Scientific Psychology in the 18Th Century

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Scientific Psychology in the 18Th Century PPSXXX10.1177/1745691616635601Schwarz, PfisterEmpirical Psychology in the 18th Century 635601research-article2016 Perspectives on Psychological Science 2016, Vol. 11(3) 399 –407 Scientific Psychology in the 18th © The Author(s) 2016 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Century: A Historical Rediscovery DOI: 10.1177/1745691616635601 pps.sagepub.com Katharina A. Schwarz and Roland Pfister Department of Psychology, University of Würzburg Abstract As early as 1783, the almost forgotten philosopher, metaphysicist, and psychologist Ferdinand Ueberwasser (1752– 1812) designated himself “Professor für empirische Psychologie und Logik” (professor of empirical psychology and logic) at the University of Münster, Germany. His position was initiated and supported by the minister and educational reformer Franz von Fürstenberg (1729–1810), who considered psychology a core scientific discipline that should be taught at each school and university. At the end of the 18th century, then, psychology seems to have been on the verge of becoming an independent academic discipline, about 100 years before Wilhelm Wundt founded the discipline’s first official laboratory. It seems surprising that Ueberwasser’s writings—including a seminal textbook on empirical psychology—have been almost entirely overlooked in most historical accounts. We focus on this important founding moment of psychological science and on the circumstances that eventually brought this seminal development to a halt. Keywords history of psychology, 18th century, psychology, philosophy The advent of psychology is traditionally considered to Ueberwasser (1752–1812) designated himself “Professor für have occurred in the late 19th century, with Wilhelm empirische Psychologie und Logik”—professor of empirical Wundt founding the discipline’s first official laboratory in psychology and logic—at the University of Münster, 1879 (Boring, 1929). Well-known predecessors paved the Germany, as documented in corresponding archival data way for this groundbreaking development. These prede- (see Fig. 1; LAV NRW W, 2014a, 2014b).1 This early concep- cessors included such distinguished figures as the psy- tion of psychology as an independent academic discipline chophysicists Ernst Heinrich Weber (1795–1878) and seems unparalleled, yet Ueberwasser did not leave a visible Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801–1887), who pioneered trace in the history of the discipline and, in fact, seems to the application of mathematical tools in the study of the have been overlooked, even by thorough historical human mind. Similarly, discoveries by the neuroanato- accounts (e.g., Boring, 1929, 1953). The sole exception to mists Paul Broca (1824–1880) and Carl Wernicke (1848– this state of affairs seems to be Wolfgang Prinz (2014; cf. 1905) laid the foundation for a physiological approach to Prinz, De Maeght, & Knuf, 2005), who, in recent writings, understanding the human mind, and integrative work specifically highlighted Ueberwasser’s forgotten pioneering from philosophers such as Johann Friedrich Herbart work on action control and imitation (for Ueberwasser’s (1776–1841) and Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817–1881) reception in other disciplines, see Bierbrodt, 2000). In this provided theoretical frameworks that facilitated a struc- article, we aim to shed some light on this forgotten pioneer tured understanding of psychological phenomena. of psychological science and his 18th century conception The writings of these scientists appeared from the begin- of the study of the mind. ning of the 19th century onward (e.g., Herbart, 1824/1825); signs that psychology had been established as an indepen- dent field of study do not seem to have surfaced prior to Corresponding Author: this date. A recent rediscovery, however, suggests that this Roland Pfister, Department of Psychology, University of Würzburg, notion is incorrect: As early as 1783, the almost forgotten Röntgenring 11, D-97070 Würzburg, Germany philosopher, metaphysicist, and psychologist Ferdinand E-mail: [email protected] Downloaded from pps.sagepub.com at Universitatsbibliothek on May 23, 2016 400 Schwarz, Pfister Fig. 1. Confirmation of attendance issued by Ferdinand Ueberwasser in 1803. His signature clearly identifies him as a professor of psychology and logic (“Psychol. & Logica”). Courtesy of the Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Münster, Germany (LAV NRW W, 2014a; reproduced with permission). Biographical Notes reform introduced a seminal emphasis on mathematics and scientific education—an emphasis that also included Ferdinand Bernard Ueberwasser was born on August 13, the discipline of psychology, which Fürstenberg even 1752, in Meppen, Germany (Bahlmann, 1895). At the age defined as one of three primary sciences (in addition to of 18 years, he became a Jesuit novice, apparently intend- mathematics and physics; Fürstenberg, 1776/1960; see ing to pursue a clerical career (Marx, 1829). At this time, Fig. 2).3 In the course of this reform, Ueberwasser was however, the Society of Jesus had already fallen into dis- asked to prepare a new textbook on psychology (Carus, credit and had been banned in different nations across 1808) for use at the university and also at the military Europe (Pollen, 1912). When the Jesuit congregation academy in Münster. This seminal textbook was titled became officially suppressed by papal decree in 1773, Anweisungen zum regelmäßigen Studium der Empiri- Ueberwasser took a position as teacher at the former Jesuit schen Psychologie für die Candidaten der Philosophie zu secondary school Gymnasium Nepomucenum (then under Münster (Instructions for the regular study of empirical secular authority) in the German city of Coesfeld and, from psychology for candidates of philosophy at the Univer- 1776 onward, at the convent school Gymnasium Paulinum sity of Münster; hereafter referred to as Instructions; in Münster (Bahlmann, 1895; Marx, 1829; Pieper, 1902). Ueberwasser, 1787). It provided a structured psychologi- The convent school—also having a Jesuit history—devel- cal approach to phenomena such as human memory, oped close ties with the newly founded University of Mün- empathy, and placebo effects; an exhaustive overview of ster, where Ueberwasser was appointed professor in 1783 psychological theorizing at the turn of the 19th century; in the Faculty of Philosophy.2 and a detailed set of methods for investigating psycho- The university had been founded 10 years prior to this logical processes. date by the Catholic statesman and minister Franz Fried- From this point onward, Ueberwasser also officially rich von Fürstenberg (1729–1810; cf. Esser, 1842; Pieper, denominated himself a professor of empirical psychology 1902). Officially constituted in 1780, the university was and logic (LAV NRW W, 2014b). He published a second part of Fürstenberg’s programmatic reform of the educa- edition of his Instructions in 1794 (cf. Hamberger & Meusel, tional system in the Prince-Bishopric of Münster. This 1800) and, 6 years later, a book on human motivation Downloaded from pps.sagepub.com at Universitatsbibliothek on May 23, 2016 Empirical Psychology in the 18th Century 401 Fig. 2. Educational regulations issued by statesman and reformer Franz Friedrich von Fürstenberg (upper panel). Not only did these regulations introduce psychology lessons in the curriculum of all types of schools but they also defined psychology as a “core discipline” (lower panel), together with mathemat- ics and physics: “The intent that the pupil should learn every truth as a truth calls for psychology to be studied at the earliest possible stage, as it is to be regarded as a basic science for the most important aspects of human knowledge. It [psychology] contains the roots of all beauty and all good, and even the very rules that logic dictates the intellect as the preconditions of understanding the truth are only through [psychology] turned into true laws.” (Ueber das Begehrungsvermögen; Ueberwasser, 1800). In initially to be released in three volumes. Although the addition to serving as a professor of empirical psychology, second and third volumes were never finalized (Esser, he took on the professorship of moral philosophy at 1832), the first volume (see Fig. 3) documented a seminal Münster in 1803 and continued to hold both positions until conception of psychology as an empirical science. In the his death on January 15, 1812. following sections, we spotlight several aspects of its content. An 18th Century Conception of Instructions (Ueberwasser, 1787) begins with a gen- eral introduction to psychology as an independent field Empirical Psychology of study, accompanied by detailed methodological con- Ueberwasser’s (1787) Instructions presents an extensive, siderations. These considerations prepare readers for five structured approach to empirical psychology. It was chapters on basic cognitive processes: (a) sensation and Downloaded from pps.sagepub.com at Universitatsbibliothek on May 23, 2016 402 Schwarz, Pfister cognition as one hallmark of the human mind, Ueberwasser, in describing what constituted psychology, was also concerned with what would today be termed hot cognition as a second hallmark (i.e., motivation and emotion, or Begehrungsvermögen). These latter subjects were allotted to the third volume, and a synopsis of this third volume eventually appeared as the above- mentioned independent book on the psychology of motivation (Ueberwasser, 1800). In the following sections, we present several descrip- tions of the content of the Instructions
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