SOLUTION NO.,
THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL
Htp Problwa No ~ . Serie*.
IN CASE OP REPLY TO 3E RETURNED TO RECEPTACLE BY 0:00 A.M.
US-0. S. 8 8UBJEOT: A study of the Campaign of Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor, 1864. I. PAPERS ACCOiiPANYIliG. 1, A bibliography for this study. 2, Five maps showing situation at beginning of the campaign, in vicinity of Spotsylvania ar.d In vicinity of Cold Harbor. II. THK STUDY PRSSKNTEH.-- Two outstanding lessons to be learned from th* Campaign of Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor, 1864. III. HISTORICAL FACTS RELATING TO THE STUDY.- 1. On the irornirve of JJay 7, 1854, the hopes of th* North *rd thoBe of the South rested in the two anri?B facing each othor in tho Virginia woods just tP3t of Ola Wilderness Tavern about sixty riles north of Richmond. The resources of the North \r. men, food, ind equipment were 3till An a state of sufficient supply while thone of the South were f^st reaching exhaustion. (1) Cenyr'tl U.S. Grant was personally directly he Union forces here consisting of the Ariuy of t3io Potomac under Major General George G. Ueade and an independent corps, the IX Corps, cocir,ended by tivjor General Ambrose E, Burnside. The Amy of the Potomac wac organ!t-.J into three corps and th« cavalry as follows: Th« II Corps under Uaj. Gen, Winfield S. Hancock. The V Corps under Uaj. Gen0 Gouvurneur K. larren. The VI Corp8 under Mftj. Gen. John Sedgwick. Tho Cavalry under Idoij. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan. The total strength after the battle of the Wilderness was approximately one hundred thousand sen and more than three hundred guns. (2) The Army of Northern Virginia under General Robert E. Lee totalPU approxinately fifty-one thousand men and two hundred guns. It %CL8 organited into three corps and the cavalry as follows: I Corps under Lt. Gen. R.H, Anderson, who had succeded Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, II Corps under Lt. Gen. R.S. Bwoll, III Corpu under Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill, Cavalry under Maj. Gen. .T.E.B. Stuart. (3) (1) (2-19) (2) (12 106 to 116. 5-^80. 4-367,372. 11-482.) (3) (3-182. 11482.) -1 - 2. Tht» Battle of the Wilderness closed on May 6, 1364. On the morning of Ifey 7, the two armies were disposed as shown on Special Ifap No. 1. (4) After such a battle as was just completed previous Union Generals had recoiled frcro the shock and turned northward for recipera tlon and reenforcemento. (5) Not to with Grant. He had made Lie's Aray his objective and he had n? thought of turning backt(6) His general plan was to wear down Lee's Army by constant and persistant fighting on every occasion which offered a chance to diminish Lee's forces, which he knew could not be replaced.(7) A reconnaissance by each side on the rooming of Ifey 7 disclosed to each that the other was not disposed to renev the attack. Lee knew that he must conserve his dwindling tonn power by avoid ing costly offensive actions and by the use of defensive works.(8) Grant concluded that Lee could no longer maintain battles in the open field and that therefore his offensive actions would be limited. Tiie present position of the Confederates combined with the wooded terrain wns not favoiable to an attack. The woods reduced Grant's advantage in superiority of men and guns. He decided to draw Leo into the open field and there att&ck him at every opportunity.(9) He desired to interpose his force between Lee's and Richmond. Such a position *rould safeguard Butler scuth of the James River and force L«e to move out of the Wilderness, whero Grant hoped to'attack the Confederate Arw-y in the open. (10) To accomplish this, Grant's immediate plan was to r.ove to Spotsylvania Court House about fifteen nllea southeast of Old Wilder neas Tavern, under cover of darkness during tho night of May 7 and 8. (11) Spotsylvania wag not a placo of great ntlitary importance except for the fact that the roads south from th* Vfilderneas net there the main road froa Fredericksburg to Richmond.(12) In order to be prepared for an attack during thn narch from the Wilderneae the movement was ordered to begin from the right flank.(13) General Sheridan wat» directed to give timely warning to the Corps commanders of any advance of the oneay along roads leading in from the right but this mia3ion was not fulfilled. (14)' In order to clear the narrow roadB for the uso of troop move ments that night, the wagon trains were moved out during the afternoon. T4) (2-209. 1174R7T 5) (9-229. 11-487) 6) (10-306. U-4B3. 12-2) 7) (11-487. 12-22) 3) (4-375. 11-482. 12-18) (9) (2-214,215. 4-375. 11-487) (lil) (2-213. 6—*W. 12,19) (11) (4-375. 12-2,3,19) (12) (9-229. 11-489) (13) (11-488) (14) (2-221) -2 General Lee, who tyas watchfully awaiting the next Union move, was advised of tin movement of the Union trains on the afternoon cf May 7, (lf>) He could not tell froc. this whethnr Grant would uncover Washington by Rrcov >ra»nt to the South or intended to nove to Fredericfca bur£. Howevar, in either case a position at Spctsylvqnin would bo advantageous to the Confederate Army, so General Lee decided to take up a position in readiness at that point, (1M Lee ordered the covenant to begin i'roa the right flank, (17) The cavalry was to r«jconnoiter the roadB fiojr, thu direction of FVederlckaburg and ileli/ the mrch of the Union colunr. at th*. a*r.e time screening the Confederate cov*aent.(i8) The movement toward 3potsylvan!a Court House started as ordered in the Union Ai'ny, beginning between 8:30 and J:00 in the evening. (U) In the Confederate Kr?y the rcoveirent ordered for earl/ on toy 8 actually began a*, about 11:00 P.M. Jia/ 7 by Anderson's Corps.(20) Since the Union movement begun fror. tho Hank firtheat from Spoteylvania while the Confederates began from the flank nearest that point the head cf the Union force had to irarch ov«r three K.ilea further than the head of the Confederate force. On the narrow road through the filderneas the Union advance WAS deJa/ed by the Confederate Cavalry. The head of th<9 Confederate cclunjt met no delays and reAch od the vicinity of Pfotc/lvania first and took up a position p.croe* tho road upon which the leading l/nlon corps wn« advancing slowly, de layed by the Confederate Cavalry.(21) Warren's Corps could not dislodge Anderson13 Corps and «o await ed reinforcements. By the tice these arrived Ccvnfederate reenforcw.enta hac also arrived. Thus Lee reached Spotsylvania first.(22) terrain here at Spotsyl ii was eoaothat undulatinc and while nore open than that in the Wilderness, was still partly covered with tre<*s. Woods and open fields being in aoout equal proportion.(23) During the renaJnder of the 8th and most of the Jth of May both armies developed their columns and prepared uefensive works of en trenchments and breastworks,(24) The Confederate Army occupied hastily selected lines north and around Spotsylvania, The flanka were refused with the left resting on Glady Run and tti© ri^ht on the Ny River. The center had been permitted to extend north around high ground in the vicinity of the Me Cool farm house and then south a&ain resulting in the formation of a large salient about a r.ile deep and about three quarters of a mile •vide at the bn..e. (See special cap fJZ) Its weakness vas recognized and a second line was entrenched across its base so that in case of need the salient could be cut out oi the line.(25^ On the yth of Itoy, Grant started Sheridan en a cavalry raid. Hi8 raission fas t.o ride around the Confederate Army, disturb their cowr-ukications and obstruct their avenues of retreat.(26) (lr-) (3-128. 9-22)) (25) (4-376,377. 1-515,516) (16) (0-305. 11-438) (26) (4-375. 6-lb?,lh7.12-19) (17) (11-448) (18) (]1-489) (19) (B-303) (20) (5-290,291. 9-3OS. 7-62) (21) (6-213, 7-70) (22) (1-512) 23J (4-37 5) (24) (1-513, 11-492/ Bheridnn rejoined Grant on the Korth Anna River, the 24th of Ifey having defeated the Confederate Cavalry, destroyfed ten milo3 of railroad, and valuable supijliee and captured,temporarily th« outer defenses for Richmond.(27) During the afternoon of May 9th a Union rftconnaiefiince in force by Hnncock's Corps was initiated around the Confederate left flank. On the tenth of kby the two armies wore facing ee.ch other as shown on Special Map No, 2.(28} While Lee'a position wa3 fairly strong either flank mi £ kit have been successfully turns'), On Ifey Hh BurnBi^e's Corps was in a favorable position froc which to turn Lee's rlp.ht, Hancock was con tinuing to exploit the Confederate left on the morning of !&y 10th and was in a position favorable for turning Lee's left, when he nne ordered to withdraw two divisions to assist Warren's Corps in a proposed frontal attack. (See Special Hap No.2) (30) Tho withdrawal of t*o divisions from south of Po River made it neceBsary to withdraw the t 'ird. This withdrawal was mad* with difficulty and heavy losses.(31) The attack by Warren's corpB and two divisions of Hancock's corps was niade agair.at a hill strongly held by the enei/.y. It resulted in a repulse with vory Sbvnre losBes. > second assault wis r»ade here an hour after the failure of the first. Ite failure waa ror« complete then thf» first attempt. (32) an After tMa,4attack was orfinizod against th* eist face of the salient previously referred to? Twelve picJtf*l rp^ir *»nts,totaling approximately 3OUO c.en.-yerp placed usidor Colonel Bo.^ry Upton for the assault. This assault was to be supported with an attack by Gon<°rnl r.fctt's Division. (See Special Map 1,0.3) (33) Colonel Upton launched his attack at about .l>:'>0 P,:.'. from cover closr? to t'n* encrty with such suddenness as to overrun the Confederate line. He captured nearly 1O()O prison«r8 and ««v*ral guns. He had te/rporarily brokon the Ccnfeti^rot*? line, A stror^ sunportlnt attack was needed to aaintnln the n^vnritap.e he had gained, (34) Uott's 8up;jorting attack did not roaterialiie. He had formed for the attack wherp his fore* could be seen by the enemy. As he started forward he ras met by concentrated fire of artillery and rifles, which broke down his advance before it hau gained momentum, It was therefore necessary to withdraw Upton's force under cover of darkness and the temporary *dvaritaf,o -**3 completely lost.(35) The total Federal loss during May 10th in killed, «vnunded and prisoners "*H3 over 4000 rt.en. Confddsrnte less ia estin/vtfii a3 ji like hftlf thin nuz:.bpr. (36) On the 11th of ttiy it rair.ed, T>IP p»npit'rn tf the two a«t,i*s rornined about *i;he sane. On this dny Ornnt sent a n.*»ftse^f! tc llalleck, extracts of which follow; WW* hive now fnded thf* Bi,xt)» day of vrry heavy fi^htin^ . We have lnst to this tin* eleven £,enernl officpre killed^ vrc>»nrted or p.ipoin^ and probably 20,000 r.pn, T gropeso to fight it «..ut on tkils linn if it takes all aurn.er.1' (37) (27) (1-W2. ) (20) (2-254 tc 2b6. 7-76,77.) (29) (7-72 to 7t>. 2-?.5O to 25?. 6-Mb) (3U) (2-Wb. 7-77 to 30. 11-508. 12-Sb) (31) ('-77 to 79. f-306. 1^-66) (32) (4-?77. 12-56,67) (33) (4-37". }-.r>J6,517.) (34) (6-22?. 7-cl4,ai. 11-435. J3-67) 3b) (1-517. (5-224. 7-Uti,»J7) 36) (1-[17) ?7) (4-377,374, 12-4.) 1 -4 Grin* determined 1c mke another effort to penetrate the th*-- Ccnfcderate line. He decided tc nwke the naifi of fort »;^i::ot the upox and both faces of the salient.(38) • Th*. att'ick wa« launched about 4:3 5 A, 7. J2U> of thy with trto4 3 in mabB fcrn.ation with units in line. (So* S;>ecli] Map Nr, 4) It waj favored by the presence of n foe wheih partially covered the union advance and by the absence of artillery from this part of thp Con federate poaitirn, Th« artillery had been withdrawn frtr. the si] ient fcr uoo at anothor j>lace in the line ar.d Tiae returned only in tine to have 20 of the ZZ |;unB captured.(39) The a88tult, r..et by .'..usketry fire only, arept over, by weight cf r.ucbers, the firet line of breastworks, eppturin^, in addition to twenty tlinoi »k>cut 4O00 prisoners, including O^nprai Johnson and General O.A. Stuart arid about thirty colcrs.(40) The fnicn UAaa fcrnAtion wus disorganised in capturing the bronst works cf the salient and was stopped by the line acrosB tho base of the salient.(41) Lee ree^nfrrced t)ie threatened j-ositicn ard the Federals were i>i8hed back to the nuteid* face of the criminal front line breastworks. Here a most fierce and blotdy hand to hand conflict ensued, / The place was later caJled "The Bloody An^le." At other part? of ths line the fi^htin,tj did not apprc&ch in fierceness that at -iioody An^jle. (42) Before dawn the Federals retired to a position about 800 yds. to th« rear and tho Confederates withdrew from the e'ilient. The total Union losses in killed, wounded e/id missing on May 12th were about 6,000. (Hancock's Corps lost 2,50J). rea The Confederate loss is estinated a& bei,i£ oomewhat t ter t considering; the prisoners t?ken perhaps over 8,000,(43) Fron the l?th to the 13tli it rained continously. Both armies rested. (44) On May lHh reenfercements from Washington, which Grant had been awaiting, completed their arrival. These new troops ware about equal in nunber to the total Union losses during this campaign to date. The losses at Spotsylvania alone amounted to 18,000.(45) 3. Grant now decided to draw Lee out of his position at Spotaylvania.(46) On May 19th a rr-ovement by the left flank was Btarted an 4t Grant arrived in front of Leo's position by night of May 31 with the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Corps. The armies had been in continual contact and several engage ments had te'-en place during these movements. Grant decided not to assault the Confederate position south of Totopotoniy but to concentrate on Lee's ri^ht, and so continued south ward toward Cold Harbor.(55) Lflfl shifted his forces to meet this move and occupied a position from Hanover Courthouse nearly tc Botto/r. Bridge. Cold Harbor, witnin aix miles of tho outer WOTKS of Richmond was of strategic value in that roads concentrated there from Bethesda c*hurch, Old Church, White House, Mew Bridge,and to all bridges over Chickahominy to Richmond. During the night May 31-June 1 and June 1st both Armins concentrated on Cold Harbor. (56) The Confederate position was approximately as shown on Special Map No. 5. It covored tho approaches to the Chickahominy River, tho crossings of which led straight tr Richmond.(57) } General Smith with the XVIII Corps WAS delayed by a mistake in orders and did not arrive until the afternoon of June lF.t,wh Later when ordered to continue the attack each Corps ccn.nnnder con.plainfid that in order to advance it wns necessary for the corps on i his flank to con.e forward to cover his flank. After finding that they could not cooperate, Grar.t ordered each to ccntiuu* without re- Card to the oth«r. Tnis produced no results. At about 1:30 in the afternoon Grnnt ordered Corps cormanders to suspend operations and to entrench 5.P preoent positions. (64) The Pattle of Cold Harbor wa3 over. I^e's position v.-yc r.ot broken. Active sniping continued on both cidoo. The Vn.'cn arry regained in pooiticn until the r.i£ht of Juno 12th when it was with drawn preparatory to crossing tho James. (65) 5. Tho t'nicn Jesses frcrii Juno 2nd to Junr- 15th totaled 12,73B. The Confederate- loss is unknown but was very r.uch snallrr. (G5) From the beginning of t)ie battle of the Wilderness on '.'ay Hh to 12th of June, Grant's lossts totaled £>4,J29, He begun with 10l14h r.en and during that tirce ho received aiiproxirntely \i/3'l2 ts. (6 ?) Loe begin the canpai^n vrith about 62,OHO and received in reenforcerents eoaething like 14,400 rren.(68) At thft and of the car.naii_m his arny was worn down to such a point that he could only hone to delay con plot« def eit. (J (59) (12-10,11,21,86) (65) (6-27J,2 88. 12-11 (60) (3-n8,215) (od) 111-503. 1P.-180) (61) (fi-268,269) (57) (9-240. 11-503) (62) (3-215 tc 217) (68) (3-187. 11-503) (63) (3-216 to 217. 12-22) (64) (11-502. 12-22,B7fH8) —7 IV. OPINION OF THE A'JTHOR: 1. Discussion. -- In tMs campaign Genwral Grant by pur suing hi6 plan of wearing down thp Confcdorate arn.y by a policy of persietant hajroiering reduced Lee's force to ths point whore strategical offensive action was impracticable and brought nenr tc t\,n end, this bloody struggle. In accomplishing this his own loss in nurr.b^rs was nearly three tin.es that inflicted on the enen.y but he knew that the Confederate losses could not be replaced while his own crulri be re newed. Grant wide Lee's Army his objective and he kepc persistently after it. His turning DOVAnentB were not nnde to capture Richir.cud but for the purpose of bringiic; Lee to battle on more favorable ter rain and in petition less prpp, red for defense. Greater results were not attained due to th? alertr.tsB and akill of General Lee. Grant siezed anct retain-d the initiative throughout the campaign, applying aiost diligently th^ principle of the offensive. He recuperated quickly afier every engag^cent, even the ugh his losses were heavy, arid kept advancing and inflicting losnes on the enemy. Thiy forced Lee to the defensive inaking it iapossiblp for him to do r.ore than avoid defeat. As compared with the action of previous Union leaders in this theater, Grant deserves much credit, however his strategy was not brilliant in this cturnaign and his tactics were often quite faulty. He should have taken the neceo3:try utepc to insure his arrival at Spottsylvania previous to Loe'a, Thia co At Cold Harbor there was littl e cocrdir.ation and only a rou^h scherce of naneuver. Attacks were i^ade "All along the line", and although Grant did not plan a nuccessive atte.ck dime wern an poorly coordinator as to approach this error. Grant might have avoided Leo's position at Cold Harbor as he did at North Anna but ho had found it difficult to get around I,o»?'a flank and he knew that to end the struggle ho rcuat defeat the Con federate Aray. LOR'B bick was to tho ChickahorrAny and his iefeat here would be decisive. failure hero might have accomplished irretrievable losses to Lee while Grant's preponderence in nunbers would leavs him able to continue to another field. Ho could not fore3fe the unequal 1O9s that resulted and so the chance was taken. His greatest iua take was that of continually making frontal attacks against strong poslticnd wl-ien enveloping attacks were quite practicable. This con tributed to hin enormous losaes. 2. Conclusion.-- Grant's success then wa.3 largely duo: a. To his selection of the correct objective, Lo^'o Army, the destruction of vhlch wci.ld gf^in nil other oiris desired. b_. To hia offensive action which held the initiative and forced Loe to subjugate his OTM plpnB to rr.e«t those of Grant. The ftdherenco to t)ie principles of the objective nnd the the offen3e will greatly contribute to 8UCC*»BS even though accorpnnied by rrii V. HSCOUUENPATICKS. -- None required. VI. CONCURRENCES. — Nonn required. ^(Signature) .(Rark) (Office) -eu BJBUCGKAPHY. Key: (2-19,22) = Ko. ?• text (belcw) fates !'• fn6 t'l. 1. Military Uo^oira of * Confpdrr&te, a Criticrl Nar By Edward .Forter Alexander, 1,'ew York, Cliirlea Scribn^r'o of 3S64 and 136fj. Cold K'irbcr, Uhy CJ-.Tun« ?, 136'i. By CanrJes F. AtkJnaor . London, Kuuh R9»8, l'J»08. 3. Battle:) itnd LenderB CJ' the Civil War. Tliu Century Co», JIow York, la^-lSdS. (Vol. 4, i 4. Hiutoiy of the Ar.ericin Civil AAr. By J.W. Draj fr. Korpor and rrothfci-8, New York. {Vol.L.) i>. Cair.j.aitnfr of the Aaericnn CivU Ear. Py I'.J. Fi ebe^or. West roJrt , i:.v ,, UilJtar/ Academy Print5n£ Cffico, 1310. o. Personal Uftcoirs of U.S. Grant. By I'.S, Hrpnt. Charles L. Webster ar.d Ct'nj'any 7. The Virginia Carr^.ni^n of 1P.64 mid 186&J the Arry of the PotoirAC and the Aririy of the Jan.es, By A.A. Hunpflreyo. Charles Scribner'a Sor.6, 1893. !>vr York. 8. Pictorial History of tr.e Civil War in the United States of Ar.erica. By B.J.lceaini; (3 voluirer.) Vol 3. Hartford T Bel knap lfcS6B. 9. Robert ?.. L^e, the Soldier. By Sir Frederick Mturice. Cc-nct^blfr ): Comjjany Ltd., London, 19i5f', 10. History of the Civil War 1861-1865. By Jarr.*s Ford Rhodoc . f.ft>fl York. The Macnillan Co., 1917. 11. American Capoai^ns, By II,F. Steele. Waahin£tcn, Byron S. , Publisher 190J. 2 volumes, (Vol. 1) 12, li.S. War Departciflnt. War of the Rebellion. Series I, Vol. XXT/I Part 1- reports. All sources were obtainfxi frcm the Library, C i OS School. Fort Lonvonwcrth, Kansao. SPECIAL MAP NO. 1. -10 BATTLKo* THE WILDERNESS. May 6 SPECIAL WAP NO. 2, -11 SPECIAL MAP NO. 3. -12 SPECIAL MAP NO. 4 . -13 SPECIAL UAP NO. I. -14 BATTLE OF COLO HARBOR i ft * *