GDP-Indexed Bonds, Argentinian Debt Crisis, Sovereign Debt; Debt Management; Inflation Indexation; Real Indexation
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SUERF2013_5.book Page 1 Monday, March 24, 2014 3:05 PM The Future of Sovereign Borrowing in Europe SUERF2013_5.book Page 2 Monday, March 24, 2014 3:05 PM SUERF2013_5.book Page 3 Monday, March 24, 2014 3:05 PM THE FUTURE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING IN EUROPE Edited by and Introduction by Morten Balling, Ernest Gnan & Johannes Holler Chapters by Ulrich Bindseil and Nicolas Sauter Hans J. Blommestein Maria Cannata Bonfrate Juha Kilponen Alessandro Missale Ewald Nowotny Guido Sandleris and Mark L.J. Wright A joint publication with the Austrian Society for Bank Research SUERF – The European Money and Finance Forum Vienna 2013 SUERF Study 2013/5 SUERF2013_5.book Page 4 Monday, March 24, 2014 3:05 PM CIP The Future of Sovereign Borrowing in Europe Editors: Morten Balling, Ernest Gnan and Johannes Holler Authors: Ulrich Bindseil and Nicolas Sauter, Hans J. Blommestein, Maria Cannata Bonfrate, Juha Kilponen, Alessandro Missale, Ewald Nowotny, Guido Sandleris and Mark L.J. Wright Keywords: Nowotny: fiscal policy, monetary policy, sovereign bond markets, sovereign debt, monetary union, financial stability Missale: sovereign yield spreads, sovereign debt crisis, crisis resolution mechanisms, debt sustainability Blommestein: sovereign borrowing, funding strategies, public debt management Kilponen: Euro Area debt crisis, sovereign risk, crisis resolution mechanisms, sovereign borrowing Bindseil and Sauter: government debt, monetary policy implementation, international comparison Cannata Bonfrate: public debt management, funding strategy risk management Sandleris and Wright: GDP-Indexed Bonds, Argentinian debt crisis, Sovereign debt; debt management; inflation indexation; real indexation JEL Codes: E42, E52, E58, E62, E63, F34, H12, H63 Vienna: SUERF (SUERF Studies: 2013/5) – January 2014 ISBN: 978-3-902109-71-2 © 2013 SUERF, Vienna Copyright reserved. Subject to the exception provided for by law, no part of this publication may be reproduced and/or published in print, by photocopying, on microfilm or in any other way without the written consent of the copyright holder(s); the same applies to whole or partial adaptations. The publisher retains the sole right to collect from third parties fees payable in respect of copying and/or take legal or other action for this purpose. SUERF2013_5.book Page 1 Monday, March 24, 2014 3:05 PM 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Authors. 5 1. Key Findings of a Conference Jointly Organized by SUERF, OeNB and BWG on March 8, 2013, in Vienna . 7 Ernest Gnan and Johannes Holler 1.1. Framing the Discussion on the Future of Sovereign Borrowing 7 1.2. Questioning the Conventional Wisdom on Debt Sustainability 8 1.3. Reacting to the Changed Environment . 9 1.4. Reviewing the Role of Sovereign Debt for Monetary and Financial Stability . 12 1.5. Improving Risk Management and Prudence of Sovereign Borrowing . 14 1.6. Conclusions. 16 2. Opening Address SUERF/OeNB/BWG Conference on ‘The Future of Sovereign Borrowing in Europe’ . 19 Ewald Nowotny 2.1. The Future of Sovereign Debt Markets Is Crucial in Many Respects . 19 2.2. A Short History of Euro Area Sovereign Debt since the 1990s 20 2.3. The Impact on Monetary Policy Efficiency and Financial Stability. 21 2.4. Eurosystem and Crisis Resolution Mechanisms Become New Players in European Sovereign Bond Markets . 22 2.5. Regulatory Considerations . 22 2.6. Sovereign Debt Management. 23 2.7. Lessons Learned and a Few Conclusions . 24 3. The Future of Sovereign Borrowing in Europe . 27 Alessandro Missale 3.1. Introduction . 27 3.2. Debt Sustainability: the Role of Expectations . 29 3.2.1. Market Sentiment and Yield Spreads: The Evidence . 30 3.3. Policies for Crisis Prevention . 33 3.3.1. Public Debt Management . 33 3.3.2. Fiscal Rules . 35 3.3.3. Fiscal Austerity . 36 3.3.4. Money of Last Resort . 37 3.4. The ESM-ECB Scheme for Crisis Prevention . 40 larcier SUERF2013_5.book Page 2 Monday, March 24, 2014 3:05 PM 2 THE FUTURE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING IN EUROPE 3.5. Conclusions. 42 References . 43 4. Forces Shaping the OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook with Emphasis on the Challenges for European Sovereign Issuers . 45 Hans J. Blommestein 4.1. Introduction . 45 4.2. OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook with a Closer Look at Issuance by EU Governments . 46 4.3. The Explosion in Central Government Debt of Advanced Economies . 48 4.4. Tough Issuance Conditions for Sovereign Issuers, Notably for Several European Ones . 50 4.5. Loss of Market Access by European Countries and Efforts to Return to (international) Longer-term Markets . 53 4.6. Game Changing Policy Responses to European Sovereign Debt Markets under Severe Stress . 53 4.7. Conclusions. 56 References . 56 Annex: Country Groupings . 57 5. European Debt Crisis and Crisis Resolution Policies . 59 Juha Kilponen 5.1. Introduction . 59 5.2. Historical Context. 59 5.3. Road to Debt Crises . 61 5.4. European Crises Resolution Policies . 63 5.5. Effectiveness of European Crises Resolution Policies . 64 5.6. Conclusions. 65 6. The Role of Sovereign Debt in Monetary Policy Implementation – An International Comparative Perspective. 67 Ulrich Bindseil and Nicolas Sauter Abstract. 67 6.1. Introduction . 67 6.2. Theory. 68 6.2.1. Outright Holdings of Sovereign Debt . 69 6.2.2. Collateral Framework – Broad versus Narrow Collateral Set. 70 6.2.3. Two Fundamental Central Bank Doctrines: the ‘Consolidated State Sector’ versus ‘Central Bank Independence’ . 71 larcier SUERF2013_5.book Page 3 Monday, March 24, 2014 3:05 PM TABLE OF CONTENTS 3 6.3. Practice and International Comparison . 72 6.3.1. Comparison of Outright Holdings in Normal Times. 73 6.3.2. Comparison of Asset Purchase Programmes in Times of Crisis . 74 6.3.3. Comparison of Collateral Frameworks . 79 6.3.4. Comparison of Outright and Repurchase Operations 83 6.4. Conclusions. 83 References . 85 7. Risk Management of a Public Debt Portfolio: The Italian Experience 87 Maria Cannata Bonfrate 7.1. Introduction . 87 7.2. The 1980s . 87 7.3. From the 1992 Crisis to the EMU . 89 7.4. The Euro Single Market . 92 7.5. The Current Financial Crisis . 94 7.6. Conclusions. 97 References . 97 8. GDP-Indexed Bonds: A Tool to Reduce Macroeconomic Risk? . 101 Guido Sandleris and Mark L.J. Wright Abstract. 101 8.1. Introduction . 101 8.2. The Experience with Indexed Debt . 103 8.2.1. Indexed Sovereign Debt. 103 8.2.2. Real-indexed Sovereign Debt. 105 8.3. Alternative Forms of Indexation . 109 8.4. Why Don’t We Observe More Real Indexed Debt? . 111 8.4.1. The Existence of Substitutes for Real-Indexed Debt . 111 8.4.2. Fixed Costs of Market Set-Up . 112 8.4.3. Moral Hazard and Incentives to Misrepresent Data . 113 8.4.4. Political Costs . 115 8.5. Conclusions. 116 References . 116 larcier SUERF2013_5.book Page 4 Monday, March 24, 2014 3:05 PM SUERF2013_5.book Page 5 Monday, March 24, 2014 3:05 PM 5 LIST OF AUTHORS Morten BALLING Professor Emeritus of Finance, Department of Economics and Business Studies, Aarhus School of Business and Social Sciences, Aarhus University and SUERF Managing Editor Ulrich BINDSEIL Director General, Market Operations, European Central Bank Hans J. BLOMMESTEIN Head, Bond Market and Public Debt Management Unit, OECD Maria CANNATA BONFRATE Director General of the Public Debt Management in the Treasury Department of the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance Ernest GNAN Counsel to the Board and Head, Economic Analysis Division, Oesterreichische Nationalbank and SUERF Secretary General Johannes HOLLER Economist, Economic Analysis Division, Oesterreichische Nationalbank Juha KILPONEN Head of Forecasting, Monetary Policy and Research Department, Bank of Finland Alessandro MISSALE Professor of Economics, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy Ewald NOWOTNY Governor, Oesterreichische Nationalbank Guido SANDLERIS Professor and Director, Center for Financial Research, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (UTDT), Buenos Aires, Argentina Nicolas SAUTER Directorate Risk Management, European Central Bank Mark L.J. Wright Associate Professor, University of California, Los Angeles, and Senior Economist and Research Advisor, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago larcier SUERF2013_5.book Page 6 Monday, March 24, 2014 3:05 PM SUERF2013_5.book Page 7 Monday, March 24, 2014 3:05 PM 7 1. KEY FINDINGS OF A CONFERENCE JOINTLY ORGANIZED BY SUERF, OENB AND BWG ON MARCH 8, 2013, IN VIENNA Ernest Gnan and Johannes Holler In March 2013 around 130 participants from academia, banking and finance, governments and central banking gathered at the premises of the OeNB in Vienna for a conference jointly organized by the European Money and Finance Forum SUERF, the OeNB and the Austrian Society for Bank Research to discuss “The Future of Sovereign Borrowing.” The financial, economic and sovereign debt crisis has fundamentally changed the rules of the game in sovereign debt markets, particularly in the euro area, but also beyond its borders. Sovereign bonds are no longer widely perceived as ‘risk-free’ assets. Even the sovereign bonds of safe-haven countries have come under close scrutiny or lost some of their prime ratings. Yet crisis countries have seen dramatic downgrades of their sovereign debt ratings so that they face soaring risk spreads and unsustainably high financing costs (or even a loss of access to bond market financing), pushing them towards shorter financing or forcing them to rely on financial support from other countries and the international community or massive intervention by central banks. Against this backdrop, the conference focused on three aspects: first, issuers and lenders reaction to the changed environment (session 1); second, implications of the current and likely future state of public finances and debt markets for financial stability, monetary policy and central banks (session 2); and third, ways to improve risk management and foster caution in future sovereign borrowing (session 3). 1.1. FRAMING THE DISCUSSION ON THE FUTURE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING In opening the conference, OeNB Governor Ewald Nowotny emphasized the importance of the topic, given that the ability to borrow centrally affects governments’ ability to conduct countercyclical policies, with direct operational and strategic ramifications for monetary policy, particularly in a monetary union.