Indonesia's Lessons for the Middle East and North Africa and Other Emerging Democracies
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Indonesia's Lessons for the Middle East and North Africa and other Emerging Democracies Prepared by Devin Stewart and Joshua Kurlantzick Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs This document may not be fully accessible. For an accessible version, please visit http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/isrop-prisi/research-recherche/intl_security-securite_int/ Report-Indonesias_Lessons.aspx INDONESIA’S LESSONS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA AND OTHER EMERGING DEMOCRACIES Devin Stewart and Joshua Kurlantzick Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, NY, New York Prepared for the International Security Research and Outreach Programme International Security and Intelligence Bureau Summer 2012 2 PREFACE The International Security Research and Outreach Programme (ISROP) is located within the Defence and Security Relations Division of The International Security and Intelligence Bureau. ISROP’s mandate is to provide the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT) with timely, high quality policy relevant research that will inform and support the development of Canada’s international security policy in the areas of North American, regional and multilateral security and defence cooperation, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. The current ISROP research themes can be found at: http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/isrop-prisi/index ISROP regularly commissions research to support the development of Canadian foreign policy by drawing on think-tank and academic networks in Canada and abroad. The following report, Indonesia’s Lessons for The Middle East and North Africa and other Emerging Democracies, is an example of such contract research. Disclaimer: The views and positions expressed in this report are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade or the Government of Canada. The report is in its original language. 3 PRÉAMBULE Le Programme de recherche et d’information dans le domaine de la sécurité internationale (PRISI) fait partie de la Direction des relations de sécurité et de défense, qui relève elle-même de la Direction générale internationale de la sécurité et du renseignement. Ce programme a pour mandat de fournir au Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international (MAÉCI), en temps utile, des études stratégiques pertinentes et de haute qualité qui permettent d’orienter et de soutenir l’élaboration de la politique canadienne en matière de sécurité internationale concernant la coopération nord-américaine, régionale et multilatérale en matière de sécurité et de défense, ainsi que la non-prolifération, le contrôle des armements et le désarmement. Les thèmes de recherches actuels du PRISI figurent à l’adresse suivante : http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/isrop-prisi/index Le PRISI commande régulièrement des études à des groupes de réflexion et à des réseaux d’universitaires au Canada et à l’étranger afin d’appuyer l’élaboration de la politique étrangère canadienne. Le rapport sommaire suivant, intitulé, Leçons tirées de l’expérience de l’Indonésie pour le bénéfice des démocraties émergentes du Moyen Orient, de l’Afrique du Nord et d’ailleurs, est un exemple de ce type d’étude. Déni de responsabilité : Les vues et opinions exprimées dans le présent rapport sont exclusivement celles de l’auteur, et ne reflètent pas nécessairement la position du Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international, ou celle du gouvernement du Canada. Le rapport est présenté dans la langue de rédaction. 4 Executive Summary Over the past decade, Indonesia has accomplished one of the most successful processes of democratization among developing countries, a success made all the more notable by the fact that it has occurred while democracy, throughout the developing world, has been in a period of regression for nearly ten years, according to studies by Freedom House and other analysts. Although the reasons for Indonesia’s transformation are varied, given that it is such a large and diverse country, the authors have concluded that several of Indonesia’s decisions have been critical: ---Empowering local and provincial communities through rapid decentralization of budget resources, elections, and political decision-making. (We use the terms devolution and decentralization essentially interchangeably throughout.) However, this also had the downside of allowing some more militant politicians to take control of local areas, and of allowing paramilitaries to flourish in outlying regions. As decentralization has calmed domestic turmoil, a shift in focus away from exclusively domestic politics also has allowed successive Indonesian governments to devote more of their leading officials to foreign affairs including trade, regional institution-building, and regional nontraditional security issues ----Establishing effective civilian control over the armed forces while not completely destroying the armed forces’ image, history, and central role in society, by allocating them prestige and protecting them from prosecutions. This boosted accountability of the armed forces, allowed the Indonesian government to cull some of the most abusive segments of the army and special forces, and paved the way for greater military-military cooperation with Western democracies. However, in some restive regions like Papua territorial commanders still exercised massive influence with little civilian control. ---Working closely with leading Islamic figures to develop a system of laws that established the primacy of secular criminal law and secular civil law in most cases, while still permitting some degree of flexibility, from province to province, regarding civil law and the influence of Islamic law. ---Obtaining significant amounts of foreign development aid during the transition period, from IFIs as well as bilateral donors, while still maintaining Indonesian leadership of programs that relied on aid dollars. ----Transforming the struggle against militancy into one that can be embraced and supported by local religious, education, and media leaders, as well as by the broader Indonesian public. ---Creating high-level anti-corruption authorities that are largely insulated from political pressure. 5 ---Fostering effective compromise, in the early part of Indonesia’s transition, between emerging political leaders and leaders from the old regime. In essence, a pacted transition designed to control and minimize cleavages within parties and religious groups, and to prevent the state from spinning out of control ----Absorbing the most recalcitrant elements of the prior New Order (Suharto) regime into new state institutions, so that these recalcitrant elements could not threaten the state’s survival. Recommendations for North American policy-makers The lessons of Indonesia’s transition offer several key lessons for North American policy- makers, as they consider how best to assist the potential emerging democracies of the Middle East, North Africa, and other developing regions. Key recommendations include: ---Focus assistance on the initial years of transition, when emerging democracies are most likely to be influenced and foreign aid funding can have the greatest impact. Focus assistance on making the political competitions more level, to prevent the development of a “democracy of the wealthy” as in the Philippines in which nearly the entire Congress is dominated by wealthy landowners and entertainers and businesspeople. ----Increasingly shift the focus of State Department/Foreign Ministry to more effectively engage with civil societies in emerging democracies such as Indonesia and the MENA region. This shift should include Foreign Service officers not only directly engaging with civil society but also helping form links between North American civil society and civil societies in developing nations. Social media is also an effective tool for helping promote these links. ---Minimize the temptation to judge a developing nation’s progress through national elections or the election of one supposedly reformist national-level leader (Yudhoyono, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, etc) ---Instead, develop a broad set of factors to judge developing nations’ success. The Millennium Challenge Corporation has amassed one comprehensive list of such criteria, but it is hardly the last word. Holding national elections alone, however, is but one criterion for success. ---Work with leaders of emerging democracies to more effectively manage the expectations of publics as to how democratization will impact economic growth. Help emerging democracies in MENA and other regions develop cash transfer programs based on models like Indonesia and Brazil to reduce inequality in the early transition period. 6 ---Be humble about the faults and flaws of Western democracies, which are all the more so exposed because of the Western financial crisis and the problems of governance in the U.S. and Western Europe. ---Work with leaders in the Middle East and North Africa to transform the struggle against militancy into one defined more by the local context, local threats, and local police work, than any broader global war against terrorism/militancy. If and when the “localization” of this battle against militancy results in some alleged militants being freed in jury trials (as with Indonesia’s Abu Bakr Bashir), resist the temptation to call for continued, extraconstitutional detention of such militants. ---Publicly affirm emerging democracies that do not