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2021Usmanphd.Yu Bangor University DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY The Renewal of Hostilities in the Nigerian Delta Region in 2016 and the Failure of the Presidential Amnesty Usman, Yusuf Award date: 2021 Awarding institution: Bangor University Link to publication General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ? Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 07. Oct. 2021 The Renewal of Hostilities in the Nigerian Delta Region in 2016 and the Failure of the Presidential Amnesty Yusuf Usman A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Criminology and Criminal Justice) School of History, Philosophy and Social Sciences College of Arts, Humanities and Business July 2021 1 Dedication To my Mum and Dad 2 Abstract This thesis titled ‘The Renewal of Hostilities in the Nigerian Delta Region in 2016 and the Failure of the Presidential Amnesty’ investigated the renewal of the hostilities, the alleged sponsor(s) of the perpetrators, the impact of their activities on the oil and gas sector and their environment. Opinions explored consist of research participants’ general viewpoints on the presidential amnesty programme. From the creation of PAP to its implementation, it is in some way evident that the PAP was not designed to provide a lasting solution to the Niger Delta conflict. The politicking in the process of its execution has created a mixed reaction among researchers and writers alike. While some researchers identified the many shortcomings of PAP, others question the value of amnesties that ignore past crimes or atrocities committed by militants/combatants. It is argued that attaining peace should not mean overlooking past atrocities and that failure to prosecute those who committed the worst human rights abuses ignores the suffering of their victims, delays long term reconciliation, and propagates a culture of impunity that can contribute to future abuses. The thesis adopts mixed methods because of the growing consensus that combining the approaches is advantageous in revealing different aspects of reality. Self-administered questionnaires were used as an instrument for quantitative data collection. The questionnaires were distributed in each of the six geo-political zones. Out of the 330 distributed, 287 (95%) were returned and upon these numbers (n=287), the quantitative data was presented and analysed. An in-depth interview was the instrument for qualitative data. The qualitative data was analysed manually using thematic content. Among other aspects, the study discovered that some prominent individuals led by one ex- militant leader were the sponsors of the new groups, and that the PAP was designed to enrich political godfathers. Respondents agreed that the PAP was genuinely packaged but got derailed at the implementation stage and suggested re-packaging it. The study points out the role played by the politicians as one important factor why the conflict seems to be reoccurring. 3 Declaration I hereby declare that this thesis is the results of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. All other sources are acknowledged by bibliographic references. This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree unless, as agreed by the University, for approved dual awards. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… Yr wyf drwy hyn yn datgan mai canlyniad fy ymchwil fy hun yw’r thesis hwn, ac eithrio lle nodir yn wahanol. Caiff ffynonellau eraill eu cydnabod gan droednodiadau yn rhoi cyfeiriadau eglur. Nid yw sylwedd y gwaith hwn wedi cael ei dderbyn o’r blaen ar gyfer unrhyw radd, ac nid yw’n cael ei gyflwyno ar yr un pryd mewn ymgeisiaeth am unrhyw radd oni bai ei fod, fel y cytunwyd gan y Brifysgol, am gymwysterau deuol cymeradwy. Yusuf Usman July 2021 4 Table of Contents Dedication ……………………………………………………………………………..……………….…………………... 2 Abstract …………………………………………………………………….………………..……………………………. 3 Declaration ……………………………………………………………….………………………………………………. 4 Acknowledgements ……………………………………………………………..……………………………………… 16 Appendices …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 10 Images ……………………………………………………………………….………...………………….…………………… 10 Tables ……………………………………………………………………………...…………………………..................... 10 Boxes ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………………… 12 Acronyms ………………………………………………………………………...……………………………………………… 12 Chapter One: Introduction 1.1 Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 18 1.2 Background of the study …………………………………………………………………………………………. 22 1.3 Objectives of the study and research questions ………………………………………………………. 27 1.4 Research gap …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 29 1.5 Contextual framework: State Corporate Crime Theory ……………………………………………. 29 1.6 Limitations ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 34 1.7 Overview ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 35 Chapter Two: The Nigerian State and its dependence on the oil and gas sector. 2.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 38 5 2.2 The Nigerian state ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 38 2.2.1. The Niger Delta region ……………………………………………………………………………………… 40 2.2.2 The six geo-political zones ………………………………………………………………………………. 43 2.3 The Nigerian economy ………………………………………………………………………………………… 46 2.4 The political system ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 48 2.5 The legal system …………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 51 2.6 Discovery of oil in Nigeria ………………………………………………………………………………………… 55 2.6.1 Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC)/Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 57 2.7 Multinational oil companies and the Niger Delta environment ………………………………….. 62 2.8 Oil spills compensation in the Niger Delta region ……………………………………………………….. 66 2.8.1 National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) and the Bonga oil spill ….. 67 2.8.2 Global oil spills, Niger Delta oil spills and payment of compensation ………………………. 70 2.9 Gas flaring in the Niger Delta region ………………………………………………………………………….. 72 2.10 Effect of gas flaring on population, health and the environment ……………………………. 73 2.11 Multinational oil companies and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) …………………….. 75 2.12 Summary ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 77 Chapter Three: Struggle for justice and emergence of the Presidential Amnesty Programme 3.1 Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 78 3.2 Struggle for justice and emergence of armed conflict in the Niger Delta region ……….. 78 3.3 Background to the Presidential amnesty programme (PAP) …………………………………….. 83 6 3.4 Presidential Amnesty programme under Umaru Musa Yar’adua: Ledum Mitee Report of 2008 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 84 3.5 Implementation of Presidential Amnesty programme under Goodluck Ebele Jonathan …. 87 3.6 Presidential Amnesty Programme/Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration: Failure or success? ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 88 3.7 Summary …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 95 Chapter Four: Niger Delta violence – Terrorism, militancy or criminality? 4.1 Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 96 4.2 The term crime/criminal, terrorism/terrorist and militant …………………………………….. 96 4.3 Classification of armed and non-armed groups in the Niger Delta region ……………… 103 4.4 Emergence of Niger Delta militants/armed groups ……………………………………………….. 104 4.5 From ordinary gang leaders to superrich ex-militants ……………………………………………. 105 4.5.1 Mujahid Asari Dokubo, Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF)……………………………………………………………………………………… 106 4.5.2 Atake Tom, Icelander and the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) ……………………………………… 107 4.5.3 Government Ekpemupolo (Tompolo), Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Youths (FNDIY) and Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) ………………………………. 109 4.6 Selected key events that assisted the emergence of militants/armed groups …………… 112 4.7 Amnesty in Rivers State ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 121 4.8 The link between Niger Delta militants, cult, armed groups and politicians ……………. 123 4.9 Summary ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 125 7 Chapter Five: A few getting rich at the expense of their environment. Negative activities of militants on the oil and gas sector. 5.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 126 5.2 Niger Delta militants and kidnapping …………………………………………………………………… 127 5.3 Militant activities and the reduction of multinational oil company’s employees ………. 128 5.4 Niger Delta militants, gangs and piracy on the coast of Nigeria ……………………………. 128 5.5 Niger Delta militants and oil theft or oil bunkering ……………………………………………… 132 5.6 Niger Delta militants and illegal oil refineries …………………………………………………………. 135 5.7 Oil, Niger Delta militants, MASSOB, IPOB and the
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