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General Assembly United Nations FIRST COMMITTEE, 833rd GENERAL MEETING ASSEMBLY Tuesday, 5 February 1957, .... ,~ at 3.30 p.m. ELEVENTH SESSION Official Records • New York CONTENTS and the Algerian Moslem Students' Union. The move­ Page ment showed no sign of Communist tendencies. The Agenda item 62: political forces in Algeria were not unified. The French Question of Algeria (continued).... ....... 119 representative was wrong in claiming that there was dissension among the different groups or that the independence movement did not represent the Algerian Chairman: Mr. Victor A. BELAUNDE (Peru). people. The fact that some Algerians preferred to play the part of "collaborators" with France did not alter AGENDA ITEM 62 the truth of that statement. 4. With respect to the elections proposed by the Question of Algeria (A/3197) (continued) French Government, past experience had shown that 1. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria), continuing his state­ the Arabs had every reason to be mistrustful. The ment from the previous meeting, said that the Algerian Algerian movement itself was formed on a democratic liberation movement actually dated from the beginning basis and had every intention of living up to its watch­ of the French occupation. For a century and a. quarter, word: independence, union and progress. In fact, its the movement had shown unconquerable ten-'l.city in the power as a democratic organization came from the face of constant oppression. Over the years it had given people. That power was vested in an elected committee proof of a capacity for organization rarely surpassed by a hierarchic chain which started in the village and in the modern world. Its activity had increased to such town precinct. an extent that at the present time it could be considered 5. It was readily understandable that France's chief practically irreversible. It had been particularly active purpose in describing the Algerian movement as a during the first eighteen years after 1830, when it had Communist movement was to cause it to lose credit been founded, and from 1870 to 1872. In the past, with certain delegations. From a practical point of it had had renowned leaders such as Abd-el-Kader view, it was not a bad thing for a country to acquire among many others, and although active resistance a "red tinge", since without it certain States might had been intermittent, passive resistance had never not be interested in what was happening in Africa or ceased. Today the liberation movement had become a Asia. In actual fact, however, the Algerian movement mass movement thanks to reorganization over the last was a purely patriotic and democratic one. twenty-five years, and particularly since 1945. The 6. As to the Algerian Communist Party, it was under pioneer in that development had been the North African the influence of the French Communist Party, which Star association, founded in 1925. That association, directed it from Paris. The statement by the French which demanded the independence of Arab North representative that a French officer named Maillot Africa, had been dissolved in 1937; subsequently, the had furnished arms to the Algerians did not of itself Algerians had replaced it by the Algerian People's prove that they took orders from the Communist Party, Party. Whatever the French representative might for it was certain that a large part of the arms possessed think, the North African Star had not been a communist by the movement at that time had come from French party, but had maintained close relations with members stores through one channel or another. of French political parties, the Socialist Party, for example. The Algerian People's Party had been officially 7. The structure of the movement consisted of a dissolved in 1939, two years after its formation, and National Council of the Algerian Revolution, with had then begun its underground activity. In 1947, when seventeen members, which directed the movement. the Algerian liberation movement reappeared on the Besides that supreme body, there was a Co-ordination political scene, it was led by the Organization for the Committee, the executive body of the movement, which acted in accordance with the general policy set by the Triumph of Democratic Liberties. The measures taken by France in 1945, leading to the massacre of 45,000 Council. The names of the members and the meeting­ Algerians in one week, precipitated the development place of the Committee were confidential. However, of the movement; it organized a semi-permanent army contrary to what the French representative had said, which took the name "The Special Order". Gradually, none of the five Algerian leaders arrested by the French the movement adapted its methods to the circums­ had belonged to that Committee, and Mr. Ben Bella tances created by French imperialism, which seemed was only a kind of military attache for the movement ready to resort to brute force to solve any problem. outside. Moreover, the Committee did not function in Cairo but in Algeria. The movement had gradually 2. The revolt had broken out on 1 November 1954, organized an army which at the present time was able one week after the French Minister of the Interior had to hold in check half a million French soldiers as well officially announced his satisfaction that the situation as 100,000 armed residents. It was composed of groups in Algeria was calm. split up into sections, the sections in turn being 3. The liberation movement immediately received the organized into successively larger units making up a support of numerous Algerian organizations, such as sectional division, which was directed by the central the trade unions, the Algerian Commerce Association, headquarters of the movement. The most important 119 A/C.l/SR.833 120 General Assembly- Eleventh Session-First Committee unit in the army was the volunteer, who was ready to not even want to accept United Nations intervention sacrifice his life in the cause of truth and justice. So and was trying to deal with the problem unilaterally. far, the army had enrolled only one-tenth of the On the other hand, there was no denying that the only volunteers who had come forward. It was a fact that practical and legitimate objective to be attained was some of them came from France, where they had to ensure for the Algerians a free national life of their settled and received military training in the French own, i.e., their independence, while at the same time Army. The movement also had a civil administration protecting the interests of the residents. The residents for the liberated parts of the country. would be allowed to become Algerians if they wished 8. The Algerian Government had not yet been offi­ or they could remain Frenchmen and continue to live cially recognized by any State, but in fact such a in Algeria, but without enjoying political rights. That Government was virtually in existence and its official objective should be attained gradually by a procedure recognition might be announced by some States if along the following lines. First, France should recognize the French continued to deny Algeria's right to inde­ the right of the Algerians to self-determination and pendence. The existing situation was that France had independence. Secondly, a provisional Algerian Govern­ ceased to govern Algeria-the French residents were ment should be formed which would have the respon­ ruling by means of the French administrative machinery, sibility : in the first place, to enter into negotiations while the Algerian liberation movement was adminis­ with France on behalf of Algeria, the negotiations to tering the liberated territories itself. Thus France be conducted in an atmosphere where some kind of could not be said to have lost a right which legally international supervision would be exercised; in the it had not possessed, and although, like any other dele­ second place, to convene a constituent assembly elected gation, France had the right to discuss the Algerian by universal suffrage; and in the third place, concur­ situation in the General Assembly, it should be remem­ rently with the establishment of a provisional Govern­ bered that it could no longer carry out any political ment, to order a cease-fire and release all prisoners. programme in Algeria because of the simultaneous All acts of repression and resistance would cease as opposition of the Arabs and the residents. soon as the provisional Government was formed and 9. The facts about the Algerian liberation movement Algeria's right to independence was recognized. Thirdly, could be summed up as follows : It was a mass move­ after the Algerian Assembly was convened, the question ment. It was an organized movement with a party, a of establishing lasting and reciprocal contractual rela­ system of civil administration and fighting forces. It tions with France would be considered. Of course, was composed of volunteers who were prepared to the Algerian Assembly would have to incorporate in sacrifice their lives. The volunteers enrolled up to the its constitution provisions for safeguarding the interests present did not amount to more than 10 per cent of and rights of the residents. those who had came forward. It was recognized as 13. Such a procedure implied an understanding be­ the legitimate power in Algeria, not only by the great tween the French Government and the Algerian liber­ majority of the Algerian people, but also by many ation movement. That understanding could be reached States and international conferences; France itself directly or indirectly through talks and negotiations had recognized its authority by negotiating with its such as those held in the past year, for example. representatives. It was democratic in its purpose and Mediation by the Secretary-General of the United organization. The movement was such that it could Nations or by Member States which enjoyed friendly not be changed by French declarations or French relations with France and Algeria might be useful.
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