APEIRON a Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science
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APEIRON a journal for ancient philosophy and science CONTENTS VOlUME XXXVIII No. 1 MARCH 2005 Page 1 Euthyphro 10a2-11b1: David Wolfsdorf A Study in Platonic Metaphysics and its Reception Since 1960 73 Virtue and Pleasure in Plato's Laws John Mouracade No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior written pennission of the publisher or, in case ofphotocopying or other reprographic copying, a license from CANCOPY (Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency) 1 Yonge 5t., 5te 1900, Toronto, ON M5E 1E5, FAX (416) 868-1621. Aucune portion de cette publication ne peut etre reproduite, entreposee dans un systeme de recuperation au transmise, saus quelque forme au par quelques moyens que ce soit sans Ie consentement prealable, par ecrit, de l'editeur OU, dans les cas d'une photocopie au tout autre reprographie, une license de CANCOPY (Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency) 1 Yonge St., 5le 1900, Toronto, ON MSE 1E5, FAX (416) 868-1621. M"ilpc! in Anril ?OO<; Euthyphro 10a2-11b1: A Study in Platonic Metaphysics and its Reception Since 1960 David Wolfsdorf I Introduction I i The Elenchos at Euthyphro lOa2-11bl: Outline AtEuthyphro lOa2-11b1Socrates criticizes the third account of thatwhich is holy qua holy ('to oO"wv). The critique is more complex than many of Socrates' elenchoi in response to proposed definitions among the early definitional dialogues. Basically, the response has the following form. Original disjunction Socrates presents Euthyphro a set of two alternatives: (1) That which is holy is loved by the gods because it is holy. (2) That which is holy is holy because it is loved by the gods. First epagoge Euthyphro fails to understand the alternatives, and Socrates proceeds to explain himself through two epagogai. In the first, he introduces the distinction between agent and patient by means of three examples: something carrying and something being carried, something leading and something being led, and something seeing and something being seen. In view of these, he distinguishes between something loving and something being loved. 2 David Wolfsdorf Platonic Metaphysics 3 Second epagoge That which is god-beloved is such as to be loved (oloY qnAEta8at) Given the agent-patient distinction, Socrates suggests, through develop- because it is loved, whereas that which is holy is loved by the gods ment of the three examples employed in the first epagoge, that patients because it is such as to be beloved. have affections (that is, patient conditions) because they are acted upon, rather than that patients are acted upon because they have affections. For Second clarification example, something carried has the affection of being carried because it is carried, that is, because something carries it, rather than that some- Socrates then explains that by identifying that which is holy qua holy thing carried is carried because it has the affection of being carried. with that which is god-beloved qua god-beloved, Euthyphro identified Socrates expresses this as a general principle (P), which he then applies an affection (1tCleo~) of that which is holy, not the being or essence (oucrtu) to something being loved; and he presents Euthyphro with a second set of that which is holy. of alternatives: (3) That which is god-beloved is god-loved because it is loved by I ii Notes on the Outline of the Elenchos the gods. The elenchos is difficult to interpret, and the articulation of the outline (4) That which is god-beloved is loved by the gods because it is itself involves a number of controversial positions: god-beloved. (i) Itis unclear how to interpret the phrases formed from the neuter Euthyphro agrees that (3) is true and (4) is false. definite article and adjective, for example, '1:0 ocrtOV'. I call these On the basis of the two epagogai, Euthyphro more clearly understands '1:0 phrases'. the original disjunction, and he accepts (1) and rejects (2). (ii) It is unclear what Socrates' 'What-is-F?' question seeks. Argument Socrates now argues against the identity of that which is holy qua holy (iii) The nature of the distinction in the first epagoge is controversial. (that is, holiness) and that which is god-beloved qua god-beloved (that is, god-belovedness) using a reductio and a pre-theoretical ancestor of (iv) It is unclear how to interpret the because-clauses, specifically in Leibniz' Law (precisely, the indiscernibility of identicals in its contrapo- (1)-(4). Accordingly, the meaning of (P) in the second epagoge is sitive formulation, the distinctness ofdiscernibles). Assume that holiness also controversial. and god-belovedness are identical. Then, if (1) that which is holy were loved by the gods because itis holy, (4) that which is god-beloved would (v) It is unclear how the epagogai clarify the original disjunction. be loved by the gods because it is god-beloved. And if (3) that which is god-beloved were god-beloved because it is loved by the gods, (2) that (vi) It is controversial whether the argument is for the non-identity which is holy would be holy because it is loved by the gods. But (4) and of holiness and god-belovedness. (2) are false. Therefore, holiness and god-belovedness are not identical. (vii) It is unclear what principle of (non-)identity the argument em- . First clarification ploys. In the wake of the argument, Socrates clarifies the distinction between (viii) It is controversial how the phrase 'otOY q>tA£lcrem' in the first •holiJ;J.ess and god-belovedness in two ways. First, he states that: clarification is to be understood. (ix) It is controversial what Socrates means by the distinction be- tween 7taeO~ and oucrtu in the second clarification. 4 David Wolfsdorf Platonic Metaphysics 5 The aim ofthis paper is to resolve these nine problems. The discussion II ii To Phrases divides into five sections, (I) Introduction, (V) conclusion, and three Throughout the elenchos Socrates uses phrases composed of the neuter sections that constitute the body of the argument: (II) The 'What-is-F?' singular definite article 'to' and a neuter singular adjective; for example, Question, (III) na8o~ and the Epagogai, and (IV) Plato's Aetiology and the 'to DO"lOV' and 'to eEOqnA,£~'. I call these expressions 'to phrases'. to Argument of Euthyphro 10a9-lle4. Subsection I ii ii addresses problem phrases may be used in at least two ways, as quantifier phrases or as (i). Section IT addresses (ii). Subsections III ii-iii address (iii) and (iv). referring expressions. As quantifier phrases, the definite article functions Subsections IV i-iv address (v)-(viii). Section III ii addresses (ix). like a universal quantifier ranging over all entities of the kind charac- With slight modifications, each of the three main sections arguably terized by the adjectival expressions. For example, 'to uya80v EO"tt KaA.OV' could stand as an independent paper. But since the aim is to interpret may be translated as 'that which is good is beautiful'. But, of course, the elenchos at Euthyphro lOa2-llbl as a whole, their compresence is Socrates also and distinctively uses to phrases to refer to Forms. So the necessary. And since this compresence also interilluminates the various sentence 'to uya80v EO"ft KaA,OV' could also be translated as 'the Form of problems of the elenchos as well as the scholarly controversies from the the good (or goodness) is beautiful'. This ambiguity of the to phrase is '60s to the presentsurrounding these problems, the interpretation of the noteworthy since one of the central objectives of Euthyphro is to distin- elenchos as a whole is desirable. guish the Form F fromfinstances or, asI prefer to call them,Jparticipants. Throughout the elenchos Socrates uses to phrases in both ways, al- though mainly as quantifier phrases. However, since he is not arguing II i Note on Translation and Notation that the sets of holy and god-beloved participants are not identical, but that holiness and god-belovedness are not identical, he must employ to The adjective 'oO"toV' is translated by both 'pious' and 'holy'. The two phrases to designate these entities at least twice in the argument, as in English words are used under different conditions. Something that is the following: 'But, if, Euthyphro, my friend, to 8EOqnA,£C; and to GO"toV were same ... ,2 pious has or is related to a particular psychological state - for instance, a pious person or action performed by such a person. Something that is The bivocal use of the to phrase runs through the entire investigation holy need not have or be related to such a psychological state - for of the identity of to Dmov in Euthyphro. When he initially formulates the example, holy site or holy water, whereas the phrases 'piOUS water' or 'What-is-F?' question, Socrates attempts to clarify that he is seeking to 'pious location' are nonsensical. In Euthyphro Socrates and Euthyphro omov insofar as it is Dmov, that is to say, that which is holy insofar as it is holy. He employs the emphatic pronoun 'auto' to make this restricting are mainly concerned with people and their actions. But since the adjec- 3 tive 'oO"toV' is in fact used in Greek in conjunction with artifacts and qualification, as I call it: to Dmov auto. In defining the opposite Form of unholiness, he uses the restricting qualification 'Kata tilv uvomotllta' for places, throughout I translate 'OO"lOV' and its cognates by 'holy' and its 4 .cognates. the same purpose. However, Socrates does not always employ a restrict- ing qualification when he uses the to phrase to designate a Form, and In certain passages of the paper I also employ an idiosyncratic nota- throughout his elenchos to the third definition he does not.