PEACE & SECURITY REPORT
CHAD CONFLICT INSIGHTS APRIL 2021
The purpose of this report is to provide analysis and recommendations to national, regional and continental decision makers in the implementation of peace and security-related instruments. The opinions expressed in this report are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies. www.ipss-addis.org/publications
CONTENTS
SITUATION ANALYSIS 2 CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT 3 ACTORS 4 DYNAMICS OF THE CONFLICT 8 CURRENT RESPONSE ASSESSMENT 10 SCENARIOS 11 STRATEGIC OPTIONS 12 REFERENCES 13 CONFLICT TIMELINE 14
CONTRIBUTORS
Cynthia Happi (Author) Dr. Mesfin Gebremichael (Editor In Chief) Moussa Soumahoro (Associate Editor) Tigist Kebede Feyissa (Associate Editor)
© 2021 Institute For Peace And Security Studies | Addis Ababa University. All Rights Reserved. Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Chad Conflict Insights Report 2 15.5M SITUATION ANALYSIS FIGURE 1.COUNTRY PROFILEANDDEMOGRAPHICS NIGERIA NIGER CAMEROON SUDAN LIBYA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC is beingstrongly contested onboth political andsocio- The legitimacy ofPresident IdrissDéby Itno’s government protracted conflict since independence achieving in1960. has beeninastate ofalmost constant instability and central Africa andahometo over 150 The Republic of Chadisalandlocked innorth- country https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/ tion-abroad-challenging-times-ahead.pdf pw136-debys-chad-political-manipulation-at-home-military-interven- https://www.britannica.com/place/Chad/Plant-and-ani- 2 mal-life 1 i UNDP, Index HumanDevelopment 2019.Available at :http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TCD (at 53-58%),followed by Christianity (at 35-40%). of thecountry, withthemost popularreligion beingIslam diversity, French andArabic are thetwo officiallanguages and linguistic groups. Besidesits richethnic andlinguistic POPULATION NEIGHBOURS 1 different ethnic RANK: 187/189 INDEX: 0.401 54.0 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX(HDI) LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (YRS) 2 Chad national andregional instabilities. making the conflict-prone vulnerable country to both neighboring countries exacerbates internal crisesinChad, from neighboring countries. Conflict dynamicsinthese the country. Inaddition,Chadissurrounded by conflicts intensify theongoing political grievances throughout religious rivalries, aswell associo-economic crisis,further after elections and recurrent attempted coups. Ethnic and which revolves around contestation for power duringand economic fronts. Itexperiences recurrent political violence I $1,745 ECCAS GDP PERCAPITA RECS fighting andsectarian conflicts. limited resources, resulting eventually ininter-community has alsoplaced mountingdemographic pressure onthe and non-indigenous communities over land use rights. It to frequent clashesandviolence between theindigenous northerners inthesouthern areas has led of the country livelihood insecurities.Inaddition,theresettlement ofthe vulnerabilities to mobilize individualsdiscontented with and non-state armedgroups have exploited these the government. have caused They unrest inthecountry education have created seething resentment towards limited access to basic suchashealth services care and social relations. to ethnic tensions andincreased violence inpolitical and have largely beenexcluded from political power, leading few ministerial positions inthecurrent government, they discontent amongmost people.Whilesoutherners hold 5 freedom-world/2020, 4 2019. chad/au-tchad-lincursion-des-rebelles-devoile-les-fragilites-du-pouvoir, 3 countries intheworld with about 46.7% economic challenges. Chad is one of the poorest situation inChadis related to thecountry’s socio- One ofthestructural causes ofthecurrent security Socio-Economic Challenges economic systems since the1990s have been in control of Chad’s military, political and group from thenorth,whoare ademographic minority, Moreover, thefact that members oftheZaghawa ethnic the country’s political crisisandinternal power struggle. more recently in2018to consolidate power hastriggered boycotts. Theamendmentoftheconstitution in2005and alleged electoral irregularities andsuccessive opposition won elections in 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016 despite since ascending to power in 1990. He overwhelmingly power. President Déby hasdominated Chadianpolitics since produced 1996,noneofthemhasever achange in Although Chadhasheldregular presidential elections Centralization ofPower CAUSES OFTHECONFLICT (2.2M ppl.)andfood insecurity(3.7Mppl.), population livingbelow the poverty line. Malnutrition 6 sources/Chad---Country-profile---September-2019-.pdf OCHA,https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/re Freedom House,https://freedomhouse.org/country/chad/ ICG, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/ UNWFP, https://www.wfp.org/countries/chad ,2019. 4 3 has created aserious 5 ofthecountry’s 6 aswell as - national security. western border withNigeria still posesamajorthreat to rule, theresurgence ofattacks by Boko Haram onChad’s in thefightagainst terrorism under President Déby’s the country. hasbecome Althoughthecountry aleader Basin, notably Chad,resulting inpersistent insecurityin Haram affect countries inthe region oftheLake Chad in thecountry. Moreover, theviolentoperations ofBoko pressure onscarce resources andexacerbate tensions country’s andsystems. poorsocialservices heighten They to Chad. 500,000 refugees anddisplaced persons beingrelocated Libya andtheCentral African Republic resulted inabout dynamics in neighboring countries. Conflicts in Sudan, to cross-border instability andspillover from conflict Chad’s geo-strategic location makes subject thecountry Neighboring Countries Spillover fromConflictsin https://reliefweb.int/report/chad/unicef-chad-humanitari- an-situation-report-1-january-30-june-2019 7 7 Theserefugees place additionalpressure onthe 3 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Chad Conflict Insights Report Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Chad Conflict Insights Report 4 National Assembly. FIGURE 2.ACTORS MAPPING ACTORS tion-abroad-challenging-times-ahead.pdf, 2017. pw136-debys-chad-political-manipulation-at-home-military-interven- 10 http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2061_E.htm expected to beheldinApril2021. 9 8 ministerial positions with 117/188 seats since control 1996.They majorityoftheparliament and (MPS), andallied parties have beengoverning thecountry ruling political party, Patriotic Movement ofSalvation as both the Headserves of State and Government. The Chad isapresidential republic whereby thePresident The Government - 50,000 security and uses its armed forces of an estimated 20,000 the government generally implements policiesto advance making Chadanemerging by country then.Inthisregard, Sahel regions. It is a key contributor to the Multinational most respected armies intheLake ChadBasin andthe major anti-terrorist operations thusbecoming oneofthe The Chadian armed force equally participates in three integrity. Institutions (DGSSIE) to curb unrest and maintain national and General Direction of State of the Security Services G5 Sahe MINUSM 10 l troops oftheChadianNational Army(ANT) USIP, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/ Legislative elections have not beenheldsince 2011andare A AU 9 Thegovernment’s 2030visionaimsat Non- Armed Groups Stat e Rebel G ov e r n
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Assembly. Its leader and the 2016 presidential elections party intheParliament with10seats at theNational well asMoundouandSarh.Itisalsothelargest opposition the southwest, Mayo-Kebi east andwest, Kelo, Tandjilé as 1992. Theparty hasastrong representation andsupportin Union for Democracy andRenewal (UNDR),founded in standing regime. Themainoppositionparty istheNational is to attain national power andputanendto thelong system in1996.Theobjective oftheseoppositionparties Chad since the reintroduction of the multi-party electoral https://tsep.africa.ufl.edu/the-party-system-and-condi- https://af.reuters.com/article/idAFKCN21V0HT-OZATP tions-of-candidacy/chad/ 12 11 There have beenmore than150oppositionparties Opposition Parties (MINUSMA) with more than1,400soldiers. contributor to theU.N. peacekeeping missioninMali G5 Sahel.TheChadianarmyisalsothelargest troop Joint Task Force (MNJTF)andtheJointForce ofthe France andtheUSA. maintains strong diplomatic tieswith countries suchas as theUN,OIF, AU, ECCAS andmanyothers. Chadalso to several regional andinternational organizations such D n
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i e s Key Broken Alliance Discord/Conflict Links/Close Relationships 11 Itisamember 12 in order” and“disturbingorder” publicorder.” “incitement to anunarmedgathering,” “disobeying an and Iyinayouth were movement. They charged with also arrested thespokespersons ofEnoughis for political change. rapidly lead to widespread demonstrations and demands that populardiscontent over livelihood conditions could always dwindled to nothing, proved nevertheless they to worsen in thecountry. Although CSO’s protests have sector workers strike aseconomic conditions continued prolonged protest 2020 saw public- in 2018, while January at therisingfueland cooking gas costs again resulted in ga-2018-OECD-chad.pdf 17 cations/factional-dynamics-within-boko-haram, 2018 16 15 https://www.civ- icus.org/index.php/fr/medias-ressou ists-ahead-of-april-10-elections rces/112-news/899-media-statement-on-chad-release-civil-society-activ 14 strike brought manyofChad’s towns andthecapital N’Djamenato ahalt. 2016toon 24February protest Déby’s continuing tenure. Thenationwide 13 structures.military engaged inlarge scale assaults primarilytargeting faction of Boko Haram which operates in Chad, is Yusuf. TheIslamicState inWest Africa Province (ISWAP), 2002 inNortheastern Nigeria by thelate clericMuhammed Boko Haram isajihadist militant organization founded in Boko Haram Union ofTrade UnionsofChad. in March 2016, responded by arresting members ofthe campaign, demanding political change. Security forces, movement protested duringthepresidential electoral platforms such as Enough Is Enough and the Iyina youth grip onpower. In2016,inparticular, several civilsociety conditions, impunityandPresident Déby’s continuing been active inmobilizingstreet protests living to decry human rights, democracy have and development, sector-based pressure groups and campaigners for Since 2014,CivilSociety Organizations (CSOs), including The CivilSociety irregularities andDéby’s continuing tenure. boycotted elections, protesting against alleged electoral for Change (FONAC). Oppositionparties have repeatedly 29 opposition parties formed Opposition Front the New opposition describedas“an electoral coup,” acoalition of Following the2016presidential elections whichthe in parliament with8members at theNational Assembly. and Democracy (URD)isthesecond largest opposition head ofthecountry’s opposition. TheUnionfor Renewal Runner-up (13%ofthevotes), SalehKebzabo, isthe 2015, causing thedeath ofhundreds ofChadians. rapidly escalated intheLake Chadregion throughout the borders ofChadin2014andviolence by thegroup OCED,https://sahelresearch.africa.ufl.edu/files/Eizen- ISS, https://issafrica.org/research/books-and-other-publi- Ibid Chad’s oppositionled alarge-scale nationwide shutdown 16 Boko Haram began to spillover into 14 Chadianauthorities 15 Popular discontent 13 17 The - and hadanestimated 2,000-3,000militants Chadian rebel groups. Itmainly operated ineastern Chad the leadership ofMahamat Nouri,was oneofthelargest (UFDD), whichemergedand Development in2006under of President Déby. TheUnionofForces for Democracy government ofPresident Déby. (CCMSR), founded in2016,equallyseekto overthrow the Command Councilfor theSalvation oftheRepublic Several other Chadianrebel groups suchastheMilitary government andmilitary, era. Thesegroups, mostly ledby defectors from Chad’s successive governments inthe post-independence as aresult ofarmedoppositionpoliticsthat shaped Chad has experienced the proliferation of rebel groups Groups Non-state ArmedRebel others. 2015, killing37peopleandwounding more than100 and national police academy inN’DjamenaJune Islamist group notably attacked thepolice headquarters 19 18 (JEM). Darfuri groups like theJustice andEquality Movement mainly of Zaghawa fighters) and maintains close ties with at Bohoma,killing98Chadiansoldiers. Boko Haram combatants attacked base aChadianmilitary biggest loss in Chadian history military in March 2020 when Zaghawa people led by Timane Erdini. It receives strong support from the another alliance ofrebel groups founded in2009and government. TheUnionofResistance Forces (UFR)is on Chad’s capital, N’Djamena, in order to overthrow the command. In2006,theUFDDledanunsuccessful offensive former UFDDand hasanestimated 1000combatants. and UnityinChad(FACT). FACT isasplinter group ofthe Ali Mahamat in 2016, forming the Front for the Change unified undertheleadership ofMahamat NouriandMahdi French Moreover, intervention. anumberofrebel groups 2019 buttheattempted coup was aborted following tion-abroad-challenging-times-ahead.pdf pw136-debys-chad-political-manipulation-at-home-military-interven- 24 http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/ BA-Armed-Groups-URF.pdf archive/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/armed-opposition-groups/JEM/HS 23 Feb 2019. chad/au-tchad-lincursion-des-rebelles-devoile-les-fragilites-du-pouvoir, http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/ 22 facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf 21 USIP_1208_5.PDF 20 calating-fight-against-boko-haram/, April2020. 23 18 TheUFRtriedto overthrow thegovernment in The Chadiangovernment furtherwitnessedthe DanielEizenga, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/chad-es Ibid USIP, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/ ICG, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/ USIP, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/ 22 (theirestimated 4000members consist 20 aimat overthrowing theregime 19 21 underits - 24 -
5 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Chad Conflict Insights Report Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Chad Conflict Insights Report 6 of onetheoppositioncandidates on8February. kidnapping andgang raping oftheteenage daughter fifth term inoffice. These protests were triggered bythe 2016against24 February Déby’s bidto contest for a mass protests inN’Djamenaandother majorcitieson the 2016presidential elections. Theoppositionorganized in publicopinionandstrong electoral challenges during President Déby, however, faced mountingdisapproval some political reforms. parties andthepolitical oppositionwere held,resulting in national dialoguesbetween thepresidential majority Following the2011presidential election boycotts, several boycotting the2006and2011presidential elections. government and repeatedly protested against the regime, then questioned thelegitimacy ofPresident Déby’s keep himselfinpower. Oppositiongroups have since by the oppositionasclear evidence ofhisintention to President Déby runandwina4thterm in2011, was viewed political crisis.Theamendedconstitution, whichenabled turning point for themore recent phaseofthe country’s limits inthe2005 constitutional referendum was the party system in1996,theelimination ofpresidential term resources. Although President Déby reintroduced multi- by groups competing for political power andaccess to authoritarianism andweak democratization fuelled instability, periodicviolence, civilwars, coup d’états, Since independence, Chadhasexperienced recurring CONFLICT DYNAMICS ga-2018-OECD-chad.pdf 26 25 leaders who planned the rallies. scheduled demonstrations andarresting thecivilsociety authorities suppressed themovement by banning society groups demanding political change. Chadian led to theemergence ofacoalition ofanti-regime civil been routinely postponed since 2011.In legitimacy nationally. Moreover, legislative elections have jeopardizes thecurrent regime’s abilityto claimpolitical only exacerbates political violence inChadandfurther the opportunity to remain in power until 2033. This law with the2018constitution whichgave President Déby consolidated political power. Thiswas furtherapparent underscored theextent to whichPresident Déby had and thoseseekingdemocratic change inChad,butalso characterized therelationship between thegovernment elections didnot onlyportray themaindynamicsthat OECED, https://sahelresearch.africa.ufl.edu/files/Eizen- Chad OppositionProtests,Newsweek, 2015. 25February 26 The 2016 presidential 25 It between theChadian government andrebel groups. Peace Agreement whichwas signedonOctober 25,2007 2008 coup attempt symbolized thecollapse oftheSirte Chadian authoritiesandforced therebels to retreat. The France’s equallycame intervention insupportofthe guard thecapital against possiblefuture coup attempt. a state ofemergency andenacted securitymeasures to Following theattack, theChadiangovernment declared almost overthrew thegovernment ofPresident Déby. forces andlaunchedanattack onN’Djamenaandthat 2008, three rebel groups (UFDD,RFC andFUC)joined occasions to overthrow thegovernment. InFebruary of several rebel groups that have attempted onseveral The struggle for political power alsoledto theemergence accountability andpolitical legitimacy. a definingfeature ofdemocratic rule,government fact, Chaddoesnot holdregular legislative elections, 0/03932729.2020.1833475?scroll=top&needAccess=true, Nov 2020. 31 chad-intercommunal-conflict-national-concern-after-37-killed, 2019. 30 https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24430 chad/au-tchad-lincursion-des-rebelles-devoile-les-fragilites-du-pouvoir 29 28 2018. the-unstable-foundations-of-political-stability-in-chad_508844d3-en, 27 administration inNovember 2015. The government also in theLake region, effectively placing itundermilitary tothe National establish Assembly astate ofemergency continues to present asecurityproblem. Thiscaused particularly intheLake Chadregion where Boko Haram Compounding this isthe emergence ofinsurgency groups stability. inter-communal fightingpersists, threaten Chadian Chad particularly in Ouaddai (bordering Darfur),where Other conflicts suchasthoseintheeastern regions of France to thegovernment. territory, manyhave alsocriticized thesupportgiven by condemn the incursions of rebel groups into their While most Chadiansare against coup attempts and 2019at3-6 February therequest ofChadianauthorities. following France’s (Operation intervention Barkhane)on the government 2019.Theplanwas aborted inFebruary group of Chadian rebels (UFR) again tried to overthrow lawlessness andrebel financing. Chadian government to control andhave beenplaguedby sites inTibesti region have challengingto proven the very southern border into CARandtheartisanalgold mining of theserioussecurityconcerns. Raids across Chad’s recurrent closure dueto insecurityhasalsobeenone 30 Chad’s northern border withLibya andits Luca Raineri, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.108 Aljazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/8/9/ ICG, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/ OCED,https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/ 29 31 27 28 A 1000 Boko Haram fighters. Boko Haram inApril2020leading to thedeath ofat least Chadian armedforces launchedamajoroffensive against in Chadianhistory. Inresponse to loss,the thismilitary 32 death of98Chadiansoldiers base at BohomainMarch 2020,however, resulted inthe N’Djamena. Boko Haram’s attack onaChadianmilitary Joint Task Force (MNJTF)withits headquarters based in Haram alsoledto thereactivation oftheMulti-National police presence in N’Djamena. The threat posed by Boko reinstated death penaltyfor terrorist crimesandincreased html, April2020. ian-troops-kill-1000-boko-haram-fighters-lake-chad-200409183528130. 33 calating-fight-against-boko-haram/, April2020. DanielEizenga, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/chad-es Aljazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/chad- 33 32 , thebiggest loss military - 7 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Chad Conflict Insights Report Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Chad Conflict Insights Report 8 lasting solutionto theproblems facing Chad. in constructive dialogue aimed at finding a peaceful and unconditionally renounce theuseofforce andengage PSC) called onthegovernment andtheoppositionto The Peace andSecurityCouncil oftheAfrican Union(AU The AfricanUnion ASSESSMENT CURRENT RESPONSE bueros/fes-pscc/14200.pdf, 2017. 37 que-chairperson-boko-haram-attacks-nigeria-and-chad 36 35 que-of-the-peace-and-security-council-chad-1 34 member states andBenin. on October 7, 2014 at the Extraordinary Summit of LCBC was later given aclearer mandate against Boko Haram to encompass counter-terrorism operations. TheMNJTF by theLCBC on30April2012withanadditional mandate engagement. Thisledto thereactivation oftheMNJTF pushing countries towards collaborative military Basin Region, concerns over regional securityincreased Boko Haram’sAs activities extended across theLake Chad Commission (LCBC) The LakeChadBasin Boko Haram’s attacks inNigeria andChad. issued a diplomatic statement on 24 March 2020, following 2016 Presidential Elections while theAU Chairperson Observation Mission(EOM)inChadto oversee theApril The AU furtherauthorized thedeployment ofanElectoral Benin amongother countries. had troops from Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Chadand deployment by AU 2015,theMNJTF PSC on29January period oftwelve 2020. (12) months, effective 31January PSC alsorenewed themandate oftheMNJTFfor another Friedrich EbertStiftung, https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/ AU, https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20200324/communi- Ibid http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communi AU, - 37 Formally authorized for 36 34 TheAU 35
incursions ineastern Chadby armedgroups. issued astatement inMay2009,condemning themilitary coup attempts inChadwhiletheUNSecurityCouncil France in2006,2008and2019 intervened International Partners USIP_1208_5.PDF 41 https://td.usembassy.gov/joint-local-declaration-europe sy-united-states-2/ an-union-embassy-federal-republic-germany-embassy-france-embas 40 CF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Sudan%20SPRST200913.pdf 39 chad-frances-role-and-political-instability-23842 38 and near refugee camps. have both concentrated ontheprotection ofciviliansin (EUFOR) and UNMission in theCARand Chad (MINURCAT) civil society activists. representatives inChad2017 onthedetention of equally issuedajointstatement withother diplomatic and surveillance capabilities to theMNJTF. training,support, advisors military aswell asintelligence Turkey have alsoprovided financialandhumanitarian the UN,EU, US, France, Britain, China,Canada,Israel and USIP, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/ UN, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF- ISPI, https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/ 40 Inaddition,theEUForce inChad 41 International partners suchas 38 to prevent 39 TheUS - - root causes ofits internal conflicts. enable Chad to deploy more resources to deal with the by thegroup’s violentattacks. Thisscenario willalso other regions that ofthecountry are not directly affected it will prevent the spread of Boko Haram’s operations in insurgency would beabest case scenario. Ifthisoccurs, in Chadandother countries affected by thegroup’s Similarly, thedecimation andtotal defeat ofBoko Haram parts ofthecountry. and religious tensions that are triggers ofviolence inmany armed groups. It would alsolead to thereduction ofethnic democratization inChadandmitigate future conflict with result intheopeningupofpolitical space for increased power could betransferred peacefully. Thiswould a clear andinstitutionalized pathway by whichpolitical away from such atradition would, however, help to create of authoritarian regimes following oneanother. Adrift usually came aboutthrough coups military withahost independence inthejudiciary. Power changes inChad representative government inthelegislature aswell as the executive government andhelpthepromotion of that would putinplace acontrolling mechanismon of power through political andinstitutional reforms The best case scenario would beapeaceful overturn Best CaseScenario SCENARIOS Most LikelyScenario a clear impossibilityin Chad. Want’, andtheUN2030Sustainable Agenda Development such as theAfrican UnionAgenda 2063,‘The Africa We implementation ofcontinental frameworks development Vision 2030,‘TheChadWeWant.’ Itcould alsomake the have a negative impact ofthecountry’s ontheachievement humanitarian crisiswilldeepen.Thisscenario could also and economic instability willworsen whileon-going regions ofChad.Underthisworst case scenario, political the expansion oftheIslamist group’s operations to other case ofBoko Haram, theworst case scenario would be odds witheach to other secure power. intrying Inthe as political elites andrebel groups continue to beat of violence andsubsequentcollapse ofthegovernment The worst case scenario for Chadwould beanescalation Worst CaseScenario Lake ChadBasin. outsignificant terroristcarry attacks intheRegion ofthe security as itwill continue to demonstrate its ability to Haram willlikely remain athreat to national andregional this maynot lead to atotal defeat ofthegroup. Boko also continue its campaign against Boko Haram although violent transfer of power. The Chadian government will opposition groups and rebel groups seealternatives to violence andcoup attempts willberecurrent untilChadian into full-scale civilwar. Itis,therefore, likely that political of insecurityproblems, withoutnecessarily descending experience economic crisis, fragile peace and a series internal conflicts. Underthisscenario, will thecountry The most likely scenario isthecontinuation ofcyclical 9 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Chad Conflict Insights Report 10 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Chad Conflict Insights Report • • • To theNationalGovernment STRATEGIC OPTIONS Haram insurgency. decades of civil conflicts that predate theBoko of violence that inacountry hasalready witnessed Haram fighters inorder to prevent anunendingcycle for rehabilitation andreintegration offormer Boko Chadian authoritiesshoulddefineaclear policy which itissignatory. with fullrespect to international andregional lawsto nationalaimed at stability preserving are conducted PSC Protocol, shouldensure that securityoperations ofthe The government ofChad,asperArticle3(f) in thecountry. democratic governance andhumanrights situation vigorously implementtheACDEG to improve the In linewiththis,thegovernment ofChadshould Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). oftheAfricanare Charter allwithinthepurview on Enhancing andpromoting democratic practices • • To theAfricanUnionandRECs internal crisisinto theregion. will prevent furtherescalation andspillover ofChad’s in Chadandpress for internal political reforms. This the AU and/or RECs to reconcile the warring factions the statutes oftheAU andRECs,there isaneedfor interference andterritorial integrity are enshrinedin Although theprinciplesofsovereignty, non- and Securitybetween theAU andRECs. Understanding onCooperation intheArea ofPeace Protocol, aswell asArticle5oftheMemorandum of andArticle16ofthePSC in linewithArticle7(j) strengthen its operational capacities. Thiswillbe resources and support to the MNJTF in order to collaborative efforts towards mobilizingadditional The AU, ECCAS, andLCBC shouldredouble their USIP (2008).Toward Resolving Chad’s Interlocking Conflicts. Available at:https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/ USIP (2017). Déby’s Chad; Political manipulation at abroad, intervention home, military challenging times ahead. Available at:https:// toUNDP (2017).Journey extremism. Available at:https://www.undp.org/content/dam/denmark/docs/Journey%20to%20Extremism_ (2008).TheChad–Sudan ProxySmall ArmsSurvey War andthe‘Darfurization’ ofChad:MythsandReality. Available at:http://www. Pérouse de Montclos (2014).Boko Haram: Islamism,politics,securityandthestate inNigeria. Available at :https://openaccess.leidenuniv. OCED (2018).Theunstable foundations ofpolitical stability inChad.Available at:https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/the- Nextier SPD(2019).MNJTF:Sofar soso. Available at: https://nextierspd.com/download/mnjtf-so-far-so-so/ ISS (2018).Responses to Boko Haram intheLake ChadRegion: Policies, Cooperation andLivelihoods. Available at:https://reliefweb.int/ ISS (2018).Factional dynamicswithinBoko Haram. Available at: https://issafrica.org/research/books-and-other-publications/factional- ISPI (2019).Chad:France’s Role andPolitical Instability. Available at: https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/chad-frances-role-and- ICG (2019).Rebel Incursion Exposes Chad’s Weaknesses. Available at:https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/au-tchad- Hudson Institute (2020).TheoriginsofBoko Haram andwhyitmatters. Available at:https://www.hudson.org/research/15608-the- Friedrich EbertStiftung. (2008).Thedynamicsof conflicts inthetri-border region oftheSudan,ChadandCentral African Republic. Cynthia Happi(2020).Violentextremism intheLake ChadBasinRegion: Evolution andImpact ofBoko Haram. Available at:http://ipss- REFERENCES USIP_1208_5.PDF challenging-times-ahead.pdf www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/pw136-debys-chad-political-manipulation-at-home-military-intervention-abroad- report.pdf smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-12-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War.pdf nl/bitstream/handle/1887/23853/ASC-075287668-3441-01.pdf unstable-foundations-of-political-stability-in-chad_508844d3-en#page1 sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018-07-06-research-report-1.pdf dynamics-within-boko-haram political-instability-23842 lincursion-des-rebelles-devoile-les-fragilites-du-pouvoir origins-of-boko-haram-and-why-it-matters Available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez//05423.pdf addis.org/download/violent-extremism-in-the-lake-chad-basin-region-evolution-and-impact-of-boko-haram/ 11 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Chad Conflict Insights Report 12 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Chad Conflict Insights Report 2016 February -Theoppositionorganizes protests countrywide 2016against on24February President Déby’s bidto 2015 -Boko Haram suicidebombers simultaneously attack thepolice headquarters andnational police academy in 2014 - Spillover of Boko Haram’s insurgency into Chadian borders with thousands of Nigerian refugees seeking shelter in 2013 -Leaders ofpolitical parties constituting both thepolitical oppositionandpresidential majoritysignapolitical 2011 -Déby runsfor fourth term andwinspresidential election boycotted by opposition. 2010 -Chad-Sudan border reopens years seven after Darfur conflict forced its closure. Anagreement for the restoration of 2008 -Rebel groups joinforces andlaunch anattack on N’Djamenawhichalmost overthrows thegovernment ofPresident 2007 -TheSirte Peace Agreement issignedon25October 2007between theChadiangovernment andrebel groups. 2007 -UNSecurityCouncilauthorizes UN-European Union peacekeeping force (EUFOR) to protect civiliansfrom violence 2006 -President Déby isdeclared winnerofpresidential elections inMay. Themainoppositionparties boycott thepoll. 2006 -Rebel groups seekingto overthrow President Déby’s government launchanassaultinN’Djamenaon13April2006. 2005 -Constitutional amendments allow President IdrissDéby Itnoto stand for athird term in2006. 2001 -IdrissDéby Itnorunsfor asecond term winspresidential election. andoverwhelmingly 1996 -IdrissDéby ItnowinsChad’s first multi-party presidential election. 1990 -IdrissDéby Itnoandhisparty, thePatriotic Salvation Movement, ascend to power. 1982 -HissèneHabré seizes control ofgovernment through acoup d’état. Heleads aone-party dictatorship government 1979 -Goukouni Oueddeisucceeds Félix Malloumasleader ofChadandrulesuntil1982. 1975 -Tombalbaye isoverthrown andkilled.Heissucceeded by Félix general Malloum,amilitary whoruleduntil1979. 1965 - Muslims in the north, led by the National Liberation Front of Chad (French: Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad, 1963 –François Tombalbaye bans political parties andthistriggers violentprotests intheNorthernregion ofChad. 1960 –Chadgains independence from France on11August 1960undertheleadership ofFrançois Tombalbaye. 1960-2021 CONFLICT TIMELINE contest for afifth term inoffice. N’Djamena inJune2015killing 37 peopleandwounding more than100 others. the Lake ChadRegion. accord inaneffort to improve theelectoral process. 2010,markstheendofafive-yearharmony between war. ChadandSudan,signed15January Déby. spilling over from Darfurinneighboring Sudan. Chad cuts diplomatic tieswithSudan,accusing itofbacking therebels. until 1990whenheisoverthrown by IdrissDéby. FRONILAT), begin acivilwar. 2021 April20-President Deby diesonfrontline 2021 April19-Electoral officialsdeclared President Deby thewinnerofApril11presidential election. 2020 July-Electoral CommissionandNational Framework for Political Dialogue(CNDP)publishelection calendar, 2020 April-Chadianarmedforces launchamajoroffensive against Boko Haram leading to thedeath of at least 1000 2020 March –MNJTF’s raid on23March results inthedeath of92Chadiantroops killedby Boko Haram militants, the 2019 February - Chadian rebels attempt to overthrow President Idriss Déby’s government. Theplan is aborted following constitution2018 -Anew expanding thepresident’s powers isapproved andsignedinto by theNational law Assembly 2016 April-President Déby isdeclared winnerofthepresidential elections. scheduling presidential election for 11April2021andlegislative elections for 24Oct 2021. Boko Haram fighters. biggest lossinChadianhistory. military French 2019. on3-6February intervention military by President Déby. 13 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Chad Conflict Insights Report Peace and Security Reports
Although key continental and regional institutions have their own early warning reporting systems, policy making within these institutions also benefit from a number of analytical and periodic reports generated by think tanks and research institutes. The Research Unit at IPSS provides brief and critical analyses of the state of peace and security in different African countries as well as critical appraisals of interventions by various African actors. The reports will cover African countries showing positive signs as well as those undergoing negative developments.