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The Logik by Rudolf Hermann Lotze: the Concept of Geltung

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The Logik by Rudolf Hermann Lotze: the Concept of Geltung The Logik by Rudolf Hermann Lotze: the concept of Geltung Michele Vagnetti Abstract: The subject of this paper is Rudolf Hermann of his Logik,2 published in Lipsia in 1874. The original Lotze’s concept of Geltung as him outlines it in the sec- version, first printed in Berlin in 1843, merges completely ond Logik (1874). This paper, through the notions of into the first book of the 1874 edition and is entitled Vom gnoseological immanentism and anti-psychologism, aims Denken. The subject of this first part of Lotze's Logik is to shed light on the notion of validity (Geltung). The Gel- not new, dealing as it does with formal logic and the theo- tung’s concept is very interesting not only for the role that ries of concept, judgment and syllogism. However, the it plays in Lotze’s philosophy, but also for the importance second (Vom Untersuchen) and the third (Vom Erkennen) that Lotze’s validity has in the philosophical debate until books go on to discuss applied logic (Angewandte Logik) the 1930s. and the theory of knowledge. It was precisely this ex- panded version of Logik, the first part of a System der Keywords: Lotze, Geltung, Logik, Gnoseological Imma- Philosophie, which Lotze never completed, that aroused nentism, Anti-Psychologism. such interest in so many academic philosophers. The concept of validity (Geltung) is central to the en- tire 1874 work and it must therefore be analysed carefully A brief introduction to the theme of «validity» in so as to understand both its origin and its significance for Lotze's Logik academic philosophy. Importantly, Lotze argues that the concept of logical validity must be distinguished from the This contribution aims to shed light on the concept of va- subjective psychological process. Though this idea is not lidity that Rudolf Hermann Lotze outlines in the second entirely new in philosophy – earlier traces can be found in edition of his Logik. Lotze’s concept of validity is very the works of Kant, Leibniz and Herbart – it was Lotze important for the Neo-Kantian Baden School, as well as who gathered and synthesised earlier teachings into this for Frege, Husserl and the young Heidegger. After pre- succinct distinction and introduced the term Geltung to senting the main coordinates of this general diffusion of philosophy. Lotze's philosophy, we will focus on the concept of va- In Logik, Lotze argues against tendencies that reduce lidity in itself. The introduction of this concept to phi- thought to a mere representative process, giving thinkers losophy was a response, according to Lotze, to a set of such as Frege, Windelband and Husserl strong arguments theoretical exigencies. Once the correspondence theory of against Psychologism. Lotze’s anti-psychologism does truth had been rejected, the objectivity of knowledge no not exclude the role of psychology outright, it simply longer resided in the recreation of a world irremediably points out that there is a categorical difference between external to man; this objectivity became instead immanent psychology and logic. in our inner world of representations. This inner world The concept of validity had a central role in logic and should not be understood as subject to the changeability epistemology until the 1930s. If we turn our attention to of the psychological processes; rather it guarantees fixity the philosophical debate of the German philosophers, we and stability to the very structure of knowledge. As an see that the arguments of both the Neo-Kantians and the anti-psychologist, Lotze had both to guarantee the inter- Phenomenologists were deeply rooted in Lotze’s Logik. subjectivity of our thought’s contents, and at the same The Neo-Kantian Baden school – of which the prominent time defend the complete objectivity of cognition. The exponents were Windelband, Liebmann, Rickert, Bauch, answer to these questions is, for Lotze, supplied by va- and Lask – was clearly and explicitly influenced by lidity. Validity is the reality itself of our thought’s con- Lotze. Franz Brentano as well was in regular contact with tents, the famous 'third realm', a third path that positions Lotze and Brentano’s disciples Stumpf (Husserl’s Dok- itself between transcendent reality and the subjectivism of torvater) and Marty often attended Lotze’s lectures. the psychological process which creates representations. The work of Lotze that established his centrality and John Passmore describes Lotze as the most «pillaged» relevance within the philosophical context of his time philosopher of the nineteenth century.1 The widespread was, as has been said, his second Logik and, in particular, influence of his thought is the result of the second edition its third book, which must be read with great attention. It Dipartimento di Lettere e Filosofia, University of Florence Philosophical Readings X.2 (2018), pp. 129-137. Firenze, Italia DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1209459 email: [email protected]; [email protected] MICHELE VAGNETTI is here that Lotze introduces the concept of validity. In its tion, either as events or as the Really true, that is valid, as second chapter, «The World of Ideas», Lotze reinterprets explained in the quotation above. The self-identity con- Plato’s thought in light of the Gelten problem. Here Lotze tent of the proposition returns as Gedanke in Frege, Sin- affirms Plato’s recognition that ideas have validity of their ngebilde in Rickert, Objectiv in Meinong, ideal iden- own which has nothing to do with the existence of things. tischer Inhalt in Husserl6 and logischer Inhalt in Heideg- Plato locates ideas in the Hyperuranion, a world of pure ger7. validity, in order to clarify, according to Lotze, that ideas The logical theory of validity was further developed do not belong to the real world. This interpretation allows by two alternative schools of thought: the Neo-Kantian Lotze to reconcile arguments in defence of Platonic Baden school and Phenomenology. The Baden school ex- thought with those of Kantian philosophy, arguing that panded Lotze’s theory of validity (Geltung) beyond logic, the logical content of thought, according to Platonic doc- constructnig a theory which also includes ethics and aes- trine, is independent from the subjectivity of the individ- thetics, with corresponding distinctions in the sphere of ual thinker, while at the same time reevaluating in a Kant- value. The phenomenological tradition, at least in the be- ian sense the role of the transcendental because the logical ginning was particularly attentive to logical-ontological content’s independence from the real world is not onto- problems. Husserl, on the basis of Frege’s intuitions8, logical but rather logical. This is more concerned not with took Lotze’s distinction between the objective contents of existence, but with validity. thought (unreal) and real thought events as the point of The categories by which logic proceeds are those departure for his research in logic. Noteworthy, too, is the based on the «distinction of value as that between truth fact that in the same year that Ideen I was published, and untruth»3. True and False cannot belong to simple Husserl decided to add to a reprint of Logische Unter- subjective psychological processes but must instead refer suchungen a long introduction about the problem of real- to contents, which are always identical, of the thought it- izing logical ideality in the concreteness of Erlebnis9. self. The condition of possibility by which a logical con- Lotze’s anti-psychologism was also fundamental import- tent can be recognised as true or false is one in which the ance for Heidegger – as a student both of Husserl and the mind can capture the same knowledge, regardless of any neo-kantian Rickert – as can be seen clearly in Neuere particular subjective psychological process, and thus dis- Forschungen über Logik10, in which Heidegger defines cuss its same logical content. Thought, therefore, cannot Lotze’s Logik as the «fundamental book (Grundbuch)»11 be conceived as a simple subjective psychic process be- of modern logic. It is also important to remember that cause, if that were the case, one could not grasp the same Heidegger recommended that his student Picht read thought and the same content. Thought, therefore, has its Lotze’s Logik as an introduction to philosophy12. In Sein intersubjective merit; it bears the truth value, and in this und Zeit, Heidegger argues against the contemporary sense must be said to have no individual, psychological theory of validity, defining validity as a «verbal idol existence. Thought and its logical content do not exist in (Wortgötze)»13. strict sense, but they do have validity ; validity does not By the term “logic,” Lotze intended not just logic in imply existence. The logical content of thought, as the the strict sense of the word, but also the theory of know- bearer of truth value and that transcendental condition ledge itself. It is not simply incidental that Lotze’s theory which allows one to speak about true and false in logic, is of validity influenced the various theories of knowledge not however an ontological entity. To make this step in of his time. A useful example of this influence is the the argument clear, we must consider Lotze’s conception problem of a priori, discussed in the third chapter of of validity as a «form of Reality (Wirklichkeit)», in his Logik's third book. Lotze says: own words: It is clear therefore that the attempt to derive the entire body of We call a thing Real (wirklich) which is (ist), in contradistinc- general knowledge from experience, that is to say from a mere tion to another which is not (nicht ist); an event Real which oc- summing up of particular perceptions, breaks down. We have curs or has occurred, in contradistinction to that which does not invariably to help ourselves out by assuming at one point or an- occur; a relation Real which obtains (besteht), as opposed to one other some one of those self-evident principles, some principle which does not obtain; lastly we call a proposition Really true to which when once its content has been thought we at once (wirklich wahr) which holds or is valid (gilt) as opposed to one concede with intuitive confidence that universal validity to of which the validity is still doubtful.
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