DOCSLIB.ORG

13Rd Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
13Rd Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 1st APRIL 1942 —31st MARCH 1943 BASLE Autumn 1943 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. Introduction 5 II. Exchange Rates, Foreign Trade and Commodity Prices: (1) Exchange Rates 39 (2) Foreign Trade 60 (3) Price Movements . 83 III. Production and Movements of Gold: (1) Supply of Gold 113 (2) Movements of Gold 118 IV. Lend-Lease, British Disinvestment and European Clearings 132 V. Government Finance, Money and Capital Markets and the Stock Exchanges: (1) Government Finance, Money and Capital Markets 170 (2) Share Markets 280 VI. Central Banking and Currency Developments 291 VII. Current Activities of the Bank 321 VIII. Conclusion 328 ANNEXES I. Balance sheet as at March 31, 1943. II. Profit and Loss Account and Appropriation Account for the financial year ended March 31, 1943. THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS announced at the ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING held at Basle, 16th June 1943. The President has the honour to submit herewith the Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements for the thirteenth financial year, beginning 1st April 1942 and ending 31st March 1943. The results of the year's business operations are set out in detail in Chapter VII. Net profits, after provision for contingencies, amount to 4,508,953.89 Swiss gold francs. After the allocation to the Legal Reserve that is required by Article 53 of the Statutes, to an amount equal to 5 per cent, of the net profits, i. e. 225,447.69 Swiss gold francs, there remain 4,283,506.20 Swiss gold francs available towards the payment of a dividend. This sum together with the balance in the Dividend Reserve Fund amounting to 1,626,940.33 Swiss gold francs — in all 5,910,446.53 Swiss gold francs — permits the distribution of a dividend of 29.55 Swiss gold francs per share. At the end of the financial year the balance-sheet total was 483.4 million Swiss gold francs, as compared with 476.6 million Swiss gold francs on 31st March 1942. Although the total of the Bank's balance sheet has thus risen slightly, there has again been some curtailment in current business after the substantial reductions which occurred in the first two years of the war. Such operations as are still possible, including the management of the Bank's investments on various markets and certain transactions for the Red Cross, now usually call for much more detailed work than in the past, on account of the great mass of new regulations to which international payments have been subjected and other difficulties which have to be overcome. In its activities, the Bank has continued to adhere to the principles of scrupulous neutrality which it laid down for itself in the autumn of 1939, avoiding all transactions whereby any question could possibly arise of conferring economic or financial advantages on a belligerent nation to the detriment of another. From the very outbreak of hostilities it was generally realised that war in modern conditions demands the utmost effort, both civilian and military, from belligerent nations and that state direction of economic life was involved on a scale surpassing anything known in the past. It would even be an understatement to say that in matters of government control the present war started where the last one left off, since in many fields lacunae which were still embarrassing the administrations of 1918 were this time dealt with immediately the war began, one notable example being the early imposition of exchange control. While the present struggle was thus a total war from its very beginning, with each year that it has been prolonged and with each extension of its compass there has been a further intensification of effort, through which, so to speak, higher and higher degrees of totality have been attained.* In the field of foreign commerce government direction is everywhere supreme, trade being subject to priorities, import and export permits, rationing of foreign exchange and allocation of transport facilities, while premiums and special charges have been introduced to "equalise" prices at home and abroad and thus assist the movement of goods in directions where otherwise the price differential would be prohibitive or would exert an undesirable influence on the price structure. The methods of control are many but the result is one: private business, tied by governmental restrictions, is made to function more and more for official account. Through economic warfare — the blockade, the counter-blockade and all the measures supplementary thereto — the world has become divided into quasi-watertight compartments, with only a few trickles of trade being allowed to pass through the barriers, as, for instance, imports and exports to and from Sweden via Gothenburg and to and from Switzerland via Portuguese, Spanish and Italian ports, these ship- ments requiring permits from the belligerents on both sides. In the winter of 1941-42 the pattern of world trade was suddenly changed in a large measure by the extension of Japanese domination in the south and south-western Pacific. This made it necessary for many countries either to seek alternative sources of supply, for instance in Latin America, or to embark upon the production of substitutes at home; an outstanding example of such production is the manufacture of artificial rubber in the United States at a rate estimated at 250,000 to 275,000 long tons in 1943, compared with peacetime requirements of natural rubber amounting to 410,000 long tons in 1938. Another important change in the international movement of goods has been the increase in lend-lease deliveries, not less than 60 per cent, of the total exports of the United States in 1942 being on lend-lease account. On the other hand, foreign trade inside the continent of Europe showed little change in 1942, credits through the clearing mechanism being on about the same scale as in the previous year. In its economic policy each belligerent country must aim at a maximum utilisation of its human and material resources. Under the influence of cost and price changes in markets still comparatively competitive, the man- power of a nation could in peacetime be left more or less free to distribute * The war has brought the suppression of a number of statistical series, in particular those relating to commodity stocks and other matters on which information might be considered of value to the enemy; and, for much the same reasons, the greater part of the new material collected for official purposes connected with the war effort has not been published. But a considerable volume of reliable statistical material has remained, although not always easily available: especially as regards monetary and financial developments is much of the information normally received in peacetime still to hand; indeed, in a number of cases, regular publication has been resumed after an initial suspension, e. g. of certain central-bank returns. y itself among the various occupations open to it; but, in time of war, the government itself must necessarily determine what groups have to be drafted for service in the armed forces and it must further try to prevent, or at least to limit, the rise in prices which would normally be the result of its own increased demand for goods and services. In some countries higher prices and pay have no doubt been helpful factors in the transformation of production, including the regrouping of labour; but, with the intensifi- cation of the war effort, the driving force has increasingly been supplied by government direction, exerting its influence through a whole series of economic measures: • (i) The mobilisation of the last reserves of manpower includes (in addition to the use of foreign workers, which has been important in Germany), the reabsorption of the unemployed, the lengthening of hours of work, the postponement of retirement, the earlier active employment of young people and — as not the least important measure — the greater empjoyment of women in all kinds of occupations. Experience in more than one industry has shown that women often equal men in efficiency and sometimes even surpass them. In Germany, where 50 per cent, more women were working in trade and industry in 1939 than in 1932, the war at first brought a decline in the employment of women (mainly as a result of the many marriages) ; but the figure began to rise again in 1940, so that by 1942 1.3 million more women were employed than at the outbreak of war (and early in 1943 there was a further enlistment in order to set more men free for active service or armament production). By the end of 1942 foreign workers (including prisoners of war) represented 17 per cent, of those employed in industry in Germany, it being estimated that the effective yield of foreign labour was on an average about 80 per cent, of that of German workers. That in times of heavy rearmament and war there is an urgent need for manpower is but another way of stating the fact that at such times unemployment has ceased to be a problem. In the United States, for instance, there were about 7 million more people employed in the autumn of 1942 than in the summer of 1939 and during the same interval the actual working week in manufacturing establishments had been lengthened by about one-seventh. In this as in other countries heavy new orders by the state, financed to the extent of one-half or more by additions to the public debt, provide a definite outlet for productive capacity; commodity prices — whether strictly controlled or not — are fixed so as to allow full remuneration of costs ; and the redundant purchasing power in the hands of the public makes it possible to sell almost anything, while the standard of living in civilian life is necessarily pressed down.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • World War II: Moments in Our Family
    Georgia State University ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University English Honors Theses Department of English 9-11-2006 World War II: Moments in our Family Yvonne Richter Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/english_hontheses Recommended Citation Richter, Yvonne, "World War II: Moments in our Family." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2006. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/english_hontheses/1 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of English at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in English Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. WORLD WAR II: MOMENTS IN OUR FAMILY by YVONNE NICOLE RICHTER Under the Direction of Josh Russell ABSTRACT This thesis explores the history of one German family during World War II, using the inspiration and background knowledge gained from historic scholarship and literature to create narratives closely following actual experiences and memories to help understand the peculiarities of war narrative and war memory. The sources are interviews with relatives, existing literature on the subject matter, and the writer’s imagination. INDEX WORDS: World War II, Refugees, Vertreibung, Silesia, Germany, Paderborn, Silesia, Germany, Paderborn, Red Army, Children, Adolescents, Firebombing, Ratibor, Gestapo WORLD WAR II: MOMENTS IN OUR FAMILY by YVONNE NICOLE RICHTER An Honors Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfi llment of the
    [Show full text]
  • The Crisis Manager the Jacobsohn Era, 1914 –1938 INTRODUCTION
    CHRONICLE 05 The crisis manager The Jacobsohn era, 1914 –1938 INTRODUCTION From the First World War to National Socialism A world in turmoil “Carpe diem” – seize the day. This Latin motto is carved over their positions. Beyond the factory gates, things on the gravestone of Dr. Willy Jacobsohn in Los Angeles were also far from peaceful: German society took a long and captures the essence of his life admirably. Given time to recover from the war. The period up until the the decades spanned by Jacobsohn’s career, this out- end of 1923 was scourged by unemployment, food and look on everyday life made a lot of sense: after all, housing shortages, and high inflation. The “Golden his career at Beiersdorf took place during what was Twenties” offered a brief respite, but even in the heyday arguably the most turbulent period in European history. of Germany’s first democracy, racist and anti-Semitic In fact, there are quite a few historians who describe feelings were simmering below the surface in society the period between 1914 and 1945 as the “second and politics, erupting in 1933 when the National Socia- Thirty Years War.” lists came to power. Jewish businessman Jacobsohn The First World War broke out shortly after Jacob- was no longer able to remain in Germany and, five years sohn joined the company in 1914. Although the war later, was even forced to leave Europe for America. ended four years later, Beiersdorf continued to suffer However, by then he had succeeded in stabilizing the crisis after crisis. Dr. Oscar Troplowitz and Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Services Offered at the Branches of the Deutsche Bundesbank to The
    Addresses and contact details The addresses, contact details and opening times of the Deutsche Bundesbank's branches can be found at the following link. www.bundesbank.de/branches Services offered to the general public Exchanging DM for euro It is possible to exchange unlimited amounts of DM for euro indefinitely and free of charge. We reserve the right to accept larger amounts of currency against temporary receipt and pay out the equivalent value established after processing at a later date. There is also the option of sending DM cash by post – at your own risk – to our branch in Mainz. You can find further information at www.bundesbank.de/dm_eur_exchange Exchanging euro banknotes and coins (in reasonable household quantities; not for commercial purposes) Private customers have the option of exchanging euro banknotes and coins for other denominations in reasonable household quantities (unsorted and unrolled coins) free of charge. We reserve the right to accept larger amounts of currency (particularly coins) against temporary receipt and pay out the equivalent value established after processing at a later date. Replacing damaged cash As a general rule, we will replace damaged euro and DM banknotes if more than half of the note is presented. Deliberately damaged euro banknotes will not be replaced. The same applies to euro and DM banknotes that have already been exchanged and devalued by a Bundesbank branch. All other banknotes can be submitted by filing an application for reimbursement. The Bundesbank will also replace damaged coins denominated in DM (pfennig), regular issue coins denominated in euro (cent) and German euro collectors' coins, provided they have not been counterfeited, do not contain holes and have not been altered in any way other than through normal use.
    [Show full text]
  • Small State Autonomy in Hierarchical Regimes. the Case of Bulgaria in the German and Soviet Spheres of Influence 1933 – 1956
    Small State Autonomy in Hierarchical Regimes. The Case of Bulgaria in the German and Soviet Spheres of Influence 1933 – 1956 By Vera Asenova Submitted to Central European University Doctoral School of Political Science, Public Policy and International Relations In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Supervisor: Prof. Julius Horváth Budapest, Hungary November 2013 Statement I hereby state that the thesis contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions. The thesis contains no materials previously written and/or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgement is made in the form of bibliographical reference. Vera Asenova ………………... ii Abstract This thesis studies international cooperation between a small and a big state in the framework of administered international trade regimes. It discusses the short-term economic goals and long-term institutional effects of international rules on domestic politics of small states. A central concept is the concept of authority in hierarchical relations as defined by Lake, 2009. Authority is granted by the small state in the course of interaction with the hegemonic state, but authority is also utilized by the latter in order to attract small partners and to create positive expectations from cooperation. The main research question is how do small states trade their own authority for economic gains in relations with foreign governments and with local actors. This question is about the relationship between international and domestic hierarchies and the structural continuities that result from international cooperation. The contested relationship between foreign authority and domestic institutions is examined through the experience of Bulgaria under two different international trade regimes – the German economic sphere in the 1930’s and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in the early 1950’s.
    [Show full text]
  • The Ends of Four Big Inflations
    This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Inflation: Causes and Effects Volume Author/Editor: Robert E. Hall Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press Volume ISBN: 0-226-31323-9 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/hall82-1 Publication Date: 1982 Chapter Title: The Ends of Four Big Inflations Chapter Author: Thomas J. Sargent Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11452 Chapter pages in book: (p. 41 - 98) The Ends of Four Big Inflations Thomas J. Sargent 2.1 Introduction Since the middle 1960s, many Western economies have experienced persistent and growing rates of inflation. Some prominent economists and statesmen have become convinced that this inflation has a stubborn, self-sustaining momentum and that either it simply is not susceptible to cure by conventional measures of monetary and fiscal restraint or, in terms of the consequent widespread and sustained unemployment, the cost of eradicating inflation by monetary and fiscal measures would be prohibitively high. It is often claimed that there is an underlying rate of inflation which responds slowly, if at all, to restrictive monetary and fiscal measures.1 Evidently, this underlying rate of inflation is the rate of inflation that firms and workers have come to expect will prevail in the future. There is momentum in this process because firms and workers supposedly form their expectations by extrapolating past rates of inflation into the future. If this is true, the years from the middle 1960s to the early 1980s have left firms and workers with a legacy of high expected rates of inflation which promise to respond only slowly, if at all, to restrictive monetary and fiscal policy actions.
    [Show full text]
  • The Berlin Stock Exchange in the “Great Disorder” Stephanie Collet (Deutsche Bundesbank) and Caroline Fohlin (Emory University and CEPR London) Plan for the Talk
    The Berlin Stock Exchange in the “Great Disorder” Stephanie Collet (Deutsche Bundesbank) and Caroline Fohlin (Emory University and CEPR London) Plan for the talk • Background on “The Great Disorder” • Microstructure of the Berlin Stock Exchange • Data & Methods • Results: 1. Market Activity 2. Order Imbalance 3. Direction of Trade—excess supply v. demand 4. Volatility of returns 5. Market illiquidity—Roll measure “The Great Disorder” Median Share Price and C&F100, 1921-30 (Daily) 1000000000.00 From the end of World War I to the Great Depression 100000000.00 • Political upheaval: 10000000.00 • Abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II Median C&F100 1000000.00 • Founding of the Weimar Republic • Rise of the Nazi party 100000.00 • Economic upheaval: • Massive war debt and reparations 10000.00 Percent of par value of par Percent • Loss of productive capacity (and land) 1000.00 • Monetary upheaval: • Hyperinflation and its end 100.00 • Reichsbank policy regime changes 10.00 • Financial upheaval: • Boom in corporate foundations 1.00 • 1927 stock market “bubble” and collapse (Black Friday, 13. May 1927) Date Early 20’s Run-up to Hyperinflation Median Share Price in the Early Stages of Inflation, 1921-22 (Daily) 1600.00 1400.00 “London Assassination of 1200.00 Ultimatum” on foreign minister, reparations Walther Rathenau 1000.00 800.00 reparations set at 132 billion 600.00 gold marks Percent of par value parof Percent 400.00 Germany demands 200.00 Median C&F100 moratorium on reparation payments 0.00 Date Political Event Economic/Reparations Event Financial/Monetary Event The Hyperinflation Median Share Price and C&F100 During the Peak Hyperinflation, Median October 1922-December 1923 (Daily) C&F100 1000000000.00 Hilter's 100000000.00 beer hall putsch, 10000000.00 Occupation Munich of Ruhr 1000000.00 15.
    [Show full text]
  • World Bank Document
    I NTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUGTImr AIID DEY2LOP11Eifr ECONOMIC DEPARTMENt ,-------------- Public Disclosure Authorized 68047 Public Disclosure Authorized THE CURRENCY REFORH II~ T' m; i.rr.srLFU~ ZO IRS Public Disclosure Authorized Prepared b,y: Svend Andersen August :;iJ, 1948 Public Disclosure Authorized THE CURRENCY REFORM IN THE HESTER:tLZONES OF GERHANY ?umma~I and Gonclu~ions Judged by the initial effects, the currency reform in Hestern Germany has been a fair success. Roughly nine-tenths of the war inflated money volume has been eliminated. Hoarded goods have re-appeared in the shops, the black market has been dealt a damaging blow, and the rene\ved incentives to earn money have caused absenteeism to disappea.r. Vlith one stroke a money economy has been restored. Furthermore the influx of raw materials has increased through the ECA, the food situation has improved thanks to both ECA and the weather, and finally Germany has been incor­ porated in the plans for expansion of inter-European trade. Prospects for a sUbstantial increase in the present level of production, which is only half of pre-war, should therefore be fairly good. On the purely monetary side, the means are available to prevent both exaggerated deflation and renewed inflation. However, this relatively bright picture has many dark spots. Not only are there a number of "ifs" on the production side, but equilibrium between the income level and the flow of consumer's goods has not yet been reached. When the extreme scarcity of money immediately fo11ouing the reform has been mitigated, the question will arise whether production can be stepped up quickly enough to prevent an excessive increase in the price level, now largely free from controls.
    [Show full text]
  • Common Currencies: Precedents and Prospects
    NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Volume 4 Number 1 Article 3 Summer 1978 Common Currencies: Precedents and Prospects Frank A. Southard Jr. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Frank A. Southard Jr., Common Currencies: Precedents and Prospects, 4 N.C. J. INT'L L. 1 (1978). Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol4/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Common Currencies: Precedents and Prospects by Frank A. Southard, Jr.* A common currency emerges when two or more political units use the same currency as their sole or predominant legal tender. It may be issued by one political unit (an independent country or a political de- pendency) and made legal tender in one or several other units, or it may be issued by an institution common to all the participating units. A common currency is to be distinguished from a monetary agree- ment by which a group of countries provides for some degree of inter- change of their currencies. 1 However, the distinction between the two becomes narrow in some cases. The Latin Monetary Union, organized in 1865 by Belgium, France, Italy and Switzerland, provided for standard coins which all public offices were required to accept, even though they were separately minted by each country.
    [Show full text]
  • The Politics of Central Banking in Thailand, 1942-1997 Supanai
    Unpopular Guardian The Politics of Central Banking in Thailand, 1942-1997 by Supanai Sookmark A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science Carleton University © 2009 by Supanai Sookmark All Rights Reserved Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Library and Bibliotheque et 1*1 Archives Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-52067-3 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-52067-3 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives and Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par Nntemet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans loan, distribute and sell theses le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, worldwide, for commercial or non­ sur support microforme, papier, electronique commercial purposes, in microform, et/ou autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. this thesis. Neither the thesis Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de nor substantial extracts from it celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement may be printed or otherwise reproduits sans son autorisation.
    [Show full text]
  • German Monetary History in the First Half of the Twentieth Century
    CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by Research Papers in Economics German Monetary History in the First Half of the Twentieth Century Robert L. Hetzel t the end of 1998, the German Bundesbank turned over the adminis- tration of monetary policy to the European Central Bank (ECB). In Athe years between World War I and 1998, the Bundesbank had come to embody the modern central bank. What history did Germany traverse to make possible the creation of such an institution? And how does that history help us define a modern central bank? Today, a central bank chooses one of two objectives. It may target either the exchange rate or domestic economic conditions, including the inflation rate. In either case, the central bank is the unique institution charged with controlling the chosen objective. Such control relies exclusively on the central bank’s management of its own balance sheet. In particular, the central bank controls its liabilities (the monetary base) through its asset acquisition.1 Conversely, a country with a modern central bank does not rely on govern- ment intervention in specific markets to achieve either price-level or exchange- rate objectives. If the central bank targets the exchange rate, the country does not rely on exchange controls, multiple exchange rates, tariffs, quotas, or other This history will be continued in a related article, to appear in a future issue of the Economic Quarterly. It will consider how Germany came to define stability of the mark in terms of its internal value (price level) rather than external value (exchange rate).
    [Show full text]
  • CURRENCY BOARD FINANCIAL STATEMENTS Currency Board Working Paper
    SAE./No.22/December 2014 Studies in Applied Economics CURRENCY BOARD FINANCIAL STATEMENTS Currency Board Working Paper Nicholas Krus and Kurt Schuler Johns Hopkins Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and Study of Business Enterprise & Center for Financial Stability Currency Board Financial Statements First version, December 2014 By Nicholas Krus and Kurt Schuler Paper and accompanying spreadsheets copyright 2014 by Nicholas Krus and Kurt Schuler. All rights reserved. Spreadsheets previously issued by other researchers are used by permission. About the series The Studies in Applied Economics of the Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health and the Study of Business Enterprise are under the general direction of Professor Steve H. Hanke, co-director of the Institute ([email protected]). This study is one in a series on currency boards for the Institute’s Currency Board Project. The series will fill gaps in the history, statistics, and scholarship of currency boards. This study is issued jointly with the Center for Financial Stability. The main summary data series will eventually be available in the Center’s Historical Financial Statistics data set. About the authors Nicholas Krus ([email protected]) is an Associate Analyst at Warner Music Group in New York. He has a bachelor’s degree in economics from The Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, where he also worked as a research assistant at the Institute for Applied Economics and the Study of Business Enterprise and did most of his research for this paper. Kurt Schuler ([email protected]) is Senior Fellow in Financial History at the Center for Financial Stability in New York.
    [Show full text]
  • Made in Germany : the German Currency Crisis of July 1931
    Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from Boston Library Consortium Member Libraries http://www.archive.org/details/madeingermanygerOOferg 31 DEWEY 415 01- 1 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Economics Working Paper Series MADE IN GERMANY: THE GERMAN CURRENCY CRISIS OF JULY 1931 Thomas Ferguson Peter Temin Working Paper 01 -07 February 2001 Room E52-251 50 Memorial Drive Cambridge, MA 02142 This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network Paper Collection at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf7abstract id=260993 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Economics Working Paper Series MADE IN GERMANY: THE GERMAN CURRENCY CRISIS OF JULY 1931 Thomas Ferguson Peter Temin Working Paper 01 -07 February 2001 Room E52-251 50 Memorial Drive Cambridge, MA 02142 This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network Paper Collection at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf7abstract id=260993 MASSACHUSEnslNSTiTUTT _OFTECHWL0GY AUG 2 2 2001 LIBRARIES Made in Germany: The German Currency Crisis of July, 1931 Thomas Ferguson and Peter Temin* February, 2001 Abstract The Great Depression reached a turning point in the currency crises of 1931, and the German banking and currency crisis was a critical event whose causes are still debated. We demonstrate in this paper that the crisis was primarily domestic in origin; that it was a currency crisis rather than a banking crisis; and that the failure was more political than economic. We clarify the arguments involved as we present this view. German banks failed in 1931, but the problem was not primarily with them.
    [Show full text]