AFGHANISTAN UNDER SOVIET DOMINATION, 1964-83 UNDER SOVIET DOMINATION, 1964-83

Anthony Hyman

M MACMILLAN PRESS LONDON © Anthony Hyman 1982, 1984

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means without permission

First edition (Afghanistan under Soviet Domination, 1964-1981) 1982 Second edition 1984

Published by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD London and Basingstoke Companies and representatives throughout the world

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Hyman, Anthony Afghanistan under Soviet domination, 1964- 1983. -2nd ed 1. Afghanistan - Politics and government 2. Afghanistan- History- Soviet Occupation, 1979- I. Title 325' .32'0947 DS369.4 ISBN 978-0-333-36353-9 ISBN 978-1-349-17443-0 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-17443-0 Contents

List of Maps and Plates Vll Preface Vlll Acknowledgements XI

PART ONE

l The Land and the People in History 3

2 Society and Economy 23

3 Afghan Foreign Relations 38

4 The New Democracy and its Limitations 51

PART TWO

5 The Saur Revolution 75 1: Two coups 75 II: Reforms- the attempt to mobilise the rural poor 85 III: The children of history remake the world 92

6 Reforms from A hove and Repressions 99

7 Afghan Centres of Opposition 121

8 Disintegrating Army v. Divided Opposition 146

9 'Positive Non-alignment' 161 Vl Contents

10 A State of Nature 176

Postscript Uune 1983) 197

APPENDICES

A Influential Figures in the PDPA 225

B Opposition Parties 227

C Shabnamah (night letter) of Kabul Opposition, summer 1980 229

D Land Reforms 232

E Chronology 234

Notes 236 Index 243 List of Maps and Plates

MAPS

1 Principal tribes and ethnic groups 12 2 Provinces since 1964 56 3 Afghanistan 1982 123

PLATES

1 Kabul street life (a) Kabul bazaar; (b) Selecting fruits 2 King Zahir Shah and his daughter with Queen Elizabeth II 3 Khalq Party demonstration 4 An arms-store in Darra Adam Khel 5 Choosing arms 6 Hizb-i-Islami mujahidin 7 Babrak Karma! 8 Loya Jirga of Afghan tribesmen 9 Refugees 10 Children in Baluchistan

The photographs for plates 3, 4, 5, 8 and 10 were taken by the author during various visits to Afghanistan. Plates 1(a) and (b)© Alastair Cook; 2 © H.M. Government; 7 ©Camera Press; and 6 and 9 (photographers unknown).

Every effort has been made to trace all the copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publisher will be pleased to make the necessary arrangement at the first oppor• tunity.

Vll Preface

There have been many crises in the modem history of Afghani• stan, though none as serious as the present bitter civil war and Soviet occupation of the towns. Twice in the last century armies from British India invaded, held the capital and some of the towns, trying to impose a ruler upon the fiercely independent tribes- and each time, after initial military successes, the British retreated, leaving the country to its own devices. Even one hundred years ago, when Afghanistan was incom• parably more remote, more backward and much less open to foreign influences, there was plenty of evidence of Russian cultural penetration in Kabul. In 1879, when the army of General Roberts occupied Kabul, its chief wrote:

we found Kabul much more Russian than English. The Afghan Sirdars and officers were arrayed in Russian pattern uniforms, Russian money was found in the treasury, Russian wares were sold in the bazaars, and although the roads leading to were certainly no better than those leading to India, Russia had taken more advantage of them than we had to carry on commercial dealings with Afghanistan.

Roberts did not make the simple mistake of equating Russian or English trade, fashions or influence in Kabul with actual political power in the country as a whole. He clearly saw that Afghan suspicions of foreigners in general were too intense to be ignored:

It may not be very flattering to our amour propre but I feel sure I am right when I say that the less the Afghans see of us, the less they dislike us. Should the Russians attempt to conquer Afghanistan we should have a better chance of attaching the Afghans to our interest if we avoid all interference with them.

viii Preface lX

This same cautious policy of keeping a low profile has been adopted by Soviet troops in the capital, only rarely in evidence by daylight, their tanks kept discreetly out of sight behind public buildings and in military camps on the outskirts of Kabul. There are many other similarities between these chief exponents of European imperialism in Asia, separated though they are by a century of rapid change and fundamental differences in ideology. Just like British military writers in the second Anglo-Afghan war of 1878-80, Russian press and radio have consistently under• rated Afghan military abilities; British troops indignantly declared that it was not mere Afghans but Russian gunners who were raining down accurate fire from Afghan gun emplacements. A century on, the Soviet media denounces the activities of foreign agents from the USA, China, , Britain, and even Israel, rather than admit that 'mere Afghans' are hitting back by acts of sabotage in a nationwide guerrilla war. Yet it is hardly vulgar racism which explains the curious Soviet inability to understand the popular roots of resistance to three successive Marxist Governments in Kabul since April 1978. The need to justify to the world the extent of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan is the key to the intense Soviet propaganda against a largely mythical foreign interference. Neither at the beginning of this involvement, with full Soviet backing for the so-called 'Saur Revolution' of April 1978, let alone after the military adventure of December 1979, and the imposition of Babrak Karma} as Prime Minister, could the official line of the Kremlin afford to admit doubts as to the popular standing of its proteges inside Afghanistan. This was heresy of a particularly damaging and dangerous kind. Viewed from outside, the cruelly destructive warfare may seem a continuation of older rivalries, the latest (and possibly the last) round of the Great Game- as Anglo-Russian imperial expansion into the borderlands of Central Asia came to be known. Such judgements ignore some basic shifts in regional and global power, not only since the independence and partition of India in 194 7, but the gradual rise to pre-eminence in the region of the over the past decade, due to its firm friendship with India and loss of US prestige or even absence of US policy initiatives. If, then, the Russians are playing a game, it is essentially a new game with ground-rules in their favour. X Preface

By now the grim reality of the power struggle going on is plain to see - a poor and underdeveloped country is tearing itself apart, while the world media looks on spasmodically. The full extent of the tragedy affecting the lives of the Afghan people is still only partly known, with very few foreign journalists permitted entry legally, others venturing into provinces lying along Pakistan's borders, with only rumours to inform us of happenings in many regions. The presence of over two million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran is proof of the seriousness of disruption to normal life by the coming of the war into villages. This book attempts to show how the present crisis was reached, to examine the nature of the opposition and governments inside Afghanistan, and to assess the prospects for the country. It demonstrates also how foreign policy decisions taken in Moscow, as well as in Kabul itself, have dictated a course of developments largely responsible for the whole tragedy. Acknowledgements

Initial encouragement and practical help throughout has come from Baqer Moin, David Page and many other friends at Bush House, in the Eastern and other services of the BBC. Evan Charlton helped more than he knew, at Bush House and as editor of the Round Table. I greatly appreciated the interest shown by Louis Dupree, Malcolm Yapp and Peter Hardy at SOAS, and all those associated with ARIN (Afghan Refugee Information Net• work). In Kabul I was received with warmth by many kind people, in particular Allan Baldry, Anna Clare MacAdam, Dick Parsons and Rainer Schlageter, together with many Afghans who must remain unnamed. In Pakistan there was invaluable help from Trevor Wood of Reuters, J-F. Le Mounier of AFP, Sayeed Hasan Khan in Karachi, Mohammad Ikram and Yusuf Lodi in Peshawar. I am very grateful for long discussions and trouble taken by Ghulam Zamarlwal, Hashim Kamali, Aziz Nairn and Rahim Nauroz. For valued criticisms, thanks to Nasir and Helen Saberi. Needless to say, except where otherwise stated, those named above are not responsible for the opinions and conclusions expressed in the following pages, which are my own. Tim Farmiloe has been a patient and helpful editor, along with Isobel Creevy, and I would also like to thank Trevor Mostyn, lately with Macmillan, and Hilary Hyman for drawing the maps.

XI