ACTS of REFERENCE: an ESSAY on the RATIONAL POWERS of PROPER NAMES by Nicholas Goldberg a Dissertation Submitted to Johns Ho
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ACTS OF REFERENCE: AN ESSAY ON THE RATIONAL POWERS OF PROPER NAMES by Nicholas Goldberg A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Baltimore, Maryland July 2017 © 2017 Nicholas Goldberg All Rights Reserved ABSTRACT The dissertation deals with a cluster of questions surrounding singular reference and singular content. My particular topic is proper names, which I treat as a case study throughout. I maintain that for any approach to pass muster, it cannot be incompatible with descriptions of competent linguistic behavior as itself a form of rational action. In familiar terms, speech is something we do, rather than something that merely happens to us. Human linguistic communication is, as such, quite fundamentally a species of intentional action. Making sense of an action, whether in the linguistic case or generally, crucially involves recognizing the agent’s own perspective in so acting. We cannot then be content with a conception of language at odds with the rationality internal to the phenomenon of human language use. In the first chapter I develop a critique of a currently orthodox conception of semantic content—so-called “Millianism” or “Direct Reference Semantics”—in Scott Soames’ most explicit and developed version of it. I demonstrate that Direct Reference fails irremediably by making the rational or intentional aspect of language use posterior to its “propositionalist” approach to semantic content. The attempt to preserve linguistic rationality non-semantically, as direct reference must, leads to a kind of psychologism about meaning. The larger implication is that in order to do justice to the rationality of speech, of which Frege’s puzzle is one historically important benchmark, we need a conception of content controlled by the notion of rationality itself. The topic of the second chapter, the fixation of reference, continues the theme of the rationality of reference. Against the background dialectic of competing descriptivist and causalist accounts, I introduce Gareth Evans’ fertile notion of a proper-name- using practice as presenting a potential third way. The two primary goals of this chapter are, first, applying Evans’ mature apparatus to yield an account of the vexed question of “Madagascar’s” inadvertent shift in reference; and, second, an account of the determination of reference in terms of the rational basis of information anchoring a practice. This sets the stage for the third chapter, where I develop and defend a notion of de re sense originating in the work of John McDowell and Gareth Evans. The basic idea is that we can accommodate Frege’s aim of according distinct senses to certain pairs of co-referring terms, while characterizing their contents in fundamentally non- descriptive ways and tying them essentially to their reference. It thus combines the merits of what motivate proponents of direct reference with the ease with which it was thought descriptivism could handle Frege’s puzzle, while avoiding the characteristic pitfalls of both. My main contention in this chapter is that we can achieve this desirable end by recognizing the rational powers constitutive of competence with a proper name as an element in a public language. In the remainder of the chapter I pursue various applications, including semantic i individuation, reference relations, and partially descriptive names. The chapter comes to a close in comparing this account to another one of its current crop of competitors, viz. meta-linguistic descriptivism. Having eschewed a position for descriptive content in the content of a proper name, in the fourth chapter I consider the possibility of descriptive reference-fixing and its implications for the expressions formed thereby, viz. descriptive names. I part ways with Evans to some extent here in countenancing the possibility that a descriptive name could get by without a descriptive content. I argue nevertheless that the epistemic peculiarities thwart any prospect of a complete cognitive assimilation with the class of proper names. I conclude by suggesting the bearing of these points on the Kripkean contingent a priori and the status of singular negative existentials. The final chapter promises a resolution of Frege’s puzzle in terms of de re sense, which I approach from two angles. From the first, I stress the centrality of the utterance in specifying the content of attributions, and point out its advantages over its sententialist and propositionalist rivals. Toward this end, I defend Davidson’s paratactic proposal, and bring out its harmony with the notion of sense on offer. This generates two types of truth-conditions, which proves to be an indispensible principle in the ascription of singular content. I end by applying these principles to Kripke’s puzzle. ii Names are magic—One word can pour such a flood through the soul. Walt Whitman iii Acknowledgments I owe the greatest debt of gratitude to my dissertation director, Steven Gross, for his insight, encouragement, and forbearance. His ecumenical approach to the space of intellectual possibilities remains a guiding ideal. The other members of my internal committee, Michael Williams & Justin Bledin, provided me priceless insights that could have only come from each individual. Just as well, my external readers—Geraldine Legrande & Kyle Rawlins—offered broadening challenges from the field of linguistics. My debt to John McDowell is incalculable. I have had the wonderful opportunity to study with John since the earliest days of my formal philosophical education, and most recently in 2015 as a Visiting Scholar at the University of Pittsburgh’s Department of Philosophy. The subtlety and depth of his philosophical outlook operate on me more than footnotes can reveal. While at Pitt, I also had the great good fortune to pick up with another formative figure in my philosophical education, Mark Wilson. Maverick and polymath, Mark’s radical vision for tying philosophical inquiry to empirical reality is endlessly inspiring. Thanks are due to the Pitt Philosophy department and specifically Anil Gupta for generously extending the invitation to visit, as well as to my home department of Johns Hopkins which sponsored me with the award of a Lovejoy dissertation fellowship. Here too I must mention my gracious hosts in Pittsburgh, Rocco Pacella & Seth Dubin, who punctuated my monasticism with joy. My lifelong friends, Josh Fattal & Emma Fried-Cassorla, deserve special thanks for harnessing me along intersecting paths. I thank my family: grandparents, Herb & Barbara Hantman; parents, Drs. Stephen Goldberg & Jean Hantman; brother and sister, Alex Kohen & Hannah Beaver, for their loving patience and unfailing support—here as in everything else. Finally, I dedicate the dissertation to Kelly Walsh, denizen of archaic night, who lifted me up when I was mired in Apollonian excess. iv Table of Contents Chapter I: The Doctrine of Direct Reference 1. Introduction 2. A Brief Sketch of Direct Reference Semantics 1 3. Frege’s Puzzle 4. Soames’ Solution 5. The Problems of Pragmatic Descriptive Enrichment Chapter II: The Fixation of Reference 1. Introduction 2. Descriptivism & Its Discontents 17 3. A Proper-Name-Using Practice 4. Practice as Rational Ground of Information Chapter III: The Semantics of Proper Names 1. Introduction 2. Acting on an Understanding 37 3. Ways of Thinking 4. Nominal Identification 5. Rational Powers 6. A Canonical Referential Specification 7. Individuation Chapter IV: The Status of Descriptive Names 1. Introduction 2. The Possibility of Descriptive-Reference Fixing 86 3. The Epistemic Status of a Descriptive Name 4. The Kripkean Contingent A Priori Chapter V: Reports of Nominal Thought & Talk 1 1. Introduction 2. The Paratactic Proposal 08 3. Two Types of Truth Conditions 4. Frege’s Puzzle 5. Kripke’s Puzzle Bibliography 1 Curriculum Vitae 131 40 v THE DOCTRINE OF DIRECT REFERENCE What is the curious rapport of names? Walt Whitman1 1. Introduction The primary task of this chapter is to query a currently orthodox conception of semantic content—“Millianism” or “Direct Reference Semantics”—in Scott Soames’ most explicit and developed version of it. I argue that Millianism fails irremediably by making the rational or intentional aspect of language use posterior to its account of semantic content. In what follows, then, my strategy is to lay bare the incompatibility between the doctrine of Direct Reference and unavoidable facts about the rationality of language use. If my arguments are correct, a major upshot is that an adequate account of singular reference and singular content should countenance a semantic difference between certain pairs co-referring expressions, and deny on those grounds that such terms are capable of inter-substitution in all contexts without change in meaning or truth. 2. A Brief Sketch of Direct Reference Semantics2 In broad terms, Direct Reference or Millianism is the view that the semantic content of any meaningful expression of a language is nothing other than its reference. Beginning with the various species of singular terms—proper names, demonstratives, and indexicals—its adherents identify their semantic contents with their referents. For example, the meaning of “Bertrand Russell” is Bertrand Russell, that is, the man himself—the object referred to by this name. Further, the semantic contents of predicative expressions (including words for relations and functions which are not, unlike singular terms, standardly treated as referring expressions)