And the C a U S E S of War
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Human Nature and the C a u s e s of War JOHN DAVID ORME Human Nature and the Causes of War John David Orme Human Nature and the Causes of War John David Orme Oglethorpe University Brookhaven, GA, USA ISBN 978-3-319-77166-3 ISBN 978-3-319-77167-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77167-0 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018936599 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifcally the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microflms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specifc statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affliations. Cover image: © duncan1890/Getty Images Cover design by Thomas Howey Printed on acid-free paper This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer International Publishing AG part of Springer Nature The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author is grateful to Brad Stone, Robert Kaufman, Samantha Flynn, Stephen Schwark, Imran Demir and an anonymous referee for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. The responsibility for remaining errors of fact or argument is the author’s alone. Special thanks are also extended to Manning M. Pattillo, who encouraged the present author’s interest in Reinhold Niebuhr by his gift of The Nature and Destiny of Man, many years ago. v CONTENTS Human Nature, the Regime and War 1 Kings and Counselors 21 Monarchy 21 The Wars of Louis XIV 23 Charles XII’s Invasion of Russia 33 Frederick II and the Aggrandizement of Prussia 40 Nicholas I and the Crimean War 53 Otto von Bismarck and the Austro-Prussian War 61 The Wars of Kings and Counselors 68 Heroes and Sultans 87 Tyranny, Charisma and Sultanism 87 Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia 90 Louis Napoleon and the Franco-Prussian War 98 Francisco Solano López and the War of the Triple Alliance 104 Idi Amin’s Invasion of Tanzania 111 The Wars of Sultans and Charismatic Dictators 117 Soldiers and Subordinates 127 Praetorian Dictatorship 127 The Japanese Military and the Pacifc War 129 Mohammad Ayub Khan and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 140 vii viii CONTENTS Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Six Day War 146 The Argentine Junta’s War Over the Malvinas 152 The Wars of Praetorian Dictators 157 Despots and Demagogues 169 Totalitarianism 169 Mussolini’s Entry into World War II 171 Hitler’s Invasion of Soviet Russia 181 Mao’s Intervention in the Korean War 195 Saddam Hussein’s Wars 204 The Wars of Totalitarian Tyrants 215 Oligarchs, Democrats and Rebels 235 Republics 235 Britain and the American Revolution 237 The War of 1812 246 The Secession of the Confederacy 255 The Wars of Republics 264 Classical Realism and History: Findings and Implications 279 Appendix 287 Index 289 Human Nature, the Regime and War To understand world politics, one must strive frst to comprehend what statesmen seek, not only their explicit objectives but also their unspoken and unconscious desires. According to the doctrine of Neo-Realism and its offshoots, Offensive Realism and Defensive Realism, the crucial moti- vation is fear.1 The cause of insecurity is said to be international anarchy. Because there is no effective international authority to establish order, the leaders of states are anxious. To protect their lands and peoples, they seek power. Power is relative, however. An augmentation of the power of one state diminishes that of others. Competition thus ensues. The surest method of increasing power and reducing vulnerability is to accumulate resources and add strategic depth through expansion. Rival states, antici- pating this, may choose to attack frst. Hazardous as the pursuit of power may be, it is the lesser risk, for opting out of the competition could leave one vulnerable. Others may be peacefully inclined, but one cannot be sure. It is safer to assume the worst. Persistent danger transforms con- tented states into aggressors. Anarchy engenders anxiety; anxiety rivalry; and rivalry war. For the Offensive Realists, world politics is an inescapable tragedy.2 Defensive Realists deduce from the same premises a more hopeful conclusion.3 The international system provides considerable protec- tion to states and is resistant to aggression. Military technology usually favors the defender and aggressors are promptly confronted by oppos- ing coalitions. Anarchy correctly understood should encourage caution © The Author(s) 2018 1 J. D. Orme, Human Nature and the Causes of War, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77167-0_1 2 J. D. ORME not belligerence. The greatest danger is that an anxious statesman, untutored in the wisdom of Defensive Realism, might try too hard to increase his strength, alarming his neighbors and provoking a spiral of misunderstanding. To augment one’s power is more dangerous than to neglect it.4 Neither version of Neo-Realism is convincing. Regarding Offensive Realism, Randall Schweller has posed a pertinent question. In a world with “all cops and no robbers,” why would there be crime? (If all states were seeking only security, why would they ever go to war?) The stand- ard argument is that statesmen misperceive their neighbors’ unstinting efforts to acquire power, setting in motion a dangerous spiral of hostility that can lead to war. The crucial problem is uncertainty. Other states may harbor aggressive intentions, and it may not be possible to recognize them.5 As Thomas Hobbes explained: …because there be some that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires, if others (that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within mod- est bounds) should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing on their defense, to subsist.6 This concern is not baseless, but seems somewhat exaggerated. Serious errors in the assessment of other states are certainly possible, but the intentions of others are not entirely unintelligible. Peaceful countries have ways of communicating their intent.7 Statesmen need not assume the worst about opposing states if they have some objective basis for understanding them. Moreover, statesmen not only fear their enemies, they also fear war. War brings death, destruction and sometimes defeat. It is not to be undertaken lightly. Fear would convince a leader to fght if he feels threatened by an enemy and confdent that the enemy can be defeated. Those with the most to fear from others (weaker states) have the motive for such a war but not the means; those with the means (stronger states) lack the motive. War for the sake of security requires a curious combination of perceived vulnerability and confdence that, if not logically impossible, must be rather unusual. If Offensive Realism is sometimes right, it is right for the wrong reasons. Defensive Realism faces a more basic problem. The cheerful pros- pect envisaged by its proponents is belied by the often-bloody history of world politics.8 The balance of power and the presumed advantages of the defender have not afforded states consistent security. The robust HUMAN NATURE, THE REGIME AND WAR 3 resistance to aggression expected by Defensive Realists depends upon the willingness of defenders to threaten retaliation and the attentive- ness of potential aggressors to those deterrent threats. Neither is certain. Either the white blood cells of the international system are less reliable or the germs more virulent than the Defensive Realists have recognized. The anarchic international system is neither the catalyst nor the imped- iment to war that it is purported to be by these contending strands of Neo-Realism. The root of the Neo-Realists’ errors lies in a defcient conception of the principal subject of the social sciences, human beings. Reinhold Niebuhr, writing in 1944, noted that “the conception of human nature which underlies the social and political attitudes of a liberal and dem- ocratic culture is that of an essentially harmless individual. The survival impulse, which man shares with the animals, is regarded as the normative form of the egoistic drive.”9 Seven decades later, this observation still seems apposite. The starting point for most academic commentary and theorizing about international politics in the last generation has been the assumption that leaders value security and prosperity above all else. The Classical Realist tradition, better grounded in political philosophy, pro- vides a richer and more compelling description of humanity. Readers of Chapter XIII of Hobbes’s Leviathan may be left with the impression that it is the desire for security alone that transforms the state of nature into a state of war. Elsewhere, Hobbes posits “a gener- all inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death.” He speaks initially of power as “a means to obtain some future apparent good,” but includes “dignity” as an important component of power.