Electoral Studies 59 (2019) 27–38

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Electoral Studies

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The leaky pipeline and sacrificial lambs: Gender, candidate nomination, and T district assignment in South 's national legislative elections Young-Im Lee

Department of Political Science, California State University-Sacramento, 6000 J Street, TAH 3104, Sacramento, CA, 95819-6089, USA

ABSTRACT

If gender quotas are applied to only one tier in a mixed-member majoritarian system, do we see a spillover effect of an increased proportion of women in the other tier? Based on statistical analysis of national legislative elections in from 1988 to 2016, this study casts doubt on the validity of the pipeline theory. The analysis shows that South Korea's gender quota has been achieving its primary goal of the political empowerment of women since its adoption in 2004, but with weak inter-tier contagion effect. In-depth interviews reveal the unique culture of the National Assembly and political parties which deem district-tier seats moreprestigious than PR seats, and the informal practice of disadvantageous candidate district assignments lead to PR members having a hard time continuing their political careers once their terms as PR members are over.

1. Introduction featuring mixed electoral rules. Some studies cast doubt on the re- lationship between the and women's representation The existing literature posits a strong correlation between the type (Roberts et al., 2013; Salmond, 2006), and in-depth case studies fo- of electoral system and women's numerical representation. Countries cusing on single countries show a pattern of stagnation in the share of with proportional representation (PR) systems tend to have higher women in the legislature over time (Davidson-Schmich, 2010; Yoon and shares of women in their legislatures than those with single-member Shin, 2015). district (SMD) systems (Rule, 1994, 1987; Salmond, 2006; Schwindt- How, then, do the mixed-member system and gender quotas work in Bayer and Mishler, 2005; Studlar and McAllister, 2002; Tremblay, tandem when it comes to electing women? If gender quotas are applied 2006). A mixed-member system (sometimes referred to as “hybrid”) is to only one tier in a mixed-member system, is there a spillover effect of thought to be the “best of both worlds,” as it “harness[es] the benefits of an increased proportion of women in the other tier, leading to a more minority representation indicative of its PR component, while main- lasting and wider impact of quotas on women's electoral success? South taining levels of geographic representation and accountability inherent Korea makes an ideal case through which to investigate these questions. in plurality/majority systems” (Johnson-Myers, 2017, p. 15). Another The country seemingly meets the conditions for a high level of women's critical factor affecting women's political representation is gender representation: it uses a parallel system that features SMD and nation- quotas, and 133 countries had adopted gender quotas at the national wide PR seats, has implemented legislative quotas for its PR seats, and and sub-national levels as of November 2018 (International IDEA, ranks 10th in the world in the United Nations' Gender Inequality Index 2018). (United Nations Development Programme, 2017). However, after Although an increasing number of countries have introduced var- adopting the gender quota and the parallel system in 2004, the increase ious institutional changes to promote women's political representation, in women's share was only modest after the spike that immediately the numerical representation of women has increased only gradually. followed the changes in 2004. The improvement was primarily in the Over the last few decades, 38 countries have adopted a variety of number of PR seats held, and the total number of women has been mixed-member systems, and 18 of them have also adopted legislative growing only slowly (Appendix Table 1). quotas for national-level elections to improve women's representation The majority of PR members do not go on to hold district-tier seats (Table 1). Political parties in thirteen countries with mixed-member after their career in the PR seats ends, even though they have accu- systems have adopted voluntary gender quotas, and six countries have mulated political experience at the national level. Fig. 1 illustrates this both legislative quotas and voluntary party quotas in place. Whereas in “leaky pipeline” issue in South Korea. In 2004, there were approxi- some countries, such as Bolivia, Mexico, and Senegal, women's re- mately 30 female PR members; five of them ran for SMD seats, and two presentation is more than 40 percent at the national level, women as- were eventually elected. In the same year, 15 PR men ran for SMD seats, sume only a quarter of national legislative seats on average in systems and two won the election. The pattern was similar in subsequent years:

E-mail address: [email protected]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2019.02.004 Received 17 May 2018; Received in revised form 1 December 2018; Accepted 8 February 2019 Available online 12 February 2019 0261-3794/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Y.-I. Lee Electoral Studies 59 (2019) 27–38

Table 1 interruption and termination for PR members? Why is there only a Mixed-member system, gender quotas, and women's representation in national weak spillover effect from the PR seats to the SMD seats? legislatures. In unraveling this question, this case study focuses on both the Data sources: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2018a, 2018b; International IDEA, formal and informal rules of candidate nomination and elections and 2018; The Electoral Knowledge Network, 2018. examines whether the PR-tier gender quota fulfills its intention of Country Legislative Voluntary Reserved % women in promoting women's political inclusion in the overall legislative body. Quotas Quotas Seats national legislature, The effectiveness of gender quotas is heavily influenced by the electoral October 2018 system and the specific quota provisions, such as the placement man- Bolivia Yes Yes 53.1 date, the minimum percentage requirement, and the closed-party list Mexico Yes Yes 42.6 system (Jones, 2009, 2004, 1998; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). In the case of Senegal Yes 41.8 Bolivia, which currently has the highest level of women's representation Ecuador Yes - only PR 37.96 (53.1%) among the countries using a mixed-member system (Table 1), Germany Yes 37 Italy Yes 35.7 initially adopting gender quotas only to PR seats with no placement New Zealand 34.2 mandate did not increase the number of women elected. Adopting a Taiwan Yes - only PR Yes 33 40% quota with a placement mandate in 2006, and consequently a 50% Nepal Yes 32.7 quota in 2009 led to an increase, which shows the importance of ex- Andorra 32.1 amining specific quota provisions (Htun and Piscopo, 2010, p. 17). Cameroon Yes 31.1 Sudan Yes 30.5 Existing studies, including those on South Korea, have demonstrated Philippines 29.8 that political parties are unwilling to recruit women to SMD candidacies Mauritania Yes 25.1 but are more likely to compromise by promoting women to PR seats Bulgaria 23.8 (Yoon and Shin, 2015). Using quantitative and qualitative empirical Madagascar 23.13 Moldova Yes 22.8 evidence, this study goes further to demonstrate that the formal and Venezuela Yes - only PR Yes 22.2 information district assignment and nomination patterns and practices Lesotho Yes - only PR 22.1 of the major parties create challenges for women aspirants even when Lithuania Yes 21.3 they have political experience. By identifying factors that either pro- Seychelles 21.2 mote or obstruct the election of women to the national legislature, this Honduras Yes - only PR 21.1 Romania Yes 20.7 study shows that South Korea's gender quota has been achieving its Pakistan Yes 20.6 primary goal of the political empowerment of women since its adoption Panama Yes 19.3 in 2004, but with weak inter-tier contagion effect. Tajikistan 19 This case study provides in-depth analysis of a country that is under- Armenia Yes - only PR 18.1 South Korea Yes - only PR Yes 17 studied, and tests the applicability of the existing theory which is based Georgia Yes - only PR 16 primarily on Western democracies. To understand how formal rules Egypt 15 such as electoral systems and quotas interact with informal rules to Niger Yes Yes 14.6 impact women's representation, examining one country's experience Guatemala Yes 13.9 over a lengthy period and explaining any incongruence between the Chad 12.8 Hungary Yes 12.6 case and the theory are critical (Luciak, 2005; Roberts et al., 2013). Ukraine 12.3 Formal and informal rules should be examined together to understand Japan 9.3 how gender norms and political institutions work in tandem, which DR Congo Yes 8.9 calls for a mixed-methods approach (Hinojosa and Franceschet, 2012; Total 18 13 1 Avg = 24.4% Kenny, 2013). This study is by no means the first to explore the South Korean case: Lee and Shin (2016), Shin (2014), and Yoon and Shin (2015) all provide rich context on the adoption and implementation of the gender quota for PR seats, qualitatively analyzing why the political parties do not comply with its provisions. Lee (2015) also examines how political, socioeconomic, and ideological factors influenced women's re- presentation in the South Korean National Assembly from 1948 to 2008. The current study complements these previous studies by em- pirically testing the spillover effect of the gender quota in the mixed system. It addresses the invisible hierarchy stratifying PR and SMD members in the mixed legislature of South Korea and the political parties' candidate nomination practices in applying the gender quota. Neither these aspects of political culture nor these institutions have been widely discussed even though they influence the effectiveness of the gender quota in promoting gender parity in the legislature over time. The current study casts doubt on the validity of the pipeline theory and examines political parties' unwillingness to recruit women using a large-N statistical analysis as well as interviews with political Fig. 1. PR members, PR members competing in district elections, and PR actors that support and strengthen the findings from the quantitative members elected to district seats, by gender (data source: National Election analysis. Commission, 2016). The following section explains the electoral system and gender quota provisions of South Korea. The existing studies on the impact of fewer than half of PR members ran in SMD elections by the end of their district assignments and prior political experience on women's electoral PR terms, and fewer than half of those candidates were elected (except success are reviewed, and hypotheses are drawn from them. The hy- in the 2016 elections, in which the success rate of PR women was potheses are tested using both statistical and interview analyses. The higher than in previous elections). What explains this career interviews with legislators and legislative staffers also illustrate how

28 Y.-I. Lee Electoral Studies 59 (2019) 27–38 limited access to party leadership positions for PR members and a po- engage in discriminatory nomination practices, causing even “quali- litical culture that privileges SMD members over PR members con- fied” and experienced women to not see themselves as viable candi- tribute to politically experienced women's political career interruption dates? The following section reviews the literature on the spillover ef- and termination. The implications of the findings conclude the paper. fect and the sacrificial lamb theory.

2.1. District assignment: incumbent advantage and party loyalty 2. Gender quotas in South Korea Each party's candidate nomination process and organization affect The watershed year for South Korean women's political re- nomination outcomes, both in terms of whether women win nomina- presentation was 2004. The National Assembly passed a new election tions and where they run (Lovenduski, 1993; Luhiste, 2015). Existing law mandating a two- system in which voters indicate separately studies focusing on political parties' candidate nomination and district which candidate they prefer as their district representative (SMD) and assignment practices identify political party gatekeepers as the single the party they support to elect nationwide PR-tier representatives. Until greatest hindrance to women's political representation (Cheng and the 2004 election, the PR seats were distributed among the parties Tavits, 2011; Kunovich and Paxton, 2005; Murray et al., 2012; Niven, proportional to the number votes a party had won through all of its 2006, 1998). Women candidates' party affiliation determines electoral candidates (National Law Information Center, 2001). Pushed by a outcomes to a far greater extent than gender stereotypes do (Dolan, strong women's movement and international norms such as The Con- 2013), and sometimes gender stereotypes can work to women candi- vention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against dates' advantage if the candidate and voters are co-partisan (Bauer, Women (CEDAW), the country also adopted a 30% candidate quota for 2017). The bias of the party elite and ensuing discriminatory district PR seats for the first time in 2000 and then expanded the quota in2004 assignments for women are also more critical than voters' gender bias in (Yoon and Shin, 2015). The new legislative quota of 2004 stipulates a determining electoral outcomes (Murray et al., 2012). 50% legislative gender quota, applicable to the 54 PR seats of the 299 I examine two aspects of district assignments: running as an in- total legislative seats. The measure mandates a zipper system, alter- cumbent or in an open seat and the level of support for one's party in nating women and men on the closed party list for PR seats (Korean the district at hand. Generally speaking, running in a district with National Election Commission, 2015).1 The gender quota for PR seats strong support for a candidate's party is as important as winning a had an immediate effect: the number of PR women elected increased major party's nomination, and incumbency gives candidates significant from 11 in 2000 to 29 in 2004. Of the 178 women who were elected to advantages (Herrnson et al., 2003; Palmer and Simon, 2006; Schwindt- the National Assembly between 2004 and 2016, 109 were elected to PR Bayer, 2005; Studlar and McAllister, 1991). The effect of incumbency seats. However, political party rules stipulate that PR members cannot advantage on voting decisions is stronger than that of shared gender serve in this capacity for more than one term, and those who have been identity with the candidate: although women voters feel close to elected and served at the PR tier must subsequently seek election as women candidates, they typically make their ultimate voting decisions SMD members if they desire to continue their legislative careers. Al- on the basis of incumbency or political experience as well as the party though the majority of women started their political careers in PR seats, affiliation of the candidates (Dolan, 2008). Furthermore, once women women did not occupy more than 10% of the total SMD seats until 2016 prove their electability by getting elected, they are more likely to be re- (Appendix Table 1). nominated for the next election than male incumbents, their success Additionally, the two major parties have adopted 30% voluntary rate in the following election is as high as male incumbents' (Shair- party quotas for SMD elections, but they have not been proactive in Rosenfield and Hinojosa, 2014), and they can and do raise the same nominating enough women to meet this goal, even though the revised level of campaign funds from similar sources as men (Adams and Political Fund Act allows political parties to receive additional political Schreiber, 2011). funds if 30% of their SMD candidates are women (Yoon and Shin, Many women candidates worldwide are political novices when they 2015). In advance of the two latest elections in 2012 and 2016, the run for office. As a result, few of them enjoy an incumbency advantage; conservative pledged that 30% of its SMD candidates even worse, they often run as challengers against the districts' incum- would be women, but in both elections, only 7% of its candidates were bents rather than vying for open seats, as political parties favor male (Appendix Table 2). Only 15% of the SMD candidates of the central-left candidates (Bernstein, 1986; Burrell, 1992; Niven, 2006). Women face Democratic Party were women in 2012 (M. Kim, 2012, p. 60), and only tougher primaries than men (Lawless and Pearson, 2008), and once 10.7% were women in 2016 (Lee, 2019; Appendix Table 2). they win the primaries, political parties assign women candidates to run However, the fundamental issue lies in the dearth of women who in districts where the level of support for their parties is low, making come forward to seek party nomination. During the candidate nomi- them the “sacrificial lambs” (Luhiste, 2015; Thomas and Bodet, 2013). nation season, national and local newspapers in South Korea print a list Even when women run as incumbents, they are less likely to compete in of the names of those who apply for nomination by the major parties. their own party's strongholds than men (Thomas and Bodet, 2013). The data show that women made up only 4% of the total applicants for Will incumbency status and favorable district assignment rectify both major parties in 2008, 7% in 2012, and approximately 9% in 2016. women's electoral disadvantage? Earlier studies showed that when Once women applied for nomination consideration, their success rate women are placed to run as incumbents or to be elected for open seats, was not significantly lower than that of men and was actually higher they are more likely to win than men (Fox and Oxley, 2003), but more than men's in some cases (Lee, 2019; See Appendix Table 2). These recent studies present evidence otherwise. For example, a study of the numbers show that women are as competitive as men in the nomination U. S. House elections shows that even though incumbent female can- and election stages, but only a few throw their hats into the ring (cf. didates fared better than non-incumbent female candidates, quality Lawless and Fox, 2010; Pruysers and Blais, 2017). Once candidates female candidates for open seats were less likely to win than quality secure their nomination, then, do women and men win at different male candidates running for open elections (Barnes et al., 2017), and rates, even controlling for district-level factors and prior political ex- women are still viewed as less competent and less favorable than their perience? Do women have limited prior political experience, thus male counterparts even when running as incumbents or contesting open leading to a limited pool of qualified women? Or do political parties seats (Pearson and McGhee, 2013). As Fulton states, “to perform on par with men, women incumbents would need to be approximately one 1 See Shin (2014) and Yoon and Shin (2015) for detailed discussions of the standard deviation greater on the quality scale than their male coun- gender quota adoption in South Korea and the role of women's movements in terparts” (Fulton, 2012, p. 308). the process. Studies focusing on South Korean elections find similar male-

29 Y.-I. Lee Electoral Studies 59 (2019) 27–38 preferential dynamics with regard to candidates' party nomination but women's predicted probability of winning is lower than men's de- (Chin, 2004; Kim, 2012; Yoo, 2012; Yoon, 2012). Having political ex- spite their comparable level of qualification (Barnes et al., 2017; perience is just as important as winning a nomination from a major Pearson and McGhee, 2013). In fact, men win in greater numbers when party in determining electoral outcomes, and it also increases the both men and women have prior political experience (Murray, 2012). chances of getting a nomination (Hwang, 2006; Kim and Kim, 2012; Women hit a glass ceiling when moving up the ranks within their own Seo, 2004). Incumbents are more likely to receive media coverage, and parties, and women's promotion within parties is slower than men's their casework and other constituent service allow them to develop a (Folke and Rickne, 2016). Bauer's research shows local leadership is close rapport with local voters (Hwang, 1998). However, just as Dolan still associated with masculine traits (Bauer, 2018), thus local office is (2008) found in her study on the U.S., South Korean voters also not necessarily more friendly or accessible to women, contrary to prioritize the political experience and incumbency of candidates over common perceptions; career progression from the state level to the their gender. One survey found that 35.4% of respondents said they national level has been less common among women than men (Mariani, voted for women candidates because the candidates had already served 2008). Similarly, women are still viewed as less competent and less in the same district (Kim et al., 2002, p. 42). Conversely, 32.4% of the favorable than their male counterparts even when they have the same respondents stated that the most salient reason for not supporting level of political experience (Branton et al., 2018), which implies that women candidates was their lack of political experience. However, si- women's far better résumés produce seemingly gender-neutral victory milar to the Chilean case (Shair-Rosenfield and Hinojosa, 2014), the rates (Lawless and Pearson, 2008). Based on these studies, I test the incumbent re-nomination rate is not high enough to guarantee an au- impact of candidate gender on electoral victory: tomatic incumbent re-nomination or reelection: the data used in this article show that only approximately 16% of all candidates between • H3: Controlling for other factors, being a woman decreases the 2004 and 2016 ran as the district's incumbent. predicted probability of getting elected to an SMD seat. Few studies of South Korea have empirically tested how political parties' district assignments affect electoral outcomes. This is a critical Existing studies have shown that gender quotas are more effective oversight considering South Korea's centralized, top-down candidate under a PR system than an SMD system (Jones, 2009, 2004; 1998; nomination process, which confers significant power on political parties Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). Under the SMD/FPTP (a first-past-the-post) as gatekeepers.2 A recent study on South Korea's national and local system, quotas are less likely to be adopted in the first place, and po- elections found that incumbency advantage exists at the local level, but litical parties are more likely to compromise by promoting women to the positive effect is smaller and even negative at the national level PR seats in the mixed systems (Yoon and Shin, 2015). What happens in (Kang et al., 2018). However, the study did not consider a possibility of a mixed system that features both an FPTP system and a PR system, but differing effects based on the candidates' gender. Based on the existing the quota is applicable to only one tier? Will there be an inter-tier literature, I posit the following hypotheses for testing the sacrificial spillover effect of the quota? Davidson-Schmich (2010) analyzed lamb theory: German Bundestag elections in 2009 and showed almost no contagion effect between SMD and PR seats. On the other hand, in the caseof • H1: Compared to women, men are more likely to run as incumbents South Korea, Shin argued that the gender quota for PR seats has “a of their districts or vie for open seats. prolonged impact on women's sustainable representation” (Shin, 2014, • H2: Compared to women, men are more likely to run in their parties' 80) because former and current PR legislators are more likely to be strongholds. successful in their bids for SMD seats. Davidson-Schmich (2014) also suggested a spillover effect of the PR gender quota on SMD elections in South Korea but has not empirically tested the extension of her findings 2.2. Previous political experience: spillover effects of PR experience to the South Korean setting. Similarly, Lee (2015) demonstrated that women were more likely to be nominated for the PR elections than for In contrast with the sacrificial lamb theory, which focuses on dis- the SMD elections in South Korea but did not mention the success of criminatory candidate assignment and nomination practices, the pipe- these candidates in the election. Related to the original research ques- line theory posits that a low level of women's political representation tion of this article, I test a hypothesis to examine whether there is a results from a limited pool of qualified candidates. As an increasing spillover effect of the gender quota between tiers. number of women attain political experience at the lower level, more women candidates will be elected to higher-level offices (Ford, 2002; H4: Serving as a PR legislator increases the predicted probability of Buckley et al., 2015). In this respect, gender quotas can be a stepping • winning an SMD election. stone for women to gain access to political office as well as to expand the pool of experienced women candidates. Some empirical studies 3. Quantitative research design and data have demonstrated that so-called “quota women” are as qualified as men (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2012), or even more qualified than the I tested my hypotheses in two stages of statistical analysis. First, I men they replace (Huang, 2016), actively participate in legislative ac- analyzed the background of 8629 candidates who ran in South Korean tivities (Murray, 2012), and promote women's interests (Clayton et al., district-tier elections from 1988 to 2016. I examined the relationship of 2017). Well-designed gender quotas not only affect the way political gender to party affiliation (major party candidate, minor party candi- parties recruit their candidates (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, 2011) but date, or independent), the type of competition (incumbent, challenger, also provide opportunities for women to gain political experience and or open-seat), the level of party loyalty of the district (party stronghold demonstrate their capabilities. or non-stronghold), and the candidates' national-level legislative ex- On the other hand, some studies have shown that accumulating perience. Existing studies of South Korean elections have used “regional political experience does not always lead to political career progress or cleavage” as a proxy to gauge the party loyalty of a district, assuming electoral victory for women, and political experience seems to affect that all the districts in a province share the same party loyalty. women and men differently. Women candidates have more political However, even districts in the same city or the same province display experience than their male counterparts (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2009), mixed party preferences. Based on the two-ballot system used since 2004, this study uses party ballot results at the district level to gauge a 2 In the case of the two major parties, aspirants send their application ma- district's party loyalty, achieving a level of geographic granularity that terials to each party's national party election committee office, in-person (no is not possible with the regional cleavage method and therefore offering mail-in allowed). a better empirical basis for testing the sacrificial lamb theory.

30 Y.-I. Lee Electoral Studies 59 (2019) 27–38

Considering that the two-ballot system and the 50% gender quota for PR seats were implemented for the first time in 2004, I analyzed the candidates who ran before 2004 and who ran under the new system separately. I collected the data from the National Election Commission of South Korea and the national legislators' roster in the Republic of 0: 6701 (77.66%) 0: 4246 (49.21%) 1: 2967 (34.38%) 0: 4361 (50.54%) 0: 3480 (84.65%) 1: 238 (2.76%) 0: 6541 (75.80%) 0: 8185 (94.85%) Korea Parliamentary database (Republic of Korea Parliamentarian Society, 2015; Korean National Election Commission, 2016). In the second stage of analysis, I compared the impacts of the aforementioned 8629 1: 1928 (22.34%) 8629 1: 4383 (50.79%) Num. Obs. Count (%) 8629 2:4111 1301 (15.08%) 1: 631 (15.35%) 8629 2: 1850 (21.44%) 8629 1: 444 (5.15%) factors on district-tier electoral outcomes using logistic regression analysis. Overall, the dataset includes 8629 candidates’ background and electoral outcomes from the 13th to the 20th elections (1988–2016), encompassing 4518 candidates before 2004 and 4111 under the new electoral system that has been in place since 2004 (Table 2; hereafter pre-reform and post-reform). The majority of individuals were affiliated with the major parties, namely the Saenuri Party or the Democratic Party (50.79%). Approximately 15% of all candidates sought reelection in the district where they served as the incumbent at the time of the election, and approximately half of the candidates were challengers running against these incumbents. Approximately 34.4% of the candi- dates were competing in districts where the incumbent was not running (open seat). For approximately 21% of the candidates, their highest level of national-level legislative experience was the national SMD position, counting all preceding terms at the timing of election, and only ap- proximately 3% of the candidates had held a national PR seat at the time of the election. More than 75% of the candidates did not have any national-level legislative experience. Only 5% of all candidates were women. Because of the two-ballot system adopted in 2004, I added a dummy variable, running in his or her party's stronghold, to the logistic regres- sion analysis for the 2004–2016 elections. The concept was measured by the relative share of the two major parties' PR votes in the district. When the share of PR votes cast for the Democratic Party in a district is more than 20 percentage points higher than that for the Saenuri Party, the district is considered pro-Democratic, and vice versa. The Democratic candidates running in the pro-Democratic districts and the Saenuri candidates running in the pro-Saenuri districts are considered to be running in “favorable districts.” This means all the independent candidates or minor party candidates are coded as not running in fa- vorable districts. Approximately 15% of the 4111 candidates ran in their party's strongholds.

3.1. Quantitative findings

3.1.1. Gender gaps in candidates’ personal background and district assignment Table 3 presents a summary of the 8629 SMD candidates’ party affiliations, district assignment, and prior political experience, which all 1: Winner of the district0: election, Otherwise 1: Either Democratic or Saenuri party candidate; 0: Minor party or independent candidate Description 2: Running as a SMDchallenger incumbent against of an the incumbent district; 1: Running in a district where the district's incumbent does not seek reelection; 0: running as a 1: Running in his/her party's stronghold, 0: Otherwise 2: Highest level of politicallevel experience legislative = experience national SMD member; 1: Highest level of political experience = national PR member; 0: No national- 1: Woman, 0: Man show a significant gender gap. With regard to party endorsement, women were most likely to run as minor party candidates (40.45%), and a higher share of women (23.6%) ran as independents than men (20.59%) before 2004. Under the new electoral system, the number of women candidates increased almost four times, from 89 candidates between 1988 and 2000 to 355 candidates between 2004 and 2016. The percentage of women running as major candidates rose to 41.13% after 2004, an approximately 5-percentage-point jump from the pre- vious elections, even though the majority of the women candidates had a minor party label. Nevertheless, a higher share of women, in major Variable Party's Stronghold experience Woman and minor parties, ran with party endorsement than in the pre-2004 era. The majority of male candidates hailed from the major party at a higher level than in pre-2004 and compared to the women running in the same period. The pattern of district assignments also reveals a gender gap, which is pertinent to both the pipeline and the sacrificial lamb theories. For men and women, both before and after the electoral system reforms, the Dependent Variable Winner Party Nomination Major party Category District Assignment District's Incumbent Political Experience Highest level of political Gender

Table 2 Summary of variables. majority of the candidates ran as challengers against the district's

31 Y.-I. Lee Electoral Studies 59 (2019) 27–38

Table 3 Gender gaps in candidates’ backgrounds, 1988–2016.

Pre-Quota (1988–2000) Post-Quota (2004–2016)

All candidates (% of all Men (% of all Women (% of all All candidates (% of all Men (% of all Women (% of all candidates) men) women) candidates) men) women)

Total 4518 4429 89 4111 3756 355 Nomination Type Major party 2195 (48.58%) 2163 (48.84%) 32 (35.96%) 2188 (53.22%) 2042 (54.37%) 146 (41.13%) Minor party 1390 (30.77%) 1354 (30.57%) 36 (40.45%) 1203 (29.26%) 1024 (27.26%) 179 (50.42%) Independent 933 (20.65%) 912 (20.59%) 21 (23.60%) 720 (17.51%) 690 (18.37%) 30 (8.45%) District Assignment Incumbent 625 (13.83%) 622 (14.04%) 3 (3.37%) 676 (16.44%) 636 (16.93%) 40 (11.27%) Open Seat 1619 (35.83%) 1585 (35.79%) 34 (38.20%) 1348 (32.79%) 1231 (32.77%) 117 (32.96%) Challenger 2274 (50.33%) 2222 (50.17%) 52 (58.43%) 2087 (50.77%) 1889 (50.29%) 198 (55.77%) Party stronghold (2004–2016 631 (15.35%) 591 (15.73%) 40 (11.27%) only) Highest level of Political Experience* Former and current SMD 950 (21.03%) 943 (21.29%) 7 (7.87%) 900 (21.89%) 854 (22.74%) 46 (12.96%) Former and current PR 148 (3.28%) 142 (3.21%) 6 (6.74%) 90 (2.19%) 51 (1.36%) 39 (10.99%) No national-level legislative 3420 (75.70%) 3344 (75.50%) 76 (85.39%) 3121 (75.92%) 2851 (75.91%) 270 (76.06%) experience

incumbent running for reelection. However, women have a slightly incumbents with national-level SMD experience over time. However, higher percentage of challengers than their male counterparts (50.17% women were less likely to run as major party candidates and the in- among men vs. 58.47% among women before 2004, and 50.29% among cumbent of a district and in their parties’ strongholds than their male men vs. 55.77% among women after 2004), supporting H1. Only ap- counterparts. Women were not necessarily less experienced, but they proximately 14% of the pre-2004 candidates and 16% of the post-2004 utilized PR experience more often than men as the stepping stone to candidates were the district incumbents, and the number of female SMD election. incumbents rose to 40 after 2004, from only 3 between 1988 and 2000. This accumulation of women SMD members over time leads to an in- 3.1.2. Findings from logistic regression analysis: election stage creased supply of women candidates, which, combined with a slight In the candidate nomination stage, the descriptive statistics above decrease in the share of women challengers, presents positive evidence show the existence of a gender gap in candidates' backgrounds and the of the pipeline theory. However, the percentage of district incumbents party nomination pattern, although the gap has narrowed in more re- among women is still lower than that among men. Similarly, between cent years. To examine the magnitude and direction of each factor's 2004 and 2016, men were slightly more likely to run in their party influence on electoral outcomes controlling for other variables, Iused strongholds (15.73% of men vs. 11.27% of women), supporting the logistic regression analysis. As with the descriptive analysis, I divided sacrificial lamb theory (supporting H2). the candidates into two groups by the timing of their campaigns, pre- Related to the pipeline theory, candidates' political experience prior 2004 electoral reform (1988–2000) and post-reform (2004–2016). In to running for the national elections shows a gender gap, but the gap each time period, I ran one model including all the candidates and a narrows over time. Compared to pre-2004 levels, a higher number and second model with only the top two contenders from each district, share of women ran for national legislative office with national-level which account for more than 80% of the total votes in each district SMD experience between 2004 and 2016 (7 women or 7.87% vs. 46 election. Considering South Korea's dominant two-party system, fo- women or 12.96%). The number of women who had served as national cusing on the two most competitive candidates will provide better re- PR members increased by 6.5 times (6 women to 39 women), showing a presentation of the actual electoral context than including all candi- positive spillover effect of PR quotas to SMD candidacy (supporting dates. I included election-year fixed effects in the models to control for Shin, 2014). Compared to that in pre-reform elections, after 2004, the unobserved heterogeneity between election years. To facilitate analysis, percentage of women without any national-level legislative experience I report the odds ratio (the ratio of the probability of electoral victory to decreased by 6 percentage points, which is comparable to the share of the probability of electoral defeat) and the predictive margins of the male candidates running sans national-level political experience variables. (75.9%). This supports the pipeline theory: a growing number of Table 4 reports the results for the pre-reform period, and Table 5 women candidates have accumulated national-level political experi- reports the results for the post-reform period. The analysis shows that ence. A higher number of women than men use PR experience as the having political experience has a positive correlation with electoral stepping stone to SMD candidacy after 2000 (1.36% for men and victory for district-tier seats, but the kind of political experience mat- 10.99% for women). However, it may take time to narrow the gender ters. Compared to running without any national-level legislative ex- gap in political experience: after 2000, the percentage of men and perience, being a current or former SMD member at the time of the women running with SMD experience shows a gap of almost 10 per- election doubles the odds of electoral victory in the pre-reform era and centage points. Even though the descriptive statistics show a narrowing almost triples them in the post-reform elections (Tables 4 and 5). gap in political experience and changing parties’ district assignment Compared to running without any national-level legislative experience, practices which disadvantage women over time, the gap is still evident. running as a current or former PR legislator also increases the odds ratio Overall, these individual-level candidate background data present to a similar degree, and the predicted probability of getting elected with mixed support for the pipeline theory and the sacrificial lamb theory: SMD membership and PR membership is similar in both pre- and post- more women ran with a major party nomination and more ran as reform elections (supporting H4).

32 Y.-I. Lee Electoral Studies 59 (2019) 27–38

Table 4 Party nomination type, political experience, and electoral success, 1988–2000.

All Candidates (base year = 1988) Top Two Contenders (base year = 1988)

DV: Winning in the SMD Election Odds Ratio (S.E.) z-value Odds Ratio (S.E.) z-value Odds Ratio (S.E.) z-value Odds Ratio (S.E.) z-value

Year 1992 1.06 (.11) .54 1.79** (.22) 4.74 1 (.13) 0 1.14 (.16) .99 Year 1996 .81 (.08) −2.03 1.74** (.21) 4.67 1 (.13) 0 1.18 (.16) 1.2 Year 2000 1.02 (.11) 0.16 1.84** (.23) 4.83 1 (.13) 0 1.13 (.16) .88 Major Party Candidate 7.24** (.76) 18.81 1.87** (.23) 5.01 District Incumbent 2.98** (.5) 6.55 2.2** (.4) 4.33 Open Seat 1.83** (.18) 6.08 1.57** (.18) 3.92 Highest: SMD experience 2.28** (.33) 5.75 1.27* (.02) 1.52 Highest: PR experience 2.14** (.43) 3.79 1.04 (.22) .2 Woman .49 (.2) −1.78 .51 (.22) −1.53 Intercept .28** (.02) −17.15 .02** (0) −26.08 1 (.09) 0 .33** (.06) −6.44 N 4518 4518 1884 1884 LR chi2 (3) 8.62 LR chi2(9) = 1049.61 0 LR chi2(9) = 120.24 Prob > chi2 .03 0 1 0 Pseudo R2 0 .23 0 .05 BIC 16.62 −973.87 −11565.588 −11640.58

Table 5 Party nomination type, political experience, and electoral success, 2004–2016.

All Candidates (base year = 2004) Top Two Candidates (base year = 2004)

DV: Winning in the SMD Election Odds Ratio (S.E.) z-value Odds Ratio (S.E.) z-value Odds Ratio z-value Odds Ratio (S.E.) z-value

Year 2008 1.07 (.11) .69 1.47** (.2) 2.92 1 (.12) 0 1.03 (.15) .2 Year 2012 1.43*** (.15) 3.43 1.7** (.23) 4 1 (.13) 0 1.1 (.16) .65 Year 2016 1.41*** (.14) 3.3 .84 (.11) −1.36 1.008 (.13) .06 0.79 (.11) −1.65 Major Party Candidate 8.53** (1.14) 16.1 1.92** (.3) 4.2 District Incumbent 4.17** (.82) 7.27 2.72** (.56) 4.83 Open Seat 2.46** (.27) 8.29 2.09** (.25) 6.11 Running in Party's Stronghold 3.33** (.38) 10.5 3.77** (.48) 10.42 Highest: SMD experience 2.97** (.52) 6.18 2.17** (.41) 4.06 Highest: PR experience 2.7** (.71) 3.79 1.51* (.4) 1.54 Woman .88 (.17) -.66 .91 (.18) -.46 Intercept .26*** (.02) −18.51 .02** (0) −25.57 1 (.09) 0 0.18** (.03) −8.97 N 4111 4111 1970 1970 LR chi2 (3) 18.83 LR chi2(10) = 1574.44 .01 LR chi2(10) = 428.49 Prob > chi2 0 0 .99 0 Pseudo R2 0 .35 0 .16 BIC 6.14 −1491.23 −12182.67 −12558.06

The analysis also reaffirms the crucial roles that prior political ex- Being a woman decreases a candidate's prospects of getting elected, perience and political parties play in electoral victory. Considering all the but the effect is not statistically significant in either the pre-reform or candidates, the largest positive impact on electoral victories relates to post-reform eras (not supporting H3).3 Combined with this finding, the securing the major parties’ nomination in both periods. Compared to correlation between national-level legislative experience and electoral running as a minor party candidate or as an independent, being a major victory in the following election seemingly supports the pipeline theory: party candidate increases the odds of getting elected by more than 7 with the accumulation of women with political experience, one can times in both periods; the odds ratio is higher in the post-reform period expect an increase in the number of women elected to the National (Table 5), which indicates the stronger impact of political parties on the Assembly in the long run. electoral process as South Korean democracy has consolidated over time. Narrowing the focus of the analysis to the top two contenders of the The kind of district assignment also plays a positive role in , however, shows a slightly different picture. Considering the success, again underlining the critical role political parties play as single-member district/plurality-voting system combined with the gatekeepers. Before 2004, running as the incumbent of the district in- dominant two party system in Korea, the top two candidates have a creased the odds of winning the election by almost three times com- realistic chance of winning the election. In the pre-reform period, the pared to running as a challenger (Table 4). In the post-reform elections, major variables’ statistical significance is the same, but the magnitude the incumbency advantage is even stronger than in the pre-reform of the impact is smaller when considering only the top two contenders period (Table 5). Compared to running as a challenger, running for than when considering all the candidates. For example, being a major open seats almost doubles the odds ratio of electoral victory, and the party candidate almost doubles the odds ratio of winning the election, odds ratio is slightly higher from 2004 onward (Tables 4 and 5). which still indicates a significant impact but one that is much smaller Compared to running without a favorable district assignment, running than the 7.24 in the model considering all the candidates (Table 4). in one's own party's stronghold (another aspect of district assignment) Another variable to note is PR experience; this variable does not have a almost triples the odds of electoral victory. This again implies the in- creased significance of political parties in a consolidated democracy in promoting individuals to elected office, and simultaneously emphasizes 3 I tested several interaction terms of candidate gender and other variables, the stiff barrier to entry for political newcomers without prior political but they were not statistically significant, and including the interaction terms experience or party endorsement. decreased the model fit. Therefore, I did not include them in the final analysis.

33 Y.-I. Lee Electoral Studies 59 (2019) 27–38

Fig. 2. Predictive margins of independent variables, pre-quota period. statistically significant impact when considering only the two most Thus, understanding why PR experience only marginally helps in SMD competitive contenders in a district in the pre-reform era (Fig. 2). The electoral bids will illuminate how the type of political experience same figure shows that running for open seats or running as the district women have affects the continuance of their political career. Second, incumbent significantly increases the predicted probability of winning why are women more likely to run as challengers and less likely to run the district election compared to that in the scenario in which a can- in their party's strongholds? didate is running as a challenger. A similar pattern surfaces in the post-reform period. The odds ratio 3.2. Interview analysis of significant variables is smaller when considering only the toptwo contenders than in the model including all 4111 candidates (Table 5). To explain this limited spillover effect of the gender quota forPR The impact of running in one's own party's stronghold is greater in the seats and the major parties' practices regarding district assignment and second analysis than in the all-candidate model (3.33 vs. 3.77, Table 5) nomination, which put women at a disadvantage, I analyzed 28 semi- and is the most decisive factor in electoral victory (Fig. 3). As in the pre- structured in-depth interviews conducted in Seoul, South Korea, in reform period, the impact of PR experience is smaller when considering 2015. Although they are not a representative sample of South Korean only the top two candidates than in the full model (2.7 vs. 1.51) but is politicians, the interviewees have diverse backgrounds: 10 men and 18 still statistically significant. Compared to having no national-level leg- women; four former PR members and one current SMD member; two islative experience, having PR experience increases the predicted primary candidates who did not win major parties’ nominations; seven probability of winning the election by almost 0.1, even though the wide party staffers; nine legislative staffers; four scholars; one activist; and confidence interval implies that the prediction is less precise (Fig. 3). As members of the ruling party, main opposition party and minor parties. pointed out earlier, women are more likely to use PR experience as the Interviewees ranged in age from their mid-20s to mid-60s. (See the stepping stone to SMD candidacy (Table 3), but this PR experience does online appendix for a list of interviewees.) not boost their electoral success significantly. Existing studies on electoral incentives in mixed-member systems This quantitative analysis tested the hypotheses but also raises suggest that SMD members and PR members face different legislative several new questions. First, the current gender quota is applicable only organizations and legislative expectations, which affect their electoral to PR seats, and the political parties do not allow individuals to serve incentives: “legislators elected in SMD are expected to be more inter- more than one terms as PR members. However, the analysis shows that ested in delivering particularistic goods to their district, whereas a PR having served as a PR member has a weaker correlation with electoral electoral system generally is expected to produce policy outcomes that victory in district elections than SMD experience, among the two most provide more dispersed benefits” (Pekkanen et al., 2006, p. 184). In competitive candidates in each district, which leads to career termi- South Korea, PR members' main focus and expected role is to write bills nation/interruption for PR members despite their four-year national- and represent specific interest groups, such as labor unions, women's level political experience. Even though the impact of PR experience on organizations, and professional associations. These differential ex- electoral victory is not dependent on the candidate's gender, the ana- pectations for the two-tier legislators, while seemingly logical, works lysis of candidates' backgrounds revealed that women are more likely to against PR members when they vie for SMD seats in subsequent elec- rely on the PR route to start their political career than men (Table 3). tions.

34 Y.-I. Lee Electoral Studies 59 (2019) 27–38

Fig. 3. Predictive margins of independent variables, post-quota period.

During their legislative term, PR members focus on drafting bills, in the opinion poll, is critical for winning the nomination in South and by the time they need to decide if they want to continue to pursue Korea, and the local network is the key to recruiting such members. their political career, the favorable districts with high levels of support According to Rich (2012), the South Korean Assembly's mixed system for their parties are likely to have been claimed by other candidates creates an invisible hierarchy of SMD and PR members in which the [Interviewee #13]. The small share of PR seats in the Korean legislature former is deemed more prestigious and legitimate, as SMD members are and the centralized party nomination process may limit the inclusion- directly elected by voters. There is little expectation that they establish building effect of the PR system even further. This limits how muchthe local networks, and the resulting lack of geographically defined support gender quota actually increases the share of women elected, even bases undermines their prospects of transitioning from PR posts to though many scholars have hailed this system as a fast-track remedy to district-tier seats. addressing women's underrepresentation in legislatures. Relatedly, Due to their "second-class citizen" status in the National Assembly when PR members are nominated to run for upcoming SMD elections, and in the party, PR members are implicitly discouraged from applying party leaders expect them to run in unfavorable districts hoping that the for leadership positions in the Assembly and are discriminated against PR members bring unexpected electoral victory to the party in legislative committee assignments (Kim et al., 2014), which is [Interviewees #2, #7, #8, #10, #21, but #1 disagreed]. This district echoed by interviewees for this project. Holding party leadership po- assignment practice explains the findings from the statistical analysis, sitions increases legislators' name recognition and visibility, offers ac- showing experience serving as PR members increases the predicted cess to the resources that enable a candidate to establish personal probability of winning SMD bids only marginally. support networks, and is also a critical evaluation criterion in the SMD Moreover, many women are in double jeopardy due to their gender candidate nomination process. All of these factors increase candidates' and seat type (more likely to be PR than SMD). The most prominent chances of successful career continuation. For PR members, assuming political cleavage in South Korea is based on geographic region. The positions of national party leadership and local party precinct com- Saenuri Party enjoys a high level of support in the southeast part of the mittee leadership is unlikely due to the informal rules that prioritize country (Gyeongsang Province), the Democratic Party has a strong seniority and SMD members. During the 19th session, only 12 of the support base in the southwest region of Jeolla Province, and the me- 48 PR members from either major party assumed a local party leader- tropolitan Seoul area is considered a “swing” region. The mixed system ship position (Jung and Oh, 2015). Thus, PR members’ struggles to in this heavily region-based political climate endows PR members with emerge as party organization leaders negatively influence their suc- a unique status in the Assembly, as they do not have geographically cessful bids in SMD elections. defined support base [Interviewee #3]. Lacking a geographically defined support base makes it difficult for 4. Conclusion PR members to establish the strong local support base they need to secure nomination and win elections, similar to the case in Canada This analysis shows that women can convince voters to vote for (Pruysers and Cross, 2016). Recruiting new members to the party them when they demonstrate prior political experience and favorable during the candidate selection contest, who can vote for the candidate support from political parties, though this does not imply that there is during the primaries or who can mark their preference for the candidate no discrimination against by voters and the

35 Y.-I. Lee Electoral Studies 59 (2019) 27–38 media (Barnes et al., 2016; Hyun and Kim, 2005; Keum and Kim, 2008; differently. This finding suggests policy recommendations for empow- Lee and Rich, 2018). The findings support the sacrificial lamb theory, ering women politically, which have been echoed in other states' con- indicating that parties tend to place women candidates in unfavorable texts: political parties hold the key to addressing women's continued contests, more so than the pipeline theory, which alternatively points to underrepresentation in politics. Changing the electoral system to a a lack of experienced female SMD candidates. Although previous stu- mixed one and adopting gender quotas have not led to a significant dies argued that former and current PR legislators are more likely than increase in women's presence in the legislature, though more time is inexperienced legislators to be successful in their bids for SMD seats needed to see the real impact of these two institutional factors on wo- (Shin, 2014), this study shows that the gender quota's empowering ef- men's representation (Thames, 2017). Serving as an SMD member is the fect for the PR tier is limited to the candidate selection stage. Informal surest path to electoral victory for women, and the parties should en- and formal rules governing the practices of candidate nomination, courage women to be more successful in their SMD bids. elections, and the workings of the parties and the National Assembly In East Asia, the findings in the existing literature have limited pose invisible barriers to women, which in turn lead to career inter- applicability, such as the context-specific nature of the linkage between ruption and/or termination for PR women. Future studies can test the symbolic representation and descriptive representation (Liu, 2018), and generalizeabiliy of these findings, by comparing South Korea's case with the impact of commonly cited factors such as political parties’ ideolo- its two East Asian democratic neighbors, Japan and Taiwan, as all three gies on women's electoal success (Jones, 2009), as different gender cases feature a mixed system with political culture of invisible hier- norms prevail in the region than in the Western European context. This archy between tiers. study tested how well the theories on gender and election can transfer Some broader conclusions regarding electoral politics in South to the non-Western European context. Findings from this single-case Korea can be also drawn. South Korea's centralized, top-down candidate study lay a foundation for future comparative studies of similar in- nomination process confers significant power on political parties as stitutional arrangements of mixed-member systems combined with gatekeepers, but the existing literature on South Korean electoral pol- legislative quotas in only one tier, such as those found in Armenia, itics does not provide empirical evidence of how political parties' dis- Ecuador, Georgia or Honduras. trict assignment practices affect electoral outcomes for men and women

Appendix

Table 1 Share of Women Legislators in South Korean National Assemblies.

Assembly Total Women (%w) SMD seats Women SMD (%w) PR seats Women PR (%w)

1st (1948) 200 1 (.5%) 2nd (1950) 210 2 (.9%) 3rd (1954) 203 1 (.5%) 4th (1958) 233 1 (1.3%) 5th (1960) 233 1 (.4%) 6th (1963) 175 2 (1.1%) 131 1 (.7%) 44 1 (2.3%) 7th (1967) 175 3 (1.7%) 131 1 (.7%) 44 2 (4.5%) 8th (1971) 204 5 (2.5%) 153 0 (0%) 51 5 (9.8%) 9th (1973) 219 13 (5.5%) 146 2 (1.4%) 73 10 (13.7%) 10th (1978) 231 8 (3.5%) 154 1 (.6%) 77 7 (9.1%) 11th (1981) 276 9 (3.3%) 184 1 (.5%) 92 8 (8.7%) 12th (1985) 276 8 (2.9%) 184 2 (1.1%) 92 6 (6.5%) 13th (1988) 299 6 (2%) 224 0 (0%) 75 6 (8%) 14th (1992) 299 8 (2.7%) 237 1 (.4%) 62 7 (11.3%) 15th (1996) 299 11 (3.7%) 253 3 (1.2%) 46 8 (17.4%) 16th (2000) 273 16 (5.9%) 227 5 (2.2%) 46 11 (23.9%) 17th (2004) 299 39 (13%) 243 10 (4.1%) 56 29 (51.8%) 18th (2008) 299 41 (13.7%) 245 14 (5.7%) 54 27 (50%) 19th (2012) 300 47 (15.7%) 246 19 (7.7%) 54 28 (51.9%) 20th (2016) 300 51 (17%) 253 26 (10.2%) 47 25 (53.2%)

Source: Lee, 2017

Table 2 Gender of National Assembly Applicants Nominated and Elected, 2008–2016.

Men Women

Applied Nominated (% of the applied) Elected (% of the nominated) Applied Nominated (% of the applied) Elected (% of the nominated)

Saenuri 2008 1110 227 (20.45%) 121 (53.30%) 50 18 (36%) 10 (55.56%) 2012 905 214 (23.65%) 123 (57.48%) 67 16 (23.88%) 4 (25%) 2016 744 231 (31.05%) 98 (42.42%) 78 16 (20.51%) 6 (37.5%) Democratic 2008 465 182 (39.14%) 51 (28.02%) 21 15 (71.43%) 4 (26.67%) 2012 665 188 (28.27%) 93 (49.47%) 48 21 (43.75%) 13 (61.90%) 2016 334 209 (62.57%) 93 (44.50%) 35 25 (71.43%) 17 (68%)

Data Sources: Hangyoreh Shinmun (2008, 2012b), Korean National Election Commission (2016), Kyonghyang Shinmun (2012), The Seoul Post (2008), Women News (2016).

36 Y.-I. Lee Electoral Studies 59 (2019) 27–38

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oceaneng.2018.12.017.

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