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Proquest Dissertations Epistemology in the scientific image Item Type text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Cruz, Joseph Lewis Hernandez Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 03/10/2021 20:57:07 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/289194 INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. 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Bell & Howell lnformatk>n and Leamirtg 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 800-521-0600 EPISTEMOLOGY IN THE SCIENTERC IMAGE by Joseph L. Hernandez Cruz Copyright © Joseph L. Hernandez Cruz 2000 A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 2 0 0 0 UMI Number 9983917 Copyright 2000 by Cruz, Joseph Lewis Hemandez All rights reserved. A UMI UMI Microform9983917 Copyright 2000 by Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. Bell & Howell Infomiation and Leaming Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 THE UNIVERSITY Or ARIZONA GRADUATE COLLEGE As members of Che Final Examinacion Commiccee, we cercify chat: we have read the dissercacion prepared by Joseph L. Hernandez Cruz encicled Episcemolocrv in che Sciencific Image and recommend chac it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree of nortor of Philosophy Xlvln Goldman 5^ -aij\l(rO John Pollock Dat^ eith Lehrer Da Date Date Final approval and acceptance of this dissercacion is concingent upon che candidate's submission of the final copy of the dissertation to che Graduace College. I hereby cercify Chat I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement. ^ O i hrV Dissertation Director Alvln Goldman Date/ 3 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library lo be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the copyright holder. SIGNED: 4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The University of Arizona Department of Philosophy, the Department of Psychology, and the Program in Cognitive Science constitute a stimulating environment, and I am very pleased to have been part of it. For invaluable help and support during the writing of this work, I thank the following: Andre Ariew. Tim Bayne. Felice Bedford. .Michael Bergman. Paddy Blanchette, Paul Bloom, David Chalmers, Fiona Cowie. Denise Cummins. Rob Cummins, Merrill Garrett, Alan Hajek, Scott Hendricks. Chris Hill. Jack Lyons. Chris Maloney. Chad Marsolek, Mary Peterson, Joel Pust. Laleh Quinn. Linda Radzik. Patrick Risiew. Tom Senor. David Silver, Holly Smith. Steve Stich. Neil Siillings. Joe Tolliver. Steve Weisler, and Karen Wynn. •Vlelissa Barry deserves a separate line. Keith Lehrer, John Pollock, and, especially, Alvin Goldman have been constant sources of insight, encouragement, and critical engagement. They are the best committee an epistemologist can imagine. 5 This work is dedicated to my parents. Jose Cruz and Olga Hernandez Cruz 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract 8 PART ONE I. EPISTEMOLOGY, METAEPISTEMOLOGY & TWO RIVAL IMAGES OF MIND 10 1. Epistemology 12 2. Metaepistemology 2 8 3. Two Images of the Mind 44 4. Epistemology in the Scientific Image 5 0 II. NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY 53 1. Stances on Naturalism in Epistemology 54 2. Metaepistemic naturalism 63 3. Methodological naturalism 72 4. The Realistic Principle and Psychology in Naturalized Epistemology 81 5. Causal Arguments for Psychologistic Naturalism 89 III. PSYCHOLOGY & EPISTEMIC EXPLANATION 103 1. The Foundations of Psychological Explanation 109 2. Fodor's Language of Thought 131 3. Marr' s Vision 141 4. Artificial Intelligence 150 5. Epistemic Explanation 153 PART TWO IV. EPISTEMIC EXPLANATIONISM 159 1. The methodology of intuitions reconsidered 161 2. Epistemic explanations in cognitive science 167 Step one: Identify behaviors that exhibit intelligence 167 Step two: Isolate theoretically tractable constituents 169 7 TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued Step three: Identify candidate representations and describe a sequence or sequences of representations that would explain the behavior constituents identified in step two 16 9 Step Four: Perform empirical studies to determine whether prediction made by a particular representation-manipulation framework are confirmed by intelligent behavior 17 5 3. Epistemic explanation of the psychology of expert problem solving in chess 177 4. Epistemic Explanation as Naturalized Epistemology 183 V. EPISTEMOLOGY & PSYCHOLOGICAL ACCESS 187 1. Access in Epistemology 190 Low Access 19 0 Intermediate Access 192 H igli-Access 193 2. Alston's Internalist Extemalism 2 02 3. Audi's Causalist Intemalism 2 0 9 4. Feldman & Conee's Evidentialism 214 5. Research on Access 219 6. Epistemic Explanation of Pseudo Access 22 5 7. Epistemic Explanation of Null Access 23 6 8. Conclusion 240 .1 REFERENCES 2 42 8 ABSTRACT The leading versions of epistemic naturalism have attempted to make normative accounts of justification and knowledge in part dependent upon scientific psychology. Call \h\^ docinxxQ psychologistic naturalism. Psychologistic naturalism, it is thought, holds the promise of integrating normative questions about the relation between evidence and belief with a physicalist, causal conception of our mental life. In Part One of this essay I argue that psychologistic naturalism fails. My reasons for claiming this differ significantly from those advanced in the contemporary literature by epistemic non-naturalists, however. Non-naturalists have mistakenly accepted the terms of debate set by psychologistic naturalists, and thus they have argued that the empirical results of the science of the mind — as part of a merely descriptive causal account of natural systems — have no important place in epistemology. But psychologistic naturalism does not fail because psychology is causal and descriptive, as the non-naturalist alleges. It fails, instead, because psychology is not wholly or even primarily causal and descriptive. Psychology requires a robust normative account of rational inference in order to offer explanations within acognitivist framework. The inadequacy of psychologistic naturalism may seem to invite a return to epistemology as first philosophy, where the primary methodology deploys a priori intuitions about cases. In Part Two, I argue that this is not the best response to the instability of psychologistic naturalism. If psychological explanations e.vpress an embedded normative component, then the non-naturalist's objections to a liaison between epistemology and psychology are misguided. I pursue an epistemology in the scientific image, where psychological explanations encode a normative epistemic component and where the states of natural cognizers are characterized at a finer resolution than beliefs. Psychological explanation involves an evaluation of the inferential cogency of each step in a 9 cognitive process, and I replace the traditional methodology of epistemology with this more subtle and nuanced version of epistemic appraisal. 10 CHAPTER ONE: EPISTEMOLOGY, METAEPISTEMOLOGY & TWO RIVAL IMAGES OF MIND In spite of a history of on-again off-again infatuation with science, philosophers recognize that the challenge of explaining and predicting and analyzing the world around us can be met in non-scientific ways. As Sellars puts it, ...the philosopher is not confronted by one complex many-dimensional picture, the unity of which, such as it is, he must come to appreciate; but by two pictures of essentially the same order of complexity, each of which purports
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