The Command and General Staff School
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SOLUTION NO., THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL Htp Problwa No ~ . Serie*. IN CASE OP REPLY TO 3E RETURNED TO RECEPTACLE BY 0:00 A.M. US-0. S. 8<hi.. Fort UirrnworUi-f-lS-IS—ttU MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, 2d Year Class, Coa.nand and General Stuff School, Fort Loavenworth, Kansas. 8UBJEOT: A study of the Campaign of Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor, 1864. I. PAPERS ACCOiiPANYIliG. 1, A bibliography for this study. 2, Five maps showing situation at beginning of the campaign, in vicinity of Spotsylvania ar.d In vicinity of Cold Harbor. II. THK STUDY PRSSKNTEH.-- Two outstanding lessons to be learned from th* Campaign of Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor, 1864. III. HISTORICAL FACTS RELATING TO THE STUDY.- 1. On the irornirve of JJay 7, 1854, the hopes of th* North *rd thoBe of the South rested in the two anri?B facing each othor in tho Virginia woods just tP3t of Ola Wilderness Tavern about sixty riles north of Richmond. The resources of the North \r. men, food, ind equipment were 3till An a state of sufficient supply while thone of the South were f^st reaching exhaustion. (1) Cenyr'tl U.S. Grant was personally directly he Union forces here consisting of the Ariuy of t3io Potomac under Major General George G. Ueade and an independent corps, the IX Corps, cocir,ended by tivjor General Ambrose E, Burnside. The Amy of the Potomac wac organ!t-.J into three corps and th« cavalry as follows: Th« II Corps under Uaj. Gen, Winfield S. Hancock. The V Corps under Uaj. Gen0 Gouvurneur K. larren. The VI Corp8 under Mftj. Gen. John Sedgwick. Tho Cavalry under Idoij. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan. The total strength after the battle of the Wilderness was approximately one hundred thousand sen and more than three hundred guns. (2) The Army of Northern Virginia under General Robert E. Lee totalPU approxinately fifty-one thousand men and two hundred guns. It %CL8 organited into three corps and the cavalry as follows: I Corps under Lt. Gen. R.H, Anderson, who had succeded Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, II Corps under Lt. Gen. R.S. Bwoll, III Corpu under Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill, Cavalry under Maj. Gen. .T.E.B. Stuart. (3) (1) (2-19) (2) (12 106 to 116. 5-^80. 4-367,372. 11-482.) (3) (3-182. 11482.) -1 - 2. Tht» Battle of the Wilderness closed on May 6, 1364. On the morning of Ifey 7, the two armies were disposed as shown on Special Ifap No. 1. (4) After such a battle as was just completed previous Union Generals had recoiled frcro the shock and turned northward for recipera tlon and reenforcemento. (5) Not to with Grant. He had made Lie's Aray his objective and he had n? thought of turning backt(6) His general plan was to wear down Lee's Army by constant and persistant fighting on every occasion which offered a chance to diminish Lee's forces, which he knew could not be replaced.(7) A reconnaissance by each side on the rooming of Ifey 7 disclosed to each that the other was not disposed to renev the attack. Lee knew that he must conserve his dwindling tonn power by avoid ing costly offensive actions and by the use of defensive works.(8) Grant concluded that Lee could no longer maintain battles in the open field and that therefore his offensive actions would be limited. Tiie present position of the Confederates combined with the wooded terrain wns not favoiable to an attack. The woods reduced Grant's advantage in superiority of men and guns. He decided to draw Leo into the open field and there att&ck him at every opportunity.(9) He desired to interpose his force between Lee's and Richmond. Such a position *rould safeguard Butler scuth of the James River and force L«e to move out of the Wilderness, whero Grant hoped to'attack the Confederate Arw-y in the open. (10) To accomplish this, Grant's immediate plan was to r.ove to Spotsylvania Court House about fifteen nllea southeast of Old Wilder neas Tavern, under cover of darkness during tho night of May 7 and 8. (11) Spotsylvania wag not a placo of great ntlitary importance except for the fact that the roads south from th* Vfilderneas net there the main road froa Fredericksburg to Richmond.(12) In order to be prepared for an attack during thn narch from the Wilderneae the movement was ordered to begin from the right flank.(13) General Sheridan wat» directed to give timely warning to the Corps commanders of any advance of the oneay along roads leading in from the right but this mia3ion was not fulfilled. (14)' In order to clear the narrow roadB for the uso of troop move ments that night, the wagon trains were moved out during the afternoon. T4) (2-209. 1174R7T 5) (9-229. 11-487) 6) (10-306. U-4B3. 12-2) 7) (11-487. 12-22) 3) (4-375. 11-482. 12-18) (9) (2-214,215. 4-375. 11-487) (lil) (2-213. 6—*W. 12,19) (11) (4-375. 12-2,3,19) (12) (9-229. 11-489) (13) (11-488) (14) (2-221) -2 General Lee, who tyas watchfully awaiting the next Union move, was advised of tin movement of the Union trains on the afternoon cf May 7, (lf>) He could not tell froc. this whethnr Grant would uncover Washington by Rrcov >ra»nt to the South or intended to nove to Fredericfca bur£. Howevar, in either case a position at Spctsylvqnin would bo advantageous to the Confederate Army, so General Lee decided to take up a position in readiness at that point, (1M Lee ordered the covenant to begin i'roa the right flank, (17) The cavalry was to r«jconnoiter the roadB fiojr, thu direction of FVederlckaburg and ileli/ the mrch of the Union colunr. at th*. a*r.e time screening the Confederate cov*aent.(i8) The movement toward 3potsylvan!a Court House started as ordered in the Union Ai'ny, beginning between 8:30 and J:00 in the evening. (U) In the Confederate Kr?y the rcoveirent ordered for earl/ on toy 8 actually began a*, about 11:00 P.M. Jia/ 7 by Anderson's Corps.(20) Since the Union movement begun fror. tho Hank firtheat from Spoteylvania while the Confederates began from the flank nearest that point the head cf the Union force had to irarch ov«r three K.ilea further than the head of the Confederate force. On the narrow road through the filderneas the Union advance WAS deJa/ed by the Confederate Cavalry. The head of th<9 Confederate cclunjt met no delays and reAch od the vicinity of Pfotc/lvania first and took up a position p.croe* tho road upon which the leading l/nlon corps wn« advancing slowly, de layed by the Confederate Cavalry.(21) Warren's Corps could not dislodge Anderson13 Corps and «o await ed reinforcements. By the tice these arrived Ccvnfederate reenforcw.enta hac also arrived. Thus Lee reached Spotsylvania first.(22) terrain here at Spotsyl ii was eoaothat undulatinc and while nore open than that in the Wilderness, was still partly covered with tre<*s. Woods and open fields being in aoout equal proportion.(23) During the renaJnder of the 8th and most of the Jth of May both armies developed their columns and prepared uefensive works of en trenchments and breastworks,(24) The Confederate Army occupied hastily selected lines north and around Spotsylvania, The flanka were refused with the left resting on Glady Run and tti© ri^ht on the Ny River. The center had been permitted to extend north around high ground in the vicinity of the Me Cool farm house and then south a&ain resulting in the formation of a large salient about a r.ile deep and about three quarters of a mile •vide at the bn..e. (See special cap fJZ) Its weakness vas recognized and a second line was entrenched across its base so that in case of need the salient could be cut out oi the line.(25^ On the yth of Itoy, Grant started Sheridan en a cavalry raid. Hi8 raission fas t.o ride around the Confederate Army, disturb their cowr-ukications and obstruct their avenues of retreat.(26) (lr-) (3-128. 9-22)) (25) (4-376,377. 1-515,516) (16) (0-305. 11-438) (26) (4-375. 6-lb?,lh7.12-19) (17) (11-448) (18) (]1-489) (19) (B-303) (20) (5-290,291. 9-3OS. 7-62) (21) (6-213, 7-70) (22) (1-512) 23J (4-37 5) (24) (1-513, 11-492/ Bheridnn rejoined Grant on the Korth Anna River, the 24th of Ifey having defeated the Confederate Cavalry, destroyfed ten milo3 of railroad, and valuable supijliee and captured,temporarily th« outer defenses for Richmond.(27) During the afternoon of May 9th a Union rftconnaiefiince in force by Hnncock's Corps was initiated around the Confederate left flank. On the tenth of kby the two armies wore facing ee.ch other as shown on Special Map No, 2.(28} While Lee'a position wa3 fairly strong either flank mi £ kit have been successfully turns'), On Ifey Hh BurnBi^e's Corps was in a favorable position froc which to turn Lee's rlp.ht, Hancock was con tinuing to exploit the Confederate left on the morning of !&y 10th and was in a position favorable for turning Lee's left, when he nne ordered to withdraw two divisions to assist Warren's Corps in a proposed frontal attack.