Montenegro's Independence Drive Crisis Group Europe Report N°169, 7 December 2005 Page Ii
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MONTENEGRO’S INDEPENDENCE DRIVE Europe Report N°169 – 7 December 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. MONTENEGRO IN BRIEF.......................................................................................... 2 A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW........................................................................................................2 III. MONTENEGRINS AND SERBS.................................................................................. 4 A. INTERMINGLING....................................................................................................................4 B. R-E-S-P-E-C-T ....................................................................................................................4 IV. STATE UNION POLITICS........................................................................................... 5 A. DIVERGENT PRIORITIES.........................................................................................................6 B. DIVERGENT ECONOMIES .......................................................................................................7 C. A NEAR COLLAPSE ...............................................................................................................8 V. REFERENDUM POLITICS.......................................................................................... 9 A. HOW WILL THEY VOTE?.......................................................................................................9 B. WHO OPPOSES INDEPENDENCE? .........................................................................................10 C. INDEPENDENCE CRITERIA ...................................................................................................11 D. REFERENDUM CRITERIA......................................................................................................12 VI. EU POLICY AND REGIONAL SECURITY ............................................................ 14 A. WILL MONTENEGRIN INDEPENDENCE BE A FORCE FOR INSTABILITY? ................................14 B. WILL MONTENEGRIN INDEPENDENCE AID ORGANISED CRIME?..........................................16 C. THE ARMY-CHURCH AXIS ..................................................................................................16 VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 18 APPENDICES A. MAP OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO....................................................................................19 B. GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ................................................................20 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................21 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON EUROPE ..........................................................22 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ...................................................................................24 M Europe Report N°169 7 December 2005 MONTENEGRO’S INDEPENDENCE DRIVE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Montenegrins are more likely than not to vote in April property and banking sector adjustments – are well ahead 2006 to break away from the State Union of Serbia and of Serbia’s, as demonstrated by higher per capita foreign Montenegro. It is time for the European Union, private investment. These differences are reflected in whose diplomacy in 2001-2002 created the manifestly official EU assessments and in the twin-track Stabilisation dysfunctional confederation, to make clear that it will and Association process the EU recently established. The accept whatever decision Montenegro’s citizens make, Montenegrin government also appears to be cleaning up and encourage those opposing independence to participate its act with respect to organised crime, which has long peacefully in the referendum process. At a time when caused international concern. There is a strong feeling in the international community needs to concentrate on Podgorica that its opportunity to advance faster toward EU resolving Kosovo’s status, it is important for the EU membership is held hostage to Serbia’s often retrograde not to be seen as giving any comfort, inadvertently or policies. otherwise, to those still-dangerous Serbian nationalist forces who may be prepared to risk potentially Against this background, Montenegro’s neighbours (other destabilising actions, not only in Montenegro but than Serbia), the U.S. and a number of EU member states elsewhere in the region. appear relaxed about accepting a referendum’s results: Montenegro seems objectively to fulfil the requirements The State Union’s Constitutional Charter of 4 February the EU used when it recognised the independence of other 2003 permits either party to begin independence former Yugoslav republics, and it has operated as a de procedures as early as February 2006. Opinion polls in facto independent state since 1999. But other EU member Montenegro suggest that pro-independence forces are states and the foreign policy apparatus of the Council likely to prevail, though that is not a foregone conclusion. and the European Commission remain concerned about The State Union appears to be equally unpopular in each independence implications, to the point of pressing of its constituent parts. But the independence question the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission to delay remains sensitive domestically both for nationalist and pronouncing on preconditions for the referendum, emotional reasons, and because of uncertainty about threatening consequences in the Stabilisation and property and pension rights for the many citizens of one Association process, and at least tacitly encouraging the republic who live in the other. And it remains sensitive anti-independence opposition. internationally because of questions about how it would affect the political climate in a still highly nationalist Any effort to freeze the Montenegrin independence issue and significantly unreformed Serbia, the political and until Kosovo’s final status is worked out would risk constitutional climate in a still fragile Bosnia and repeating the mistakes of the early 1990s, when Western Herzegovina, and the diplomatic climate around the reluctance to face up to the impending break-up of Kosovo negotiations that have just begun. Yugoslavia encouraged extremists. Already there are indications that Serbian nationalist elements, in both Those sensitivities notwithstanding, Montenegro has taken Belgrade and Montenegro’s anti-independence opposition, major steps to earn the right to make its own decision interpret EU discomfort as a green light to reject dialogue free of outside pressure. It is the only republic of the with the government, boycott a referendum and possibly former Yugoslavia that has formed a genuinely multi- resort to violence. There are signs that some elements ethnic government without internal conflict. It is also the are discussing the organisation of a secessionist Serbian only one to volunteer reparations for the wars of the Autonomous Region inside Montenegro, a move 1990s, and it enjoys good relations with its neighbours, reminiscent of the precursors to the wars in Bosnia and including Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia and Croatia. Its Croatia. economy has been largely self-sufficient since 1999, and its reforms – privatisation, restitution of nationalised Montenegro's Independence Drive Crisis Group Europe Report N°169, 7 December 2005 Page ii There are risks in Montenegrin independence: probably 2. Encourage the Council of Europe’s Venice the most serious of them is that the immediate reaction in Commission to issue its report on referendum Serbia could be to the political advantage of that republic’s standards by 20 December 2005. most extreme elements. However, at least from a slightly longer-term perspective, resolving Montenegro’s status To the Venice Commission: definitively (likewise Kosovo’s) would be likely on balance to contribute to regional stability by encouraging 3. Issue its report on referendum standards by 20 Serbia – its most essential potential component – to December 2005. concentrate at last on its own internal problems, beginning by finally carrying through advertised reforms of the To the Governments of Montenegro and Serbia: military and security services as well as halting the army’s practice of using Montenegrin ports for smuggling 4. In the event Montenegro chooses independence, weapons, immigrants and other goods into the EU. strive for a “velvet divorce”, including smooth regulation of issues such as dual citizenship, In any event, the EU needs to begin sending a consistent property rights, pensions, taxation, health care, message that should include the basic point that it is labour rights and schooling, and consider whether prepared to accept whatever decision Montenegro’s there are additional areas of common interest in citizens make about their future – provided it is which cooperation should be continued such as done transparently and democratically, pursuant to diplomatic infrastructure and sports. internationally accepted standards. To the Government of Serbia: RECOMMENDATIONS: 5. State publicly that it wishes to maintain good relations with Montenegro regardless of how that To the European Union: republic decides with respect to independence and encourage Montenegro’s