Addressing the Climate Change Insecurity Challenge in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin ZEBULON SUIFON TAKWA
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ISSUE BRIEF Issue no. 22/2020 PDA Fellowship co-hosted by UNDP Oslo Governance Centre and the Folke Bernadotte Academy, in partnership with the Joint UNDP-DPPA Programme Cohort 4: Climate-related security risks and sustaining peace Addressing the climate change insecurity challenge in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin ZEBULON SUIFON TAKWA Introduction jointly undertaken by the World Bank, UN, and EU in The multifaceted crisis involving violence and insecuri- partnership with the State and Federal Governments, ty and environmental conflicts in the Lake Chad Basin1 identified climate change as a main structural driver of has been attributed partly to the development deficit conflicts in Nigeria’s north-east region. Climate change 1 the region has endured over the years. In response, has led to desertification, drought, and the contraction a military approach has been used, albeit with limited of Lake Chad to less than 10 percent of its area in 1963. success, to quell the menace. The myriad initiatives in As a result of the prolonged droughts of early 1970s the wider Sahel region and the growing awareness and 1980s, Lake Chad’s waters declined to about that climate change is breeding insecurity or impact- 2,000km2, although some studies allude to the fact ing it negatively has gained momentum of late. Yet, the that the lake waters have risen to about 14,0000km2, crisis in the Sahel region, particularly in the Lake Chad including groundwater. Its status is somewhat stable, 2 Basin, requires deeper analysis to understand the root with multiple “islands” of sand-filled lakebed. The causes and drivers of the violent insurgencies such as shrunken Lake Chad (see map on page 6) is at the core Boko Haram and unpack the linkages between the in- of the multiple problems that define today’s regional surgency and conflicts between herders and farmers, crises engulfing that part of the greater Sahel region the regional dimensions and ways to address resultant of Africa. complexity in the immediate, short/medium and long Literature abounds on the causes, drivers, and motiva- term. tions of insurgency in Nigeria’s north-eastern region. In Nigeria, many initiatives have been undertaken to Successive Nigerian governments have grappled with address the security and environmental challenges effectively responding to and curbing the spread of facing the northern part of the country, particularly the insurgency, which is plagued by a politically divi- encroaching desertification, that have affected liveli- sive discourse with varied conspiracy theories about hoods, specifically agriculture, fishing, and animal hus- its origin, sponsorship, and the government’s ability to bandry. The Boko Haram insurgency, now entering its defeat the group. Over that time, the herders-farmers second decade, has left immense devastation. The Re- crisis, which has been a recurrent issue in Nigeria, has covery and Peace-Building Assessment (RPBA, 2016), assumed alarming proportions. A conflict and fragility 1 This area includes Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Libya, Sudan, Central African Republic and Cameroon (see map on page 3 below). 2 https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/wrcr.20452; https://shoring-up-stability.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Shoring-up-Stability.pdf. assessment, undertaken as part of joint support to the economic development strategy that addresses the Government of Nigeria’s recovery efforts, states, “The drivers and structural factors or roots of the crises can violence has left widespread devastation on a level un- reverse the region’s fortunes. precedented since the [Nigerian] civil war of 1967-1970, with an estimated 27,000 dead, more than 2.4 million people displaced internally or across international bor- Understanding the ders, and 2,000 missing persons (UNOCHA January interconnectedness and complexity 2016).’’3 of the issues at stake This paper makes a case for solid options concerning The Lake Chad Basin has been an enclave for criminal the revitalizing the Lake Chad and the lake ecosystem. groups and traffickers of all kinds from the time of the The paper highlights the fact that climate change and trans-Saharan trade. It is believed to host a large num- the resultant shrinking of Lake Chad have been major ber of former fighters of the Chadian and Central Afri- factors responsible for violent conflicts affecting Nige- can civil wars. With the emergence of the Boko Haram ria and the entire Lake Chad Basin. Restoring the lake insurgency and other groups, such as Al Qaeda in the waters and associated tributary rivers is therefore an Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Daesh or the Islamic State (IS) option for consideration to resolving the Lake Chad and multiple splinter or allied groups in the greater Sa- conflict system, although it is not the only solution. This hel-Sahara, ranging from Mauritania, Mali, Algeria, Ni- paper further posits that while immediate and short- ger to Libya, the quest to dig deep into the root causes term security and livelihood support initiatives will sta- fuelling violent extremism and terrorism has become a bilize the region, only a multi-pronged and long-term recurrent imperative. 2 Source: LCBC, “Roadmap of Restoring Lake Chad” 3 UN, EU, World Bank, “Conflict and Fragility Assessment for Northeast Nigeria”, 2016. Also see the USAID climate and fragility profile for Nigeria:https:// pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00TKRT.pdf and the global study https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00TBFH.pdf. Reduced pasture and lack of demarcated grazing The link between the insurgency and the herders-farm- lands in countries around Lake Chad, blocked cattle ers conflict must be examined to better understand routes and water sources for livestock, expanding ag- the complexity of the crises. The narrative of the Boko riculture and fisheries that have also increased food Haram and herders-farmers conflict has become a insecurity are among the myriad of issues/drivers that very toxic and politically sensitive issue. Conspiracy have aggravated the herders-farmers conflict. Compe- theories abound, with claims that both threats are a tition over land and other natural resources, especial- disguised religious agenda to “Islamize” Nigeria. Em- ly between agriculturalists and pastoralists, has been pirical evidence suggests that if undertaken success- identified as the immediate trigger of the violent clash- fully, the proposed re-watering of Lake Chad (see sec- es. In their quest for pasture and water, herders from tion on proposed replenishing the lake waters ahead) the Lake Chad Basin area and other West African Sahel could further de-politicize the herders-farmers crisis if countries have been pushed by climate consequenc- it is seen as responding to a consequence of climate es and insecurity to drift southwards into other parts change. Many reasons support the strong link between of Nigeria. Although the practice of transhumance, the the Boko Haram insurgency and the herders-farmers seasonal movement of cattle from the Sahel towards conflict in the Lake Chad Basin countries, particularly the fringes of the tropical forests, has existed for centu- in Nigeria. ries, a 2018 study by the United Nations Office for West First, the Boko Haram insurgency has forced pastoral- Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) revealed the changed ists of the Lake Chad Basin (both Nigerian and from dynamics, often characterized by violent confronta- neighbouring countries of Niger, Chad and Cameroon) tions, banditry attacks and cattle rustling.4 According to drift southwards in search of safer areas for grazing, to the International Crisis Group (ICG, 2018), clashes thus aggravating an already existing crisis. Second, between farmers and herders have escalated in recent Boko Haram and other insurgent factions use cattle to years, acquiring an ethnic and religious dimension that finance the movement; they attack herders and seize poses grave threats to the country’s stability and unity. herds of cattle to sell or feed on in their hideouts. Third, In 2018 alone, the total number of fatalities from the according to claims and counterclaims, some insur- crisis–1,949—was three times the number of deaths at- gents may have infiltrated the herders and joined them tributed to Boko Haram. to wage violent confrontations with farmers and ban- The collapse of the Gaddafi regime in Libya aggravat- dits in an apparent coalition of convenience. The ap- ed the situation, as the whole region became awash parent “soft approach” that the Government of Nigeria with arms.5 Vast areas of ungoverned spaces with little has adopted in dealing with the armed herders has fur- 3 or no government presence, particularly in peripheral ther fuelled the perception of a conspiracy to Islamize areas in most of the countries in the Lake Chad Ba- Nigeria, using the crisis as an alibi. sin, provided fertile ground for insurgent and criminal While one dimension of the herders-farmers crisis is re- groups to fester. Cattle rustling, armed banditry (par- lated to the ownership of and access to land and water, ticularly the coupeurs de route phenomenon in Chad, there is no gainsaying that climate change, encroach- Niger and Cameroon), kidnap for ransom, organized ing desert and the growing population have increased crime and trafficking in prohibited goods, drugs (in- the pressures on land, especially with the widespread cluding tramadol and codeine) and persons, poaching practice of non-sustainable farming systems (pastoral- of wildlife in national parks, and massive displacement ism and shifting cultivation). In the Middle Belt region have become familiar phenomena in the region. of Nigeria, where the crisis peaked in 2018, a total of Fishing, crop and cereal farming, animal husbandry and 191,922 people were internally displaced in the Guma, booming trade activities gave way to frustration and Logo, Nasarawa, Awe and Keana local government are- lack of employment opportunities, leaving the entire as (LGAs), with a gender disaggregated data as follows: Lake Chad Basin subregion vulnerable in the context 41,936 adult males; 44,774 adult females; 53,053 male of a growing population, estimated at about 25-40 mil- children; and 52,161 female children.6 The conventional lion.