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Shadworth Hodgson and the Psychology of William James: Experience, Teleology and Realism

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Shadworth Hodgson and the Psychology of William James: Experience, Teleology and Realism University of New Hampshire University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository Doctoral Dissertations Student Scholarship Winter 1978 SHADWORTH HODGSON AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WILLIAM JAMES: EXPERIENCE, TELEOLOGY AND REALISM RICHARD PAUL HIGH Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/dissertation Recommended Citation HIGH, RICHARD PAUL, "SHADWORTH HODGSON AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WILLIAM JAMES: EXPERIENCE, TELEOLOGY AND REALISM" (1978). Doctoral Dissertations. 1220. https://scholars.unh.edu/dissertation/1220 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 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ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, Ml 48106 18 BEDFORD ROW, LONDON WC1R 4EJ, ENGLAND 7921023 HIGH* RICHARD PAUL SHADHQRTH HODGSON AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WILLIAM JAM ESS EXPERIENCE* TELEOLOGY AND REALISM. UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE* PH.D.* 1978 University Microfilms International :oo n .z e e b r o a d , a n n a r b o r , mi 4 8 io 6 SHADWORTH HODGSON AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WILLIAM JAMES EXPERIENCE, TELEOLOGY AND REALISM by RICHARD PAUL HIGH B.A., University of Hartford, 1971 M.A., University of New Hampshire, 1976 A DISSERTATION Submitted to the University of New Hampshire In Partial Fulfillment of The Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy December, 1978 This thesis has been examined and approved. Thesis director, William R. Woodward, Asst. Prof. of Psychology James Blight, Asst/ Prof. of Psychology David Leary, (/sst. prof. of Psychology Johw Limber, Assoc.m r * . VProf-; m f - l <of Psychology George M/jHaslerud,Prof. Emeritus of Psychology Ronald Shor, Prof. of Psychology Paul T. Brockelman, Prof. of Philosophy djUj it. inr ABSTRACT SHADWORTH HODGSON AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WILLIAM JAMES: EXPERIENCE, TELEOLOGY AND REALISM by RICHARD PAUL HIGH UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, 1978 In the last fifteen years there has been a renaissance of scholarly activity on the psychological thought of William James from both the Con­ tinental and Anglo-American philosophical traditions. These works are illuminating in a number of respects, as James did anticipate a number of the central themes of contemporary phenomenology and logical positivism. A problem which pervades this literature, however, is that it is method­ ologically presentistic. That is, it tends to view the past, in this case James's Principles of Psychology, out of its historical context, focussing instead on its distinctively modern aspects. The result is that James is portrayed as a thinker who was moving toward either a phenomenology or logical positivism, depending on the predisposition of a particular writer. This study seeks to redress this problem by examining the origin and development of the fundamental themes and/or theories in James's Principles. Three general areas of James's psychological thought are considered: vi (1) philosophical psychology, (2) cognition and (3) perception. Once this clearly historical orientation is adopted, the importance of Shadworth Hodgson, a nineteenth century English philosopher who has been ignored in contemporary James scholarship, comes to the foreground. This study is composed of five chapters. The first chapter is a general introduction to James's early life and thought and seeks to integrate relevant biographical material with his published writings between 1861 and 1884. After examining his early con­ flict over the question of freedom vs. mechanism, it is argued that his voluntaristic solution formed the conceptual basis of his general account of philosohpical and scientific activity. This solution is articulated on the basis of a series of philosophical essays he published between 1877 and 1884. The chapter concludes with a preliminary sketch of some of the problems which his voluntarism created for his later program of scientific psychology. The second chapter is devoted to an examination of James's debt to Hodgson with respect to the philosophical assumptions which underlie the Principles. Three philosohpical problem areas are considered. First, James's methodological orientation is explicated within the context of his notion of the psychologists' fallacy. It is argued that his call for an assumptionless description of experience is an outgrowth of what Hodgson called the method of reflection, which arose in conjunction with a critical interpretation of the two dominant philosophical traditions of the nine­ teenth century. Second, it is argued that James's epistemological dis­ tinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge about is a devel­ opment of Hodgson's distinction between first and second intention descriptions. Lastly, James's somewhat contradictory statements regarding vii dualism in the Principles is examined within the context of Hodgson's more consistent formulation of a philosophical monism and methodological dualism for scientific psychology. James's formulation of the higher mental processes in the Principles is examined in the third chapter. This chapter begins with a consideration of his debt to Hodgson in offering a dynamic formulation of the laws of association. In examining James's formulation of reasoning (cognition) and valuing (belief), however, it is argued that he went beyond the letter and spirit of Hodgson's philosophy. With respect to human cognition, James's biological interpretation of the a priori is set forth as an attempt to synthesize Kant's rationalism and Mill's empiricism. His formulation of the sub-universes of reality (belief) is then interpreted as an attempt to deal with the dynamic, transitive portions of the stream of thought. In the fourth chapter James's theory of perception is examined in relation to the perceptual realism he found in Hodgson's analysis of space and time. James's critique of the empiricist account of space perception is examined within the context of three problems in perceptual psychology: (1) simultaneous color contrast, (2) the eccentric projection of sensations and (3) form perception. Hodgson's influence with respect to James's notion of the spatial quale is then examined, followed by James's attempt to retain a perceptual realism while acknowledging the role of intellect in perception. The concluding chapter summarizes the impact of Hodgson on James's psychology and briefly sketches the impact of James on psychology between 1900 and 1920. Two somewhat distinct lines of influence are delineated: (1) the dynamic, cognitive psychologies of Calkins, MacDougall and Baldwin and (2) the neo-realist thought of Holt, Perry and Dewey. viil TABLE ON CONTENTS ABSTRACT.................................. ......... vii INTRODUCTION ....................................... 1 I. WILLIAM JAMES: THE YOUNG PHILOSOPHER-PSYCHOLOGIST . 8 1. Early Misgivings about Mechanical Science and Moral Philosophy.......................... 11 2. James's Early Critique of Science and the Concept of Subjective Interests ............... 20 3. James's Philosophical Defense of Human Freedom . 32 4. Human Freedom and a Scientific Psychology.... 36 II. SHADWORTH HODGSON AND JAMES'S PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY......................................... 48 1. Shadworth H o d g s o n ............................ 52 2. James's Notion of the Psychologists' Fallacy . 55 3. The Hodgson-James Critique of Rationalism and the Need for Distinguishing Between Two Types of Knowledge........................ 64 4. The Hodgson-James Critique of Empiricism: the
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