Siphosami Malunga

POStSCRIpt: A TaLE OF BROKEN PROMISES Siphosami Malunga A TaLE OF BROKEN PROMISES: ZIMbabWE AFtER MUGabE For millions of Zimbabweans, who had suffered political repression and economic deprivation and decline during the preceding 40 years, Mugabe’s removal was a much-needed relief. Little did it matter that it was his com- rades, with whom he had killed thousands, stifed dissent, closed the democratic space and plundered the economy and public purse who removed him, under the banner of the ironically titled Operation Restore Legacy. He was the head of the Zimbabwe African National Unity–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) system, and as such, his exit was seen by many as providing an opportunity for change. For that reason, rallied by the army generals who were seeking but struggling to “constitutionally” remove Mugabe, thousands of Zimbabweans came out to the streets to send a message to Mugabe “to leave and leave now”. Thus, they “sanitized” the coup. After his removal, the generals summoned Mugabe’s former deputy, Emmerson Mnangagwa, back from exile to take over. Mnangagwa had dramatically fed the country weeks earlier after being fred by Mugabe, claiming that he feared for his life after an alleged poisoning attempt. © The Author(s) 2020 389 S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, P. Ruhanya (eds.), The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2 390 S. MALUNGA After taking control of the ruling party and reversing all of Mugabe’s decisions and dismissals that had affected Mnagangwa’s faction, the generals took their plan to Parliament, forcing Mugabe to buckle and resign. Mnangagwa was inaugurated as President on 27 November 2017 with promises to bring in political and economic reforms. At his inauguration, attended by foreign diplomats and opposition leaders, Mnangagwa promised to undo the disastrous results of Mugabe’s 40-year rule. He promised to fx the ruined economy and open the long isolated and ostracised country for business and investment. He promised to restore and respect democracy, to repeal draconian laws, to restore the rule of law, to fght corruption, to revisit compensation to white farmers for land, to re-engage the international community and most importantly to respect the will and voice of the people, which, he argued was the voice of God. To that end, he promised to provide the people with the ultimate opportunity to decide on the future political leadership of the country via free, fair and peaceful elections. Individually and taken together, what Mnangagwa promised was exactly what the country needed, and what it had been denied by Mugabe and ZANU–PF for decades. Two years after Mugabe was deposed, with Zimbabweans worse off than they were during the worst of Mugabe’s equally disastrous rule, it is clear that Mnangagwa’s is a tale of broken promises. So what went wrong? FaLSE EXpECtatIONS, FaLSE CHaNGE To start, post-Mugabe Zimbabwe was a proverbial house built on sand. Driven by Mugabe’s henchmen, who had been the architects and imple- menters of his disastrous policies in the previous four decades, it was not really the change that Zimbabweans and the world thought it would be. It was triggered by and aimed to settle an internal ZANU–PF factional fght (between the Generation 40 (G40) faction, led by Grace Mugabe, and Lacoste, led by Emmerson Mnangagwa, inside ZANU–PF. It was and had never been a people’s project and certainly never ideologically founded or spurred on by a genuine desire for real political and social change. To that extent, little should have been expected from the coup. This alone easily explains why it delivered nothing in resolving Zimbabwe’s long-term cri- ses and instead dug the country into a deeper hole. The so-called new dispensation has been a catalogue of failure since November 2017, failing the several tests it faced. PostsCript: A Tale of BroKen Promises 391 FaILED POLItICaL REFORM The frst test for the post-coup regime was openness to political reform. Under Mugabe, ZANU–PF had shown extreme political intolerance. In the 1980s, seeking a one-party state, Mugabe, with Mnangagwa as his security minister, had massacred thousands of supporters of the opposition party Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), forcing its leader Joshua Nkomo to capitulate and join a unity government under ZANU–PF. In the 1990s, Mugabe had violently suppressed all signs of internal and exter- nal opposition, sending gunmen to shoot and kill opponents in the Zimbabwe Unity Movement. In 2000, his ego dented by the loss of the constitutional referendum, and fearing that he would lose the parliamen- tary election to the new Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), Mugabe had deployed party youths and war veterans to violently attack white farmers and farm workers perceived to be supporters of the new opposition party. In 2008, with clear signs of having lost the presidential election to Morgan Tsvangirai in the frst round, he resorted frst to rig- ging, then violence, to win the run-off from which Tsvangirai ended up withdrawing. When Mnangagwa took over in 2017, all eyes were therefore on how his regime would treat the opposition. Never mind that Mnangagwa had been Mugabe’s mastermind and enforcer of violence against the opposition, going back to 1980. As security minister, he had directed the intelligence aspects of the Gukurahundi operation that left 20,000 civilians dead. In 2000, 2002 and 2008, he had also played a key role in election- related violence directed at MDC offcials and supporters. He was considered a key architect of the closed political space in Zimbabwe, an idea that went back decades. To many, it was therefore unreasonable to expect any meaningful change in political tolerance after the coup. Yet, aware of his own dubious credentials and also to curry favour with his western backers and funders, especially the United Kingdom, Mnangagwa promised to open the country up not just for business but also politically. In a public relations stunt, he publicly visited sick MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai and offered government support for his medical treatment as well as the transfer of his offcial state-purchased residence, which Mugabe had refused to hand over. He even tolerated criticism in the media and from civil society on historically taboo subjects, such as Gukurahundi. To cap it all, he even “joined” social media. 392 S. MALUNGA The period between the coup and elections in July 2018 saw a marked and unprecedented improvement and opening up of political, civic and media space. But purges of G40 elements, Mnangagwa’s erstwhile neme- sis, continued, with selective arrests and prosecutions. There were still bans on protests, arbitrary arrests, the abuse of power and authority, and regular violations of constitutional and human rights that targeted activists. FIXED aND FLaWED ELECtIONS The second major test was the general election in July 2018. Seen as being central to restoring democracy after the coup, there was little doubt that the post-coup elections would need to pass the free, fair and peaceful test. Previous elections in Zimbabwe had been bloody, with outcomes con- tested. In 2008, because of the violence, the continental and global community had refused to sign off the presidential elections, forcing Mugabe into a coalition government with Morgan Tsvangirai. In the 2013 election, although it had been peaceful, the manipulation of the roll of voters, which was withheld by the electoral commission until election day, again undermined the legitimacy of Mugabe’s victory. In 2018, Mnangagwa was therefore aware that if anything was needed to gain internal and exter- nal legitimacy as part of his open for business mantra, delivering free, fair and peaceful elections was the silver bullet. Despite their promises, Mnangagwa and ZANU–PF resorted to tried and tested tactics. They retained the tainted and discredited Zimbabwe Election Commission and Secretariat, considered by many as lacking inde- pendence and made up of security and intelligence personnel. Again, as in previous elections, the commission failed to release the voters roll on time and in a searchable format, and even then it was plagued with irregulari- ties. As in previous elections, ZANU–PF leaned on the army—whose mere presence especially in rural areas intimidated voters. It also manipu- lated the government’s agricultural subsidy scheme to “buy” the rural vote. As in previous years, ZANU–PF and Mnangagwa monopolized the state media in their electoral campaign, denying equal and fair play to the opposition. With the Mugabe era draconian laws on access to information and protection of privacy, and on public order and security, still frmly intact, the pre-election environment and playing feld was far from being level. The operational conduct of the election, including the tabulation, transmission and announcement of elections results, pointed to a rigged process. With the closeness of the results between Mnangagwa and his PostsCript: A Tale of BroKen Promises 393 opposition challenger, Nelson Chamisa—with Mnangagwa receiving just over the 50% required—no wonder the outcome was disputed and chal- lenged in court. The Constitutional Court ruled in favour of Mnangagwa but failed to give its reasons for almost 18 months, further entrenching partisan perspectives. LEOpaRDS CaN’t CHaNGE THEIR SpOtS Mnangagwa’s third test involved human rights. As he had played a central role as Mugabe’s right hand, in the gradual and systematic erosion of citi- zens’ rights for the preceding 40 years, many were sceptical that he and ZANU–PF would miraculously begin to respect human rights. The scep- tics were right. Shortly after the July election, in response to public protest against delays in announcing election results, Mnangagwa deployed the military—who shot and killed six unarmed civilians and injured scores more.

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