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MAX Security Report Intel@Max-Security.Com +44 203 540 0434 MAX Security Report [email protected] +44 203 540 0434 Politics Zimbabwe Alert (UPDATE): Zanu-PF provincial 17 bodies, war veterans call for Mugabe’s NOV removal, as pro-military rallies planned in 18:44 UTC Harare on November 18; minimize movement Please be advised Reports indicate that all ten of the ruling Zanu-PF party’s provincial branches have passed no- confidence motions against President Robert Mugabe and called upon the party’s Central Committee to remove Mugabe from office on November 17. Additionally, reports indicate that Chris Mutsvangwa, the chairman of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans’ Association (ZNLWVA), said in a press conference on November 17 that President Robert Mugabe must step down allow the military to move forward. Mutsvangwa further called upon the Zimbabwean people to gather at a rally in solidarity with the Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF) at the Zimbabwe Grounds in Harare on November 18. Rally notices published by civil society social media accounts suggest that additional demonstrations will take place at Robert Mugabe Square, also known as Freedom Square, as well as the State House in Harare, to begin at 10:00 (local time). page 1 / 4 page 2 / 4 In a statement broadcasted on state media on the morning of November 17, the ZDF said that military leaders were continuing to engage with “Commander-in-Chief” Robert Mugabe regarding the next steps ahead. They further added that they had made progress in their “operation to weed out criminals around” Mugabe, who had been “committing crimes that were causing social and economic suffering in Zimbabwe.” Unconfirmed reports from late on November 16 indicate that Mugabe had agreed to step down as party leader in December during the Zanu-PF and then leave office when his term is due to expire in 2018. However, sources citing anonymous Zanu-PF officials suggest that, should Mugabe continue to refuse to resign, party leaders intend to remove from the Zanu-PF by November 19, and then move to impeach him on November 21, when Parliament is slated to reconvene. President Mugabe made his first public appearance since the military intervention began, attending a graduation ceremony at Zimbabwe Open University in Harare on November 17. Assessments & Forecast 1. The reported political developments within Zanu-PF as the provincial bodies passed motions of no-confidence against President Mugabe are among the most significant developments since the military intervention began. This appears to support the unnamed party official who said that Mugabe would be formally forced out of the party within days, and further indicates that Zanu-PF has fallen in line with the military to work toward the removal of Mugabe from office and the likely reinstatement of former Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa in his position, potentially as the interim leader going forward. While the potential timeline that was stated by the anonymous official appears to be a legitimate possibility, with Parliament reportedly scheduled to reconvene, the situation continues remain highly uncertain, particularly regarding President Mugabe’s own decision-making going forward. 2. At the same time, the statement by the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans’ Association (ZNLWVA) is likewise significant given the role that war veterans play in Zimbabwean society. This support for Mugabe’s removal was expected as the ZNLWVA has had repeated conflicts and controversies with the Mugabe government, often over the same issue of Grace Mugabe, and are further known to fully support Mnangagwa. Regardless, the public call by the ZNLWVA for Mugabe to resign and allow the military to move the country forward adds yet another public voice in support of the ZDF and its intervention. 3. However, despite the provincial votes, it is likely that there remains some element of opposition to the military intervention both within the political establishment as well as broadly across the country. There likely remains those who supported First Lady Grace Mugabe’s bid to succeed President Mugabe, though with many of her supporters arrested or purged by the ZDF, this internal opposition is evidently silenced for the time being. In tandem, Mugabe still has broad support throughout the rural and outlying regions of the country, and may have followers who disapprove of the conduct of his removal from office. The ZDF was likely attempting to address Mugabe’s popular status by continuing to refer to him as “Commander-in-Chief” as well as allowing Mugabe to attend the graduation ceremony in Harare as had over past years. 4. FORECAST: The situation in Harare has been broadly calm since the initial steps that the ZDF took in order to seize control during the early morning of November 15, with reports of residents continuing to go about their business in the city. In this context, the planned rallies will represent the largest public gatherings following the military intervention, and may serve as one measure of the level of support for the ZDF. Furthermore, as Harare has long been regarded as an opposition stronghold, to an extent, the rallies are likely to see thousands of people in attendance. Given that the demonstrations are in support of the military, which is deployed throughout Harare, it is likely that the events will be fairly peaceful. However, given the volatile political situation and unknown factors such as possible discontent within the police or other security forces as well as other elements of the public, there remains a distinct potential for unrest and other instances of violence. page 3 / 4 Recommendations 1. We continue to advise those operating or residing in Harare to minimize movement throughout the city over the coming hours and days given the volatile political situation and potential for escalation. 2. Avoid all travel to Zimbabwe Grounds, Robert Mugabe Square, the State House, and any other gatherings on November 18 given the slated rallies and potential for unrest. 3. For any further questions or consultation, please contact us at [email protected] or +44 203 540 0434. page 4 / 4 Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org).
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