Zhukov's Greatest Defeat?
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Russian civilians look at the destroyed remains of their home following the Battle of Rzhev. Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat? By John M. Barr t 7:50 a.m. on 25 November Volga River, Rzhev was the focus of The fi ghting began in October 1941, 1942, approximately 10,000 intense military operations from as the Germans pushed on with their A guns and mortars unleashed October 1941 through January fi nal assault on Moscow. There was no a massive opening barrage heralding 1943. The bitter nature of fi ghting pause in military operations around the onset of Operation Mars against on this front was captured by A. Rzhev, as a salient was formed in the the German Rzhev salient. For the Tvardovsky who started his poem, German lines by the Soviet winter next 26 days, seven Soviet armies “I was killed near Rzhev” with: offensive of 1941-42. On 7 January comprised of seven tank corps and 37 1942, after the initial success of Russian rifl e divisions hurled themselves at the I was killed near Rzhev attacks on Army Group Center, Stalin German Ninth Army. In the end, little In a nameless bog ordered the Kalinin Front to attack the ground was taken in exchange appar- In Fifth company, juncture between Army Group North ently for massive Soviet casualties. On the Left fl ank and Army Group Center with an eye In a cruel air raid towards capturing Rzhev and pushing Earlier Fighting in on to cut the Minsk-Moscow highway, the Rzhev Salient I didn’t hear explosions severing Nazi rail communications. And did not see the fl ash Meeting an initial success, Lt. Gen. A relatively small city of 60,000 Down to an abyss from a cliff Yeremenko’s forces seized the large people on the northern end of the No start, no end German supply depot at Toropets, 32 WORLD at WAR 47 | APr – MAY 2016 capturing 450,000 shells, millions of south in the summer of 1942, Stalin did in his diary on 16 August 1942, “tense rounds of small arms ammunition, not let matters rest at the Rzhev salient. situation in Rzhev.” Gen. Halder’s nota- several food dumps, nearly 1,000 As the Germans broke through on their tions were in direct response to Gen. trucks, and six tanks. This early way to Stalingrad and the Caucasus Model’s communication that same day, success tore a nine-mile gap in the Mountains, Stalin ordered a series informing the high command that the German lines. Rzhev, however, did of attacks on the Rzhev salient and Ninth Army was nearly fi nished and not fall and as the Soviets regrouped near Leningrad to tie down German that if he did not receive three more to launch a fresh assault on the city. reserves. In August 1942, four Soviet divisions he would not be responsible The newly appointed commander of Armies, under the direction of Zhukov for the results. The divisions were sup- the Ninth Army, Panzer Gen. Model, and Konev, launched a fresh series plied and the crises passed. However, a launched a counter attack that helped of attacks in the Rzhev region. While precedent had been set, using attacks to encircle the Soviet 20th Army. By there were no decisive breakthroughs, on the Rzhev salient as a way to divert the middle of February, 6,000 men the Soviets did push the Germans back German attention from the south. were left in the 20th army when it at least 20 miles in some locations. began to attempt its breakout. More importantly, from a Soviet Operation Mars Preparations The net result of the fi rst Russian point of view, the Germans had to winter offensive in the Rzhev region move 25 divisions to this front to Given the repeated Soviet was a large salient in the Russian line contain Russian efforts, including at offensives in the Rzhev area from late that gave the Germans their closest least nine divisions from the south. The 1941 through the summer of 1942, it is positions to Moscow. While Hitler’s bitter fi ghting in these battles led Chief perhaps no surprise the area fi gured as offensive power was directed to the of the OKW Col. Gen. Halder, to note a signifi cant objective in Russian plans WORLD at WAR 47 | APr – MAY 2016 33 for counter attacks in late 1942. In Meanwhile, the 41st Army would addition, the fact Rzhev was a salient open operations with an attack by appealed to the Soviets as a potential the 6th Siberian Infantry Corps. This target in which to trap German troops corps was tasked with opening the much as the subsequent Kursk salient German defenses for exploitation was to lure in the Germans in July 1943. by the 1st and 2nd Mechanized Corps. In September 1942, while street The 22nd Army would attack with two fi ghting raged in Stalingrad, Stavka divisions, whose job it was to clear a (Soviet High Command) approved path for the 3rd Mechanized Corps. two operations. The more famous The Soviets also planned for the Operation Uranus, aimed at 30th and 39th Armies to attack the encircling the German Sixth Army salient from the north. This attack at Stalingrad, and Operation Mars, would not only trap the German which had the aim of encircling the forces, but also prevent their redeploy- German Ninth Army at Rzhev. ment to aid in the defense of the For Operation Mars, the Russians salient’s fl anks. All three attacks were allocated about 2,300 tanks, 10,000 slated to start on the same day. artillery pieces, and two fronts com- The original assault for Operation prised of seven armies. The basic plan Mars was scheduled for 12 October of attack was to launch simultaneous 1942. However, torrential rains in the assaults on each side of the salient and middle of the month reduced roads pinch it off in the middle. In the mean- to mud and forced a postponement time, German troops on the salient’s of the offensive. In the meantime, northern edge would be attacked with the Germans picked up hints of the the aim of tying down the troops up impending Soviet attack. In September, there and preventing their escape from German intelligence noted an increase any pocket that would be formed. in Russian rail traffi c near the Rzhev The 20th Army, under the command salient and by mid-October Berlin of Gen. Konev of the Western Front, began to suspect a Soviet offensive would strike from the east with the might be aimed at the Ninth Army 30th Army on its right fl ank. In the after the ground dried. Facing the west, the 41st and 22nd Armies, under 20th Army’s assault on the eastern Gen. Purkaev’s Kalinin Front, would face of the salient were three German launch the main attack. The 20th infantry divisions with a similar Army planned to attack the fi rst day three divisions on the western face. with four infantry divisions, which The Germans also deployed strong would open up the German defenses armored reserves comprised of two and allow the 6th Tank Corps and the panzer divisions and two motorized 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps to exploit divisions, including the powerful through and meet up with the Kalinin Grossdeutschland division, inside the Front. The 30th Army would launch salient. Model could call for immediate the offensive with three infantry divisions and two tank brigades. continued on page 36 » Russian civilians symbolically hand over new KV-1 tanks to the Soviet army, after donating to have the tanks built. 34 WORLD at WAR 47 | APr – MAY 2016 WORLD at WAR 47 | APR – MAY 2016 35 » continued from page 34 relief upon the army’s reserve of a panzer division located at the salient’s base and three additional panzer divi- sions in Army Group Center’s reserve. At the end of October 1942, Zhukov fl ew to Moscow to discuss both Mars and Uranus with Stalin. At that time, the fi nal assault for Uranus was set for 16 November, and Mars for 25 November. On 6 November 1942, the Germans issued a new intelligence estimate based upon their alleged super spy, code-named Max. According to Max, attacks were due near Vorenezh, Grozny, south of Leningrad, but no mention appears to have been made of Stalingrad. After meeting with Stalin, Zhukov spent the middle of November near Stalingrad inspecting Soviet preparations for Uranus. Soviet T-34 tanks, mainstay of the Soviet armored force throughout the war. 36 WORLD at WAR 47 | APr – MAY 2016 Soviet anti-tank crews preparing to engage German armor. Defeat on the Salient’s Operation Mars. Further south, the resupply continued to be hampered Eastern Front German defenders infl icted a similar by stubborn German defense, and the drubbing on the three infantry divi- Russians were unable to effectively The Russian artillery barrage that sions on the 20th Army’s right fl ank. In exploit this modest success. heralded the opening of Operation 20th Army’s center, however, the 247th Mars on the eastern face of the salient Division achieved results positive lasted 90 minutes. Unfortunately, enough to allow Konev to order the 6th heavy snow and fog limited the Tank Corps into battle the next day. barrage’s effectiveness. The snow also Poor weather and wretched roads hindered Soviet efforts to use their air hampered Soviet efforts to reinforce force for direct support and to interdict the 20th army’s limited success. the movement of German reinforce- Furthermore, the Germans clung tena- ments.