THE EDMONTON SUN, a DIVISION of SUN MEDIA CORPORATION Appellant (Respondent) - and ~

SCC Court File No. 32865

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

(ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF ALBERTA)

BETWEEN:

THE EDMONTON SUN, A DIVISION OF SUN MEDIA CORPORATION Appellant (Respondent) - and ~

CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, EDMONTON JOURNAL, A DIVISION OF CANWEST MEDIAWORKS PUBLICATIONS INC., BELL GLOBEMEDIA PUBLISHING INC., CARRYING ON BUSINESS AS THE GLOBE AND MAIL and CTV TELEVISION INC. Appellants (Respondents) - and ~

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Respondent (Appellant) ~ and-

MICHAEL JAMES WHITE Respondent (Appellant)

FACTUM OF THE APPELLANT THE EDMONTON SUN (Pursuant to Rule 42 ofthe Rules ofthe Court ofCanada, SOR/2006-203)

FRASER MILNER CASGRAIN LLP FRASER MILNER CASGRAIN LLP 2900,10180-101 Street 1420, 99 Bank Street Edmonton, AB T5J 3V5 Ottawa, ON KIP 1H4 Barry Zalmanowitz, Q.C. / Peter D. Banks K. Scott McLean / Corey Villeneuve Tel: (780) 423-7344 / (780) 423-7391 Tel: (613) 783-9699 Fax: (780) 423-7276 / (780) 423-7276 Fax: (613) 783-9690 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Counsel for The Edmonton Sun Ottawa Agents for the Appellant The Edmonton Sun REYNOLDS. MIRTH, RICHARDS & FRASER MILNER CASGRAIN LLP FARMERLLP K. Scott McLean / Corey Villeneuve Fred Kozak QC and Matthew Woodley 1420· 99 Bank Street 3200 Manulife Place Ottawa, ON KIP 1H4 10180 - 101 Street Phone: 613.783.9699 Edmonton, AB T5J 3W8 Fax: 613.783.9690 Phone: 780.425.9510 Email: [email protected] Fax: 780.429.3044 [email protected] Email: [email protected] and Agents for Appellants [email protected] Counsel for the Appellants

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALBERTA GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP James Robb, Q.c. Henry S. Brown, Q.C. 3rd Floor, 9833 109 Street 2600 ,,' 160 Elgin St Edmonton, AB T5K 2E8 Ottawa, ON KIP 1C3 Phone: 780422.5402 Phone: 613.233.1781 Fax: 780.422.1106 Fax:· 613.788.8433 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Counsel for Her Majesty the Queen Agents for Her Majesty the Queen

DAWSON STEVENS DUCKETT SHAIGEC SACK GOLDBLATT MITCHELL LLP Laura Stevens, Q.c. Colleen Bauman 300, 9924 106 Street 500 - 30 Metcalfe St. Edmonton, AB T5K 1C4 Ottawa, ON KIP 5L4 Phone: 780.424.9058 Phone: 613.235.5327 Fax: 780.425.0172 Fax: 613.235.3041 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Counsel for Michael White Agents for Counsel for Michael White 11

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PART I - OVERVIEW OF POSITION AND STATEMENT OF FACTS. ". ".,,,0>,,0>,,, 1

A. Overview . 1

B. Background to White Case . 1

C. Decisions Below in Constitutional Challenge , 2 (1) R. v. White, 2007 ABQB 359 2 (2) R. v. White, 2008 ABCA 294 4

PART II - QUESTIONS IN ISSUE 5

PART III-STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT 5

A. Preliminary Issues 5 (1 ) What is the proper procedure for third party challenges to legislation in criminal cases? 5 (2) Did'the Court ofAppeal have jurisdiction to hear the appeal? 7

B. Does s. 517 ofthe Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as amended, infringe s. 2(b) ofthe Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms ""., ,... 10 (1 ) Section 517 . 10 (2) Section 2(b) ofthe Charter is Infringed 12

C. If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 ofthe Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms? .. , ,'." .. ,."".".... 14 (1) No Hierarchy ofRights 14 (2) The Oakes Test...... 15 (a) The Objective ofSection 517 is to Protect the Accused's Right to a Fair Trial ". "".. " "..".. " 15 (b) Rational Connection? ,.. 20

1. Lack ofRational Connection - s. 517 applies to non-jury trials ' " "...... 21 111

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11. Lack ofRational Connection - s. 517 is a blanket ban which includes information favourable to the accused ., , ,...... 22

111. Lack ofRational Connection - s. 517 leads to incomplete reporting which can itselffuel uninformed speculation " ,.. , ,. 22

IV. Lack ofRational Connection- s. 517 is inherently inconsistent with the system'sfaith in juries ""., .. , "., .. ,. ,.. " .. "."""' ,, 22 v. Lack ofRational Connection - s. 517 is inherently inconsistent with the tertiary groundfor bail ".", .. , .. "", " .. ,."., , 23

VI. Conclusion on Rational Connection ,' 23

1. Minimal Impairment Test Not Satisfied - the blanket ban in s. 517 is overbroad ,.', .. ', 24

11. Minimal Impairment Test Not Satisfied the mandatory nature ofthe ban in s. 517 is a blunt tool , , ,...... ,...... 24

111. Minimal Impairment Test Not Satisfied - the "certainty" argument ...... ,...... ,.. ,...."... 25

IV. Minimal Impairment Test Not Satisfied - Section 517's minimizingfeatures are illusory .,,' , 28 v. Dagenais/Mentuck Test 29

VI. Conclusion on Minimal Impairment Test , ,.,... 32

1. Section 517 is oflimited efficacy - bulk are non-jury trials 33

11. Section 517 is oflimited efficacy right to afair trial can be effectively protected by a discretionary ban , ,.. . 33

111. Section 517 is oflimited efficacy - strength ofjuries ,.. ,.. ,...... 33

IV, Section 517 is oflimited efficacy - long time to trial .,.... ,.. , ,,, ".. 34 v. Section 517 is oflimited efficacy - similar information may already be in public domain ,.... 34 IV

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VI. Section 517 is oflimited efficacy - other safeguards " .. , ,.. ,...... ,."...... 34

VB. Section 517 is oflimited efficacy - does not change right to bail ., .. ,., .. ,.. ,., ,, , 35

V111. Google is neutral "." .. ,.. ,.. " .. ,.. , , ,., , 35

IX. Deleterious effects ofs. 517 are drastic - unconstitutionally overbroad violation ofs. 2(b), ,., 35 x. Deleterious effects ofs. 517 are drastic - erodes public confidence , 36

Xl. Deleterious effects ofs. 517 are drastic - inconsistent with the tertiary ground (s. 515(10) (c)) .. ,... ,. ,,.... 38

D. Ifthe infringement is not saved by s. 1 ofthe Charter, what is the remedy? 39

E. Conclusion...... 39

PART IV - SUBMISSION AS TO COSTS ,.. ,.. ,.. "., .. , ,...... 39

PART V- STATEMENT OF THE ORDER SOUGHT ...... ,...... 40

PART VI-TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.,."." , " , , 41

PART VII - STATUTORY PROVISIONS...... 43 PART I- OVERVIEW OF POSITION AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Overview

1, In Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, Fish 1. explained: In any constitutional climate, the administration ofjustice thrives on exposure to light -- and withers under a cloud ofsecrecy. I

2. Section 517 ofthe Criminal Code2 requires a judge, ifrequested by the accused, to impose a blanket publication ban on argument, evidence, information and reasons in bail proceedings. As such it covers, in a cloud ofsecrecy, an important component ofour criminal justice system depriving the public ofunderstanding.

3. The case at bar also presents important procedural issues which remain unresolved for third party challenges to legislation in criminal proceedings.

B. Background to White Case3

4. In the summer of2005, Michael White engaged the public's sympathy and assistance in his search for Liana, his missing wife. National media broadcast his pleas for assistance. The public helped search and eventually Liana's body was found. Michael White was charged with her murder.

5. Michael White was released on bail and the public was outraged. Petitions circulated for his return to custody. Everyone was prohibited from publishing the judge's reasons for granting bail because ofthe mandatory publication ban provided by a pre-Charter amendment to s. 517 ofthe Criminal Code. Michael White had requested and the Court was required to grant the publication ban. The media were not permitted to inform the public about the legal principles applicable to bail and how they were applied by the judge to Michael White, and the public were

I Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188 at para. 1 [Edmonton Sun Authorities ("ESA") Tab 43]. 2 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 as amended. 3 Court ofQueen's Bench Reasons at paras. 1 - 10 [Joint Record ofthe Appellants ("JRA") ~ Tab D]; Court of Appeal Reasons at paras. 1 - 4 [JRA - Tab I]. 2 not permitted to receive this information from the media at the time when their interest in receiving it was engaged.

6. The Crown pursued a s. 680 bail review ofMichael White's bail. The Crown succeeded, ironically on the tertiary ground, i. e., public confidence in the administration ofjustice, and Michael White was returned to custody>4 The publication ban covering the Queen's Bench bail proceedings remained in place, but the panel ofthe Court ofAppeal hearing the s. 680 bail review held that the s. 517 publication ban did not apply to the Court ofAppeal proceedings.5 Consequently, even though the Queen's Bench bail proceedings remained subject to the s. 517 publication ban, Michael White had to apply for a common law ban pursuant to the Dagenais/Mentuck test to cover the Court ofAppeal proceedings.6 Michael White applied for such a ban, but the Court held that the Dagenais/Mentuck test was not satisfied in this case and refused to grant a ban covering the s. 680 bail review. 7 As such, most ifnot all ofthe information that was covered by the s. 517 ban could be published as it was also material before the Court ofAppeal in the s. 680 bail review.

C. Decisions Below in Constitutional Challenge

(1) R. v. White, 2007 ABQB 359

7, The Edmonton Sun and other media outlets challenged the publication ban originally ordered by Brooker J. in conjunction with a constitutional challenge to s. 517.8 The challenge was brought by notice ofmotion in the criminal proceedings before Brooker J., who was the Court of Queen's Bench justice who had granted Michael White's bail and the mandatory publication ban pursuant to s. 517, The original s. 517 publication ban covering the Queen's Bench bail proceedings still remained in force despite similar information in the s. 680 review at the Court ofAppeal not being covered by the publication ban.

4 Court ofAppeal Reasons on s. 680 Review at paras. 1 - 23 [IRA . Tab C]. 5 Ibid. at paras. 28 - 38. 6 Ibid. at paras. 37 - 38. 7 Ibid. 8 Notice of Motion The Edmonton Sun [IRA ~ Tab N]; Notice of Motion Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, et aI [JRA - Tab M]. 3

8. Justice Brooker held that s. 517 was unconstitutional. It violated s. 2(b) ofthe Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms9 and could not be saved by s. 1, The Court stated that the object ofs. 517 was to protect the accused's right to a fair trial in front ofan impartial jury. 10 The Court concluded that the blanket ban in s. 517 was not rationally connected to this objective. 11 The banned items listed in s. 517 might not be prejudicial in every case and publication may even be beneficial in some situations. In addition, Brooker 1. held that s. 517 is overly broad. 12 Section 517 covers situations where no jury trial is possible. As well, a number ofless intrusive courses of action are available to protect the accused's right to a fair trial.

9. The Court held that the deleterious effects of s. 517 are disproportionate to the salutary effects which are minimal. l3 Justice Brooker explained "[t]he deleterious effects ofthis legislation include, in addition to the infringement ofthe right to freedom ofexpression: hindering public awareness and understanding ofthe bail process and associated Charter rights, and a compromise ofthe open court principle which includes public scrutiny, awareness and discussion ofthat system. This leads to the potential for public speculation, misunderstanding and mistrust ofthe justice system.,,14

10. The chambers judge ordered that, effective immediately, s. 517 should be limited to situations where a jury trial is possible. There was no justification for a publication ban to protect the accused's right to a fair trial by preventing any contamination ofthe jury pool in cases where a jury trial is not available. IS The Court also declared that the mandatory words "and shall on application ofthe accused" be struck out, but suspended that declaration for a period of 12 months to give Parliament the opportunity to amend it.

11. The Crown and White sought to appeal the Court of Queen's Bench decision. Procedurally, the Crown did this by an application for a bail review pursuant to s. 680 ofthe

9 Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, Part I ofthe Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 ("Charter"). 10 Court ofQueen's Bench Reasons at para. 39 [JRA ~ Tab D]. 11 Ibid at paras. 61 - 62. 12 Ibid at para. 9. 13 Ibid at paras. 98 - 102. 14 Ibid at para. 101. 15 Ibid at paras. 129 - 131. 4

Criminal Code 16 as well as filing a notice ofappeal. 17 White filed an application for a s. 680 Criminal Code bail review. I8 The Court ofAppeal requested counsel to address the issue of whether the Court ofAppeal had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 19 On the preliminary application for a s. 680 bail review, Watson J.A., sitting alone, directed the issue ofjurisdiction to be considered by a full panel ofthe Court ofAppeal.20

(2) R. v. White, 2008 ABCA 294

12. The Court ofAppeal overturned Brooker],'s entire decision.

13. Writing for the Court, Slatter J.A. rebuked the chambers justice on the issues ofboth procedure and substance. The Court ofAppeal characterized the third party challenge to the publication ban in the criminal proceedings before the superior court as being civil in nature and took jurisdiction on the appeal pursuant to civil procedure rules?1

14. Slatter J.A. criticized the chambers justice for striking the portion of s. 517 applicable in situations in which a jury trial is not possible because it was always known that Michael White's trial was going to be a jury trial. According to Slatter lA., Brooker 1 committed an error of principle in striking this portion?2

15. On the larger issue ofthe constitutionality ofs. 517's mandatory publication ban upon request ofthe accused, Slatter J.A. held that the mandatory nature ofthe ban was to alleviate the burden on the accused and was constitutional.23 According to Slatter J.A., s. 517 had other objectives beyond the protection ofthe accused's right to a fair trial in front ofan impartial jury. These objectives include "the protection ofthe right to reasonable bail and a fair bail hearing, the protection ofthe presumption ofinnocence, and the enhancement ofthe efficiency ofthe trial process,,?4 Slatter J.A. agreed that the objective ofpreserving an untainted jury could be

16 Crown's Applicationfor s. 680 Review [JRA - Tab P]. 17 Crown's Notice ofAppeal [JRA - Tab 0]. 18 White's Applicationfor s. 680 Review [JRA- Tab Q]. 19 Court ofAppeal Letter [JRA - Tab AA]. 20 Written Reasons ofWatson JA. [JRA - Tab F]. 21 Court ofAppeal Reasons at paras. 17, 19 - 30 [JRA - Tab I]. 22 Ibid. at paras. 16,39. 23 Ibid. at paras. 33 - 58. 24 Ibid. at para. 38. 5 realized in most cases by a discretionary ban, however the other objectives of s. 517 depended upon the publication ban being mandatory?5 According to Slatter lA. "[n]o restriction short ofa mandatory restriction would be effective, and therefore the impairment is as minimal as it can be... ,,26 The Court ofAppeal overturned Brooker l's entire decision.

PART II - QUESTIONS IN ISSUE

16. The ChiefJustice stated the constitutional questions as follows?7

L Does s. 517 ofthe Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as amended, infringe s. 2(b) ofthe Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms?

2. Ifso, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 ofthe Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms?

17. Other issues include the proper procedure for third party challenges to legislation, such as the media's challenge to s. 517 in the case at bar, and the corresponding routes ofappeal.

PART 111- STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT

A. Preliminary Issues

(1) What is the proper procedure for third party challenges to legislation in criminal cases?

18. The first preliminary issue concerns the proper procedure for third party challenges in cases such as this. The s. 517 publication ban arose in the context ofWhite's criminal proceedings and was mandated by the Criminal Code. In Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., Lamer C.J. stated:

Challenges to publication bans may be framed in several different ways, depending on the nature ofthe objection to the ban. Iflegislation requires a judge

25 Ibid. at para. 44. 26 Court ofAppeal Reasons at para. 44 [JRA .Tab I]. 27 Constitutional Questions [JRA . Tab K]. 6

to order a publication ban, then any objection to that ban should be framed as a Charter challenge to the legislation itself.28 (emphasis added)

19, This is precisely what the media did in this case. The constitutionality ofs. 517 was challenged before the bail judge who granted the original ordeL29 Issues including mootness, jurisdiction and the proper forum were addressed by the parties and the Court of Queen's Bench. The Crown ultimately conceded that the media's application was not moot and the Court agreed. 3o Justice Brooker concluded:

21 The normal procedure for bringing a challenge to legislation which, during the course ofa proceeding, has resulted in the infringement ofconstitutionally protected rights or freedoms, is to bring the challenge in the court hearing the matter, As Professor Peter Hogg in Constitutional Law ofCanada, looseleaf edition (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) explains, at 37-22:

Whenever the [constitutional] validity ofa statute (or other official act) is relevant to the outcome ofa dispute, the court that is seized ofthe dispute has the power and the duty to determine whether or not the statute (or other act) is valid.

22 The publication ban is relevant to the outcome ofthe dispute, since one ofthe reasons for its imposition is to prevent contamination ofthe jury pool. Therefore, this Court, being the court seized ofthe criminal matter, has a duty to consider the constitutionality of s. 517 ofthe Criminal Code.

23 Although the challenging party is not a party to the proceedings, the publication ban significantly affects the media. The courts ofthis country have repeatedly recognized the significance ofpublication bans to the media. For example, in Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario (2003), 67 O.R. (3d) 577 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 14, the Ontario Court of Appeal acknowledged that the media has "an important role to play in applications brought to prohibit public access to court records or to prohibit publication ofcourt proceedings."

28 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 at p. 874 (emphasis in original) ("Dagenais") [ESA Tab 7]. 29 In addition, the Court held a pre-hearing meeting to address issues of procedure Pre-Hearing Meeting before Brooker J May 10, 2006 ~ Transcript [IRA - Tab U]. 30 Court ofQueen's Bench Reasons at paras. 11 - 12 [JRA Tab D] The Court ofAppeal at para. 9 criticized the chambers judge on the issue ofmootness since similar information at issue in the original bail hearing was said to be at issue at the earlier Court ofAppeal s. 680 review and the fact that the reasons for decision were not issued until after the publication ban expired after the trial had ended. However, at the time ofthe constitutional challenge, the mandatory publication ban ordered by Brooker 1. pursuant to s. 517 was still in effect. Therefore, the issue was clearly not moot at the time it was argued. The issue may have become moot by the time the Court's reasons were released however. The Court reserved its decision for 9 months and the publication ban expired by the time Brooker 1. issued his reasons. Nevertheless, the Court clearly exercised its discretion to still release the reasons given the importance ofthis issue which needed to be resolved. 7

24 For the reasons given above, I find that the Applicants have brought the constitutional challenge of s. 517 in the proper forum, and that this Court is not functus officio. I need not, as a result, consider issues ofnotice or material change which would arise in an application to vary or revoke an order.

20. The Court ofAppeal harshly criticized the media stating "[t]here were several problems with the proceedings before the chambers judge: the standing ofthe applicants, exactly what jurisdiction ofthe court was being engaged, whether the issue was moot, whether the proceedings were an appropriate way to decide important constitutional issues, and whether (all things considered) the chambers judge should have entertained the applications.,,31 The Court of Appeal called the media's proceedings "irregular and unfortunate".32 This criticism is unduly harsh and unfounded. The media and the Court ofQueen's Bench did indeed address these issues and properly proceeded.33

(2) Did the Court ofAppeal have jurisdiction to hear the appeal?

21. The other preliminary issue is whether the Court ofAppeal had jurisdiction to hear the Crown's appeal or whether this case falls within the category ofother cases involving challenges to publication bans arising in the criminal context in which the provincial courts ofappeal do not have jurisdiction and the only route ofappeal is to proceed directly to the Supreme Court of Canada pursuant to s. 40(1) ofthe Supreme CourtAct?4 See for example: Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.,35 R. v. Adams,36 R. v. Mentuck. 37

31 Court ofAppeal Reasons at para. 11. See also paras 10 - 18. [JRA Tab I]. 32 Ibid. at para. 30. th 33 Court ofQueen's Bench Reasons at paras. 11 ~ 25 [JRA ~ Tab D]; P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law ofCanada, 5 ed. Supplemented (Thomson Carswell: Looseleaf) at pp. 59-1 - 59-21 [ESA Tab 45]; R. v. Adams, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 707 [ESA Tab 15]; Rohani v. Rohani, 2002 CarswellBC 2940 (S.c.) [ESA Tab 36]; Toronto Sun Publishing Corp. v. Alberta (Attorney General), 1985 CarswellAlta 129 (C.A.) [ESA Tab 41] This was not a case of"breach now challenge later". R. v. Daly, 2005 CarswellBC 1828 (C.A.) [ESA Tab 18]; R. v. Domm, 1996 CarswellOnt 4539 (C.A.) [ESA Tab 19]. 34 Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26 See: E.G. Ewaschuk, Criminal Pleadings & Practice in Canada (Canada Law Book Looseleaf) at 23:0045, 23:0050, 23:2007 [ESA Tab 44]; Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 [ESA Tab 7]; R. v. Adams, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 707 [ESA Tab 15]; R. v. Mentuck, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 [ESA Tab 26]; R. v. Laba, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 965 [ESA Tab 15]; Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 [ESA Tab 35]; Kourtessis v. MNR., [1993] 2 S.c.R. 53 [ESA Tab 12]; Knox Contracting Ltd. v. Canada, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 338 [ESA Tab 11]; Canada Packers Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1985 CarswellAlta 619 (Q.B.) [ESA Tab 3]; Canada Packers Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1985 CarswellAlta 618 (C.A.) [ESA Tab 4]; R. v. Forget, 1982 CarswellOnt 1341 (C.A.) [ESA Tab 21]; R. v. Needham, 1992 CarswellBC 308 (C.A.) [ESA Tab 27]; Saxena v. Thailand (Kingdom), 1997 CarswellBC 1325 (C.A.) [ESA Tab 37]. 35 In Dagenais, Lamer C.l explained at para 38 that appeals from discretionary publication bans ordered by provincial court judges can be made to superior court as an application for an extraordinary remedy ofcertiorari. 8

22. Appeals are strictly the creature of statute and in order for a provincial court ofappeal to have jurisdiction it must be provided by the relevant legislature. In cases where the Court of Appeal does not have jurisdiction, the only route is to go directly to the Supreme Court of Canada pursuant to s. 40(1) ofthe Supreme Court Act. Section 40(1) states:

40. (1) Subject to subsection (3), an appeal lies to the Supreme Court from any final or other judgment ofthe Federal Court ofAppeal or ofthe highest court of final resort in a province, or a judge thereof, in which judgment can be had in the particular case sought to be appealed to the Supreme Court...

(emphasis added)

23. A decision ofthe superior court offirst instance is the final judgment ofthe highest court offinal resort in a province in which judgment can be ifthere is no other route ofappeal. This road block triggers s. 40(1) ofthe Supreme Court Act. Numerous publication ban cases arising in the criminal context fall within this category. In R. v. Mentuck/8 Iacobucci J. explained:

21 The situations in which this Court has jurisdiction under s. 40 ofthe Supreme Court Act over direct appeals from the court offirst instance are, therefore, appeals where (a) an order deals with issues ancillary, or not integrally related, to the guilt or innocence ofthe accused; and (b) where there is no other available right ofappeal or any explicit bar to appeal. In this case, the publication ban was not integrally related to the guilt or innocence ofthe accused. It was neither intended to preserve the fair trial rights ofthe accused, nor to secure evidence that might lose its value in the context ofthe trial ifwidely known.. ,. No appeal was available under s. 676(1) ofthe Criminal Code, and neither the Code nor s. 40(3) ofthe Supreme Court Act bars the appeal. I therefore conclude that this Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 40 ofthe Supreme Court Act.

(emphasis added)

24. The Court ofAppeal in this case characterized the constitutional challenge to s. 517 of the Criminal Code, although a challenge to both a provision within the Criminal Code itself and

By virtue ofs. 784(1) ofthe Criminal Code, a further appeal lies to the Court ofAppeal from a decision granting or refusing the reliefsought in proceedings by way ofcertiorari. Consequently, a statutory route to the Court ofAppeal is provided by Parliament in certiorari proceedings originating from a provincial court judge's order. However, there is a jurisdictional vacuum for orders originating in the Court ofQueen's Bench. Section 40(1) ofthe Supreme Court Act fills this jurisdictional vacuum. Parliament has been called upon many times to fix this. 36 R. v. Adams, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 707 at paras 10 - 18 [ESA Tab 15]. 37 R. v. Mentuck, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 at paras 17 - 21 [ESA Tab 26]. 38 Ibid. 9 an order granted pursuant to it, and arising during the course of ongoing criminal proceedings, as civil in nature and took jurisdiction pursuant to the civil rules. 39 This is contrary to decisions of this Court which have held that challenges to publication bans in criminal proceedings are criminal in nature. In Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. ,40 Lamer C.J. stated:

,,, we are dealing here with media challenges to publication bans ordered by judges under their common law or legislated discretionary authority in response to a request for a ban made by the Crown and/or by individuals charged (or at risk of being charged) with criminal offences. Such challenges are criminal matters, not civil ones.

(emphasis added)

25. In Dagenais, although dealing with an order granted pursuant to ajudge's common law authority, this Court expressly rejected the argument that provincial courts ofappeal can take jurisdiction pursuant to the civil rules:

Provincial Judicature Acts provide for appellate jurisdiction over civil matters. For example, according to s. 6 ofthe Ontario Courts ofJustice Act ".Ifan application challenging an order banning publication is characterized as a criminal matter, then the Judicature Acts do not provide jurisdiction. Ifit is characterized as a civil matter, then it may be argued that these Acts do provide jurisdiction.

This avenue has the advantage that it uses established procedures. Furthermore, it has intuitive appeal to those who think that the object ofan application by the media is a civil remedy which affects a civil right (the right ofthe media to free speech). Nevertheless, I reject this avenue.41

(emphasis added)

26. The Ontario Court ofAppeal in R. v. Forget held that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a mandatory publication ban provided by s. 517 (at the time s.457.2(1)). Howland C.J.O explained:

In our opinion, the proceedings under s. 457.2(1) [s.517] are properly characterized as criminal and not civil. Accordingly, this Court does not have

39 Court ofAppeal Reasons at para. 30 [JRA Tab - 1]. 40 Dagenais at p. 864 [ESA Tab 7]. 41 Ibid at p. 863. 10

jurisdiction to hear an appeal under s. 28(1) ofthe Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.223.42

27. Ifthe constitutional challenge to s. 517 ofthe Criminal Code made during the course ofthe criminal proceedings is a criminal matter falling within the same category as the other publication ban cases arising in the criminal context such as Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.,43 R. v. Adams,44 R. v. Mentuck,45 then it is unlikely that the Court ofAppeal had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and the appeal had to be made directly to this Court. The Supreme Court ofCanada has called upon Parliament many times to address this problem. Unfortunately, Parliament has not yet done so.

B. Does s. 517 of the Criminal Code, R.S.c. 1985, c. C-46, as amended, infringe s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter ofRights andFreedoms?

(l) Section 517

28. Section 517 provides for publication bans on bail proceedings. The publication ban in s. 517 is a blanket ban which covers evidence, information, argument and reasons. Section 517 states:

517. (1) Ifthe prosecutor or the accused intends to show cause under section 515, he or she shall so state to the justice and the justice may, and shall on application by the accused, before or at any time during the course ofthe proceedings under that section, make an order directing that the evidence taken, the information given or the representations made and the reasons, ifany, given or to be given by the justice shall not be published in any document, or broadcast or transmitted in any way before such time as

(a) ifa preliminary inquiry is held, the accused in respect ofwhom the proceedings are held is discharged; or

(b) ifthe accused in respect ofwhom the proceedings are held is tried or ordered to stand trial, the trial is ended.

42 R. v. Forget, 1982 CarswellOnt 1341 (C.A.) at para 11 [ESA Tab 21]. 43 Dagenais, [ESA Tab 7]. 44 R. v. Adams, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 707 at paras 10 -18 [ESA Tab 15]. 45 R. v. Mentuck, [2001] 3 S.c.R. 442 at paras 17 - 21 [ESA Tab 26]. 11

(2) Everyone who fails without lawful excuse, the proofofwhich lies on him, to comply with an order made under subsection (1) is guilty ofan offence

punishable on summary conviction.. co 46

(emphasis added)

29. Anyone who fails without lawful excuse to comply with an order made under s. 517 is guilty ofan offence punishable on summary conviction.

30. Section 517 provides two different types ofpublication bans. The first type is the discretionary ban in s. 517 available to the prosecutor at any time during the course ofthe proceedings. As a discretionary ban, this ban is governed by the Dagenais/Mentuck test which applies to all discretionary court orders that limit freedom ofexpression and freedom ofthe press in relation to legal proceedings.47

31 . The second type ofpublication ban is the mandatory ban in s. 517. This blanket mandatory ban must be ordered regardless ofthe necessity. The Court must order such a ban

46 The current version ofs. 517 is reproduced above. Section 517 was slightly amended effective January 2, 2006 by S.c. 2006 c. 32, s. 17 which replaces the word "newspaper" with the word "document". White was granted bail on October 7, 2005, therefore s. 517 at the time bail was granted stated: 517. (1) Where the prosecutor or the accused intends to show cause under section 515, he shall so state to the justice and the justice may, and shall on application by the accused, before or at any time during the course ofthe proceedings under that section, make an order directing that the evidence taken, the information given or the representations made and the reasons, ifany, given or to be given by the justice shall not be published in any newspaper or broadcast before such time as (a) ifa preliminary inquiry is held, the accused in respect ofwhom the proceedings are held is discharged; or (b) ifthe accused in respect ofwhom the proceedings are held is tried or ordered to stand trial, the trial is ended. Failure to comply (2) Every one who fails without lawful excuse, the proofofwhich lies on him, to comply with an order made under subsection (l) is guilty ofan offence punishable on summary conviction.

Definition of"newspaper" (3) In this section, "newspaper" has the same meaning as in section 297..

RS.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 517; R.S.C. 1985, c. 27 (lst Supp.), s. 101 (E).

The Edmonton Sun submits that this amendment from "newspaper" to "document" does not change the analysis. See also: E.L. Greenspan & M. Rosenberg, Martin's Annual Criminal Code 2009 (Canada Law Book: 2008), s. 517 annotation [ESA Tab 48].

47 Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, [2005] 2 S.C.R 188 at para 7 IESA Tab 42]. See also: Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.C.R 480 [ESA Tab 5]. 12 whether it is warranted or not. The mandatory ban in s. 517 is the result ofa pre-Charter amendment to a predecessor ofthat provision. The original version used to be purely discretionary, See s. 457.2 ofthe Bail Reform Act;48 s. 48 ofthe Criminal Law AmendmentAct 1975. 49 Parliament does not appear to have debated this pre-Charter addition.so The Law S Reform Commission has since recommended its repeal. !

(2) Section 2(b) ofthe Charteris Infringed

32. The mandatory blanket publication ban in s. 517 clearly and significantly infringes s. 2(b) ofthe Charter. Section 2(b) ofthe Charter states:

2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:

(b) freedom ofthought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom ofthe press and other media ofcommunication

33. In Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), Cory 1. explained:

It is difficult to imagine a guaranteed right more important to a democratic society than freedom ofexpression. Indeed a democracy cannot exist without that freedom to express new ideas and to put forward options about the functioning of public institutions. The concept offree and uninhibited speech permeates all truly democratic societies and institutions. The vital importance ofthe concept cannot be over-emphasized... ,52

34. Cory J. explained "[i]t seems that the rights enshrined in s. 2(b) should therefore only be restricted in the clearest ofcircumstances."s3

35. In Re Vancouver Sun,S4 Iacobucci and Arbour J1. explained:

26 The open court principle is inextricably linked to the freedom ofexpression protected by s. 2(b) ofthe Charter and advances the core values therein:

48 Bail Reform Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 2, s. 457.2. 49 Criminal Law AmendmentAct 1975, S.C. 1975, c. 93. 50 Court ofQueen's Bench Reasons at para. 28 [JRA . Tab D]; Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, 2009 CarswellOnt 301 (C.A.), Rosenberg lA. (dissenting) at para 11 [ESA Tab 42]. 51 Law Reform Commission ofCanada, Working Paper 56 Public and Media Access to the Criminal Process (Ottawa: 1987) at pp. 75 -77 [ESA Tab 47]. 52 Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 at p. 1336 [ESA Tab 9]. 53 Ibid. (emphasis added). 54 Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 [ESA Tab 35]. 13

Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), supra, at para. 17, The freedom ofthe press to report on judicial proceedings is a core value. Equally, the right ofthe public to receive information is also protected by the constitutional guarantee offreedom ofexpression: Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712; Edmonton Journal, supra, at pp. 1339-40. The press plays a vital role in being the conduit through which the public receives that information regarding the operation ofpublic institutions: Edmonton Journal, at pp. 1339-40. Consequently, the open court principle, to put it mildly, is not to be lightly interfered with.

27 Furthermore, the principle ofopenness ofjudicial proceedings extends to the pretrial stage ofjudicial proceedings because the policy considerations upon which openness is predicated are the same as in the trial stage...

36. The open court principle and freedom ofthe press are fundamental pillars ofour free and democratic society and constitutionally protected under s. 2(b) ofthe Charter, This Court has expressed this point on numerous occasions. See for example: Dagenais v. Canadian 7 Broadcasting Corp.;55 Re Vancouver Sun; 56 A.G. (Nova Scotia) v. Maclntyre/ Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General);58 and Edmonton Journal v. Alberta

(Attorney General). 59 60 Any statutory provision that has the restriction ofexpression as its purpose will necessarily violate s. 2(b). Even temporary restrictions on publication or broadcast violate s. 2(b). See: Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation,61 Thomson Newspapers

Co. v. Canada. 62

37. The open court principle applies to all stages ofthe proceedings, including pre-trial stages. InA.G. (Nova Scotia) v. MacIntyre, Dickson 1. (as he then was) said "I find it difficult to accept the view that a judicial act performed during a trial is open to public scrutiny but a judicial act performed at the pretrial stage remains shrouded in secrecy,,,63

55 Dagenais [ESA Tab 7]. 56 Re Vancouver Sun, 2004 sec 43 at paras. 23 - 26 [ESA Tab 35]. 57 A.G. (Nova Scotia) v. Maclntyre, [1982] 1 s.e.R. 175 [ESA Tab 1]. 58 Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 at paras. 21-22 [ESA Tab 5]. 59 Dagenais [ESA Tab 7]; Thomson Newspaper Co. v. Canada, [1998] 1 S.e.R. 877 [ESA Tab 40]. 60 See: Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada, [1998] 1 S.c.R. 877 [ESA Tab 40]; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.e.R. 480 at para 33[ESA Tab 5]; Canadian Newspapers Co. v, Canada, [1988] S.C.R. 122 [ESA Tab 6]. 61 Dagenais [ESA Tab 7]. 62 Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada, [1998] 1 S.c.R. 877 [ESA Tab 40]. 63 A,G. (Nova Scotia) v. Maclntyre, [1982] 1 S.e.R. 175 atp. 186 [ESA Tab 1]. 14

38. Section 517 ofthe Criminal Code is a serious and obvious infringement of s. 2(b) ofthe Charter. The facial purpose ofs. 517 is to restrict free expression and limit the open court principle. The ban is mandatory when sought by the accused and all-embracing. It prohibits publication of"the evidence taken, the information given or the representations made and the reasons, ifany, given or to be given by the justice"c Thus, even the reasons for granting bail cannot be published at the time the decision is made. The ban remains in place until the accused is discharged after a preliminary inquiry or until the trial is ended. Bail hearings can take place months or even years before trial. In R v. White, the time between the bail hearing and the end of trial when the s. 517 publication ban expired was 14 months.64 The information could not be imparted to the public at a time when their interest in receiving it was greatest. The ban is a de facto permanent ban. While it could be published at the conclusion of White's trial, by then, any interest in it would be historical. The s. 2(b) infringement was conceded by both the Crown and 65 Michael White. The issue is whether it is justified by s. 1c

C. Ifso, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter ofRights andFreedoms?

(1) No Hierarchy ofRights

39. There is no hierarchy of Charter rights. In Dagenias, Lamer C.l. stated "[a] hierarchical approach to rights, which places some over others, must be avoided, both when interpreting the Charter and when developing the common law.,,66 Before Dagenais, an applicant for such a ban merely had to show that there was a real and substantial risk ofinterference with the right to a fair trial. Ifthis was demonstrated, a publication ban could be ordered. In Dagenais the Supreme Court ofCanada held that in a post-Charter era, the old rule that emphasized the right to a fair trial above the right to freedom ofexpression was not appropriate. Instead, a rule that fully respects both rights was necessary, The Court rejected the "clash model" and explained that a hierarchical approach to rights was to be avoided. The rights must be balanced instead.

64 White was granted bail on October 7, 2005. A jury convicted White on December 7, 2006. See: Court ofAppeal Reasons at paras. 3, 5 [IRA ... Tab I]. 65 Court ofQueen's Bench Reasons at para. 30 [IRA ~ Tab D). 66 Dagenais at p. 877 [ESA Tab 7]. 15

The Court created the Dagenais test (later to be known as the Dagenais/Mentuck test) which uses the Oakes principles to balance these important rights. 67

(2) The Oakes Test

40. Since s. 517 infringes s. 2(b) ofthe Charter, the onus at this stage shifts to the Crown to establish that the infringement can be saved by s. 1 The test for s. 1 justification is the Oakes test pursuant to which the Crown must establish that:

(a) the legislation has a pressing and substantial objective; (b) there is a rational connection between the legislation and the objective; (c) the legislation impairs the Charter right as minimally as possible to achieve the objective; and

(d) there is proportionality between the deleterious and salutary effects. 68

41. Ifthe legislation does not satisfy these elements it cannot be saved by s. 1.

(a) The Objective of Section 517 is to Protect the Accused's Right to a Fair Trial

42. The objective of s. 517 is to protect the accused's right to a fair trial. Section 517 was drafted in a pre-Charter era during which the right to a fair trial trumped all others. Balancing other important rights was not necessary. The legislative objective ofs. 517 is to provide the accused an assured means ofpreventing the dissemination ofpotentially prejudicial information from the earlier bail hearing to protect the right to a fair trial.

67 The constitutionality ofs. 517 has been considered in the case at bar, Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, 2009 CarswellOnt 301 (C.A.) ("Toronto Star") [ESA Tab 42] and Re Global Communications Ltd. andAttorney Generalfor Canada (1984),44 O.R. (2d) 609 (C.A.) [ESA Tab 32]. In Toronto Star, the majority upheld s. 517 but not the portion that could apply without ajury. The dissent, written by Rosenberg l.A., held that neither the portion that could apply without a jury nor the mandatory publication ban could be saved by s. 1. In Re Global Communications Ltd. andAttorney-Generalfor Canada, the Ontario Court ofAppeal held that s. 517 was reasonably justified under s. 1 ofthe Charter. Global Communications was decided pre-Dagenais and pre-Oakes and is oflimited precedent value. The Law Reform Commission ofCanada has recommended the repeal ofthe mandatory ban in s. 517. See: Law Reform Commission ofCanada Working Paper 56, Public Media Access to the Criminal Process (Ottawa, 1987) [ESA Tab 47]. 68 See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at pp. 138 - 139 [ESA Tab 28]. 16

43. In G. Trotter, The Law ofBail in Canada 2nd Ed. (1999), the author states: "[t]he purpose of s. 517 is to protect the accused person's fair trial interests by limiting the dissemination ofthis type ofinformation.,,69

44. In R.E. Salhany, Canadian Criminal Procedure (Looseleaf 2009) the author explains: "[t]he main purpose ofthe section is to ensure that future jurors will not hear reports of potentially prejudicial information from the bail hearing which could affect their verdict and, therefore, the accused's right to a fair trial. ,,,,70

45. In Re Global Communications Ltd. andAttorney-Generalfor Canada, Thorson lA. canvassed the legislative intention reflected in the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1975 which made publication bans mandatory upon request ofthe accused and concluded:

,,' Parliament was faced with exactly this very issue, that is to say, the choice between the discretion which the law then allowed the justice and the mandatory order which the law now requires, and when faced with the need to choose between them decided that the right ofan accused person to receive a fair trial, following his or her bail hearing and in the afterglow ofthe publicity that could attend that hearing, was not adequately safeguarded under the law as it then was. Implicit in this decision was Parliament's acceptance that the public interest in allowing full media publication and broadcasting of the evidence that may be given at a bail hearing must yield to the public interest in ensuring the right ofthe accused to a fair trial, and that the latter may be jeopardized if the accused has no assured means ofpreventing the dissemination ofthat evidence in advance ofhis or her trial.71

(emphasis added)

69 G.T Trotter, The Law ofBail in Canada, 2 ed. (Carswell: 1999) at p. 197 [ESA Tab 50). The author also states at p. 196 "At the heart ofthis discretion is the protection ofthe accused from the injection ofprejudicial information into the public domain."

70 R.E. Salhany, Canadian Criminal Procedure (Canada Law Book: Looseleaf) at pp. 4-10 [ESA Tab 49).

71 Re Global Communications Ltd. and Attorney-General for Canada (1984), 44 O.R. (2d) 609 (C.A.) at p. 619 [ESA Tab 32]. As well, in R. v. White, 2006ABCA 65 (White #2) [JRA Tab C) the Court ofAppeal stated at para 29 "Parliament has enacted legislation to protect accused persons from unwanted pre-trial disclosure of the evidence and allegations against them .. , These provisions [i.e., ss. 517 and 539] appear to be aimed at preserving the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial by ensuring that prospective jurors have no preconceived notions about guilt prior to trial. .. " 17

46. Ultimately, s. 51Ts objective is to protect the accused's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury.72 The mandatory ban gives the accused an assured means ofpreventing the dissemination ofevidence in advance ofhis or her trial. Although expedient bail is raised as a positive effect ofthe mandatory ban in s. 517, this cannot be the objective. Indeed, the ban provided to the Crown is itselfdiscretionary. 73 Therefore, ifthe Crown alone applied for a ban, which is totally out ofthe control ofthe accused, the discretionary Dagenais/Mentuck test would govern. The fact that Parliament chose to make the ban discretionary where the Crown is the applicant tends to undermine any argument that the objective ofthe ban in s. 517 is to create an efficient bail application process. Also, Parliament did not provide for a publication ban where bail is reviewed by the Court ofAppeal under s. 680 ofthe Criminal Code.

47. These important aspects of s. 517 and s. 680 were overlooked by the Court ofAppeal and consequently misdirected the entire Oakes analysis. The listed "objectives" by the Court of

Appeal relied upon for the Oakes analysis simply do not fit. 74

48. Slatter J.A. listed these additional "objectives":

36 Apart from the objective ofhaving an untainted jury, the following objectives ofthe section directed at preservation ofa fair bail hearing and a fair trial have been identified:

(a) The provisions ofsection 517 are mandatory because placing any burden on the accused to justify a limitation on publication undermines the presumption ofinnocence and the right to remain silent. For example, at the bail hearing evidence relating to the character, lifestyle and associates ofthe ~ccused may be presented. It is inappropriate to expect the accused to rebut this evidence prior to his trial. Reasons ofthe chambers judge, para. 127; R. v. White,

72 Justice Brooker concluded at para 35 "In my view, the objective of the mandatory publication ban in s. 517 is to protect the accused's right to a fair trial in front of an impartial jury by seeking to avoid contamination of the jury pool." [IRA Tab D]. The additional "objectives" asserted by the Crown simply flowed from the manner in which the legislation was drafted. See also paras 32 - 36.

73 Section 517 provides: 517. (1) Ifthe prosecutor or the accused intends to show cause under section 515, he or she shall so state to the justice and the justice may, and shall on application by the accused... (emphasis added)

74 The Court of Appeal at para. 37 criticized the chambers judge for not identifying these other objectives as being the objective ofs. 517 but considering them at other stages. This criticism is incorrect. Just because a factor may be relevant in considering the deleterious effects does not mean it is an objective ofthe legislation. 18

2006 ABCA 65 (Alta. C.A.) at para. 34; Global Communications at p. 620; Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. R. (2006),211 C.C.C. (3d) 234 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 30-31,33; Phillips v, Nova Scotia (Commissioner, Public Inquiries Act), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 97 (S.C.C.) at para. 162.

(b) The accused is already pitted against the resources ofthe Crown, and it is unfair to expect the accused to also defend his entitlement to judicial interim release on fair terms against the interests ofthe media. The accused is frequently unrepresented at the bail hearing. Reasons ofthe chambers judge, paras. 127-8; R. v, White, 2006 ABCA 65 (Alta. C.A.) at para. 35.

(c) Where the Crown has the burden ofintroducing evidence, it is illogical to expect the accused to be able to identify in advance the specific evidence that would justify a limitation on publication of that evidence. Bail is often applied for before the Crown has made full disclosure. Bail proceedings are informally conducted, the rules ofevidence are not strictly applied, hearsay evidence and mere allegations are relied on, and it is unrealistic to expect the accused to anticipate everything on which the Crown might seek to rely: Global Communications at p. 620; Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. R. (2006),211 C.C.c. (3d) 234 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 30 31,33-4.

(d) Likewise, it will often be impossible for the judge to rule on whether there should be a restriction on publication in a bail proceeding without having first heard the evidence. The bail judge can undoubtedly order a temporary restriction on the proceedings until the final order is made, but this requires the accused to gamble on whether the temporary restriction on publication will be made permanent. This type ofsituation was called "a 'bear trap' for the accused" in R. v. Underwood (1997), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 77 (S.C.C.). Ifthe accused applies for bail he will know that there is at least the possibility that everything said in the bail hearing might potentially become public before his trial: Global Communications at p. 622. The accused should not have to choose between introducing evidence at his bail hearing, and keeping that evidence private until trial. Making the order mandatory neutralizes these concerns.

(e) A delay in the availability ofbail significantly reduces the value of that bail, and undermines the accused's rights under s. 11(e): Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. R. (2006),211 C.C.c. (3d) 234 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 28-9. Requiring the accused to justify a limitation on publication would require more preparation and thereby delay the time at which the application could be made. If 19

the media were to be given notice ofthe application, and then elected to participate in the hearing, even further delay would result. Reasons ofthe chambers judge, paras. 118-122.

(f) Requiring the accused to justify a restriction on publication would also lengthen the proceedings once they commence. Interventions by third parties such as the media, and the possible need to call expert evidence, would further lengthen the proceedings. All the while the accused remains in custody. It is significant that neither the Crown nor White attempted to justify a common law restriction when the Court ofAppeal ruled that no statutory restriction applied; the media essentially won by default, in part no doubt because ofthe resources that would have to be expended to support any restrictions on publication. Reasons ofthe chambers judge, para. 127; R. v. White, 2006 ABCA 65 (Alta. C.A.) at para. 35.

(g) Numerous bail applications are made every day, usually in a summary fashion, and the expenditure oftime and resources that would be required ifthe accused had to justify a restriction on publication cannot be justified on a systemic basis. Making the restrictions on publication mandatory preserves resources. Reasons ofthe chambers judge, paras. 119, 127; R. v. White, 2006 ABCA 65 (Alta. C.A.) at para. 35.

The mandatory aspect of s. 517 is largely directed at these objectives, not the objective of preserving an untainted jury. These objectives are also sufficiently important to justify limiting the s. 2(b) Charter right.

49. The argument relied upon by the Court that "efficient" bail is s. 517's objective is undermined by the fact that Parliament included within s. 517 itselfa discretionary ban available to the prosecutor and ifhe or she applied for a ban, the Dagenais/Mentuck test would govern and the accused would be involved.75 It is also undermined by the fact that there is no mandatory ban when bail is reviewed under s. 680 by a Court ofAppeal. Rather, the mandatory ban in s. 517 reflects the pre-Charter concern about the right to a fair trial. It reflects an overly cautious approach to this concern giving the accused an assured means ofpreventing the dissemination of that evidence in advance ofhis or her trial. It is conceded that the right to a fair trial is a pressing and substantial objective. The right to a fair trial in front ofan impartial jury is important and

75 It is important to remember that the accused also has a right to a public forum. In Toronto Star [ESA Tab 42], Rosenberg lA. (dissenting) at paras 128 - 134 sets out an excellent criticism ofthe objectives identified by the Court ofAppeal. 20 this is what s. 517 is aimed at. The mandatory nature ofthe ban simply reflects the pre-Charter approach that placed the right to a fair trial above freedom ofexpression and all other rights.

50. In the alternative, ifthe true objective ofs. 517 is not to protect the right to fair trial, but rather, or in addition, expedient bail, the Crown has not established that this particular concern is a pressing and substantial objective in this context. Although generally the right to bail is an important objective, the particular scenario suggested by the Crown, i.e., the right to bail without the inconvenience ofhaving to justify a publication ban, is suspect. The accused is free to apply for bail, with or without any kind ofpublication ban. Ifthe accused seeks a publication ban, he or she could apply for the context sensitive Dagenais/Mentuck/Toronto Star ban which has been developed by this Court in a long line ofcases to balance freedom ofexpression/open courts and the proper administration ofjustice.

(b) Rational Connection?

51. The Crown must demonstrate that the breach of s. 2(b) is rationally connected to the legislative objective. The law must be "carefully designed to achieve the objective in question,,76 and must not be "arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations".77

52. The rational connection between s. 517 and the objective ofprotecting the right to a fair trial is questionable. The Court ofAppeal upheld s. 517, but the Court's mischaracterization of the objective of s. 517 steered it in the wrong direction. Slatter l.A. held that s. 517 was rationally connected to the other "objectives":

38 The chambers judge concluded that s. 517 is not rationally connected to its objectives. This resulted, however, because the chambers judge focused only on the effect that the restrictions on publication would have on ensuring an untainted jury. At the same time, the chambers judge found that it was the mandatory aspect of s. 517 that was unconstitutional. The mandatory aspect ofthe section is said to be rationally related to the objectives listed in para. 36, supra, and not to the preservation of an impartial jUry per se....78

76 Oakes at p. 139 [ESA Tab 28]. 77 Ibid 78 The Court ofAppeal did say, notwithstanding its focus on all ofits other "objectives", at para 40: " ... while Dr. Freedman is generally skeptical about the need for restrictions on publication to preserve an untainted jury, even he acknowledged that juries are influenced by pretrial publicity of information which is strongly indicative ofguilt. If 21

(emphasis added)

53. It is questionable whether s. 517 is rationally connected to its actual objective which is to protect the right to a fair trial before an impartial jury.

54. Alternatively, ifthe objective ofa mandatory ban is to ensure the right to efficient bail, it is not rationally connected to this objective. A ban on publication clashes with the tertiary ground for denying bail.

i. Lack ofRational Connection - s. 517 applies to non-jury trials

55. Section 517 applies to both jury and non-jury trials. The applicability to a non-jury trial is not rationally connected to the objective ofprotecting the accused's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. The Court ofAppeal disagreed. Slatter 1.A. criticized Brooker l's analysis on this point stating that it "precludes consideration of any argument that trial judges (even though they are trained to ignore such matters) should be insulated from pre-trial publicity when possible.,,79 This position is questionable. Trial judges are trusted to rule on such things as the admissibility ofevidence and it is unlikely that insulating trial judges from pre-trial publicity could legitimately constitute a rational connection for s. 517. The entire panel ofthe Ontario Court ofAppeal in Toronto Star disagreed with Slatter 1.A.'s statement.so Protecting trial judges from pre-trial publicity cannot be a rational connection to uphold s. 517. nothing else, this is sufficient to show some rational connection between s. 517 and the objective ofan untainted jury. A rational connection is not the same thing as convincing proofofefficacy..." 79 Court ofAppeal Reasons at para. 39 [JRA - Tab I]. 80 In Toronto Star [ESA Tab 42], Feldman lA. held: 185 Fair trial rights cannot be said to be at risk where a judge, sitting alone, is exposed to prejudicial information which should not be admitted at trial. Judges are effectively professional decision-makers. They know the rules they must apply when considering the admissibility of different types ofevidence. They are required and are able to disabuse themselves ofprejudicial information they may learn in a voir dire setting or in the context ofother mid- or pre-trial rulings they are routinely called upon to make. Ifthey were not trusted to do so, then our trial system would not be able to function as it does. Justice Rosenberg stated: 125 I cannot agree with the Alberta Court ofAppeal that an objective ofthe provision could be to insulate trial judges from pre-trial publicity. Trial judges are expected to ignore such matters; our entire system ofnon-jury trials is built on the theory that judges can ignore highly prejudicial and inadmissible evidence. Trial judges are routinely asked to rule on the admissibility of confessions, bad character evidence, and constitutionally inadmissible evidence. The system depends on the ability oftrial judges to ignore evidence deemed inadmissible when reaching the 22

ii. Lack ofRational Connection - s. 517 is a blanket ban which includes informationfavourable to the accused

56. Section 517 is a blanket all or nothing ban. It includes "the evidence taken, the information given or the representations made and the reasons, ifany, given or to be given by the justice" - even that which is favourable to the accused. This is not rationally connected to the legislative objective ofprotecting the right to a fair trial.

iii. Lack ofRational Connection - s. 517 leads to incomplete reporting which can itselffuel uninformed speculation

57. Section 517 leads to incomplete reporting, which can fuel uninformed speculation. The media can report the result ofthe bail proceedings - but not the argument, evidence nor, most importantly, the reasons for granting or denying bail. This incomplete reporting leaves the public to speculate. For example, an accused could be denied bail because he or she is a flight risk, but the public is not advised ofthis and instead relies upon speculation to come up with' reasons for detention. In this case, the Court of Queen's Bench noted that: "the Accused concedes the publication ban may have been detrimental to him since it kept the public ignorant ofthe accused's right to reasonable bail and the presumption ofinnocence".81 Promoting an environment ofuninformed speculation is not rationally connected to the objective ofprotecting the right to a fair trial.

iv. Lack ofRational Connection - s. 517 is inherently inconsistent with the system'sfaith in juries

58. Section 517 is inherently inconsistent with the confidence our system ofjustice has in juries. In R. v. Corbett, Dickson C.J. explained "In my view, it would be quite wrong to make too much ofthe risk that the jury might use the evidence for an improper purpose. This line of thinking could seriously undermine the entire jury system.,,82 Dickson C.l. continued at p. 693

merits ofthe case. I am not aware ofany case that holds that a publication ban can be justified on the basis that a trial judge should not be tainted by pre-trial publicity.... in my view, the rational connection ofs. 517 to the objectives cannot be supported by relying on the tainting effect ofbail information on non-jury trials. 81 Court ofQueen's Bench Reasons at para. 69 [JRA - Tab D]. 82 R. v. Corbett, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670 at 692 (emphasis in original) [ESA Tab 17]. 23 that ifthe right to a jury trial is so important then "it is logically incoherent to hold that juries are incapable offollowing explicit instructions ofa judge".83

59. In R. v. Vermette, LaForest 1. stated "'There is an initial presumption that ajuror ... will perform his duties in accordance with his oath,' and the fact that he may have read about the case through the media is by and large unimportant '" In an extreme case (and the present certainly qualifies), such publicity should lead to challenge for cause at trial, but I am far from thinking that it must necessarily be assumed that a person subjected to such publicity will necessarily be blase.,· d ., ,,84

v. Lack ofRational Connection - s. 517 is inherently inconsistent with the tertiary groundfor bail

60. Section 517 is inherently inconsistent with the tertiary ground in bail proceedings, and as such is not rationally connected to the objective of an efficient bail process. The tertiary ground is based upon public confidence in the administration ofjustice. See s. 515(10)(c) ofthe Criminal Code. See also R. v. Hall. 85 Secret bail hearings and public confidence in the administration ofjustice are at war with each other. Section 517 lacks a rational connection with the legislative objectives ofthe entire bail system.

vi. Conclusion on Rational Connection

61 . The chain ofrational connection between s. 517 and its legislative objectives is missing many links given that it applies to non-jury trials, includes innocuous information and information that is favourable to the accused, leads to incomplete reporting (which itselfcan fuel uninformed speculation), and is internally inconsistent with the system's faith injuries, as well as being logically inconsistent with the tertiary ground in bail proceedings. Much ofthe information presented at a bail hearing such as criminal record, character and eyewitness accounts is available from other sources and routinely published at the time ofarrest.

83 Ibid at p. 693. 84 R. v. Vermette, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 985 at pp. 992-993 [ESA Tab 30). 85 R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309 [ESA Tab 22). See also R. v. White, 2006 ABCA 65 (White No.2) at paras 1 ~ 23 [JRA - Tab C). 24

62. The next element ofthe Oakes test is the minimal impairment test. Professor Hogg describes this element as "the heart and soul ofs. 1 justification".86 Parliament must tailor the legislation to ensure that it infringes Charter rights no more than necessary to meet the pressing and substantial legislative objective. In Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General),87 Cory J. stressed: "The importance offreedom ofexpression and ofpublic access to the courts through the press reports ofthe evidence, arguments and the conduct ofjudges and judicial officers is of such paramount importance that any interference with it must be ofa minimal nature." Likewise, in Re Vancouver Sun, Iacobucci and Arbour JJ stated "the open court principle, to put it mildly, is not to be lightly interfered with.,,88 In this case, the mandatory blanket ban in s. 517 is overbroad.

i. Minimal Impairment Test Not Satisfied - the blanket ban in s. 517 is overbroad

63. Section 517 operates as a blanket prohibition. It provides that the Court shall "make an order directing that the evidence taken, the information given or the representations made and the reasons, ifany, given or to be given by the justice shall not be published...". This blanket ban extends to non-prejudicial information. It also extends to information whose potential prejudice could be addressed by other measures such as a Dagenais/Mentuck ban or, ifnecessary, challenges for cause or strong judicial directions. The blanket publication ban includes banning the reasons for granting or denying bail which may have nothing to do with the underlying offence nor unduly prejudicial. This blanket ban applies even ifthe case will not be tried by a Jury. The blanket ban fails the minimal impairment test.

ii. Minimal Impairment Test Not Satisfied - the mandatory nature ofthe ban in s. 517 is a blunt tool

64. The mandatory nature ofthe ban in s. 517 also fails the minimal impairment test. Section 517 provides that the judge "shall" impose this blanket ban on application ofthe accused.

86 P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law ofCanada, 5th ed. Supplemented (Thomson Carswell: Looseleaf) at pp. 38-35 38-36 [ESA Tab 46]. 87 Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney Genera!), [1989] 2 S.c.R. 1326 at p. 1347 [ESA Tab 9]. 88 Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 at para 26 [ESA Tab 35]. 25

Section 517 precludes the Court from considering whether the information is prejudicial, the effect ofthe evidence given, the length oftime until trial or other alternatives available such as questioning potential jurors, challenging jurors for cause, or giving special instructions to the jury. It must be ordered without any regard to the underlying necessity for such a ban. The blanket mandatory ban in s. 517 is an egregious violation of s. 2(b) ofthe Charter,

65. The Court ofAppeal in this case acknowledged that "[i]t is true that the objective ofan untainted jury could be realized in most cases by the availability ofa discretionary ban, as opposed to a mandatory ban.,,89 Ifthe Court ofAppeal identified the correct objective, this ought to have ended the matter. Instead, it was the other "objectives" which lead Slatter lA. to conclude that "[n]o restriction short ofa mandatory restriction would be effective, and therefore the impairment is as minimal as it can be. ", " These "objectives" (in addition to them not being the actual objectives ofthe legislation) can still be effectively addressed by other means such as a context sensitive Dagenais/Mentuck ban ifnecessary.

iii. Minimal Impairment Test Not Satisfied - the "certainty" argument

66. The Alberta Court ofAppeal in this case and the Ontario Court ofAppeal in Toronto Star accepted the "certainty" argument for justifying a mandatory ban. The Court ofAppeal held that the ban must be mandatory to give the accused confidence that he or she could apply for bail without worrying whether or not a publication ban would be ordered. A temporary ban, which the court could put in place while the bail hearing itselfor application for a permanent ban is heard, would, according to the Court ofAppeal, be ineffective because the accused could not be confident that the court ultimately would properly apply the Dagenais/Mentuck test. Slatter lA. outlined this reasoning at para. 36:90

89 Court ofAppeal Reasons at para. 44 [IRA ~ Tab I]. 90 Court ofAppeal Reasons at para. 36 [IRA ~ Tab I]. 26

that everything said in the bail hearing might potentially become public before his trial: Global Communications at p. 622. The accused should not have to choose between introducing evidence at his bail hearing, and keeping that evidence private until trial. Making the order mandatory neutralizes these concerns.

67, This argument is troubling for several reasons. The Court ofAppeal, in accepting this argument, is in effect deciding that the accused's rational or irrational perceptions should override the confidence our system ofjustice places in courts to properly apply the Dagenais/Mentuck test and provide for a fair trial. The "gamble" described by the Court of Appeal is taking the risk that the courts below know how to do their job.

68. In Toronto Star, Rosenberg lA. also appears to have accepted the "certainty" argument:

63 I will review a number ofless impairing alternatives to show why these alternatives would not adequately achieve the law's objective. First, the media suggest that a less rights-impairing solution is to allow for a time limited publication ban, pending a hearing to determine ifthe ban should continue. In the meantime, the bail hearing would proceed. It seems to me, however, that this proposed solution ignores the contextual factors discussed above and places the accused in an invidious position. Without knowing whether or not the publication ban will be in place, the accused cannot know whether to take the risk of contesting bail to possibly obtain the immediate reward ofrelease at the cost of the more serious risk ofpoisoning the minds ofjurors at the subsequent trial. Either accused wait until the publication ban issue has been finally determined, or they forego the bail application until they are in a better position to make reasoned submissions in accordance with the Dagenais test. This would have a detrimental effect on an accused's liberty interest. As Martin L. Friedland said in Detention Before Trial: A Study ofCriminal Cases Tried in the Toronto Magistrates' Court (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1965), at p. 172, "The law should abhor any unnecessary deprivation ofliberty and positive steps should be taken to ensure that detention before trial is kept to a minimum" (footnote omitted). 64 The "certainty" argument in favour ofmandatory prohibitions in bail hearings is similar to the rationale used to uphold the mandatory ban in sexual assault cases in Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122.,» (emphasis added) 27

69. The reference made by the Court ofAppeal to this Court's decision in Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General),91 is slightly out ofcontext. In Canadian Newspapers, this Court considered the ban on publication ofa claimant's identity in a sexual assault case which is mandatory ifrequested by the complainant. The legislative objective was to overcome the underreporting ofsexual offences. This is one ofthe rare cases where the mandatory nature ofthe order itselfis necessary to meet the legislative objective. The' mandatory nature ofthe ban was essential to the legislative objective ofaddressing the underreporting ofsexual offences (ofwhich there was evidence before the Court). Lamer 1. (as he then was) stated at p. 132:

Obviously, since fear of publication is one ofthe factors that influences the reporting ofsexual assault, certainty with respect to non-publication at the time ofdeciding whether to report plays a vital role in that decision. Therefore, a discretionary provision under which the judge retains the power to decide whether to grant or refuse the ban on publication would be counterproductive, since it would deprive the victim of that certainty, Assuming that there would be a lesser impairment offreedom ofthe press ifthe impugned provision were limited to a discretionary power, it is clear, in my view, that such a measure would not, however, achieve Parliament's objective, but rather defeats it.

(emphasis added; underline in original)

70. However, the Court also stressed that the mandatory ban was limited in that it only restricted publication offacts disclosing the complainant's identity. It was not overly broad. This provision was carefully tailored to meet the legislative objective and saved under s. 1.

71, Equating the underreporting ofsexual assaults to the risk that bail will be under-applied for is remarkable. In Canadian Newspapers the Court concluded from the evidence that "ofthe most serious crimes, sexual assault is one ofthe most unreported" and that the main reasons included "fear ofpublicity or embarrassment" 92 The argument that an accused will not apply for bail because he or she doesn't trust our courts to apply the Dagenais/Mentuck test to ensure a fair trial is speculative and runs contrary to common sense. The mandatory ban provided by s. 517 is

91 Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122 [ESA Tab 6]. 92 Ibid. at pp. 131, 132. 28 clearly overbroad.93 Many equally effective alternatives are available to reach the legislative objective while minimally impairing s. 2(b). Accepting the "certainty" argument puts the accused's subjective perceptions above the Court's confidence that courts below will properly apply the Dagenais/Mentuck test to prevent the dissemination ofprejudicial information which cannot be addressed by alternative measures.

72. Perhaps most troubling about the certainty argument is that it is nothing more than a disguised rejection ofthe principles underlying the Dagenais/Mentuck test.

iv. Minimal Impairment Test Not Satisfied -Section 517's minimizingfeatures are illusory

73. Although s. 517 is theoretically a temporary ban, its operation produces a de facto permanent ban. Section 517 provides that the blanket ban remains in place until the accused is discharged after a preliminary inquiry or ifordered to stand trial, after the trial has ended. Although this appears to be a temporary ban, it is in effect a de facto permanent ban. Bail hearings can take place months or even years before trial. In R v. White, the time between the bail hearing and the end oftrial when the s. 517 publication ban expired was 14 months.

74. Timeliness ofnews is critical. In R. v. White, 2005 ABCA 435 (White No.1) Berger lA. stated that "News is a perishable commodity." unjustified delay in permitting full public access will have a deleterious effect on the ability ofthe media to report, and, in the result, for the public to be informed.,,94 Justice Berger continued "Contemporaneous access to court documents and processes allows the media to fulfil their legitimate role as the eyes and ears of the public. As Kerans, J.A. noted in Triple Five Corp., 'time [for the media] is always ofthe essence,,,.95

75. Relatively few members ofthe public can actually attend court proceedings. Therefore, the media have been referred to as the eyes and the ears ofthe public. The media's ability to report on what transpires in court is essential. See Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney

93 This rationale extends to situations involving informer privilege, see Named Person v. Vancouver, [2007] 3 S.c.R. 253 [ESA Tab 13]. 94 para 6 [JRA Tab - B]. 95 Ibid. 29

General);96 Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General);97 Re Vancouver Sun. 98

76. Slatter lA. dismissed media's argument about timely news. He explained:

47 The media respondents argued that the newsworthiness ofthe information depends on it being immediately available, and that late disclosure ofthe information is largely meaningless. The chambers judge accepted this argument, holding at para. 88:

,.. a temporary ban is in effect a permanent ban ,., Where the media is prevented from reporting on bail proceedings at the time ofbail, it will generally not have incentive to report on such proceedings after the trial is over. The speaker will have "lost his audience",

To some extent this may be seen as a form ofjournalistic bootstrapping. The media have a considerable ability to decide what is and what is not newsworthy, and ifthey chose to give prominence to the bail reasons at the end ofthe trial, they could do so. Their audience is in many respects "captive" and will have access to what the media decides to report. It is not uncommon to see, at the end ofa trial, detailed newspaper reports summing up the prosecution, and reporting matters that were previously embargoed, such as statements ofthe accused that were not admitted in evidence, tendered evidence that was excluded by the trial judge, evidence ofthe prior criminal record ofthe accused, and so forth.

77. Slatter J.A. continued: "... ifthe media chose to stimulate a public debate on the place of bail in the criminal justice system, they could easily have done so after the trial".99 This is a naIve response to a significant infringement of s. 2(b).

v. Dagenais/Mentuck Test

78. In Re Vancouver Sun, Iacobucci and Arbour n. explained "This Court has developed the adaptable Dagenais/Mentuck test to balance freedom ofexpression and other important rights and interests, thereby incorporating the essence ofthe balancing ofthe Oakes test: Dagenais,

96 Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 [ESA Tab 9]. 97 Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 at pp. 493 - 498 [ESA Tab 5]. 98 Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 at paras. 23-27 [ESA Tab 35]. 99 Court ofAppeal Reasons at para. 49 [JRA - Tab I]. 30 supra; Mentuck, supra; R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. The rights and interests considered are broader than simply the administration ofjustice and include a right to a fair trial. .. " lOa

79. The Dagenais/Mentuck test, which was developed through a long line ofdecisions ofthis Court, provides that a publication ban should only be ordered when:

(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration ofjustice because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

(b) the salutary effects ofthe publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests ofthe parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free expression, the right ofthe accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy ofthe administration ofjustice.

80. In Re Vancouver Sun, Iacobucci and Arbour J1. continued "The first part ofthe Dagenais/Mentuck test reflects the minimal impairment requirement ofthe Oakes test, and the second part ofthe Dagenais/Mentuck test reflects the proportionality requirement. The judge is required to consider not only 'whether reasonable alternatives are available, but also to restrict 1 the order as far as possible without sacrificing the prevention ofthe risk. ", 01 This flexible test has been applied to the exercise ofdiscretion to limit freedom ofexpression and ofthe press in a variety oflegal settings. It protects the right to fair trial, the openness ofthe court and freedom ofexpression. This test is based upon Oakes principles and guarantees a constitutional balance ofrights. 102

100 Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 at para 28 [ESA Tab 35]. 101 Ibid. at para 30. 102 Discretionary bans are preferable from a constitutional perspective - unless it is the mandatory nature itself which is absolutely essential to the true legislative objective. A good illustration is Re Southam Inc. and The Queen (No.1) and (No.2). In Re Southam Inc. and The Queen (No.1) (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 113 (C.A.) [ESA Tab 33] a constitutional challenge was made to s. 12(1) ofthe Juvenile Delinquents Act, R.S.C. 1970 c. J-3 which at the time required trials ofall juveniles to be held in camera. This was an absolute ban. The Court ofAppeal held that this was not saved by s. 1 as an absolute ban was not reasonable (see pp. 134-135). The legislation was subsequently amended to give the trial judge a discretion to order trials ofyoung persons to be held in camera. In Re Southam Inc. and The Queen (No.2) (1986), 53 O.R. (2d) 663 (C.A.) [ESA Tab 34] this provision was saved by s. 1. The flexibility incorporated into a discretionary power is important as it ensures a balanced response. In Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 [ESA Tab 5] the issue was whether the trial judge properly excluded the media and public from the courtroom during part ofthe accused's sentencing pursuant to s. 486(1) ofthe Criminal Code (which gives a judge the discretion to exclude members ofthe public from the courtroom). Justice LaForest explained at para. 50 that "the discretionary element ofs. 486(1) is crucial to the analysis." (emphasis added) 31

81, Like the Crown's argument in this case, in Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario,103 it was argued that the Dagenias/Mentuck test would be unworkable. 104 This Court firmly rejected that suggestion. Justice Fish held:

31 It hardly follows, however, that the Dagenais/Mentuck test should be applied mechanistically. Regard must always be had to the circumstances in which a sealing order is sought by the Crown, or by others with a real and demonstrated interest in delaying public disclosure. The test, though applicable at all stages, is a flexible and contextual one. Courts have thus tailored it to fit a variety ofdiscretionary actions, such as confidentiality orders, judicial investigative hearings, and Crown-initiated applications for publication bans.

(emphasis added)

82. In Re Vancouver Sun,105 Iacobucci and Arbour explained:

43 In applying the Dagenais/Mentuck approach to the decision to hold the investigative judicial hearing in camera, judges should expect to be presented with evidence credible on its face ofthe anticipated risks that an open inquiry would present, including evidence ofthe information expected to be revealed by the witness. Even though the evidence may reveal little more than reasonable expectations, this is often all that can be expected at that stage of the process and the presiding judge, applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test in a contextual manner, would be entitled to proceed on the basis of evidence that satisfies [page3531 him or her that publicity would unduly impair the proper administration of justice.

(emphasis added)

83. In Toronto Star, Rosenberg J.A. (dissenting) noted:

99 ,.. As already noted, the strict rules of evidence do not apply at bail hearings. In my view, in considering whether to impose a publication ban, the justice ofthe peace is entitled to act upon the kind ofinformation that can be received on a bail hearing, being evidence that is considered credible and trustworthy. It is not unusual for evidence to be presented through statements offacts read out by Crown counsel. It would seem to me that the justice ofthe peace would be entitled to act upon submissions ofcounsel in deciding whether or not to impose a publication ban. It is not practicable to expect the

l03 Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188 [ESA Tab 43]. l04 Toronto Star dealt with search warrants. 105 Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 [ESA Tab 35]. 32

party seeking the order to adduce the kind ofevidence that might be admissible at a trial, in accordance with the normal rules ofevidence.

84. In Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), LaForest 1. explained that s. 486(1), which incorporates the Dagenais/Mentuck test:

Section 486(1) arms the judiciary with a useful and flexible interpretative tool to accomplish its goal ofpreserving the openness principle, subject to what is required by the proper administration ofjustice, and the discretionary aspect of s. 486(1) guarantees that the impairment is minimal. Again relying upon the fact that the discretion must be exercised in a manner that conforms with the Charter, the discretion bestowed upon the court by s. 486(1) ensures that a particular exclusionary order accomplishes just what is necessary to advance the interests of the proper administration ofjustice and no more.,. 106

85. The Court in Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario concluded: "The Crown has not demonstrated, on this appeal, that the flexible Dagenais/Mentuck test as applied to search warrant materials is unworkable in practice", 107 Nor is it unworkable in this case.

86. As well, the Dagenais/Mentuck test will not cause undue delay. Justice Brooker even noted that "With respect to a hearing delay, the Accused conceded that where charges are serious, issues ofnotice to the media would not generally hinder bail hearings. This is because bail hearings are typically heard several weeks after an arrest is made in serious cases.,,108 On a practical level the media are likely to get involved in publication ban issues only in bail hearings involving serious cases.

87. Iftiming is an issue, the court could grant a temporary ban so the bail hearing could proceed and address the issue ofanother ban pursuant to the adaptable Dagenais/Mentuck principles at a later point. As noted above, the Court must have confidence that courts below will properly apply the Dagenais/Mentuck test.

vi. Conclusion on Minimal Impairment Test

88. The minimal impairment test is not satisfied as the blanket ban in s. 517 is overbroad, the mandatory nature ofthe ban is not necessary, and the minimizing features of s. 517 are illusory.

106 Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 at para 60. 107 Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, [2005] 2 S.c.R. 188 at para 34 [ESA Tab 43]. 108 Court o/Queen 's Bench Reasons [JRA - Tab D] para 93. 33

The Dagenais/Mentuck test is a flexible tool workable in this situation. Section 517 fails this element.

(d) Deleterious effects outweigh any salutary effects

89. The final element ofthe Oakes analysis weighs the salutary and deleterious effects ofthe legislation. It is the practical impact ofthe legislation which is examined at this stage. 109 In this case, the salutary effects of s. 517 are speculative and limited, while the deleterious effects are drastic.

i. Section 517 is oflimited efficacy - bulk are non-jury trials

90. Section 517 is oflimited efficacy. In Toronto Star, Rosenberg 1.A. (dissenting) pointed out: "Less than 2 percent ofall criminal cases are tried by jury.,,110 Consequently, the mandatory ban in s. 517 is oflimited efficacy.

ii. Section 517 is oflimited efficacy - right to a fair trial can be effectively protected by a discretionary ban

91, The Court ofAppeal itselfacknowledged that "[i]t is true that the objective ofan untainted jury could be realized in most cases by the availability of a discretionary ban, as opposed to a mandatory ban",III The mandatory blanket ban adds limited benefit to the discretionary ban.

iii. Section 517 is oflimited efficacy - strength ofjuries

92. The judicial system is premised on the strength ofjuries. Studies have suggested that the impact ofpre-trial publicity on jurors is limited. 112 Numerous cases have echoed the Court's faith in juries.l13 Thus, the ban is oflimited efficacy,

109 See Canada (Attorney Generaij v. JTI Macdonald Corp, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610 at para 45 [ESA Tab 2]. 110 Toronto Star para 80. 11 I Court ofAppeal Reasons at para. 44 [JRA - Tab I]. 112 Affidavit ofDr. Freedman [Joint Record ofthe Appellants - Tab X]; Affidavit ofDr. Freedman [Joint Record of the Appellants - Tab X]; Transcript ofCross Examination [Joint Record ofthe Appellants - Tab Y]. 113 Dagenais at p. 884; R. v. Vermette, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 985 [ESA Tab 30]; R. v. Corbett, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670 [ESA Tab 17]; Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commissioner, Public Inquiries Act), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 97 [ESA Tab 14]; Edmonton (City) v. Kara, 1995 CarswellA1ta 3 (Q.B.) [ESA Tab 8]. 34

iv. Section 517 is oflimited efficacy - long time to trial

93. Bail hearings can take place months or even years before trial. In R v. White, the time between the bail hearing and the end oftrial when the s. 517 publication ban expired was 13 months. A publication ban may be said to be oflimited efficacy.

v. Section 517 is oflimited efficacy - similar information may already be in public domain

94. Section 517 is also oflimited efficacy as similar information may already be in the public domain. The information presented at bail hearings and subject to s. 517 may already be in the public realm from other sources such as police statements, interviews with neighbours, searches ofthe suspect's history, etc. I 14 This information already in the public domain has not been tested for admissibility at trial. Thus, given the nature and extent ofinformation which is already likely in the public domain through other sources, it is fair to conclude s. 517 is of limited efficacy. 115

vi. Section 517 is oflimited efficacy -other safeguards

95. Section 517 is oflimited efficacy as there are other effective safeguards available beyond imposing a blanket publication ban. In R. v. McClenaghan,116 Hunt lA. noted:

6 ,,. The jury selection process, including challenges for cause, should be effective to disqualify any prospective juror who may show bias as a result ofany publicity in this case. Moreover, members ofa jury - instructed that their oaths bind them to decide the case solely on the evidence before them and not on extraneous matters .should be a sufficient safeguard for a fair trial.

114 In R. v. McClenaghan, [2008] AJ. No. 394 (CA), 2008 ABCA 141 [TAB 43] the Court of Appeal refused a publication ban stating at para 7 " ... the evidence produced by the applicants establishes that much of the material that the provisional ban was intended to protect has already been in the public domain for some time. The salutary effects do not, therefore, outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression ofthose affected by the ban."

115 This also addresses that Court ofAppeal's point at para. 54 concerning the nature ofthe information. Court of Queen's Bench Reasons [JRA - Tab D]. See also Dagenais at pp. 884 - 890. In Toronto Star, Rosenberg lA. (dissenting) stated: "81 ... It is ofinterest in this case that some ofthe accused opposed the publication ban precisely because they hoped that the more measured information disclosed at the bail hearings would counteract the inflammatory information disclosed by the police." ll6 R. v. McClenaghan, 2008 CarswellAlta 461 (C.A.) [ESA Tab 25]. In addition, the media is already precluded from publishing unduly prejudicial information by the common law ofcontempt sub judice. See: R. v. Edmonton Sun, 2003 Carswel1Alta 23 (C.A.) [ESA Tab 20] setting aside conviction. 35

vii. Section 517 is oflimited efficacy - does not change right to bail

96. Section 517 does not change the right to bail. In Toronto Star, Rosenberg lA. (dissenting) pointed out "I am not convinced that the delay and other problems suggested by the government and the accused are as serious as argued", 117

97. The accused is free to apply for bail with or without s. 517. The Dagenais/Mentuck test need not cause undue delay as it is context specific. It does not require expert evidence to establish a ban. "The test, though applicable at all stages, is a flexible and contextual one." 118 The test is applied by courts routinely on a variety ofissues. Iftiming ofbail is a concern, the accused could apply for a temporary publication ban and deal with the rest ofthe application later,

viii. Google is neutral

98. The Crown raised the Google argument against publication at bail proceedings, based on the fear that jurors may "google" information about the case. However, Google is also available for all searches, including other pre-trial publicity which may include similar information but is outside ofs. 517. A more realistic solution is needed. For example, this concern can be addressed by instructing jurors not to conduct their own independent research on the case. The solution to technology change is not to infringe s. 2(b) more extensively,

ix. Deleterious effects ofs. 517 are drastic - unconstitutionally overbroad violation ofs. 2(b)

99. The deleterious effects of s. 517 are drastic. The blanket publication ban prohibits publication ofall information, evidence, and submissions, even those that could not possibly affect the accused's fair trial resulting in an extreme violation of s. 2(b). The ban also prohibits publication ofthis material where alternative measures such as challenge for cause, change of venue, and strong judicial directions could eliminate risk to a fair trial since all that can be published is the fact ofthe bail hearing and the result.

117 Toronto Star at para 97. 118 Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, [2005] 2 S.c.R. 188 at para 31. (emphasis added) [ESA Tab 43]. 36

x. Deleterious effects ofs. 517 are drastic - erodes public confidence

100. The most damaging effect of s. 517 is the lack ofpublic understanding ofthe bail system it creates. The lack oftimely information about bail decisions as a result ofs. 517 erodes public confidence in the administration ofjustice.

101. In Re Vancouver Sun, Iacobucci and Arbour Jl generally explained: "Openness is necessary to maintain the independence and impartiality ofcourts. It is integral to public confidence in the justice system and the public's understanding ofthe administration of justice. ,.. ,,119

102. In R. v. Hall, McLachlin C.J. commented specifically in relation to bail "Where justice is not seen to be done by the public, confidence in the bail system and, more generally, the entire justice system may falter". 120 ChiefJustice McLachlin continued "Public confidence is essential to the proper functioning ofthe bail system and the justice system as a whole.,,121 ChiefJustice McLachlin further stated "Without public confidence, the bail system and the justice system generally stand compromised.,,122

103. In R. v. White, (White #1), Berger lA queried:

"How is public confidence enhanced by a 'cone ofsilence' descending over the careful and considered analysis ofthe adjudicator?" Keeping the public in the dark, in my opinion, can be a recipe for uninformed speculation fuelling widely publicized concern in the community, a far greater risk to the fair trial rights of the accused and the Crown. 123

104. In R. v. Smith, Nordheimer J. stated:

Section 517 ofthe Criminal Code makes such an order mandatory ifit is requested by the accused person. The order was therefore granted. .,. I will say that one unfortunate consequence ofthe mandatory order banning the evidence heard and reasons given in a bail application is that the public is denied the very information that they ought to have to properly understand and assess any order the court may make and the reasons underlying that order. That denial of information has the very real potential for fostering misunderstanding, and a lack

119 Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 at para 25 [ESA Tab 35]. 120 R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309 at para. 26 [ESA Tab 22]. 121 Ibid at para 27, 122 Ibid at para 31. 123 R. v. White, 2005 ABCA 435 (White #1) at para 16 [IRA - B]. 37

ofproper appreciation among members ofthe public respecting the result, and the specific facts ofthe case that must ofnecessity, solely dictate that result. 124

105. In Toronto Star, Rosenberg J.A. (dissenting) pointed out:

32 ,.. Section 517 cuts offmeaningful and informed public debate about a fundamental aspect ofthe administration ofcriminal justice, the bail system, at the very time that the debate may be most important - when the decision is made to grant or deny baiL It also hinders debate in other circumstances ofgreat public interest, as where an accused on bail commits another, perhaps serious crime. The public is left to speculate about why the accused was released and the justice system is unable to provide a timely and meaningful response because ofthe statutorily imposed silence.

106. In Toronto Star, Rosenberg J.A. (dissenting) continued:

Section 517, however, prevents the dissemination ofthe information necessary to promote public confidence in the bail system. This is the case both at the time the initial decision is made, and later where subsequent events may raise questions as to the wisdom ofthat decision, as when the accused who is on bail commits further offences. The fact that an accused was on bail when he or she committed a further serious offence often receives wide coverage in the media. However, the public is left to speculate as to why the accused was initially released, because of the s. 517 order,

107. Justice Rosenberg J.A. noted: "The public is left to wonder, for example, why in light of the serious allegations made against the accused at the pre-hearing press conference a justice or judge nevertheless released the accused.,,125

108. The lack ofpublic understanding about the bail system is rampant. Extra-judicially, the ChiefJustice ofthe Court ofQueen's Bench ofAlberta commented on the bail system .. 126 expIammg:

I understand the frustration. I'm a citizen myself, and all ofa sudden you see a great number ofpeople who've been arrested right back on the street, you wonder why...

- Allan Wachowich, chiefjustice ofAlberta Court of Queen's Bench.

[24 R. v. Smith, 2006 CanLII 30593 (Ont. S.c.) at para 2 [ESA Tab 29]. [25 Toronto Star para 76. 126 Affidavit ofDonna Harker sworn October 29,2008 - Exhibit "A" [IRA - Tab BB ]. 38

109. The White case is an excellent example. The public, outraged at White's release on bail (but not knowing the reasons), signed petitions demanding his return to custody" The circulation ofthe petition itself illustrates the public's interest in bail - but at the same time highlights the lack ofunderstanding.

110. In "Role ofthe chiefjustice has changed dramatically over the last 100 years", Edmonton Journal, August 27,2007, ChiefJustice Wachowich commended Justice Brooker in this case noting: 127

"He's [Justice Brooker] had some experience at that level and he controls the courtroom very well," Wachowich says. "And he knows how to handle controversy, as well, because he was the person who granted bail to Michael White," who was charged with, and later convicted ofmurdering his pregnant wife in a sensational Edmonton case. The bail decision was very controversial.

"We wished we could have published the reasons in the White case but the publication ban (was) mandatory under the Criminal Code" Wachowich explains.

111. However, s. 517 perpetuates the public misunderstanding ofthe bail system. As Brooker 1. explained: "The deleterious effects ofthis legislation include, in addition to the infringement ofthe right to freedom ofexpression: hindering public awareness and understanding ofthe bail process and associated Charter rights, and a compromise ofthe open court principle which includes public scrutiny, awareness and discussion ofthat system. This leads to the potential for public speculation, misunderstanding and mistrust ofthe justice system."128

xi. Deleterious effects ofs. 517 are drastic - inconsistent with the tertiary ground (s. 515(10)(c))

112. Ironically, notwithstanding the cloud ofsecrecy created by s. 517, the tertiary ground is itselftheoretically based upon public confidence in the administration ofjustice. The mandatory ban in s. 517 negatively impacts this. See s. 515(1 0)(c) ofthe Criminal Code.

127 Affidavit ofDonna Harker sworn October 29, 2008 - Exhibit "C" [JRA - Tab BB ]. 128 Court ofQueen's Bench Reasons at para. 101 [JRA - Tab D]. 39

D. Ifthe infringement is not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, what is the remedy?

113. The mandatory ban in s. 517 is the result ofa pre-Charter amendment to a predecessor of the provision drafted during an era during which the right to a fair trial trumped all others. The Law Reform Commission has recommended its repeal. The blunt pre-Charter approach reflected in s. 51Ts blanket mandatory ban has been departed from in cases such as Dagenais, Mentuck, and Toronto Star in which an approach has been taken which balances these important rights. The proper remedy is for the court to strike the mandatory words "and shall on application by the accused" from s. 517. There is no need to suspend a declaration of invalidity given the Dagenais/Mentuck test which is available.

E. Conclusion

114. The constitutional questions posed by the ChiefJustice ought to be answered as follows:

1. Does s. 517 ofthe Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as amended, infringe s. 2(b) ofthe Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms?

Answer: Yes.

2. If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 ofthe Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms?

Answer: No.

115. The proper remedy is for the court to strike the mandatory words "and shall on application by the accused" from s. 517.

PART IV - SUBMISSIONS AS TO COSTS

116. The Edmonton Sun submits that costs ought not be awarded. 40

PART V- STATEMENT OF THE ORDER SOUGHT

107. The Edmonton Sun requests that the appeal be allowed.

ALL OF WHICH is respectfully submitted.

DATED at Edmonton, Alberta, this 9th day ofJuly, 2009.

FRASER MILNER CASGRAIN LLP

Per:

Per: ~~ Peter D. Banks J

Counsel for The Edmonton Sun, A Division ofSun Media Corporation 41

PART VI - TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Paragraph TAB Numbers Where Reference is made A. G. (Nova Scotia) v. MacIntyre, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175 36,37 1

Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI Macdonald Corp, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 89 2 610

Canada Packers Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1985 21 3 CarswellAlta 619 (Q.B.)

Canada Packers Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1985 21 4 CarswellAlta 618 (C.A.)

Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), 30,36, 70, 71, 5 [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 75,81,84 Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Canada, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122 69 6

Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 18,21,24,25, 7 27,36,39,93

Edmonton (City) v. Kara, 1995 CarswellAlta 3 (Q.B.) 93 8

Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 33, 34, 36, 62, 9 1326 75 Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 10

Knox Contracting Ltd. v. Canada, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 338 21 11

Kourtessis v. MNR., [1993] 2 S.C.R. 53 21 12 42

Named Person v. Vancouver, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 253 71 13

Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commissioner, Public Inquiries Act), [1995] 2 93 14 S.C.R. 97

R. v. Adams, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 707 20,21,27 15

R. v. Bryan, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527 16

R. v. Corbett, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670 58,93 17

R. v. Daly, 2005 CarswellBC 1828 (C.A.) 20 18

R. v. Domm, 1996 CarswellOnt 4539 (C.A.) 20 19

R. v. Edmonton Sun, 2003 CarswellAlta 23 (C.A.) 96 20

R. v. Forget, 1982 CarswellOnt 1341 (C.A.) 26 21

R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309 60, 103 22

R. v. Laba, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 965 21 23

R. v. MB.D., 2003 CarswellMan 395 (C.A.) 21 24

R. v. McClenaghan, 2008 CarswallAlta 461 (C.A.) 95,96 25

R. v. Mentuck, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 21,23,27 26

R. v. Needham, 1992 CarswellBC 308 (C.A.) 21 27

R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 40,51 28 43

R. v. Smith, 2006 CanLII 30593 (ant. S.C.) 105 29

R. v. Vermette, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 985 59,93 30

Re Global Communications andAttorney-Generalfor Canada (1983), 31 42 O.R. (2d) 13 (H.C.J.)

Re Global Communications Ltd. andAttorney-Generalfor Canada 45,68 32 (1984),44 O.R. (2d) 609 (C.A.)

Re Southam Inc. and The Queen (No.1) (1983),41 O.R. (2d) 113 80 33 (C.A.)

Re Southam Inc and The Queen (No.2) (1986), 53 O.R. (2d) 663 80 34 (C.A.)

Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 21,35,36,62, 35 75, 78, 80, 82, 102 Rohani v. Rohani, 2002 CarswellBC 2940 (S.C.) 20 36

Saxena v. Thailand (Kingdom), 1997 CarswellBC 1325 (C.A.) 21 37

Sierra Club ofCanada v. Canada (Minister ofFinance), [2002] 2 38 S.C.R.522

Southam Inc. v. Brassard, 1987 CarswellQue 11 (S.C.) 39

Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 36 40

Toronto Sun Publishing Corp. v. Alberta (Attorney General), 1985 20 41 CarswellAlta 129 (C.A.) 44

Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd v. Canada, 2009 CarswellOnt 301 39,49,55,68, 42 (C.A.) 69,83,90,91, 97, 106, 107, 108 Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd v. Ontario, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188 1,30,81,85,98 43

Secondary Sources and Other Materials

E.G. Ewaschuk, Criminal Pleadings & Practice in Canada (Canada 21 44 Law Book Looseleaf) at 23:0045,23:0050,23:2007

P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law ofCanada, 5th ed. Supplemented 20 45 (Thomson Carswell: Looseleaf) at pp. 59-1 ~ 59-21

P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law ofCanada, 5th ed. Supplemented 62 46 (Thomson Carswell: Looseleaf) at pp. 38-35 - 38-36

Law Reform Commission ofCanada, Working Paper 56 Public and 31,39 47 Media Access to the Criminal Process (Ottawa: 1987) at pp. 75 ~ 77

E.L. Greenspan & M. Rosenberg, Martin's Annual Criminal Code 28 48 2009 (Canada Law Book: 2008), s. 517 annotation

R.E. Salhany, Canadian Criminal Procedure (Canada Law Book: 44 49 Looseleaf) at pp. 4-10 - 4-11

G.T Trotter, The Law ofBail in Canada, 2 ed. (Carswell: 1999) at p. 43 50 193 ~ 196 45

PART VII - STATUTORY PROVISIONS

TAB Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, s. 1, Part I ofthe Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK.), 1982, c. 1L Section 1 A

Section 2(b) B

Section 11 C Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as amended s. 517 (current) D Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 517 (historical as in force until E January 1, 2006)

Bail Reform Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 2, s. 457.2 F Criminal Law Amendment Act 1975, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 93, s. 48 G Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as amended, s. 680 H Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as amended, s. 515 I

Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, as amended, s. 40 J

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as amended, s. 674 K TAB A REVISED STATUTES LOIS REVISEES OF CANADA, 1985 DU CANADA (1985)

Prepared under the authority Revision realisee sous Ie regime de la of the Statute Revision Act Loi sur la revision des lois

APPENDICES APPENDICES

'I.' " ')L'EEYS PRINTER FOR CANADA IMPRIMELR DE LA REINE POLR LE (","ADA OTT,\W,\. l'Jil5 On,\WA. J'JKl Annexe B Loi constitutionne//e (1982) J SCHEDULE B ANNEXE B CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982 LOI CONSTITUTIONNELLE DE 1982

PART I PARTIE I

CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND CHARTE CANADIENNE DES DROITS ET FREEDOMS LIBERTES

Whereas Canada is founded upon principles Attendu que Ie Canada est fonde sur des that recognize the supremacy of God and the principes qui reconnaissent la suprematie de rule of law: Dieu et la primaute du droit:

Guarantee ofRights and Freedoms Garantie des droits et Iibertes

Rights and I. The Canadian Charter of Rights and I. La Charte canadienne des droits et Iiber Droits el Iiber freedoms in tes au Canada Canada Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms tes garantit les droits et libertes qui y sont set out in it subject only to such reasonable enonces. lis ne peuvent etre restreints que par limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably une regie de droit, dans des limites qui soient justified in a free and democratic society. raisonnables et dont la justification puisse se demontrer dans Ie cadre d'une societe libre et democratique.

Fundamental Freedoms Libertes fondamentales

Fundamental 2. Everyone has the following fundamental 2. Chacun ales libertes fondamentales sui- Liberles fonda· freedoms freedoms: vantes: mentales (a) freedom of conscience and religion; a) liberte de conscience et de religion; (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and b) liberte de pensee, de croyance, d'opinion et expression, including freedom of the press d'expression, y compris la liberte de Ia presse and other media of communication; et des autres moyens de communication; (c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and c) liberte de reunion pacifique; (d) freedom of association. d) liberte d'association.

Democratic Rights Droits democratiques

Democratic 3. Every citizen of Canada has the right to 3. Tout citoyen canadien a Ie droit de vote et Droits demo rights of citi· ~r~~~~~s lens vote in an election of members of the House of est eligible aux elections legislatives federales des Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be OU provinciales. qualified for membership therein.

Maximum 4. (I) No House of Commons and no legisla 4. (1) Le mandat maximal de la Chambre Mandat maxi dur:ltion of mal des assem· legislative tive assembly shall continue for longer than five des communes et des assemblees legislatives est blees bodies years from the date fixed for the return of the de cinq ans a compter de la date fixee pour Ie writs at a general election of its members. retour des brefs relatifs aux elections generales correspondantes. Continuation in (2) In time of real or apprehended war, inva (2) Le mandat de la Chambre des communes Prolongations special circum speciales stances sion or insurrection, a House of Commons may ou celui d'une assemblee legislative peut etre be continued by Parliament and a legislative prolonge respectivement par Ie Parlement ou assembly may be continued by the legislature par la legislature en question au-dela de cinq beyond five years if such continuation is not ans en cas de guerre, d'invasion ou d'insurrec opposed by the votes of more than one-third of tion, reelles ou apprehendees, pourvu que cette the members of the House of Commons or the prolongation ne fasse pas l'objet d'une opposi legislative assembly, as the case may be. tion exprimee par les voix de plus du tiers des deputes de la Chambre des communes ou de l'assemblee legislative. TABB REVISED STATUTES LOIS REVISEES OF CANADA, 1985 DU CANADA (1985)

Prepared under the authority Revision realisee sous Ie regime de ta of the Statute Revision Act Loi sur la revision des lois

APPENDICES APPENDICES

... ()L'EEYS PRINTER fOR C.\N,\D,\ IMPRIMELR DE L~ REI'\E POLR LE ('''ADA On,\W,\.I"'5 OTT,\ W.1, i "~l Annexe B Loi constitutionne/le (/982) J SCHEDULE B ANNEXE B

CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982 LO! CONSTITUTIONNELLE DE 1982

PART I PARTIE I

C\:"oIADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND CHARTE CANADIENNE DES DROITS ET FREEDOMS L1BERTES

Guarantee ofRights and Freedoms Garantie des droits et /ibertes

Rights and I. The Canadian Charter of Rights and I. La Charte canadienne des droits et /iber Droits et Ii ber freedoms in tes au Canada Canada Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms tes garantit les droits et libertes qui y sont set out in it subject only to such reasonable enonces. Ils ne peuvent etre restreints que par limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably une regie de droit, dans des limites qui soient justified in a free and democratic society. raisonnables et dont la justification puisse se demontrer dans Ie cadre d'une societe libre et democratique.

Fundamental Freedoms Libertes fondamentales fundamental 2. Everyone has the following fundamental 2. Chacun ales libertes fondamentales sui- Liberti:s fonda freedoms fret:doms: vantes : ,ncnta!es (a) freedom of conscience and religion; a) liberte de conscience et de religion; (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and b) liberte de pensee, de croyance, d'opinion et expression, including freedom of the press d'expression, y compris la liberte de la presse and other media of communication; et des autres moyens de communication; (c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and c) libertc de reunion pacifique; (d) freedom of association. d) libertc d'association.

Democratic Rights Droits democratiques

Democratic 3. Every citizen of Canada has the right to 3. Tout citoyen canadien a Ie droit de vote et Droits demn rights of citi or;ltlques des lens vote in an election of members of the House of est eligible aux elections legislatives federales citoyens Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be ou provinciales. qualified for membership therein.

'vIaximum 4. t I) No House of Commons and no legisla ... (1) Le mandat maximal de la Chambre .'vIandat m.lxi· dur;ltion of mal Jes assem :cglslative tive assembly shall continue for longer than five des communes et des assemblees legislatives est blecs bodies years from the date fixed for the return of the de cinq ans a compter de la date fixee pour Ie writs at a general election of its members. retour des brefs relatifs aux elections generales correspondantes. Conllnuation in (2) [n time of real or apprehended war, inva (2) Le mandat de la Chambre des communes Prolongatiuns ;pecial .::ircum ,pee..les :itanccs sion or insurrection, a House of Commons may au celui d'une assemblee legislative peut etre be continued by Parliament and a legislative prolonge respectivement par Ie Parlement ou assembly may be continued by the legislature par la legislature en question au-dela de cinq beyond five years if such continuation is not ans en cas de guerre, d'invasion ou d'insurrec opposed by the votes of more than one·third of tion, reelles ou apprehendees, pourvu que cette the members of the House of Commons or the prolongation ne fasse pas robjet d'une opposi legislative assembly, ciS the case may be. tion exprimee par les voix de plus du tiers des deputes de la Chambre des communes ou de l':lssemblee legislative. TABC REVISED STATUTES LOIS REVISEES OF CANADA, 1985 DU CANADA (1985)

Prepared under the authority Revision realisee sous Ie regime de 13 of the Statute Revision Act Loi sur la revision des lois

APPENDICES APPENDICES

(el (e) QUEEN'S PRINTER FOR CANADA IMPRIMEUR DE LA REINE POUR LE CANADA OTTAWA,I985 OTTAWA,1985 s\

Annexe B Loi constitutionnelle (1982) 5

(c) to have the validity of the detention c) de faire contr6ler, par habeas corpus, la determined by way of habeas corpus and to legalite de sa detention et d'obtenir, Ie cas be released if the detention is not lawful. echeant, sa liberation.

Proceedings in 11. Any person charged with an offence has 11. Tout inculpe a Ie droit: Affaires crimi criminal and nelles et penales penal rna lters the right a) d'etre informe sans delai anormal de (a) to be informed without unreasonable I'infraction precise qu'on lui reproche; delay of the specific offence; b) d'etre juge dans un delai raisonnable; (b) to be tried within a reasonable time; c) de ne pas etre contraint de temoigner con (c) not to be compelled to be a witness in tre lui-meme dans toute poursuite intentee proceedings against that person in respect of contre lui pour l'infraction qu'on lui repro the offence; che; (d) to be presumed innocent until proven d) d'etre presume innocent tant qu'il n'est guilty according to law in a fair and public pas declare coupable, conformement ala loi, hearing by an independent and impartial tri par un tribunal independant et impartial a bunal; l'issue d'un prod:s public et equitable; (e) not to be denied reasonable bail without e) de ne pas etre prive sans juste cause d'une just cause; mise en liberte assortie d'un cautionnement (j) except in the case of an offence under raisonnable: military law tried before a military tribunal, j) sauf s'il s'agit d'une infraction relevant de to the benefit of trial by jury where the max la justice militaire, de beneficier d'un proces imum punishment for the offence is impris avec jury lorsque la peine maximale prevue onment for five years or a more severe pun pour I'infraction dont il est accuse est un ishment; emprisonnement de cinq ans ou une peine (g) not to be found guilty on account of any plus grave; act or omission unless, at the time of the act g) de ne pas etre declare coupable en raison or omission, it constituted an offence under d'une action ou d'une omission qui, au Canadian or international law or was crimi moment ou e1le est survenue, ne constituait nal according to the general principles of law pas une infraction d'apres Ie droit interne du recognized by the community of nations; Canada ou Ie droit international et n'avait (h) if finally acquitted of the offence, not to pas de caractere criminel d'apres les princi be tried for it again and, if finally found pes generaux de droit reconnus par I'ensem guilty and punished for the offence, not to be ble des nations; tried or punished for it again; and h) d'une part de ne pas etre juge de nouveau (i) ;f found guilty of the offence and if the pour une infraction dont il a ete definitive punishment for the offence has been varied ment acquitte, d'autre part de ne pas etre between the time of commission and the time juge ni puni de nouveau pour une infraction of sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser pun dont il a ete definitivement declare coupable ishment. et puni; i) de beneficier de la peine la moins severe, lorsque la peine qui sanctionne ('infraction dont il est declare coupable est modifiee entre Ie moment de la perpetration de l'infraction et celui de la sentence.

Treatment or 12. Everyone has the right not to be sub 12. Chacun a droit a la protection contre Cruautc punishment jected to any cruel and unusual treatment or tous traitements ou peines cruels et inusites. punishment. Self-crinllna 13. A witness who testifies in any proceed 13. Chacun a droit a ce qu'aucun temoi Temoignage incriminant lion ings has the right not to have any incriminating gnage incriminant qu'il donne ne soit utilise evidence so given used to incriminate that pour l'incriminer dans d'autres procedures, sauf witness in any other proceedings, except in a lors de poursuites pour parjure ou pour temoi gnages contradictoires.

97734-15 TABD R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 517 Page 1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 517

c Canada Federal Statutes

Criminal Code

"[3 Part XVI -- Compelling Appearance of an Accused Before a Justice and Interim Release

"131 Judicial Interim Release

s 517.

Federal English Statutes reflect

amendments current to June 10,2009

Federal English Regulations are current to

Gazette Vol. 143:12 (June 10,2009)

517. 517(1) Order directing matters not to be published for specified period

If the prosecutor or the accused intends to show cause under section 515, he or she shall so state to the justice and the justice may, and shall on application by the accused, before or at any time during the course of the proceedings under that section, make an order directing that the evidence taken, the information given or the representations made and the reasons, if any, given or to be given by the justice shall not be published in any document, or broadcast or transmitted in any way before such time as

(a) if a preliminary inquiry is held, the accused in respect of whom the proceedings are held is discharged; or

(b) if the accused in respect of whom the proceedings are held is tried or committed for tri al, the trial is ended. 517(2) Failure to comply

Everyone who fails without lawful excuse, the proof of which lies on him, to comply with an order made under subsection (1) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction. 517(3)

[Repealed 2005, c. 32, s. 17(2).] R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 517 53 Page 2 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 517

R.S.C. 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 101(2)(a); 2005, c. 32, s. 17

END OF DOCUMENT L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-46, s. 517 Page 1 L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-46, s. 517

c Canada Federal Statutes French Code criminel

"[3] Partie XVI -- Mesures concernant la comparution d'un prevenu devant un juge de paix et la mise en liberte provisoire

"[3] Mise en liberte provisoire par voie judiciaire s 517.

Federal French Statutes reflect amendments current to May 27,2009

Federal French Regulations are current to

Gazette Vol. 143:11 (May 27,2009) 517.

517(1) Ordonnance de non-publication

Si Ie poursuivant ou Ie prevenu declare son intention de faire valoir des motifs justificatifs aux termes de l'article 515 au juge de paix, celui-ci peut et doit, sur demande du prevenu, avant Ie debut des procedures engagees en vertu de cet article ou a tout moment au cours de celles-ci, rendre une ordonnance enjoignant que la preuve recueillie, les renseignements fournis ou les observations faites et, Ie cas echeant, les raisons donnees ou devant etre donnees par Ie juge de paix, ne soient ni publies ni diffuses de quelque fayon que ce soit :

a) si une enquete preliminaire est tenue, tant que Ie prevenu auquel se rapportent les procedures n'aura pas de libere; b) si Ie prevenu auquel se rapportent les procedures subit son proces ou est renvoye pour subir son proces, tant que Ie proces n'aura pas pris fin.

517(2) Omission de se conformer Quiconque, sans excuse legitime, dont la preuve lui incombe, omet de se conformer aune or donnance rendue en vertu du paragraphe (1), est coupable d'une infraction punissable sur declaration de culpabilite par procedure sommaire. 517(3) [Abroge, 2005, ch. 32, art. 17(2).] L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-46, s. 517 Page 2 L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-46, s. 517

2005, ch. 32, art. 17

END OF DOCUMENT TABE Current to June 22, 2009

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 517

[effDecember 12,1988 to January 1, 2006](Past Version)

Criminal Code

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46

PART XVI COMPELLING APPEARANCE OF ACCUSED BEFORE A JUSTICE AND INTERIM RELEASE

Judicial Interim Release

SECTION 517.

Order directing matters not to be publishedfor specified period

517. (1) Where the prosecutor or the accused intends to show cause under section 515, he shall so state to the justice and the justice may, and shall on application by the accused, before or at any time during the course ofthe proceedings under that section, make an order directing that the evidence taken, the information given or the representations made and the reasons, ifany, given or to be given by the justice shall not be published in any newspaper or broadcast before such time as

(a) if a preliminary inquiry is held, the accused in respect ofwhom the proceedings are held is discharged; or

(b) ifthe accused in respect ofwhom the proceedings are held is tried or ordered to stand trial, the trial is ended.

Failure to comply

(2) Every one who fails without lawful excuse, the proofofwhich lies on him, to comply with an order made under subsection (1) is guilty ofan offence punishable on summary conviction.

Definition of"newspaper"

(3) In this section, "newspaper" has the same meaning as in section 297.

R.S.e. 1985, c. C-46, s. 517; R.S.e. 1985, c. 27 (lst Supp.), s. 101 (E). 5+

•• Ministoro de la Justice Departmoot of JusticeC""li'l"l ~1;1 I Q1nada canada nTc 0.<1 Code criminel ( L.R., 1985, ch. C-46 )

Loi ajour en date du 7 octobre 2005

Ordonnance enjoignant de ne pas publier certaines choses pendant une periode specifiee

517. (1) Lorsque Ie poursuivant ou Ie prevenu a I'intention de faire valoir des motifs justificatifs aux termes de I'article 515, Hie dec/are au juge de paix et celui-ci peut et doit, sur demande du prevenu, avant Ie debut des procedures engagees en vertu de cet article ou a tout moment au cours de celles-ci, rendre une ordonnance enjoignant que la preuve recueillie, les renseignements fournis ou les observations faites et, /e cas echeant, les raisons donnees ou devant etre donnees par Ie juge de paix, ne soient publies dans aucun journal ni radiodiffuses :

a) si une enquete preliminaire est tenue, tant que Ie prevenu auquel se rapportent les procedures n'aura pas ete Iibere;

b) si Ie prevenu auquel se rapportent les procedures subit son proces ou est renvoye pour subir son proces, tant que Ie proces n'aura pas pris fin.

Omission de se conformer

(2) Quiconque, sans excuse legitime, dont la preuve lui incombe, omet de se conformer aune ordonnance rendue en vertu du paragraphe (1) est coupable d'une infraction punissable sur declaration de culpabilite par procedure sommaire.

Definition de « journal»

(3) Au present article, ({ journal» a Ie sens que lui donne I'article 297.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 517; L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1 er suppl.), art. 101 (A). REVISED STATUTES LOIS REVISEES- - OF CANADA, 1985 DU CANADA (1985)

Prepared under the authority Revision realisee sous Ie regime de Ia of the Statute Revision Act Loi sur la revision des lois

VOLUME III VOLUME III

IC,i ~I QLEEN'S PRINTER FOR CANADA IMPRI"tEUR DE LA REINE POUR LE (A"ADA OTTAWA,1985 OTTAWA,I985 CHAPTER C-46 CHAPITRE C-46

An Act respecting the Criminal Law Loi concernant Ie droit criminel

SHORT TITLE TITRE ABREGE

Shurttitle l. This Act may be cited as the Criminal l. Code eriminel. S.R" ch, C-34, art. I. Titre abrege Code. R.S., c. C-34, s. I.

INTERPRETATION DEFINITIONS ET INTERPRETATION

Definitions 2. In this Act, 2. Les definitions qui suivent s'appliquent a Definitions "Act" "Act" includes la presente loi. ./0;. d~accusa· (a) .acte d'accusation» Sont assimiles a un acte cacte an Act of Parliament, tion .. (b) an Act of the legislature of the former d'accusation : "indictment" Province of Canada, a) une denonciation, une declaration d'un (c) an Act of the legislature of a province, acte d'accusation emise par Ie grand jury and et un chef d'accusation y indus; (d) an Act or ordinance of the legislature b) une defense, une replique ou autre of a province, territory or place in force at piece de plaidoirie; the time that province, territory or place c) tout proces-verbal ou dossier. became a province of Canada; .acte testamentaire» Tout testament, codicille cacte testamen taire. "Attorney "Attorney General" means the Attorney Gen ou autre ecrit ou disposition testamentaire, Utestamtn General" soit du vivant du testateur dont if est cense tary...... procur~ur...• eral or Solicitor General of a province in which proceedings to which this Act applies exprimer les dernieres volontes, soit apres son are taken and, with respect to deces, qu'jJ ait trait a des biens meubles ou (a) the Yukon Territory and the North immeubles, au a des biens des deux west Territories, and categories. .agent de la paix» .agent de la (b) proceedings instituted at the instance palx» of the Government of Canada and con a) Tout maire, president de conseil de ..peace..... ducted by or on behalf of that Government comte. prefet. sherif, sherif adjoint. offi in respect of a contravention of or conspir cier du sherif et juge de paix; acy to contravene any Act of Parliament b) tout directeur. sous-directeur, instruc or a regulation made thereunder other teur, gardien, geolier, garde et tout autre than this Act, fonctionnaire ou employe permanent d'une means the Attorney General of Canada and, prison; except for the purposes of subsections 575(4) c) tout officier de police. agent de police, and 577(3), includes the lawful deputy of the huissier ou autre personne employee a la said Attorney General, Solicitor General and preservation et au maintien de la paix Attorney General of Canada; publique ou a la signification ou aI'execu tion des actes judiciaires au civil; Partie XVI Cude eriminc/ Chap. C-46 291

Sufficiency uf (9) For the purposes of subsections (5) and (9) Pour l'application des paragraphes (5) et Expose record (6), it is sufficient if a record is made of the (6), il est su ffisant de consigner les raisons en suffisant reasons in accordance with the provisions of conformite avec les dispositions de la partie Part XVIII relating to the taking of evidence at XV III ayant trait a la manicre de recueillir les preliminary inquiries. temoignages lors des enquetes preliminaires. Justification for ( 10) For the purposes of this section, the ( 10) Pour I'application du present article, la Motifs deleotion in justinant Ja custody detention of an accused in custody is justified detention d'un prevenu sous garde n'est justi detention only on either of the following grounds: fiee que pour l'un ou l'autre des motifs (a) on the primary ground that his detention suivants : is necessary to ensure his attendance in court a) pour Ie motif principal que sa detention in order to be dealt with according to law; est nccessaire pour assurer sa presence au and tribunal afin qu'il soit traite selon la loi; (b) on the secondary ground (the applicabili b) pour Ie motif secondaire - la validite de ty of which shall be determined only in the ce motif ne pcut etre etablie, d'une part, que event that and after it is determined that his s'il est determine que la detention du prevenu detention is not justified on the primary n'cst pas justifiee pour Ie motif principal ground referred to in paragraph (a») that his mentionne a I'alinea a) et, d'autre part, qu'a detention is necessary in the public interest pres que ce fait a ete determine - que sa or for the protection or safety of the public, detention est necessaire dans I'interct public having regard to all the circumstances ou pour Ia protection ou la seeurite du public, including any substantial likelihood that the eu egard aux circonstances, y compris toute accused will, if he is released from custody, probabiIite marquee que Ie prevenu, s'il est commit a criminal offence or interfere with mis en liberte, commettra une infraction cri the administration of justice. minclle ou nuira a I'administration de la justice. Detention in (II) Where an accused who is charged with (II) Le juge de paix devant lequel est con Detenllon pour custody for Infraction uffence an offence mentioned in section 522 is taken duit tout prevenu inculpe d'une infraction men mentionnee a mentioned in before a justice, the justice shall order that the tionnee a I'article 522 ordonne qu'il soit detenu rart. 522 section 522 accused be detained in custody until he is dealt sous gardejusqu'a ce qu'il soit traite conforme with according to law and shall issue a warrant ment a la loi et delivre a son sujet un mandat in Form 8 for the committal of the accused. redige selon la formule H. S.R., ch. C-34, art. R.S., c. C-34, s. 457; R.S., c. 2(2nd Supp.), s. 457; S.R., ch. 2(2< suppl.), art. 5; 1974-75-76, '5; 1974-75-76, c. 93, s. 47. ch. 93, art. 47.

Remand in 516. A justice may, before or at any time 516. Un juge de paix peut, avant Ie debut de Rt:nvoi suus ~arde custody during the course of any proceedings under procedures engagees en vertu de I'article 515 section SIS, on application by the prosecutor or ou a tout moment au cours de celles-ci, sur the accused, adjourn the proceedings and demande du poursuivant ou du prevenu, ajour remand the accused to custody in prison by ncr les procedures et renvoyer Ie prevenu a la warrant in Form 19, but no adjournment shall detention dans une prison, par mandat selon la be for more than three clear days except with formule 19, mais un tel ajournement ne pcut the consent of the accused. R.S., c. 2(2nd jamais etre de plus de trois jours francs sauf Supp.), s. 5. avec Ie consentcment du prevenu. S.R., ch. 2(2· suppl.), art. 5.

Order directing 517. (I) Where the prosecutor or the 517. (I) Lorsque Ie poursuivant ou Ie pre Ordonnance mailers not to enjoignant dc be published for accused intends to show cause under section venu a I'intention de faire valoir des motifs ne pas publier specined period SIS, he shall so state to the justice and the justificatifs aux termes de I'article SIS, il Ie certaines choscs justice may, and shall on application by the declare au juge de paix et celui-ci peut et doit, pendant une pCriode accused, before or at any time during the sur demande du prevenu, avant Ie debut des spCcifiee course of the proceedings under that section, procedures engagees en vertu de cet article ou a make an order directing that the evidence tout moment au cours de celles-ci, rendre une taken, the information given or the representa ordonnance enjoignant que la preuve recueillie, tions made and the reasons, if any, given or to les renseignements fournis ou les observations 292 Chap. C-46 Criminal Code Part XVI be given by the justice shall not be published in faites et, Ie cas echeant, les raisons donnees ou any newspaper or broadcast before such time as devant etre donnees par Ie juge de paix, ne (a) if a preliminary inquiry is held, the soient publies dans aucun journal ni radiodiffu accused in respect of whom the proceedings ses: are held is discharged; or a) si une enquete preliminaire est tenue, tant (h) if the accused in respect of whom the que Ie prevenu auquel se rapportent les pro proceedings are held is tried or committed cedures n'aura pas ete libere; for trial, the trial is ended. b) si Ie prevenu auquel se rapportent les procedures subit son proces ou est renvoye pour subir son proces, tant que Ie proces n'aura pas pris fin.

Failure 10 (2) Everyone who fails without lawful (2) Quiconque, sans excuse legitime, dont la Omission de se comply excuse, the proof of which lies on him, to preuve lui incombe, omet de se conformer a une conformer comply with an order made under subsection ordonnance rendue en vertu du paragraphe (I) ( I) is guilty of an offence punishable on sum est coupable d'une infraction punissable sur mary conviction. dec.laration de culpabilite par procedure som- malre.

Definition of 0) In this section, "newspaper" has the (3) Au present article, "journal» a Ie sens que Definition de "newspaper" same meaning as in section 297. R.S., c. 2(2nd lui donne I'article 297. S.R., ch. 2(2< suppl.), .juurnal. Supp.), s. 5; 1974-75-;6. c. 93, s. 48. art. 5; 1974-75-76, ch. 93, art. 48.

In4uirie. to be 518. (I) I n any proceedings under section 518. (t) Dans toutes procedures engagees en I'n4uCle. roade by Ju.tice dcvant clrc and eVidence 515, vertu de I'article 515 : (aite. par Ie (a) the justice may, subject to paragraph a) Ie juge de paix peut, sous reserve de I'ali juge de paix el preuve (h), make such inquiries, on oath or other nea b), faire, aupres du prevenu ou a son wise, of and concerning the accused as he sujet, sous serment ou autrement, les enque considers desirable; tes qu'it estime opportunes; (h) the accused shall not be examined or b) Ie prevenu ne peut etre interroge ni con cross-examined by the justice or any other tre-interroge par Ie juge de paix ni par person respecting the offence with which he aucune autre personne, quant a l'infraction is charged, and no inquiry shall be made of dont it est inculpe, et aucune question ne him respecting that offence; peut lui etre posee rclativement a cette (c) the prosecutor may, in addition to any infraction; other relevant evidence, lead evidence c) Ie poursuivant peut, en sus de toute autre . (i) to prove that the accused has previous preuve pertinente, presenter une preuve en ly been convicted of a criminal offence, vue: (ii) to prove that the accused has been (i) soit d'ctablir que Ie prevenu a anterieu charged with and is awaiting trial for rement ete dcclare coupable d'une infrac another criminal offence, tion criminclle, (iii) to prove that the accused has previ (ii) soit d'etablir que Ie prevenu a ete ously committed an offence under section inculpe d'une autre infraction criminelle et 145.or attend son proces acet egard, (iv) to show the circumstances of the (iii) soit d'etablir que Ie prevenu a ante alleged offence, particularly as they rclate rieurement commis une infraction aux to the probability of conviction of the termes de I'article 145, accused; (iv) soit d'indiquer les circonstances de (d) the justice may take into consideration I'infraction presumee relatives, tout parti any relevant matters agreed on by the culierement, a la declaration probable de prosecutor and the accused or his counsel; culpabilite; and d) Ie juge de paix peut prendre en considera (e) [he justice may receive and base his deci tion toutes questions pertinentes sur lesquel- sion on evidence considered credible or trust- A.cts of the Parliament Lois du Parlement of Canada du Canada

Passed in the year adoptees en 2005 '2005

During (he fifty-third and pendant les cinquante-troisieme et fifty-fourth years cinquante-quatrieme annees du regne of the Reign of Her Majesty de Sa Majeste QUEEN ELIZABETH II LA REINE ELIZABETH II

These Acts were passed during that au cours de la periode 2005 de la portion of the First Session of the premiere session de la Thirty-eighth Parliament that included trente-huitieme legislature the 2005 calendar year

Her Excellency the Right Son Excellence la tres Honourable honorable ADRIENNE CLARKSON ADRIENNE CLARKSON Governor General Gouverneure generale

Her Excellency the Right Son Excellence la tres Honourable honorable MICHA.ELLE JEAN MICHAELLE JEAN Governor General Gouverneure generale 53-54 ELIZABETH II 53-54 ELIZABETH II

CHAPTER 32 CHAPITRE 32

An Act to amend the Criminal Code (protection Loi modifiant Ie Code criminel (protection des of children and other vulnerable persons) enfants et d'autres personnes vulnerables) and the Canada Evidence Act et la Loi sur la preuve au Canada

[Assented to 20th July, 2005] [Sanctionnee Ie 20 juil/et 2005]

Preamble WHEREAS the Parliament of Canada has Attendu: Preunbule grave concerns regarding the vulnerability of que la vulnerabilite des enfants a OOute forme children to all fonns of exploitation, including d'exploitation - notamrnent la pornographie child pornography, sexual exploitation, abuse juvenile, I'exploitation sexuelle, la negligence and neglect; et ('abus - preoccupe Ie Parlernent du WHEREAS Canada., by ratifying the United Canada au plus haut point; ;-.lations Convention on the Rights of the Child, que Ie Canada s'est engage a proteger les has undertaken to protect children from all enfants contre toute forme d'exploitation ou forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, d'abus sexuels par la ratification de la and has obligations as a signatory to the Convention des Nations Unies relative aux Optional Protocol to the Convention on the droits de I'enfant et qu'il a des obligations a Rights ofthe Child on the sale ofchildren, child respecter en tant que signataire du Protocole prostitution and child pornography; facultatif a la Convention relative aux droits WHEREAS the Parliament ofCanada wishes de I'enfant, concernant la vente d'enfants, la to encourage the participation of witnesses in prostitution des enfants et la pornographie the criminal justice system through the use of mettant en scene des enfants; protective measures that seek to facilitate the que Ie Parlement du Canada desire, tout en participation of children and other vulnerable respectant les droits des accuses, encourager witnesses while ensuring that the rights of [a participation des temoins au systeme de accused persons are respected; justice penale au moyen de mesures de AND WHEREAS the continuing advance protection visant a faciliter la participation ments in the development of new technologies, des enfants et autres temoins vulnerables; while having social and economic benefits, que Ie developpement constant de nouvelles facilitate sexual exploitation and breaches of techniques, tout en apportant des avantages privacy; sociaux et economiques, facilite I'exploita tion sexuelle et la violation de la vie privee, NOW, THEREFORE, Her Majesty, by and with Sa Majeste, sur I'avis et avec Ie consentement the advice and consent of the Senate and House du Senat et de la Chambre des communes du of Commons of Canada., enacts as follows: Canada, edicte: 2004-2005 Code criminel (protection des en/ants et d'autres personnes vulnerables) ch.32 23 quelque f~on que ce soit, sans la pennission de chaque personne visee a l'alinea b), des renseignements concernant: a) soit l'endroit ou s'est faite ou doit se faire la perquisition; b) soit I'identite de la personne qui occupe ou semble occuper cet endroit ou en est ou semble en etre responsable ou qui est sou~nnee d'etre impliquee dans une in fraction a l'egard de laquelle Ie mandat fut decerne.

R.S., c.27 (2) Subsection 487.2(2) of the Act is (2) Le paragrapbe 487.2(2) de la meme loi L.R.. ch.27 II sl Supp.), •. 69 repealed. (I'" ,uppl.l. est abroge. art. 69

17. (1) The portion ofsubsection 517(1) of 17. (1) Le passage du pangrapbe 517(1) the Act before paragraph (a) is replaced by de la meme 101 precedant I'atine. a) est the foOowing: remplace par ce qui suit:

Order direcling 517. (I) If the prosecutor or the accused 517. (1) Si Ie poursuivant ou Ie prevenu Ordonnance de malll:r!J IlOIlO be non-publication published for intends to show cause under section 515, he or declare son intention de faire valoir des motifs ;pecified period she shall so state to the justice and the justice justificatifs aux tennes de I'article 515 au juge may, and shall on application by the accused, de paix, celui-ci peut et doit, sur demande du before or at any time during the course of the prevenu. avant Ie debut des procedures enga proceedings under that section, make an order gees en vertu de cet article ou atout moment au directing that the evidence taken, the informa cours de celles-ci, rendre une ordonnance tion given or the representations made and the enjoignant que la preuve recueiIlie, les rensei reasons, if any, given or to be given by the gnements foumis ou les observations faites et, Ie justice shall not be published in any document, cas echeant, les raisons donnees ou devant etre or broadcast or transmitted in any way before donnees par Ie juge de paix. ne soient ni publies such time as ni diffUses de quelque f~on que ce soit: (2) Subsection 517(3) of the Act is re (2) Le paragrapbe 517(3) de I. meme loi pealed. est abroge.

R.S., c.27 18. (1) The portion ofsubsection 539(1) of 18. (1) Le paragnpbe 539(1) de I. meme L.R., ch. 27 (1" Supp.l, •. 97 Ocr .uppl.), the Act after paragraph (b) is replaced by the loi est remplace par ce qui suit: art. 97 foUowing:

make an order directing that the evidence taken 539. (I) Avant qu'il ne commence Ii recueil Onlonnancetl re

REVISED STATUTES LOIS REVISEES OF CANADA, 1985 DU CANADA (1985)

Prepared under the authority Revision realisee sous Ie regime de Ia of the Revised Statutes of Loi sur les Lois revisees du Canada. 1985 Act Canada (1985)

1st SUPPLEMENT 1er SUPPLEMENT

C C QUEEN'S PRINTER FOR CANADA IMPRIMEUR DE LA REINE POUR LE CANADA OlTAWA. 1988 OlTAWA.I911 CHAPTER 27 (1st Supp.) CHAPITRE 27 (1 er suppl.)

An Act to amend the Criminal Code, to amend Loi modifiant Ie Code criminel, la Loi modi an Act to amend the Criminal Code and to fiant Ie Code criminel, la Loi relative aux amend the Combines Investigation Act, enquetes sur les coalitions, la Loi sur I'ac the Excise Act, the Food and Drugs Act, cise, la Loi sur les aliments et drogues, la the Narcotic Control Act, the Parole Act Loi sur les stupefiants, la Loi sur la libera and the Weights and Measures Act, to tion conditionnelle de detenus, la Loi sur repeal certain other Acts and to make les poids et mesures, abrogeant certaines other consequential amendments autres lois et apportant d'autres modifica tions connexes

[1985, c. 19, assented to [1985, ch. /9. sanctionne Ie 20th June, 1985] 20 juin 1985]

SHORT TITLE TITRE ABREGE

Short title 1. This Act may be cited as the Criminal 1. £oi de 1985 modifiant Ie droit penal. Titre abrege Law Amendment Act, 1985.

PART I PARTIE I

R.S., c. C-46 CRIMINAL CODE CODE CRIMINEL LoR., ch. C-46 2. (I) The definition "Attorney General" in 2. (I) La definition de cprocureur general» a section 2 of the Criminal Code is repealed and I'article 2 du Code criminel est abrogee et the following substituted therefor: remplacee par ce qui suit: "Attorney " "Attorney General" cprocureur general» _procureur General" general. •procureur (a) with respect to proceedings to which a) AI'egard des poursuites visees par la ..Attorney..... g;";raJ. this Act applies, means the Attorney presente loi, Ie procureur general ou Ie General or Solicitor General of the solliciteur general de la province ou ces province in which those proceedings are poursuites sont intentees et leur substi taken and includes his lawful deputy, tut legitime; and b) Ie procureur general du Canada et (b) with respect to son substitut legitime, aI'egard : (i) the Northwest Territories and the (i) des Territoires du Nord-Ouest et Yukon Territory, or du territoire du Yukon, (ii) proceedings commenced at the (ii) des poursuites intentees a la instance of the Government of demande du gouvernement du Canada and conducted by or on Canada et menees par ce dernier ou behalf of that Government in respect en son nom quant aune contravention of a contravention of or conspiracy to ou a un complot en vue de contrevenir Partie I Droit penal (1985) Chap. 27 81

address the accused as follows or to the like adresse au prevenu les paroles suivantes ou effect: d'autres de meme teneur : Having heard the evidence, do you wish to say Apres avoir entendu les temoignages, desirez-vous anything in answer to the charge or any other indict dire quelque chose en reponse a ('accusation ou atout able offence, in respect of the same transaction, autre acte criminel qui decoule de la meme affaire founded on the facts that are disclosed by the evi fonde sur les faits que revele 1a preuve? Vous n'etes dence? You are not bound to say anything, but what pas oblige de dire quoi que ce soit, rnais tout ce que ever you do say will be taken down in writing and may vous direz sera pris par ecrit et peut servir de preuve be given in evidence against you at your trial. You contre vous lors de votre proces. Vous devez compren must clearly understand that you have nothing to dre c1airement que vous n'avez rien a esperer d'une hope from any promise of favour and nothing to fear promesse de faveur qui a pu vous etre faite, non plus from any threat that may have been held out to you to que rien a craindre d'une menace qui a pu vous etre induce you to make any admission or confession of adressee, pour vous induire a faire un aveu ou vous guilt, but whatever you now say may be given in reconnaitre coupable, mais tout ce que vous direz evidence against you at your trial notwithstanding the maintenant pourra servir de preuve contre vous lors de promise or threat." votre proces, malgre la promesse ou menace.•

100. The said Act is further amended by 100. La meme loi est modifiee par insertion, adding thereto, immediately after section 547 apres l'article 547, de ce qui suit: thereof, the following section:

Inability of "547.1 Where a justice acting under this «547.1 Lorsqu'un juge de paix agissant en Incapacit' du justice to jugc de paix de continuc Part has commenced to take evidence and vertu de la presente partie a commence a continucr dies or is unable to continue for any reason, recueillir la preuve et decede ou est incapable another justice may de continuer a assumer ses fonctions pour (a) continue taking the evidence at the une autre raison, un autre juge de paix peut : point at which the interruption in the a) continuer arecueillir la preuve la ou les taking of the evidence occurred, where the procedures se sont arretees si la preuve a evidence was recorded pursuant to section ete enregistree conformement a I'article 540 and is available; or 540 et est disponible; (b) commence taking the evidence as if no b) commencer a recueillir la preuve evidence had been taken, where no evi comme si aucune n'avait ete presentee, dence was recorded pursuant to section lorsque la preuve n'a pas ete enregistree 540 or where the evidence is not conformement a l'article 540 ou n'est pas available." disponible.•

101. (1) Section 548 of the said Act is 101. (1) L'artic1e 548 de la meme loi est repealed and the following substituted therefor: abroge et remplace par ce qui suit: Ordcr to stand "548. (1) When all the evidence has been «548. (1) Lorsque Ie juge de paix a Renvoi aproces trial or ou liberation dischargc taken by the justice, he shall recueilli tous les temoignages, il doit : (a) if in his opinion there is sufficient a) renvoyer l'accuse pour qu'il subisse son evidence to put the accused on trial for the proces, si a son avis la preuve a I'egard de offence charged or any other indictable I'infraction dont il est accuse ou de tout offence in respect of the same transaction, autre acte criminel qui decoule de la meme order the accused to stand trial; or affaire est suffisante; (b) discharge the accused, if in his opinion b) lib6rer I'accuse, si ason avis la preuve a on the whole of the evidence no sufficient l'egard de I'infraction dont il est accuse ou case is made out to put the accused on trial de tout autre acte criminel qui decoule de for the offence charged or any other la meme affaire n'est pas suffisante pour indictable offence in respect of the same qu'il subisse un proces. transaction. Endoning (2) Where the justice orders the accused (2) Lorsque Ie juge de paix ordonne que Mention dc I'accusation chargc to stand trial for an indictable offence, other I'accuse soit renvoye pour subir son proces a than or in addition to the one with which the I'egard d'un acte criminel different ou en sus accused was charged, the justice shall de celui dont il etait accuse, il doit mention- 82 Chap. 27 Criminal Law Amendment, 1985 Part I endorse on the information the charges on ner sur la denonciation queUes sont les accu which he orders the accused to stand trial. sations a l'egard desquelles l'accuse doit subir son proces, Defect not to (3) The validity of an order to stand trial (3) La validite d'un renvoi a proces n'est Vice de forme llTect validity is not affected by any defect apparent on the pas atteinte par un vice de forme apparent a face of the information in respect of which la face meme de la denonciation al'egard de the preliminary inquiry is held or in respect laqueUe l'enquete preliminaire a ete tenue ou of any charge on which the accused is al'egard d'une accusation pour laquelle l'ac- ordered to stand trial unless, In the opinion of cuse est renvoye pour subir son praces sauf the court before which an objection to the si, de l'avis du tribunal devant lequel une information or charge is taken, the accused objection a la denonciation ou a l'accusation has been misled or prejudiced in his defence est soulevee, l'accuse a ete induit en erreur by reason of that defect." ou a subi un prejudice dans sa defense a cause de ce vice de forme.» (2) The said Act is further amended by (2) La meme loi est modifiee par substitution )ubstituting the expression "ordered to stand de I'expression «ordered to stand trial» a l'ex trial" for the expression "committed for trial" pression .committed for trial» figurant dans la wherever the latter expression occurs in the version anglaise des dispositions suivantes : English version of the following provisions, a) I'alinea 517(l)b); namely, b) I'alinea 527(5)a); (a) paragr:lph 517(I)(b); c) l'alinea 542(2)b); (b) paragraph 527(5)(a); d) l'article 603; ie) paragraph 542(2)(b); e) l'article 5 de la formule 32 dans la partie (d) section 603; and XXVIII. (e) item 5 of Form 32 in Part XXVIII. (3) The said Act is further amended in the (3) La meme loi est modifiee conformement manner and to the extent set out in Schedule al'annexe II. II. 102. Section 551 of the said Act is repealed 102. L'article 551 de la meme loi est abroge ::md the following substituted therefor: et remplace par ce qui suit: Transmitting "551. Where a justice orders an accused .551. Le juge de paix qui renvoie un pre Documentation atransmeltre record to stand trial, the justice shall forthwith send venu pour qu'il subisse son praces expedie to the clerk or other proper officer of the immediatement au greffier au autre fonc court by which the accused is to be tried, the tionnaire competent du tribunal qui doit information, the evidence, the exhibits, the juger Ie prevenu, la denonciation, la preuve, statement if any of the accused taken down les pieces, la declaration, s'il en est, du pre in writing under section 541, any promise to venu, consignee par ecrit conformement a :lppear, undertaking or recognizance given or l'article 541, toute promesse de comparaitre, ..:ntered into in accordance with Part XVI, or toute promesse au tout engagement remis ou :.my t:vidence taken before a coroner, that is contractes en conformite avec la partie XVI, in the possession of the justice." au toute la preuve recueillie devant un coro ner, qui sont en la possession du juge de paix.»

103. (1) Paragraph (c) of the definition 103. (1) L'alinea c) de la definition de «juge» "judge" in section 552 of the said Act is a I'article 552 de la meme loi est abroge et rt:pealed and the following substituted therefor: remplace par ce qui suit: "(c) in the Province of Nova Scotia, a .c) dans la province de la Nouvelle judge of the superior court of criminal Ecosse, un juge d'une cour superieure de jurisdiction of the province or a judge of a juridiction criminelle de la province au un county court," juge d'une cour de comte;» TABF REVISED STATUTES STATUTS REVISES OF CANADA DU ,CANADA 1970 1970

Proclaimed and Published under Proc1ames et publies en conformite the authority of chapter 48 du chapitre 48 of the Statutes of Canada, 1964-63 des Statuts du Canada de 1964-65

2nd SUPPLElVIENT 2e SUPPLE~IENT

R.S.,ee. An Act to amend the prOVISIOns of the Loi modifiant les dispositions du Code B.R., ce. ("34, C-35; Criminal Code relating to the release criminel relatives a. la mise en liberte C-34, C·35; ". II(Ist ' l' c.ll(l" :-;'Ipp.); from custody of accused persons before des prevenus avant e proces ou pen- Bupp.); '. Hilst trial or pending appeal dant l'appel c.44(1" ;-';upp.) , s, 10 Supp.), art. 10 [1970-71-72, c. 37] [1970-71-7:2, c. 37]

:-;hort 1. This Act may be cited as the Bail 1. La presente loi peut etre citee sous Ie Tit~e . Litle Reform Act. titre:. L'at sur l'fa re orme d'u cautwnnement. CLbrege

2. Section 20 of the Criminal Code, 2. L'article 20 du Code criminel, chapi chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of tre C-34 des Statuts revises du Canada de Canada, 1970, is repealed and the following 1970, est abroge et remplace par ce qui substituted therefor: suit:

('ertain "20. A warrant or summons that is «20. Un mandat ou une sommation Certains 't actes :Lets on authorized by this Act or an appearance autorises. , par '1a pres' ente l'01 ou une CI a- peuvent l){Jlirlays \'ulid notice, promise to appear, undertaking tion a comparaitre, une promesse de com- etre or recognizance issued, given or entered paraitre, une promesse ou un engagement v,a~idement 'l" . t' f faltM les into in accordance with Part XIV, XVIII de lvres, remlS ou con ractes en con or- jours feries or XXIV may be issued, executed, given mite de la Partie XIV, XVIII ou XXIV or entered into, as the case may be, on peuvent etre decernes, delivres, executes, a holiday." remis au contractes, selon Ie cas, un jour ferie.»

3. Paragraphs 127(2) (d) and (e) of 3. Les alineas 127(2)d) et e) de ladite rhe said Act are repealed and the following loi sont abroges et remplaces par ce qui :substituted therefor: suit:

" (d) indemnifies or agrees to indemnify cd) indemnise ou convient d'indemniser a surety, in any way and either in whole une caution de quelque fa~on, soit en or in part, or totalite, soit en partie, ou (e) being a surety, accepts or agrees to e) etant une caution, accepte ou con· accept a fee or any form of indemnity, vient d'accepter un honoraire ou quel whether in whole or in part, from or in que forme d'indemnite, soit en totalite, respect of a person who is released or is soit en partie, d'une personne ou a to be released from custody." l'egard d'une personne qui est ou doit etre mise en liberte.»

5 Bail Reform Chap. 2 :23

tody until he is dealt with according to garde jusqu'a ce qu'il soit trn.ite selon law and shall include in the record a la loi et verser au dossier un expose des statement of his reasons for making the r:lisons qui ont motive son ordonnance. order.

:-;'l:TIciency (6) For the purposes of subsection (6) Aux fins du paragraphe (,5), il est Expose l,t rE'cord (.5), it is sufficient if a record is made suffisant de consigner les raisons en con- suffis,mt of the reasons in accordance with the formite des dispositions de In. Partie XV provisions of Part XV relating to the ayant trait a la maniere de recueillir taking of evidence at preliminary in les temoignages lors des enquetes pnlli quiries. minaires.

.J ustifica (7) For the purposes of this section, (7) Aux fins du present article, la ylotifg tion for jus~ifi3.nt

Remand 4-57.1 A justice may, befcre or at any 457.1 ("n juge de paix peut, n.vant Ie Renyoi in cu"touy time during the course of any proceedings debut de procedures en vertu de l'article sousgarcie under section 457, upon application by 457 ou a tout moment au cours de the prosecutor or the accused, adj ourn celles-ci, sur demande du poursuivant ou the proceedings and remand the accused du prevenu, ajourner les procedures et to custody in prison by warrant in Form renvoyer Ie prevenu a la detention dans 14, but no such adjournment shall be for une prison, par mandat selon la formule more than three clear days except with 14, mais un tel ajournement ne doit the consent of the accused. jamais etre da plus de trois jours francs sauf avec Ie consentement du prevenu.

'Jrder 457.2 (1) Where the prosecutor in 4.57.2 (1) Lorsque Ie poursuivant a Ordonnance ,jirecting tends to show cause under subsection l'intention de faire valoir des motifs jus- enjoignant matters 'ft .f d h de ne pas "ot to be -l57 (1) , he ",hall so state to the tl catl s a.ux tHmes . u paragrap e publier l,ublisheu justice and the justice may, before or at ·!57 (1 i, il doit Ie declarer au juge de paix cert.aines for any time during the course of the pro et Ie juge de paix peut, avant Ie debut choses "peciJied 'd d'1 pendant une ceriod ceedings under that section, make an (es1 proce ures en vertu e cet artlC e periode spe<;ifiee

27 24 Chap. 2 Cautionnement

order directing that the evidence taken, au a tout moment au cours de calles-ci, the information given or the representa rendre une ordonnance enjoignant que 130 tions made and the reasons, if any, given preuve recueillie, les renseignements four or to be given by the justice, shall not nis ou les observations faites et, Ie cas be published in any newspaper or broad echeant, les raisons donnees ou devant cast before such time as etre donnees par Ie juge de paix, ne (a) if a preliminary inquiry is held, soient publies dans aucun journal ni the accused in respect of whom the radiodiffuses, proceedings are held is discharged, or a) si une enquete preliminaire est te (b) if the accused in respect of whom nue, tant que Ie prevenu auquel se the proceedings are held is tried or rapportent les procedures n'aura pas committed for trial, the trial is ended. He libere, ou, b) si Ie prevenu auquel se rapportent les procedures subit son proces ou est renvoye pour subir son proces, tant que Ie proces n'aura pas pris fin. Failure (2) Every one who fails without law (2) Quiconque, sans excuse legitime, Omission to comply ful excuse, the proof of which lies upon dont la preuve lui incombe, omet de se de se him, to comply with an order made canformer 'da une or onnance rendue en conformer under subsection (1) is guilty of an of vertu du paragraphe (1), est coupable fence punishable on summary convic d'une infraction punissable sur declaration. tion sommaire de culpabilite.

"Newspaper" i (3) In this section, "newspaper" has (3) Au present article «journah a Ie-Journal. the same meaning as it has in sections sens donne a ce mot, en vertu de I'article 262 to 281 by virtue of section 261. 261, dans les articles 262 a 281.

Inquiries 4057.3 (I) In any proceedings under 1.57.3 (1) Dans toutes proc;looures en Enquetes to be made section 457, vertu de l'article 457,

28 TABG Acts of the Parliament Lois du Parlement of Canada du Canada

Passed in the session held in the Adoptees pendant la session tenue la twenty-third, twenty-fourth and vingt-troisieme, vingt-quatrieme et twenty-fifth years vingt-c~nquieme annees of the Reign of Her Majesty du Regne de Sa Majeste QUEEN ELIZABETH II LA REINE ELIZABETH II

First Session of the Premiere session de la Thirtieth Parliament trentieme Legislature

Begun and held at Ottawa Commencee et tenue it Ottawa on the thirtieth day of September, 1974 Ie trentieme jour de septembre 1974 and prorogued on the twelfth day of et prorogee Ie douzieme jour October, 1976 d'octobre 1976

His Excellency the Right Honourable Son Excellence Ie tres honorable

JULES LEGER JULES LEGER Governor General Gouverneur general Co 93 ::n-21-2;5 Euz. I

and shall Issue a WUfr:1.nt in Form 8 lur Lilt' l'onl\mnemPllt ;1. la [oi I't d,·livre :1. .iUn ;"ujd I:ummletal uf the accused." ,m ll1andat r~'dige sdon la forrnule 8."

,~. :} (2nd :1lJpp), 18. All that portion of subsectiunl57.2(1 ) UJ. La partie ,Iu paragr:lphe 1;5/.20) de ", ',,:(:;;. ~·IPP.). d rt. ;J ".5 of the:;aid Act preceding paragraph (a) r,hHeuf hdite loi qUI prf:ci:de 1'.1.linhL (1) pst abrflgee fet is repealed and the ;'ollowing substituted remplac;{'e par "e 'lui suit: therefor:

Order dirpct.lng "l57.2 (1) Whf:re the prosecutor or the "~57.2 (1) Lorsque Ie poursuivant ou le ( )rdf)nr~anr:e matters noL f.O ,·njOlgnant de be published for accused intends to "how muse under section pr{;vf'nu a I'intention de fa-ire v:Lloir 'les ::1' ;n\d I}uhlwr "peclfied pHlI)d 157, he shall so state to the justice and the motifs justiiicatifs .lUX termes de I'article ':erl,.'lln,'.., ,·hl);if'S pl·ndant ',me justice may, and shall upon application by ·157. il .loit. Ie deelarer au juge de ;JCi.ix et Ie ;:./. nodt' ::- pl-"el fee the accused, before or at any time during jnge de paix peut et doit, sur flf,mande du the course of the proceedings under that prevenu, avant Ie debut des procedures en section, make an order directing that the vprtu de eet ;uticle ou :i tout moment au evidence taken, the information given or the cours de cl'llcs-I.:i, rf'ndre une ordonnance representations made and the reasons, if "njoignant que la preuve recueillie, les ren any, given or to be given hy the justice shall ;ieignement~ iournis ou les ohservations not be published in :.lny newspapu ur faites et. le (;as r:'chr:'ant, les r,lisons donnees broadcast before such time as" I)U df:vant f:tre donnees p:lr Ie juge de paix, '1e ;,ioient pilbli{;s dans :Lueun journal ni radiodiffu::,e::;"

(:. 2 1,2nd ;3IlllP.), t9. Paragraph1.j/.:JOXc) of the ~aid Ad is ~9. L'alinf:a. '157.:3(l)c) de ladite loi 1St. ", '_~12" '~'IPP.)• .lrL. ,j d. ,j ~f'pealed :lI1d the following ..mbstitutfcfi ubf/)ge I,t remplace par ce qui "uit: therefor:

"(c) the prosecutor may, in addition to "e) Ie poursuivant peut, en :ms de toute any other relevant evidence, lead autre preuve pertinente, pre~enter une evidence preuve en vue (j) to prove that the accused has preVI (i) d'etablir que Ie prevenu a anterieu ously been convicted of a fTiminal rement Cte dedare coupable ,J'une oifence, infraction (:runinelle. (ii) to prove that the accused has been (ii) d'ctablir que Ie prevenu a de charged with and is awaiting trial for ineulpe d'une autre iniraetion enmI another CrIminal ()ifence, nelle (~t attend ~on prf)Cf~S aeet {;gard, (iii) to prove that the aecu"ed has pre (iii) d'etablir que Ie prevenu a ante viou~ly f~ommitted an offence under ,-;ec rieurement eommis une infractIOn a.ux tion 1:33, or tprmes de l'article 1:3:3, ou (iv) to show the ,'ircumstances of the (iv) d'indiquer les eircoClstances de I'in alleged I)JTence, particularly as they (fadion prlcsumt':-e relatives, tout parti relate to the probability of convietlOn culif~rement, ,). la declaration probable of the accused;" de (~ulpabIlite;,'

30. (1) All that portion of ;.;ubsection ,)0. (I) La partie du paragraphe ,157.1(1) de 1.57.10) of the said Act preceding paragraph bdite loi qui pref:0de I'ulin{~a a) f::st abrog(,e P.t (a) thereof is repealed and the following :mb remplac('e par l:e 'lui suit: "tituted therefor: rteipi:".~e r)f "t57. ~ ([) Where a justice makes ~ln "~:>7. ~ (I) Lorsqu'ull juge de paix rend \,!j..., .... ,'n i,ht->rte i.cl~u.-;ed fJrder under Jubsection 15/(1), (2), (5.2) ur une ordonnanGe en vertu des par:l~raph(cs rill pr':Vt'f1U 15.3)" 1;)7(1), (2), (.5.2) Oil (.).3)"

1::\94 TABH R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 680 Page 1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 680

c Canada Federal Statutes

Criminal Code

"[3] Part XXI -- Appeals -- Indictable Offences

"[3] Procedure on Appeals

s 680.

Federal English Statutes reflect amendments current to June 10, 2009

Federal English Regulations are current to

Gazette Vol. 143: 12 (June 10, 2009)

680.

680(1) Review by court of appeal

A decision made by a judge under section 522 or subsection 524(4) or (5) or a decision made by a judge of the court of appeal under section 261 or 679 may, on the direction of the chief justice or acting chief justice of the court of appeal, be reviewed by that court and that court may, if it does not confirm the decision, (a) vary the decision; or (b) substitute such other decision as, in its opinion, should have been made.

680(2) Single judge acting On consent of the parties, the powers of the court of appeal under subsection (1) may be exer cised by a judge of that court. 680(3) Enforcement of decision

A decision as varied or substituted under this section shall have effect and may be enforced in all respects as though it were the decision originally made.

R.S.C. 1985, c. 27 (Ist Supp.), s. 142; 1994, c. 44, s. 68 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 680 Page 2 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 680

END OF DOCUMENT L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-46, s. 680 Page 1 L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-46, s. 680

c Canada Federal Statutes French

Code criminel

"[3] Partie XXI -- Appels -- actes criminels

"[3] Procedures en appel

s 680.

Federal French Statutes reflect amendments current to May 27,2009

Federal French Regulations are current to

Gazette Vol. 143: 11 (May 27, 2009)

680. 680(1) Revision par la cour d'appel Dne decision rendue par un juge en vertu de l'article 522 ou des paragraphes 524(4) ou (5) ou une decision rendue par un juge de la cour d'appel en vertu des articles 261 ou 679 peut, sur l'ordre du juge en chef ou du juge en chef suppleant de la cour d'appel, faire l'objet d'une revision par ce tribunal et celui-ci peut, s'il ne confirme pas la decision:

a) ou bien modifier la decision; b) ou bien substituer acette decision telle autre decision qui, ason avis, aurait dli etre ren due. 680(2) Un seul juge Les pouvoirs de la cour d'appel prevus au paragraphe (1) peuvent etre exerces par un juge de cette cour si les parties y consentent.

680(3) Execution de la decision Dne decision telle que modifiee ou rendue en vertu du present article peut etre executee atous egards comme s'il s'agissait de la decision originale.

L.R.C. (1985), ch. 27 (1 er suppl.), art. 142; 1994, ch. 44, art. 68 L.R.c. (1985), ch. C-46, s. 680 Page 2 L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-46, s. 680

END OF DOCUMENT TAB I R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 515 Page 1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 515

c Canada Federal Statutes

Criminal Code

,,~ Part XVI -- Compelling Appearance of an Accused Before a Justice and Interim Release

,,~ Judicial Interim Release

s 515.

Federal English Statutes reflect

amendments current to June 10, 2009

Federal English Regulations are current to

Gazette Vol. 143:12 (June 10,2009) 515. 515(1) Order of release

Subject to this section, where an accused who is charged with an offence other than an offence listed in section 469 is taken before a justice the justice shall, unless a plea of guilty by the ac cused is accepted, order, in respect of that offence, that the accused be released on his giving an undertaking without conditions, unless the prosecutor, having been given a reasonable op portunity to do so, shows cause, in respect of that offence, why the detention of the accused in custody is justified or why an order under any other provision of this section should be made and where the justice makes an order under any other provision of this section, the order shall refer only to the particular offence for which the accused was taken before the justice.

515(2) Release on undertaking with conditions, etc.

Where the justice does not make an order under subsection (l), he shall, unless the prosecutor shows cause why the detention of the accused is justified, order that the accused be released

(a) on his giving an undertaking with such conditions as the justice directs; (b) on his entering into a recognizance before the justice, without sureties, in such amount and with such conditions, if any, as the justice directs but without deposit of money or oth er valuable security; (c) on his entering into a recognizance before the justice with sureties in such amount and with such conditions, if any, as the justice directs but without deposit of money or other R.S.c. 1985, c. C-46, s. 515 Page 2 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 515

valuable security;

(d) with the consent of the prosecutor, on his entering into a recognizance before the justice, without sureties, in such amount and with such conditions, if any, as the justice directs and on his depositing with the justice such sum of money or other valuable security as the justice directs, or

(e) if the accused is not ordinarily resident in the province in which the accused is in cus tody or does not ordinarily reside within two hundred kilometres of the place in which he is in custody, on his entering into a recognizance before the justice with or without sureties in such amount and with such conditions, if any, as the justice directs, and on his deposit ing with the justice such sum of money or other valuable security as the justice directs. 515(2.1) Power ofjustice to name sureties in order

Where, pursuant to subsection (2) or any other provision of this Act, a justice, judge or court orders that an accused be released on his entering into a recognizance with sureties, the justice, judge or court may, in the order, name particular persons as sureties.

515(2.2) Alternative to physical presence

Where, by this Act, the appearance of an accused is required for the purposes ofjudicial inter im release, the appearance shall be by actual physical attendance of the accused but the justice may, subject to subsection (2.3), allow the accused to appear by means of any suitable tele communication device, including telephone, that is satisfactory to the justice.

515(2.3) Where consent required

The consent of the prosecutor and the accused is required for the purposes of an appearance if the evidence of a witness is to be taken at the appearance and the accused cannot appear by closed-circuit television or any other means that allow the court and the accused to engage in simultaneous visual and oral communication.

515(3) Release on undertaking with conditions etc.

The justice shall not make an order under any of paragraphs (2)(b) to (e) unless the prosecu tion shows cause why an order under the immediately preceding paragraph should not be made.

515(4) Conditions authorized

The justice may direct as conditions under subsection (2) that the accused shall do anyone or more ofthe following things as specified in the order:

(a) report at times to be stated in the order to a peace officer or other person designated in the order;

(b) remain within a territorial jurisdiction specified in the order; R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 515 <6\ Page 3 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 515

(c) notify the peace officer or other person designated under paragraph (a) of any change in his address or his employment or occupation;

(d) abstain from communicating, directly or indirectly, with any victim, witness or other person identified in the order, or refrain from going to any place specified in the order, ex cept in accordance with the conditions specified in the order that the justice considers ne cessary;

(e) where the accused is the holder of a passport, deposit his passport as specified in the order;

(e.1) comply with any other condition specified in the order that the justice considers ne cessary to ensure the safety and security of any victim of or witness to the offence; and

(£) comply with such other reasonable conditions specified in the order as the justice con siders desirable. 515(4.1) Condition prohibiting possession of firearms, etc.

When making an order under subsection (2), in the case of an accused who is charged with

(a) an offence in the commission of which violence against a person was used, threatened or attempted,

(a. 1) a terrorism offence,

(b) an offence under section 264 (criminal harassment),

(b. 1) an offence under section 423.1 (intimidation of a justice system participant),

(c) an offence relating to the contravention of subsection 5(3) or (4), 6(3) or 7(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, Proposed Amendment -- 515(4.1)(c) (c) an offence relating to the contravention ofsubsection 5(1) or (2), 6(1) or (2) or 7(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act,

2003, c. 8, s. 8 [Not inforce at date ofpublication.]

(d) an offence that involves, or the subject-matter of which is, a firearm, a cross-bow, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited am munition or an explosive substance, or

(e) an offence under subsection 20(1) of the Security ofInformation Act, or an offence un der subsection 21 (1) or 22(1) or section 23 of that Act that is committed in relation to on offence under subsection 20(1) of that Act, the justice shall add to the order a condition prohibiting the accused from possessing a fire- R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 515 Page 4 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 515

arm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, pro hibited ammunition or explosive substance, or all those things, until the accused is dealt with according to law unless the justice considers that such a condition is not required in the in terests of the safety of the accused or the safety and security of a victim of the offence or of any other person.

515(4.11) Surrender, etc.

Where the justice adds a condition described in subsection (4.1) to an order made under sub section (2), the justice shall specify in the order the manner and method by which

(a) the things referred to in subsection (4.1) that are in the possession of the accused shall be surrendered, disposed of, detained, stored or dealt with; and

(b) the authorizations, licences and registration certificates held by the person shall be sur rendered.

515(4.12) Reasons

Where the justice does not add a condition described in subsection (4.1) to an order made un der subsection (2), the justice shall include in the record a statement of the reasons for not adding the condition.

515(4.2) Additional conditions

Before making an order under subsection (2), in the case of an accused who is charged with an offence referred to in subsection (4.3), the justice shall consider whether it is desirable, in the interests of the safety and security of any person, particularly a victim of or witness to the of fence or a justice system participant, to include as a condition of the order

(a) that the accused abstain from communicating, directly or indirectly, with any victim, witness or other person identified in the order, or refrain from going to any place specified in the order; or

(b) that the accused comply with any other condition specified in the order that the justice considers necessary to ensure the safety and security of those persons.

515(4.3) Offences

The offences for the purposes of subsection (4.2) are

(a) a terrorism offence;

(b) an offence described in section 264 or 423.1;

(d) an offence under subsection 20(1) of the Security ofInformation Act, or an offence un- R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 515 Page 5 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 515

der subsection 21 (1) or 22(1) or section 23 of that Act that is committed in relation to an offence under subsection 20( 1) of that Act.

515(5) Detention in custody

Where the prosecutor shows cause why the detention of the accused in custody is justified, the justice shall order that the accused be detained in custody until he is dealt with according to law and shall include in the record a statement ofhis reasons for making the order. 515(6) Order of detention

Unless the accused, having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so, shows cause why the accused's detention in custody is not justified, the justice shall order, despite any provision of this section, that the accused be detained in custody until the accused is dealt with according to law, if the accused is charged

(a) with an indictable offence, other than an offence listed in section 469,

(i) that is alleged to have been committed while at large after being released in respect of another indictable offence pursuant to the provisions of this Part or section 679 or 680,

(ii) that is an offence under section 467.11,467.12 or 467.13, or a serious offence al leged to have been committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal organization,

(iii) that is an offence under any of sections 83.02 to 83.04 and 83.18 to 83.23 or other wise is alleged to be a terrorism offence,

(iv) an offence under subsection 16(1) or (2), 17(1), 19(1),20(1) or 22(1) of the Secur ity ofInformation Act,

(v) an offence under subsection 21(1) or 22(1) or section 23 ofthe Security ofInforma tion Act that is committed in relation to on offence referred to in subparagraph (iv),

(vi) that is an offence under section 99, 100 or 103,

(vii) that is an offence under section 244, or that is an offence under section 239, 272 or 273, subsection 279(1) or section 279.1, 344 or 346 that is alleged to have been committed with a firearm, or

Proposed Amendment -- 515(6)(a)(vii) (vii) that is an offence under section 244 or 244.2, or an offence under section 239, 272 or 273, subsection 279(1) or section 279.1, 344 or 346 that is alleged to have been committed with a firearm, or

2009, c. 22, s. 17 [Not in force at date ofpublication.] R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 515 Page 6 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 515

(viii) that is alleged to involve, or whose subject-matter is alleged to be, a firearm, a cross-bow, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a prohibited device, any am munition or prohibited ammunition or an explosive substance, and that is alleged to have been committed while the accused was under a prohibition order within the meaning of subsection 84( 1);

(b) with an indictable offence, other than an offence listed in section 469 and is not ordin arily resident in Canada,

(c) with an offence under any of subsections 145(2) to (5) that is alleged to have been committed while he was at large after being released in respect of another offence pursu ant to the provisions of this Part or section 679,680 or 816, or

(d) with having committed an offence punishable by imprisonment for life under subsec tion 5(3), 6(3) or 7(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act or the offence of con spiring to commit such an offence.

515(6.1) Reasons

If the justice orders that an accused to whom subsection (6) applies be released, the justice shall include in the record a statement of the justice's reasons for making the order.

515(7) Order of release

Where an accused to whom paragraph 6(a), (c) or (d) applies shows cause why the accused's detention in custody is not justified, the justice shall order that the accused be released on giv ing an undertaking or entering into a recognizance described in any of paragraphs (2)(a) to (e) with the conditions described in subsections (4) to (4.2) or, where the accused was at large on an undertaking or recognizance with conditions, the additional conditions described in subsec tions (4) to (4.2), that the justice considers desirable, unless the accused, having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so, shows cause why the conditions or additional conditions should not be imposed.

515(8) Idem

Where an accused to whom paragraph (6)(b) applies shows cause why the accused's detention in custody is not justified, the justice shall order that the accused be released on giving an un dertaking or entering into a recognizance described in any of paragraphs (2)(a) to (e) with the conditions, described in subsections (4) to (4.2), that the justice considers desirable.

515(9) Sufficiency of record

For the purposes of subsections (5) and (6), it is sufficient if a record is made of the reasons in accordance with the provisions of Part XVIII relating to the taking of evidence at preliminary . .. mqUlnes.

515(10) Justification for detention in custody R.S.c. 1985, c. C-46, s. 515 Page 7 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 515

For the purposes of this section, the detention of an accused in custody is justified only on one or more ofthe following grounds:

(a) where the detention is necessary to ensure his or her attendance in court in order to be dealt with according to law;

(b) where the detention is necessary for the protection or safety of the public, including any victim of or witness to the offence, having regard to all the circumstances including any substantial likelihood that the accused will, if released from custody, commit a crimin al offence or interfere with the administration ofjustice; and

(c) if the detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to all the circumstances, including

(i) the apparent strength ofthe prosecution's case,

(ii) the gravity ofthe offence,

(iii) the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, including whether a firearm was used, and

(iv) the fact that the accused is liable, on conviction, for a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment or, in the case of an offence that involves, or whose subject-matter is, a firearm, a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of three years or more.

515(11) Detention in custody for offence mentioned in s. 469

Where an accused who is charged with an offence mentioned in section 469 is taken before a justice, the justice shall order that the accused be detained in custody until he is dealt with ac cording to law and shall issue a warrant in Form 8 for the committal of the accused.

515(12) Order re no communication

A justice who orders that an accused be detained in custody under this section may include in the order a direction that the accused abstain from communicating, directly or indirectly, with any victim, witness or other person identified in the order, except in accordance with such conditions specified in the order as the justice considers necessary.

R.S.C. 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), ss. 83, 186 (Sched. IV, item 7); 1991, c. 40, s. 31; 1993, c. 45, s. 8; 1994, c. 44, s. 44; 1995, c. 39, ss. 153, 188(b); 1996, c. 19, ss. 71, 93.3; 1997, c. 18, s. 59; 1997, c. 23, s. 16; 1999, c. 5, s. 21; 1999, c. 25, s. 8; 2001, c. 32, s. 37; 2001, c. 41, ss. 19, 133(15)-(17); 2008, c. 6, s. 37

c Canada Federal Statutes French

Code criminel

"131 Partie XVI -- Mesures concernant la comparution d'un prevenu devant un juge de paix et Ia mise en liberte provisoire

"131 Mise en liberte provisoire par voie judiciaire

s 515.

Federal French Statutes reflect

amendments current to May 27,2009

Federal French Regulations are current to

Gazette Vol. 143:11 (May 27,2009)

515.

515(1) Mise en liberte sur remise d'une promesse

Sous reserve des autres dispositions du present article, lorsqu'un prevenu inculpe d'une infrac tion autre qu'une infraction mentionnee a l'article 469 est conduit devant un juge de paix, ce lui-ci doit, sauf si un plaidoyer de culpabilite du prevenu est accepte, ordonner que Ie prevenu soit mis en liberte a l'egard de cette infraction, pourvu qu'il remette une promesse sans condi tion, a moins que Ie poursuivant, ayant eu la possibilite raisonnable de Ie faire, ne fasse valoir a l'egard de cette infraction des motifs justifiant Ia detention du prevenu sous garde ou des motifs justifiant de rendre une ordonnance aux termes de toute autre disposition du present article et lorsque Ie juge de paix rend une ordonnance en vertu d'une autre disposition du present article, l'ordonnance ne peut se rapporter quIa l'infraction au sujet de laquelle Ie prevenu a ete conduit devant Ie juge de paix.

515(2) Mise en liberte sur remise d'une promesse assortie de conditions, etc.

Lorsque Ie juge de paix ne rend pas une ordonnance en vertu du paragraphe (1), il ordonne, a moins que Ie poursuivant ne fasse valoir des motifs justifiant la detention du prevenu sous garde, que Ie prevenu soit mis en liberte pourvu que, seion Ie cas:

a) il remette une promesse assortie des conditions que Ie juge de paix fixe;

b) il contracte sans caution, devant Ie juge de paix, un engagement au montant et sous les conditions fixes par celui-ci, mais sans depot d'argent ni d'autre valeur; L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-46, s. 515 Page 2 L.R.c. (1985), ch. C-46, s. 515

c) il contracte avec caution, devant Ie juge de paix, un engagement au montant et sous les conditions fixes par celui-ci, mais sans depot d'argent ni d'autre valeur;

d) avec Ie consentement du poursuivant, il contracte sans caution, devant Ie juge de paix, un engagement au montant et sous les conditions fixes par celui-ci et depose la somme d'argent ou les valeurs que ce dernier prescrit;

e) si Ie prevenu ne reside pas ordinairement dans la province ou il est sous garde ou dans un rayon de deux cent kilometres du lieu ou il est sous garde, il contracte, avec ou sans caution, devant Ie juge de paix un engagement au montant et sous les conditions fixes par celui-ci et depose la somme d'argent ou les valeurs que ce dernier prescrit.

515(2.1) Le juge de paix a Ie pouvoir de nommer des cautions dans l'ordonnance

Lorsque, en conformite avec Ie paragraphe (2) ou toute autre disposition de la presente loi, un juge de paix, un juge ou un tribunal ordonne qu'un prevenu soit libere pourvu qu'il contracte un engagement avec cautions, Ie juge de paix, Ie juge ou Ie tribunal peut, dans l'ordonnance, nommer certaines personnes it titre de cautions.

515(2.2) Comparution par telecommunication

Le prevenu tenu par la presente loi de comparaitre en vue de la mise en liberte provisoire Ie fait en personne ou par Ie moyen de telecommunication, y compris Ie telephone, que Ie juge de paix estime satisfaisant et, sous reserve du paragraphe (2.3), autorise.

515(2.3) Consentements

Le consentement du poursuivant et de l'accuse est necessaire si des temoignages doivent etre rendus lors de la comparution et s'il est impossible al'accuse de comparaitre par television en circuit ferme ou par tout autre moyen permettant au tribunal et al'accuse de se voir et de com muniquer simultanement.

515(3) Idem Le juge de paix ne peut pas rendre d'ordonnance aux termes de l'un des alineas (2)b)it e), a moins que Ie poursuivant ne fasse valoir des motifs justifiant de ne pas rendre une ordonnance aux termes de l'alinea precedant immediatement.

515(4) Conditions autorisees

Le juge de paix peut ordonner, comme conditions aux termes du paragraphe (2), que Ie prevenu fasse celle ou celles des choses suivantes que specifie l'ordonnance : a) se presenter, aux moments indiques dans l'ordonnance, a un agent de la paix ou a une autre personne designes dans l'ordonnance;

b) rester dans la juridiction territoriale specifiee dans l'ordonnance;

c) notifier it l'agent de la paix ou toute autre personne designes en vertu de l'alinea a) tout L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-46, s. 515 Page 3 L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-46, s. 515

changement d'adresse, d'emploi ou d'occupation;

d) s'abstenir de communiquer, directement ou indirectement, avec toute personne -- vic time, temoin ou autre -- identifiee dans l'ordonnance ou d'aller dans un lieu qui y est mentionne, si ce n'est en conformite avec les conditions qui y sont prevues et qu'il estime necessaires;

e) lorsque Ie prevenu est detenteur d'un passeport, deposer son passeport ainsi que Ie specifie l'ordonnance;

e.l) observer telles autres conditions indiquees dans l'ordonnance que Ie juge de paix es time necessaires pour assurer la securite des victimes ou des temoins de l'infraction;

f) observer telles autres conditions raisonnables, specifiees dans l'ordonnance, que Ie juge de paix estime opportunes.

515(4.1) Condition additionnelle

Lorsqu'il rend une ordonnance en vertu du paragraphe (2) dans Ie cas d'une infraction perpetree avec usage, tentative ou menace de violence contre autrui, d'une infraction de terror isme, de l'infraction visee a l'article 264 (harcelement criminel) ou 423.1 (intimidation d'une personne associee au systeme judiciaire), d'une infraction aux paragraphes 5(3) ou (4),6(3) ou 7(2) de la Loi reglementant certaines drogues et autres substances, d'une infraction relative a une arme a feu, une arbalete, une arme prohibee, une arme a autorisation restreinte, un dispos itif prohibe, des munitions, des munitions prohibees ou des substances explosives, d'une in fraction visee au paragraphe 20(1) de la Loi sur la protection de l'information, ou d'une infrac tion visee aux paragraphes 21(1) ou 22(1) ou a l'article 23 de cette loi commise a l'egard d'une infraction visee au paragraphe 20(1) de cette loi, Ie juge de paix doit, s'il en arrive a la conclu sion qu'il est souhaitable de Ie faire pour la securite du prevenu, de la victime ou de toute autre personne, assortir l'ordonnance d'une condition lui interdisant, jusqu'a ce qu'il soit juge conformement a la loi, d'avoir en sa possession de tels objets ou l'un ou plusieurs de ceux-ci.

Modification proposee -- 515(4.1) 515(4.1) Condition additionnelle

Lorsqu'i! rend une ordonnance en vertu du paragraphe (2) dans Ie cas d'une infraction perpetree avec usage, tentative ou menace de violence contre autrui, de l'infraction visee a l'article 264 (harddement criminel), d'une infraction relative a la contravention des para graphes 5(1) ou (2), 6(1) ou (2) ou 7(1) de la Loi reglementant certaines drogues et autres substances ou d'une infraction relative a une arme a feu, une arbalete, une arme prohibee, une arme a autorisation restreinte, un dispositij prohibe, des munitions, des munitions prohibees ou des substances explosives, Ie juge de paix doit, s'i! en arrive a la conclusion qu'i! est souhaitable de Ie faire pour la securite du prevenu, de la victime ou de toute autre per sonne, assortir l'ordonnance d'une condition lui interdisant, jusqu'a ce qu'i! soit juge conformement a la loi, d'avoir en sa possession de tels objets ou l'un ou plusieurs de ceux-ci. L.R.C. (1985),ch. C-46, s. 515 Page 4 L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-46, s. 515

2003, ch. 8, art. 8 [Non en vigueur a la date de public ation.)

Modification proposee -- Modification conditionnelle -- 515(4.1) A l'entree en vigueur de 2001, ch. 32, par. 37(1) [En vigueur Ie 7janvier 2002.} ou a celle de 2003, ch. 8, art. 8 [Non en vigueur a la date de publication.], la derniere en date titant a ret enir, Ie paragraphe 515(4.1) de la version fram;aise du Code criminel, sera remplacee par ce qui suit:

(4.1) Condition additionnelle

Lorsqu'i! rend une ordonnance en vertu du paragraphe (2) dans Ie cas d'une infraction perpetree avec usage, tentative ou menace de violence contre autrui, de l'infraction visee aux articles 264 (harcelement criminel) ou 423.1 (intimidation d'une personne associee au systeme judiciaire), d'une infraction aux paragraphes 5(1) ou (2), 6(1) ou (2) ou 7(1) de la Loi reglementant certaines drogues et autres substances ou d'une infraction relative a une arme a feu, une arbalete, une arme prohibee, une arme a autorisation restreinte, un dis positijprohibe, des munitions, des munitions prohibees ou des substances explosives, Ie juge de paix do it, s /i! en arrive a la conclusion qu'i! est souhaitable de Ie faire pour la securite du prevenu, de la victime ou de toute autre personne, assortir l'ordonnance d'une condition lui interdisant, jusqu'a ce qu'i! soit juge conformement a la loi, d'avoir en sa possession de tels objets ou l'un ou plusieurs de ceux-ci.

2001, ch. 32, art. 82(3) [Modifie par 2004, ch. 12, art. 23.} [Conditions non remplies.}

515(4.11) Remise

Le cas echeant, Ie juge de paix mentionne dans l'ordonnance la fayon de remettre, de detenir ou d'entreposer les objets vises au paragraphe (4.1) qui sont en la possession du prevenu, ou d'en disposer, et de remettre les autorisations, permis et certificats d'enregistrement dont celui ci est titulaire. 515(4.12) Motifs

Le juge de paix qui n'assortit pas l'ordonnance rendue en application du paragraphe (2) de la condition prevue au paragraphe (4.1) est tenu de donner ses motifs, qui sont consignes au dossier de l'instance. 515(4.2) Opportunite d'assortir l'ordonnance d'une condition additionnelle

Le juge de paix qui rend une ordonnance en vertu du paragraphe (2) dans Ie cas d'une infrac tion mentionnee au paragraphe (4.3) doit considerer s'il est souhaitable pour la securite de toute personne, en particulier celle des victimes, des temoins et des personnes associees au systeme judiciaire, d'imposer au prevenu, dans l'ordonnance, tout ou partie des obligations suivantes : L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-46, s. 515 Page 5 L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-46, s. 515

a) s'abstenir de communiquer, directement ou indirectement, avec toute personne -- vic time, temoin ou autre -- qui y est identifiee ou d'aller dans un lieu qui y est mentionne;

b) observer telles autres conditions que Ie juge de paix estime necessaires pour assurer la securite de ces personnes.

515(4.3) Infractions

Les infractions visees par Ie paragraphe (4.2) sont les suivantes :

a) infraction de terrorisme;

b) infraction visee aux articles 264 ou 423.1;

c) infraction perpetree avec usage, tentative ou menace de violence;

d) infraction visee au paragraphe 20(1) de la Loi sur fa protection de f'information ou in fraction visee aux paragraphes 21 (1) ou 22(1) ou a l'article 23 de cette loi commise a l'egard d'une infraction visee au paragraphe 20( 1) de cette loi.

515(5) Detention

Lorsque Ie poursuivant fait valoir des motifs justifiant la detention du prevenu sous garde, Ie juge de paix ordonne que Ie prevenu soit detenu sous garde jusqu'a ce qu'il soit traite selon la loi et porte au dossier les motifs de sa decision.

515(6) Ordonnance de detention

Malgre toute autre disposition du present article, Ie juge de paix ordonne la detention sous garde du prevenu jusqu'a ce qu'il soit traite selon la loi -- a moins que celui-ci, ayant eu la possibilite de Ie faire, ne fasse valoir l'absence de fondement de la mesure -- dans Ie cas OU il est inculpe :

a) soit d'un acte criminel autre qu'une infraction mentionnee a l'article 469 :

(i) ou bien qui est presume avoir ete commis alors qu'il etait en liberte apres avoir ete libere a l'egard d'un autre acte criminel en vertu des dispositions de la presente partie ou des articles 679 ou 680,

(ii) ou bien qui est prevu aux articles 467.11, 467.12 ou 467.13 ou qui est une infrac tion grave presumee avoir ete commise au profit ou sous la direction d'une organisa tion criminelle, ou en association avec elle,

(iii) ou bien qui est une infraction prevue a l'un des articles 83.02 a 83.04 et 83.18 a 83.23 ou une infraction de terrorisme presumee avoir ete commise,

(iv) ou bien qui est une infraction prevue aux paragraphes 16(1) ou (2), 17(1), 19(1), 20(1) ou 22(1) de la Loi sur fa protection de f'information, L.R.e. (1985), ch. C-46, s. 515 Page 6 L.R.e. (1985), ch. C-46, s. 515

(v) ou bien qui est une infraction prevue aux paragraphes 21(1) ou 22(1) ou a l'article 23 de cette loi commise a l'egard d'une infraction mentionnee au sous-alinea (iv);

(vi) ou bien qui est prevu aux articles 99, 100 ou 103,

(vii) ou bien qui est prevu a l'article 244 ou, s'il est presume qu'une arme a feu a ete utilisee lors de la perpetration de l'infraction, aux articles 239, 272 ou 273, au para graphe 279(1) ou aux articles 279.1, 344 ou 346,

Proposed Amendment -- 515(6)a)(vii) (vii) au bien qui est prevu aux articles 244 au 244.2 au, s'il est presume qu'une arme a feu a ete utilisee lars de la perpetration de I'infraction, aux articles 239, 272 au 273, au paragraphe 279(1) au aux articles 279.1, 344 au 346,

2009, ch. 22, art. 17 [Non en vigueur ala date de pub lication.]

(viii) ou bien qui est presume avoir mis en jeu une arme a feu, une arbalete, une arme prohibee, une arme a autorisation restreinte, un dispositif prohibe, des munitions, des munitions prohibees ou des substances explosives et avoir ete commis alors qu'il etait vise par une ordonnance d'interdiction au sens du paragraphe 84(1);

b) d'un acte criminel autre qu'une infraction mentionnee a l'article 469 et qui ne reside pas habituellement au Canada;

c) soit d'une infraction visee a l'un des paragraphes 145(2) a (5) et presumee avoir ete commise alors qu'il etait en liberte apres qu'il a ete libere relativement a une autre infrac tion en vertu des dispositions de la presente partie ou des articles 679,680 ou 816;

d) soit d'une infraction -- passible de l'emprisonnement a perpetuite -- aux paragraphes 5(3), 6(3) ou 7(2) de la Loi reglementant certaines drogues et autres substances ou d'avoir complote en vue de commettre une telle infraction.

515(6.1) Motifs

S'il ordonne la mise en liberte du prevenu vise au paragraphe (6), Ie juge de paix porte au dossier les motifs de sa decision. 515(7) Ordonnance de mise en liberte

Le juge de paix ordonne la mise en liberte du prevenu vise aux alineas (6)a), c) ou d), qui fait valoir l'absence de fondement de sa detention sous garde, sur remise de la promesse ou de l'engagement vises a l'un des alineas (2)a)a e) et assortis des conditions visees aux para graphes (4) a (4.2) qu'il estime souhaitables notamment, lorsque Ie prevenu etait deja en liberte sur remise de tels promesse ou engagement, des conditions supplementaires visees aux paragraphes (4) a (4.2), a moins que celui-ci, ayant eu la possibilite de Ie faire, ne fasse valoir des motifs excluant l'application des conditions. L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-46, s. 515 Page 7 L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-46, s. 515

515(8) Idem

Le juge de paix ordonne la mise en liberte du prevenu vise a l'alinea (6)b), qui fait valoir l'absence de fondement de sa detention, sur remise de la promesse ou de l'engagement vises a l'un des alineas (2)a)a e) et assortis des conditions visees aux paragraphes (4) a (4.2) qu'il es time souhaitables.

515(9) Expose suffisant

Pour l'application des paragraphes (5) et (6), il est suffisant de consigner les raisons en conformite avec les dispositions de la partie XVIII ayant trait a la maniere de recueillir les temoignages lors des enquetes preliminaires. 515(10) Motifs justifiant la detention

Pour l'application du present article, la detention d'un prevenu sous garde n'est justifiee que dans l'un des cas suivants : a) sa detention est necessaire pour assurer sa presence au tribunal afin qu'il soit traite selon la loi; b) sa detention est necessaire pour la protection ou la securite du public, notamment celle des victimes et des temoins de l'infraction, eu egard aux circonstances, y compris toute probabilite marquee que Ie prevenu, s'il est mis en liberte, commettra une infraction criminelle ou nuira a l'administration de la justice; c) sa detention est necessaire pour ne pas miner la confiance du public envers l'administration de la justice, compte tenu de toutes les circonstances, notamment les suivantes : (i) Ie fait que l'accusation parait fondee,

(ii) la gravite de l'infraction, (iii) les circonstances entourant sa perpetration, y compris l'usage d'une arme a feu,

(iv) Ie fait que Ie prevenu encourt, en cas de condamnation, une longue peine d'emprisonnement ou, s'agissant d'une infraction mettant en jeu une arme a feu, une peine minimale d'emprisonnement d'au moins trois ans. 515(11) Detention pour infraction mentionnee al'article 469 Le juge de paix devant lequel est conduit un prevenu inculpe d'une infraction mentionnee a l'article 469 doit ordonner qu'il soit detenu sous garde jusqu'a ce qu'il soit traite selon la loi et decemer a son sujet un mandat redige selon la formule 8. 515(12) Ordonnance de s'abstenir de communiquer

Le juge de paix qui ordonne la detention du prevenu sous garde en vertu du present article L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-46, s. 515 Page 8 L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-46, s. 515

peut lui ordonner, en outre, de s'abstenir de communiquer, directement ou indirectement, avec toute personne -- victime, temoin ou autre -- identifiee dans l'ordonnance si ce n'est en conformite avec les conditions qui y sont prevues et qu'il estime necessaires.

L.R.C. (1985), ch. 27 (1er sUPP!.), art. 83, 186 (Ann. IV, no 7); 1991, ch. 40, art. 31; 1993, ch. 45, art. 8; 1994, ch. 44, art. 44; 1995, ch. 39, art. 153, 188b); 1996, ch. 19, art. 71,93.3; 1997, ch. 18, art. 59; 1997, ch. 23, art. 16; 1999, ch. 5, art. 21; 1999, ch. 25, art. 8; 2001, ch. 32, art. 37; 2001, ch. 41, art. 19, 133(15)-(17); 2008, ch. 6, art. 37

END OF.DOCUMENT

c Canada Federal Statutes

"[3 Supreme Court Act

"[3 Appellate Jurisdiction

s 40.

Federal English Statutes reflect

amendments current to June 10, 2009 Federal English Regulations are current to

Gazette Vol. 143: 12 (June 10, 2009)

40.

40(1) Appeals With Leave Of Supreme Court Subject to subsection (3), an appeal lies to the Supreme Court from any final or other judg ment of the Federal Court of Appeal or of the highest court of final resort in a province, or a judge thereof, in which judgment can be had in the particular case sought to be appealed to the Supreme Court, whether or not leave to appeal to the Supreme Court has been refused by any other court, where, with respect to the particular case sought to be appealed, the Supreme Court is of the opinion that any question involved therein is, by reason of its public import ance or the importance of any issue of law or any issue of mixed law and fact involved in that question, one that ought to be decided by the Supreme Court or is, for any other reason, of such a nature or significance as to warrant decision by it, and leave to appeal from that judg ment is accordingly granted by the Supreme Court.

40(2) Application for leave

An application for leave to appeal under this section shall be brought in accordance with para graph 58(1)(a).

40(3) Appeals in respect of offences

No appeal to the Court lies under this section from the judgment of any court acquitting or convicting or setting aside or affirming a conviction or acquittal of an indictable offence or, except in respect of a question of law or jurisdiction, of an offence other than an indictable of fence.

40(4) Extending time for allowing appeal R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 40 Page 2 R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 40

Whenever the Court has granted leave to appeal, the Court or a judge may, notwithstanding anything in this Act, extend the time within which the appeal may be allowed.

S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 37.

END OF DOCUMENT L.R.C. (1985), ch. S-26,s. 40 Page 1 L.R.c. (1985), ch. S-26, s. 40

c Canada Federal Statutes French

"131 Cour supreme, Loi sur la

"131 Juridiction d'appel

s 40.

Federal French Statutes reflect

amendments current to May 27, 2009

Federal French Regulations are current to

Gazette Vol. 143:11 (May27,2009)

40.

40(1) Appel avec l'autorisation de la Cour

Sous reserve du paragraphe (3), il peut etre interjete appel devant la Cour de tout jugement, definitif ou autre, rendu par la Cour d'appel federale ou par Ie plus haut tribunal de dernier ressort habilite, dans une province, ajuger l'affaire en question, ou par l'un des juges de ces juridictions inferieures, que l'autorisation d'en appeler ala Cour ait ou non ete refusee par une autre juridiction, lorsque la Cour estime, compte tenu de l'importance de l'affaire pour Ie pub lic, ou de l'importance des questions de droit ou des questions mixtes de droit et de fait qu'elle comporte, ou de sa nature ou importance a tout egard, qu'elle devrait en etre saisie et lor squ'elle accorde en consequence l'autorisation d'en appeler.

40(2) Demandes d'autorisation d'appel

Les demandes d'autorisation d'appel presentees au titre du present article sont regies par l'alinea 58(l)a).

40(3) Appels it l'egard d'infractions

Le present article ne permet pas d'en appeler devant la Cour d'un jugement prononyant un ac quittement ou une declaration de culpabilite ou annulant ou confirmant l'une ou l'autre de ces decisions dans Ie cas d'un acte criminel au, sauf s'il s'agit d'une question de droit ou de competence, d'une infraction autre qu'un acte criminel.

40(4) Prorogation du delai d'appel

Dans tous les cas ou elle accorde une autorisation d'appel, la Cour ou l'un de ses juges peut, L.R.C. (1985),ch. S-26,s.40 Page 2 L.R.c. (1985), ch. S-26, s. 40

ma1gre Ies autres dispositions de Ia presente Ioi, proroger Ie delai d'appel.

L.R.C. (1985), ch. 34 (3 e suppl.), art. 3; 1990, ch. 8, art. 37

END OF DOCUMENT TABK ..t<~ I Departmoot of Justice Ministom de I~ JusticeCa l'ldl;'. I ... Canada Canoo::l . r c: d

Criminal Code ( R.S., 1985, c. C-46 )

Act current to June 15th, 2009

RIGHT OF APPEAL

Procedure abolished

674. No proceedings other than those authorized by this Part and Part XXVI shall be taken by way of appeal in proceedings in respect of indictable offences. R.S., c. C-34, s. 602. •• Department of Justico Ministom de la JusticeC~l" .]1;1 • C3nooa G..lnada aT ana

Code criminel ( L.R., 1985, ch. C-46 )

Loi ajour en date du 15 juin 2009

DROIT D'APPEL

Procedure abolie

674. Nulle procedure autre que celles qui sont autorisees par la presente partie et la partie XXVI ne peut etre intentee par voie d'appel dans des procedures concernant des actes criminels. SR, ch. C-34, art. 602.