Issue 7 January 2014 POLITICAL ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY TURKEY URBAN TRANSFORMATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT TOWARDS THE ELECTIONS And the cement is tempered Ecology 28 International Politics 52 Culture 58 Slow philosophy The hedging strategy in foreign policy Gezi’s universe of possibilities Rıdvan Yurtseven M.Sinan Birdal Ezgi Bakçay Contents 3 Editorial URBAN TRANSRORMATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT TOWARDS THE ELECTIONS 4 Gezi, elections and a political alternative, Stefo Benlisoy 9 HDP: Possibilities and obstacles, Ayhan Bilgen 14 Autonomy in local government, Hacı Kurt 19 Crazy urban transformation, rational capital accumulation, Gökhan Bilgihan 24 Weakening the local, reinforcing the center, Prof. Dr. Nadir Suğur ECOLOGY 28 Slow philosophy, Rıdvan Yurtseven 33 Çıralı: Paradise lost, Yusuf Yavuz DEMOCRACY 36 Democratization package evaluated with the independent criteria prevalent in democracies, Ayşen Candaş 41 Violence Prevention and Monitoring Centers (ŞÖNİM) that can’t (won’t) prevent male violence, Deniz Bayram 46 The German political associations - demon and enemy of Turkey? Ulrike Dufner 48 In praise of Turkishness - an end in sight?, Özgür Sevgi Göral INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 52 The hedging strategy in foreign policy, M.Sinan Birdal CULTURE 58 Gezi’s universe of possibilities, Ezgi Bakçay HUMAN LANDSCAPE 65 Wooden-sworded knight of the last Roman castle, or the cry of a human rights defender, Muherrem Erbey 69 News from hbs Heinrich Böll Stiftung - Turkey Represantation The Heinrich Böll Stiftung, associated with the German Green Party, is a legally autonomous and intellectually open political foundation. Our foremost task is civic education in Germany and abroad with the aim of promoting informed democratic opinion, socio-political commitment and mutual understanding. In addition, the Heinrich Böll Stiftung supports artistic and cultural as well as scholarly projects, and co-operation in the development field. The political values of ecology, democracy, gender democracy, solidarity and nonviolence are our chief points of reference. Heinrich Böll’s belief in and promotion of citizen participation in politics is the model for the foundation’s work. Editor in chief: Dr. Ulrike Dufner; editorial team: Özgür Gürbüz, Semahat Sevim, Umud Dalgıç, Yonca Verdioğlu; contributors Banu Yayla, Saynur Gürçay Heinrich Böll Stiftung Turkey Representation, İnönü Cad. Hacı Hanım Sok. No. 10/12, Gümüşsuyu İstanbul; Telephone: +90-212-249 15 54 Fax: +90-212-245 04 30 email: [email protected] web: www.tr.boell.org Editor: Yücel Göktürk Translation: Barış Yıldırım, Hande Eagle. Proofreading: Clare Frost, Jennifer Petzen, Leyla Keough, Marcy Laughlin Print Production: Farika Tasarım Date: December 2013 Printing House: Ezgi Matbaacılık, Sanayi Caddesi Altay Sok. No:10 Yenibosna / İstanbul Tel: 0.212.452 23 02 Perspectives – Political analysis and commentary from Turkey will appear quarterly and distributed for free. For subscription please send your request by email to [email protected] The magazine and each article can be downloaded from our webpage www.tr.boell.org Articles published in Perpectives represent the opinions of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Heinrich Böll Stiftung – Turkey Representation Q Democracy Q International Politics Q Ecology Q Culture Q News from hbs COVER PHOTO: © Gülşin Ketenci / NarPhotos Neigborhood forums that spread the whole country after the Gezi Protests Editorial The year 2013 was problematic for the AKP repeatedly proclaimed advancing the equal government. It started with the surprising but rights of women by initiating conservative poli- promising opening of talks between the National cies increased unrest not only among feminists Intelligence Service and the PKK leader Öcalan. but also among women who define themselves These officially sponsored talks created some as devout Muslims. If we consider that nearly cautious hope for the beginning of a sustainable one third of the female population is between the peace process. Furthermore, a letter from Öcalan ages of 25-44, we can estimate that the paternalis- was read out to the public at Newroz in Diyarba- tic rhetoric directed at young women by the AKP kir and the groups of “Wise Persons Councils” that government might be challenged by the young were formed with the intention of discussing the female population in Turkey. Due to the absence issues with the general public can be understood of fierce protests from the Kemalist circles, even as another element of hope. the right to wear the headscarf in public institu- However, not much seems to be left over tions could no more be used as a success story by from the optimism and support for the govern- the AKP. ment in this issue. After a stalemate in the talks Finally, the conflict between the AKP and the for some months and with the well known quar- Gülen movement might have a spillover effect to rels between the government and pro-Kurdish other religious circles in Turkey. It certainly fur- party about who had fulfilled its promises or who ther damaged the image of the government as it hadn’t, the energy and dynamism of the initial publicly acknowledged the privileges it had given phase seemed to be exhausted quickly. The pro- to the Gülen movement. When the Gülen move- claimed democratic reform package of fall 2013 ment threatened the AKP government with pub- included also too little change to reignite any lishing compromising material about government hope. At the end of 2013 we can conclude that the members, the government itself did not hesitate official beginning of talks is at least something. to counter by threatening the Gülen movement Finally Prime Minister Erdoğan even dared to use with publishing compromising information the word “Kurdistan” at his meeting with Barzani about the movement. The public is watching this in Diyarbakir in November. ping pong between the “moral authorities” of the 2013 is also defined by the protests that arose country with a mixture of fascination and disgust. at Gezi Park and soon spread all over Turkey. When reading these words, the December 17 While these protests inspired the population and operation and the following litigation process for gave hope and the idea of power to the people, corruption allegations are still going on. Alleged the image of the government was significantly amount of money transferred to Turkey, under damaged. Erdoğan appeared as a despot who lost the mediation and protection of top political connection to the public. In addition to the use of authorities and several other civilians add up to brutal police force and prosecution, the govern- 87 billion dollars. The amount of bribery involved ment attempted to use the new method of chal- in this transfer scheme is claimed to be around lenging the opposition by trying to gather masses 24 billion dollars, in ten months 6,2 billion Euro at alternative squares and in doing so claimed to is laundered in other countries. Compare this represent the majority. This attempt clearly dem- amount to Turkey’s trade deficit, 5,358 billion onstrates the dismissal of a policy of pluralism, Euros as of October 2013! The government sees compromise and negotiation. The nakedness of these allegations as a conspiracy against it, plot- the repressive character of the regime, assisted ted by an interconnected foreign and domestic by the media, did not result in the desired effect interest group. Could this group be composed of of the government. It even strengthened the ties the very extortionists themselves? among those who were threatened and increased At the end of 2013, with the loss of two main the solidarity among the protesters from all seg- sources of the strength of the government, cred- ments of society. ibility and moral authority, there seems to be The government not only lost its reformist only a few cards left to be played: pure force and image inside and outside of Turkey, but became economic power. It is this climate that will shape increasingly identified with Putin and a dictator- the upcoming three elections in Turkey: the local ship. The AKP even lost its image as being better elections in March, the presidential elections in than the existing alternatives. In other words, the summer 2014 and the parliamentary elections in fact that there is a lack of a real opposition repre- 2015. senting democratic reforms became an untenable argument. On behalf of the Perspectives team The fact that the AKP government and Erdoğan Ulrike Dufner 4 Heinrich Böll Stiftung / Turkey URBAN TRANSFORMATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT TOWARDS THE ELECTIONS Gezi, elections and a political alternative Stefo Benlisoy A period of consecutive and possibly concurrent AKP’s success elections is upon us. The local elections on March 30th, 2014 will be followed by presidential elections The primary reason why the local elections have led to high expectations is that for the first time in summer and then general elections. Undoubtedly, in its eleven-year rule, the government’s political this process will lead to new political alignments apparatus and alliances seem to have lost their in the country. Despite the ubiquitous claim that inner coherence. Naturally ,there is a backgro- they have totally different dynamics than general und to this process. The main point which dis- tinguishes the AKP government from the others elections, local elections have in the past virtually that came to power in the post-coup era was its turned into general elections and paved the way to success in bringing almost all the mechanisms of new political and social equations. “oversight” under its control. The AKP has largely succeeded in subsuming those institutions es- tablished by the military to perpetuate its control over the political system after the coup (e.g. the Naturally, the first examples that spring to mind president’s powers reminiscent of a semi-pre- include the 1989 local elections, which corre- sidential system, the 10% electoral threshold, sponded to the first social mobilization and left the anti-democratic law on political parties, the turn in the aftermath of the military coup of Sep- Higher Education Council and the position of tember 12th, 1980; and the 1994 local elections, higher judicial bodies).