Regarding HMS Hood and the Battle of Denmark Strait By Buzz Beurling

So this post is here.. ...to answer the questions that keep getting posed and to put right some myths. Firstly a bit of background history. I see it time after time people comparing HMS Hood's loss to those of the ships at Jutland. Aside from the fact that all the ships we are talking about exploded THERE IS NO COMPARISON. The armoured cruisers HMS Defence and HMS Warrior were battered at such close range they were annihilated. It's hardly surprising what happened. All three of the at Jutland were lost to UNSAFE AMMO HANDLING PRACTICES, where stacks of unprotected cordite were piled up just inside the magazine doors, which were then left open throughout combat. Had this not been done ( and this was proven with the Q turret hit to HMS Lion ) NONE OF THE BATTLECRUISERS AT JUTLAND WOULD HAVE BEEN LOST. Also not one was lost to plunging fire or any weakness in their decks. The ships of both fleets were simply too close to each other. Now it would be helpful to explain that all Naval gunfire has a plunging aspect. That is how they work. When we refer to plunging fire we are talking about a shell incoming at such an angle as to be able to pierce the decks of a warship. On the largest ships this would have to be above 20 to 25 degrees descent angle to penetrate. Higher velocity guns fire at a flatter trajectory than lower velocity guns. Now in the case of HMS Hood there was nothing similar to what happened at Jutland. British ammo handling practices had been wholly and completely changed after Jutland and this did NOT happen again. So with the Jutland part out of the way... let's get onto HMS Hood herself. After the , HMS Hood's build was stopped. She was totally redesigned with the addition of 5000 tons of extra armour and her keel was re-laid 3 months later on the 1st September 1916. She had with the various additions, in all reality, ceased to be a . She kept the DESIGNATION as Battlecruiser right up until WW2. The designation for a "Fast Battleship" ( that being a Capital Warship with the speed of a Battlecruiser, but the protection of a full Battleship) was Battlecruiser. (See Note 1 in Appendix 1 on Fast Battleships and Battlecruisers and Note 2 in Appendix 1 on BB and BC Armour differences) To put this into perspective the G3 Battlecruisers, had they been built, would have been the most powerful Warships on the planet. Yet due to their speed they were DESIGNATED Battlecruisers. The same would have applied had the RN built the Iowa class in the 20's. In fact, when HMS Hood was commissioned she was pretty much the most powerful single capital unit on the planet. She was the most heavily armoured and protected warship in the RN until the launch of the Nelson class, with protection in vertical, , and underwater, wholly superior to that of the Queen Elizabeth class. There are multiple sources for this, including the DNC and the Admiralty, her designer D’Eyncourt and can be found in books by Maurice Northcott, Raven and Roberts, and Friedman, not to mention any actual study of Hood’s design and specs. Now jump to 1941. HMS Hood was 21 years old and well overdue for a major refit/rebuild. We have a vague idea what this would have entailed ( looking at HMS Renown is a good starter), but the ideas were only vaguely written down and no official plans yet drawn up. HMS Hood was struggling with her engineering plant ( the boilers were past due, but her turbines were still good ) and her fire control was overdue updating. However she was still faster than the KGV's , and had one of the finest and best trained crews in

Page 1 FINAL Regarding HMS Hood and the Battle of Denmark Strait By Buzz Beurling the RN. She was a Battleship and as such, she was expected to be used to engage enemy capital units when needed. The main reason for her not getting this refit earlier ( other than the obvious flying the flag escapades and the start of WW2 ) was simply because she was considered far stronger than any of the older ships, and as such the older ships were prioritized modernizing. Bismarck herself although more modern, was riddled with her own flaws. Her decks were just as vulnerable to plunging fire, her armour was barely superior to Hood's, in fact she had a similar main belt, and she was vulnerable to mission kill due to not adequately protecting her communications equipment ( this is the briefest of summaries ). In no way shape or form was HMS Hood incapable of taking her on. Comments such as "she should never have been there" are frankly ridiculous. She wasn't there on her own. There were 2 county class cruisers and the POW ( See Appendix 1, Note 3 Brief summary of POW readiness and combat performance ). The Germans only ever had a 25% success rating and if you played this out 1000 times it would end badly for the Germans. However luck is a huge part of naval combat and luck was not with HMS Hood that day. I won't go into battle tactics in this post.

Bismarck's 15inch guns fired a lighter shell than the British but at very high velocity. This gave them a very flat flight trajectory. Much flatter than the RN shells. We know this as we have the Germans OWN gunnery manual for details. As such we know what their armour penetrating characteristics were. ( it's also known that the German shells had issues, for whatever reason, in activating their bursting charge ) They had excellent penetration properties for vertical armour, but to be sure of penetrating Hood's decks she had to be out as far as 25k to 32k yards. Bearing in mind that the longest ever confirmed ship on ship hits ( shared by Warspite and Scharnhorst) was 26k yards, HMS Hood wasn't in too bad a position. In fact Hood's own guns had superior deck penetrating characteristics. HMS Hood had a total of 7 inches of protection over 3 decks above her magazines. Slightly less over her engineering spaces. By 24k yards her magazines were pretty much safe and by just under 22K yards there was simply NO PHYSICAL WAY her magazines were going to suffer a plunging hit. HMS Hood was sunk at 16,500yards. At that range the German shells were "plunging" in at 11 degrees down angle. Let that sink in a little. There is simply no way ( unless you want to change the laws of physics ) that the German shells will penetrate ALL 3 of Hood's decks above her magazines AND her magazine crown.

Now... Bismarck's shooting was not good ( an argument for another time ). She had a baring issue. The gunnery officer had abandoned the ladder after 2 salvos and was making adjustments on the fly. The shell of the 5th salvo that hit HMS Hood was going to be a near miss. Unfortunately, HMS Hood had begun her 20 degree turn to port at this time and turned INTO the shell. This turn opened up the length of the ship and she was hit at between 50 degrees and 60 degrees to the horizontal plain ( see Appendix 1 ).

Now to put this in perspective. Battleships are designed for broadside engagements. So even if the shell penetrates, the armour is designed to slow it in the most efficient way. The evidence is clear. When you collate the witness statements AND the time frame of what actually happened, there was only ever one way for the German shell to penetrate to Hood's magazines.

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Now it would be helpful to mention certain aspects of Hood's design that enabled Bismarck's shell to do what it did. Firstly the main armoured deck ( Refer to Figure 1 & see Appendix 2 ) curved down at the edges into the 2inch slope. It was known in the 20's that not only was the 2inch slope inadequate ( it was upgraded to 4inches in Renown for example ) but the horizontal deck didn't go all the way out to the edge of the hull abreast the engineering sections as it did abreast the magazines. Had either of these issues been dealt with (and it was relatively simple) it's highly possible the shell would have been deflected away from the engineering spaces. In fact tests by the Admiralty on Hood’s armour mockups prove this very statement. ( see Apendix 2 )

Also HMS Hood in 1939 and 1940 had her AA armament substantially increased. As such this necessitated an enlarged 4-inch magazine. Unlike say Renown whose rebuild had allowed more space within the citadel to Figure 1 - HMS Hood hull armour plan adequately protect her secondary magazines, there was no space in Hood. Please refer to Figure 1 above for the following analysis They were wrapped round the upper Look at the Deck that curves at the end ‘8’. ( See Appendix 2 for Builders level of X magazine and butted up pics ) against the magazine bulkhead. Also That deck needed additional 3 inch plating extending all the way to the hull. they were extended forward behind a That never happened so a shell coming in through the side, wouldn’t be weakly protected bulkhead to the deflected due to the angled deck plate. engineering spaces. This gave a direct connection whereby a shell detonating This was known about since the early 1920’s. Putting the additional deck around that bulkhead could potentially plate in, would have taken her out of service for longer than the Navy was set off a catastrophic explosion. Which willing to allow. is exactly what happened. Now time is not at issue here. I often hear it said “oh she was taken out with only one shell.” That shell hit could have happened after 5 minutes or 3 hours. Had it been 3 hours, many would lose an excuse to calling HMS Hood a weak ship. Time is simply a non-factor. So the kill shot. As has been explained with HMS Hood turning into the kill-shot, this gave the shell access to the length of the ship. It hit the side of the ship in the vicinity of the main mast in the area of the upper (7 inch ) belt at over 500mps.

In penetrating the plate, it was rotated towards the surface normal of the plate just enough to put it on a path through the weak slope discussed earlier ( without the 3 inch deck protecting it ), and to the bulkhead at the rear end of the engineering space where the enlarged 4-inch magazine ( See Figure 3 )had been extended too.

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Had it hit during the interception or when the ship had completed her turn it would have missed this magazine. It was the turn and the impact angle of 50 to 60 degrees which allowed the deflection of the shell towards the plate normal to target the magazine.

This weak spot was about 30ft x 10ft ( see Appendix 1c). Just hitting it was unreal. The end catastrophic result was wholly unbelievable. A complete fluke in anybody's book. The proof for this table of events is simple. The shell hit itself wasn't the destructive element, merely the catalyst. The ship didn't immediately explode. There was a very slow ( relatively speaking ) conflagration. When the 4-inch magazine went up ( either as a direct hit or splinters from the shell going through the bulkhead), the cordite vented from the path of least resistance. This path was forward up through the engineering vents next to the mainmast. If you look at that very famous drawing by HMS Prince of Wales's Captain Leach, the cordite plume vented high into the air through these vents by the main mast. ( see Figures 2 & 3 ) It was only after this venting that the main magazines exploded. Either by damage to the magazine bulkhead or heat transfer from the 4-inch magazine explosion. This rent the sides of the ship open ( See Figure 4 ) and blew the bottom out of the ship. This is why she stopped almost immediately.

Figure 2 - drawing by Captain Leach (HMS Prince of Whales)

Please refer to Figure 3 for the following analysis

The cordite venting seen between the mast and X turret was escaping via the engine room vents (of which there are two between the mast and rear range finder). So, how does cordite smoke travel into the engine room from X magazine for several seconds before the ship blows up? The simple answer is that it doesn't - This venting is from another smaller explosion which also spreads to the 15 inch X magazine. - Compartment #12 is the 15 inch cordite magazines - Compartment #13 is the 15 inch "powder" handling room, - Compartment #6 is the 4 inch magazine,

Now, if you look at the walls, compartment # 6 has a thick bulkhead or barrier to compartment #12. But a very thin barrier to the spaces which connect it to the engine spaces and vent ( Item # 79 )

So, the reason we get venting next to the main mast is this - and while that was happening, the heat was eating through the wall between 6 and 12... This only takes a few seconds before we get the big boom...

Figure 3 - Technical analysis of the venting

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Figure 4 - The fatal shell and resulting sequence of events (See also Appendix 1)

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Now it is often mentioned that the fire from the ready use ammo on the boat deck is what destroyed Hood. That fire was started by the German cruiser Prinz Eugen. She was firing High Explosive shells as there was zero chance that she could penetrate Hood's armour with AP shells. Let me say that again. ZERO CHANCE. Also it is useful to know she'd changed fire to POW minutes before HMS Hood was sunk. Now the fire on the boat deck may have looked spectacular. There were 4-inch "ready use" and UP projectiles popping off like fireworks. But all the hatches would have been closed. There was NO WAY WHATSOEVER for this to go down four decks to set off the magazines. NO WAY. So let's put that to bed now shall we? I would suggest you find and read Bill Jurens excellent paper on the sinking of Hood. He is the foremost expert on these matters. It is useful to mention that The Admiralty were disappointed and embarrassed at the loss of the Hood. The speed and scale of the explosion was a serious issue for the RN who had spent so long bathing in the glory of Hood's size and power. There would have also been questions asked why a known issue ( which almost certainly sent her to the bottom ) wasn't addressed.

Because of this, HMS Hood was cast as not fit for purpose in the press and inquests into the loss. The Admiralty ( as they did after Jutland ) turned attention from themselves by blaming the ship. Once more "Fisher's Folly" was raised and used as a scapegoat. It perpetuated the view that it was "common knowledge" that HMS Hood was a failed ship who never stood a chance against Bismarck ( newer ship, more powerful etc... ).

This is both untrue and unfair. HMS Hood was in poor health at the time of her loss, this is true ; but she should have been in for her refit years before her loss. This common knowledge has crept into 7 decades of books and research and nobody has dared question the veracity of it. Serious technical reviews of the ship and the battle paint a different story, and highlight the errors of the Admiralty, and the luck of the Germans.

NOTE: See Sources -Next page

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Citations and References

Sources:

RN Admiralty Inquiries RN Admiralty Hood designs William Jurens ( Analysis + The Loss of HMS Hood – A re-examination ) Maurice Northcott ( Ensign / Man O’War 6 – Hood ) Raven & Roberts ( British Battleships of WW2 ) John Roberts ( Anatomy of the Ship – Hood ) Bruce Taylor ( The Battlecruiser HMS Hood ) Norman Friedman ( The British Battleship 1906 – 1946 ) Colin William McMullen ( IWM – Oral History ) Marco Santorini (Bismarck and Hood: The Battle of the Denmark Strait – A Technical Analysis for a New Perspective ) Colin William McMullen ( IWM – Oral history interview ) Gordon Smith ( naval-history.net ) Alexander Ray ( Ship model ) David Mowbray ( Analysis ) Monty Mills ( Analysis ) David Manley ( Analysis ) James Woodley ( Analysis ) Rob Godden ( Analysis ) Brooks Ashley Rowlett ( Analysis ) German GKDOS 100 Krupp Formulae

Jutland conclusions :

Andrew Gordon’s Rules of The Game Marder’s Dreadnought to Richard Hough’s Great War at Sea Massie’s Dreadnought and Castles of Steel R.A. Burt’s British Battleships 1905 – 1919 The Harper Record

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APPENDIX 1 It's a bit rough and ready, but here is Alex's model of Hood, and a spare piece of sprue. Now his green Modeling Matt has 45 degree cross lines on it, and he's placed Hood's Main Mast at X Marks the Spot. Bismarck's shells were approaching at roughly a 50 Degree angle from the normal to Hoods side, at a very shallow angle off her Starboard Bow. This picture shows roughly the angle and path the killer shell took.

If the shell had hit anywhere else it would have glanced off Hood's armoured deck.

If it was near the Base of the main mast, it would have gone out the other side of the ship and exploded in the sea.

This is the ONLY Location that the shell could have hit that would have defeated the side armour, deck armour, AND made its way to the aft magazines.

ANYWHERE ELSE AND THE SHELL PHYSICALLY CANNOT MAKE IT TO THE MAGAZINE'S. Not without defying the laws of physics. Appendix 1a - The path of fatal shell ( it would be actually falling at a ~11 degree down angle)

Appendix 1b - The path of fatal shell ( it would be actually falling at a ~11 degree down angle)

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APPENDIX 1 Continued

Appendix 1c - The path of fatal shell ( it would be actually falling at a ~11 degree down angle)

Note 1: Fast battleship vs. Battlecruiser From Wiki: A "Fast Battleship" was a Battleship which emphasized speed without – in concept – undue compromise of either armor or armament. Most of the early -era dreadnought battleships were typically built with low design speeds, so the term "Fast Battleship" is applied to a design which is considerably faster. The extra speed of a Fast Battleship was normally required to allow the vessel to carry out additional roles besides taking part in the line of battle, such as escorting aircraft carriers. A Fast Battleship was distinguished from a Battlecruiser in that it would have been expected to be able to engage hostile battleships in sustained combat on at least equal terms. The requirement to deliver increased speed without compromising fighting ability or protection was the principal challenge of Fast Battleship design. While increasing length-to-beam ratio was the most direct method of attaining a higher speed, this meant a bigger ship that was considerably more costly and/or could exceed the naval treaty tonnage limits (where these applied – such as the Washington Naval Treaty shaping naval fleet composition before World War II). Technological advancements such as propulsion improvements and light, high-strength armor plating were required in order to make Fast Battleships feasible. Unlike Battlecruiser, which became official Royal Navy usage in 1911, the term" Fast Battleship" was essentially an informal one. The warships of the Queen Elizabeth class were collectively termed the Fast Division when operating with the . Otherwise, Fast Battleships were not distinguished from conventional Battleships in official documentation; nor were they recognized as a distinctive category in contemporary ship lists or treaties. There is no separate code for "Fast Battleships" in the US Navy's hull classification system, all Battleships, fast or slow, being rated as "BB".

Note 2: On Battleship and Battlecruiser armour differences

The following figures are for RN Warships. The total weight of HMS Hood’s over 14,000tons of armour was 32% of her . The Queen Elizabeth and Nelson class was 31.6% of displacement. The KGV class ( WW2 era ) was 33.8%.

Hood was originally designed and laid down as an “Admiral class” Battlecruiser. However after the Battle of Jutland the design was extensively modified to include a huge amount of extra armour protection, effectively converting her to a Battleship. However she kept her original Battlecruiser designation. This was 2 fold. Firstly the RN by the time of Hood’s launch referred to any with a significant speed advantage ( and Hood’s speed was significant, making 32.07 knots in the Arran Mile in a Force 7 gale) as a Battlecruiser, regardless of armour specification.

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APPENDIX 1 Continued

Secondly as the only ships with the speed to adequately sail with her, were other Battlecruisers, the designation was kept and she was placed with the Battlecruiser units in fleet movements. A case of the designation fitting her usage, rather than her actual superior ability.

In comparison the weight of armour protection of displacement for a true Battlecruiser, HMS Renown, was only 18% of displacement. Although that figure was later increased, there is no way that Hood with a percentage figure of 32% ( which as we have seen compares favourably with other RN Battleships ) can be accurately described as a Battlecruiser when compared to Renown – A true Battlecruiser.

As most people understand, Battlecruisers, as first conceived by Jackie Fisher carried capital ship guns, but in order to attain a higher speed gave up armour to save weight. That was then used for larger engineering plant. Add the saved weight and powerful engines together and you gain a significant speed advantage. This same philosophy carried through right the way to the RN’s last true Battlecruisers, the Renown Class. However as the designs evolved, engineering plants were smaller aswell as more efficient and powerful, and the ships themselves grew larger and were able to accommodate much better protection whilst maintaining the speed advantage. This can be seen clearly in the specifications of the RN Splendid Cats ( A huge improvement over the early I’s ) and the Derfflinger’s of Germany ( that were armoured on a par with the German’s own Battleships ).

This however was always going to change. The Battlecruiser as it was originally envisaged always had a shelf life. It was held back only by hull design and developments in both superior armour tech and most importantly engineering technology, which was surging forward year on year, until with the advent of superior oil fired boilers and modern turbines, there was a point where a Battleship no longer had to drop armour to gain superior speed. That was the genesis of the fast battleship and the first ship of that class WAS HMS Hood. She gave away no armour to the rest of the fleet. She attained her high speed through a long and hydrodynamic hull, and a huge engineering power plant, that developed 144,000shp. To put that in perspective the RN didn’t produce engines capable of a standard Shaft Horsepower output ( There was a safety margin built in to all RN engines, usually 10% and HMS Renown several times pushed her engines to 160,000shp in WW2) superior to HMS Hood, until the launch of Audacious Class, HMS Eagle in 1946 ( She had 152,000shp ).

In reality you can call Hood a meat popsicle if you wish. But the designation is not an indication of her ability as a front line Capital unit.

Note 3: Brief summary of POW readiness and combat performance

It is often stated that POW was a brand new ship, just out of the dockyard, with builders still on board and also should not have been there. This is taking an element of truth and once again twisting it out of proportion to gain a false narrative.

The RN in wartime speed up their workup period. This was expedited due to the danger of German Fast Battleships breaking out into the convoy systems of the Atlantic. POW had been fully completed and fitted out. She had taken her place at Scapa Flow, just as KGV before her and DOY after. There had been extra damage that needed repairing on POW due to bomb damage from air raids on Liverpool before she transferred to for fitting out. As she was running late and due to the importance of completion and repairs taking priority, tests by the builders such as, watertight compartment air tests, fuel oil systems and full power trials were waived. Also the quad turrets were not fully operational, hence the Vickers staff still being aboard at Scapa Flow and indeed many still being on the ship when she departed for the Denmark Strait action.

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APPENDIX 1 Continued

Now most of April was taken up by work up of the ship and crew. ( 80% of the crew were hostilities only, meaning that many hadn’t been on a ship before. However Duke of York had 85% hostilities crew, so this wasn’t particularly unusual ). The Radar and Fire Control performed perfectly during tests however there were still major issues afflicting the quad turrets that curtailed much of the gunnery work up. The last turret was officially accepted from Vickers on the 27th April.

Intensive gunnery trials begun, and full power trials were commenced on the 8th May, and despite the turret issues the ship reported ready for action on the 21st May. This was a total workup period of 55 days.

This was very similar to what KGV and DOY went through. KGV worked up at Scapa Flow for only 45 days and DOY worked up for 39 days. However they had far less issues with their Quad Turrets than seems to be the case with POW.

It was found after this period that POW was functioning well and the crew were well trained and efficient. The gunnery part of the workup had also gone well from a Fire Control and Radar perspective, as had the many brand new systems being built into the KGV design. However there were multiple mechanical issues with the loading arrangements of the quad turrets, necessitating that Vickers staff remained aboard to aid with addressing the turret problems.

These very same issues afflicted KGV and DOY even after workup. THIS was the reason for there being civil engineers aboard. There was 1 Foreman from Vickers to each turret, to try to find a way around the turret issues. These weren’t teething troubles of an incomplete ship, but design flaws trying to be worked out. Captain Leach had been the Director of Naval Ordnance, and knew well about the turret issues as far back as 1939. This was probably the reason he was given command of POW.

POW’s performance on the 24th May was in many ways superior to that of KGV on the 27th. Morale was high and whilst the crew were understandably nervous, they were also quietly confident. Even more impressive she was in actuality the best shooter during the Denmark Strait encounter. She fired a total of 55 shells ( out of a possible 74 ) and out of 18 salvos, scored 3 straddles and 3 direct hits. In contrast Hood fired 48 shells getting several straddles ( including a first salvo straddle on PE )but no hits. Prinz Eugen fired 178 shells with multiple straddles and 5 confirmed hits. Bismarck fired 93 shells and got several straddles and 4 confirmed hits.

During the action she had 74% useage of her guns. In A turret she had only 3 guns for the entire action. For most of the action she had 9 available guns. Y turret went into local control not due to a loss of fire control, but due to an overly eager turret Captain taking control ( According to Colin McMullen ). Y turret then only jammed when POW made her hard port turn to disengage. Before this she still had 9 available guns.

To put this in perspective and for comparative purposes. KGV in the final Bismarck action had a 73% useage of her guns. All guns performed faultlessly for over half an hour. Then A turret jammed, with ALL guns out of action for 10 minutes. Followed by Y turret with ALL guns out of action for 7 minutes. Her performance was considered below the expected standard. Again she struggled heavily. Design issues with the interlocks and loading trouble, blighting reliability. At one point she only had 40% possible useage of her guns!

DOY at the battle of North Cape had just as serious problems, with mechanical issues in the loading mechanism, water ingress in forward turrets and poor loading drill. She only managed 58% gun useage over the 2 and a half hours of combat. A loading breakdown effected every main gun on the ship, with the least effected gun being number 1 of B turret, that only missed 3 broadsides. Number 3 gun in A turret only fired for 6 broadsides, before a shell cage defect put it out of action for the entirety of the rest of the battle. 3 guns in Y turret were unable to fire for 15 minutes missing 17 broadsides. It was also found that ventilation was inadequate and as the battle went on fatigue was effecting Rate of Fire. Her gunnery performance other than reliability was spectacular. She fired a total of 77 broadsides in the action ( A total of 450 shells out of a possible 770). She straddled Scharnhorst in well over 50 broadsides and hit her atleast 30 times, possibly more.

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APPENDIX 1 Continued

When compared to her 2 sisters, POW performed exactly to type. With great accuracy, vindicating the new fire control systems as a whole and proving that the KGV class was an excellent gunnery platform, but suffering niggling issues with turrets, and design defects that effected the class as a whole, and weren’t solved to any satisfaction until the younger sisters Howe and Anson were commissioned. In fact they couldn’t be solved at sea and necessitated complete removal and modification of the turrets, off the ships.

POW took her hits well. At NO point was she in danger of sinking. Her Citadel and Turrets hadn’t been hit, never mind penetrated. Her Fire Control was FULLY operational, she had FULL maneuverability and could steam at full speed. There was an amount of damage but nothing to impair her combat efficiency or endanger the ship’s life. She had armour quality and scheme design superior to Bismarck. In fact only the Yamato had superior citadel protection to the KGV class. She could afford to take damage the Germans could not. Every ship was precious to the Germans, whereas the RN had ships to replace any damaged or sunk. It would have been ludicrous for the Germans to chase POW, especially when you consider that apart from a Magazine catastrophe, it is incredibly difficult to sink a Capital Ship with gunfire alone. Bismarck herself is proof of that and POW was a superiorly armoured vessel. Even the mighty Iowa couldn’t sink the USS Nevada with gunfire alone. ( in gunnery tests after ww2 ) Admiral Lutjens definitely made the right decision to disengage. His ship was already badly damaged, with reduced range and speed, down by the bow and leaking fuel.

The people that constantly suggest “ he should have finished POW off “ or “ POW was there for the taking and would have easily been sunk “ , have no comprehension of the design of the KGV class Battleships, nor of how potent a weapon POW still was, even with a jammed Y turret. This is all aside from the actual mechanics of putting a capital ship under the waves. For Bismarck to have continued to chase POW, knowing full well that the RN had other powerful hunting groups seeking her, and that she needed to escape into the Atlantic, would have been folly of the highest order.

To further this point : ‘Bismarck ‘( David J. Bercuson & Holger H. Herwig), ‘Bismarck’ ( Niklas Zetterling & Michael Tamelander ), and ‘The Battle of Denmark Strait’ ( Robert J. Winklareth ), ALL state that Bismarck, due to damage in her bow and concern that the adjoining bulkhead was in danger of giving way, was almost immediately forced to reduce speed to 27 knots.

POW at this time could still maintain 28 Knots, and other than relatively minor damage was still in excellent fettle. Bismarck wasn’t the faster ship due to battle damage and POW had a head start of 15,100yards to go with that greater speed. Without reducing POW’s speed significantly, Bismarck was not able to pursue and catch POW. Plus there was the small problem of 2 RN County Class Cruisers ( Norfolk and Suffolk ) armed with 8 inch guns and with 21inch torpedos that would come into play in a prolonged combat situation.

After HMS Hood was sunk, POW’s main guns were still for the majority working. So much so that when the Captain made the hard turn to Port to disengage McMullen sent a messenger to find the Captain, to inform him that the shooting was going fine. ( Due to the Bridge hit the Captain had moved and was momentarily out of communication with McMullen )

However it was this hard turn that jammed Y Turret shell ring for about an hour.

Bismarck ( as had been mentioned elsewhere ) had been having trouble with her range targeting. She inherited POW’s range and baring as the British task force were so close together, POW literally sailed by the side of Hood. This helped the German gunners immensely in changing target to POW. However as can be seen during POW’s disengagement, Bismarck’s hits to POW only lasted as long as it took for POW to alter course away, in doing so she broke Bismarck’s ability to predict her range. Bismarck struggled to reacquire her range thereafter, for the self same reasons she struggled to find Hood’s range.

Leach then made the sensible decision to withdraw to effect repairs to his main armament. They did NOT run away. He joined up with Rear Admiral Wake-Walker on Norfolk who then took command. They continued shadowing and POW twice tried to re-engage Bismarck at range. Hardly the decision of a crippled and toothless ship. The crew were quite disheartened that they couldn’t be a part of the end game, but rightly proud that their excellent gunnery was a large part responsible for ruining Bismarck’s one and only cruise in the Atlantic.

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APPENDIX 1 Continued

Specific issues with KGV Class Quad Turrets: The problem was that those incredibly complicated quad turrets ( There was no issue with the far simpler twin ‘B’ Turret ) were performing well at the Vickers Armstrong factory. But when installed on a ship, moving at high speed, due to the tolerances of the hull being different and the stress and torsion of the hull during heavy turns, the turret’s mechanisms jammed, blocking the turret.

Also the handling lifts and interlocks were a problem. One that was mostly rectified later on. The drive and ring gear issues, however, could not be solved without a major overhaul and lifting the turrets out of the ship. A very big job for urgently needed warships. When HMS Howe was commissioned, she spent 4 months ‘available’ to the home fleet. However in reality she spent most of this time undergoing extensive gunnery trials. It’s conclusion was the modifications were largely successful. The earlier ships received refits to modify them to the same specifications as Anson and Howe.

APPENDIX 2

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APPENDIX 2 Continued

Note on Admiralty tests on Hood armour mockups :

In February 1919 there were test firings of 15 inch shells against armour mockups of HMS Hood. The tests used a Hadfield 15 inch APC MK 11A shell, with a striking velocity of 1430fps simulating a gun range of 19,500 yards. The target mockup represented a section of Hood between A and B barbettes. The mockup included 2 inch armour representing the magazine crowns, the 7 inch upper belt, 1.25 inch armour with 0.75 inch backing to represent the 2 inch slope and 0.75 inch HT bulkhead.

The shell penetrated the 7 inch armour, through the slope and bulkhead and burst 31 feet behind into one of the plates representing the magazine crown, breaking it into one large and several smaller pieces. The test proved that the shell carried out it’s intended purpose perfectly. However it also confirmed a weakness in the protection of Hood in that particular area to specific shell penetrations in the 7 inch belt.

After the test it was recommended that 3 inch thick armour should be fitted at the sides of the main deck, out to the hull and above the slope armour abreast the magazines both fore and aft.

Later that year, more tests were carried out as before but with the extra 120lb ( 3 inch ) armour in place. A 15 inch shell hitting at the same 1430fps, was successfully deflected by the extra armour, thereby effectively protecting the magazines. This added approximately 130 tons of weight which necessitated reductions of weight elsewhere on the ship.

However this extra armour was never fitted abreast the engineering sections of the ship, meaning that as per the above experiments, a 15 inch shell in the correct circumstances ( accepting that this was a narrow window ) could gain entrance to the interior of the ship.

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