In the Making: Moral Subjectivity in the Face of Sexbots
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
Paladyn, Journal of Behavioral Robotics 2020; 11: 284–300 Research Article Jan Peter Bergen* Love(rs) in the making: Moral subjectivity in the face of sexbots https://doi.org/10.1515/pjbr-2020-0016 has been optimistic, with some instead voicing serious received September 30, 2019; accepted April 28, 2020 concerns about the deleterious effects the widespread use of Abstract: This article offers a novel reading of the sexbots may bring. This article engages with some of these ff - criticisms of sex robots put forward by the Campaign concerns by o ering a novel take on a well known criticism ( ) Against Sex Robots (CASR). Focusing on the implication by the Campaign Against Sex Robots CASR concerning the ff ’ of a loss of empathy, it structures CASR’s worries as an morally problematic e ects of sex robots normalization. ’ [ ] argument from moral degradation centered around the Proposed in Kathleen Richardson s 1 critical paper on the “ potential effects on sexbot users’ sexual and moral topic, CASR is inspired by the conviction that an organized subjectivity. This argument is subsequently explored approach against the development of sex robots is necessary through the combined lenses of postphenomenology and in response to the numerous articles and campaigns that - the ethical phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas. In so now promote their development without critically exam ff ” [ ] doing, it describes the type of human-technology ining their potentially detrimental e ect on society 2 .On fi relations that sexbots invite, identifying alterity as a the one hand, CASR is skeptical about some of the bene ts central feature. It also highlights how alterity, respon- alleged by sexbot proponents.¹ More scathing, however, are ’ sibility, and subjectivity are intimately connected. CASR sconcernsovertheharmfulconsequencesthey However, that connection is distinctly different in sexual foresee sexbots exacerbating: •“ circumstances, making current versions of Levinasian We believe the development of sex robots further fi roboethics largely inapplicable for the ethics of sexbots. sexually objecti es women and children. • To overcome this, the article delves into Levinas’ The vision for sex robots is underscored by reference to - phenomenology of Eros and identifies voluptuousness prostitute john exchange² which relies on recognizing as a type of enjoyment of the Other that is different from only the needs and wants of the buyers³ of sexual the enjoyment invited by current sexbots and is abuse, the persons in prostitution are not attributed ( ) compatible with responsibility. Based on this, the article subjectivity and reduced to a thing just like the robot . • provides examples of how this phenomenology of Eros The development of sex robots and the ideas to can inspire the design of future sexbots in ways that support their production show the immense horrors alleviate some of CASR’s concerns. still present in the world of prostitution which is built on the ‘perceived’ inferiority of women and children Keywords: sex robots, postphenomenology, Levinas, sub- and therefore justifies their use as sex objects. jectivity, Eros, ethics, design 1 Introduction 1 This includes the idea that “sex robots could help reduce sexual As technological advancements increasingly facilitate the exploitation and violence towards prostituted persons, [because] ff design of relatively a ordable, interactive, and engaging technology and the sex trade coexist and reinforce each other sex robots, the latter have been receiving increased media creating more demand for human bodies” [2]. and academic attention. However, not all of this attention 2 For more information on the ways in which the use of sex robots resembles exchanges between sex workers and sex buyers (johns), see [1]. 3 As Levy [3] points out, one of the advantages of sex robots would * Corresponding author: Jan Peter Bergen, Department of be that they can be tailored to the needs and wants of the buyer/ Philosophy, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands, user and would thus lead to more sexual satisfaction. This has also e-mail: [email protected] been dubbed as the greater satisfaction thesis [4]. Open Access. © 2020 Jan Peter Bergen, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Public License. Love(rs) in the making: moral subjectivity in the face of sexbots 285 • We propose that the development of sex robots will with robots to the aforementioned “prostitute-john” further reduce human empathy that can only be relations. They reconstruct the argument as follows: developed by an experience of mutual relationship” [2]. (1) “Prostitute-john (or sex worker-client) relations are ethically problematic (for a number of reasons, but So CASR is worried about an escalation in terms of particularly due to objectification of the sex worker). the objectification of women and children, claiming that (2) Sexbot-human relations are being modeled on sex increased use of sexbots somehow “justifies” this worker-client relations and so will share similar happening. What is not immediately clear, however, is properties with those relations. how this outcome is related to CASR’s other concerns (3) Therefore, sexbots-human relations will be ethically presented above. This in turn obfuscates the process by problematic (by analogy). which the objectification is supposed to come about. (4) Therefore, we ought to Campaign Against Sex Robots” Indeed, as it stands, the list does not present a structured [5,pp.48–49]. argument. Not only does this frustrate the search for constructive solutions (for which we would benefitfroma They then provide three main reasons why they more well-ordered causal chain), but it also makes think the argument should fail to persuade us to CASR. empirical investigations into the merits of the argument For one, even if the worry about objectification is rather difficult.⁴ As such, it needs further specification if it warranted, one could act upon that by introducing is to be convincing. regulation⁵ or designing sexbots so as to invite different In what follows, I first discuss previous attempts at sorts of relationships to them. As such, CASR’s conclu- such specification in the form of two connected but sion is much stronger than its premises allow for. alternative readings of CASR’s criticism of sexbots: one Second, Danaher et al. contend that CASR’s argument as an argument from analogy and one from symbolic operates on a misleading account of sex work, where all consequences. Subsequently, a third plausible reading is sex work is characterized by objectification, denial of proposed in the form of an argument from moral subjectivity, and asymmetrical power relations. How- degradation, which emphasizes CASR’s worry about the ever, they then proceed to show that the reality of loss of empathy more than previous attempts have. The sex work is more nuanced and that its “bad-making rest of the article substantiates this proposed argument properties” are not unique to it. Consequently, “simply using and combining insights from postphenomenology referring to those harms without showing how they are and Levinas’ ethical phenomenology. It ends with some unique, uniquely bad, or would be reduced rather than initial recommendations for future, more responsible, exacerbated by a ban, is not enough to show that sexbot design. prohibition would be warranted” [5p.53]. Third, they identify obvious disanalogies between sex work and sex with robots. For one, there is the fact that robots are 2 Arguments from analogy and unlikely to be persons, while sex workers most definitely symbolic consequences are. Second, while it may be likely that the way we treat persons affects the way we treat other persons, Danaher et al. consider it less obvious that the way we treat In their chapter titled Should We Campaign Against Sex objects would likewise translate to interhuman behavior. Robots?, Danaher et al. [5] present the argument by And lastly, the analogy is said to be incomplete: since it CASR as an argument from analogy, where the strength ignores possible benefits of sex robots, no conclusion of the argument depends on the analogousness of sex can be reached on proper policy concerning them based on this analogy because harms and benefits cannot be weighed against one another. ’ So this rendition of CASR sworriesas an argument 4 Such empirical investigations are important. Social consequences from analogy does not support their strong sexbot-critical of a technology’s introduction are notoriously hard to predict [6]. Similar claims to CASR’s have in the past been made about porn and violent video games, and final consensus is still lacking on the full range of effects. While pessimistic predictions of their results on 5 Danaher et al. [5] remain vague about what kinds of regulation sexual and violent crime rates seem to have been largely overblown would be helpful here. However, Gutiu [10] presents a number of [7,8], claims about pornography’seffect on consumers’ objectifying arguments that favor regulation of sexbots over prohibition, attitudes apparently have some merit [9]. including some concrete examples of possible regulations. 286 Jan Peter Bergen position. Nevertheless, sex work and sex with robots need that empathy is desirable)!Thatisquitetheclaim,tobe not be entirely analogous to support a sexbot-critical sure. But how are we to understand this? How is this position if it is not the analogy that does the persuasive personal moral decline connected to CASR’sotherpointsof work. In the same volume, Danaher proposes an alter- concern? One possibility is presented by Gutiu [10], native reading of CASR’s position: as an argument from characterizing it as an additional harm to users (next to symbolic-consequences [11]. Generally, the argumentative the harm to women) resulting from the representation of structureisasfollows: ethically problematic norms. Similarly, sexbot users could (1) “Sex robots do/will symbolically represent ethically run the risk of social isolation by withdrawing from real problematic sexual norms. (Symbolic Claim.) contact with other people, thus not cultivating empathy in (2) If sex robots do/will symbolically represent ethically social situations [12,13].