a cross-departmental government approach to small business development. The key components of the strategy are: a) Specific sectoral initiatives to promote small business development b) The introduction of new products to support small businesses c) Greater coordination across government d) Amendments to the National Small Business Act e) The consolidation of all mentorship support projects f) Improved access to finance (see Access to Finance section above) g) Increased access to markets through competition policy and export promotion h) The promotion of entrepreneurship i) The expansion of business support infrastructure and the provision of localised support infrastructure

EMPLOYMENT 9 A government-wide approach to employment is needed. A three-stage approach to addressing the employment question is being followed: a) In the long-term, the restructuring of the economy and higher levels of integration in manufacturing resulting from the successful implementation of the our approach to growth and devleopment will result in employment creation in the economy. b) There are also several medium-term strategies that are in place to generate jobs including increased public sector capital expenditure, improved labour market information, small business development and black economic empowerment, and human resource development. c) However, it is recognised that immediate short-term actions need to be taken to create jobs. Such actions will include specific programmes in rural areas, urban nodes, and specific sectors of the economy, as well as programmes for new labour market entrants.

GEOGRAPHIC SPREAD 10 A legacy of the policies of the apartheid regime is the uneven economic development of South Africa’s regions. In order to achieve greater geographic equity a specific focus on the geographic spread of economic activities and investment has been adopted. A range of policies is already in place in this regard, such as the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy, the Urban Renewal Strategy, Industrial Development Zones, Spatial Development Initiatives, and Integrated Development Plans. The challenge to the state is to improve the coherence of these strategies and ensure more coordinated implementation. In this regard, productive investments have to be linked to areas of high poverty and unemployment and more geo-technical data and analysis required.

ROLE OF THE STATE Government’s institutional role 11 The role of the state in ensuring the successful implementation of the microeconomic reform strategy in order to attain Vision 2014 includes the following priority actions: a) Promoting coherent policy across government, i.e., policies that promote growth and employment. b) Ensuring the all legislation and regulations promote growth and employment. c) Narrowing the gap between financial and operational planning with spending and identification of priorities. d) Restructuring government budgets to better reflect and measure this new coordinated approach. e) Managing the mandates of parastatals and public entities in promoting growth and employment. f) Improved knowledge management and information sharing. g) More effective management of intergovernmental relations. h) Improved communications, branding and marketing to build policy certainty and confidence.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT PAGE 27 i) Increasing the capacity of government to spend effectively. j) More effective engagement and dialogue with the social partners and the rest of civil society 12 A critical component of the role of the state is to ensure that the various products and services, the policy instruments that it designs and offers to citizens and economic actors are relevant, effective and easily accessible. To achieve this, government will: a) Compile a products register in each department. b) Review all existing products for relevance, efficacy and accessibility. c) Replace inadequate offerings that do not contribute to government’s objectives. d) Introduce new, more relevant offerings. e) Review and introduce new delivery systems to improve access, reach and volume of offerings delivered to targeted groups in particular, and citizens in general. Targets, monitoring and evaluation 13 Government will increase the resources available for measuring performance against its objectives and will develop uniform and integrated measurement systems across government. Performance will be more frequently communicated to stakeholders. The impact of projects, programmes and policies will be a focus.

MACRO BALANCE 14 There have been considerable achievements in terms of macroeconomic balance as outlined above. There is still need for fine-tuning of macroeconomic policy in order to address the consequences of a volatile and undervalued exchange rate for inflation and for food and input price. Attention also needs to be paid to government’s weak investment performance for while funds available on budget for capital expenditure have increased, investment performance has not improved. 15 A country’s current and future competitiveness requires that a set of ‘fundamentals’ be in place in the economy. These ‘fundamentals’ include appropriate and efficient economic and social infrastructure, access to finance for productive activities, investment in research and development, innovation and the take-up of new technologies, as well as investment in human capital and an adaptive, flexible workforce. The state has a critical and active role to play in developing appropriate policies and initiating programmes to ensure that these competitiveness fundamentals are in place in the economy. 16 However, the state can play a greater role in raising levels of investment in R&D, human resource development, and infrastructure, as well as in making capital available for new productive activities. This should be a major part of the Growth and development Strategy.

TECHNOLOGY 17 With respect to technology issues, it is apparent that progress has been made in a number of areas including a new biotechnology strategy. Unfortunately, investment in research and development (R&D) remains low. 18 A new technology, innovation and R&D strategy proposes a number of measures that government will take to raise investment in R&D, including: a) An increase in funding for strategic areas such as biotechnology. b) Strengthening research in the private sector. c) Addressing issues of intellectual property and indigenous knowledge systems. d) Coordinating the currently fragmented management of state-led science and technology activities. e) Improvements in the rate of technology take-up by enterprises through technology incubators, and venture and seed capital funds. f) Establishing strong centres of excellence in tertiary institutions and science councils. g) Strengthening and extending regional innovation initiatives.

HRD 19 The integrated human resource development strategy is being implemented, however, further work will be undertaken to extend the visibility and impact of the strategy to the continent, social partners, and all spheres of government. Further, individual departments will align their departmental priorities with the HRD strategy. Additional capacity and financial resources will be allocated to the implementation of the strategy on a sustainable basis.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT PAGE 28 ACCESS TO FINANCE 20 Access to finance for small business development and black economic empowerment will be enhanced through the coordination and subsequent integration of existing financing vehicles such as Khula and the National Empowerment Fund. Such an integrated financing mechanism will include incentives (currently offered by the dti), guarantees (currently offered by Khula), grant facilities, risk capital, debt and equity financing, and specialist funds for targeted beneficiaries, e.g., youth and women. It is anticipated that this mechanism will address the current uncoordinated approach of government to access to finance. 21 Government will also promote and support alternative financial institutions, second-tier institutions, and community-based saving schemes. Legislation providing for disclosure and community reinvestment in the financial sector will be enacted. The role of the Post Bank in providing affordable services to the largely unbanked rural communities will be strengthened.

INFRASTRUCTURE 22 An integrated system for planning and implementation of infrastructure is critical. This system will include national departments, parastatals, provincial and local governments. Further, more work is required to integrate social and economic infrastructure projects. 23 Critical infrastructure projects currently underway include: a) Coega Port and Industrial Development Zone b) Industrial Development Zones in Richards Bay and East London c) Regional spatial development initiatives, eg, Lubombo SDI d) Tourism and heritage infrastructure projects e) Construction of a link road in Richards Bay f) Steel and aluminium hubs g) ICT hubs h) Logistics projects linking the Gauteng auto cluster and Durban port i) Municipal and Metropolitan investment projects, for example, Blue IQ in Gauteng j) Development of gas fields on the West Coast and the Pande gas fields

INPUT COSTS 24 Input costs drive competitiveness for they impact on all economic activities across the economy. Three critical input sectors, namely, transport, energy and telecommunications, are firmly within the ambit of the state’s control as these sectors are dominated by parastatals. Two issues confront the state with respect to these sectors: ensuring greater access to these services by all South Africans, and ensuring the cost competitiveness and efficiency of these services. The mandates of parastatals will be reviewed to ensure that the emphasis is placed on delivering an efficient service rather than profit seeking for its own sake. 25 A process of managed liberalization is underway in the three input sectors in order to introduce competition, increase efficiencies and lower costs. Further, infrastructure projects are underway in each sector to expand access to services and upgrade service delivery. 26 In addition, to the three input sectors identified in the 2001 integrated action plan, it should be noted that issues around water and water resource management are increasingly important.

TRANSPORT 27 Government will focus on the following transport issues in 2002: a) Ports policy and improving the overall competitiveness of freight and wharfage charges b) Increasing airline frequencies c) Upgrading rural roads d) Finalising appropriate restructuring models for Spoornet’s coal link general freight business e) Prioritisation of the taxi recapitalisation project f) Integration of SADC transport systems

Alliance Summit/April2002 l DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT PAGE 29 TELECOMMUNICATIONS 28 Government will focus on the following key issues in 2002: a) Increasing the competitiveness of local fixed line operations, cellular telephone networks, and international telecommunications through legislative and regulatory reforms b) Creation of black economic empowerment and small business investment opportunities through the managed liberalization of the sector c) Utilising new technologies to lower telecommunications costs for underdeveloped regions d) Improving government coordination on telecommunications issues e) Strengthening the capacity and role of Icasa

ENERGY 29 Government is prioritising the following issues in the energy sector in 2002: a) Implementation of an integrated energy plan b) Continued implementation of the national electrification programme c) Introduction and encouragement of greater utilization of renewable energy sources d) Implementation of energy efficiency programmes e) Development of a twenty-year gas master framework f) Institutionalisation of the liquid fuels charter

GROWTH SECTORS 30 Five sectors of the economy that have considerable potential for increased outputs, exports, and employment creation will receive focused attention from the state. These sectors are export sectors, agriculture, tourism, ICTs, and cultural industries. In each sector, programmes will include a specific focus on employment generation, value addition, export growth, small business development and black economic empowerment. 31 The state is addressing the key drivers of export performance, namely: a) Taking advantage of and expanding market access b) Improved supply chain management and logistics c) Supporting product design and innovation d) Addressing issues of standards and non-tariff barriers to trade e) Strengthening and expanding export councils and other sectoral partnerships f) Branding and marketing sectors and clusters g) Increased government coordination in the development of sector strategies h) Integration of geographic, BEE and small business objectives in sector strategies

EXPORT SECTORS 32 The following export sectors have been targeted for priority attention in 2002/03: a) Clothing and textiles b) Auto, auto components and transport c) Agro-processing d) Mining, metals and minerals beneficiation e) Chemicals and biotech f) Crafts g) Information and communication technology 33 These sectors have been selected for their employment potential in wider value chains, integration into global production systems, potential for beneficiation, and the strengthening of existing competitive advantages.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT PAGE 30 TOURISM 34 In 2002/03, government is prioritising the following activities: a) Projects to maximize the benefits arising from a depreciated exchange rate for both increased international visitors and domestic tourism b) Joint marketing strategies to six major tourism markets c) Focus on new non-traditional tourism markets in Africa, China and the Middle East d) Reviewing the role and strategy of SAA with a view to increasing the number of flights to SA e) Strengthening human resource development in the sector f) Promotion of BEE and small business development in the sector g) New, expanded and restructured national and transfrontier parks h) Consolidation of investment in and the further development of the Lubombo and Wild Coast spatial development initiatives i) Improvements in the standards and quality of tourism products and services

AGRICULTURE 35 A strategic plan for agriculture has been jointly developed and agreed upon by government and the organized agricultural sector, including both established and emerging farmers. This landmark agreement will now be implemented, including the following: a) Fast-tracking of the land redistribution and agricultural development programme b) Support programme for black farmers c) Implementation of a risk management strategy d) Expanding and developing organized agriculture e) Developing of domestic and global markets for agricultural products f) Introduction of PPPs in new farmer settlements g) Focusing on high value-added and export-orientated sectors h) Promoting competitive supply chains i) Increasing investment in innovation and research and development j) Rehabilitating infrastructure k) Development of rural financing mechanisms l) Introduction of an agricultural database and information management

ICT’S 36 South Africa is developing a competitive advantage in several areas of ICT including project solutions, wireless technology, systems integration, encryption and security, and offshore desktop publishing. Government has already coordinated the establishment of an ICT Development Council with the private sector and other role players. An ICT sector summit is currently being planned under the auspices of Nedlac. 37 Specific focus areas of government in this sector in 2002 are: a) Implementation of e-commerce legislation b) Development of opportunities in online processing and call centres c) Maximising the benefits of the President’s international ICT council d) Increasing the number of graduates with IT skills e) Increasing ICT learnership programmes f) Introduction of a small business ICT strategy g) Market South Africa as a source of high quality IT products, services and training h) Software development for export

Alliance Summit/April2002 l DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT PAGE 31 i) Increase research and development investment in the ICT sector j) Development of ICT clusters in Gauteng and Western Cape

CULTURAL INDUSTRIES 38 South Africa’s cultural industries include music, film and television, audio-visual services, publishing, and crafts. The sector is growing and government will be taking various actions in 2002 to further promote the sector including: a) Marketing to increase exports b) Establishment of an export council c) Improved access to finance for small businesses d) Improved training in cultural industries e) Promotion of South African arts festivals f) Use of technology to improve competitiveness of the sector g) Establishment of a craft emporium h) Strategy on South African audio-visual services

Alliance Summit/April2002 l DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT PAGE 32 APPENDIX TWO: ACCELERATING GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT SOME KEY ISSUES FOR DEBATE AROUND GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT RAISED BY COSATU

1 A critical task for the Alliance is to define together the factors behind slow growth and rising unemployment. Debates centre on whether the key causes are: 1.1 The structure of the economy, especially the role of the dominant centres of local and foreign capital in terms of the impact on production structure and capital flows combined with persistent underdevelopment in the former homeland areas and townships. 1.2 Overall inefficiency and excessive dependence on mineral exports as a result of the history of protection for manufacturing, inefficient provision of infrastructure by the big parastatals, labour market inefficiencies (poor skills and other rigidities) and, in this context, inadequate use of the information and communication technologies (ICT) which is critical for engagement in the modern global economy. 2 These two analyses are not necessarily contradictory, but they lead to divergent approaches to microeconomic reform. 2.1 The structural approach suggests the need for strong and coherent strategies to direct resources into labour-intensive sectors, production of wage goods as well as exports, and gradually to restructure capital by supporting SMMEs, co-ops and state-owned enterprise. In other words, this analysis suggests the need for an industrial strategy geared to transforming the nature of production and capital. 2.2 The competitiveness analysis would focus our efforts, instead, on broad measures to enhance efficiency, in large part by ensuring market pricing systems where possible, without favouring particular sectors or restructuring capital systematically. This type of “competitiveness strategy” would accept general support for SMMEs and competition policy, but would not target measures to achieve a particular economic structure. In this context, key areas of debate within the Alliance include the following. 3 In terms of microeconomic reforms, 3.1 Whether government should use exports alone as the indicator of success, or should also concentrate on improving production of wage goods and services. A greater emphasis on production of basic necessities would require closer co-ordination of social programmes with economic policy, and in particular a review of housing and infrastructure strategies as well as the main social services to ensure they bring the greatest possible benefits in terms of growth and employment creation. In addition, the relative importance of food security in shaping agricultural policy has come to the fore with the recent rapid rise in food prices. 3.2 How to deal with the main centres of capital – that is, in particular, the mining and finance houses and foreign investors in manufacturing - to redirect investment to bolster local production, especially in ways that can create employment. A structural approach requires that big capital be compelled to invest in new ways, using a combination of carrots and sticks. It also requires much more rigorous redirection of resources to new types of enterprise. In contrast, a competitiveness strategy aims generally to improve the conditions for efficiency, and leaves the structure of investment and ownership largely up to the workings of the market in that context. 3.3 A related question is how rigorously to support a redirection of resources out of the traditional centre of economic power around minerals production, and the potential in this context for strengthening agriculture and food processing; higher value-added in industries related to mining and energy; and other services and manufacturing. These changes can be conceptualised as a process of completing domestic value chains in order to enhance diversity, local value added, employment creation and resilience to changes in international markets. Since restructuring the economy away from mining and basic refining requires a substantial change in approach for capital, this is not an easy policy to develop or enforce. 3.4 Debates also arise on how to handle tariff reductions. An industrial strategy approach generally sees tariffs as an important way to nurture potentially competitive industries, in some cases for decades. Changes in the trade regime should be carefully linked to sectoral strategies. A competitiveness strategy, in contrast, generally calls for overall reductions in tariffs in order to ensure a generally more competitive economy. 3.5 Finally, how important are sector job summits? COSATU sees these as the most important way to develop a meaningful industrial strategy that is both based on stakeholder support, buy in and information

Alliance Summit/April2002 l DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT PAGE 33 and responsive to the needs of the majority. Critics argue that the results to date have not been convincing, and that this approach requires too much institutional change and resourcing from government departments. 4 On fiscal and monetary policy, the debates centre on whether a more expansionary approach is possible. 4.1 COSATU argues that we need to spend more both to redistribute income, which should stimulate domestic demand, and to improve infrastructure. It sees a basic income grant as a critical element in this strategy. COSATU also contends that where external shocks, like the recent depreciation, raise inflation, government should not permit interest rate hikes. Instead, to restrain price hikes, it should look to measures to raise productivity and enhance the efficiency of markets in key wage-good sectors. 4.2 Government has argued that thanks to the fiscal restrictions of the late 1990s, it can now increase spending significantly in real terms in any case, without relaxing fiscal targets. Moreover, vigorous measures are needed to combat inflation. Although interest rate increases may dampen growth and employment in the short run, high inflation would have a worse impact. In any case, a substantial shift in fiscal or monetary targets would hamper foreign investment, which is necessary to counter low domestic savings. 5 To focus our debates during the Summit, we propose that the commissions engage with the government’s microeconomic reform strategy and the following proposals for the Growth and Development Strategy. In this process, we can develop a common strategy that we can take forward together to a more inclusive Growth and Development Summit.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT PAGE 34 - 6 -

RESOLUTION ON PALESTINE

This summit of the Tripartite Alliance, comprising the African National Congress (ANC), South African Communist Party (SACP), Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO):

Noting,

1 The rapidly deteriorating situation in the Middle East, occasioned by Israeli state aggression against the state and people of Palestine, including the killing and maiming of civilians;

2 The further occupation of Palestinian land and territory by the Israeli government, and the military siege of the home and offices of President Yasser Arafat;

3 The violation by the Israeli government of UN Human Rights treaties and the Geneva Convention and protocols on the treatment of civilians and prisoners of war;

4 The efforts of the Arab States, the United Nations (UN), the UN Security Council and several other governments, including the government of South Africa, to finding a lasting peaceful solution in the Middle East; and,

And Believing that,

1 The actions of the Israeli government constitute a grave threat to world peace and security;

2 These actions, in the context of the continued denial to the Palestinian people of the right to national self-determination, is an affront to the dignity of humanity;

3 The plight of the Palestinian people should be the concern of all the world’s people, regardless of race, nationality, religion or class;

4 The heightened violence in the region, including attacks against both Israeli and Palestinian civilians, endangers efforts to create a climate conducive to peace;

This Summit therefore,

1 Expresses its outrage at the continuing Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands in blatant violation of international law and human morality;

2 Condemns in the strongest possible terms the violence perpetrated by the Israeli occupation forces which includes extra-judicial killings, the wanton destruction of infrastructure, government installations and Palestinian homes;

3 Expresses its support for the Peace Plan proposed by the Arab States that recently met in Lebanon;

Alliance Summit/April2002 l RESOLUTION ON PALESTINE PAGE 35 4 Calls for the resumption of negotiations between the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), led by President Yasser Arafat, and the government of Israel to resolve the problems peacefully;

5 Calls on the government of Israel to:

a. Immediately and unconditionally lift the Israeli siege of the home and offices of President Yasser Arafat and the complete withdrawal of all Israeli occupation forces from Palestinian territory;

b. Implement United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1402 and 1403 stipulating immediate Israeli withdrawal from occupied Palestine;

c. Accept President Yasser Arafat as the legitimate representative of the people of Palestine and as a central interlocutor in the critical process of finding a peaceful solution to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East;

6 Calls on the United States government to use its influence to promote the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions and the peace plan of the Arab States;

7 Calls on the UN Security Council and the international community to take appropriate action in the instance of an Israeli refusal to comply with Resolutions 1402 and 1403;

8 Calls for a cessation of all hostilities, and an end to attacks from all sides, as part of the process of creating a climate conducive to the peaceful resolution of the Middle East problems;

9 Urges all South Africans to join the people of Africa and the world in campaigning for the peaceful resolution of the crisis in the Middle East, and act in solidarity with the Palestinian people.

10 Resolves to urgently mobilise all components of the Alliance at all levels to undertake, in concert with other sectors of society, a programme of action in support of this resolution.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l RESOLUTION ON PALESTINE PAGE 36 - 7 -

CLOSING REMARKS BY DEPUTY PRESIDENT JACOB ZUMA

This summit has been refreshing, and its deliberations are well captured in the Summit Declaration. It will disappoint our enemies, who said we would emerge more divided. There have been people who have said that the Alliance would die. Recent events led these people to think they were right. This Summit proves them wrong. The summit indicated a high level of debate, though some comrades would say we didn’t go far enough in some of the issues. The feeling of the Alliance Officials is that issues highlighted but not resolved will be pursued towards resolving at a future point.

The President said at the beginning that we are looked upon by the rest of the world to provide leadership. Both friends and foe agree that South Africa has a role to play in the world. That presents a big challenge to ourselves, as a collective, to look at our readiness to do so, and what actions we should take. Our discussions have responded to that challenge.

What remains is to look at how we move away from how we have been in the recent past. We must find a way to resolve our differences. The issues of difference are not new, there have always been differences. But what enabled the Alliance to succeed historically was the management of these differences - knowing what to say in public, and what not to say in public. This tests the quality of the Alliance leadership.

This Summit is saying lets lead differently.

The Alliance doesn’t belong to individuals; it belongs to the people of this country. We must move away from the tendency to exaggerate tensions that are very insignificant. The organisation is above everything. Our duty is to protect, defend and maintain this Alliance. This Summit has provided an opportunity to be stable and provide the necessary leadership. We must not lose the momentum. We are alive and well, and ready to lead the transformation of this country, the continent and the world.

I hope the spirit of this Summit and the issues arising from it will be taken to all structures of the Alliance at all levels.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l DEPUTY PRESIDENT’S CLOSING REMARKS PAGE 37 - 8 - ALLIANCE SECRETARIAT REPORT (PRESENTED TO THE SUMMIT)

INTRODUCTION 1 This Summit is the first such gathering of our revolutionary Alliance since October 1998. During 1999 an Alliance Summit was planned but not held, and a ten-a-side meeting was instead held towards the end of the year. In the year 2000 no Summit or ten-a-side was held among the Alliance partners. While 2001 commenced with a series of positive bilateral discussions, particularly between the ANC and COSATU, the end of the year, as we all know, was perhaps the lowest point in Alliance relations since the democratic breakthrough. Aside from secretariat meetings, there has been a growing void in official political interactions between us as alliance partners. This, amongst other factors, contributed towards a breakdown of trust and the emergence of public misunderstandings and even attacks, providing fertile ground for the media and others to intensify divisions. 2 The ANC, following its NEC meeting in September 2001 and countrywide Regional General Council briefings in October, initiated a programme of bilateral meetings with its Alliance partners to seek to resolve some of the underlying problems facing the Alliance. As a result, two meetings were held between the ANC and COSATU (12 January and 9 -10 February 2002) and two meetings between the ANC and SACP (29 October 2001 and 26 – 27 January 2002). Following these bilateral meetings, a ten-a-side meeting was held at Luthuli House on 9 – 10 March 2002. 3 This report characterises the main outcomes of the bilateral process and the ten-a-side taken together as a single process. It attempts to describe some of the broad areas of consensus that emerged from this process. It does not purport to be a record of these discussions but merely provides an overview. ISSUES DISCUSSED 4 The bi-laterals and the ten-a-side discussed a wide range of issues. Many documents were presented by each of the Alliance partners on a number of issues. While it is not possible to provide an exhaustive account of the bilaterals and ten-a-sides, the following issues in particular were raised the course of the process: 4.1 A process of ‘clearing the air’ and building trust, after a virtual breakdown in communication and public acrimony that characterized relations towards the end of last year, in particular during and in the aftermath of the general strike. This included discussion of a common understanding of the characterization of the problems facing the Alliance at present, engaging on the ANC Briefing Notes as well as numerous documents presented by the ANC, SACP and COSATU on the characterization of these problems. 4.2 Discussion on the theory of the NDR and the balance of forces: This included consideration of the underlying theory of our revolution, its character in the current phase, the role of and relationship between the motive forces. Between the ANC and SACP in particular, discussion was entertained on how, for socialists, the NDR relates to the struggle for socialism. In the light of our assessments of the NDR, the balance for forces (both domestically and internationally) was assessed. This included consideration of how the balance of forces had evolved since 1994, and their relation to the policy choices actually made. Also discussed was the character of the balance of forces at the current conjuncture and how, in a forward-looking manner, the Alliance should act to influence them. As a whole, these discussions were not exhaustive and there was general acknowledgment of the need for ongoing debate and engagement on all these matters. 4.3 Discussions on the Nature of the Alliance. Issues flagged in the course of discussion including political basis of the Alliance, the roles of each Alliance partner in the current phase of the NDR, the nature of structural relationships between the Alliance partners and proposals on a joint Alliance programme of action. In other words, the tasks of the Alliance and the tasks of each of the allies. 4.4 Discussion also took place on particular areas of policy. This included the flagging of ideas on a growth and development strategy, the proposed social agreements and a growth summit as well as the proposed People’s Economic Summit, and the relation of these events to overall growth and development strategy. Also raised was the challenge of HIV/AIDS, and the tasks, shape and size of the democratic state.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l ALLIANCE SECRETARIAT REPORT PAGE 38 OUTCOMES 5 To a large degree the process succeeded in reducing the public acrimony that existed amongst the Alliance partners. The meetings also provided a platform for frank and open engagements on the areas of disagreement, helped to clear misunderstandings and laid the foundation for the rebuilding of trust. 6 In addition to overcoming disagreements that resulted from misunderstandings and poor communications, the process also helped us to more clearly identify those areas where real differences remain and clarify the nature of these differences. 7 Nevertheless, there was broad agreement among all three Alliance partners that 2002 is the year in which we want to reposition the Alliance in order to exercise its profound responsibility to lead society. To do so, we must first take into account the new political realities and challenges that face us, through a sober assessment of the NDR and the balance of forces in the current conjuncture. The aim would be to harmonize our understanding these factors and, flowing from this, identify the key economic, social problems that confront us and, in that respect, the role of the Alliance in leading society to meet these challenges. Once this is done, it will become possible to consciously link (politically) these Alliance processes with the activities of each component of the Alliance. 8 Furthermore, the meetings broadly agreed on the following: 8.1 The nature and tasks of the NDR, as described in Strategy and Tactics of the ANC and the founded on the vision of the Freedom Charter. 8.2 Objective conditions and the role that both the democratic state and the democratic movement have played have resulted in circumstances that create the potential for a further shift of the balance of forces in favour of the NDR 8.3 The unity of the Alliance is of critical importance in realising the potential for further shifting the balance for forces in favour of the NDR and actualising this exceptional possibility for sustained socio economic transformation in favour of the poor. 8.4 There are divergent views on the nature, role and tasks of the Alliance, and of each of the allies, in this phase of the NDR. The lack of theoretical consensus on these issues leads to difficulties in the management of our relationships, and divergent proposals regarding the structural and operational solutions to these difficulties. 8.5 Therefore, further debate on the theoretical issues relating to the unfolding of the NDR is critical to achieving unity of the Alliance 8.6 The immediate challenge facing the Alliance and the country as a whole is to ensure growth, development, job creation, the eradication of poverty and greater equality, for the benefit the overwhelming majority of our people. 8.7 We must work to strengthen the collective and individual components of the Alliance and ensure that tensions that manifest themselves in the recent past do not recur, and are resolved through regular interactions. 9 A number of outstanding issues that emerged from the bi-laterals and the ten-a-side still need to be taken forward. This includes finalising the record of these discussions, the holding of further bi-laterals on issues specific to bi-lateral relations, and the ongoing discussion of a number of policy matters in various forums. THE CHALLENGE OF HIV/AIDS 10 A specific discussion was held on the question of HIV/AIDS at the ten-a-side. Comrade Manto Tshabalala- Msimang made a presentation on behalf of the ANC, which outlined the comprehensive strategy for meeting the challenges posed by HIV/AIDS in the context of the broader challenges of public health policy in the context of widespread poverty. 11 The ten-a-side noted that, while the information provided was not necessarily new, the presentation formed the basis for further detailed consideration of the issues by the Alliance partners both separately and collectively. Discussion and the sharing of information on the strategic agenda of pharmaceutical multinationals, as well as broader questions of the politics of AIDS, should take place within the Alliance. 12 Specifically, there is also a need to clarify our positions, both separately and collectively, on the following:

§ The treatment component of the comprehensive strategy. § Mobilisation of civil society around the HIV/AIDS-related issues should be carefully considered in the light of the profound responsibility of the Alliance to lead society. § Communications strategies around HIV/AIDS including the role of the government and Alliance partners in that regard.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l ALLIANCE SECRETARIAT REPORT PAGE 39 OBJECTIVES OF THE ALLIANCE SUMMIT 13 The meetings agreed that we had laid a solid foundation towards the Alliance summit. The ten-a-side tasked the Alliance Secretariat to prepare for the Summit by preparing documentation that would summarise the some of the debates that have taken place, and outcomes thereof, as well as provide a framework for further discussion in the Summit itself. It is in this light that the following documents are presented by the Alliance Secretariat as a basis for further discussion during the Alliance Summit:

§ The NDR and the Balance of Forces § Building the Alliance: Overlapping membership, multiple mandates and the modus operandi of inter- Alliance relations § Towards a Growth and Development Strategy None of these documents represent the position of any component part or structure within the Alliance. They are submitted to the summit by the Alliance secretariat as work in progress, as a basis for further discussion. We hope that the Summit itself will criticise them robustly and thereby enrich them. 14 In this year we hope to reposition the Alliance to give expression to its profound responsibility to lead society toward a better life for all. While the Summit itself is not the end of this process, but more of a beginning, we trust that, by the end of this Summit, we would have furthered the following objectives: 14.1 Assess the current state of the NDR and the Balance of Forces, with a view to harmonizing our understanding these factors; 14.2 Exchange views and build consensus around the nature of the Alliance, including its political basis, the role of each Alliance partner in the current phase of the NDR, the nature of structural relationships between the Alliance partners, with a view to making progress towards a joint Alliance programme of action. 14.3 Identify the key political, economic and social problems that confront us and the role and programme of the Alliance in leading society toward the solution to these problems, in particular with regards to the idea of a Growth and Development Strategy, as well as social agreements that would form part of such a strategy. 14.4 Engage in further discussion on an Alliance Programme of Action as a key element in building unity in action of the Alliance partners. Such a programme should relate directly to the ANC’s programme of action (as described in the January 8th statement), and express the profound responsibility of the Alliance to unite and lead society behind political, social and economic transformation. It should also link to the participation of Alliance partners in the ANC Policy Review process and Policy Conference in Sept 2002. 14.5 Engaging in further discussion around specific issues and policy questions as part of the process of ongoing debates concerning these issues, in particular in the lead up to the ANC’s 51st National Conference in December. The following issues in particular were raised in the course of the meetings: macro-economic policy, the restructuring of state owned assets, HIV/AIDS and comprehensive social protection. 15 While final agreement on every issue cannot be expected, it is incumbent on us to use the Alliance Summit to find one another on as many issues as possible. This is what is expected of us by the cadre of activists that form the common core of our movement, as well as the people as a whole.

Alliance Summit/April2002 l ALLIANCE SECRETARIAT REPORT PAGE 40 SUMMIT AGENDA

WEDNESDAY 3 APRIL [Preparatory meetings]

14h30 – 17h30 ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION COMMITTEE 17h30 – 18h30 SUPPER 18h30 – 20h30 ANC CAUCUS

THURSDAY 4 APRIL Chair: Terror Lekota

08h30 – 10h30 ALLIANCE OFFICIALS MEETING § Review Summit Agenda § Review Summit documentation

09h00 – 10h00 DELEGATES REGISTER

10h30 – 13h00 OPENING PLENARY § Opening Remarks by the President § Report of the Alliance Secretariat § Presentation on NDR and Balance of Forces § Presentation on the Political Basis of the Alliance § Commission Guidelines and Venues

13H00 – 14H00 LUNCH

14h00 – 19h30 COMMISSIONS: § NDR and the Balance of Forces NDR, Balance of Forces & the Alliance § The Political Basis of the Alliance [All commissions discuss the same issues]

19h30 – 20h30 MEETING OF THE DRAFTING TEAM

19h30 SUPPER

FRIDAY 5 APRIL Chair: Willie Madisha

08h30 – 10h30 PLENARY SESSION Presentation on Growth and Development Strategy

10h30 – 11h00 TEA 11h00 – 13h30 COMMISSIONS: Growth and Development Strategy 13h30 – 14h30 LUNCH 14h30 – 18h30 COMMISSIONS: Growth and Development Strategy 18h30 – 19h00 MEETING OF THE DRAFTING TEAM 19h00 – 21h30 CULTURAL EVENING

Alliance Summit/April2002 l SUMMIT AGENDA PAGE 41

SATURDAY 6 APRIL Chair: Charles Nqakula

08h30 – 11h00 PLENARY Commission Reports 11h00 – 11h30 TEA 11h30 – 13h00 PLENARY Commission Reports 13h00 – 14h00 LUNCH 14h00 – 16h00 MEETING OF THE DRAFTING TEAM Finalise Draft Summit Report/ Programme of Action and Summit Declaration 14h30 – 16h30 SOCCER MATCH 16h30 – 19h00 CAUCUSES Discussion on Draft Summit Report/POA and Summit Declaration 19h00 – 10h00 ALLIANCE OFFICIALS MEETING 19h00 SUPPER

SUNDAY 7 APRIL Chair: Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi

08h00 – 10h00 PLENARY Presentation and Discussion of Summit Report 10h00 – 10h30 TEA

10h30 – 12h30 PLENARY § Adoption of Summit Report and Declaration § Closing Remarks 12h30 CLOSURE

Alliance Summit/April2002 l SUMMIT AGENDA PAGE 42 LIST OF ATTENDEES

ANC 65. Skwatsha, Mcebisi 17. Guma, Siphelele 1. President Thabo Mbeki 66. Skweyiya, Zola 18. Gumede, Vuyokazi 2. Deputy President Jacob Zuma 67. Yengeni, Tony 19. Gwagwa, Thembeka 3. Mosiuoa Terror Lekota 20. Howard, Randal 4. Thenjiwe Mtintso 68. Cumberledge, Dianne 21. Johnson, Patric 69. Istain, Zenobia 22. Kgaka, Joe 5. Botha, Ntombazana 70. Kubu, Steven 23. Khumalo, Sipho 6. Chabane, OC 71. Manxiwa, Nomatshawe 24. Kiti, Seleboho 7. Chikane, Frank 72. Mostert, Cheslyn 25. Kojana, Themba 8. Didiza, Thoko 73. Sachs, Michael 26. Lesufi, Mankoto 9. Direko, W 74. Speed, Steyn 27. Maboea, Aubrey 10. Dlamini, B 28. Mabuyakhulu, Vincent 11. Dlamini-Zuma, Nkosazana SACP 29. Mafalo, EP 12. Du Toit, Dirk 1. Nqakula, Charles 30. Mafani, Nyameka 13. Erwin, Alec 2. Fraser-Moleketi, Geraldine 31. Magagula, Bheki 14. Gcabashe, Sipho 3. Nzimande, Blade 32. Majola, Fikile 15. Gigaba, Malusi 4. Cronin, Jeremy 33. Makapela, Lungile 16. Ginwala, Frene 5. Mufamadi, Thaba 34. Makgetla, Neva 17. Godongwana, Enoch 35. Mantashe, Gwede 18. Hendricks, Lindiwe 6. Carrim, Yunus 36. Mashinini, Sam 19. Jordan, Z Pallo 7. Davies, Rob 37. Matebeni, D 20. Khasu, Jomo 8. Dexter, Phillip 38. Matshikiza, Sizwe 21. Mabandla, Bridgit 9. Jara, Mazibuko K 39. Matutoane, Cappy 22. Mabudafhasi, RT 10. Kondlo, Ncumisa 40. Mduu, Thamsanqa J 23. Macozoma, Saki 11. Maduma, Lawrence 41. Mini, Luvuyo 24. Mahlalela, Fish 12. Makupula, Mandla 42. Mohai, Moeketsi Freddi 25. Makhura, David 13. Mapaila, Solly 43. Mokhantso, Mpho 26. Manana, Naph 14. Martins, Ben Dikobe 44. Mokoena, Norman 27. Manuel, Trevor 15. Masondo, David 45. Moni, Crosby 28. Makhaye, Dumisane 16. Masualle, Phumolo 46. Montsele, Mncedisi 29. Makwetla, Thabang 17. Mogale, EP 47. Mqwathi, Nkone 30. Mapisa-Nqakula, Nosiviwe 18. Mokonyane, Nomvula 48. Ngobeni, Tom 31. Maxegwana, Humphrey 19. Moloi, Joyce 49. Nhlapo, Vusi 32. Mbalula, Fikile 20. Moloto, Sello 50. Mabyana, Ezron 33. Mbete, Baleka 21. Moonsamy, Kay 51. Nolingwa, Welile 34. Mello, Lucas 22. Mvelase, Dipuo 52. Nxesi, Thulas 35. Mkhatshwa, Smangaliso 23. Nkadimeng, John 53. Nxu, X 36. Mkhize, Zweli 24. Nkwanyana, Smiso 54. Nzimande, Fuindi 37. Mohlala, France 25. Ntamnani, 55. Pakati, Xola 38. Mokaba, Peter 26. Parkies, Phel 56. Phadu, T 39. Moleketi, Jabu 27. Piitso, Justice 57. Pillay, Edwin 40. Moloto, Pitsi P 28. Ramatlakane, Leonard 58. Ronnie, Roger 41. Mompati, Neville 29. Satgar, Vishwas 59. Scheepers, Jan 42. Moosa, M Valli 30. Strachan, Garth 60. Seboni, Violet 43. Molete, P 31. Thibedi, Jerry 61. Selepe, Anthony 44. Mosala, GB 32. Tsotetsi, Juda 62. Sibiya, Noluthando 45. Mphahlwa, Sipho M 33. Zitha, Langa 63. Sithole, Mabutho, Kid 46. Mthembi-Mahanyele, S 64. Treganna, Fiona 47. Mufamadi, Sydney COSATU 65. Tsiane, Jan 48. Mushwana, Lawrence 1. Madisha, Willy 66. van Meelis, Tanya 49. Myakayaka-Manzini, Mavivi 2. Nkosi, Joe 67. William, Thomas 50. Netshitenzhe, Joel 3. Pekane, Joyce 68. Witbooi, Abbey 51. Ngonyama, Smuts 4. Vavi, Zwelinzima 69. Zokwana, Senzeni 52. Ngwenya, S 5. Ntshalintshali, Bheki 53. Nhleko, Nkosinathi 6. Rantsolase, Alina SANCO 54. Omar, Dullah 1. Hlongwane, Mlungisi 55. Pahad, Aziz 7. Bhengu, Mahlengi 2. Bhengu, Ruth 56. Pahad, Essop 8. Bodibe, Oupa 3. Mthimunye, George 57. Pandor, Naledi 9. Boshielo, Simon 4. Molefe, William S 58. Ramatlhodi, Ngoako 10. Cebekhulu, ZE 59. Rasool, Ebrahim 11. Cele, Derrick 5. Mahlangu, Khehla 60. Radebe, Jeff 12. Chauke, Joe 6. Mbatha-Cele, Phumzile 61. Shabangu, Susan 13. Coleman, Neil 7. Mntalame, Dumisani 62. Sigcau, Stella 14. Craven, Patrick 8. Seoketsa, Gloria 9. Thusi, Siphiwe 63. Sisulu, Lindiwe 15. Dube, JJ 10. Williams, Donovan 64. Sisulu, Max 16. Ehrenreich, Tony

Alliance Summit/April2002 l LIST OF ATTENDEES PAGE 43