A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION: ASSESSING STATES’ BEHAVIOR IN SOUTH ASIA PhD DISSERTATION
This Dissertation is submitted to National Defence University, Islamabad in partial fulfillment for the degree of PhD in International Relations By KHURRAM MAQSOOD AHMAD NDU-IR/PhD-14/S-029
Supervisor DR. RASHID AHMED
Department of International Relations Faculty of Contemporary Studies National Defence University, Islamabad Pakistan, 2020
DEDICATION
I dedicate this to my beloved parents, who guide me in every field of life. Their invaluable prayers are key to my success.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
First of all, thanks to Almighty Allah for giving me the courage and ability to undertake the successful completion of this thesis. I believe that such innovative efforts are impossible without the grace of Allah, the Beneficent and the Merciful.
I am extremely grateful to my thesis supervisor, Dr. Rashid Ahmed, for being extremely cooperative. I really faced with a paucity of words to express my gratitude to him for his generosity. He has been a great facilitator and has enabled me to embrace new opportunities and expand my intellectual horizons. I would also appreciate the faculty of National Defence University who equipped me with tools for a better understanding of the whole on a variety of levels.
Additionally, I would like to acknowledge the assistance provided by my wife at every stage and without which this research project would have remained a dream. I would also like to thank my parents, sister, and brother for their support and encouragement. Special gratitude is due to my parents to whom I am indebted for having been there for me throughout my life. I would also like to appreciate my friends for their moral support and encouragement.
Khurram Maqsood Ahmad
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ABSTRACT The nuclearization of South Asia has not only reshaped the nature of conflict in the region but has also reduced the chances of conventional wars between India and Pakistan. However, it is equally true that nuclear weapons have neither been able to promote lasting peace in the region nor has deterrence helped in the resolution of conflict. Both states share a history of protracted conflict embedded in mutual threat perception and security dilemma vis-à-vis each other which has resulted in an acute sense of insecurity. This psychological preoccupation is a major hurdle in conflict resolution between two states and is at the core of shaping their aggressive behavior towards each other. This study has examined nuclear deterrence, conflict transformation and the behavior of states in South Asia under the nuclear umbrella. These three aspects have been covered on account of their profound effect on issues such as nuclear non-proliferation, state motivation behind acquisition of nuclear weapons and the impact of nuclear weapons on the protracted conflict. The reason for conducting this research is to study and analyze the paradox that conflict transformation is challenging in the presence of nuclear deterrence in South Asia. Ironically, where chances of war are curtailed by deterrence, chances of conflict resolution are also curtailed by the same. Hence the study focuses on finding answers to the four basic questions: (i) “how the nuclear deterrence concept in South Asia is different from the Cold War explanation of nuclear deterrence?”; (ii) “how the contours of conflict transformation contribute to transform states’ behavior?”; (iii) “how the contemporary approached of conflict transformation are challenged by India-Pakistan scenario under nuclear deterrence in South Asia?”; (iv) “why protracted conflicts between Pakistan and India could not transform through nuclear deterrence?” The study has used qualitative method in analyzing the proposed hypothesis. In the contemporary conflict transformation literature, it has not been discussed at length with nuclear deterrence in perspective. Realism has been used as a theoretical concept for building upon the base for understanding the conflict between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, the nuclear deterrence and acquisition of nuclear weapons have also been analyzed through the lens of realism as a theoretical framework. This study has made a significant contribution to the present debate on conflict transformation. The study finds that the conventional practices used for conflict transformation are not applicable in India Pakistan conflict and the theory needs to be revamped in order to suggest solution to protracted state conflicts.
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Key Terms/Concepts:
The study focuses on following three main concepts. The intervening related terms and concepts are discussed in relevant chapters;
(i) Conflict Transformation; as a concept is very important to understand for this study. Conflict transformation does not only means the resolution of conflict but it means the elimination of the cause of conflict and positive transformation in the relative behavior of the two states for this particular study.
(ii) Nuclear Deterrence; in context of India-Pakistan in the South Asian region is different from the Cold War conception. It depends upon several factors like geo-strategic landscape of the region, relative capabilities of India-Pakistan and China factor in the overall power balance.
State Behavior Transformation; refers change of behavior from negative enmity to positive friendship in context of conflict resolution. This term is hugely important for this study because protracted conflict between India and Pakistan has grown deep rooted negative behavior towards each other that has always prevented to establish trust among them which is the most important factor to start a peace process.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS A.Q. Khan Abdul Qadeer Khan
AEC Atomic Energy Commission
APC Armed Personnel Carriers
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
CBMs Confidence-Building Measures
CENTO Central Treaty Organization
CPEC China Pakistan Economic Corridor
CGE Canadian General Electric Company
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIR Canada-India Reactor
CIRUS Canada-India Reactor, US
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
Indo-Pak India-Pakistan
Indo-US India-U.S.
KANUPP Karachi Nuclear Power Plant
LoC Line of Control
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT Non- proliferation Treaty
PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
PARR-1 Pakistan Research Reactor-1
PNE Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
PTBT Partial Test Ban Treaty
RMA Revolution in Military Affairs viii
SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organization
TNW Tactical Nuclear Weapons
US United States
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
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Contents
DEDICATION ...... iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ...... v ABSTRACT ...... vi LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ...... vii INTRODUCTION ...... 1 Problem Statement ...... 4 Objectives of the Study ...... 5 Significance of the Study ...... 5 Gap Identified ...... 6 Hypothesis...... 6 Variables ...... 7 Research Questions ...... 7 Research Methodology ...... 8 Research Design...... 9 Data Collection ...... 9 Primary Data ...... 9 Interview Technique ...... 9 Secondary Data ...... 10 Limitation and Scope of the Study...... 10 Temporal Boundary ...... 10 Spatial Limitation...... 11 Unit of Analysis ...... 11 Organization of the Study ...... 11 Literature Review...... 12 CHAPTER ONE ...... 51 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ...... 51 1.1 Realism Theory in Essence ...... 53 1.1.1 Realism and Human Behavior ...... 57 1.1.2 State Behavior – State Based Realism ...... 58
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1.1.3 System Behavior – System Based Realism ...... 62 1.1.4 Neo-Realism and System Behavior ...... 62 1.1.5 Realism and International Institutions ...... 66 1.2 Deterrence and Realism ...... 67 1.2.1 Deterrence and Human Behavior ...... 68 1.2.2 Deterrence and Power Politics ...... 70 1.3 Realism and Conflict Transformation ...... 71 1.3.1 Theoretical Basics of Conflict Transformation ...... 72 1.3.2 Realism and Conflict Transformation ...... 74 1.3.3 Conflict Resolution under Binding Settlement ...... 80 1.3.4 Deterrence and Conflict Transformation ...... 81 Concluding Thoughts ...... 84 CHAPTER TWO ...... 88 AN ANATOMY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: LESSON FROM COLD WAR POLITICS FOR INDIA-PAKISTAN ...... 88 2.1 Conceptualizing Deterrence ...... 89 2.2 Types of Deterrence ...... 93 2.2.1 Direct Deterrence ...... 93 2.2.2 Extended Deterrence ...... 93 2.2.3 General Deterrence ...... 94 2.2.4 Immediate Deterrence ...... 95 2.2.5 Collective Deterrence...... 95 2.2.6 Recessed Deterrence ...... 96 2.2.7 Ready Deterrence ...... 96 2.3 Conditions of Deterrence ...... 96 2.3.1 Capability to Deter ...... 97 2.3.2 The Political Will ...... 98 2.3.3 Credibility ...... 98 Concluding Thoughts ...... 113
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CHAPTER THREE …………………………………………………………………………….116 TRANSFORMING STATES BEHAVIOR FROM ENMITY TO AMITY ...... 116 3.1 Types of Conflict ...... 117 3.1.1 Conflicts Executed and Escalated by Global Politics ...... 118 3.1.2 Inherited Conflicts ...... 119 3.1.3 Internal Political Conflicts ...... 119 3.1.4 Conflict and Non-State Actors ...... 119 3.2 Causes of Conflict and Wars...... 120 3.3 Phases of Conflict ...... 126 3.4 Conflict Transformation Mechanisms ...... 127 3.4.1 Conflict Settlement ...... 128 3.4.2 Conflict Management...... 129 3.4.3 Conflict Resolution ...... 129 3.4.4 Conflict Transformation...... 130 3.5 Scholarly Debates ...... 131 3.6 Nuclear Deterrence and Conflict ...... 141 Concluding Thoughts ...... 143 CHAPTER FOUR ...... 145 PROTRACTED CONFLICTS IN SOUTH ASIA UNDER NUCLEAR AMBIT ...... 145 4.1 Dynamics of India-Pakistan Enmity ...... 147 4.2 Essence of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia ...... 151 4.2.1 Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Drivers and State Behavior ...... 151 4.2.2 Rationale for Nuclear Development ...... 152 4.2.3 Nehruvian Philosophy ...... 155 4.2.4 Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrence: Drivers and Behavior ...... 157 4.3 Nuclear Balance of Power in South Asia and Nuclear Doctrines ...... 159 4.4 Nuclear Deterrence during the Phases of Covert and Overt Nuclearization ...... 162 4.4.1 Kargil Crisis 1999 ...... 163 4.4.2 Border Confrontation 2001-2002 ...... 164 4.4.3 Mumbai Attacks 2008 ...... 164
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4.5 South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: An Analysis ...... 165 4.6 Second Strike Capability: Nuclear Triad and ABM System ...... 167 4.7 TNW as a Counter for Indian Offensive War Doctrines ...... 168 Concluding Thoughts ...... 169 CHAPTER FIVE ...... 171 NORMALIZING NUCLEAR SOUTH ASIA THROUGH THE CONTOURS OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION ...... 171 5.1 India Pakistan Peace Process amidst Enduring Rivalry ...... 172 5.1.1 Kashmir Conflict: A Major Bone of Contention ...... 173 5.1.2 Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) ...... 175 5.2 South Asian Nuclear Deterrence ...... 178 5.3 Conflict Transformation in South Asia: Prospects, Realities and State Behavior ...... 181 5.4 Possibility of Conflict Transformation between India and Pakistan ...... 183 5.5 Approaches of Transformation in Case of India-Pakistan ...... 185 5.5.1 Rule Transformation ...... 186 5.5.2 Issue Transformation ...... 188 5.5.3 Actor Transformation...... 189 5.5.4 Structure Transformation ...... 189 Concluding Thoughts ...... 190 CONCLUSION ...... 192 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 199
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INTRODUCTION
In the study of international relations the concept of deterrence denotes the policy of a state by which it can discourage any hostile action by an opponent state. This policy includes certain measures taken by a state which would guarantee its deterrence power. Deterrence lies in the realm of strategy and its foundation is a kaleidoscope of changing political and military variables. There are no regulations or pre-defined rules for dealing with military strategy. However, after the World War II and advent of nuclear deterrence, modern strategies emphasize the deterrence concept and explain the deterrence phenomenon through the concept of rationality. Deterrence has become “the central recourse for sustaining international/internal security and stability among and within states in an era of serious conflict.”1 Though classical strategies of conventional deterrence are still in vogue, but the nature of the modern war has undermined their importance to a large extent. In a classical military strategy, the political context is immaterial, and the major emphasis is on the available means of military action directed towards the ultimate goal of destroying the enemy’s armed forces with no limits on the level of violence required to achieve this end.
Even Clausewitz separated the act of war from its political consequences. The strategy of “rationality of irrationality”2 is a deductive process based on logic, which enables decision-makers to decide rationally through understanding the consequences of irrationality. The crux of this strategy is based on “uncertainty” which acts as an inhibiting factor urging both the contestants to avoid a nuclear confrontation. Thus, “it can be stated that nuclear weapons act as a deterrent which dissuades both the parties (opponents) from attacking each other. However, the factor of uncertainty as a fundamental basis for the nuclear strategy must be distinguished from the destructive power of nuclear weapons, which alone causes”3 the ultimate restraint or deterrence.
Deterrence theory emerged in academic literature during the Cold War and is mainly associated with nuclear weapons and their use.4 ‘Nuclear Deterrence Theory’ implies a strategy in which an adversary i.e. an enemy state is dissuaded from taking an
1 Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) The Concept of Deterrence and Deterrence Theory,” (2017), 2. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Carcelli Shannon, and Erik A. Gartzke, “The Diversification of Deterrence: New Data and Novel Realities,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politic, (2017), 1. 1
action which may serve to escalate the conflict. It works on the principle that one can effectively communicate to an adversary that one possesses both the capability as well as the resolve to use it in case of any aggression. Bernard Brodie rightly said, “A credible nuclear deterrence must be always at the ready, yet never used.”5
Once deterrence is established between states and the chances of war are minimized, conflicts between states are still there, which act as constraint towards peaceful relationship. However, contemporary conflicts are different in shape and dimension and encompass both interstate and intrastate levels. The practitioners dealing with conflict studies have attempted to determine how resource, sectarian, and ethnic conflicts could be transformed from negative to positive manner. In addition to this, they worked to investigate the facts and circumstances that complicate any conflict and the attendant process of transformation. In view of Lederach, “conflict transformation means to reduce the gap between theory and practice, which demands a long-term transformative process. In this process, adverse relations are adjusted by using advocacy (non-violent activism), education and mediation.”6 Similarly, the main problem indicated by Ahmar addresses the definition of transformation of the human mind as well as an understanding of conflict.7 Thus, it is significant to distinguish conflict transformation and conflict resolution. The former means addressing actual factors involved in a conflict such as leadership, nature and structure of conflict, societal set-up and behavior of people, whereas later may be said to lead to a resolution of the problem by addressing the root causes of conflict.
Some diverse approaches to conflict transformation classified by Dr. Hussain are as follows: “expand (new problems), broaden (new actors), and escalate (new victims). He has further suggested that conflict transformation covers five identified types of transformation”8 while paying attention to behavioral, structural and attitudinal aspects of conflicts. These are listed as: (i) Actors transformation– “modifying actors goals and their approach to pursuing these goals, including by strengthening understanding as to the causes and consequences of their respective actions”; (ii) “Contexts transformation–
5 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (New York: Princeton University Press, 1959), 186. 6 John Paul Lederach, Preparing for Peace, Conflict Transformation, Across Cultures (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 6. 7 Moonis Ahmar, “Conflict Transformation and South Asian Security Dynamics-Strengthening Role of Civil Society,” (jointly organized by the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS) and Friedrich Neumann Foundation (FNF), Islamabad Club, Islamabad, July 18, 2012). 8 Syed Rifaat Hussain, “Conflict Transformation and South Asian Security Dynamics-Strengthening Role of Civil Society.” (jointly organized by the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS) and Friedrich Neumann Foundation (FNF), Islamabad Club, Islamabad, July 18, 2012). 2
challenging the meaning and perception of conflict itself, particularly the respective attitudes and understandings of specific actors towards one another”; (iii) “Issues transformation– redefining the issues that are central to the prevailing conflict, and reformulating the position of key actors on those very issues”; (iv) “Rules transformation – changing the norms and rules governing decision-making at all levels in order to ensure that conflicts are dealt with constructively through institutional channels”; and (v) “Structures transformation – adjusting the prevailing structure of relationships, power distribution and socioeconomic conditions that are embedded in and form the conflict, thereby affecting the very fabric of interaction between previously incompatible actors, issues and goals.”9
South Asian security environment is unique as the shared history of India Pakistan enmity has rendered the region unstable and prone to wars and conflicts. Both states have been engaged in wars in 1948, 1965 and 1971 and engaged in different conflicts in 1999 and 2001-2002. They are still in conflict over issues such as transboundary water management, Kashmir, Siachin and Sir Creek. Pakistan perceives India as a key peril to its national security while India considers Pakistan as a major hurdle in the region to its desire of becoming a dominant regional power. The enduring rivalry feature between Pakistan and India is more committed towards the adoption of tougher policies including the use of threats, challenges, mobilization of forces, and demonstration of forces and so on. India is using the tactics and policy tool in its favor. India is also trying to win global sympathy and support for it by projecting Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism.
With the nuclear explosions in “South Asia in May 1998, when India conducted its nuclear tests and Pakistan followed suit to maintain the regional balance of power”,10 nuclear capability established nuclear deterrence in South Asia; both states having refrained from taking any military action which could lead to war. There is a trust deficit existing between Pakistan and India which has halted the conflict transformation practices through time. Both states have accused each other of not being serious in resolving their longstanding issues. Pakistan says that it seeks to build friendly atmosphere in South Asia11 but India’s regional hegemonic desires prevent from developing any cordial relation with its aggressive eastern neighbor. Moreover, Pakistan always assumed it a
9 Ibid. 10 Nazir Hussain, “Nuclearization of South Asia and the Future of Non-Proliferation,” Journal of Political Studies (2011): 1, Available at http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/Currentissue-pdf/NAZIR%20HUSSAIN.pdf. 11 “Pakistan Keen to take India Dialogue Forward,” Pakistan Today, October 20, 2011, Available at http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2011/10/20/national/pakistan-seeks-friendly-relations-with-india-hina/. 3
security dilemma vis-a-vis India and any step taken by India regarding its military modernization and nuclear development add to Pakistan’s threat perception. This heightens Pakistan’s insecurity and fuels its perception of India as a state seeking regional hegemony.
On the other hand, India sees Pakistan’s closeness to China as a threat. China is not only playing as a power equalizer apropos India in terms of both economic and military capability but commands an advantageous position in both fields. India and China had a war in 1962 with territorial issues still unresolved between them. According to Indian analysts, Pakistan’s military developments are supported by China. So, the friendly relation between China and Pakistan furnishes India with sufficient reason to feel insecure and threatened. This vicious cycle of power politics and an unending blame game has complicated the region’s chances for peace and stability. Continued skirmishes at the Line of Control (LoC) are part of long-standing issues, with both sides remaining firm on their respective stances. Although there has not been a full-scale war between the two ever since credible deterrence was put in place, yet this has not led to conflict elimination or an alteration in the psychological perception of mutual animosity. Both are engaged in arms race based on the belief that each is the opponent of the other and is trying to destabilize, if not out rightly destroy its opponent.
This study focuses on an under studied phenomenon of nuclear deterrence and conflict transformation and the behavior of states in South Asia under the nuclear umbrella. These three aspects cover an account of their profound effect on nuclear non- proliferation, state motivation behind acquisition of nuclear weapons and the impact of nuclear weapons on the protracted conflict between Pakistan and India. The focus is more on protracted India – Pakistan conflict through the lens of conflict transformation theory. The study identifies the initiatives so that peace can be ensured in the region. It also focuses on the challenges for South Asian security environment, and possible solutions to address these challenges.
Problem Statement Nuclear deterrence has minimized the chances of full-fledged war in South Asian region as witnessed during times of crises between India and Pakistan. However, both states are engaged in the constant border skirmishes, issues are long-standing and both sides are firm on their respective positions. Both are engaged in an arms race based on the 4
notion that each is the enemy of the other and is trying to destabilize, if not completely destroy its opponent. This psychological preoccupation is a major hurdle in conflict resolution between India and Pakistan. Although, deterrence has curtailed the chances of war between two adversaries but it has also reduced the chances of conflict transformation in South Asian region. As both have history of rivalry before and after acquiring of nuclear weapons, this makes them unique because they did not resort to peace even after minimizing the chances of war. It is pertinent that nuclear deterrence in South Asia could not transform the nature of conflicts between Pakistan and India.
Research Objectives The study objectives are:
To fill the gap in collected works by discussing nuclear deterrence to restructure the contemporary approaches of conflict transformation.
To explore the applicability of contemporary approaches of conflict transformation in the case of India-Pakistan under the ambit of nuclear deterrence.
Significance of the Study Rising security challenges and perpetually changing dynamics of regional politics, necessitate an urgent search for new channels for the promotion of peace between Pakistan and India. This study fills the gap in collected works by discussing nuclear deterrence to restructure the contemporary approaches of conflict transformation. Moreover, this research will also explore the applicability of contemporary approaches of conflict transformation in the case of Pakistan-India under the ambit of nuclear deterrence. This study has broad scope, as it not only considers conflict transformation and nuclear deterrence but in addition, examines the behavior of the two nuclear rivals of South Asia. The deterrence forms a wide-ranging subject, which has received considerable scholarly attention in the past few decades. One of the aspects of examining the concept of deterrence is to discern what impact deterrence has had on the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan.
This research would contribute to the existing literature on nuclear deterrence, conflict transformation and the behavior of states in South Asia under the nuclear umbrella. The concept of conflict transformation is an extensive one, with much work having been done in the field. Scholars have contributed to it immensely and Peace and 5
Conflict Studies in contemporary times covers how to settle, manage, resolve and transform conflicts. However, theorists of all these attendant approaches of peace and conflict studies lack consideration of nuclear weapons in assessing transformation of contemporary conflicts of the world and particularly South Asia.
Gap Identified It has been analyzed from the considered literature that significant amount of work has already been done on the subject. Though remarkable work has been done on nuclear deterrence, conflict transformation and the behaviors of states in South Asia separately but little research has been done in a combination of all three. Only one writer has viewed the conflict existing in South Asia through the prism of conflict transformation,12 but the work is limited to the analysis as to what role nuclear weapons have played, when introduced in a protracted conflict. Saira Khan explores how the introduction of nuclear weapons in South Asia transforms protracted conflicts into unsolvable problems. While the existing study will highlight how the contours of conflict transformation are challenging due to nuclear deterrence in South Asia. She also ignores the resolution of Kashmir issue and does not provide any framework for the resolution of main bone source of conflict between the two rivals.
As mentioned, there is deficiency of work that covers nuclear deterrence and conflict transformation together and study of it in South Asia, so the focus is more on protracted conflict between India and Pakistan through the lens of conflict transformation theory. Thus, it can be stated that one of the purpose of this research is to address a gap in the study of conflict transformation and nuclear deterrence. The study has identified the initiatives so that peace can be ensured between India and Pakistan. The research has also focused on the challenges for South Asian security environment, and possible solutions to address these challenges. The study will provide foundational research for researchers, students, and policymakers. It will also assist the policy making institutions, governing bodies to shape their policies in such a way that ensures peace processes in South Asia.
Hypothesis The applicability of contemporary approaches of conflict transformation theory have been challenged by nuclear deterrence in India- Pakistan protracted conflict.
12 Saira Khan, “Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation: The Case of India-Pakistan”, Journal of Southern African Studies, 2010, p.2 6
Variables Primary Dependent Primary Intervening Antecedent Variable Variable Independent Variable Variable Conflict transformation Nuclear Kashmir Conflict Cross-border skirmishes between India and Deterrence Pakistan Regional Peace Deterrence Stability Role of regional and global countries Water Peace process Indo-US Nuclear Role of global countries Deal
India role as to India hegemonic design counterweight to in the region China Terrorism Indian military modernization or Cold Start doctrine
Table of Variables under Study
Role of Variables in the Study
Variable, in simple words is a characteristic of a given term/phrase (for our study) which varies under different circumstances. A dependent variable “shows the effect of manipulating or introducing the independent variable”. The variation in dependent variable depends on the variation in independent variable. For our research conflict transformation between India and Pakistan and regional peace are dependent variables. An independent variable is one which has distinct relationship with dependent variables. If its values change, the values of dependent variables also change. Nuclear deterrence is independent variable because once it is established then regional peace and stability depends upon stability of deterrence. Intervening variables “refer to abstract processes that are not directly observable but that link the independent and dependent variables”. Terrorism, Kashmir issue, and Indo-US nuclear deal are some examples of intervening variables. Antecedent variables are the ones that take place “in a chain of causal links”. For example if conflict transformation is dependent variable, then peace process, India Pakistan military modernization, and role of regional and global countries would be antecedent variables.
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Type of Hypothesis:
The conflict transformation between India and Pakistan (dependent variables) are inversely related to nuclear deterrence (Independent variable). The values of dependent variables and independent variables change inversely.
Research Questions The supporting questions in the study are as given below:
1. How the nuclear deterrence concept in South Asia is different from the Cold War explanation of nuclear deterrence?
2. How the contours of conflict transformation contribute to transform states behavior?
3. Why protracted conflicts between Pakistan and India could not transform through nuclear deterrence?
4. How the contemporary approaches of conflict transformation are challenged by India-Pakistan scenario under nuclear deterrence in South Asia?
Research Methodology With the aim of conducting effective research, this study has used qualitative method in testing the proposed hypothesis. Methods of qualitative research include observation and immersion, interviews, open-ended surveys, focus groups, content analysis of visual and textual materials, and oral history. Qualitative research allows the researcher to analyze the behavior, actions and interaction of the subject and interpret meanings attached to such behaviors. Quantitative research helps relating variables while qualitative research explains why this relationship exists.
It is best suited for this research because using the literature, media and interviews it is intended to analyze the state behavior of Pakistan and India over the history. This analysis is also important for the research question which is based on the state behavior in an environment of enmity and nuclear deterrence. The only limitation of qualitative method of research is that it is focused and its results may not be generalized.
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Research Design While applying the theories of realism, deterrence and conflict transformation, this research is based on exploratory research design. The causal factors under the study is identified and to identify the causal factors, the qualitative tools of research are employed.
Data Collection Primary Data Primary data have been drawn from official statements, personal and email based interviews, reports, press releases, biographies, diaries, opinion polls, reports and online proceedings of conferences, seminars, roundtables etc. Some data including documents (in soft & hard copies), prepared by government departments, and NGOs working on nuclear related issues has also been used. It also follows the meetings with the policymakers and leaders of the subject when required.
Interview Technique One-on-one elite interviews (the term elite refers to the person who is chosen by name or position for a particular reason) have been conducted with the duration of each interview spanning approximately 1 hour. In some cases, more than one session was conducted with the participants. In cases where the participants were unwilling to have the interview recorded, hand written notes of the meeting were taken down. The sample consists of roughly 20 elite interviews conducted with key individuals based in different countries. The Sample Criteria is as:
(a) One on one elite interview with leading professionals involved in working on conflict and nuclear related issues.
(b) The Members of political parties and government representatives from Pakistan and India.
(c) Institutional representation: retired army officers, diplomats, practitioners (top- level, mid-rankers and active politicians) and officials of ministry of defence (who have been dealing with the nuclear issues).
(d) Journalists and leading academicians covering security and strategic affairs.
The interviews were open and respondents were approached through different channels such as official letters, emails and academic references. In cases where some 9
experts were not physically accessible, email or telephonic conversation were used to take their views into account. The questionnaire consisted of following questions:-
1. What are the effects of deterrence on the India Pakistan arms race scenario?
2. Is there a scope for India Pakistan conflict transformation?
3. What is conflict transformation and how it contributes to the peace process?
4. How conflict can be transformed through nuclear deterrence in South Asia?
5. How nuclear deterrence has influenced the state behavior in South Asia?
6. Are the contemporary approaches of conflict transformation applicable in case of India Pakistan?
7. What steps are essential for normalization of India Pakistan relations?
8. Any comments?
Secondary Data Secondary data is derived from think-tank papers, books, articles, and newspapers on the subject under study. For analysis part, special attention is devoted to the existing policies and concluded agreements between two states, electronic media discussions, interviews and news for current developments related to various aspect of the study topic. Proceedings of academic seminars, papers presented in different international conferences and official stances of the respective states have been taken from the authentic internet sources, books, and government departments.
Limitation and Scope of the Study As it is pertinent to set boundaries before collecting the data, therefore, the temporal, spatial and unit of analysis for this study are as follows:
Temporal Boundary This study follows the facts from the India-Pakistan nuclearization, nonetheless, while ignoring the excessive literature related to causes of conflict, the study will disclose the factors since 1947 to December 2017 related to the subject of nuclear deterrence and transformation of conflict and the behaviors of India and Pakistan.
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Spatial Limitation The study primarily focuses on India-Pakistan relations by analyzing the nuclear deterrence and its role in impacting the conflict in South Asia. The study is limited to the issues of South Asian nuclear deterrence and particularly India and Pakistan relations.
Unit of Analysis India-Pakistan are the primary unit of analysis.
Organization of the Study This study consists of five chapters. The introduction begins by unfolding the phenomenon of deterrence, which holds great significance in international relations. Considerable attention is given to the topic of deterrence as a concept and strategy right from its emergence to contemporary times. This section also includes problem statement research questions, hypothesis and the research methodology and literature review. The academic material gathered by researcher is reviewed and analyzed to understand the topic by applying it to the South Asian security environment. The study, which was conducted for this piece of work, demonstrates and supports the hypothesis. This is significantly appropriate understanding of the behavior of the South Asian states.
The first chapter covers the theoretical and analytical framework of the study. It highlights the basic assumption of realist school of thought. The concept of nuclear deterrence and conflict transformation are viewed through the lens of ‘realism’. The discussion in this chapter would be on classical realism and neo-realism. A brief overview has been given and a connection with nuclear deterrence and conflict transformation has been developed in this chapter.
The second chapter discusses an anatomy of nuclear deterrence, its important components, its significance in contemporary international relations, and some challenges facing deterrence theory as a concept in explaining the international conflict. It also represents how nuclear deterrence has worked in different regions of the world. Deterrence role during the Cold War period has been highlighted because most of the work in the field of nuclear deterrence was carried out during this era. Even in the present world, deterrence politics is being analyzed through the study of pros and cons of nuclear deterrence of Cold War period. It will also discuss some lessons of nuclear deterrence from Cold War politics for India-Pakistan.
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The third chapter of the study highlights the basic concepts of conflict and different approaches existing in the field of peace and conflict studies. Conflict management, resolution and settlement are discussed as a separate field and then analyzed in combination with each other in order to highlight the difference between them. The main focus is on the concept of conflict transformation. How has it evolved, what are its basic contours and who are its main proponents?
The fourth chapter illustrates that how protracted conflicts between Pakistan and India could not transform through nuclear deterrence? However, before analyzing the issues, the dynamics of conflict in South Asia must be elaborated to get the whole picture of the situation. The brief history of nuclear technology development in South Asia vis-à- vis rivalry between India and Pakistan is discussed. It is followed by an assessment of the nuclear tests conducted in South Asia and future politics under the umbrella of deterrence is subsequently highlighted.
The last chapter focuses on the South Asian case by evaluating nuclear deterrence and conflict resolution leading to transformation. Moreover, it would be analyzed that why applicability of conflict transformation approaches are challenging in case of India and Pakistan. In the end, conclusion will finally test the hypothesis.
Literature Review There are multiple academic approaches, which are used as lenses to analyze contemporary world politics and evolving threats to international peace. This analysis is conducted to have the understanding of the functioning of the world system and to generate solutions addressing the emerging issues and problems. Similarly, the emergence of nuclear deterrence concept and conflict transformation in the nuclear security and peace and conflict studies deals with the resolution of threats to international peace and stability. Nuclear deterrence deals with avoiding war in a way that a state threatening another state cannot take any initiative which could lead to a war. Likewise, conflict transformation develops an approach which could be used in such a conflict in which other approaches did not work as desired. Objective of both the approaches is to avoid war, establish and maintain peace between conflicting parties.
Although, there is a lot of literature on nuclear deterrence and conflict transformation separately, but there is no significant work, which applies to conflict
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transformation in an environment of nuclear deterrence analyzing its effects and implications simultaneously. The relationship between nuclear deterrence and conflict transformation and their applicability to the region of South Asia is absent in previous works. Most of the writings relating to conflict transformation are attributed to the South African civil war context which was a localized conflict involving two sections of a community whereas in South Asian case it is the matter of two sovereign states in conflict. More importantly, conflict transformation has not been discussed with reference to adversaries having nuclear weapons which are the case with India and Pakistan. Therefore, this study is aimed at trying to fill this gap in literature and provide a perspective on conflict transformation under the ambit of nuclear deterrence. The literature on conflict transformation has this limitation because in order to transform the conflict, all the necessary conditions i.e. absence of war, resolution of conflict, elimination of causes of conflict, and transformation of negative conflict into positive relations. However, the nuclear deterrence stops at the first condition of absence of war and does not complement the condition of resolving the conflict. To enhance the understanding of concepts of nuclear deterrence and conflict transformation the study will consider the case of previous Indo-Pak peace processes as well. This would help the researcher to contribute to available literature on the subject and also enrich the research on theories of nuclear deterrence and possible techniques of conflict transformation.
The study conducted for this research provides sufficiently good understanding in the field of nuclear studies, whereas the available body of literature profoundly assesses the concept of deterrence. The reviewed work also covers the concept of nuclear deterrence, conflict transformation and India-Pakistan relations in South Asia. Saira Khan tries to answer various questions such as what will happen when there is a prolonged conflict accompanied by nuclear weapons.13 Khan discusses the implications and effects of nuclear weapons for the conflict that states are involved in. For this reason, an effort has been made to develop a relationship between the attainment of nuclear weapons and conflict transformation. She tried to assess the correlated aspects of the possession of nuclear weapons by contending states and its outcome on conflict transformation. This area has not been focused on previously.
13 Sairah Khan, Nuclear Weapon and Conflict Transformation: The Case of India-Pakistan (London: Routldge, 2009), 51. 13
Hobbes gives us the background and motives of the quarrel between opponents.14 There are three reasons for quarrel, (i) a result of competition or pursuit of gains; (ii) desire for safety; and (iii) glory or desire for competition. Quarrel is defined as “war of every man against every man”.15 Samir Kr Das, after mentioning Hobbes point of view, has stated that history has shown that peace with justice seemed impossible as it was considered that peace could prevail if justice is really implemented.16 The author further questions the need to separate peace studies from conflict. He also raises the question; if “peace is the absence of war then why war is not the absence of peace?” The author has rightly pointed out that peace can only be made possible if parties are willing to bring peace between them, otherwise it is a futile exercise. Similarly, two nations like India and Pakistan wish to avoid war between them, what would they try to do among other things is to first wish for peace.17
With a review of the writing on the term 'strife change', rather than 'struggle determination', Johannes Botes, “in Conflict Transformation: A Debate Over Semantics or a Crucial Shift in the Theory and Practice of Peace and Conflict Studies? has reviewed the semantic subtleties and operational contrast between the two terms.”18 The term ‘strife change’ has introduced new hypothetical thoughts and implemented acts of peace struggle or necessarily redevelopment of the term ‘struggle determination’. These terms are used generally due to their significance. There appears to be a shift in the term struggle change. In any case, it is additionally contended that the term strife change still be characterized in more unmistakable courses with a specific end goal to represent how it either ought to supplant the term struggle determination or be closed to it. The author alludes to the term “conflict transformation similar to the process of going from conflict- habituated system to peace systems. This process is differentiated from the usual term of conflict resolution because it centers on systems change”.19 Deep-seated social conflicts get such names because of the patterns created by conflicts which have become a segment of the social system. Considering the “social system as a component of analysis” the term resolution appears to be less appropriate. Transforming profound conflict is somewhat about ‘resolving’ issues of the conflict while the key issue is systemic change or
14 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, CB Macpherson, ed. (NYC: Penguin Books, 1968), 12. 15 Ibid., 26. 16 Samir Kr Das, Peace Studies: An Introduction to Concept, Scope and Theme (New Delhi: Sage Publications Pvt Ltd, 2004), 12-22. 17 Ibid. 18 Johannes Botes, “Conflict Transformation: A Debate Over Semantics or a Crucial Shift in the Theory and Practice of Peace and Conflict Studies?,” The International Journal of Peace Studies (2003): 1-27. 19 Ibid. 14
transformation”.20 It is impossible to get systems ‘resolved’ they can only be transformed; hence the term conflict resolution is used. Conflict management positively and constructively deals with divergence and difference. Instead of supporting the methods for removing conflicts it deals with the practical question of managing conflict. It also considers coping with it in a positive manner and engage the “opposing sides in a cooperative process”. Furthermore, it also suggests “how to design a realistic and attainable cooperative system for the constructive management”21 of dissimilarity.
Paul Kennedy in “The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 argue that the status of great powers is dependent on the strength of other powers because it is a relative phenomenon”.22 He enumerates various sources like economic stability and military power to ascertain the status of great power. He opines that the rise of powers is dependent on the availability of these resources and their decline is also dependent on the non-availability of these.
George Mitchell tries to promote peace while highlighting the role of religion and media. The main focus is on media, that once the event is recorded, it can be viewed again and again. The author has asserted that religion plays a crucial role in shaping conquest of people for world peace. Many peace-loving people have accepted the idea that wars begin in their minds. According to the preamble of UNESCO, wars “first begin in the minds of men therefore the defenses of peace must be built in the minds of men.”23
Media and journalism can provide immense help in both conflict management and peacebuilding. In the event of crises or conflicts the international media can grasp worldwide attention. Interference by an impartial and free global media is of great significant for the global citizens and the immediate victims. Whilst counting the success and failure of any conciliatory initiative there is a probability that the following four factors would influence the manner in which the conciliatory gesture is examined. These four factors are (1) the circumstances of the conflict itself, (2) the character of the conflict, (3) the particular state of the initiator and the victim, and (4) the channel of communication of the initiative from the former to the latter. Mitchell discusses different
20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (Vintage, 2010), 24. 23 George. J. Mitchell, The Negotiator: A Memoir, (New York: Simon and Schuster 2015) . 15
gestures, which develop after the process of reconciliation begins between the conflicting parties.24
Dayton and Kriesberg in “Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution examine the strategies that can be used to minimize the destructiveness of large-scale social conflicts and to transform them so as to achieve significant mutual benefit”. 25 These types of strategies are considered to be constructive. Different case studies are presented, so that one can learn about conflicts which avoided extreme violence, limited destructive trajectories, and resulted in the advancement of some of the interests of most parties impacted by the conflict.26 The authors have contemplated different ways by which diverse and large-scale conflicts were carried out. These include: (i) civil rights struggle, (ii) class based revolutions, (iii) community dispute regarding garbage disposal, (iv) border wars, (v) communal conflict and (vi) labor and management struggle. The above-mentioned struggles are included within the category of social conflicts.
John Paul Lederach in “Preparing for Peace, Conflict Transformation, Across Cultures forms an account on peace-building while saying that resources used for war are much more than those required to establish peace”.27 Accordingly, two factors are important to establish a long-lasting peace i.e. socio-economic and socio-cultural. The former deals with disbursement of funds in a society while later deals with cultural dimensions, which play a significant role in creating peace. In Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies Lederach is of the view that sustainable peace is a concept which is far beyond the traditional concept of peace. Some of us think peace can be easily attained by brokering a ceasefire, finalization of peace agreement and applying a peace accord. In order to gain peace “for a long period of time, a paradigmatic shift is required that focuses on the restoration and rebuilding of relationships.”28
Craig Rosebraugh states, while quoting Gandhi, no one is capable of knowing the absolute truth.29 The author said so because the one who uses violence claims to know the absolute truth. Moral beliefs that are appealing to the heart and mind are stronger than
24 Ibid. 25 Louis Kriesberg and Bruce W. Dayton, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution (New Delhi: Viva Books, 2013), 1-9. 26 Ibid. 27 John Paul Lederach, Preparing for Peace, Conflict Transformation, Across Cultures (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 6. 28 John Paul Lederach, Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 88- 89. 29 Craig Rosebraugh, The Logic of Political Violence: Lessons in Reform and Revolution (Oregon: Arissa Media Group, Portland, 2004), 226. 16
appeals based on threats and violence. While quoting Satyagrahi, these types of beliefs might be easy to achieve but they are not long lasting and disappear as the forces that hold them disappear. Weinbaum writes that when one tries to create peace ‘a legitimate national leadership, an agreed constitutional framework and broad humanitarian assistance’30 is essential. Similarly, Nausheen Wasi, in Regional Organizations and Early Warning Mechanism elucidates that whenever there are problem-creating forces, there are counter mechanisms.31
Zartman’s work represents an addition to a growing body of analytical and practical writings on approaches for managing and resolving inter and intra-State conflicts. The techniques of making violence prone adversaries halt their acts of carnage and destruction are not always based on detailed analyses or the invocation of time honored principles and techniques. With the passage of time various methods and techniques as applied to various conflicts have evolved. Contemporary peacemaking incorporates many methods and approaches for understanding, managing and resolving conflicts.32 Many scholars have carried out their assignments either intellectually or by applying techniques and methods. These techniques and methods are tested proven successful in managing the former conflicts. Relatively new techniques have been investigated such as negotiations, bargaining and the third party mediation. Some of the advanced methods include problem solving workshops, making use of economic incentives and disincentives for conflict management, providing conflict resolution education in conflict zones, incorporating conflict management techniques in the contemporary peace-making.
An important contribution to the growing scholarship on post-conflict peacebuilding, with policy implications for the US and other institutions is made by Charles T. Call.33 He tries to answer questions like “Is state building essential to post war building? Are there functional priorities in fostering legitimate states in war-torn societies, and how should they be advanced? How does the process of building states relate to the process of building peace? What are the tensions between peace building and
30 Marvin G. Weinbaum, “U.S Involvement in Afghanistan since 9/11: Strategic objective and Reconstruction,” in The Challenges of Rebuilding Afghanistan, ed. Monis Ahmar (Karachi: Bureau of Composition, Compilation and Translation Press, 2005), 163. 31 Nausheen Wasi, “Regional Organizations and Early Warning Mechanism,” in Early Warning Systems: Potential for Crisis Management and Regional Cooperation, ed. Monis Ahmar (Karachi: Bureau of Composition, Compilation and Translation Press, 2010), 113. 32 William Zartman, Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, (Washington DC: USIP Press, 2007), 1-460 33 Charles T. Call, Building States to Build Peace (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, USA, 2009), 365. 17
state building?”34 Amy L. Freedman in book The Internationalization of Internal Conflicts: Threatening the State addresses two different but essential linked questions that why do some insurgencies against the state become internationalized or regionalized while others do not and why have some conflicts been resolved while others have not?35 It has been argued that the factors which differentiate the success stories from unsuccessful ones are the building of democratic institutions and the constructive involvement of neutral international actors in both creating and overseeing the implementation of peace. Two factors are important, one is democratization and other is outside involvement. Both elements help in building trust among disputing parties, imparting a sense of legitimacy among the actors and providing mechanisms for articulating preferences or interests outside committing acts of violence. Third-party participation can open the door to negotiations and can serve as a follow-up once an agreement has been reached.
Peacekeeping has developed as an important tool for management of conflict. Peter Wallensteen in Peace Research: Theory and Practice intends to make peace through peace research.36 Lessons from history could lead us to peace and away from war. Peace is the only way to move forward for health, economic growth, democracy and all relevant goals to be achieved by society. Similarly, civil society is an integral part of conflict and it can act to achieve peaceful resolution and reconciliation.”37 Civil society plays an important role in the state machinery. One of the many roles which the civil society plays is to initiate and strengthen comprehensive dialogue between the government and its citizens. By doing so the civil society promotes conflict resolution endorses human rights and strengthens better democratization processes. The civil society on account of its multi- dimensional and flexible structure is capable of adjusting to rapid global changes.
Power, intimately connected to individual issues and collective security and survival and also to conflict and enmity can play a significant role in conflict transformation. Collective exercise of power especially through political institutions, such as states or governments leads to peace and stability. Quoting social contract theorists,
34 Ibid. 35 Amy L. Freedman, “Explaining Peace” in The Internationalization of Internal Conflicts: Threatening the State, ed. Amy L. Freedman (New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2014), 253-254. 36 Peter Wallensteen, Peace Research: Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2011), 4. 37 Raffaele Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci, Conflict Society and Peace Building: Comparative Perspective (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2011), 42. 18
Iain Atack in Non-violence in Political Theory claimed that the basic human condition is one of a ‘state of nature’, consisting of competition for resources and a struggle for survival.38 Power is the reflection of our ability to focus and direct not only our but also the energy of others towards imagined and desired goals and their outcomes. Power is individual or collective grounded in self-discipline and regulation. Conflict management is immensely influenced by both the distribution of power during a conflict and power is employed. The frameworks and problem-solving values cannot be applied elsewhere. This claim is based on the fact that these approaches have cultural constraints and thus would prove ineffective in dealing with different world-views, realities and conflict perceptions. Conflict resolution in spite of transnational character still continues to be influenced by a number of traditions.
The end of the Cold War has witnessed rapid transformation in world affairs. The old system has been replaced by a new system. Although this change can be easily detected, it is difficult to confirm whether this new system has taken its place or not. The new emerging patterns are hard to define. These changes have manifested in the following set of circumstances (1) the end of bipolar era, (2) a fresh wave of democratization, (3) increased globalization, (4) growth in the economic and information sector, efforts towards coordinating international security policy, and (5) redefining sovereignty which exerts new responsibilities on States towards their citizens and the international community. Bloomfield and Leiss have contributed by bringing up some interesting body of work on the change in the nature of conflict that has been witnessed in the recent past.39 John Lederach, who is “the advocate of conflict transformation, in Little Book of Conflict transformation has discovered the difference between conflict resolution and conflict transformation.”40
The literature on conflict and conflict transformation has amply described the concept. However, the limitation of conflict transformation related to nuclear deterrence has hampered analyzing aspects of application of these concepts in the South Asia. The main takeaways of the literature review on conflict transformation are: (i) conflicts are bound to happen in the human society as it is the part of human behavior; (ii) the nature
38 Iain Atack, Non-violence in Political Theory (United Kingdom: Edinburgh University Press Ltd, 2012), 100. 39 Lincoln P. Bloomfield, and Amelia C. Leiss, The Control of Local Conflict: A Design Study on Arms Control and Limited War in the Developing Areas, Vol. 2. [Cambridge, Mass.]: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Washington, DC: for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, 1967. 40 John Lederach, Little Book of Conflict Transformation: Clear Articulation of the Guiding Principles by a Pioneer in the Field (Skyhorse Publishing, Inc., 2015), 12. 19
of conflict is defined by the objectives and means of the contending parties; (iii) conflict among states is driven by competition for resources and struggle for survival and power; (iv) post conflict peace-building is as important as ending the conflict because the sources of conflict also need to be removed for lasting peace; (v) in the conflict transformation ladder, the first step is ending the war so that conflict is managed at the second stage in order to resolve the conflict in the third level. Finally the conflict is transformed through eliminating the sources of conflict.
The international relations theory emphases on the main constructs of political thought that explain the state behavior in international politics. The scholars have elaborated different theories for the conceptual understanding of international relations. However, for brevity in arguments and to keep the study focused, realism is used as the basic theoretical construct for this study. The international relations debate has been dominated by realism for the most part owing to its emphasis on war and security competition. The concept of realism asserts that the basic human nature is selfish thus the basic human nature transcends into the behavior of the states. In light of the realist paradigm, all states are hostile, competitive and power maximizers. The promotion of peace and security by states as suggested by other theories is not at the expense of their state security. Realism has evolved over a long period of time. A tremendous growth in the theory of realism has been witnessed.
Realism, for this study, explains the state behavior in view of nuclear deterrence very aptly. However, the conflict, as much as better defined by realism, cannot be described smoothly when discussed in connection to resolution or transformation as realism argues that states can cooperate but only for their interests and they would not be lured towards ending a conflict and managing to eliminate the sources of it also. Therefore, we will have to consider this limitation of realism while explaining the conflict transformation in connection with the nuclear deterrence and state behaviors.
For understanding the critical appraisal of nuclear deterrence, conflict transformation and the behavior of states in South Asia, it is important to understand how different theories and concepts have evolved for the past many centuries till to date. In the light of the realist concept of statecraft, national survival and the acquisition of power are supreme. In the international system nothing is as precious as the sovereignty of a state. Realism shows that international relations are a domain of power and interest. The
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international system has been hostile and states have always desired to maximize their power from ancient times. Therefore, the concepts of realism are influenced by the history of the Greeks. Realism further suggests that states are rational and therefore they should discern their interest in terms of power to get advantage over other states. Even Thucydides and Machiavelli suggest that selfishness greed and being advantageous dominate human nature. Both India and Pakistan are in this hostile international system, hence both the states try to promote their self- interest and power maximization.
In the light of political realism, politics just like the society is governed by laws which are influenced by the human nature. However, individuals have their own fears and priorities which are governed by their nature and responds to external factors accordingly. 41 Thus, security dilemma remains inescapable for all states regardless of their economic and social order. “The structure of international system influences the behavior of states. John Mearsheimer asserts that the nature of the international system is responsible for the aggressive behavior of the states.”42 Mearsheimer has expounded the realist theory and international institutions in the light of “realist assumption that states desire to maximize their power”43 .
Morgenthau in “Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace” gives the traditional realist account which focuses on human nature based on inherent greed and dishonesty.44 Thegreat powers are interest oriented and pursue their national interests at any cost. The great powers maneuver international organizations in order to foster their own interests and enhance their power. Thucydides and Niccolo Machiavelli are advocates of traditional realism. The roots of theory are based in the ancient times when Thucydides describes the stories of Peloponnesian war. Machiavelli narrates the rising into power of the Prince.45 His actions were based on the natural instinct of pursuing self-interest at any cost. These two proponents of traditional realism are of the view that basic nature of human beings is greed for power, selfishness and seeking advantage over others.
Thomas Hobbes takes a similar line in believing human nature to inspire actions for the sake of interests. In Leviathan, Hobbes is of the opinion that the man is constantly
41 Kenneth Waltz, The Theory of International Politics (New York: Waveland PrInc, 1979), 19. 42 John Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism," In Tim Dunne, International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 3rd Edition, ed. Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 70. 43 Ibid. 44 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1967), 60. 45 Niccolo Machiavelli, "The Prince and the Discourses, trans," Luigi Ricci, (New York: Modern Library, 1950), 70. 21
in a state of war which is the natural condition of mankind. Human nature as based on selfishness.46 The international system is anarchic due to the fact that each state has capabilities which are similar to other states. In his view, “even the weakest has the strength to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others.”47 Some states are more powerful than others and they are able to dominate others, but domination does not go unattended. The other powers also try to match that state which gives rise to a conflict situation which could erupt suddenly.
In “The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations”, E. H. Carr convincingly elucidates that the realist view remains dominant despite some efforts for cooperation among the states.48 He begins with the optimistic view of cooperation among states after World War I. However, another war after so many peace efforts made Carr come to the conclusion that the world-view of idealistic cooperation is flawed, and the realistic paradigm continues to prevail. Barry Buzan in The State and the International Political System tells that “the international anarchy not constituting a single form with relatively fixed features, but rather a single condition around which many large variations in character can be arranged. Some forms of anarchy heighten the problem of national security, whereas others mitigate it49 and the 'natural' trends affecting the matter are contradictory, with improvements in the system structure racing against an expanding universe of threats and vulnerabilities. Short of some gigantic catastrophe like nuclear war, we are unable to go back to pre-anarchic systems when the level of contact among units was too low to justify the notion of an international political system. The principal alternatives to the innumerable varieties of anarchy are thus unitary systems”.
The realist idea of “international relations as a just power struggle between the states dismissed by Hedley Bull who has opined that the states of the world as members of the anarchical society, the states obey certain rules and norms that allow a civilized nature to international politics regardless of the classical realists who were never willing to accept. 50 He proposes that states act in such a way that they can maintain the international order because this corresponds to their own interest which facilitates the
46 Hobbes, Leviathan, 58. 47 Ibid. 48 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (Macmillan, 1983), 34-35. 49 Barry Buzan, “The State and the International Political System,” People, States and Fear, An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era Second Edition, (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1998), 50. 50 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics Ed. 2 (New York: McMillan, 1977), 80. 22
states’ pursuit of security and development. His emphasis on the international order and skepticism about international morality made him known among the realists as “a wolf in sheep’s clothing”. Yet Bull could never differentiate between distinction of Order and Justice. His arguments uneasily try to reconcile the two concepts which gives great input to the analysis used in this study.
State relations are governed by realism that focuses on national interests and power. The individual behavior as discussed by Hobbes transforms into states behavior of E. H. Carr. This state behavior is bound to transform into behavior of international system. So, the basic driving force at all the levels of human society is governed by realism.
In realism theory, deterrence plays at the outskirts though its basics are well imbedded in it. The nuclear deterrence theory gained sufficient significance as a “military strategy” during the Cold War.51 During this period, it attained distinctive status as considerable nuclear force was deemed capable of causing extreme destruction and would thus deter a powerful adversary. But it also ensures the protection against any sudden destruction. Deterrence is a strategy which aims at preventing the enemy from taking any hostile action. Bernard Brodie argues “a credible nuclear deterrent must be always at ready, yet never used”.52 It is an instrument of war which remains activated during pre- war era. It is only useful as long as it prevents the war but once a war begins, this instrument is considered to be useless.
It indicates that the author claims the possession of nuclear weapons to be bargaining chip in international diplomacy. Furthermore, it also gives one an advantage among the nuclear states. In “Nukes: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons”, Steve Minneus gives “an overview of nuclear weapons, their history, the danger they pose, the efforts of countries such as Iran and North Korea to develop, acquire them and the treaties that prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology.”53 Nuclear weapons are prone to obvious proliferation and every country would aspire to have them to guarantee its national security interest. Also, the less effective nature of the international non- proliferation treaties renders no restraint in proliferation. However, this argument is narrow because “the development of nuclear weapons is not easy task”, there are certain
51 Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and the Cold War," Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 2 (1995): 157- 181. 52 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (New York: Princeton University Press, 1959), 126. 53 Steve Minneus, Nukes: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Southport: Rosen Publishing Group, 2007), 76-81. 23
prerequisites that kill the motivation of states to go nuclear. The threat to humanity as a whole from nuclear weapons has led many to oppose these weapons since their development.
Sudha Raman states that “nuclear deterrence has the ability to not only prevent a major war but also to limit the area of conflict while using the threat to avoid it in other area.”54 In American Foreign Policy, Kissinger remarks that deterrence “occurs above all in the minds of men.”55 While Robert Jervis in “The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, contends the psychological framework of deterrence decides the behavior of the deterer and the deterred.”56
The book “People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem” by Barry Buzan central objective of the author is to highlight “how states and societies pursue freedom from threat in an environment in which competitive relations are inescapable across the political, economic, military, societal and environmental landscapes.”57 During the discourse of this book, “attention is placed on the interplay of threats and vulnerabilities, the policy consequences of overemphasizing one or the other, and the existence of contradictions within and between ideas about security.”58 Moreover, “security provides an analytical framework which stands between the extremes of power and peace, incorporates most of their insights and adds more of its own.”59
Buzan puts into account the dilemma of defence, “the fear of nuclear war, and the consequent ending of the legitimacy of war as a major instrument of relations among the great powers, amounts to a desirable transformation in the nature of the international system the nuclear defence dilemma is providing the international system with an unprecedented service.”60 Buzan elaborates although a “multipolar deterrence system is not without its problems; it has the advantage of preventing the excessive concentration of rivalry which continues to drive the power-security dilemma in a bipolar system. Even within the confines of a fully developed defence dilemma, there are still risks of accident and miscalculation which many find unacceptable, not to mention the high costs and moral effects of a permanently militarized system”.
54 Sudha Raman, Nuclear Strategy: The Doctrine of Just War (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2006), 11. 55 Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy (New York: WW Norton, 1974), 15. 56 Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), 37-40. 57 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era Second Edition, (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1998), 69. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 24
However, no theoretical framework can be perfect and all encompassing. Deterrence theory also has many flaws which are highlighted by several authors. Patrick M. Morgan “has highlighted six points which are considered as essentials of deterrence theory. These are mainly the severe conflict, the concept of retaliatory threat, the concept of unacceptable damage, the notion of credibility, and the notion of deterrence theory.”61 He also reiterates “that military modernization has overcome the usefulness of deterrence by threat of retaliation through which serious damage can be caused to the adversary. Therefore, nuclear weapons emerged as a concern for world peace.”62
In National and International Security: The Policy Problem, according to Buzan, “this policy process has a limited ability to solve the logical and perceptual problems. Also, it adds its own dimension of further difficulties to the national security problem.”63 The “political process necessarily engages a variety of domestic interests in the formulation of security policy, with the result that the national policy which goes out into the international system is as much a product of internal factors as it is of the external ones which provide its principal justification.”64 Also, the militarization of society includes “military influence in government, about the military-industrial complex as a powerful elite interest, about the corruption of higher values by the65 blatant willingness to use force, about the infringement of civil liberties by the requirements of domestic security, and about the self-perpetuating logic of security demands on society which arise from the dilemmas”.
There are numerous “incentives and disincentives for any state in developing nuclear weapons. Joseph Cirincione identifies the motives behind states to go nuclear weapons development”.66 There are some concerns faced by states in the development of nuclear weapons which makes them abandons their program. Nevertheless, “while discussing the issues of nuclear proliferation the author seems to have gone overboard because he offers a dichotomy in the overall approach prevailing at the international level to the concept of nuclear proliferation.”67 Deterrence is seldom treated as a familiar quantity and complete reality determining safety and protection; rather, it is presented as
61 Morgan, “The Concept of Deterrence.” 90. 62 Ibid. 63 Barry Buzan, “National and International Security: The Policy Problem,” People, States and Fear, An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era Second Edition, (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1998), 36. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (Colombia: Colombia University Press, 2008), 35. 67 Ibid. 25
the “rationale for the custody of nuclear weapons.”68 Though, the concept of nuclear deterrence rests on the unexamined belief which claims that the fear of your adversary of having his cities destroyed may provide you leverage.
The issues of global nuclear non-proliferation policies, other developments and the problem of test ban have been discussed by Fischer and Muller. They give full information and evaluate happenings between the third and fourth Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conferences. The significance of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) Amendment Conference has been surrounded by controversies from the beginning.69 The 1991 Persian Gulf War resulted in the non-Proliferation Regime which was the response of the international community “to the proliferation-relevant aspect of this dramatic international event. The Cold War politics gave rise to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Reiss and Litwak in Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War re- evaluate the strategic nuclear issues following the end of ideological conflicts of East- West.”70 The problems of nuclear proliferation have been posed by specific states in the past and present. The authors have presented seven national case studies which examine actual or potential proliferators (Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, India, Brazil and Argentina). Not only that but they have presented two studies of declared nuclear weapons states (former Soviet Union and China). They have also managed to bring forward the case study of Middle East with the inclusion of Iran. The authors have thus concluded their work by presenting an evaluation of both the incentives and disincentives of nuclear proliferation. These incentives and disincentive developed during the “transition from Cold War to the Post-Cold War period.”71
Pakistan as a nuclear state and how Pakistan was monitored by the outside world after terrorist attacks of September 11 on the US soil discusses by Farzana Shaikh.72 At that time the international community especially, the US was afraid “that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons may fall in the hands of terrorists”73 related to Al-Qaeda. Sumit Ganguly has given an insight into the Indian nuclear weapons program and the reason which
68 Ibid. 69 Harold Muller, David Fischer, and Wolfgang Kotter, Nuclear non-proliferation and Global Order, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 153 70 Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, Nuclear proliferation after the Cold War (New York: John Hopkins University Press, 1994), 112. 71 Ibid. 72 Farzana Shaikh, "Pakistan's nuclear bomb: beyond the non-proliferation regime," International Affairs 78, no. 1 (2002): 29-48. 73 Ibid. 26
“compelled India to carry out nuclear tests in 1998.”74 The author tried to investigate the reasons by considering several arguments, but it seems difficult to find a complete explanation. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government was fully aware of the international pressures it would face in case of conducting nuclear tests. The author has highlighted several arguments which could explain the reason for taking such a big step. One argument suggests the BJP wanted to demonstrate its masculinity at home and the expertise of the Indian military to the outside world. Another argument implies that BJP “wanted to improve its relations with”75 its parliamentary allies. This piece of work is useful in order to understand the behavior of India as a state.
The nuclear black-market is a burgeoning global threat for nuclear weapons proliferation. Langewiesche in The Atomic Bazaar: Dispatches from the Underground World of Nuclear Trafficking has given an interesting account of the inescapable transfer of the nuclear weapons from the rich to the poor.76 The author gives the estimated number of the people killed during the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki which according to him was around 220,000. The destruction and damage caused to the two Japanese cities was worn out. Different countries have been successful in acquiring nuclear weapons owing to the fact that they need these weapons to deter their adversary. The nuclearization of the world has become the norm and it cannot be changed.
Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz in “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed” discuss the very rationale for the states’ nuclearization.77 They have discussed the two streams of nuclear development such as optimists and pessimists. As far “as the strategic stability is concerned, nuclear weapons guarantee stability while pessimists argue that they opened the room for conventional war and low intensity conflicts under the nuclear umbrella which are challenges to strategic stability at the broader level. Also, the debate of stability-instability paradox is essential to comprehend strategic stability especially in the case of Pakistan and India.”78 The “stability-instability paradox” refers to the stability in the nuclear power balance brings instability in the conventional power balance and states see it convenient to indulge in conventional
74 Sumit Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program," International Security 23, no. 4 (1999): 148-177. 75 Ibid. 76 William Langeweische, The Atomic Bazaar: Dispatches from the Underground World of Nuclear Trafficking (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008), 60. 77 Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapon: A Debate Renewed (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995). 78 Ibid. 27
warfare and small battles with the impunity of not being attacked by the nuclear weapons in response. “Optimists say that more nuclear weapons may be better”79 while pessimists advocate the opposite.
Perkovich in “India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation provides a complete historical background of acquisition of Indian Nuclear Bomb.”80 He further demonstrates “the decisions of policy-makers at the time of the development of nuclear program. India's decision to go nuclear was not just a matter of security but Sino-Indian border dispute has always remained matter of great concern. Political factors have contributed in the threat perception and mould the decision.”81 Naeem Salik “comprehensively covers the evolution of Pakistan’s nuclear program, acquisition of deterrent capability and expands upon futuristic perspective.”82 It helps to draw “policy options for Pakistan as some observers of the South Asian scene believe that a disastrous nuclear crisis could even be precipitated by non-state actors and groups outside the control of government.”83
Braun and Christopher have done tremendous research in the field of nuclear non- proliferation regime. The authors have highlighted the challenges posed to the nuclear anon-proliferation regime. The nuclear program of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has posed three challenges to the regime. One of the challenges is that on the one hand countries pay heed to the non-proliferation regime. On the other hand, it works on its nuclear weapons capability. The authors assert that such countries may either back out from NPT or can continue to build their weapons. Walker has come up with some really interesting work in the field of nuclear studies. The author informs that when India refused to accept the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 it was debated that it may one day test its nuclear warheads. The Bharatiya Janata Party has long been a supporter of the idea of a Hindu Bomb. The author states that India violated the norms and hence generated fear among its neighbors. Later nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan created crisis like situation in South Asia.
Fuhrmann asserts that transfer of peaceful nuclear technology eventually results in the making of nuclear weapons. The author demonstrates that states which get nuclear
79 Ibid. 80 George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (California: University of California Press, 2002), 36. 81 Ibid. 82 Naeem Salik, The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan Perspective (Oxford: University Press, 2010), 50. 83 Ibid. 28
assistance from other states usually successfully develop their own nuclear weapons.84 Corera has presented a well-researched piece of work which gives an insight into nuclear black market and proliferation of nuclear technology.85 It informs how Dr. A. Q. Khan transferred nuclear technology to rouge states like North Korea, Iran and Libya. Also, how Dr. Khan transferred secret nuclear technology from Europe to Pakistan. It also gives an insight into the Dr. Khan network which included businessman, scientists who managed to transfer this knowledge.
Bhumitra Chakma, in “The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia” examines how nuclear weapons evolved in South Asia; the nuclear doctrine; political dimensions to nuclear strategy of Pakistan and India; the mechanisms of arms control; and the role of external powers in reducing nuclear danger in the region.86 Overall, it is an important summation of all the major issues surrounding India-Pakistan's emergence as nuclear powers as it covers the journey from history to present and then moves towards the future perspectives as well. Ganguly and Kapur in “Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behavior and the Bomb” have described the effect of nuclear weapons proliferation on security calculus of region.87 Both India and Pakistan had to go through war crises due to India military exercise named Brasstacks. Pakistan’s reaction to the biggest Indian military exercise led both the countries to the brink of war. After several months, the crises abated and there was negative peace. Although, both states came close to conventional wars only, but there is possibility of a nuclear war.
Pakistan and India are vitally important de-facto nuclear states (the term commonly used for the states which have tested nuclear weapons after the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty in 1970) in the contemporary global political system because their nuclear weapons development is on the increase and more importantly they have active conflict among them which has shown tendency to escalate into a nuclear exchange. So the India-Pakistan rivalry is as important for world politics as the US-Russia rivalry was in the Cold War. The post-tests nuclear politics in South Asia gives an image of complex relation between the states. Cheema, Chari and Cohan in “Four Crises and a Peace Process have discussed in detail the international environment from the end of Cold War
84 Matthew Fuhrmann, "Spreading temptation: Proliferation and peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements," International Security 34, no. 1 (2009): 7-41. 85 Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and fall of the AQ Khan Network (Oxford University Press, 2006), 24. 86 Bhumitra Chakma, The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia (Oxford: Tailor and Francis, 2011), 5-6. 87 Summit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behavior and the Bomb (New York: Routledge, 2008), 161. 29
to the war on terror.”88 This book contains two parts. These two parts have both good and bad report: the good report suggests that the Kargil war remained conventional in spite of the potential of transforming into a nuclear one. Thus, the bad part is that both Pakistan and India, didn’t learn anything from their historical experiences. Kargil incident has been referred which had the potential of changing into a nuclear war as both the countries at that time “had weapons of mass destruction. The international community was afraid that the conflict could transform into a nuclear one. Kargil conflict began a year after the historic nuclear tests carried out by both India and Pakistan”89 in 1998. The fear of nuclear weapons compelled the international community to stop the Kargil conflict from intensifying.
Bear F. Braumoeller in “The Great Powers and the International System”, argues two perspectives on the behavior of leaders in history.90 Firstly, he argues that leaders have the ability to form history or not. Secondly, he raises question that are the leader’s dependent on the historic instances? He has basically tried to focus on the debate of role of leaders which has been the part of international scholarship in the nineteenth century. The author agrees that both the perspectives are right. Irum Khalid, in “Pakistan- India Conflicts: An Application of Crisis Decision Making demonstrates a theoretical framework of crisis decision-making.”91 After explaining the framework, she then applies it to the case of India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s decision making is different as compared to India. The decision making in Pakistan is in the hands of the executives, but the country is mostly controlled by the military. The possibility of war between India and Pakistan remains high despite the fact that this could lead to a nuclear exchange.
Paul Kapur, in “Revisionist Ambitions, Conventional Capabilities, and Nuclear Instability: Why Nuclear South Asia is not like Cold War Europe upholds that conventional war remains likely in the region even if Pakistani leaders believe that India and the United States consider that nuclear war is costly.”92 The author comments on stability/instability paradox, developed in 1960s in the context of the US and Soviet
88 P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 13-29. 89 Ibid. 90 Bear F. Braumoeller, The great powers and the international system: systemic theory in empirical perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 13. 91 Irum Khalid, Pakistan- India Conflicts: An Application of Crisis Decision Making (Boulder: Peace Building Publishers, 2013), 39- 45. 92 Paul Kapur, “Revisionist Ambitions, Conventional Capabilities, and Nuclear Instability: Why Nuclear South Asia is not like Cold War Europe,” in Inside Nuclear South Asia, ed. Scott D. Sagan (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press India, Pvt. Ltd, 2011), 184- 218. 30
Union Cold War era but this paradox does not explain the ongoing South Asian conflicts the recent example of which is the Kargil War of 1999. The “nuclearization of South Asia in 1998 followed by two military crises of 1999 and 2001-02 generated an intense debate about the impact of nuclear weapons on South Asian strategic stability.”93 “Nuclear optimists were of the view that nuclear weapons had brought stability to the region whereas, the two crises in a quick succession led several others to highlight the inevitability of stability-instability paradox, that is, stability at higher levels due to the existence of nuclear weapons can cause instability at lower levels of violence.” Whereas, “several nuclear pessimists were quick to label it as an outcome of the stability-instability paradox, alleging Pakistan for launching sub-conventional attacks against India”.94
In “India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal, Ashley J. Tellis illustrates the Indian nuclear posture by extensively analyzing it in context to its strategic interests, security goals and institutional structures”.95 He further divides it into three spheres which include critical understanding, reconstruction and synthesis of minds related to nuclearization. The Indian nuclear tests conducted on May 11, 1998 indicated a shift in strategic thinking. Previously the Indian nuclear posture neither suggested a need of building a nuclear arsenal nor did it renounce the idea of doing so. After these nuclear tests India stood at the threshold of adopting a new posture which encouraged the need of ready arsenal and building a minimum but credible deterrent force. Tellis discusses the factors involved in the Indian policy shift i.e. political, strategic and technological. He also specifies material, infrastructural and procedural capabilities which India currently presents and intends to acquire.
Raja Menon in “A Nuclear Strategy for India” tries to solve the query that why world had 35000 nuclear weapons in 1990, when even a single bomb of 20kt is enough to flatten a city.96 While criticizing India, he is of the view that India can face a lonely path ahead if will not learn from the US government’s journey, which it had taken since 1952. Verghese Koithara, in Managing India’s Nuclear Forces suggests that every nuclear weapon state has developed and made use of its deterrence capability in a different way.97 Moreover, the deterrence relationship between the US and United Soviet Socialist
93 Ibid. 94 Ibid. 95 Ashley J. Tellis, India's emerging nuclear posture: Between recessed deterrent and ready arsenal Vol. 1127 (Rand Corporation, 2001), 20. 96 Raja Menon, A Nuclear Strategy for India (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), 41-43. 97 Verghese Koithara, Managing India’s Nuclear Forces (New Delhi: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2012), 53-86. 31
Republic (USSR) had several aspects which distinguish it from the others that followed. One is that they created new grounds in their strategy, technology and force management. Another is the fact that their rivalry is based on geopolitics and ideology. The military expenditures of India, Pakistan and China are increasing but China is advanced from India and Pakistan “both in term of absolute spending and the capacity to sustain it over a long period”.98 Military modernization by China and Pakistan is being considered the threat to India by different authors. Mandip Singh in China’s Military Modernization and India’s Security, proposes the evolution of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).99 As per the author, “China’s military modernization program is based on the ‘four modernization’ enunciated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 at the third plenum of the 11th People’s Congress.”100 These four modernizations, as imperative for China, are National defence, agriculture, industry, and science and technology. Moreover, the consequent modernization program that is currently ongoing in the PLA will pose challenges for India. In subsequent years, the power project aspirations of China in the Indian Ocean seem as a challenge for Indian Navy. Singh draws Indian attention to this, as for India, “the Chinese threat is likely to obvious itself in the medium to the long term. It is essential for India to develop its military muscle and infra-structure to deter China from exercising the military option.”101
Rup Narayan Das in “Recent Developments in India-China Relations” deals with the major issues and trends in Sino-India relations in current scenario.102 “They both have many contending issues like competing for the same resources, markets and diplomatic space, regionally and globally.”103 These issues include as ‘talks on the border dispute, Tibet and Arunachal Pradesh Conundrum, South China Sea Imbroglio, Agni-5 launched by India, Naval CBMs between India-China, and General Liang Guanglie’s visit to India, and the skewed balance of trade between India-China.’ Das critically analyzes that Chinese approach purses tactical maneuvering rather than strategic imperative in developing of two states relationship. Nuclear Modernization in India’s Neighborhood by Rajiv Nayan enunciates the nuclear modernization by China and Pakistan which has likely implications for their neighboring state India. Therefore, “India is strengthening its
98 Ibid. 99 Mandip Singh, “China’s Military Modernization and India’s Security,” Asian Strategic Review, Muni, S. D., and Vivek Chadha, eds. (Institute for Defence and Analyses, 2014), 10. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102 Rup Narayan Das, “Recent Developments in India-China Relations,” Asian Strategic Review, Muni, S. D., and Vivek Chadha, eds. (Institute for Defence and Analyses, 2014), 2. 103 Ibid. 32
security and defence preparedness and ballistic missiles development is a vital step in this course”.104
Hagerty and Joeck analyze the scenario of Indo-Pak wars. Crisis escalated in 1990 over the disputed Jammu and Kashmir region. However, due to diplomatic efforts and interventions both countries redeployed their forces from the borders to their normal positions. The author also discusses the Kargil war in Kashmir. However, again due the involvement of US this conflict was managed and both forces returned to their original places. Here some scholars are of the opinion that this conflict de-escalated due to nuclear proliferation, but others contend that what stopped both was not the nuclear deterrence but the interference by US. In December 2001, the terrorists carried out attack on the parliament in New Delhi when two hundred and fifty parliamentarians were inside the building. The next year in 2002 another crisis appeared after the terrorist attack on the Indian Army Camp in Kaluchak in Kashmir. These two crises escalated the conflict between both the states but due to nuclear threats from two sides conflicts were managed.
Rajesh M. Basrur in “South Asia’s Cold War: Nuclear Weapons and Conflict in Comparative Perspective” tries to highlight the factors responsible for India-Pakistan rivalry.105 This age-old rivalry is driven by these factors; (i) ideational factors stemming from partition, and (ii) material factors carved out due to the power distribution in the region. India - Pakistan share a specific relationship owing to nuclear weapons. Basrur brings greater delicacy and expansiveness to the notion of traditional deterrence theory and offers various lessons and judgments that are appropriate. The discussion about Pakistan’s nuclear program always brings about the controversies like non-proliferation and issues of nuclear security owing to its present security situation. However, such assumptions are politically based in particular, considering the historical aspects of strategic environment of South Asia. Asia Mukhtar, in “Threat Perception: Pakistan's Nuclear Program” discusses the threats and perceptions regarding the Pakistan's nuclear program and the on-going debates about its safety and the international politics.106 She convincingly tries to present a detailed narrative of Pakistan; the way it attained nuclear technology and the threats that compelled this country to go for the atomic bomb. It
104 Rajiv Nayan, “Nuclear Modernization in India’s Neighborhood,” Asian Strategic Review, Muni, S. D., and Vivek Chadha, eds. (Institute for Defence and Analyses, 2014), 6-7. 105 Rajesh M. Basrur, South Asia’s Cold War: Nuclear Weapons and Conflict in Comparative Perspective (New York: Routledge, 2008), 76. 106 Asia Mukhtar, Threat Perception: Pakistan's Nuclear Program (Lahore: Al-Abbas Publishers, 2012), 2-3. 33
covers the historical perspective of Pakistan nuclear program; however, the current trends in South Asian nuclear politics are ignored in this research.
There is some tremendous work done by Corera which consists of exclusive interviews of people from Islamabad, London, Washington including members of A.Q. Khan Network.107 This work unfolds that Khan worked amidst deals made by rouge states and how his unique status in Pakistan facilitated him in building his business empire. This body of work gives insights on how Khan managed to operate for so many years. Furthermore, this incredible body of work gives an insight into the Iranian nuclear program. The unique work by a journalist covers some interesting aspects such as how Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and MI6 after reaching the network convinced Musharraf to act against Khan and the high-wire dealing Moammar Gaddafi. The renunciation of Libya’s nuclear weapons eventually caused Khan’s downfall. Shopping for Bombs is a good book by Corera which describes what challenges encompass the prevention of nuclear arms race.
The Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 weakened its relationship “with the nuclear non-proliferation regime.”108 Although India claimed that its technology was for peaceful use only but contrary to the principles of nuclear Non-proliferation regime. Sarkar critically examines “India’s normative opposition to the nuclear Non-proliferation regime since 1974 and thus not acquiring a weapons program. The author has negated the Murphy’s Law of nuclear fatalism”109 and its traditional wisdom. The “Murphy’s Law of nuclear fatalism contends that if a state has the know-how to build a nuclear weapon,”110 it would definitely build one in any way. The author has argued that this logic was challenged by the Indian nuclear inaction at the start of Integrated Guided Missiles Program in 1983.
Hussain has come up with some tremendous work by assessing the nuclearization of South Asia and by narrating the efforts made by the international community regarding nuclear non-proliferation.111 The de-jure states have discriminatory and double behavior and thus undermine non-proliferation in order to protect their national interests. Nuclear
107 Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and fall of the AQ Khan Network (Oxford University Press, 2006), 4. 108 Joyita Sarkar, “India's Nuclear Limbo and the Fatalism of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, 1974–1983,” Strategic Analysis 37, no. 3 (2013): 322-337. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid. 111 Nazir Hussain, “Nuclearization of South Asia and the Future of Non-Proliferation,” Journal of Political Studies (2011): 1, Available at http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/Currentissue-pdf/NAZIR%20HUSSAIN.pdf. 34
non-proliferation efforts came under consideration when the devastating effects of nuclear technology came to be known to the world in 1945. The US Atom for Peace Program and NPT, to maintain its hegemony over the nuclear technology, were remarkable steps. According to the author, after the Indian nuclear testing in 1974, the nuclearization of South Asia has been the predominant source of concern of the international community. International community has worked for nuclear non- proliferation. After 1998 the region was considered to “be the most dangerous place on the earth, according to Bill Clinton,”112 the US President. Two views dominate the debate on deterrence: the first claims that deterrence has been created in the region through nuclear weapons. Thus, with the emergence of deterrence the probability of conflict in the region has decreased. However, the second school suggests that nuclearization has increased the possibility of destructive conflicts.
Considering India as US strong ally and key supporter to achieve its military interests in the region, US intends to enhance its relations with India, a growing World Power in the region, as India also desires to achieve the major power status in the Asia Pacific Region. Over the last two decades, there is a significant development in the US- Indian ties because of three main factors i.e. end of Cold War and Russian collapse, Indian economic reforms in 1990s by Man Mohan Singh and India's emergence as a global power. Both are world’s largest democracies, interested in free trade and flow of resources, want democratic and representative political governments while also aiming a strategically stable and prosperous Asian region. In Indo-US Defence Relationship, Vivek Chadha reveals the trends in the two countries defence relations which have evolved over time.113 “It is argued that given the lack of strategic convergence in the past, Indo-US defence relations could not attain critical mass.”114 However, due to emerging “mutual interests, common threats, deepening trust and most importantly, the shedding of shibboleths which constrained ties in the past”115 have changed the past trends between two states’ relations.
Debasish Nandi in “Indo-US Relations in the Post-Cold- War Period (1992-2006) outlines that after the collapse of Soviet Union, India once again reshaped its foreign
112 Ibid. 113 Chadha, Indo-US Defence Relations: Divergence to Convergence, (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2008), p. 7 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid. 35
policy and strategies in the uni-polar world”116 and aimed to make good terms with US and European Union to secure its national interests. There was gradual development in the bilateral associations between US and India as President Clinton visited India in March 2000, the first US Prime Minister who visited India in last 20 years. Incident of 9/11, 2001 brought India and US too close to each other. “US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also visited India in 2005.”117 An “Agreement on Science and Technology Cooperation” was signed in 2005 between these states. India also donated $5 million to USA Red Cross in hurricane Katrina.
Muhammad Ishaque Fani articulates his views in “The Indo-US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for Pakistan” that since from creation, Pakistan was the member of US-block and India of Russian-block but after 9/11, 2001, the growing “Indo-US strategic partnership” is resulting in power transition in South Asian region.118 Any change in the balance of power in the region or tilting of power in favor of India may lead to war. This may cause instability in South Asia and is also perilous for Pakistan’s Security. Mairaj-Ul-Hamid depicts that in South Asia, Pakistan is acting as a security state because it is facing multi-faceted challenges to its national security from its hostile eastern neighbor India.119 Pakistan tilted towards the US in bipolar world to deal with its security concerns. Furthermore, the inauspicious relations of Pakistan with India and Afghanistan made it problematic for Pakistan to focus on domestic problems because along with these fronts, the launching of “War on Terror” have posed enduring security dilemma that disrupt the country’s progress. As the “old habits, die hard, India is still seen as the real foe to Pakistan”.
Han Zhongyi in “Internal and External Threats to the National Security of Pakistan” explains that during last few decades, the geopolitical situation in the region changed quite rapidly and may continue to change in the coming years too.120 Pakistan’s security is mainly provoked due to the malign effects of India and Afghanistan. At the same time, the proxy and civil war in Middle East, the collapse of several states and
116 Nandi, Indo-US Relations, 12. 117 Ibid. 118 Muhammad Ishaque Fani, "The Indo-US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for Pakistan." Journal of Pakistan Vision 10, no. 2 (2009): 131-159. 119 Mairajul Hamid, “Threats to National Security of Pakistan: An Analysis,” Diplomacy Pakistan News, Available at http://www.diplomacypakistan.com/main-front/threats-to-national-security-of-pakistan-an-analysis/ 120 Han Zhongyi, "Internal and External Threats to the National Security of Pakistan," International Journal for Social Studies 3, no. 7 (2017): 51-56. 36
ethnic and sectarian divide in the region also made choices difficult for Pakistan. Hence, it is not the first time that Pakistan is being affected by Indian aggression and the conflicts of other regions. At present the internal and external security situation is relatively more complex than the previous decades. Rasul Bakhsh Rais in his writing “The Emerging National Security Challenges for Pakistan” reveals that basically, there are three sets of threats i.e. traditional, unconventional and the radical.121 Indian factor (traditional threat) is the most dominating as the negotiations continuously failed and the posture, language and diplomatic actions by India are more belligerent. During last decade, Pakistan faced two insurgencies in Baluchistan and FATA and the political aggressiveness and brutality in Karachi. There is no room for any confusion, that behind these the Indian minds are working to destabilize Pakistan and causing security dilemma.
Ravi Tomar explains that in 21st century, India being the homeland of more than 1 billion people appeared as a strong and dominant strategic partner of US in the Asia Pacific Region particularly to encounter the China as emerging Global Power in the region.122 Numerous agreements regarding security, defense, economic, military, education, climate change, energy, civil nuclear cooperation, etc. were signed to enhance the bilateral relations. These relations touched the height of interaction “during the presidency of George W. Bush. President Barack Obama also visited India in November 2010 and addressed a joint session of the Indian Parliament and backed”123 India as “permanent member” of the “United Nations Security Council. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs,” Robert Blake expressed “India and the US as Natural Allies and said that the US cannot afford to meet the strategic priorities in Pakistan and Afghanistan at the expense of India.”124 In “Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries beyond War Henry D. Sokolski focuses on Pakistan’s concerns on Indo-US Nuclear Deal.”125 The implications are further analyzed in the chapters written by the anti-nuclear lobby experts of Pakistan, namely, A.H. Nayyar and Zia Mian. According to the authors, Pakistan should be concerned by the deal as it will bring India close to US and the deal will benefit India technologically.126 Braun has highlighted the prospects of the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear program and at the same time has discussed the fears
121 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, “The Emerging National Security Challenges for Pakistan,” ISPR Hilal Magazine, 2015 October. 122 Ravindra Tomar, India-US Relations in a Changing Strategic Environment (Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2002), 12. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid. 125 Henry D. Sokolski, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Woes,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries beyond War, ed. Henry D. Sokolski (US Strategic Studies Institute SSI, 2008), 1-10. 126 Ibid. 37
for Pakistan’s national security the expansion of nuclear program involves a great deal of danger due to the fear of any future terrorist attack against nuclear plants.
Munir Akram in India’s Great Power Game writes that Prime Minister Narendra Modi is aiming to achieve the great power status for India and obtain a permanent seat in United Nation Security Council by the military, economic and strategic support from US.127 India perceives Pakistan as the major obstacle in the accomplishment of its intentions because no other regional country will accept Indian prominence until Pakistan accepts it. For the achievement of its goals, India is trying to get benefits from Russia, Japan, China, Iran and other great players in world’s politics. India also wishes that there should be no further support to Pakistan from China as it is an emerging great power. As a retrospect, Ashok Kapur elucidates the rise of India as regional and global power in the most critical, dangerous and volatile part of the World, i.e. South Asia having three nuclear states which are sharing common borders with each other.128 He explained the ideological, diplomatic and strategic character of Indian foreign policy from Nehru to Vajpayee and also the paradigm shifts in Indian foreign policy to bring it in the mainstream of World’s strategy and economy. Muhammad Samir Hussain reveals that Pakistan in not in the favor of growing Indo-US strategic relations because these relations are resulting in increasing deterrence and achieving the regional hegemonic ambitions of India.129 At the same time, Pakistan also fears losing the US support on the Kashmir issue. Consequently, Pakistan believes that the growing India-US ties would cause the security threats to its security and stability and would also affect the peace of the South Asia.
Nevertheless, Pakistan is also carefully keeping an eye on Indian ambitions and tried to counter-balance its hegemonic derives by enhancing relations with China and Russia. CPEC (One belt one road) project initiated by China can be game changer in the region. Therefore, it is a key source of anxiety for both US and India. Cheng in “China’s New Silk Road: Implications for the US” is of the view that the Chinese ‘One Road One Belt’ initiative is in response to the U.S ‘Pivot to Asia’.130 Nonetheless ‘One Road and One Belt’ could provide an ‘opportunity’ for the US According to the author, “Belt and Road’ in spite of making a huge China Circle does not overlap the territory of the US
127 Munir Akram, “India’s Great Power Game,” The Dawn, 28 September,2014 128 Ashok Kapur, India - From Regional to World Power (Routledge, 2006), 2-3. 129 Muhammad Samir Hussain, “Pakistan’s Response to the Growing India-US Strategic Relationship,” (2011). 130 Shuaihua Wallace Cheng, “China’s New Silk Road: Implications for the US,” Yale Global Online (2015), Available at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china%E2%80%99s-new-silk-road-implications-us 38
with the manifestation of this circle China would be on an equal footing with the US in the international economy.131 With the emergence of this circle China will find new markets. The traditional Chinese markets in Western Europe and US are large but sluggish. China seeks to have a better access to energy and food without having too much dependence on transportation routes controlled by the United States. From a Chinese perceptive sixty per cent of the Chinese foreign reserves were spent in buying US government bonds. Now China is investing money in production and infrastructure along the route hoping for a bigger financial return.
The Case for Stronger India-China Economic Relations by Jha & Kumar expresses India’s anxiety over CPEC passing through Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan (G-B) and criticizes China for not addressing the Indian concern.132 The authors have criticized China for occupying the Askai Chin by violating the UN Resolution. They denote CPEC as an ‘ambitious scheme’ and fear the integration of G-B in China-Pakistan economy. The authors believe that by the integration of GB in Pakistan-China economy, India will be alienated from GB. According to Kumar, China is supporting militancy to harm India.133 The author has accused China of having different approach towards different extremist organizations. Z. I. Yousaf in The CPEC Controversy has highlighted the Indian hostility which is apparent in its efforts to exert its influence in Afghanistan and its role in promoting terrorism in Baluchistan. The author dismisses the idea that Gwadar port would be a military threat to India.134 This assertion is based upon the belief that insurgency in Baluchistan would predominantly reduce Gwadar port’s capability to pose a military threat to India.
Victoria Schofield has come up with some in-depth research on Kashmir conflict. The author has tried to investigate how the enduring Kashmir conflict is different from other regional disputes. Schofield illustrates that under the Treaty of Amritsar of 1846, the sale deed of the Kashmir valley which was with Muslims majority, caused the origin of Kashmir problem.135 After that, the determination and struggle of Muslims for separate homeland from British and the issue of accession of princely states to Pakistan or India brought the Kashmir conflict on surface. Since then, many turbulent events have been
131 Ibid. 132 Jha & Kumar, “The Case for stronger India- China Economic Relations,” The Diplomat, May 2015. 133 Ibid. 134 Z. I. Yousafzai, “The CPEC Controversy,” Daily Times, August 6, 2015, Available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/06- Aug-2015/the-cpec-controversy 135 Victoria S. Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict (London: Tauris, 2010), 102. 39
witnessed in the relationship of two states as they never attained the status of peaceful neighbors.
Alastair Lamb has highlighted the historical suspicion and deviating interests of Pakistan and India that lead them to the enduring enmity.136 There were many factors on the political front like worrying and fanatic involvement of Lord Mountbatten with contemplation of consequence of Radcliffe Award and Gurdasapur issue and similarly other factors as culture, language controversy, and no-representation of Muslims in the corridors of power, racism, and discriminatory attitude of the government which strengthened the sentiment in Muslims that their path diverged and different now from Hindus. There is no doubt about the fact that the British government did not make serious efforts to accommodate the view point of the Muslims and solve their problems. All such developments paved the way for the emergence of two independent Dominions.
Kashmir is one of those issues due to the lack of farsightedness, views and arrogance of leaders of that time.137 This lack of rationality and sagacity can be attributed to those leaders’ motives. These misconceptions barred them from taking objective, rational and pragmatic views of reality and rendered them incapable of looking beyond their feet. The condition deteriorated badly with the utter collapse of law and order in the valley. This study is supportive in understanding the related aspects and make the nature of Kashmir conflict more complex and ultimately to explore the possible solution to India-Pakistan longstanding rivalry. Iqbal Ali in Undeclared Water War on Pakistan illustrates that the Valley of Kashmir and its snow-capped lofty mountain-chains are the essential source of water basins which naturally flow through Pakistan; therefore, it has developed the largest irrigation system of the world that irrigates over 16 million hectares of land.138 Kashmir water resources are equally important for India to fulfil her energy requirement and economic development, India is being constructing many dams on River Jhelum which will have negative impact on Pakistan’s water requirement. This is a good pointer to trace out that how the resources of Kashmir are important for India and Pakistan.
Ijaz Hussain reveals a legal view of the dispute on Kashmir and provides analysis on Kashmir issue, as “the question of accession, question of aggression, question of self-
136 Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 127. 137 M. G. Chitkara, Kashmir: A Tale of Partition (APH, 2001), 365. 138 Iqbal Ali, Undeclared Water War on Pakistan: Tactical and Strategic Defence Measures (Allied Book Company, 2015), 290. 40
determination and the questions of the United Nations (UN) resolutions”.139 Shaheen Akhter contends that from the infancy to mature hood the Kashmir issue to a great extent owed a lot to the Indian involvement directly or indirectly which was a proven fact beyond the shadow of doubt.140 This study covers the related aspects that will be helpful to discover obstacles in a peace initiative. The Indian policy to maintain ‘status quo’ has forced the Kashmiris to change the paradigm of the conflict from a peaceful to a violent one, which cost around thousand lives in the valley of Kashmir. Seven hundred-thousand Indian security personnel have committed human rights violations but could not stop the intensity of the spirit for freedom of Kashmiris.
Kashmir: Time to Move Forward by K. Iqbal discloses that owing to its strategic and geographical importance, Kashmir is vital for Pakistan and India.141 Their interests regarding Kashmir pushed the two states on continuing enmity but now both states should move forward for the peace in the region. This is a vital study which provides recommendations for settlement of Kashmir conflict. Till the final resolution, people of Kashmir should be included in Indo-Pak peace talks as one of the principal parties to the dispute. Peter R. Lavoy views that the Kargil crisis has presented an opportunity for scholars to investigate into its causes.142 Both Pakistan and India got involved in an armed conflict even in the presence of nuclear weapons. Bruce Riedel in “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House” discloses how Pakistan was persuaded by US to back off so that the conflict did not escalate into a nuclear war.143
Ganguly has examined the insurgency in Kashmir. His work identifies the causes of insurgency and conflict in Kashmir.144 The author suggests that unrest in Kashmir should be managed. The way India deals with the unrest in Kashmir will have an impact on two main aspects of Indian polity which are democracy and secularism. Ganguly has analyzed the beginning and termination of conflicts between India and Pakistan in 1999 and 2001-02. The author claims that a careful examination of India – Pakistan crisis elaborates that deterrence in South Asia is resilient. He further suggests that India’s
139 Ijaz Hussain, Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective (Islamabad: National Institute of Pakistan Studies, 1998), 125. 140 Shahen Akhtar, Uprising in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir (IRS, 1991-92), 254. 141 K. Iqbal, “Kashmir: Time to Move Forward,” Spearhead Research, December 10, 2012. 142 Peter R. Lavoy, eds. Asymmetric warfare in South Asia: the causes and consequences of the Kargil Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 91. 143 Bruce Riedel, "American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House," Policy Paper Series 1 (2002): 10-14. 144 Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portent of War, Hope for Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 256. 41
decision of not crossing the LoC could not just be ascribed to the US intervention. This decision was also linked to the fact that Pakistan has aquired nuclear weapons.
Pakistan has always had the intention of building an operational strike force against its rival India. It seems that nuclear tests carried out in the subcontinent indicated a new problem in the region. These nuclear tests would have prolonged resentment between Pakistan and India. As the incident of Kargil crisis which at the time of escalation threatened to turn into a nuclear crisis in South Asia. There are fears that both states may engage in situations like Kargil. It seems that nuclear weapons have failed to bring trust and confidence, instead increased the feelings of mistrust and rivalry between the two states. Although, the Kargil crisis was limited but was destructive both politically and militarily as it reduced the possibility of improvement in regional security. Manjrika Sewak in “Multi- Track Diplomacy between India and Pakistan: A Conceptual Framework for Sustainable Security” stresses that to create a long-lasting peace, official and unofficial cooperation is an essential part of peace building process.145 It leads to both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches to conflict resolution. A multitrack process creates a fertile ground for conflicting parties to reach a negotiated settlement.
Scott D. Sagan being a renowned nuclear pessimist argues that the reason for the states to seek nuclear weapons has barely been examined by the scholars, despite the fact that it is the most crucial thing to know in the efforts at preventing nuclear proliferation.146 Theoretically speaking, he challenges the assumptions of the traditional realists who focus on power projection only. According to Sagan, states seek to obtain or develop nuclear weapons mainly for military and strategic purposes. The scholars and policy makers have, reluctantly, acknowledged Sagan’s point of view. Sagan stresses on the exploration and examination of varying explanations for the demand for nuclear weapons. His analysis examines three streams of political theory; “(i) security model, (ii) domestic political model and (iii) the norms model.”147 The explanation of these models is vital for the understanding of this study and covers the explanation of the concepts in the relevant chapters. The writer suggests that the nuclear proliferation is likely to be a
145 Manjrika Sewak, Multi- Track Diplomacy between India and Pakistan: A Conceptual Framework for Sustainable Security (Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 2005), 115. 146 Scott D. Sagan, “Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International security 21, no. 3 (1997): 54-86. 147 Ibid. 42
serious problem in international relations and global security management in the foreseeable future.
Stephen Cohen and Dasgupta have made a wide-ranging analysis of the development of Indian defense policy.148 According to them, the Indian military modernization is aimless and the Indian strategic establishment is finding it very difficult to manage the nuclear development in all the spheres with no aim in mind. They are critical of India while devising the nuclear policy for the country following the old- fashioned strategic thought of the Cold War era. They believe that India has the potential to become a known power in the 21st century. Indian armed forces require new weapons system worth in excess of $100 billion but lack the capability to indigenously develop such weapons. For that purpose, India is heavily relying on the foreign suppliers of weapons system. A long association, in this respect, exists between India and Russia from era of Cold War. Recently, India has developed progressive military ties with Israel. More importantly, the new military and strategic relationship with the US provides an assurance for the Indian military development. Furthermore, both the authors investigate the trends in the prevailing Indian military modernization in order to find coherence in the nuclear policy of India. They find that Indian military evolution is; (i) chaotic and lacks political direction, (ii) it suffers from outdated Cold War system of military organization and policy, (iii) remains limited due to the narrow future planning, and (iv) it is driven by the pursuit of the technology which is absolutely free from military-strategic goals. In that perspective, its strategy of arming without any strategic reason remains questionable. India is confused between seeking great-power status and acknowledgment from the world and the fact that it does not want to look intimidating.
J. N. Dixit elaborates the historical development of India Pakistan relations in the times of peace and war starting from the independence to the Kargil war.149 The core issue behind the enmity between India and Pakistan is focused around the issue of Kashmir. Another issue is the race for nuclear weapons and related technology for attaining nuclear deterrence. The long years of political struggle with episodic coups from 1972 to 1999, and the political fluctuation in the policies of both the countries towards each other is the main focus of discussion of this book. It provides a valuable account of
148 Stephen P. Cohen, and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without aiming: India's military modernization (Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 12. 149 Jyotindra Nath Dixit, India-Pakistan in War and Peace (Routledge, 2003), 124. 43
the political history of these two great South Asian rivals with the Kashmir dispute bringing Pakistan and India ever together closer to war with possibility of escalation.
The historical legacy of the Indian-Pakistan rivalry is unique of its own which resembles with Israel and Palestine conflict with the existential conditions for war. The two countries share a history of war where they went to war even within months of independence and have had three wars along with other clashes at low levels. The nature of conflict between India and Pakistan is very complex as it represents priorities of religion and territory with two absolutely opposite views of nationhood and national character. Joshi has compared the Kargil crises between India and Pakistan with the Cuban Missile Crises. Joshi, while making a comparison between the behaviors of states during the time of crises, asserts that India and Pakistan even in the Kargil crisis did nothing as dangerous as done by US. The United States in the Cuban Missile Crisis deployed nuclear submarines and directed aircraft with nuclear weapons towards the enemy’s airspace.
The “command and control (C2) system of nuclear weapons is a very intricate mechanism and a difficult challenge faced by the national policy makers. Zafar Iqbal Cheema is a deterrence optimist”.150 He comprehensively analyses the Command and Control System of nuclear weapons of Pakistan and India. He is of the view that the state “leaders want a high guarantee that weapons will always work when desired and, likewise, that they will never be used in the absence of authorized orders.”151 The centralized control of nuclear weapons assures this requirement; however, the centralized power causes unnecessary delays in the cases where weapons are required to be readily relied upon. In the start, Pakistan and India setting up of command and control systems for their nuclear arsenals as the technology develops and the system evolves accordingly. They are likely to obtain technologies to mount Permissive Action Links and institute the procedures and processes to prevent accidental and unauthorized use of weapons in the future. Nonetheless, the present form of strategic stability between India and Pakistan represents instability unlike the Cold War that was in a very different frame of reference as compared to the India Pakistan case owing to the fact that the Cold War rivals were the super powers with huge warning times while India and Pakistan do not have that longer
150 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, “Command and Control Infrastructure: Operational Asymmetries and Dichotomies,” IPRI Journal 2/2 (2002): 8. 151 Ibid. 44
flight times. The increasing mistrust and hostility between India and Pakistan due to Kashmir dispute and the intermittent clashes complexes the problem of nuclear arms and missiles acquisition at both ends.
Indian “Cold Start Doctrine” was in response to the Kargil war following Indian Parliament attack in 2001-02 where India did not respond timely to pressurize Pakistan. Subhash Kapila, unveils the nuances of new Cold Start doctrine of India.152 He is basically a deterrence optimist, but has always advocated non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. He examines that “the lessons of the Kargil War together with the severe limitations imposed on the Indian Army”153 during Operation PARAKARAM in 2001- 2002 compelled the Indian military hierarchy to devise a proactive offensive strategy to replace the old Sundarji Doctrine which was based on the defensive maneuvers in a war fighting scenario. The “Cold Start Strategy can only be successful if the Indian political leadership has the political will to use this pre-emptive military strategy at the given time of operationalization”.154 Singh has given an insight into the Indian nuclear program. The body of research is again useful in getting an understanding of the Indian behavior regarding possession of nuclear weapons. This research highlights that old non- proliferation regime was prejudiced and allowed only the five United Nations (UN) permanent members to possess nuclear weapons. The author asserts that the Indian nuclear policy was that there should be either a global disarmament or equal standards for everyone. India was concerned regarding the rise of China and Pakistan thus it wanted to have nuclear deterrence.
Padder has come up with some very interesting work on Pakistan-India composite dialogue.155 This research gives an insight into the dialogue which began in 1997. The author has raised several questions in this body of work which are significant to progress made in this direction so far. Moreover, this body of work helps to understand the behaviors of both India and Pakistan. The first question is what progress this dialogue process has made in changing the mindset on both sides? Secondly, what is up to now achievement by this process? Is there any probability that the lingering bilateral problems between the two states will be resolved in future talks? Ciorciari has done some
152 Subhash Kapila, “India’s New ‘Cold Start’ War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed,” South Asia Analysis Group 4 (2004), Available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper991 153 Ibid. 154 Ibid. 155 Sajad Padder, "The composite dialogue between India and Pakistan: Structure, process and agency," Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics 65, no. February (2012): 12. 45
interesting research on the Indian ambition of becoming a great power. The author asserts that India has the fourth largest economy of the world in purchasing power. India is slightly ahead of Brazil and is ninth largest sources for industrial products. India has also emerged as a modern military power and after entering into the India-US civil nuclear deal in 2008 it is a member of the nuclear club. The author emphasizes that in spite of all these achievements India has soaring domestic needs. Notwithstanding its tremendous domestic needs is still desirous for the status of a great power.
Peter R. Lavoy has given an insight into how Pakistan depends on its strategy for the survival of its nuclear deterrent during war time and peace.156 The Indo-US strategic partnership has raised serious issues among some of the defence planners. It is feared that certain developments of Indian conventional and nuclear capabilities can challenge the nuclear deterrence of Pakistan. The author has highlighted a few strategic threats from India due to its increasing international partnership. Pakistan is increasing its nuclear weapons stockpile and producing two plutonium reactors and new facilities for reprocessing. The incident of the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan by the US raid has raised doubts regarding the nuclear weapons. The authors claim that the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals may seem dubious.
Shanti Kumar Desai in Perspectives on Indo-US Relations tells that with the passage of time, the relations between US and India are improving in the fields of economics, military, nuclear energy, etc. which has deep influences on the countries in South Asia particularly on China and Pakistan.157 This work also provides a reply to the criticism being made by the opposition parties in India which did not show good response on this high level relations and co-operations between the two countries. Tanvir Sultan in Indo-US Relations: A Study of Foreign Policies provides detailed information about the trends in the Indo-US relations right from the India’s Independence till 1980s.158 Initially these relations faced many stress and strains due to Indian Non-Alignment Policy and refusal to become a member of US Block. In order to obtain its foothold in South Asia, USA began to pamper Pakistan through aid and stood with Pakistan on Kashmir issue but in 1962, in Sino-India war, US rushed to support India. The external factors temporarily
156 Peter R. Lavoy, "Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Security and Survivability; Strategic Insights: February 2009," Strategic Insights February 2009 (2009): 6. 157 Shanti Kumar Desai, Perspectives on Indo-US Relations (2006), 34-35. 158 Tanvir Sultan, Indo-US Relations: A Study of Foreign Policies (Deep & Deep, 1982), 57-58. 46
affected the Indo-US relations and now there is a revival of Indo-US ties after the Cold War without resulting in any hostility.
Conley in “Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation: Implications for US Security Interests” has discussed the military and nuclear cooperation between India and Russia.159 This cooperation between the two states began during the Cold War and continued afterwards. The strategic Indian mind-set influences by various factors have not been affected by the US efforts of non-proliferation. Pant has discussed the Indian nuclear doctrine and Command structure which was finalized in January 2003. The author has analyzed the Indian nuclear doctrine and Command Structure and what implications it will have on the country’s civil military relations. The control of the Indian nuclear arsenal has also been analyzed. Ashraf and Tariq have done some interesting and extensive research on the doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces. The authors assert that both these states suggest a defensive posture as both share a long history of mistrust and deception.
Paul K. Kerr claims that Pakistan still continues to improve the security of its nuclear weapons.160 Pakistan has imposed new personal security programs to safeguard its weapons. The country has also taken the international community into confidence regarding the safety of its nuclear deterrents. It was feared that the nuclear weapons would fall into the hands of terrorists. In addition to this, the discovery of the clandestine network run by Dr. A.Q. Khan has compelled Islamabad to ensure safety of its weapons.
Tallbot has given an account of the nuclear tests carried out by Pakistan and India and how the international community perceived them. The international community saw these tests as a major problem for regional peace and the efforts of non-proliferation. Carranza has researched extensively on the implications of Indo-Pak nuclear tests for regional security. His work suggests that small nuclear forces cannot determine nuclear peace in South Asia.161 The author has come up with a completely different argument which is diff erent from the beliefs of the realists and the proliferation optimists. During crises, the actual chances of the use of nuclear weapons are extremely high. The opinion of the author is completely different from that of the proliferation optimists. The
159 Jerome M Conley, Indo-Russian military and nuclear cooperation: lessons and options for US policy in South Asia (Lexington Books, 2001), 245. 160 Paul K. Kerr, Pakistan's nuclear weapons: proliferation and security issues (Diane Publishing, 2010), 34. 161 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, (London: St. Martin Press, 1998), 430 47
proliferation optimists suggest that nuclear weapons determine stability to stop the conventional wars.
Gusterson’s work highlights the aspect of human imagination which creates fear and perceptions regarding the nuclear weapon use. He has based his argument on a common belief shared by political, military and diplomatic experts. According to this common belief, future wars will be fought between neighboring states on enduring grievances.162 These conflicts may become more devastating than wars between superpowers. This body of work raises fears of nuclear weapons being used by Third World leaders. Hagerty argues that nuclear weapons capabilities are sufficient to prevent war.163 The author argues that both Pakistan and India were aware of each other’s nuclear weapons capabilities. The nuclear tests carried in 1998 only confirmed the fact that both these States had nuclear weapons capability. According to him, the nuclear deterrence in South Asia remains as resilient as it was before the nuclear tests. Jo discusses several explanations regarding nuclear proliferation to present his argument.
Perkovich and Dalton in “Not War, Not Peace?: Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism” discusses the Indian strategic dilemma, which is managing the threat of terrorism emanating from Pakistan and motivating Pakistani actors to prevent cross-border terrorism”.164 It outlines the Indian policies regarding this dilemma. They have detailed the policy options for India in the crisis situations. Two questions have been raised by the authors, which they have then tried to answer in the ensuing chapters. First, how can India effectively motivate Pakistani leaders to prevent future high-profile terrorism attacks against India and, second, if that fails how to minimize the risk that the ensuing conflict could escalate to nuclear war?
In Proactive Strategy George Perkovich and Toby Dalton deals with the Indian Proactive Strategy known as “Cold Start Doctrine”. The Indian Army produced this doctrine in April 2004.165 Cold Start was not a formal name, rather a term apparently coined by journalists to whom information about the new doctrine and the concomitant proactive strategy was leaked. After the 2008 Mumbai attacks, Pakistan suffered
162 Hugh Gusterson, Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Immagination, Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 14, No.1 (Feb. 1999), pp. 111-143 163 Devin T. Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis," International Security 20, no. 3 (1995): 79- 114. 164 George Perkovich, and Toby Dalton, Not War, Not Peace?: Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-border Terrorism (Oxford University Press, 2016), 56. 165 George Perkovich and Toby Dalton, “Proactive Strategy”, in Not War, Not Peace?: Motivting Pakistan to Prevent Cross Border Terrorism (Oxford University Press, 2016), 59 . 48
significant internal and external damage to its reputation; the 2008 attacks also raised questions about the viability of the Cold Start. The proponents of the Cold Start Doctrine submit this as evidence of its success as a deterrent, arguing that it induced caution and defensiveness in the Pakistani Army. The basic aim of the proactive strategy is to disable Pakistan’s war fighting capability. It seems from the authors’ arguments that India lacks the hardware, supplies and deployed force posture needed for army centric operations against Pakistan. Even if and when India acquired the requisite means to execute such operations, grave doubts would remain about their strategic efficacy.
George Perkovich and Toby Dalton in Nuclear Capabilities looks at India’s current and potential nuclear capabilities.166 India is looking at options that could compel Pakistan into demobilizing its support of militant groups operating from Pakistan. India’s current capabilities are not compatible for deterring Pakistan at sub-conventional level hence encouraging India to opt for limited nuclear options. However, adoption of the limited nuclear option strategy may also not solve India’s dilemma as it is impossible for any state to guarantee escalation dominance. The authors highlight the debate within India regarding changing its NFU policy because it encourages Pakistan to launch first nuclear strike, which might degrade India’s massive retaliation capability. On the issue of credibility and minimalism, the authors maintain that if India is ensuring minimalism in its nuclear forces then it should not care if Pakistan has double the nuclear forces. However, if India is to ensure credibility of its deterrence then it needs to improve its capabilities and tweak its doctrine. The authors analyze that if India has to move toward escalation dominance, it has to focus on the said capabilities i.e. militarization of Indian nuclear strategy; Procurement of military hardware and software and; develop limited nuclear options strategy. India’s current fleet of ballistic and cruise missile such as Prithvi, Agni, Prahaar, BrahMos and Nirbhay are ill-suited for limited role. The authors also present a limited war scenario, in which the outcome of a limited nuclear war after Pakistan has launched a small scale nuclear strike was discussed.167 There are two likely responses that India would consider; India press ahead with conventional response, and India responds with limited nuclear options.
In Non-Violent Compellence, George Perkovich and Toby Dalton argues that India’s strategic interests are better served by avoiding escalation of violence. The
166 Ibid. 167 Ibid. 49
restraint shown by India in the aftermath of 2001-02 and 2008 crises is an example in this regard. To this end, it is suggested that instead of interfering in internal affairs of Pakistan, India should mobilize non-violent pressure to hold Pakistan’s government accountable for not taking enough measures to prevent violent threats to not just India but the entire international community. For non-violent measures to have greater impact, India would need other influential states to join it in this cause. Non-violent compellence is effective only if the state is not acting from a position of weakness.
Therefore, even if India adopts this strategy, it would still need to acquire stronger capabilities for national defense so that India’s Army, Air Force and Navy prevail if Pakistan chooses to respond militarily to non-violent pressures. The authors have suggested four non-violent measures: economic sanctions, political isolation, naval blockade, and International social media campaign. According to authors, India can also consider naval blockade of Pakistan but current Indian naval capabilities are insufficient to meet such objectives. Furthermore, a naval blockade can invite a nuclear response by Pakistan. Since the US and China have been the two main states with whom Pakistan shares major economic cooperation, the desired objectives through economic sanctions cannot be achieved if the US and China do not participate. In the foreseeable future it seems unlikely that the US will support economic sanctions against Pakistan as this would make China more influential which would be contrary to US interest. If India succeeds in somehow economically sanctioning Pakistan, this could erode Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence where economic strangulation was once stated as one of Pakistan’s possible nuclear thresholds.
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CHAPTER ONE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK Human beings are the binary actors in running any relationship, either it is on individual, societal or international level. International politics, in a state based international system, is run and dominated by some powerful states who have the essential military, industrial and economic resources in addition to extraordinary leadership skills which enable them to run the relations with other states. Human character defines the nature of international relations. One cannot separate international relations from the human nature as the states are run by human beings. This human character, either individual or societal, defines the character of a state in international system. This human character is, arguably, pre-defined by the natural instinct and desire for power and dominance over others. Consequently, this desire replicates in the behavior of society or state. The conflict may be based on geographical or territorial differences, economic and industrial resources disparity, and ideological disputes. These conflicts may end up in wars or they may remain there for years without any war. The more powerful is able to protect and promote its interests either through winning the war or it can deter an adversary through threat to avoid war and keep its interests intact. The conflicts are maintained and resolved according to the interests. States resolve their conflicts for common good but only when their side of common good is heavier.
With the focus on human behavior and nature of state interaction at international system level, the school of thought that most aptly defines international relations is the realist school of thought. This chapter will study and elaborate the relationship of state behavior with the international relations and vice versa through the lens of realism. Realism has been for centuries, and continues to be, a dominant school of thought in the political theory of international relations. It has always dominated the academic debate in international relations as Wohlforth aptly puts it, “it is only a slight exaggeration to say that the academic study of international relations is a debate about realism.”168 The intellectual tradition of realism has evolved over the time from classical realism to state based international system and neo-realism. Based on the projections that underpin the ideological spectrum of realism, its development can be understood in four trends: (i) Groupism which indicates that humans are bound by groups that have different shapes
168 William C. Wohlforth & Stephen G. Brooks, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (New York: Princeton University Press, 2008), 131. 51
and qualities. (ii) Ego is the primary inspiration for every human being related to any group. This egoism is part and parcel of human nature. (iii) Anarchy refers to the absence of the world government to control international relations and state behaviors. And (iv) Power politics is the most dominant ordering principle in international relations. A power difference arises when there are disparities in military, industrial, and economic resources and political influence at international level.
Realist theories stand for the trials of criticisms about all their perceptions. However, rationally, human nature has attracted the most criticism over time. Classical realists have based their logic on the psychological necessity of human nature. For classical realists, human nature controls the central function which guides the behavior of the individuals and states. This psychological imperative attached to human behavior is the most challenging and difficult aspect to explain. However, realism has been tested and its explanations of human nature are most relevant in the present world affairs.
Human Level State Level System Level
1. Humans are selfish by 1. Desire for more power 1. International relations nature is a common desire of states feature a continuous 2. Egoism cruelty and 2. Each state seeks to struggle for power for selfishness stems from increase power and promote dominance inherent fear and its own national interest over 2. Military is the primary insecurity. other states. consideration followed by 3. Survival is at the heart of 3. States seek to economic relations. human nature. overpower other states to 3. International security make them subservient to depends upon their will. commonality of interests 4. The acquisition of and international security military capabilities is the organizations are mere utmost priority of all states to apparatus to gain global protect national interest. dominance either solely or 5. Military and economic through a selected alliances are short-lived and collectivity. ultimate loyalty rests with the 4. Survival of state is its sole states’ own interests. responsibility. 5. The balance of power can help to maintain system stability when there is a struggle among states to maximize power.
This chapter contains three parts. The first part, the theoretical framework, is based on the assumptions of realism which is drawn by focusing on human nature. It is the fundamental theoretical argument presented in the study that human nature controls 52
human behavior. Consequently, this human behavior translates into state behavior and state behavior is ultimately reflected in the behavior of the system. The realism argues that in setting up all these behaviors, the human nature is the most important component that is based on egoistic claims, selfish ambitions and brutal motivation oriented to power. In this part, the basic assumptions of realism would be discussed and argument would be developed to explain the core components of international system including sovereignty of states, anarchy at international level, security dilemma, and international cooperation leading to creation of international organizations and initiatives. In the second part, the theory of deterrence is briefly evaluated with the prospect of realism and human behavior. Deterrence contains psychological principles of fear, aggression, and threat based on the nature of individuals as claimed by realism. The last part discusses the theory of conflict transformation. The realism theory is again put against test of arguments for its relevance in relations to conflict leading to its possible resolution and further leading to transformation of conflict.
1.1 Realism Theory in Essence Realism became recognized wisdom in the scholarship of international relations after Second World War. It promises to provide more accurate interpretation of international relations than idealism. Realism argues that the history of world politics shows the state’s constant struggle for power and security pursued by the state under its own conditions and is in the best of its interests. The conflict and war is the only permanent phenomenon in world affairs that stems from human nature. “Peace cannot be a permanent feature in international politics; rather it is the phase of recuperation from the previous war and continuous groundwork for the next one.”169 A continuous state of conflict describes the inter-state relations.
Political realism focus upon four primary claims: first, “state is the main actor and they are the key unit of analysis in international relations” because they represent the legitimate force of people to resolve or start a conflict with other state. The state behavior is controlled or limited by the state decisions and relative power status.170 Second, state represents a sovereign entity in the international system. A state independently defines and promotes its own interest. It runs its policy according to its interests and compulsions. Third, the state represents rationality in international politics where it is goal oriented,
169 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics Ed. 2 (New York: McMillan, 1977), 105. 170 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 69. 53
independent, and its objectives are consistent and cost sensitive. States make cost-benefit analysis before pursuing certain goals in the international system. This makes states behave identically in rational conditions. A similar pattern of behavior emanates due to condition of rationality. Finally, the context of every action of state is defined by the anarchic nature of system of states. As there is no singular power to control states’ behavior, they are encouraged to adopt self-help mechanism for their security.
The realist paradigm defines the purpose of statecraft as to act as a safeguard of national survival amidst hostile environment. In order to meet this desired end of protecting national survival, nothing seems more important than acquisition of power. Furthermore, following the principle of self-help appears to place a state at an advantageous position. Considering this, the sovereignty of the state is the cornerstone of International law. Therefore, the head of state has the liberty to take whatever action to advance the interest and survival of the state. Donnelly is of the view that “Realism emphasizes the constraints on politics imposed by human nature and the absence of international government. Together, they make international relations largely a realm of power and interest.”171 Realist thought unanimously portrays nature of human beings as egoistic and these egoistic passions elaborate the central problems of politics. In the world politics, this egoistic and interest-oriented side of human nature defines the statesmanship.172
The concept of realism can be traced by the intellectualism of the Greek Historian Thucydides who gave record of the Peloponnesian wars, waged between ancient Athens and Sparta. Though the traditional realism that talked about the individuals and empires power struggle has evolved through time and transformed into the realism of nation state system, yet it remains a very prevalent theory in international relations.173 In fact the emergence of nation state system after the Treaty of Westphalia, imparted a new dimension to the concept of realism. The concept has evolved through the scholarly work of Edward H. Carr, Niccolo Machiavelli, G. F. Kennan, Reinhold Niebuhr, H. J. Morgenthau, Kautilya, and K. W. Thompson. The main thrust of the understanding of international theorizing remains in the interests sought through every mean to retain the power and have advantageous position in the international relations.
171 Jack Donnelly, The Realist Tradition in Realism (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), 2-3. 172 Ibid., 1-10. 173 Ibid. 54
The state which emerged as the binary identity in world politics pursues its interests by every means through self-help and tries to gain and maintain an advantageous place in the international system. Such a state is not answerable to any higher political authority and consequently a sense of “anarchy at the international level” is witnessed. The choice of foreign policymaking is subjective of the constraints and conditions of international relations.. Realism also requires the states to be rational actors who must calculate their interest in terms of power to acquire advantage over other actors in the system.
Thucydides and Machiavelli have written different accounts, but the main thrust of the arguments is based upon the natural instinct of human beings as based upon greed, selfishness, and pursuing self-interests at any cost. Machiavelli’s Prince, as he rises to the power, gives the utmost example of interests-based dealing of the matters.174 He gives a very de-moralized picture of the world. In his treatise, he has portrayed a realist picture of how a prince or ruler should act like. In chapter seventeen of The Prince, he argues that “whether it is better for a ruler to be feared or to be loved. He suggests that it is better to be feared than to be loved because men are ungrateful, fickle, liars and deceivers, avoiders of danger, greedy for profit.”175 These two proponents base their arguments on the basic nature of human beings as based on the selfishness and greed for power and advantage. Thomas Hobbes takes the same line of human nature that seeks its actions for the sake of interests.
Thomas Hobbes was an English polymath who used to enjoy telling people that he was born of fear as he was born pre-maturely by her mother hearing the news of Spanish invasion on England. Hobbes had judged that man in his natural state is in a state of war. Hobbes implies that it is the rough equality of capabilities which cause looming universal danger in this anarchic world. Hobbes at first explains natural equality which he illustrates in a realistic fashion. In light of this “even the weakest has the strength to kill the strong either by means of secret machination or by confederacy with others”.176 According to Hobbes, social order would have been forcefully imposed if some were stronger than the rest. In his view competition, glory and diffidence can be controlled by a higher power but these elements are natural and hence cannot be completely removed.
174 James Ferguson, “Political Realism, Ideology and Power: A Discussion and Critique via Machiavelli, Morgenthau and Sun Tzu,” 2003, Available at http://www.international-relations.com/ 175 Ibid. 176 Ibid. 55
Competition, diffidence, and glory are rooted deep in man’s nature, and these are the main reason of quarrel.177 In that situation, the best defence is a good offence.178 According to him, man will endeavor to destroy or subdue others either for safety, reputation or gaining advantage over others. Unless there is a common power to regulate men, then they remain in a state of war with each other.179
The traditional realism contends that the moral principles are a wasteful exercise in international affairs and states pursue power to achieve their self-advantage. According to realist view, for the sound policy making, virtues of character and values are irrelevant. The virtues and morality is only considered for the behavior of others. The states do give importance to these virtues but only when there is no self-interest at stake. Thus, power remains the most dominant aspect of international relations. The states seek to acquire power, increase and project it.180
To summarize the assumptions and propositions preached by the realist paradigm, Tim Donne and Brian Schmidt have listed them as under:181
a) Humans are selfish by nature.
b) All the states are motivated by a common desire for power.
c) International relations are featured by a continuous power struggle to dominate others.
d) To promote national objectives and increase power is the primary goal of each state. They always seek to make other states as their subordinates.
e) The states acquire military capabilities in an anarchic world to preserve their national integrity and protect themselves from enemies.
f) Military is given priority over economy.
g) The states form alliances to make their survival sure. However, their loyalty cannot be taken as for granted.
177 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathanor The Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1904), 104. 178 Ibid. 179 Ibid. 180 Donnelly, The Realist Tradition, 250. 181 Brian C. Schmidt and Tim Dunne, “Realism,” in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (New York: Oxford University Press: 2011), 84-99. 56
h) International security organizations cannot be entrusted the security of states. States have their own responsibility of protecting their interests. The states always want to acquire global governance in order to be able to regulate world affairs according to their own sweet will.
i) The balance of power can help to maintain system stability when there is a struggle among states to maximize power.
1.1.1 Realism and Human Behavior The study of characteristics of human nature is very unique and the questions about human behavior have been debated since old times. It is hard to define a universally acceptable human behavior in different conditions of time and space. This leads us to inquire that; is human nature defined by the human culture and how human nature transcends to high politics of states? The assumptions regarding the nature of humans are central conceptions in classical realism. Classical realists argue that social life of man is fraught with conflict and this conflict is caused by the very nature of the humans.182 The disposition for conflict is hard-coded into human nature which prompts the states to struggle for power. This struggle for power ultimately results in war.183 This tragic sense of human nature, is at the center of classical realists’ assumptions. According to them, the history is a cyclical process where peace is temporary, and the conflict is ultimate reality which returns after short time.184
The classical realism philosophers like Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes. Deriving from the thoughts of Thucydides and Hobbes, the classical realism bases itself on the manifestations of human nature. Thucydides and Hobbes are political philosophers rather than the theorists; however, their work has been represented by the theoreticians like Morgenthau who believes that human nature is evil so it behaves evil.185 Hobbes “conception of state of nature is greatly shaped by the arguments of Thucydides.”186 So, the basic understanding of “the state of nature is essential to be able to co-relate”187 it with the basic assumptions of the classical realism that advocates that world is anarchic in
182 Freyberg-Inan, What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), 92. 183 Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (London: Cornell University Press, 1999), 10. 184 Richard Ned Lebow, Forbidden Fruit: Counter Factual and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 59. 185 Robert Schuett, Political Realism, Freud, and Human Nature in International Relations: The Resurrection of the Realist Man, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 79. 186 Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrensdorf, Justice among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 146. 187 Ibid. 57
nature, understanding that leads us to conclude that classical realism basically refers to the Hobbesian realism. In the following discussion, Hobbes and Morgenthau’s explanation of political realism is discussed in detail because their arguments are based on the nature of state which would be helpful in understanding the study presented in the coming chapters. Hobbes concepts of anarchy and disorder at state level stem from the egoism, cruelty, and selfishness entrenched deep in the human nature. These passions, according to him, are unconstrained and these are influenced by the fear and insecurity.188 This trait of human nature, as argued by Morgenthau, eventuates in unending passions of war of “every man against every man”.189
Hobbes advocates that there are no constraints on human behavior and it is independent of circumstances and depends only on human nature. Use of force is not constrained either. Everyone is suspicious about others and the element of fear makes everyone capable of taking any pre-emptive action. This pre-emption is quite natural to human behavior as the self-help system for its survival is at the heart of human nature. Realism defines this behavior as the core of international politics and statehood. This makes war quite plausible because apprehension of everyone about others being aggressor, makes a state think aggressively itself. Hobbes concludes that this behavior is deep rooted in human nature and it is the sole explanation of states behaving aggressively. This makes war an advantageous strategy and the state has to strive to dominate in order to ensure its survival.190 Hobbes’s Leviathan; the concept of supreme authority or the state, presents the solution to overcome this anarchy based on the individual behavior. However, this individual behavior is then translated into state behavior as states are represented by individuals.191
1.1.2 State Behavior – State Based Realism The realist paradigm defines the purpose of statecraft. The purpose of statecraft is to act as a safeguard of national survival amidst hostile environment. In order to meet this desired end of protecting national survival nothing seems more important than acquisition of power. Furthermore, following the principle of self- help appears to place a state at an advantageous position. Considering the above discussion, it seems that sovereignty of the state is the corner stone of International law. Therefore, the head of state has the liberty to
188 Michael W. Doyl, Ways of War and Peace (New York: Norton, 1997), 9. 189 Siegfried Schieder and Manuella Spindler, Theories of International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2014), 26. 190 W. J. Korab Karpowicz, On the History of Political Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2016), 137. 191 Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory (Canada: Longman, 2012), 60-61. 58
take whatever action to advance the interest and survival of the state. Donnelly is of the view that “Realism emphasizes the constraints on politics imposed by human nature and the absence of international government. Together, they make international relations largely a realm of power and interest.”192 Realist thought unanimously portrays nature of human as egoistic and these egoistic passions elaborate the central problems of politics. In the world politics, this egoistic and interests-oriented side of human nature defines statesmanship.193 Hans J. Morgenthau has explained his “six principles of political realism which in fact form the essence of realism theory”.194 These principles are based on the psychological and behavioral aspects of human nature. He explains the basic instincts of human nature transcending into the state behavior. Understanding these principles is essential to explain the state behavior in South Asia vis-a-vis deterrence in the coming chapters.
(i) Objective laws govern Politics which are rooted in human nature: these objective laws are defined by human nature. Human nature in turn, is central aspect of human nature. These objective laws are irrefutable and hard to be challenged. These objective laws are represented by rationality. According to theory of realism these laws operate the international politics. These objective laws can be known by analyzing the very nature of human beings. And for understanding that nature, human relations are very important to analyze. A review of human interaction and relations is helpful in understanding these objective laws. Politics can be understood by evaluating the trends in the relationship of humans. In international relations, the human relationship explains the state relationship and the world politics. However, this review of relations needs to be pragmatic and cogent. This rationality guides states while devising their foreign policy.
(ii) National Interest of States is defined in Terms of National Power: This principle, like the first one, is at the core of realist thought. The states define their national interests by means of national power and try to accumulate and sustain more power to secure their national interests. The struggle for power is the reason and fact, understanding which; the international politics can be understood. It elaborates all states are always in a struggle to achieve their interest goals and the ultimate source to achieve that is
192 Donnelly, The Realist Tradition, 20. 193 Ibid. 194 Ibid. 59
the maximum attainment of power. States conceptualize their interest in terms of power. “Foreign policy decision makers have always regarded power as the central fact of international politics.”195 They know that the winner of war gets to have a say and to win wars, power is essential. Military superiority defines the behavior of states. A state which is militarily strong has the capacity to dictate its terms to a weaker state. If it behaves aggressively it will be less likely to compromise; whereas, a weaker state tries to find a compromised solution to a problem, if it is faced with a stronger adversary.
Here the considerations of logical preferences and motives are important to include in the study because these are dynamic aspects of human nature. These imperatives change the behavior of statesmen considerably because motives are highly deceptive and distorted. These vary from human to human and do not follow a set pattern. The interests and emotions of actors and observers are bound to differ. They are beyond recognition. The motives which drive the foreign policy may or may not be logical. Political realism does not give any weightage to statesmen motives, rather it judges their performance by analyzing their actions regarding securing their interests of the nations. As far as logical preferences are concerned, political realism rejects the ideology as driving the foreign policy of a statesman.
Rather, Morgenthau’s argument is that “ideology is used as a smoke screen to cover nationalistic actions which are used to promote national interest.”196 Faith or ideology or logical preferences cannot sustain the commonality of interests for long time. The Sino-Soviet conflict (1955-65) was not an ideological conflict but a conflict of interests in the international politics. The conflict was neither caused by the ideology nor was it caused by the clash of personalities of Mao and Khrushchev. The national interests are the ultimate determinants of foreign policy.
No doubt the ideas, personality and prejudices of a statesman do influence some of the foreign policy making; however, foreign policy relies on state’s interest. It is pertinent to state that national interest is reflected in the personality of statesman or conversely, the statesman personality is in compatibility with the national interests. Despite the focus solely on national interests, the realism does not completely oppose
195 Ibid. 196 Ibid. 60
morality in international politics. But they are only relevant if they are in conformity with the national interest of a state.
(iii) “Interest is always dynamic”: Interest changes with time in nature and scope. The changes in political environment change the nature of national interest. The political and cultural context defines the national interest at a particular point in time and according to that, the foreign policy is formulated. The same is the case with national power. It also changes with the changing dynamics of political and cultural environment. Security is always the main national interest of states. However, the nature of security changes with time and similarly, the national power changes with time also. As such, the nature and scope of international relations is determined by national power and national power is dynamic.
(iv) Moral Principles are not Relevant in Politics: The universal moral principles cannot be applied to international politics and the state behavior is independent of these principles. Moral principles do not determine state policy. A state cannot put security at stake in the name of moral principles. Morgenthau says that politics is not based on ethics and a statesman is not a moralist. National power being the primary objective of a nation, it does not give priority to the morals unless the morals supplement the national power. Moral principles are to be advised to be followed by others.
(v) Difference between Morals of States & Universal Moral Principles: Realism refutes the compatibility of morals of a nation and the universal morals that govern the universe. Realism contends that the universal moral principles are defined by the states according to their national interests. The morals of democracy and freedom are the morals defined by the United States which suit its own interests. States are rational actors but they are not bound by the moral principles. The moral laws do not apply to the actions of the states. The policies of states are not bound by the moral principles and their actions are determined only by their interests.
(vi) International Politics is Autonomous: Morgenthau explains that international politics is neither based on idealism nor on legalism or moralism, but it is based on realism. It is solely based on national interest defined by attainment of more and more power. International politics is autonomous in its explanations. Realism follows a distinctive approach towards international politics. The political standards set forth by realism try to subordinate other political standards. It represents that international politics is 61
autonomous in which national interest is kept supreme and is defined in terms of power.
1.1.3 System Behavior – System Based Realism Continuing from domestic to international level while state representing an individual, it can be easily understood that the state behavior derived from human nature. Due to transition of force and monopoly from citizen to state, the states become dependent on power inherently and they constantly try to strive for ultimate dominance. Individual’s ego is translated into state behavior and that consequently is illustrated in system behavior.197 Hobbes notes that state is like a greater family in which people live for their own protection. They compete with others for power and dominance. They are always in a struggle to subdue others especially neighbors as they are the first source of suspicion.198 Thus, the sphere of anarchic nature expands to international system.
1.1.4 Neo-Realism and System Behavior Neo-realism was introduced in 1979 with publication of “Theory of international Politics” by Kenneth Waltz in “response to the challenges posed by the interdependency theory and to some extent as a corrective to traditional realism’s neglect of economic might.” 199 Waltz carried out a reinterpretation of traditional realism in order to meet the challenge of those who affirmed the growth of Interdependence and trans-nationalism.200 Waltz emphasized on the importance of economics and its effects on world politics in the form of growing interdependence and weakening of state borders as a result of that interdependence. Realists stress “on the significance of the state as being the primary actor in international politics.”201 On the contrary, Waltz has stressed on the significance of the structural nature of international system. Waltz asserts that “the structure of international system controls the behavior of the states.”202 He criticized realism for being reductionist, in that it focuses only on the state while ignoring the ‘big picture’ - which is the international system.
Likewise, Marxism and Liberal Utopianism is also reductionist in nature as they focus on the unit-level at the expense of the system. The former emphasizes on free trade
197 Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 93. 198 J. Gasking, The Elements of Law, Human Nature, (New York City: OUP, 1999), 103-104. 199 Martin Griffiths, Realism, Idealism and International Politics (New York: Routledge Publishers, 1993), 230. 200 Kenneth Waltz, The Theory of International Politics (New York: Waveland PrInc, 1979), 19. 201 Ibid. 202 Ibid. 62
and democracy and the latter on class struggle and the capitalist system. “Both ignore the role of the international system in determining the behavior of the states.”203 According to Waltz, international system controls the state behavior. This explained why states with remarkably different political systems exhibited similar foreign policy behavior. For example, the foreign policy conduct of the United Stated, a capitalist and liberal democracy showed remarkable similarity with the communist Soviet Union.204 Unlike the traditional realists who “recognize the state as the primary actor and unit of analysis in international politics, Waltz recognizes the international system as the primary actor and unit of analysis.”205
Waltz pointed out that theories of international politics were both weak and confused. He termed them weak in a sense that even when we establish associations among conditions, objects, behaviors, and events… the explanations we can offer for the associations are little removed from the empirical elements directly present. Whereas he termed them as confused because when we see that what passes for theory is often an odd mixture of statements in which concepts are ill defined, the connections of the theory’s components are loosely specified.206
Waltz book Theory of International Politics fills these gaps in the theorization of structural realism in international relations. The international system, explains Waltz, has three important characteristics, which are as under:
(i) “The ordering principle of the system”
(ii) “The character of the units in the system”, and
(iii) “The distribution of the capabilities of the units in the system.”207
His analysis puts focus on structure of world system and its structure rather than the earlier belief of State as the primary actor who can influence the international system. He says that unlike a domestic political system wherein “the ordering principle is hierarchy, the ordering principle in the international system is anarchy.”208 There is no world-government or an international body that can regulate the behavior of the constituent states of the system. Nation-state system operates in an environment of self-
203 ibid. 204 Scott Burchill, Andrew Linkelater, Theories of International Relations (New York: Saint Martin Press, 1996), 85. 205 Ibid. 206 Kenneth Waltz, “Theory of International Relations,” Handbook of Political Science, 8 (1975), 5. 207 Waltz, The Theory of International Politics, 88-97. 208 Ibid. 63
help where they endeavor to maximize their security through acquisition of military power. In such an environment security dilemma is therefore inevitable and is common to all states, regardless of system they have at domestic level. The system dictates the behavior of the states. Waltz calls this process socialization of the states into power politics. Playing power politics is compulsory. A refusal to do so may jeopardize the survival of the state.209 In the international system, there have been periodic changes in the meanwhile, but the ordering principal of the international system has been constant. Anarchy has been an immutable characteristic of the system.210
Second important observation of Waltz is that the system units (states) are identical. The foreign policy behavior of states is controlled by the international system. The domestic social and economic order of the state has very little relevance on its behavior in the foreign policy arena. Lastly, while all states are similar functionally, they are not similar in terms of their capabilities. Different states have different levels of capabilities. “There is an unequal and ever shifting distribution of power in the international system. The capacity of a given state to pursue its goals in international politics depends upon its placement in the international hierarchy.”211
Neo realists assert that “there are essentially three possible systems depending on the changes in the distribution of capabilities expounded by number of great powers inside the international system”.212 The neorealist after comparing the uni-polar, bipolar and multi polar systems conclude that “a bipolar system is more stable and less vulnerable to great power war and systemic change.”213 If bipolar system is compared to a multi- polar system, it can be concluded that balancing can take place “only through internal balancing as there are no extra great powers to forge an alliance”. Only a bipolar system offers internal balancing therefore there is less chances of miscalculation and war between great powers. Neorealist claims that as war is a result of the anarchy at international system level, therefore, it is likely to persist among states. Furthermore, “the neorealist argues that the ordering principle of the international system has not witnessed
209 Ibid., 128. 210 Ibid., 66. 211 Ibid., 96. 212 Ibid. 213 Ibid. 64
any fundamental changes from the time of Thucydides to the occurrence of nuclear warfare.”214
Waltz like many other neo-realists admits the fact that globalization has posed new challenges to the states however “he does not believe that states can be replaced. He believes that no non-state actor can match the capabilities of the state.” The realists believe that war has been and still continues to be an inescapable feature of the international politics. The notion that war is inevitable is based on the fact that states experience a security dilemma. According to this viewpoint, the international system exists in a self-help environment whereas states experience unpredictability regarding the military preparations of the other states. Since the uncertainty is irresolvable, so states are likely to remain mistrustful of each other. As a result of security dilemma “action reaction” cycle may well result. As the arguments laid down by Waltz are based on the shortcomings of the classical realism that it fails to explain, it is important that we have a look at the comparison of classical realism and neorealist assumptions.
In the view of Mearsheimer “the nature of the international system is responsible for the aggressive behavior of the States in the international politics.”215 He in “Tragedy of the Great Power Politics” has projected Waltz as a defensive realist. Both Waltz and Mearsheimer have different opinion regarding the concept of power. Mearsheimer asserts that the pursuit of power is limitless however Waltz claim that it is limited. Waltz maintains that it is imprudent for the states to attempt to get a maximum share in the world power because in doing so these states will get punished by the system. On the contrary Mearsheimer claims that great powers maximize their relative power. The limitless power struggle is dominated and influenced by the anarchy. Thus, it is strategically prudent to pursue hegemony.
Mearsheimer explains “realism’s five assumptions about international system to explain how the world works.”216 Firstly, the word anarchy gives us the idea that states do not have any higher authority in this anarchic world which can govern them, as Mearsheimer quotes Inis L. Claude, there is “no government over governments”. Secondly, “states have intrinsic military capability which gives them the potential to
214 Ibid. 215 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of the Great Power Politics, 12. 216 Inis L. Claude Jr., Swords into Plowshares: The Problem and Progress of International Organization (New York: Random House, 1971), 14. 65
either dominate or destroy other states.”217 Thirdly, states are not sure regarding the intentions of other states. There is not even a single state which is fully assured that the other state will abstain from using offensive military strategy against it.
Fourthly, the idea of survival gives impetus to the offensive behavior of a state therefore it wants to keep their sovereignty at any cost. Fifthly, states have to think strategically in order to survive in this international system. In all probability states in spite being rational can be deceived by the enemy’s intentions. These assumptions do not singularly point out that states will act competitively. Not one of the five assumptions singularly point out that states will act competitively. However, when these assumptions are studied collectively then it can be concluded that states will act rather aggressively. Consequently, the following patterns of state behavior can be witnessed.
The first pattern suggests that states are suspicious of each other due to a constant fear of the likelihood of war. According to the second pattern, each state views the other state as a potential threat. In this international system both alliances and adversaries are subject to change. States according to the self-help system will always prefer their self- interest. States want to maximize their power. States not only want to increase their hegemony but also want to expand their military power at the cost of other states. This kind of hegemonic status can be a guarantor of survival.
1.1.5 Realism and International Institutions Realist theory has an entirely different world view about worldwide foundations when contrasted with liberals and institutionalists. John Mearsheimer tries to clarify the pragmatist hypothesis and worldwide foundations as far as realist presumption of look for security and expansion of power through any methods. The states collaborate in the realm of rivalry, however that participation is restricted in light of the fact that world legislative issues are ruled by security rivalry which no collaboration can wipe out. He enumerates five presumptions about global framework to clarify how the world functions.
First, the international system representing the states is essentially based on methodical improvement in the power orientation of world politics. The resulting conflict is inevitable because states are continuously busy in minimizing the power difference among their adversaries. The word conflict implies that there is not any authority above
217 Ibid. 66
states to administer them, as Mearsheimer cites Inis L. Claude, there is “no governance over governments”.218 Second, states have a natural aggressive military capability which gives them the power to devastate or dominate different states. All things considered, state's military power relies upon the nature and number of weaponries at a specific state's disposal. Third, “the states can never be sure about the potential of opposing states”. No state can say for sure that the other state will avoid utilizing hostile military course of action against it.. Moreover, the aims are accorded by the abilities. Fourth, the most essential rationale driving the states hostile behavior is survival. States need to keep up their power at any cost. Fifth, states think deliberately to get power balance in worldwide framework. States are balanced yet they can fall in erroneous conclusion because of uncertainty about their foe's goals.
None of these five presumptions uniquely show that states will respond aggressively. In any case, when taken together, these presumptions show that states need to respond aggressively because of common belief that the adversary always wants to harm the interests of the state.
As per realist worldview, each and every state thinks according to the similar rationale. This implies states not just anticipate exploiting over different states but also, they struggle to guarantee that no other state can manipulate them. At the end of the day, states are overly insecure and over protecting themselves to such an extent that there is strong possibility of war and very small possibility of peace.
1.2 Deterrence and Realism Deterrence plays at the outskirts of realism theory while its basics are well rooted into the realism theory. Deterrence is used to avoid conflict. The deterrence concept is applied so that the other states are deterred, and this is achieved by preparing for war early and making the adversary believe that a heavy retaliation is imminent as a consequence of war. This preparation for war and psychological impact associated with deterrence has its foundations in the classical realism. The psychological impact of deterrence results in the change in behavior of the states. The state behavior, at first place, is guided by the human nature which is fraught by greed for power and preservation and promotion of interests at any cost. This greed for power then results in the security dilemma of adversaries who then try to balance power or overpower the adversary.
218 Ibid. 67
Though deterrence is a rather new theoretical construct, the roots of it are found in realism theory. In the following discussion, deterrence would be studied through the lens of realism and behavioral aspects associated with the concept of deterrence and realism alike.
1.2.1 Deterrence and Human Behavior Deterrence as psychological phenomenon is not bound to the strict logic. As human nature controls the human behavior, human logic is also influenced by the human nature. Deterrence controls human behavior on the basis of logic and human behavior controls deterrence on the basis of nature. The realist explanation of nature is based on power maximization, so the utmost objective of deterrence driven by nature is aimed for power maximization. The deterrence gives a statesman an option for achieving the ultimate power position in the world affairs.219 Political conflict will remain in mutual interests of the states; however, the nuclear deterrence gives a power balancer in case of adversaries already having it and gives a power advantage in case the adversaries do not have it.
The significance of deterrence has a compatibility with the human nature. The power status associated with the nuclear weapons gives, according to the realists, the necessary incentive to the statesmen to pursue nuclear deterrence. This gives a dual advantage against other states; one is that it provides a credibility of survival against the adversaries, and second is that it elevates a country to advantageous position in the world politics. So, the states are bound by nature to pursue power in international system which is amplified by nuclear deterrence.
Certain behavioral trends are associated with deterrence. The nuclear weapon states, or the P5, are given exceptional status in the world politics. Their standing as a power in international system reflects their behavior. They behave as the stakeholders in international peace. They are in a position to extend security umbrella to the states who are allies and which do not have nuclear weapons. This extended deterrence220 of United States offered for Europe is not for the good will of a foreign country but it is for the preservation and promotion of great powers’ own interests. Although the great powers
219 Robert Powel, “Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense,” International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 86-118. 220 “The United States has long extended a nuclear umbrella over NATO. This has been manifested in the deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, backed up by the commitment of US strategic nuclear forces, as well as by NATO nuclear policy.” Steven Pipher, Richard C. Bush, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Martin S. Indyk, Michael O’Hanlon, and Kenneth M. Pollock in “Extended Deterrence and NATO Europe,” Brookings Arms Control Series, Paper 3, May 2010, 18. 68
champion the world peace and order, yet the smaller states can be capable of equalizing the deterrence value thanks to nuclear weapons.
The states who do not have nuclear weapon seek to balance power with the help of alliances or bandwagoning with the great powers. The behavior of such states is somewhat submissive to the great powers. They have to compromise on aspects of loyalty to the alliance in order to achieve their security through collective security mechanism. United States’ security umbrella to South Korea and Japan seeks loyalty to United States. However, being allies to the United States, they are faced with the security challenge from North Korea. Now that North Korea has claimed to have developed nuclear technology to prepare nuclear warhead, it has limited the options of United States security umbrella. Nuclear deterrence changes the behavior of great powers as well as the small powers. Alternately, North Korea has tried to challenge US on the basis of nuclear deterrence. This compels South Korea and Japan towards nuclearization.
The third type of states have established nuclear deterrence, but they have active conflicts which make war an imminent possibility. Pakistan and India have active unresolved conflicts which are responsible for the mutual aggressive behavior of both. Nuclear deterrence has managed to avoid any war between Pakistan and India, but it has also increased the hostilities. There have been very few CBMs developed between them. The conflict is managed between the states, but it still remains active at low intensity level conventionally. In case of Pakistan and India, state behavior is driven by deterrence and deterrence is also driven by state behavior. Their relative state behavior prevents any form of conflict resolution to achieve, let alone the conflict transformation. States behave aggressively in order to achieve maximum power irrespective of the nuclear deterrence. However, this aggressiveness is managed by the factor of rationality.
The word rational actor, effectively, for the purpose of deterrence theory, is equated with the rationality which means that gaining as much of information of the situation as possible and analyze the options for dealing with it while keeping in mind the cost and benefits. Then the decision will be made regarding choosing the best possible option which promises the most advantage or the least disadvantage in any worst situation. The rationality means that deterrence can best be understood when this assumption is taken into consideration.221 The theory assumes that what a rational actor
221 Patrick Morgan, Deterrence Now (New York: CUP, 2002), 11-12. 69
would do in case of an immediate deterrence situation and what would be the best preparation or response for such a scenario in consideration of deterrence being in place.
The realist approach suggests that it is the international politics which has engrossed the states in conflict. Hence states have fixation with readiness of force fearing the use of force by others. Realists contend that the conflict has made the states feel concerned regarding their security. This security dilemma stems from the rationality of states and the response is also based on rationality. So, realist explanation of rationality assumes that states would prefer the rational decision either they are faced with offensive or defensive compulsions. For offensive compulsions, the states would be rational and would not go overboard in pushing adversary to the wall so much that it has to decide irrationally for response.
The nuclear age brought to the research of international relations, an intrinsic normative psychological appeal for rationality. It maintained that irrational choices in the decision-making can kill everyone and for wisest of decisions, they have to be taken rationally. The behavioral analysis of social sciences also inclines powerfully towards rationality in decision-making. Scholars assume rationality as the central point in theory building. So deterrence was conceived as the strategy in which rational deterrer is faced by attacker rationality, either of which is prone to lose it at any time.222 This assumption based criteria render deterrence weakness in its explaining certain behavioral aspects which in turn is not the trait of the theory by logic, however, when the assumption is made, the aspects of behavior are to be well considered.
1.2.2 Deterrence and Power Politics Deterrence generally refers to the political power. The stronger political power means that a state can induce others to change their behavior or line of action in a conflict. Deterrence represents “its negative aspect as it is the power of a state to dissuade other state from doing anything which, one believes, is against its own interests.”223 This goal is achieved through deterrence and that deterrence is achieved through the power of a state. Deterrence is achieved by having the capability to refuse the adversary any advantage that it may have gained from any action that is to be deterred.224 Deterrence
222 James G. Blight, The Shattered Crystal Ball: Fear and Learning in the Cuban Missile Crisis (Lanham, MD: Littlefield Adams, 1992), 79-83. 223 Glenn H Snyder, “Deterrence and Power,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 4, no. 2 (1960): 163-178. 224 Ibid. 70
and political power both complement each other. Political power strengthens deterrence and deterrence strengthens political power. Deterrence can be achieved by a state either by a single means or by combination of actions including military strength, economic strength and nuclear weapons. However, political power is complemented by all of these factors. Nuclear weapons, alone, can offer deterrence against adversaries independent of the economic and military imperatives, while political power depends upon the complementary effects of economic and military power. So, the realist belief would advocate that power maximization is necessary and all the components that complement to it are highly recommended to be achieved.
“Power has four basic components; (i) base, (ii) means, (iii) amount, and (iv) scope.”225 Base means the force value that enables a state “to affect the position of others i.e. military force, economic assets etc. means is the method by which power base is”226 demonstrated i.e. the threat of using force and its demonstration. The quantity of power indicates a possible state action. And the scope is the possible choice of actions of the other state that can be influenced successfully with the help of threat of force. “These categories can also be applied to the deterrence”. For example; “in deterrence by massive retaliation, the base is the capability to inflict227 massive destruction through military or nuclear means”. The scope refers to the different types of threats that can be minimised by use of threat. The amount of threat forces the reduction in the possible actions that may have been resulted from after the use of the threat. The base, means, amount, and scope of power and deterrence complement each other.” The stronger deterrence means greater power status of the country.
1.3 Realism and Conflict Transformation Human history is fraught with conflict and war. It would be apt to say that conflict is part of nature of human being. From the time of Plato to the contemporary international relations and political science, the philosophers and theoreticians have tried to explain human nature and its political and social role. The study of war and peace has been the central topic of cognitive process in political science theorization. Conflict and war has been an everyday phenomenon of human history. Wars of empires have transformed to the war between states. Empires system has been replaced by nation state system which is
225 Robert Dahl, Democracy, Liberty and Equality (Norway: Norwegian University Press, 1986), 65. 226 Ibid. 227 Ibid. 71
still embroiled in conflict. States interact with each other as friends and adversaries but the basic motive for any particular interaction is that there is to reduce conflicts. Theoreticians have analyzed the conditions of state interaction, relative motivations for conflict and peace, and prospects of conflict resolution leading to conflict transformation.
1.3.1 Theoretical Basics of Conflict Transformation Conflict transformation, in general, means that a state of conflict between two adversaries is dissolved into peaceful outcomes. It is step higher than conflict management or conflict resolution. Conflict transformation is not the “armistice in war” as Thucydides has stated but rather it is a state of mind and virtue of justice as considered by Baruch Spinoza. It means the elimination of conflict as well as the elimination of factors causing the conflict so that there are no chances of erupting in the future. Conflict transformation primarily finds its basis in the liberalism or idealism. The liberalism’s explanation of peace focuses on democracy and economic development. The liberalists argue that democracies do not go for war because of their transparency and accountability to the people.228 They believe that if states are economically integrated with each other then there are fewer chances that states would compromise their economic interests by waging war with the other states.
Democracies are committed to free economic activity, free trade, and free flow of information across the borders.229 The focus on economics compels states to weigh the costs of indulging into war in terms of economic loss and isolation from the world economic order. Trade is the most important tool that promoted interdependence among the democracies which are equally responsible for the security as well as economic stability of the country.230 The democracies are not only responsible for the socio- economic development of their own but also, they are responsible for the economic stability of others as well because they are integrated into an international trade system.
Liberalism also argues hegemonic stability theory which contends that international peace can be attained by establishing a world government lead by a hegemon who could set the world institutions and set their rules of business for the economic and security of the world by taking a mainstream role in the international
228 Michael White, David Epston, Narrative Means to Therapeutic Ends (New York: Norton, 1990), 227-235. 229 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Michigan: University of Michigan, 1992), 212. 230 Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 5. 72
relations.231 The hegemon has more military and economic power than the other states. The hegemon can produce economic and military stability in international system by a mechanism of collective security and economic imperatives. The hegemon can do that without having to disregard its own security or economic interests while the other states benefit from the combined effect of the stability produced as a result.232
Joseph Nye argues that role of soft power has immensely increased in post-Cold War time when the United States emerged as a hegemon to control the international politics by getting the other states to agree to its desired outcome for the common good of all. For maintaining its hegemony, the US must stay committed to its components of soft power; promotion of democracy in the world, lead the trade liberalization, advocate open market economy, and encourage development in underdeveloped countries.233 According to liberalists, “the continuation of the hegemonic structure of the international system is the key to the international peace and stability.”234 This structure gives the requisite form of an international government to regulate the world affairs.
However, this continuation of so-called hegemonic theory has not been able to eliminate conflict between the states ever since Cold War has ended. The hegemonic theory has not brought about the world’s integration in terms of economy; in fact, the economic integration of states in the Cold War where there was competition for power between the two poles; Soviet and NATO. The economic integration of Europe was due to the Cold War rivalries and the integration was promoted to economically support Europe which was at the onset of demise and the fear was that it may fall into the garb of Communism. The only example of transformation of age-old conflict between France and the Great Britain was not because of the moral values and virtues of cooperation; it is because of the external security challenges to them which encouraged economic cooperation to strengthen their sustainability. Thus, realism has more pragmatic and different view of conflict and its transformation and this cooperation for the sake of competition which is discussed briefly below for clarifying the perspective.
231 Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 153. 232 William Brown, Simon Bromley, Suma Athreye, Ordering the International: History, Change and Transformation, (Chicago: The Open University, 2004), 185. 233 Ibid. 234 Ibid. 73
1.3.2 Realism and Conflict Transformation Research on political realism in connection to “the contentious issues has had an unclear relationship; there are some scholars, on one hand, who argue that research on contentious issues challenges realism,”235 whereas, scholars have also argued that the research over contentious issues is, generally, quite consistent with realist thought. There has not been a systematic research on the conflict issues as there has been an over emphasis of the scholars on the power related issues. The individual motivations behind state actions have remained behind the scene in most of the study of conflicts.236 The scholars focusing on the international politics have remained describing the bigger picture in terms of power politics.
Vasquez argues that realists have given less importance to the issues of contention which are central to the understanding and the substance of the world politics.237 The realists have explained the state behavior to be different for different issue areas. However, the overall response towards different issues has remained the same. For example; the issues over territory gain the same international response irrespective of the state’s power structure in international system. So, the issues other than the territorial or border issues may have different responses over different scales, but the most favored response remains the best calculated one to protect the interests of the country. So, as long as there is a conflict over the territorial issue, the realists believe that the power struggle prevails, but once the territorial or border issues are settled, then violence is less likely and the lesser are the chances of war.
The state behavior in contentious issues and conflicts may vary according to the situation and perception of the decision makers. The “issue-based approach to world politics is based on three tenants”:238 First, the policy is affected by issues and not just the mere quest for the power, national interest or the hegemony. The decision makers have their policy to reach their objectives through a different set of options rather than simply challenging the international system and its structure of power. Secondly, for every policy maker, the issue varies in its significance which is reflected in their final decision making. For issues which are of greater importance and value, the greater risk against the cost of the achievement of favorable outcome can be taken by the decision maker. While, on the
235 Robert Dahl, Democracy, Liberty and Equality (Norway: Norwegian University Press, 1986), 334. 236 Ibid. 237 John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 124. 238 Ibid., 3. 74
other hand, for the issues of lesser importance may not warrant the similar risk taking by the decision maker. Lastly, there are a variety of foreign policy tools that can be used in a suitable fashion that can be done either through unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral means.
Apparently, the first two tenets seem challenging to the realist thought because they give importance to the nature of issue rather than the power politics or to use power for achievement of the goals. However, the considerations of realist school of thought and the issue-oriented scholars are very important in this regard. These considerations drive the state behavior regarding decision making for coping with a particular issue of foreign policy. The state behavior may be consistent or it may vary from the propositions of the realist school and the issue-oriented school. For example; what issue-oriented scholars consider as the most significant issue, the realists may also consider it as the central issue of national power or national interest. So, in that case, both the approaches may predict the similar state behavior on part of the states.
It is not that every contentious issue leads to war or violence. The mere presence of conflict does not mean the chances of war looming all the time. The realists argue that the rationality of costs and benefits is at the core of decision making. So, it is not that power politics would serve the purpose at all times and other means of achieving the goals are to be used. The realists have over the years respected the use of tools of foreign policy for the attainment of their goals which also include the typical goals of power maximization and hegemony in international affairs. The United States no more prefers to use force to keep its status in the world affairs, rather now it uses the soft tools of foreign policy like democracy, international institutionalism, and international law to achieve the foreign policy goals, national interests and the power interests at the same time.
The classical realists as well as structural realists along with the offensive realists hold a single view on the motivation behind the state behavior. According to Morgenthau, “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.”239 Furthermore, in his famous six principles, Morgenthau argues in the second principle saying that the “statesmen define their national interests in terms of power”, and in the sixth principle, he argues that power considerations are given top priority while evaluating policies over the
239 Hans Morgenthau, “Politics among Nations, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson and W. David Clinton,” (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2005), 13. 75
other considerations of economy, law or moral values. The power considerations are estimated as per their effects on the national power. According to him, the political policy is designed such that it keeps power, increases it, and demonstrates it.
Waltz describes that power is the means rather than the end in the anarchic international system. In this anarchic international system, the end for every state is the attainment of security for which power is merely the means. Power accumulation may or may not ensure the state security. States can balance each other’s’ power by forming alliances and bandwagoning with the great powers. The Cold War alliances and bandwagoning depicts this trend. The theory of Balance of power explains ultimate goal of a country is ensuring its national security at any cost. Military power is the most important element of protection of a state sovereignty. However, states seek to balance power with the rivals and other states through multiple sources; through forming military alliances, through economic alliances, and through getting positive security assurances from the greater states.
The realism’s main contention in the state based international system is anarchy where every state is sovereign and there is no concept of world government. Realists view international politics as an epitome of war and conflict because of human nature. Hobbes contends that there is no law existing above man to regulate him according to a set of rules and nothing prevents him from behaving immorally. According to him, diffidence, competition, and glory characterize the human behavior. The modern realism has the same basics as the traditional realism where the focus has turned from individual behavior to systemic behavior. However, the main thrust behind the behaviors remains the preservation and promotion of interests of the states at any cost and maximization of power.
The reason for anarchy is that no world government exists as a center of power and there is no hegemon to regulate state behavior in international system. This anarchy transcends into the state behavior and a struggle for power among states. As there is no authority over them, they follow the self-help rule to maximize their interests and power and to become unchallengeable in world politics.240 States always prepare for war because if force is used against any state, it must be in a position to defend itself as well as to teach a lesson to the adversary in order to maintain its credibility of force.
240 Waltz, 105. 76
However, this does not imply that there is conflict and war omnipresent in the world affairs. Mearsheimer explains that there is a relentless security competition going on between the states and the grave possibilities of conflict and war always looming over state relations. The economic cooperation and free trade are fine, but the constant struggle for military power is also going on relentlessly.241 The free trade has not bound the states economically together as compared to the military competition breeding security dilemma. The economic cooperation is competition based as well as the security cooperation is also based on competition. The innate non-trusting nature of human transcends into the possibility of cheating the economic and security alliances. This realization of cheating and selfishness ignites the ongoing security competition among the states.
Economic cooperation and military alliances are relevant only as long as the object of self-preservation is served. As soon as a state gets the chance to dominate others, it would be readily heading towards higher goals of dominance and hegemony. Lack of trust and suspicion produces this stream of behavior among the states. The realist explanation of state interaction reveals that conflict is the ultimate and unavoidable reality in the state relations. It can be managed, resolved or deferred, but it cannot be transformed. The conflict between France and Britain is going on since the times of Empires. Their relation has been complexed over the history as they have been friends as well as competitors at different instances. The post-World War II “entente cordiale”242 between the two states cannot be termed as the example of conflict transformation because this entente was the outcome of economic crisis of Europe resulting after World War II. De Gaulle was against this entente because he was fearful that this alliance would be dominated by Anglo-Saxon and France would be a second fiddle. However, France had to enter the alliance because of severe economic crisis of Europe.
So, the realist paradigm predicts that if there is any chance of dominance to any of the two countries, they would go for it. Conflict transformation can only be confined to the ethnic conflicts where there is no other state involved. Transformation in Africa can be understood because there is no other state involved. People belonging to different ethnic groups may be inclined to resolution and finally transformation of conflicts.
241 John Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1994), 11. 242 Britain and France have been rivals over the centuries but the economic devastation in Europe caused by the World War II caused both the states to engage into an entente in order to support their economic base and avoid collapsing as state. 77
However, such possibilities are limited and to apply it elsewhere, all the factors for causation of conflict must be independently transformed. The application of conflict transformation techniques varies from one study to another and cannot be universalized for every state or every conflict.
An “issue-based approach to world politics” extrapolates three main tenets of state behavior. Firstly, the foreign policy of states is directed by issues, and the states are constantly pursuing their national interests and power maximization strategies in international system. Instead of acting discretionarily, continually looking for “national power or the national interest, and instead of simply reacting to structural imperatives the international system, policymakers settle on decisions to achieve their targets on an extensive variety of issues.”
Second, issues vary in striking nature (or essentialness), and this assortment impacts policymaker’s decisions with respect to issues: leaders may debilitate “greater effort (and to risk higher costs) to achieve perfect settlements on particularly essential issues than on issues that are concurred with less hugeness.” Finally, “the focal principle is that a variety of unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral tools of foreign policy can be utilized to pursue issue-related objectives: various agreeable or confl ictual alternatives might be chosen to pursue goals over issues, refl ecting alternative mechanisms as elective components for calculating the stakes which are disputed”.
In spite of the fact that the realists accentuate power as well as security as the essential worries of state leaders, pragmatists by and large, perceive that states at times seek different objectives as well and not specifically the power or security. Waltz and Mearsheimer have contended that there is a reasonable chain of command of state objectives, with security being the essential concern. When survival is guaranteed, states can securely look for such different objectives as ideology, wealth, or human rights - however just to the degree that quest for these objectives do not contradict with their security objectives.
The realist understanding of the state behavior in case of conflict or conflict transformation can be understood on the basis of two imperative types of issues; (i) the political issues and (ii), the legal or other issues. The political issues, according to realists involve the hardcore issues which directly relate to the security of a state. There is less likelihood that the states would compromise on the political issues. Wars are more likely 78
to emerge from the political disputes rather than the legal or other disputes. Political disputes are the disputes over challenge to sovereignty of a state, border issues and the issues impacting the power structure of a state. Moreover, it is equally more difficult to differentiate between political and legal dispute. A legal dispute can be a political dispute as well. The political disputes can be on the relative desires of the states in which they are willing to retain the existing power structure, or they want to overthrow the status quo.
The above discussions lead to the following two assumptions: First, the militarized conflicts are more likely when the issues are directly affecting the military strength of states. In the system of states, particularly in our current reality, where states are increasingly contending to increment their power and security, it is not particularly astonishing that realists anticipate power to influence the probability of armed conflict. For Carr, a state is limited by its aims and capabilities while formulating its foreign policy because aims can be high in case the adversary is weak while the aims are lower in case of a stronger adversary. The strong may be able to deter weaker state from imposing any claim. However, the use of force in the state relations makes the equation of power considerably vital. So, in any issue in which military capability is vital and the resolution or the escalation of conflict directly affects the military capabilities of the states, then the peace-building efforts are not going to work in that situation.
The defensive realists like Waltz differ from those of offensive realism of Mearsheimer. Waltz emphasizes on security of a state and when states are secure, they would like to maintain the situation. However, Mearsheimer has argued that states behave as always maximizing their power and they would always be in a struggle to change the status quo and to attain hegemony over the others. There is also a difference in approach with regards to the status of a state in terms of power. The weaker states would want status quo of security while stronger sates may always like to change the situation.
Great powers quite often have revisionist expectations - with the periodic special case of a hegemon who looks to protect its favored position - "and they will utilize force to adjust the balance of power in the event that they think it should be possible at a reasonable cost. The realists believe that political issues involving military power are less likely to be resolved. Second, the likelihood of militarized conflict is less when the challenger state is weaker than the opponent. When the states involved have greater disparity in their power structure, then the stronger state has the capability to assert its
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influence on the adversary. Then the likelihood of the weaker state to challenge the stronger state is less because the costs for doing that outweigh the benefits of such an action.
1.3.3 Conflict Resolution under Binding Settlement The realists contend that the strategic issues that involve the territorial disputes and border issues which can affect its capability are unlikely to resolve under a binding settlement process through legal arrangements. Morgenthau has argued that the settlement of conflicts that spanned over a larger time and that have immediate impact on contenders’ relative power is tantamount to fail. The disputes which remain under tension and which involve the overall power distribution between the states at stake, the judicial means cannot settle the dispute.243 Carr also notes that the states do not refer to the court over disputes involving the vital interests, sovereignty, and independence of the states.244 States never recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the international courts on the matters relating to their security. However, there is possibility of conflict settlement of less vital issues and a state may be willing to accept binding settlement for a dispute under judicial process such as arbitration or through diplomacy and negotiations.
Morgenthau argues that “legal adjudication may be able to resolve comparatively minor issues which may include the territorial concessions or the matters of adjudication remaining within the status quo”.245 “The issues which do not affect the security and existence of the state can be submitted to international courts for binding resolution”. The issues relating to monetary disputes or about the far-flung territorial disputes where there is very scarce inhabitation is normally taken to the international arbitration to decide under binding resolution which are in written forms.
Whether the peace-building through negotiations or through arbitration is successful or not depends upon the states acceptance of the results. While arbitrated decisions are considered legitimately binding, and the two sides concurred ahead of time that they would acknowledge whatever decision was to be issued, the absence of an organized enforcement capability of international law, there is a possibility that the dissatisfied state may dismiss the award. If this happens, then the enforcement of such
243 Hidemi Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 346. 244 Brian C. Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 196. 245 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 24. 80
decision depends upon the reaction of the affected state. They may out rightly reject the decision, or they may be willing to enforce it.
The India-Pakistan conflict is the classic example of states with the protracted dispute over territory as well as other issues which directly affect the relative power status of both states and also affect their military capabilities. The conventional asymmetry between the two states has been neutralized by the nuclear deterrence. However, the nuclear deterrence has cemented this power difference in terms of land area, military capability, and nuclear capability which is ever widening in numbers but remains constant in terms of effects. Both Pakistan and India have remained strict on resolution for Kashmir issue which directly impacts the power status of two countries while they have been engaged in the legal compromises over smaller issues like water issues and some nuclear confidence building measures.
1.3.4 Deterrence and Conflict Transformation Deterrence and conflict transformation seem to be two conditions. Nuclear deterrence ensures that there is no conflict beyond a certain level of escalation. Nuclear deterrence is achieved because of the conflict and there is always a possibility of escalation of conflict into full-fledged war. During deterrence, the conflict remains while during the transformation, the conflict is transformed from negativity to positivity. So, if there is deterrence existing between two states, it means: (i) that there is conflict between the states which has the potential of escalation to war at any point in time; (ii) as long as deterrence is existing, there is a unfeasibility of transformation of the conflict because it is one of the factors helping them in a state of the conflicting relations. The main cause of conflict is necessary to address but deterrence in fact strengthens the root cause of conflict. The state behavior also needs transformation in order to transform the conflict. One of the objectives of deterrence is to change the behavior of the adversary according to one’s own interests.
What sort of nuclear weapons are sufficient to prevent “conventional conflict”? The literature on security displays an unavoidable “existential bias,” contending that only possessing a little nuclear stockpile should deter foes from conflict. Waltz broadly contended that simply the “validity of little deterrence forces is required to set up Thomas Schelling's threat that leaves something to chance,” and should dissuade not simply nuclear use but rather conventional war too. Existing quantitative work on nuclear 81
deterrence and conflict unequivocally communicates this bias by regarding every single nuclear capable state as equal once they gain a solitary atomic weapon. “This assumes that a state with one warhead procures a similar deterrence effect as states with developed second-strike or even first-use capacities”.246
Deterrence is specifically associated with the Cold War rivalry where both the Superpowers were way ahead of other countries to induce their deterrence power against the non-Superpowers. In the mean time, the main point of analysis is that whether the deterrence which was relevant in the Cold War is still relevant in the present nuclear weapons states? And whether the nuclear warhead amassing by the super powers can be replicated or justified in the present conflicts involving nuclear deterrence? The answer to this question is not clear because the massive stockpiling of nuclear weapons by the super powers is even not yet justified because by means of deterrence, they were weapons not to be used.
Surely, the superpower nuclear balance is a poor guide for investigating the connection between atomic weapons and deterrence for some reasons. In the first place, the superpowers were more capable than other states in the system that their capacity to dissuade non-superpower states was overdetermined.”247 Second, “because of the limitations in resources, the superpowers' extensive nuclear structures have not been, nor are probably going to be, replicated by any other state. The superpower deterrence condition is not relevant to the other nuclear weapons states. The superpower experience is subsequently a methodologically questionable for recognizing the level of nuclear forces necessary to deter a conflict”.248
Regardless, “the experiences of the regional nuclear powers — non-superpower states with independent nuclear forces—can give insight into what sorts of nuclear forces are required to deter conflict”.249 “These powers made nuclear forces of equal size and had to face constraints to go below the superpowers forces. Unlike all the superpowers, regional powers must settle on essential choices about how to allot their limited nuclear forces for deterrence. They achieved the required deterrent effect against the conventional
246 Nuno P. Monteiro, Theory of Unipolar Politics (New York: Yale University Press, 2014), 23. 247 Ibid. 248 Ibid. 249 Ibid. 82
war. Pakistan has viably deterred Indian conventional power on different occasions; however, India has not been able to do that, as the 1999 Kargil war represented”.250
This existential bias, that the nuclear weapons in any number have the combined deterring effect and the Cold War relevance of deterrence in the current scenario of South Asia needs careful study. The relevance can be established in terms of overall deterrent effect that the nuclear weapons can create. The theoretical understanding of nuclear deterrence can be understood more eloquently by focusing on two factors; first, the experiences of regional powers in devising the deterrence policies in connection to the conventional conflicts; and secondly, by shifting the level of analysis from merely possession of nuclear weapons to cause deterrence to the nuclear deterrence postures of the relative countries. These include the nuclear forces, their organization, the doctrines, and the operationalization of nuclear capabilities. The nuclear postures present different outcomes for different countries because it depends on the nature of conflict as well as the level of escalation of the conflict.
There can be three classification schemes that identify the regional power nuclear postures of the states. The nuclear postures can be “(i) catalytic, (ii) assured retaliation, and (iii) asymmetric escalation”.251 The catalytic posture means that a state has developed nuclear weapons technology and waits for the nuclear weapons to self-establish nuclear deterrence. Such kind of posture represents weak deterrence posture and it has the greatest tendency to fail. The assured retaliation posture serves the purpose during the low intensity conflicts; however, it has the tendency to fail during the high intensity conflicts where the status quo is challenged by use of conventional forces. Such posture contends that retaliation is assured with the nuclear weapons but that is assured after the conventional attack has happened and the nuclear threshold has already been crossed. This means that deterrence posture has failed to deter an attack from the adversary. The asymmetric escalation posture is dynamic and is the only posture that can withstand the highly intense conflicts. It exerts a powerful deterrent effect on the initiation and escalation of the conflict.
The above discussion implies that the focus of the states must be not on the acquisition of the nuclear weapons rather it should be on the nuclear force posture that
250 Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 479. 251 Ibid., 481. 83
follows the acquisition of nukes. This policy endorsed stability in the conflict relationship of the states in the regions like South Asia, Middle East, and Korean Peninsula. The conflict study of the South Asian region elaborates both Pakistan and India has dynamic and evolving nuclear postures for which there is always a sense of arms race between them. Both the countries are striving for quantitative and qualitative improvement of the nuclear arsenals in line with the changing geo-strategic landscape of the region. The security dynamics of the South Asia have been unstable due to wary history.
Does “stability of deterrence” mean that the conflict between the India and Pakistan can be transformed? The answer to this question is as complex as the deterrence itself is. Here again the distinction between the deterrence of the Cold War and deterrence of the contemporary international relations is important to make. The conflict in the Cold War was not limited to the homeland of US and USSR whereas the conflict in South Asia is limited to the region only. India faces security challenges from China as well, but China is also counted in the greater South Asian region. The superpower involvement in the region makes it more unique case for analysis of deterrence with relation to the conflict and conflict transformation. The outside powers have made use of the conflict between India and Pakistan for their own interests while both the states have been embroiled in a cycle of an unending conflict.
Deterrence is based on the conception of realist paradigm where a state wants to change the behavior of the adversary by any means either through use of force or merely the deterrence of using the force. For the deterrence, the state must have the force capability, the credibility that it would definitely use it when required, and the proper communication of the threat so that the adversary knows that the state has the capability and credibility of force. If any one of these is compromised, it would result in the failure of deterrence meaning conflict escalation. Deterrence failure does not automatically mean peace rather it means war because the reason behind controlling of conflict no more exists. Conflict transformation with reference to deterrence would be improbable if the factor causing the need for deterrence is existed.
Concluding Thoughts Realism has been the most dynamic and influential theory ever since its rejuvenation after the World War II. It has successfully explained the international relations phenomenon. It would not be wrong to say that it would remain the most 84
powerful school of thought as long as the nation states are sovereign and politically independent. Conflict is deep rooted in the very nature of the human beings. The clash of interest is quite natural which leads towards the differing political opinions and preferences. This clash of interests leads to the conflict among the states. According to realist paradigm, conflict is the natural instinct of the human beings and its behavior is according to this basic instinct. Although being social animal, human beings are bound to differ in any sense be it in terms of habits, culture, ideology, and other idiosyncrasies.
The roots of the modern realist thought can be derived from the classical realism of old Greek historians and philosophers who emphasized on the human nature being greedy, cruel and interest oriented. This nature of human beings is represented through the human behavior. So, the human behavior focuses on human nature. This behavior translates into the state behavior which also behaves as greedy for more power, cruel for attainment of more power and ensuring its security against its adversaries, and interests oriented in its relations with the other states. The state behavior consequently drives the system behavior.
The structural realists believe that international system that controls the state behavior. The countries behave in a greedy manner because the international system is based on the greed for resources, status and power. The status of a state in the international system produces this innate desire among the states to attain the top position in terms of power, wealth, and social security. However, the main thrust remains the acquisition of power, the hardcore military power. The status in terms of power is determined by the states themselves according to their contemporary status. The nuclear weapons have been and still remain the cornerstone for the security of states that have active conflicts to handle. Similarly, some states prioritize economic development ahead of military power owing to the fact that they have some other combined security arrangements.
The offensive realists go one step forward in contending that the only way to survive in the international system is the acquisition of maximum power as much as a state could accomplish. The sources of power have diversified and not only the military power but economic as well as social development are considered as the primary elements of power. Merely war fighting does not suffice the need for security of the country, the states have to be strong politically and diplomatically to protect its interests
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at international level. They argue that international institutions are the instruments used by great powers to create and maintain their influence on the others. The state power determines its position in these international institutions. The United Nations is the institution that has achieved universal membership, but it is structured on the discriminate manner where there are five countries which have the status of veto power. They have the power to out rightly dismiss any resolution presented by unanimously or independently by states or any state.
The gist of all the above discussion of realist paradigm brings one to the conclusion that accumulation, maintenance, and maximization of power has been and will remain the main thrust of all the states and their relative behavior is driven by the very nature of the individuals.
Furthermore, the conflict is a natural phenomenon and is bound to happen in this interdependent world because there is always going to be convergence as well as divergence of interests. We have analyzed that conflicts of political nature are difficult to reconcile and resolve owing to their potential of being directly affecting the military power of a country. For the conflicts that have no direct association with affecting the military power of the state, the states ought to choose the non-military solutions. States are ready to commit to the legal binding decisions or international arbitration on the issues which have little relevance to the hardcore power of the state. The realist paradigm contends that conflict is omnipresent in the world affairs and since there is no international sovereign power that could devise and implement the morals of peaceful existence, there is very less chance that this conflict of all against all is going to transform, at best they can be resolved or managed. The realism also advocates that conflicts can be transformed if the stakes for transforming the issue are higher than those of keeping the issue alive.
Finally, deterrence as a theoretical concept is quite complicated and requires the elaboration and analysis of context. The Cold War concept of nuclear deterrence cannot be applied in cognate to the post-Cold War scenario. There are no superpowers that have to deter each other for the purpose of containment and fulfilling the positive security assurances of their allies. Deterrence posture is more important as compared to the mere attainment of deterrence. The relative deterrence postures of the states contribute to the success or failure of the deterrence. The dynamic the posture is, the stronger is the
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deterrence. Additionally, deterrence is conversely proportional to the conflict transformation. Deterrence cements the state of conflict to a status quo and stops it from escalation. With the presence of deterrence, the conflict transformation is challenging South Asia remains a breeding ground of deep-rooted distrust and antagonism, mainly owing to the unsettled issue of Kashmir. “The skirmishing that has continued now for over seventy years, punctuated by outbreaks of full-scale war (in 1947, 1965, and 1971), have given both nations ample motivation to develop potent weapons to gain advantage over or restore balance with the other.” The pessimists suggest that the nuclear weapons in South Asia can potentially make regional conflicts extremely disastrous. These conceptions of deterrence and conflict transformation in the light of realist paradigm would be analyzed in India Pakistan case study in the coming chapters.
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CHAPTER TWO AN ANATOMY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: LESSON FROM COLD WAR POLITICS FOR INDIA-PAKISTAN
Realism has been the most dominant theoretical paradigm in explaining international conflict in particular and the international politics in general. Scholars have devised two important models in this paradigm to explain the cause of the creation and escalation of conflict. First, the approach of structural realism focuses on the international system and the associated tenets of power politics controlling state behavior. Second approach is the theory of deterrence which focuses military power of adversaries and their relative behavior resulting from the development of these capabilities. Both approaches help to understand the causes of the international conflict. The chapter looks at the anatomy deterrence, its important components, its significance in contemporary international relations, and some challenges facing deterrence theory as a concept in explaining the international conflict. It will also discuss some lessons of nuclear deterrence from cold war politics for India-Pakistan.
Deterrence simply means the action of discouraging any adversary from taking any harmful action by creating doubts or fears about the consequences of such an action. It works with the psychological imperative of human behavior. Two opponents weigh their decisions through the cost-benefit analysis.252 Deterrence in international relations means discouraging an aggressive behavior by an attacker, posing the threat of unacceptable consequences. It is a deliberate effort to prevent the agitation of aggression.253 Deterrence is contemplated and reflected by the fact that it is quite difficult to understand and explain. The theory of deterrence has traditionally been used in the field of behavioral studies or conventional forces. However, the focus has been on security studies since the Second World War and introduction of nuclear weapons in the literature. The emergence of nuclear weapons has transformed the traditional notion of conventional deterrence. Nuclear Weapons gave the most dissuasive role to states because the threat of nuclear weapons could not be combined with a stronger weapon. The purpose of nuclear deterrence is mere threat of use rather than their actual use. Deterrence simply uses threats to handle the possible adversary behavior, so that it does not think of
252 Charles D. Sutherland, The Universal Formula for Successful Deterrence (US: Beacon Press, 2000), 11. 253 Leonard Berkowitz, “Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis: Examination and Reformulation,” Psychological Bulletin 106, no. 1 (1989): 59-73, Available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.321.3829&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 88
challenging the status quo and doing something that is undesirable to the former state.254 Deterrence adds a political touch to strategy rather than hard-core military procedures. In classical strategy, the political context was secondary and the military aspect of destroying the enemy was the primary consideration. However, deterrence does not involve the use of force rather focuses on its threat.255 This very aspect of deterrence is discussed in detail in order to analyze whether it supports or hampers the conflict. Nuclear deterrence does not focus on ending the conflict rather it puts the conflict in frozen mode where it can erupt like volcano at any stage. Therefore, explanation of concept in view of South Asian conflict and arguments of conflict transformation would be done in this chapter.
2.1 Conceptualizing Deterrence Deterrence, traditionally, is linked to the concept of punishment. The philosophical works on the dissuasive punishment theory “can be traced back to the classic works of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1678), Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794) and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832).” Hobbes has given his well-known “social contract theory based on the assumptions of rationality and sovereignty in accordance with the law”. He argues that human is bound by its very nature to strive for its interests like social reputation, economic gains and safety and security which create a natural environment of conflict. However, Hobbes relates self-interests with rationality as every actor is rational enough to realize that the conflict itself is not in its interest. So, people can go off with their personal egocentricity as a response to the others as long as they do it as a social contract to avoid a conflict or war.256 However, Hobbes’s social contract theory differs from the deterrence theory in the nation-state system because Hobbes theory holds that there is a sovereign who manages social contracts and protects the people's interests through threat or deterrence.
The unique source of deterrence in contemporary world is associated with nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapon is defined as, “An explosive device that releases tremendous amount of energy as a result of nuclear fission, nuclear fusion or the combination of both”. The weapon based on nuclear fission is called ‘atomic bomb’ and the one based on
254 Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1. 255 G.G. Pamidi, Possibility of a Nuclear War in Asia: An Indian Perspective (New Delhi: Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2012), 23. 256 John J. Dulilio and William J. Walters, Moral Poverty--and how to Win America's War Against Crime and Drugs (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2010), 235. 89
fusion is called ‘hydrogen bomb’ or ‘thermonuclear bomb’. The nuclear weapons have a tremendous explosive power to destroy big cities in a flash.
Nuclear deterrence means that state possessing nuclear weapons can prevent other nuclear state from taking any actions that are detrimental to the interests of nuclear possessor. When a state has nuclear capability, it has capability to inflict “un-acceptable damage” to adversary to refrain from taking an action against the state. In world system of politics, no sovereign is there to regulate the state behavior, nuclear weapons are a means to deter behavior of other states either having nuclear weapons or not.
Deterrence is a very complex concept and is difficult to understand. As with the whole phenomenon of social sciences, there is not even an agreed definition of deterrence. Some simple definitions are as follows: According to “United States Department of Defence Dictionary”, the term deterrence is defined as “the prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.”257 Deterrence is defined by Smoke and George as “persuasion of one’s opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits.”258 Deterrence is “discouraging the enemy from taking military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk outweighing his prospective gain.”259
The basic concept of deterrence strategy is based on "uncertainty," that “acts as a restraint for both opponents in order to avoid the escalation of conflict in nuclear war. It can be said that the two states can use nuclear weapons to stop each other from attacking.” However, the factors of uncertainty must be distinguished from the destructive power of nuclear weapons because nuclear weapons themselves create the ultimate constraints called deterrence.
Traditionally, deterrence has been used as a strategy in conventional conflicts at tactical level. However, with the beginning of the nuclear strategy, it has expanded too much. It represents a theoretical framework that needs to be explained independently of specific conflict situations. Therefore, before proceeding further, it is important to differentiate between deterrence theory and deterrence strategy. The theory is based on
257 Dictionary of Military Terms, 2015, “deterrence.” 258 Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 11. 259 Glenn Herald Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Towards a Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 35. 90
which strategy is implemented and gives the basic assumption or structure of the phenomenon. The deterrence theory gives the basic principles on which the deterrence strategy is based. The theory remains the same, while the explanations and operationalization are different. The basic principle is to prevent opponents from taking an unfavorable step. The strategy will involve a thoughtful plan that covers such things as what to deter, who to deter, and how to deter. This makes deterrence a dynamic process because strategies change according to opponents and conflicts.
Dynamic strategies make deterrence a dynamic process of continuous analysis and feedback. It is a very thoughtful process, not a simple cost-benefit analysis. Decision- makers must consider all aspects of conflict and their opponents in order to make deterrence credible, because deterrence is either effective or fails. This means that decision maker, whether individuals, countries or alliances, must be intellectually rational. The decision-making process in deterrence initially involves three aspects of consideration; first, to determine who shall deter (the deterrer or protagonist), second, whom to deter (the challenger or antagonist), and three, what means to use.
Deterrence is closely related to compellence in the strategy. However, the two terms are different. Deterrence is “intended to persuade the opponent not to take any action that would compromise the interests of the challenged country”. In terms of deterrence, first explain the consequences of the action, and then wait for the opponent's actions, which can establish the failure or success of deterrence. Compellence means interpreting the consequences and starts the action and continues until the opponent changes its behavior. Compellence has a predetermined mode of action which the opponent is convinced to stay clear from. For example: the opponent is persuaded to (i) stop its action short of achieving its objective; (ii) to undo the action which it has already taken, i.e. withdrawal from territory; and change behavior in accordance with policies or in the form of government change.260
Compellence is active in nature as compared to deterrence because the consequences of compellence are instant. A state does not have to wait for the opponent to take the next step. Instead, it is a continuous process until the goal is achieved. It tries to change the status quo because it involves immediate action. Deterrence is the use of
260 Branislav L. Slantchev, “Introduction to International Relations, Lecture 8: Deterrence and Compellence,” Lecture, Department of Political Science, University of California–San Diego (2005). 91
threat of a grave consequence if the opponent takes any aggressive action while compellence is the threat as well as the action which complements the threat. In addition, unlike deterrence, compellence must have deadlines for corresponding actions. In general, the ultimate goal defines action in terms of choosing the compellence or deterrence. If the goal is to achieve deterrence, the action will focus on maintaining the status quo, and if the opponent tries to undermine the status quo it will be punished. Compliance is achieved through threat propagation. Until the adversary continues to comply, deterrence will be intact. And if the goal is to achieve compellence, the status quo changes to automatically adapt to the opponent's compliance status, for example, it becomes a reward for adversary to comply. In this case, the emphasis may be on changing the status quo or strengthening the status quo.
Deterrence theory is different from deterrence strategy because deterrence theory is a holistic concept and it involves the theoretical basis on which strategy is devised. Deterrence strategy views military policies, maneuverability, forces movement, provocation through statements to convey to the enemy that any undesirable act would be counterproductive and would have serious repercussions. Deterrence, as a theory, differs from that of “deterrence strategy” because theory has ultimate goal of preventing the enemy from taking an undesirable action. However, to achieve this deterrent effect, different deterrence strategies may be adopted to achieve deterrence goals. Therefore, strategies may differ depending on the country’s different needs.261
National security is requirement of a state for maintaining survival through economic power, diplomacy, military power, and political influence. Achieving and maintaining national security is the ultimate aim of any country. National security helps to keep a state safe from internal and external threats, whether they are physical, economic or diplomatic. In general, national security means protection of economy, people, industrial resources, traditions, culture, human rights, and independent and sovereign way of life. National security enables states to exercise their rights and duties at the international level.
261 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 1. 92
National security is defined as, “the safety of a nation against threats such as terrorism, war, or espionage”.262 This definition specifically refers to the internal factors that present a threat to national security while in the general definition the source of external threats also falls within the scope of national security. For this specific study regarding national security, general definition will be taken, including all factors considered for national security of state. In order to have a general view of national security, it is important to assess what constitutes national security? How important is deterrence for the security of a state?
National security, as a concept, is very complex. Each state caters to different security requirements and pursues different security goals. Some states have defensive policies while some have offensive way of pursuing national interests. National interests are the basic driving force for national security decisions. National interest is dynamic. According to realist paradigm, the national interest of states in the international system is power oriented. While formulating national policy, security compulsion is the foremost priority of any state.
2.2 Types of Deterrence In order to understand and elaborate on this concept, deterrence can be discussed in the following types:
2.2.1 Direct Deterrence The “direct deterrence refers to the threats that are meant to prevent direct assault on the deterring state”. According to such deterrence definition, a country issues a deterrent threat in order to persuade another state not to initiate an action against the former. In the Cold War, both Soviet Union and United States were entangled in a direct deterrence scenario where both were seeking to prevent direct attack on their mainland. Direct deterrence is always credible because defence of the mainland of a country is its foremost objective.
2.2.2 Extended Deterrence Extended deterrence, in simple words, is the security assurance given by the great powers in the form of nuclear protection. Extended deterrence can be termed as lesser credible, but it does not mean that it is weak. It serves the same purpose as the direct
262 “Oxford online dictionary,” Available at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/national_security 93
deterrence. However, the objective is changed because in extended deterrence, the deterrer is not directly involved; rather he extends protection to the third party called the protégé. He guarantees the protégé that he would resist any attack directed towards protégé. Through this concept of deterrence, the ‘national interest’ is expanded to the protégé beyond the homeland. Taiwan has been the protégé of United States because it extended deterrence to prevent Taiwan from China.
2.2.3 General Deterrence The general deterrence is said to be existing where there is not a present danger of attack by the adversary, however, due to presence of antagonism the danger of conflict persists. The general deterrence is present where: (i) one of the opponents considers attacking if the occasion arises, (ii) the other opponent maintains forces and threatens to respond to deter attack, and (iii) the first party never goes beyond the consideration of attacking because of threat of retaliation. “The general deterrence assures that the crisis never goes to the militarized state and does not escalate.”263 The general deterrence is complicated and hard to explain. Some countries perceive general deterrence as forging alliances. The deterrence exercised through the balance of power system is the general deterrence and is in consequence of competitive interactions of the states. In this variant, not only the deterrer deters but the system also deters. Waltz states that such deterrence existed among the Soviet Union and the United States.264 Deliberate systemic deterrence is the variant of general deterrence which involves the extended deterrence related to the collective actor complexities.
It has different forms: (i) as a balance of power system in which members believe that concentration of power is good for international peace. (ii) The second form is the concert of great powers. They reduce their rivalries where they indulge into a deliberate balance of power in order to execute general deterrence as a collective action. (iii) General deterrence via collective security means that all the members of the system are part of the security arrangement. In such mechanism, using a force against a single member would result in the collective response from all the members. Deterrence was conciliatory factor during the fall and rise of the Cold War. Nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence neither formed nor ended the Cold War nor did they diminish with Cold War.
263 Gareth Morgan, Beyond Method: Strategies for Social Research (New York: SAGE Publications, 1983), 42-44. 264 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 9. 94
Major contribution to deterrence theory appeared at general level. The conflicts of great powers never ended up in crisis.
2.2.4 Immediate Deterrence Immediate deterrence refers to the situation where the prospects of attack are immediate and the challenger can initiate an attack at any time. Immediate deterrence works where there is an active conflict situation. It is most important to calculate immediate deterrence correctly because the failure of it leads to the outbreak of war. The response needs to be immediate or otherwise the result would be in the form of escalation of the conflict into war. It would be limited if there are only conventional weapons involved. However, the failure of direct deterrence in case of nuclear weapons can be disastrous. In the Korean War, the United States ignored the Chinese deterrence and infiltrated into Korea which was immediately responded by China that resulted into full- fledged war.
2.2.5 Collective Deterrence The term collective actors refer to a group of states who proceed with plan of the general welfare of states. Such actors use deterrence for maintenance of international security. This includes the use of force if the deterrence fails. United Nations is such actor which is empowered by Chapter VII to use force against the non-compliant state and is also backed by the UN Security Council which takes decisions and passes resolutions for the implementation of such an action. The disagreement among the great powers highly affects the working and power of UN Security Council called the veto power. Another example can be the new NATO. As previously, NATO was an alliance which formed after war through which they were committed to contain communism. It is still an alliance, but it offers more than just containment of communism but offers more and acts for protecting peace and security of Europe.
The system of collective security behaves like collective deterrer for deterring any means of breach of the peace and security by any member. Collective actors are involved in “general deterrence” and at times in “immediate deterrence”. Collective actor deterrence is meant for consequences of handling the conflict when the deterrence fails and also it adds up to the improvement of deterrence by a concert rather than individual states or alliances, where actions taken for one’s own security can add to the security
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dilemma of other states. The action by collective actor mutes such apprehensions.265 However, the problem with this model is that it is dominated by the UNSC countries which have their political and ideological interest governed by the regional politics.
2.2.6 Recessed Deterrence Jasjit Singh has defined recessed deterrence as, “a credible nuclear weapons capability which a country is able to draw upon for political and diplomatic purposes, and is able to deploy a nuclear arsenal within a defined time-frame and effectively use it physically for military purposes.”266 George Perkovich called it as “non-weaponized deterrence” since it consists of only plans, procedures and organizations which are put in place to develop the nuclear weapons in a given time frame. In this concept, the mating of nuclear warhead with the delivery system is prohibited and remains in the low ready state. This concept was relevant in the Cold War time but for South Asian case it is outlived because the nature of conflict in South Asia is different from that of Cold War rivalry where there was no direct challenge between the adversaries.
2.2.7 Ready Deterrence Ready deterrence means the deployment of nuclear weapons and deterrence at a ready stage to be used at any time. The purpose of it is to ensure that no adversary ever think about the misadventure against a state irrespective of the level of intensity of the conflict. For India-Pakistan deterrence, ready deterrence is most relevant because the communication of threat is necessary at each and every level of the conflict. Military offensive of any kind which may end up in ready nuclear weapon use is the basic function of the ready deterrence. It is a defensive approach; however, the red line is well defined so that there is no miscalculation on the response by the adversary.
2.3 Conditions of Deterrence When a state intends to go for a war, it has assessed certain advantageous profits in doing so. Deterrence is the potential of state or collective actors to persuade the warring state that it will not gain any advantageous profit if the war begins. For a successful deterrence, the psychological imperatives that control the minds of adversary must be satisfied.267 These psychological imperatives are based on the rational decision-
265 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 174. 266 Jasjit Singh, Nuclear India (Columbia: South Asia Books, 1998), 190. 267 Garden Timothy, Can Deterrence Last?: Peace through a Nuclear Strategy (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies,1984), 19. 96
making process. To influence these imperatives and to establish deterrence, the deterring state must fulfil the following conditions beforehand.
2.3.1 Capability to Deter The deterring state requires the capability to persuade its adversary that if it initiates a war it will have to bear grave consequences. Thus, in order to establish a deterrent capability a state must have the potential to deliver its nuclear weapons at all costs. The capability means to test the nuclear weapons and to have entire wherewithal and technology to quantitatively and qualitatively improve it. The nature of capability may not involve testing or overtly accepting the possession of nuclear weapons, however, the economic strength, strategic environment, nature of conflict, and scientific research and development circuitously means that the state either have the capability or can achieve it whenever it requires. The P5 countries (US, UK, Russia, China, and France) and Pakistan and India have overtly announced their capability through nuclear testing while Israel has not tested but it has the capability. North Korea has also conducted nuclear tests, although United States and allies do not regard it successful nuclear deterrent, yet it serves as an effective deterrent.
It is the most important psychological imperative that a state must achieve. The adversary must understand that the state has the capability. It is left to the adversary that how it assesses that a state has such a capability? It is a very tricky question and any miscalculation can result in the failure of deterrence and spell catastrophe.
But, nuclear deterrence, as Bernard Brodie268 maintains, is different from conventional deterrence because first, there is lack of warning time for taking responsive course of action in case a nuclear weapon is fired and second, the level and amount of destruction is instant and huge. So, a state would prefer not to attack considering the consequence of facing a nuclear catastrophe. However, nukes are not meant for actual use, so despite capability, the choice of the using weapons means deterrence failure. According to a French Strategist General Beaufre, “the … capacity for riposte was the key to nuclear deterrence, whereas capability to reduce the riposte was the key to nuclear initiative”269 It is necessary to have the capability to counterattack, after having absorbed
a first strike, against all the counter value targets that the enemy values the most.
268 Bernard Brodie, The Anatomy of Deterrence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 24. 269 Andre Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy, trans. R. H. Barry CB (London: Faber & Faber, 1965), 21. 97
2.3.2 The Political Will The nuclear weapons give a deterrent effect and are not meant for actual use; however, the political will and communication of will to use bomb should be made in such a way that it reinforces the deterrence. It is the political will or communication of intention to utilize the bomb which eventually helps attaining deterrence. The appropriate communication to show political will of using nuclear bomb in case an adversary inflicts the first strike would ensure the capability is real and adversary would be deterred. However, if capability is not there or the political will is missing, then deterrence will not work. As Herman Kahn270 explained that “If we are only pretending that we would do it, the credibility and therefore the deterrent value of our force is almost certain to be lessened by the automatic and inevitable leaks.”271 The assessment that a state has the political will to go for nuclear attack depends on nature and conflict escalation level. It is not confirmed that North Korea have nuclear warhead capability, however, the political will to use nuclear weapon against United States mainland has created a somewhat deterrence situation. Consequently, the important factor remain that communication of threat reinforces the deterrence.
2.3.3 Credibility How credible the deterrence posture is remains contingent on the perception of the adversary. The rival state can be compelled to think that state having to deter an adversary has the will and ability to deter then the outcome of the planned strategy may not be beneficial. There remains an interaction among perception of capability and will. Both must be working independently to complement each other for the success of deterrence and both should be credible. If the adversary is not deterred by the conventional force of a state, then the credibility of capability is compromised. Similarly, credibility of political will is compromised if any state is not able to accumulate political will for nuclear use. The credibility is the most important factor in failure or success of deterrence. The more the capability to deter, the more likely is that the deterrer has the opportunity to succeed. It implies that the deterring party has the pre-requisite military or nuclear capability to impose high costs of challenging any attack or threat towards it. These capabilities are self-evident so that the challenger perceives that a state has capability as well as political will. This communication is considered self-evident with the nuclear weapon monomania.
270 Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 62. 271 Ibid. 98
2.4 Elements of Deterrence The nature, relevance, and applicability of deterrence depend upon certain elements that need analysis. These elements are important because deterrence is a dynamic phenomenon which has different applications for different countries depending upon their security compulsions and threat perceptions.
First; the severity of conflict determines the success of the deterrence. In a severe conflict or in case of ready deterrence, the likelihood of a nuclear response is more imminent and the more imminent the likelihood of response, the more stable is the deterrence. The nature of conflict in the Cold War was controlled by deterrence. No matter how intense the conflict was, both sides understood that if war happened, it was ultimate and total and world future was on stake. Both the States had calculated that the war is a constant possibility whenever a side sees a clear chance of success without any retaliation. Thus, it was deterrence, which made the war as an irrational choice for both the blocs and deterrence was practiced at all times to restrict the possibility of war.272
During the Cold War general deterrence was present and it was a probability that it may change into immediate deterrence. Theoretically, it became possible for the study to conclude that deterrence has been the phenomenon that has prevented the outbreak of war in the Cold War environment. It was the severity of Cold War conflict that the scholars did not pay attention to any other mechanism for preventing war other than to weigh the deterrence power of nuclear weapons. When the conflict is severe, and the war is looming all the time, then deterrence is the only panacea to avoid disaster.
Secondly, rationality in decision-making posits the central position while exercising effects of deterrence. Rationality means understanding the situation and gathering maximum information and estimating choices to cope with besides analyzing their cost and benefit. This is in full agreement with the realist approach. The realist approach insists that the decision-makers are preoccupied by the conflict and assumption that others will use force along with the antagonist attitude towards them. The emergence of nuclear deterrence acquired that status of a strong element of the realist theory and became the goals of balance of power system. The other influencing choices had limited applications while the nuclear deterrence gave the ultimate influencing power throughout the Cold War, which was the indication of its success. Realism views that deterrence is
272 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 31. 99
the source of assisting the states to understand the rationalist way to cater with their security concerns.
The rationality of decision-making demands the rationality at both the ends. In the Cold War scenario, the rationality was defined by the phenomenon of “mutually assured destruction (MAD)”. The rationality prevailed in the U-2 crisis in 1960s when the war was avoided after consideration of cost benefit analysis and gaining complete information about the situation. The rationality associated with deterrence theory was the reason for the cooperation among the Soviet Union and the US in the area of arms control during the Cold War. Survival is supreme objective of states.
Thirdly, the threat of retaliation is not specialty of deterrence theory. It is more of a psychological phenomenon rather than the hard-core physical method of fighting war. Freedman has elaborated the methods to militarily eliminate the threat of attack by either (i) pre-emptive attack or (ii) by vigorous defense.273 However, according to deterrence theory, manipulating the thinking of the adversary prevents war. This manipulation comes from the threat, not the actual use, of painful consequences via either defence or retaliation. The goal of deterrence is to prevent a war not to start it or fight it well. This brings to a very interesting point that deterrence is not consistent with defence. Defence comes at a second stage while deterrence talks about the first step that is to convince the adversary not to think of starting a war. So, deterrence effect is rather offensive than defensive. Deterrence aims to manipulate thinking of the adversary. Deterrence is psychological in nature rather than fighting a physical war. The Cold War history implies that Soviet Union and United States were unable to ascertain a pre-emptive strike which could destroy all nukes of the enemy.
Fourthly, “the concept of unacceptable damage” is based on calculations of maximum damage that could be acceptable before retaliation. If the opponent was rational, then prospective punishment is calculated by ascertaining the cost benefit analysis so as the total costs outweigh the benefits. However, the calculations of unacceptable damage are irrelevant in a retaliatory mode in actuality because the level of term unacceptable would be unlimited after being faced with the nuclear attack. In the nuclear scenario, the unacceptable would probably mean destroying everything of the
273 George Freedman, The Future of War: Power, Technology and American World Dominance in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Crown Publishers, 1996), 61. 100
adversary. During the Cold War both the United States and Soviet Union asserted that they had the “second-strike capability” that encouraged the result of the “first-strike” which added to the effect of deterrence and made the incentives of a “pre-emptive strike” void. However, calculation for unacceptable damage concept may play its role in terms of limited conventional war which itself is very delusive affair.
2.5 Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence Theory By definition, deterrence is an old concept like conflict itself. Like realism, it has also evolved from individual level to state and system level with the passage of time. However, the basic meaning remains the same as to accumulation of power in order to defy the enemy of any advantageous position either in peace time or during conflict escalation. Utility of nuclear bomb has been well established and the realist paradigm contends that acquisition of latest weaponry is the pre-requisite to accumulation of maximum power. The nuclear weapons are the most dangerous weapons system known at the moment and states seek to have nukes in order to make their security invincible. The possession of nuclear weapons by the states depends upon their drivers for the acquisition of the nukes, however, nuclear deterrence is a costly affair and the concept of mutually assured destruction attached with the nuclear weapons makes it pertinent to debate the possession of nuclear weapons by majority of states as safe or dangerous for the global security.
Two theorization streams exist regarding nuclear weapons; the nuclear optimists and nuclear pessimists. The nuclear optimists advocate the ownership of nuclear bombs by majority of states. However, nuclear pessimists stress restraint on the nuclear know- how to the new states as it would aggravate the insecurity of the world. According to the nuclear optimists, “the deterrence effects of nuclear weapons reduce the risk of likelihood of wars between the states because all the states would be in an equal status of power equation.” Alternately, the opponents or pessimists argue that states would not refrain from indulging into war or even from using the nuclear weapons if their interests are challenged. Mutually assured destruction is a fancy word for use in the diplomatic language in world politics, but, in reality, when a state’s destruction is in the face, it would not restrain from using nuclear weapons and from destroying the world also. Waltz, a Nuclear Optimist argues, “We should expect war to become less likely when the
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weaponry is such as to make conquest more difficult, to discourage pre-emptive and preventive war, and make coercive threats less credible.”274
They assume that nuclear weapons help prevent war and diffuse conflict from escalation because they attach high cost with them. On the contrary, optimists assert that nuclear bomb is devastating enough to restrain the adversary states that have been warring with each other. Even the fiercest of enemies will have to think many times to escalate the conflict in the contemporary nuclear realm.275
However, the nuclear pessimists believe that nuclear deterrence is never sure. It never guarantees that the war would not happen, and nuclear weapons would not be used. They opine that it can be illusion of security because it breeds more and more insecurity owing to that fact that when the capability is there then it would be used either by will or by accident. And if it is by accident, it would be more difficult to differentiate from an intended attack. It would embroil the whole world into war and destruction. Sagan, being a nuclear pessimist has strong opposition to the notion of deterrence. According to him, “(the) more (nuclear weapons states) will be worse”. He has made strong remarks that “the professional military organizations - because of common biases, inflexible routines, and parochial interests - display organizational behaviors that are likely to lend to deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental war.”276
Deterrence is an ancient phenomenon and it has earned importance over time. The US blinkered the development of nuclear bombs by other countries as threat to their national security and defense and tried to attach it with the global security. Actually, this was because they wanted to monopolize nuclear weapon technology through Baruch Plan which stated that the nuclear weapons should be controlled by the United Nations which was dominated by the US.277 However, it could not succeed as the Soviet Union rejected the proposal and conducted the nuclear weapons tests. After that Britain, France and China joined the club of nuclear weapons possessor states. By this pace, the former US president John F. Kennedy predicted that there would be at least twenty-four nuclear
274 Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapon: A Debate Renewed (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995), 6. 275 Feroz Hassan Khan, “The Independence Dependence Paradox: Stability Dilemmas in South Asia,” Arms Control Today 33, no. 8 (2003): 15, Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_10/Khan_10.asp?print 276 Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 47. 277 The Baruch Plan was a proposal from the United States of America to put a control on the spread of nuclear technology, it was proposed by the US in 1946 aimed at the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was not accepted by the Soviet Union as later was of the opinion that countries possess the rights to have access to the nuclear weapon technology. Moreover, the US should take first step by itself to put a ban on it. 102
weapons possessor states by the end of mid 1960s.278 However, this was not the case because of the nuclear non-proliferation efforts and the positive security assurances by the nuclear weapon possessor states and the military alliance formation and security umbrella extended to the allies in the Cold War.
The “acquisition of most devastating and awful power of nuclear technology by additional nations is a continuous source of tension for the nuclear technology dominating states as it challenges their supremacy, leadership role, extended deterrence to their alliances which simply means the more states going nuclear weapons are distracting the balance of power in the world.” However, despite being an old concept, deterrence got prominence into the scholarly debate with the nuclear weapons. As Freedman implies, “without nuclear weapons the Cold War deterrence would have remained an occasional stratagem.”279
2.6 Nuclear Deterrence during the Cold War Deterrence played a very critical role with the outset of the Cold War. It evoked great interest in the global political understanding. It was advanced as a distinguishing procedure to follow the national security objectives. The existence of nuclear weapons compelled states to utilize deterrence as a strategy which will cope with issues of foreign policy. The international political structure was fashioned in such a manner that deterrence became an inherent and ever-present option in the security policies of states.
The bloc system of the Cold War gradually developed into a corporate system of managing security of States through deterrence. The deterrence postures of great powers in the Cold War in their respective blocs constituted an elaborate structure of deterrence in which the great powers had to offer security assurances to the allies. This structure constrained their actions and impelled them to manage the structure in order to manage the security of international system. So, the Cold War international politics was defined in terms of deterrence and almost everything in the state affairs depended on deterrence. Thus, the deterrence worked in three scenarios or levels: firstly, as a tactic in the limited scope of battlefield strategy; Secondly as the strategy of national security, as a censorious element of the international security.
278 Kevin Kiernan, “Why Do States Give Up Nuclear Arsenals?” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 11, (2011): 12. 279 George Freedman, The Future of War: Power, Technology and American World Dominance in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Crown Publishers, 1996), 1. 103
But for the success of deterrence, it is necessary for it to be credible. The credibility of deterrence, according to Kaufmann is to persuade the enemy;
(i) That you have a strong and effective military force,
(ii) That you possess the capability to “inflict unacceptable damage” to the adversary, and
(iii) You possess the ability and intention to use the force in case you are attacked.
The use of nuclear weapons on Japan had a very devastating effect with respect to the nuclear deterrence. The nuclear weapons amplified their power and its devastating effects made everyone believe that it renders states the capability to inflict irreparable damage to a country. So, nuclear deterrence became the order of the day in the Cold War strategic thought. However, the military advancements apart from nuclear weapons had also reached a point that conventional deterrence also had its effects, especially in the conflicts which involved great powers. The means of waging wars were being expanded constantly and arsenal was being developed for unlimited objectives.280
Nuclear deterrence has prevented war, especially great power wars. It threatens awful consequences of war resulting in ruinous destruction for all warring parties. The crux of Robert Jervis arguments about ‘nuclear revolution’ is that destruction associated with nuclear weapons is unavoidable under any plausible strategy.281 Nuclear deterrence implies to the operation or usage of nuclear weapons. In other words, theory and deterrence strategy are different. Thus, deterrence strategy indicates military stance, ways of communication and threat which stops the enemy from taking any undesired action whereas deterrence theory refers to a set of principles for making a strategy.
2.7 Nuclear Deterrence Amidst Nuclear Non-Proliferation The deterrent effect of nuclear bomb influenced states to go for nuclearization. The proliferation of nuclear weapons was the major fear that dominated the Cold War politics between the great powers. The two great powers maneuvered their alliances and used nuclear deterrence to support the nuclear non-proliferation. The proliferation of
280 J.E. Dougherty and R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey (New York: Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1981), 195. 281 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1989), 89. 104
nuclear weapons was harmful for the very interests of the great powers because the proliferation was likely to happen within the alliances. The NATO bloc would have supported NATO allies to have nuclear weapons while the communist bloc would have promoted nuclear weapons in their sphere of allies. This meant threat multiplication. Therefore, both the great powers were interested in capping the proliferation of nuclear weapons while maintaining their own nuclear deterrence. That is the only reason the nuclear non-proliferation efforts were fruitful in achieving the agreement of both the adversaries. However, this agreement was merely to play around the international politics of non-proliferation among the allies and adversaries. The non-proliferation which was aimed to result in the ultimate disarmament of nuclear weapons offered the grand bargain282 to the countries for cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy.
The nuclear non-proliferation regime was established consisting of different international treaties and conventions to promote nuclear non-proliferation.283 In 1950s the problem in stability of deterrence spurred the need for the development of the concept of arms control. The arms control branch of deterrence theory focused on loss of control or the preemptive attack as likely routes to deterrence failure. The arms control suggested the intermediate approach which sought a stable relationship despite the presence of states’ military forces. The preoccupation with stability suggested that arms control is a better strategy rather than the disarmament because arms control promised stability while the disarmament could make war more likely. Furthermore, the arms control is more feasible in a conflict situation because it is more prudent for the states to negotiate for arms control rather than for disarmament. The realist nature of international politics does not offer such liberty to the states.
The nuclear non-proliferation theory suggests that a state having nuclear weapons means that there is every possibility that they are going to use them. The main argument that the propagators of non-proliferation make is that the weaker nuclear states are vulnerable to misuse or unauthorized use or they might not have the infrastructure to prevent theft of the nuclear material. So, there is a need to restrict the possession of the nuclear weapons to as much limited states as possible.284 The nuclear non-proliferation does not complement or permit the notion of nuclear deterrence. There is likelihood that
282 Tad Dalay, “The Grand bargain of NPT,” The Huffington Post, Available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tad-daley/the-grand- bargain-of-the_b_555886.html 283 Paul Huth, Christopher Gelpi, “The Escalation of Great Powers Military Disputes: Testing Rational Deterrence Theory and Structural Realism,” American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 609-623. 284 S. M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (University of Chicago Press, 1986), 243. 105
with the entry of newly nuclear states, the probability of nuclear accidents would increase and would not be mature enough to control their antagonist intentions or to have check on escalation to the nuclear war. Nuclear deterrence does not confine to the immediate adversaries only and to equal or weaker states, it has the capability to deter far flung states and even great powers. North Korea threatens United States with its nukes only because of the deterrence and devastating power of even a single nuclear weapon.285
The major powers initiated the nuclear non-proliferation regime for the purpose of resisting acquisition of nuclear weapons technology by the new states. The “Nuclear Non- proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most universal arms control treaty” which enables the member states to use the nuclear technology for the peace and obliges them to restrain from the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The NPT has, contributed to the non- proliferation of nuclear weapons and has served as most important factor in keeping the number of nuclear armed countries to the current situation.286 However, it has at best served as an arms control instrument rather than the disarmament mechanism because states who once acquired nukes are least likely to disarm.
The states which seek nuclear weapons in order to deter an adversary, then, they would take every step to retain nuclear weapons. The major bargain over their nuclear weapons to support the international nuclear non-proliferation regime would be difficult to get and the most probable compromise that can be got from such states may be the mere announcement of commitment for non-proliferation. India and Pakistan have nuclear deterrence in place. They have the mutual acrimonious relations with each other. They have fought several wars with each other over territorial issues. They warrant core value to their nuclear deterrence. Both the states have acquired nuclear capability while they were not party to NPT. They have become “de-facto nuclear weapon states”, they can be included into the treaty, however, the nuclear weapons status, as possessed by the five nuclear weapons states having the veto power, cannot be warranted to India and Pakistan.
Furthermore, India and Pakistan having active conflict with each other and active nuclear deterrence, are reluctant to subscribe to any non-proliferation initiative that could jeopardize their nuclear program either quantitatively or qualitatively. They would never
285 L. Bell, “The ultimate Nuclear Terrorist Threat to the United States,” Forbes, January 4, 2012. 286 Ansar Parvez (Chairman, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Islamabad), in discussion with author, November 2017. 106
be willing to reduce their nuclear weapons for the sake of supporting the nuclear non- proliferation regime as was the case with the US and Russia. Both the countries have the policy of maintaining deterrence to the minimum level and adhere to some international nuclear “non-proliferation” instruments for the sake of showing their promise to the international nuclear “non-proliferation.”
2.8 Learning from Cold War Deterrence The policies of great powers during the Cold War can be classified into four major schools: (i) “the Rejection School”, (ii) “the Minimum Deterrence School”, (iii) the “Massive Destruction School”, and (iv) “War Fighting School”.
The Rejection School consisted of those who opposed the idea of seeking security through deterrence. They stressed the limitation of deterrence that it is inherently flawed, the arms control motivations are nefarious and based on dishonesty, heavy economic burden is involved, and it intensifies security in an atmosphere of mutual deterrence. They were of the opinion that even confined nuclear weapon use can become an unprecedented catastrophe.
The Minimum Deterrence School advocated that the security which deterrence provides can be achieved with small number of nuclear weapons. According to this school, the credibility was not an issue because as few as ten nuclear weapons are enough for deterrence. It was a widely accepted view among states.287 The minimum deterrence also checked the stability problem. It would “not only eliminate the need for large arsenals but also constraint the major power arms race”.288 The “Massive Destruction School believed that nuclear deterrence was effective if the threat associated with it promised complete destruction”.289 The threat was effective in two ways: firstly, it would deter any leader having any type of personality frantic, zealous, or angry by clearly proving that an attack may spell suicide, secondly, fear of massive destruction as a result of escalation would reduce the possibility of lesser conflicts.
The challenger would be deterred to start a lesser conflict fearing the massive destruction. Neither credibility nor stability was the problem because the arsenal was so
287 George Freedman, The Future of War: Power, Technology and American World Dominance in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Crown Publishers, 1996), 6. 288 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGrath Hill, 1979), 9. 289 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 45. 107
huge to ignore.290 Total destruction capabilities during the Cold War made deterrence so stable that it was not affected by technological advancements (Sputnik by Soviets), numerical imbalance in nuclear weapons (as United States was having favorable edge in 1950s and 60s), fears of missile gaps, intense confrontations (Berlin Wall, Cuban Missile Crisis), defection of major allies (China and Iran), and even the collapse of super power.
The fourth approach in this regard is called the War Fighting School. It implies that deterrence faces problems of credibility and stability. According to this school, fighting had to be made rational because fighting or retaliation was necessary for the credibility of deterrence. This required States to be equipped with the capabilities to fight conventional, limited nuclear war, and even to survive and fight an all-out nuclear war. A warlike posture can help to fight a rational adversary and to fight an irrational enemy. The nuclear weapons made Cold War safe.
The end of Cold War brought about few lessons to be learnt. First, the nuclear deterrence helped end the Cold War. The nuclear deterrence ensured Soviet Union against attack no matter how much weaker it had grown after the dismantlement. The intensity of conflict had been sustained due to the fear of eruption of another great power war.
Deterrence was witnessed in the Berlin crises (1961) as well as and the “Cuban missile crises” (1962) hence it was apparent that both the Super powers were afraid of war. The main reason for success of Cold War nuclear deterrence was that Third World War was undesirable. The realist view suggests that the wars are inherent in international relations, but the absence of a world war for so long is unusual and that unusual has happened due to deterrence.
2.9 Deterrence in Post-Cold War age Deterrence is determined by its operating environment, particularly conflicts. The measure of intensity of conflict determines its saliency, functioning, utilities, and operationalization. When there are different power relations, the nature of deterrence would also be different. How will the relationship between great powers be formulated in the future? Realist theory implies that the congenial relations are not going to last forever. Once the conflicts start to rise again between the great powers, deterrence will become in
290 Charles Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 35. 108
vogue. And if not, then it will stop the stage for at least a long time. However, it may not be the cornerstone of the security strategy of the great powers.
John Mearshiemer predicts that Europe and East Asia will become highly competitive and conflictual. China’s drive for regional hegemony will challenge the US foreign policy making the chances of war plausible.291 All major powers hope to achieve hegemony and continue to fight for it. The escalation of conflict into war may be due to two reasons: (i) a State is only safe if it dominates the system, and (ii) the domination results from power and that results into increase in interests and security concerns.292 It implies that peace in international relations is only an illusion and one day it will disappear because of the outbreak of hegemonic conflicts.
As a result of US hegemony, the contradictions between great powers are being resolved. However, hegemony produces bandwagon with and against the hegemon. When the hegemon becomes weak, the other great power conflicts rise and challengers to hegemony appear. To understand hegemony of US in another way, a paradigm shift is needed from anarchic nature of world politics to democratic peace. Democracies are the least prone to war and conflict because they tend to cooperate with each other to support their economic development. Even in the midst of conflicts, they cooperate economically. It suggests that international politics will slowly develop into democratic revolution with capitalist economies.
The test of this idea will determine the future of deterrence. The great powers no longer depend on nuclear deterrence or warfare to form the legitimacy of the domestic system, and ideology and culture will not drive the country to war. In all liberal democracies, legitimacy, stability and national security are readily available without the conflict or war. China is the only country whose nuclear capability is continuously expanding and causes anxiety about conventional and nuclear deterrence issues. Since China no longer emphasizes its nuclear deterrence with Russia, it is only deterrent to the United States. China has a traditional approach to handling security threats through military development. It affects its neighbors such as India, which in turn affects Pakistan.
Deterrence with rogue states having nuclear capability can be a tricky affair when United States indulges into conflict with them. Deterrence will be of declining use against
291 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 61. 292 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1998), 9. 109
dangerous states. “Military intervention against states that possess even a small number of nuclear weapons would be impossible.”293 The nuclear proliferation and deterrence are related in two views: firstly, the proliferation of nuclear weapons will spread because nuclear weapons give a deterrent value to their national security and territorial sovereignty. Secondly, the proliferation of nuclear weapons would forestall intervention by United States or the collective actor. For achieving effective deterrence against such an adversary, “the United States must use escalation dominance based on credible threat of nuclear response to any nuclear attack on United States and its forces.”294
The discussion brings us to following conclusions:
(i) Nuclear proliferation and deterrence are relevant and have the ability to deter a nuclear response from the higher power (ii) Nuclear weapons do not improve the challenger’s capability to deter a conventional attack (iii) The best way to deter a State with WMD is to threaten it with limited conventional attack aimed at destruction of leaders and regime (iv) The question of rationality of challenger is irrelevant because the threat for destruction of regime should also include the total defeat. (v) When the threat is less than the regime destruction, then deterrence will constantly work, and it could be sustained by fighting repeatedly.
Deterrence is the most important interaction among states in international politics. Deterrence has been the central component of security studies during the Cold War and continues to be one of the leading phenomenon in defining the international security. Nuclear weapons have rejuvenated the concept of deterrence and further revolution in military affairs is going to affect the deterrence phenomenon significantly. The true understanding of the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence is incomplete. The understanding of it is inherently inconsistent with the explanations of state behavior. The imperfection in it restrains to manipulate it and fix it to make it completely reliable tool for statecraft.
293 William C. Martel and William T. Pendley, Nuclear Coexistence: Rethinking U. S. Policy to Promote Stability in an Era of Proliferation (Alabama: Air University Press, 1994), 87. 294 Ron Rymon, “An SE-Tree Based Characterization of the Induction Problem,” in Machine Learning: Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, June 27-29, ed. Machine Learning (Massachusetts: Morgan Kaufmann Publications, 1993), 274. 110
The nuclear deterrence has been unsuccessful in addressing the challenges and threats which arose after the Cold War. It remains effective against the nuclear exchange and conventional attack; however, it has been completely useless against the new threats like the multiplication of nuclear weapons, racial and religious conflicts, nuclear violence, and illicit immigration and trans-border crimes. Secondly, the role of nuclear deterrence is so limited that it does not contribute in any way for a joint action of United States and Russia against these threats. Thirdly, the huge investments that the great powers invest in maintaining their deterrence postures can be used to cope with these threats. And finally, stability would be destroyed if terrorists acquire nuclear weapons. The deterrence does nothing in terms of these threats. It only restrains the possibility of nuclear exchange and full-blown conventional war. Neither it dissolves the conflict, nor does it improve the relations among the states.
2.10 South Asian “Regional Security Complex” The “regional security complex explains that the geographical proximity is critical in terms of security, particularly when the proximate states have hostile relations with each other.”Alternately, “the regional security complex” is “set of units (states) whose processes of securitization and de-securitization or both are interlinked that their relative security issues cannot be analyzed separately.”295 Accordingly, “the sense of insecurity is because of proximity and military and political threats are more likely to travel short distances rather than long distances. Inter-regional security threats are stronger.”
South Asia is the foundation case study for the initial development of regional security complex theory.296 It was proposed by Barry Buzan and Waiver. They are of the view that, “the process of decolonization in South Asia has turned into a conflict, and regional states have never attracted regional allies. The regional security complex in the conflict-forming model attracts foreign intervention along the lines of its internal split lines. The regional dynamics in South Asia are strongly autonomous, and inputs from external states have not fundamentally changed or altered.”297
The deterrence stability ensures the security of South Asia. “Deterrence is stable as long as there is no hot war between India and Pakistan. According to the definition of
295 Julius A. Reynolds, “An Empirical Application of Regional Security Complex Theory: The Securitization Discourse in China’s Relations with Central Asia and Russia,” M. A. Dissertation, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, (June 2009), 12. Available at www.etd.ceu.hu/2009/reynolds_julius.pdf 296 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 93. 297 Ibid., 105. 111
deterrence, the nuclear weapons have stabilized the deterrence in the region. However, nuclear weapons do not rule out the possibility of conflict or limited war without involving the actual use of nuclear weapons which causes a stability-instability paradox.” A state is deterred from using nuclear weapons by the probability that the attacked state will retaliate with nuclear weapons. This situation has given rise to the doctrine of - ‘sole purpose’ – the purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack.298 “This paradox complicates the situation with the problem of quantifying the constituents of deterrence stability.”299 “What effect this deterrence stability has on the arms race between Pakistan and India is an interesting point to consider because further weapons development which may be seen, on the one hand, as an indicator of arms race between India and Pakistan and, on the other hand, actually accounting for deterrence stability in the region.”
The South Asian security dynamics are unique and different from theoretical explanations of Cold War concepts of power balancing. To develop a theoretical explanation of the South Asian security, one has to take into consideration the uniqueness and complexity of South Asian region strategic environment. South Asian security situation differs from Cold War super powers rivalry in a number of ways. First, Pakistan and India form the security dynamics of South Asian region with external powers influencing the strategic balance between them. Two, unlike Cold War, there are no great powers in direct conflict with each other in South Asia. Three, geographically, there is contiguity between the two rivaling states which was not there among the Cold War rivals. And four, the foreign policy goals and worldview of Pakistan and India are different from each other.
The regional security complex theory is relevant in case of South Asia in terms of proximity of two contending nations. According to the theory, threats travel faster over short distances and the states do not have major allies in the same region stands true for South Asia. Although the nuclear deterrence is established in the region, yet the two states, India and Pakistan, have looked out for foreign powers as allies. The process of decolonization which resulted in the bandwagoning of newly independent states to the two Cold War great powers, United States and Soviet Union, is explained by regional security complex theory. However, the patterns of arms development for maintaining
298 John Carlson (Consultant, Nuclear Threat Initiative; Lowy Institute), via interview with author through email, 22 November, 2017. 299 Ibid. 112
deterrence differs from that of Cold War pattern between two powers. The next section will analyze the dynamics of arms race in the Cold War time and the dynamics of arms development among Pakistan and India.
Concluding Thoughts Deterrence is a broad topic and has a direct connection with the political and psychological aspects of decision-making. Unlike core military programs, deterrence adds a political dimension to strategy. Classical strategy emphasizes the military aspect, while giving less emphasis to the political context. Deterrence does not focus on the use of force but focuses on the threat. Therefore, with the advent of nuclear, deterrence has become a powerful aspect of realist theory and an objective of the “balance of power” system. This balance gives strength to the theory of deterrence. The rough equality of power structure in the form of balance of power makes deterrence effective. Deterrence is a means to stop the enemy from taking aggressive actions without actually using force. Nuclear deterrence is the ultimate means of ensuring national security of a country. In international system, each state has to preserve its national interests and the security from the foreign enemies is the utmost important aspect of the national interests. Nuclear deterrence provides the power balancing effect to the possessor state with conventionally stronger states. This power equality in nuclear deterrence compensates for the conventional power weakness of a state that possesses nuclear weapons.
In order to effectively play a deterrent role, there are three pre-requisites; first, to have the capability; second, to have the credibility of the capability; and third, to communicate the threat of capability and credibility effectively so that the adversary can be sure of the consequences. In addition, it also revolves around the following factors:(i) the severity of conflict during the Cold War when the conflict was severe that it was almost all of the time imminent that the war would break out; (ii) the decision-making is rational in term of deterrence because only a rational actor can understand threat of deterrence is real and the consequences would be disastrous; (iii) the threat of retaliation is real and can be fatal in case of miscalculation or miscommunication; (iv)if the adversary tries to take aggressive action, the damage would be unacceptable.
Deterrence has certain challenges that need to be addressed and which are important to consider in terms of the stability of deterrence. These are three challenges; first and foremost, the credibility challenge, because the threat of deterrence must be 113
credible enough to convince adversary, if states believe that their core interests are compromised, they will certainly use nuclear weapons. Second, the stability issue is also a challenge for deterrence because it only works when it is stable. The stability of deterrence means that all elements and conditions of deterrence are complete and finally, the rationality problem in which the basic elements of deterrence are found.
Nuclear deterrence during the Cold War period was based on the competition of superpowers. Nuclear deterrence in South Asia is different from the Cold War experience because there are no superpowers in the region. India and Pakistan have historically been South Asian competitors and wars have already taken place between them. Nuclear deterrence has reduced the chances of war between the two states, but both states are involved in the maintenance of deterrence in order to avoid war. Deterrence stability in South Asia depends on the arms race and strategic stability. The serious conflicts between India and Pakistan have enabled deterrence to play its role even before overt nuclearization. The threat of retaliation has been conveyed and threat of unacceptable damage has also been communicated properly that has made the deterrence stable between the two states. The severity of conflicts has stabilized deterrence and because of deterrence, the stability of deterrence has always existed. Deterrence has created stability in crisis situation in the region. By contrast, no war does not mean that the India-Pakistan conflict is about to be dissolved or is about to be resolved soon.
The basic concept of deterrence explains that South Asian strategic environment is different from the Cold War environment of Superpowers owing to geographical contiguity and presence of direct active conflicts having the tendency to escalate to nuclear exchange at any time. Furthermore, the technological effects of nuclear development are more far reaching as compared to Cold War technological developments because due to size of both India and Pakistan, their objectives of nuclear development and limitations of using a particular technology are different. For example, Pakistan has developed short range missiles because it is sufficient to cover Indian threat, however, India needs to go for long ranges for missiles so that it can cover Pakistan as well as China threat. Therefore, any such development destabilizes the nuclear deterrence in the region that keep the conflict active. This debate is further discussed in detail in Chapter four.
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It is pertinent to discuss nuclear deterrence with respect to conflict transformation because conflict transformation depends upon nuclear deterrence. There is a very unique relationship between deterrence and conflict transformation. Nuclear deterrence refers that conflict would not escalate to war while on the other hand, conflict transformation also negates conflict. However, deterrence cements the conflict and creates a status quo where states can only chose between deterrence or conflict transformation. In other words, for conflict transformation, states have to forego nuclear deterrence which might not be impossible but achieving that requires more than the contemporary conflict transformation techniques which must include the condition of disarmament. Having established the understanding of nuclear deterrence, the theory of conflict transformation also needs to be elaborated to apply it to the case study of India and Pakistan. The following chapter tries to dig into theory of conflict transformation.
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CHAPTER THREE TRANSFORMING STATES BEHAVIOR FROM ENMITY TO AMITY Enmity implies a feeling of resentment, antipathy, animosity or malice between the two parties. In this enmity when “competitive individuals or groups consciously try to eradicate, defeat or subordinate each other in an effort to achieve certain objectives then conflict comes into existence”. Conflict reflects difference of opinion, clash of interests, and deviation of perceptions. Differences in opinions are bound to happen in social system regarding important matters. The differences can be due to personal and collective reasons. Principally, conflict takes place when there is a collision of interests between two actors. The actors could be individual, groups, communities, and states. Conflict also implies a clash that can occur: (i) “over resources—territory, money, energy sources, food—and how they should be distributed”; (ii) “over power, how control and participation in political decision-making are done”; (iii) “over identity, concerning the cultural, social and political communities to which people feel tied”; (iv) “over status, whether people believe they are treated with respect and dignity and whether their traditions and social position are respected and”; (v) “over values, particularly those embodied in systems of government, religion, or ideology”.
This chapter intends to discuss that how states behavior transforms from enmity to amity. Theory of conflict transformation would be discussed in detail in order to understand the nature of conflict between India and Pakistan in light of nuclear deterrence and to analyze whether the conflict between India and Pakistan be transformed. Before this, it is important to analyze the how conflict evolves on the basis of this enmity and resentment.
As far as the definition of conflict is concerned, there is no commonly agreed and universally accepted understanding of conflict. According to one definition, conflict is opposing the interests of two or more groups which are excluding the interests of other groups. From a broader perspective, the term implies the pursuits of incompatible goals by different people or groups.300 A.W. Green defines conflict as the purposeful endeavor
300 Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra, “Introduction,” Conflict and Peace in Eurasia (New York: Routledge, 2013), 7. 116
to contradict, oppose or force the will of others.301 As defined by Majumdar, conflict is a restriction or battle including a passionate state of mind of antagonistic vibe and additionally rough impedance with independent decision.302 Michel Nicholson is of the view that “a conflict exists when two people wish to carry out acts which are mutually inconsistent”.303
The conflict exists at all levels such as individual level, societal level, group level, and state or global level. The focus in this study is on the state level conflicts and their resolution mechanisms. In afore mentioned meanings of conflict inconsistency of objectives and interests between two or more states is a normal component of international system. Therefore, in order to pursue their own goals and interests, the states tend to indulge in conflicts. Conflict takes place as a result of financial separation, social change, social arrangement, mental advancement and political organization within a state.304 The contention between the conflicting parties could be competing values, scarce resources and unequal relations. The features of conflict may change and these issues may become debatable after some time.305
The eminent scholar Jacob Bercovitch considers conflict as a “pervasive social process of multi-dimensional character” which is present “in all social systems - simple or complex-irrespective of their location in time and space.” De Reuck explains conflict as an occurrence which “occurs between parties (defined and organized) that have incompatible goals”. The more the objectives, larger would be the scope for conflict. Similarly its domain would be larger. Conflict behaves in many forms – “bargaining, litigating, striking, fighting etc, which are all attempts to decide the outcome in favor of one party or another”.306
3.1 Types of Conflict Galtung explained that conflicts exist on two levels; individual and structural level. At individual level, the conflict is caused by the individuals involved. While at the system level, the basic structure of system causes the conflict. The second level is different from the first level because an individual cannot control the system. The conflict
301 Puja Mondal, “Social Processes: Elements, Classification, Characteristics,” Your Article Library, Available at http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/society/social-processes-elements-classification-characteristics-sociology/6203/. 302 Ibid. 303 Michael Nicholson, Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 11. 304 Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict, 7. 305 Ibid., 8. 306 Anthony de Reuck, The Logic of Conflict: Its Origins, Development and Resolution” in Michael Banks (ed), Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective on International Relations, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1984), 96-97. 117
at individual level can be managed by individuals as they understand their objectives and limitations. However, at system level, the overall system is designed in such a way that an individual will not have any impact on the conflict. The systematic work of conflict is affected by various factors that define international system. In such conflicts, the system controls the conflict. During the conflict, there is a period of time when the state gets frustrated. This may happen if one of the states is using too many resources and does not get the expected results. Lack of clear goals and inability to acquire them can also exacerbate conflicts. Therefore, it is important to find out reasons of exasperation in order to remove them.
Conflict as a term is generally taken in negative meanings expressed in the form of two or more states likely to go into a war. However, it may be positive for certain events. Therefore, it is important to understand the concept of positive conflict and negative conflict. Conflict is very important as it is a seedbed for nourishing change. In this way, conflict is extremely essential for the development. If there is no conflict in a society, it becomes static. It is essential to have dynamic society. Negative conflicts mean disruptive conflicts that lead to destruction and do not produce any positive results. In general, conflicts are divided into four major types depending on the situation, context and reasons associated with them.
3.1.1 Conflicts Executed and Escalated by Global Politics Such conflicts are based on strategic and geo political motives, mainly involving the great powers. External forces are the main cause of these types of conflicts. Regional security and strategic dynamics are controlled by external powers. Such conflicts include conflicts imposed by external forces that do not belong to the region. For example, after September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States’ intervened in Afghanistan to launch a “global war on terrorism”, which led to conflicts between regional states.
The Soviet army intervened in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1980, and the United States led the war of resistance with the help of Pakistan from 1980 to 1989. Both states were pushed by the existence of Cold War politics. The greater political relationship of two great powers in Cold War intensified various regional divides among South Asian countries. This complicated the internal and inter-state conflicts in the region. A typical example of this is the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan. South Asian conflict has been directly affected or reinforced by the strategic imperatives of the world order. The 118
global strategic issues gradually and indirectly stimulated and strengthened internal conflicts in the region. On the one hand, the globalization of world politics affected the relations between nations by increasing interdependence; on the other hand, it also increases the conflict caused by competition among states.307
3.1.2 Inherited Conflicts These conflicts have a history of bitter relations. The inheritance of conflict here means two states or communities which were enemies before their independence or formation. India and Pakistan is the most suitable example in this regard because two nations as separate nations were enemies before their independence from British colonial power. When they got independence, they inherited the animosity with each other that travelled from pre-independence era through bloody episodes of grand migrations during the partition. Furthermore, the Muslim majority states whose decision was pending at the time of partition further deepened the conflict between India and Pakistan.308 Such historical conflicts are very deep rooted in relations of the states. In particular, conflicts based on cultural and ideological differences are difficult to resolve.
3.1.3 Internal Political Conflicts Political troubles within a country can also cause conflicts at the international level. This type mainly includes rebellion and ethnic conflict. These rebellions and ethnic conflicts are likely to spread across borders. South Asia has been involved in such uprisings and their spread into the surrounding areas. The insurgency in Afghanistan spilled across the border and led to the conflict in Pakistan. India and Sri Lanka have been facing Tamil insurgency since long.
3.1.4 Conflict and Non-State Actors Globalization is not confined to political or economic interdependence among nations but to non-state actors that can move across national borders. Terrorist organizations are not limited to one country. They have the networks and infrastructure to operate in foreign countries. 9/11 is the biggest example of the reach of such organizations. After September 11, 2001 the focus has remained on Al Qaeda and many other organizations operating in different countries of the world. Different terrorist
307 George Heine & Ramesh Thakur (Ed.), The Dark Side of Globalization (New York: United Nations University Press, 2011), 17. 308 Dr. Crispin Bates, “The Hidden Story of Partition and its Legacies”, BBC History, 3 March 2011 available http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/partition1947_01.shtml 119
organizations with different and unique ideologies operate in South Asia, which is responsible for tensions between countries in the region. India has been accusing Pakistan of supporting terrorism in Kashmir against Indian troops and the Indian mainland and is responsible for the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001 and the 2008 Mumbai attack. Pakistan has consistently rejected India’s accusations alleging that India has sponsored terrorism in Pakistan’s province Baluchistan and other parts of the country. The activities of these groups have exacerbated conflicts between rival countries. Non- state actors have no state to represent. However, they have the ability to trigger conflicts between states.
3.2 Causes of Conflict and Wars The international system represents a basic incoherence in terms of power and status of the states along with other elements of statecraft which is responsible, inherently, for the conflict among states. As the realist paradigm suggests that states are in a constant struggle for power which constitutes sentiments for war and conflict. International conflict behavior is derived from this power status struggle between states. Therefore, before discussing conflict transformation, it is important to describe some common causes of conflicts and wars between states. The conditions of war always operate within a given international system in which there must be some interaction between the states. There are opposing interests of the states and the ability to fight. The opposing interests required for war depend on the actors and circumstances. Changes in the status quo highlight these opposing interests, and conflicts exacerbate the war. The reasons for war may vary from state to state, but there are some general factors that independently or in combination are present behind the cause of any war. They are given below:
First, if the status quo is destroyed in any way, the chances of conflict will inevitably increase. The relative change in overall power balance encourages stronger states to take advantage of this situation and impose provisions on their opponents.309 Minor alterations in the power balance do not guarantee the credibility of the states to wage war; therefore, it can lead to major changes in the power that can cause the war. The weakness of the current power will also encourage the opponent to start the war, because it will eventually change the status quo in some way. Nuclear deterrence guarantees the
309 Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: The Free Press, 1973), 134. 120
undeniable stability of the status quo. However, conventional power is not irrelevant. After all, a state cannot use nuclear weapons to protect its own nuclear weapons. Therefore, the balance of nuclear power is also important for maintaining the stability of conflicts. Changes in the balance of nuclear power lead to instability of deterrence, which leads to deterrence of defeat and ultimately to a full-scale war.
Second, despite differences in power balance, states must have a will to wage war because only power differences may provide opportunities for states, but they can only be used when states are willing to take advantage of this opportunity.310 In the worldview of realism theorists, states are essentially opportunists. If there is an opportunity to dominate the opponent, they will have the will to wage war. The will to wage war is inherent in human behavior. This behavior is reflected in the conduct of the state, because states are run by the human leaders who decide to fight. Third, ideology has always been the main cause of war in history. It may be political ideology or religious ideology or ethnically driven. From the times of crusades and even before that, the wars were fought on the basis of religious ideology.311 The Pope used to describe the necessity of war and had great influence on the decisions for war. The ideologies of democracy and communism were cause of wars between the satellite states of the super powers. The ethnic clashes remain primarily in the domestic arena; however, they tend to spread in the regional situation.312
Fourth, when a state believes that the war is about to succeed, the states prefer to join the war.313 This happens when the difference in power between states reaches a significant level, so that the stronger state expects to take out all the enemy forces in the first strike. This assumption for success requires a great314 deal of rationality to play its role, because a slight miscalculation of either party can lead to disaster. Last, if honor and credibility are threatened in a conflict situation, the war becomes more likely, more explosive, and more difficult to resolve. The self-interested nature of humanity does not allow opponents to occupy a supreme position in conflict situations and states would rather die to maintain the honor and credibility.
310 Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 115. 311 Norman Z. Alcock, and Alan G. Newcomb, "The perception of national power," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 14, no. 3 (1970): 335-343. 312 Lincoln P. Bloomfield, and Amelia C. Leiss, The Control of Local Conflict: A Design Study on Arms Control and Limited War in the Developing Areas, Vol. 2. [Cambridge, Mass.]: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Washington, DC: for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, 1967. 313 Boulding, K.E. "National images and international systems," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 3, no. 2 (1959): 120-131. 314 Hedley Bull, "Society and anarchy in international relations," in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wright, Diplomatic Investigation (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966), 40-48. 121
R.J. Rummel has discussed the following causes of the conflict:315
First, the states are unique actors in international system having their peculiar interests and policies. They seek protection of their interests and sovereignty at any cost. They have their own relative capabilities to protect their interests. Whenever opposite interests exist between states, there will be conflicts, or there will be differences in the relative capacities of states or between them. For example, in South Asia, India and Pakistan have opposite interests due to the history of mutual hostility, and they have differences in their relative military, financial, and geographic capabilities which further intensifies the conflict situation between the two states.
Second, the international system does not represent any hierarchy among the states. It indicates anarchy where every state has its own position based on the power structure. The regions and coalitions have their own political and power structures and states try to balance their power. However, if the relative balance of power changes, a conflict situation may erupt because difference in interests may result in harboring conflict.
Third, the perceptions are formulated by the relative historical relationships between the states. Historical rivalries have led to conflicts between the states. India and Pakistan have a history of confrontational relations which has been responsible for the protracted conflict between the two states. This kind of hostility is inherent in the behavior of the states and creates a sense of threat through the actions of each other.316
Fourth, state, represented by the international boundaries, is a distinctive feature of the nation state international system. The border represents the division of national sovereignty, and the country tends to defend itself as a symbol of power and status in the international system. Realism advocates that the state is greedy for power, and the acquisition of opponent's territory is considered as the winning situation in a conflict or war. Therefore, the territorial integrity is crucial in the national security policy of every state. The states that do not have agreed borders with their neighbors are often in a conflict position with them. India and Pakistan have divergent views over the accession of Kashmir. These causes are triggered by mutual perceptions, threats and coercive policies
315 R. J. Rummel, “Causes and Conflicts of International Conflict and War,” in Understanding Conflict and War: War, Power, Peace, Vol-4 (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1979), 145-180. 316 Ibid. 122
and are further aggravated by differences in the relative status of the states. However, if there is a conflict, there is an urgent need to manage them.
In addition to the causes of conflict, there are complementary factors that exacerbate the conflict and contribute to the escalation of conflict which may lead to war. These factors intensify the conflict situation and serve as the spoilers in the process of conflict resolution processes.
R. J. Rummel has discussed four conditions that generally aggravate conflict situation: socio-cultural differences, cognitive imbalance, status difference, and coercive power of a state. Socio-cultural differences are important reasons for exacerbating conflicts. If there are cultural and social differences between the parties, people are less likely to communicate with each other and solve issues. Lack of communication can lead to misunderstanding and security dilemma. It is a very important factor in the conflict resolution mechanism between India and Pakistan, because the socio-cultural differences are very deep rooted in the people of the two countries. Cognitive imbalance or the imbalance in relationship between states is also a factor that can aggravate the crisis. The history of relations between the two countries is always haunting the relationship. It leads to the misperceptions and miscommunication between the states. The balanced relationship requires a communication channel between the states through certain networks or through trade or cultural ties, or if they are aligned as a common ally or they are part of a common international or regional organization.
The status of economic or military power is the main determinant of contemporary international relations. Both these characteristics are major components of national development. The power-oriented international system has given strong states the status of respected states that have a say in world affairs. These states can greatly influence international politics. They have a greater say in conflict situations that compete with their opponents. Prestige and status considerations influence the outcome of the conflict and the political situation. Differences in status make the state’s international acceptance distinct, leading to misunderstandings and discrimination in weaker states. The coercive power of a country is its relative power to influence the ability of other states to comply with their will, because it has the political and military might to use force against the states. The great powers can influence weaker states to follow their course of action because they have the ability to influence states. However, it is not necessary that great
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powers have conflicts only, the weaker states also indulge into the conflicts and they try to influence the outcome of the conflicts according to their power status in the international system. The dissimilarity in power status of the states stimulates and aggravates conflicts. As realism advocates, the more the power a country has, the more it has the tendency to indulge into a conflict.
There may be other conditions of aggravation, such as (i) cross-stress causing uncertainty and operating in low-level conflicts, (ii) big power intervention may increase the stakes of the parties to the conflict, (iii) reputation of the conflicting parties as powerful than the adversary also makes the conflict a matter of ego and a nation’s esteem to indulge more force into the conflict, and (iv) perception of the opponent's current position may also lead to an increase in conflict, as the status quo power may defend the status quo, which may lead to excessive attention to defense and loss of offensive advantage.317 The adversary may take advantage of such a situation and conflict may aggravate. All of these conditions are important when analyzing conflict aggravation; however, they cannot be generalized for all the conflicts. These conditions are phase based factors that are usually not permanent factors of any conflict. These conditions are also relevant for this study and will be discussed in detail with reference to the conflict between India and Pakistan.
When states believe that their success is possible, they will choose to exacerbate the conflict. In the coercive power parity of the two opponents' power status in rough equality, the result becomes more ambiguous and the states hope to succeed. This condition creates intense violence and war.318 This power parity is an illusion because of the nuclear deterrence which grants a state a status of power which equates it with the other nuclear weapons states. However, this power equality must correspond with other factors of power equation which includes economic power and military strength. The nuclear deterrence creates a false sense of security because it may deter a potential adversary to use conventional force against it but sustenance of nuclear deterrence becomes a challenge for the possessor state. Alternatively, the possession of nuclear weapons does not aggravate the conflict; rather it tries to restrain escalation of conflict.
317 Murray L. Adelman, “Crisis decision-making and cognitive balance,” in John H. Sigler, John O. Field, and MurrayL. Adelman, “Applications of Events Data Analysis: Cases, Issues, and Programs in International Interaction,” Sage Professional Papers in International Studies, Vol 1, 02-002 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), 61-95. 318 Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, Translated by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (New York: Doubleday Garden City, 1966), 124. 124
Just as there are aggravating conditions, there are also inhibiting conditions, restraining conflicts, and reducing the possibility of escalation and fierce conflict. Conflict behavior changes as condition changes. Conflict-deteriorating conditions become conflict inhibiting conditions when their values are reversed. However, the increase in dissimilarity and the similarity of social and cultural values inhibit conflicts. In addition, psychological balance, status comparability and weak state power are the general inhibitors of conflict behavior. There are two common inhibitors of conflict: polarity or centralization of power, and strength of the status quo.
The polarity or centralization of power means that “there is a central single power in the international system, which has relative control over the conflict behavior of the states”. In a centralized system, central power has the capability to influence conflicts and has the ability to change the nature of the conflict itself. The alliance systems in which states are aligned with the central power tends to follow the rules of the alliance, focusing on peaceful coexistence and economic development. The participation of the central power in conflict situations, whether as a party to a conflict or as an arbitrator or a mediator, serves as the inhibiting factor in the conflict. The stronger the status quo, the less likely the conflict will be intensified, because the conflict will remain stable and the balance of power will not be disturbed. As long as the relative power structure, economic development and military capabilities develop steadily, the status quo will remain stable. The status quo also depends on the direct or indirect involvement of the major powers in the conflict.
In addition to these inhibitors, there are a number of factors that can make conflict escalation slower or less likely to occur. These factors include: (i) the system of government is the inhibiting factor because democracies are less prone to the violent conflict; (ii) the world opinion that has the power to have direct effect on the decisions of the statesmen.319 In the case of increased conflict, the allies can threaten to withdraw support, and other states can also put pressure on the states to avoid conflicts; and (iii) nuclear deterrence is also a conflict inhibiting factor because deterrence theorists have never advocated or encouraged the possibility of escalating into war. Nuclear deterrence
319 Martin Abravanel and Barry Hughes, “The relationship between public opinion and governmental foreign policy: A cross national study,” in Patrick J. McGowan (Ed.), Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, Vol. I (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973), 107-133. 125
shows that violent conflicts of power have caused nuclear weapons to become a very dangerous option in case of nuclear retaliation.
Conflict, once started, goes through times of escalations and inhibitions where states resort to different strategies. For every protracted conflict there are different phases of the conflict in which severity of conflict varies and resolution or escalation takes place.
3.3 Phases of Conflict The conflict either present at individual level or international level runs through a range of levels. Some scholars describe these levels as stages, while others describe them as phases of conflict. These stages can be defined in the conflict curves given below. The first level of conflict is classified as a latent conflict. In this case, the disagreement is still potential or does not allow the party to take steps to change the situation. These may be historical confrontation and mistrust. The next occurrence/emergence of a conflict is an event that triggers a conflict. In the case of Pakistan and India, cross-border firing from one party may be the appearance of any conflict. If this situation is not addressed, it will lead to conflict escalation. This is a situation in which the conflict has intensified. More and more issues and parties are increasingly involved in the struggle for conflict.
Figure320 01: Different Levels of Conflict
Conflict theorists Dean Pruitt and Jeffrey Rubin list five changes that occur during the escalation of the conflict:
320 Eric Graham, “Latent Conflict Stage”, September 2003, available at https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/latent_conflict 126
(i) “First, parties move from light tactics to heavy tactics. Light tactics include such things as persuasive arguments, promises, and efforts to please the other side, while heavy tactics include threats, power plays, and even violence.
(ii) Second, the conflict grows in size. The numbers of issues in contention expands, and parties devote more resources to the struggle.
(iii) Third, issues move from specific to general, and the relationship between the parties weakens. Parties develop grandiose positions, and often perceive the other side as evil.
(iv) Fourth, the number of parties grows from one to many, as more and more people and groups are drawn into the conflict.
(v) Fifth, the goal of the parties changes from doing well to winning, and finally, to hurting the other.”
If the conflict intensifies, a situation which is known as hurting stalemate occurs. It refers to “a situation in which neither side can win, but neither side wants to back down or accept loss either”. There are many reasons for the stalemate such as reduction of available resources and supports, tactical failure, “a lessening in backing of the conflict by group members or allies, or costs becoming too high to continue”. This level is also ripe for resolution. The next level then comes which is negotiation or de-escalation. “All conflicts, even intractable ones, eventually recuperate and are to some degree transformed, so that they become regarded as tractable”. Then, transformation can help the parties to address their grievances and to come with the positive behavioral changes by reducing the negative ones. They ultimately move to next levels settlement and post conflict reconstruction respectively. It can be accessed by analyzing the stages of conflict one can overcome conflict with progressive measures or at any stage intervention can be made for the transformation or settlement of any conflict.
3.4 Conflict Transformation Mechanisms The practice of ending the conflict mechanism is as old as the conflict itself. Several conflicts have been managed through different means from the time immemorial in the history. These methods and techniques have evolved over the time due to increasing amount of coordination and communication between the states. This has been
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strengthened in the recent times due to the economic integration and rise of international institutions.
Therefore, in order to understand the transformation from enmity to amity, the following terms must be briefly described:
3.4.1 Conflict Settlement Conflict settlement shows that the parties to the conflict have reached a level of understanding that enables them to end potential conflicts. It concludes the rough phase of contention.321 This is because the behavior of the conflict and the hidden basic differences may not be inclined. The conflicts arising from the debate are largely considered to be differences, including issues that can be minimized through different arrangements. Issues that can be settled through intervention or mediation are considered conflict settlement.322 Issues under conflict settlement are by and large transient and can go to the commonly acceptable arrangements. Settlement refers to an agreement on conflicting issues, which often include a trade-off or some concessions between the two. In the process of using this method, both parties are unable to achieve a large part of their goals. In this way, occasional problems may be settled forever, and if the root cause persists, another or related conflict may occur in the future. These causes are then permanently determined or expelled through the conflict transformation process.
Conflict settlement involves methods that emphasize assertions between the parties through transaction and dealing.323 However, the failure may be counterbalanced by the commonality of the trade-off. The outside arbitrators in settlement handle regularly; utilize weight, promptings or dangers to force the conflicting parties to consent to a trade-off arrangement. A settlement is frequently the sharpest answer to trouble or barbarism; however, its adequacy is transitory on the grounds that the hidden links and structures that led to the conflict remain unaddressed. Violent confrontations after settlement regularly re-emerge. The inadequacy of the Versailles agreement which ended the World War I is such an example. The Versailles agreement failed to identify and settle the causes of the conflict. By imposing constraints on the defeated Germany, it paved the way for future conflict.
321 Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict, 25. 322 Brad Spangler, “Settlement, Resolution, Management, and Transformation: An Explanation of Terms,” Beyond Intractability, (2013): Available at http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/meaning-resolution. 323 “Conflict Management, Settlement, Resolution and Transformation,” March 15, 2016, Available at http://www.netuni.nl/courses/conflict1/week1/1.3_week.html. 128
3.4.2 Conflict Management Conflict management refers to limiting any future cruelty by transmitting positive behavioral changes to the involved parties. Conflict management is a technique that stops violence at the beginning, middle or end of a conflict. According to Onigu Otite and Albert, from origin to application, conflict management is a very complex phenomenon involving constructive participation by all parties. It is a long-term process which systematizes procurements and regulatory procedures that manage conflicts, no matter where they occur. This is in line with the arguments of Ben Reilly. As they state that “conflict management is a positive and constructive handling of difference and divergence. Rather than advocating methods for removing conflicts, [it] addresses the more realistic question of managing conflict: how to deal with it in a constructive way, how to bring opposite sides together in a cooperative process, how to design a practical, achievable, cooperative system for the constructive management of difference.”324 Zartman emphasizes the comprehensiveness and institutionalization involved in conflict management. Therefore, he believes that conflict management implies the elimination and neutralization of a conflict, either transforming into a crisis or a reduction in its severity.
3.4.3 Conflict Resolution The term conflict resolution addresses the reasons for the conflict in its final arrangement and prompts to fabricate enduring connections between two parties. Wallensteen characterizes resolution of conflict “as a situation where parties to a conflict enter an understanding of their focus incompatibilities, acknowledge each other's apprehensions and continue to attend parties and meetings to prevent all barbaric activities against each other.”325 As Thomas Satie and Joyce Alexander point out, conflict resolution is to seek a result that at least attempts to change the behavior of a state from a declining position to an acceptable position.326 This seems to change the relationship between members and suggests extreme results.
Conflict resolution is a more exhaustive approach, in light of common issue sharing between conflicting parties. Conflict resolution means that the profound influence of conflict tends to change behavior of the actors so that it is no longer barbaric in character, no longer confrontational in structure, and no longer exploitative. This term
324 Khan, Nuclear Weapons and Transformation, 12. 325 Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution (London: Sage Publication, 2002), 8. 326 Khan, Nuclear Weapons, 11. 129
is used to satisfy the outcomes of the procedures (targets) and procedures for achieving these developments. Therefore, it is difficult to maintain a strategic distance from the uncertainty of its exact importance. The process of conflict resolution involves paying attention to conflicts, diagnosing their temperament and applying appropriate strategies, keeping in mind the ultimate goal:327 The resolution of conflict must achieve the following:
(i) “Diffuse the negative emotional energy involved.
(ii) Enable the disputing parties to understand and resolve their differences.
(iii) Resolve the differences so as to achieve solutions that are not imposed, which have been agreed by all the key parties, and which address the root causes of the conflict.”328
The resolution process depends on the requirements of the groups involved in the particular conflict, not on the requirements and interests of the resolver. This method certainly violates the traditional concept of power politics. The basic goal of this method setting is that one does not have to think of conflicts as challenges. Instead, it should be seen as an issue that needs to be explained.
3.4.4 Conflict Transformation It is a new development in conflict studies. It involves major social and political roots of conflict and attempts to transform the negative vitality of conflict into inspiration. J. D. Leatherman argues that “conflict transformation relies upon containing escalatory process over the transient, while at the same time adjusting the hidden underlying conditions for a long time.”329 They are of the perspective that “the limitations of diplomacy are to achieve lasting peace in contemporary conflicts and prevent others from turning to violence, meaning there is a need to innovate in traditional ideas and practices. We need to go beyond curbing violence and negotiations, changing social perceptions, injustices, deep-rooted hatred, cultural tensions, and legitimacy of institutions”330
327 “Conflict Management, Settlement, Resolution and Transformation.” 328 Ibid. 329 Khan, Nuclear Weapons, 12. 330 Ibid., 73. 130
3.5 Scholarly Debates Conflict transformation is an evolving debate in international relations. Most of the focus of the studies has been on the conflicts and wars. However, conflict transformation has evolved the processes of “conflict settlement, conflict management, and conflict resolution”. Different scholars attempt to develop techniques and structures which suggested steps that could lead to conflict transformation.
John Paul Lederach is a highly acclaimed scholarly proponent who advocates the transformation of conflict. Lederach affirms that “conflict transformation is unique in relation to conflict management and conflict resolution because it reflects a high degree of understanding of the way of conflict itself.”331 To the extent the term conflict resolution is concerned, it infers that conflict is terrible and should therefore be finished. In addition, the conflict is expected to be a short-lived miracle that can be determined at any time through intercession or other forms of mediation.332 It is also important to note that conflict resolution prompts determining the issue by tending to the underlying drivers of conflict while conflict transformation implies making a situation favorable for tending to the real base of the conflict like authority, nature of conflict, societal set-up and conduct of the general population.
Then, the term conflict management accurately predicts that conflicts are long- term and often cannot be determined immediately, however the individuals can coordinate or control like physical projects.333 In addition, the idea of management believes that, contrary to the real cause of conflict management, the focus must be on malignant reduction. It suggests dealing with conflicts to reduce violent conflict. Lederach is of the perspective that “conflict transformation does not mean that we basically come up with or control conflicts, but rather to perceive and work with its rationalization nature.”334 The transformation of on-screen characters or gatherings and occasions additionally happen in conflict transformation. It changes the connections, flow or periods of conflict giving the parties a better chance to strengthen their relationship with the agreement and thus avoid barbaric conflicts.335 He also suggests that for the
331 Brand Spangler, “Settlement, Resolution, Management, and Transformation: An Explanation of Terms,” Available at http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/meaning-resolution. 332 Ibid., 12. 333 Ibid. 334 Ibid. 335 John Paul Lederach, “Beyond Violence: Building Sustainable Peace,” in The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence, ed. Eugene Weiner (New York: Abraham Fund Publication, 1998), 447. 131
transformation of conflict, the behavioral change is brought about through following process:
(i) “The top leadership, or the level at which negotiations to end conflict normally take place
(ii) National leaders such as professionals and intellectuals from sectors through problem solving workshops or training in conflict resolution
(iii) Local leaders in indigenous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and grassroots organizations, where the impact would be on local peace commissions and grassroots training.”336
Four aspects which are involved in conflict transformation and which demand scrutiny are as follows.
(i) “Personal, or individual changes in the emotional, perceptual, and spiritual aspects of conflict
(ii) Relational, or changes in communication, interaction, and interdependence of parties in conflict
(iii) Structural, or changes in the underlying structural patterns and decision making in conflict
(iv) Cultural, or group/societal changes in the cultural patterns in understanding and responding to conflict.”337
Transforming the way, the conflict is expressed is also included in transformation. The theory of conflict transformation assumes that “conflict is caused by the real problems of inequality and injustice expressed by competitive social, cultural and economic frameworks.”338 The objectives of theory of conflict transformation are:
(i) “To change structure and frameworks that cause inequality and injustice, including economic redistribution”;
(ii) “ To improve longer-term relationships and attitudes among the conflicting parties”;
336 Ibid. 337 Lisa Schirch, “Ritual Peacebuilding: Creating Contexts Conducive to Conflict Transformation,” (Ph.D diss., George Mason University, 1999). 338 Simon Fisher et al., Working with Conflict: Skills and Strategies for Action (UK: Zed Books, 2000), 12. 132
(iii) “To develop processes and systems that promotes empowerment, justice, peace, forgiveness, reconciliation and recognition etc”.
Spencer and Spencer, recommend that “conflict transformation can take the following transformations as prerequisite:”339
(i) Transforming the Participants: The participants can be transformed by either international changes affecting the conflicting parties or occurrence and recognition of new participants.
(ii) Transforming the Issues: Issues can be transformed by a change in the agenda of the conflict and making the original issues seem less important. It is also attained by making original conflict seem less important and by stressing on the mutual concerns arising from new issues.
(iii) Transforming the Rule: In the light of this step the norms are redefined and participants while dealing with each other are observed.
(iv) Transforming the Structure: This step alludes to deep changes pertaining to the complete structure of the inter-participant relations (inter- actor relations).
In this way, “conflict transformation is an integrated approach to conflict resolution”. It includes the re-interpretation of the parties’ relationships to the conflict, through which the parties open up opportunities and present new game plans. This allows the system to assert “solution based on a positive total rather than a zero sum”. For the transformation, the issues of prior debate causing conflict become less important and become less applicable to the process, while other different issues or values become more important for all gatherings of conflict.
Dr. Riffat Hussain has also explained transformation, and suggested new problems by expanding new issues, extending new concerns, amplifying new victims, and achieving transformation. He has elaborated five kinds of transformation that highlight behavioral, structural and attitudinal characteristics of the conflict.
(i) Actors or participants- altering the goals of the actors (participants) and the approaches they follow in pursuit of these goals. This includes the attempting to understand the reason for their actions.
339 R. Vayrynen, “To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of the National and International Conflicts” in New Directions in Conflict Theory, ed. R. Vayrynen (London: Sage, 1991), 4–6. 133
(ii) Contexts - confronting the manner and perception of the conflict and the respective point of view and the perception of the actors involved.
(iii) Issues - redefining the problems which are primary to the current conflict and reformulating the place of the chief actors regarding those problems.
(iv) Rules - altering the norms and rules controlling the decision making at each level in order to guarantee that conflicts are coped with rather constructively by means of institutional channels.
(v) Structures - rearranging the current structure of relationships, division of power, socio economic state which is firmly rooted in the conflict. The conflict is transformed during the process and resultantly impacts the fabric of interaction among formerly conflicting actors, goals and issues.
As far as domestic politics is concerned, conflict transformation is categorized into four types, which are as given below:
(i) Transformation in the attitude, behavior, biases and feelings of the parties concerned about each other;
(ii) Role played by those elements that try to diminish enemy images and insecurity;
(iii) Feeling that conflict will only deepen their plight;
(iv) Emergence of a threat shared by the two conflicting parties.340
As intractable conflicts are complex and difficult to solve, it is necessary to create a picture in the form of questions that will give us a better understanding of the fundamental differences between resolution and transformation of conflict. It can be shown like this table:341
Conflict Resolution View Transformation View Point Point The main How do we stop something How to stop something devastating questions which is undesirable? and instead make something which is desireable?
340 Monis Ahmar, “Reconceptualizing Conflict Transformation?,” Academia, Available at http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html. 341 John Paul Lederach and Michelle Malese, “Conflict Transformation,” New Routes 14, no. 2 (2009): 7-11. 134
The focal It is content-centered It is centered on relationship point The motive To attain a solution regarding For fostering constructive the current issues causing crises. transformation process including instant but just restriction to it. The It is rooted and developed It pertains to respond to indicators developments around the immediacy of and engagement of system in which of processes relationship where the existing relationship is rooted. problem is visible. Time frames The scope is short – term The scope is “mid-to long-range” Views of It visualizes the need to reduce It visualizes the concept as a conflicts the intensity of conflict dynamic process where conflict is processes diminished following a constructive change
Table 02: Resolution and Alteration A Short Comparison of Viewpoint
By analyzing the above issues, it is easy to answer the various questions that lead to long-term or protracted conflicts. Dikik emphasizes on the basic structures of conflicts. Transformation is associated to causes which are even not apparent. The following are three aspects of conflict transformation:
1) The viewpoint and attitudes of the individuals (Attitude) 2) The behavior of the individuals (Behavior) 3) The situation in which individuals live (Context)
Direct Physical Violence Action: reduction of violence to Behaviour promote negative peace
Visible violence
Figure 02: Conflict Structure342
342 Oliver, Ramsbotham, Hugh Miall, and Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary conflict resolution (Polity, 2011), 10. 135
The contradiction here refers to potential conflict situations, including the perceived or actual objectives’ incongruity among parties to the conflict arising from Chris Mitchell’s so-called “mismatch between social values and social structure.” In a symmetrical conflict, this contradiction may be defined by “the parties, their interests, and the conflict of interest between them.” In an asymmetrical conflict, there is a conflict of interest between relatively similar parties (i.e., conflicts between parties with more or less equal resources). In an asymmetrical conflict, the parties, the relationships between them, and the conflicts of interest inherent in the relationship defines it. It may appear between different parties; majority or minority, established governments or rebels, employees or employers, or owners and their servants.
Attitude and behavior are two different concepts. Attitude is inner mindset or thinking because it is bonded with the individual’s thoughts and cannot be seen immediately by others. Whereas behavior is external in sense which can very well be seen by others as it is external. Experts say that “attitude is what you think whereas behavior is what you do”. Alternately, “attitude is thought-oriented whereas behavior is action- oriented”. Hence, “attitude has all the ability to shape the behavior of a person”. “It is for sure that behavior and attitude are the two dimensions of an individual”. These factors make the conflict a full conflict and influence each other.
Ultimately, however, conflict transformation can involve a series of dynamic changes that mean the mitigation of conflict behavior, changes in attitudes, and the transformation of conflict structures or the shift in conflict interests. Transformation of negative attitude of the conflicting parties can lead to negotiation. Peace can be achieved by taking multiple steps based on multiple strategies. The involvement of the different actors can be used to urge the reluctant party to the negotiating table. This would help in achieving a resolution or settlement. This can be achieved by the inclusion of political parties and by addressing the basic concerns.
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse have developed the Hourglass model, which presents different steps and processes for peace which need to be considered.
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Figure 03: The hourglass model showing “conflict containment, conflict settlement and conflict transformation”343
This hourglass model represents a reduction in the political space for conflict escalation and the extension of the conflict mitigation (the lower half of the hourglass model). The narrowing and widening of space represents the appropriateness of a particular response for conflict resolution. It is “contingency and complementarity model in which contingency refers to the nature and phase of the conflict and complementarity refers combined with the appropriate response that requires joint efforts to maximize the success in conflict resolution”. Conflict transformation is considered to include the deepest levels of structural and cultural peacebuilding. Conflict settlement (many of them critics erroneously classify with conflict resolutions) is a parallel peacemaking or negotiation or mediation between the main parties to reach an agreement acceptable to both parties. Conflict containment contains preventive peacekeeping, war restrictions and peacekeeping after the ceasefire. War restrictions include attempts to limit the geographical confrontation, mitigate and lessen its intensity, and achieve its termination as soon as possible. In this model, we distinguish the elite peacemaking that constitutes
343 Ibid., 14. 137
the essence of conflict settlement and deeper peacemaking (including reconciliation and education) better seen as part of cultural peacebuilding.
The current phenomenon of globalization has affected all spheres of life. Similarly, it also has an impact on the conflict. Even if a conflict erupts in a certain part of the world, everybody will be affected. Similarly, peace has the same effect. Peace can only be established if all problems from the local to the global are resolved.
In the process of conflict transformation, the understanding of opponent relationships is important. The past and present relationship of the opponents has had an impact on the process of resolving the conflict. An image is formed based on an action or event that occurred in the past. These images are then formed to cause an action. This can best be understood by the following examples. Suppose that states A and B have a friendly relationship when they are in trouble, and both states will enter the negotiating table. If this situation reverses in this instance and there is a fierce relationship between A and B states, then in this case, any additional trouble will cause the two states to enter the Cold War or skirmish.
In order to identify conflicts, the facts, truths and circumstances that led to the conflict must be reviewed and arranged. Therefore, the social framework will have an impact on the relationship between the enemies and their means of fighting. Various methods can be used to achieve the desired purpose. Some conflicts are explained on the basis of their result. Three kinds of results are more convincing than the rest. First, assess the conquerors and losers. Likewise, the second result shows whether the opponent is corresponding or isolated. The third result determines the level of settlement that can be achieved.
In order to examine any situation, three lenses are required. The first lens helps to see the immediate situation. With the help of the second lens, one can see beyond the apparent or existing problems, thus showing a profound pattern of relationship. The third lens serves to see the conceptual framework which is required to bring all these perspectives together. Therefore, this framework helps to link current problems and the profound relational patterns. Hence, such a framework is useful for understanding the conflicts and achieving master planning. This master plan deals with the current problems and identifies the changes required for the relational patterns.
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Conflict transformation creates a framework that addresses the following three aspects.
(i) Content The content of the transformation means the details of the issue which needs to be transformed into certain outcomes. The content includes the basic arguments about the issues that are causing the conflict between the adversaries. It includes the perspectives of both the conflicting sides about the conflict. These perspectives are important for record because they provide the vital source of communication between the warring parties and can build trust between them. For example, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,344 created by Nelson Mandela in 1996, has played a key role in developing the content of the transformation phase of conflict. This commission has been created to dissolve the bad image of whites against blacks, and vice versa, they are involved in a protracted conflict over racism. The arguments of the blacks and whites has been recorded and then transformed with the discussion over their relative crimes against each other. This is the perfect example of conflict transformation at domestic level.
(ii) Context The context refers to the historical connections of conflict that have to be transformed. The context of the conflict is equally important to resolve as it may trigger the conflict again.
(iii) Structure of Relationship The structure of relationship is important in any conflict transformation process. The structure of relationship must change in order to bring about conflict transformation.
Transformation is a way of pursuing a process of constructive change through conflict. There are many aspects to peacebuilding that need to be considered in order to achieve the desired results. Peace building requires interdependent roles and activities, a clear vision and a broader agenda for conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes. In addition, the framework has three conceptual and practical features as follows:
i. The growth of a long-term perspective of conflict;
344 “Case Study of Conflict Resolution: Nelson Mandela” Universal Peace Federation International, Available at https://www.upf.org/peace-education-and-human-development/peace-education-reports/3184-case-study-of-conflict-resolution-nelson- mandela
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ii. Sufficient descriptive language; and iii. Discernment of value paradoxes in peace building efforts.
Some gestures indicate the intentions of parties for conciliation. These gestures are shown below:
Conciliatory Gestures
Concessions Symbolic Tension Reduction Confidence Gestures Measures Building Measures
Figure 04: Intentions of Parties for Conciliation
According to Wallensteen, the classic understanding of a conflict sees it as a phenomenon. An actor reacts to the behavior of another actor, so the conflict escalates.345 It is difficult to understand which conflicting party is more responsible than the other. Once a conflict breaks out, it gains momentum and forces participants to become involved in an increasingly fierce conflict. Wallensteen asserts that the notion of conflict is a social phenomenon which grows itself deep. When the parties believe that the conflict has eliminated all other options, they now have the option to respond through violence and threats. In order to check this situation, some tools have been designed. Game theory is a mechanism for explaining how parties react to being imprisoned in the game itself. If the parties follow the rules, the results are predictable. It is possible for an actor to change the dynamics by acting or rejecting the rules created by the conflict.346
Coser has highlighted the difference between realistic and non-realistic conflict. The outbreak of a real conflict is due to the anger of people’s unfulfilled demands. The opponent needs to vent his tension, resulting in non-realistic conflicts. In this case, conflicts should not be used to achieve specific goals. Therefore, when the actor finds other options to achieve his goal, the realistic conflict will end. Coser claims that realistic conflicts are primarily guided by misleading attitudes and opinions. In addition, the reasons for engaging in the conflict are different. For example, there is a realistic reason for involving in the conflict. Similarly, the emotional reasons for participating in conflicts are also true. The two elements that are usually not realized are the motivation behind the conflict; realistic and non-realistic conflicts are very different, but still merge. Therefore,
345 Peter Wallensteen, Understanding conflict resolution (Sage Publications, 2015), 38. 346 Ibid. 140
the mediator must eliminate unrealistic hostile factors so that the opposing parties can realistically work towards the challenging demands.347
Ramsbotham, Hugh, and Woodhouse inform about a pattern of armed conflict which occurred during 1990s. The occurrence of this pattern implies a subtle model of conflict occurrence and transformation. The model sees conflicts in social change as a shift in non-violent and violent conflict transformation. As a result, they have witnessed further social changes and are then suppressed to say that their interests are resisting the current norms and power structures. The authors believe that “the life cycle of conflict develops from peaceful social change to the formation of conflict, then it turns to violent conflict, then turns to conflict transformation, and then returns to peaceful and comprehensive social change.”
However, as the formation of conflicts can lead to conflicts returning to social transformation without involving violence. It may even shift back and forth. As a result, the scope of third-party intervention has expanded. Previously, classic conflict resolution only dealt with conflicts by helping parties involved in conflicts to settle disputes in a non-violent manner. Ramsbothan, Hugh and Woodhouse inform that in the 1990s, Fisher and Keashly's third-party intervention model was introduced. The model aims to propose appropriate strategies for resolution such as mediation, peacekeeping and conciliation to places of violence.348
3.6 Nuclear Deterrence and Conflict The proponents of nuclear deterrence theory believe that all states which have nuclear weapons are equal, regardless of their conventional military strength and power status. The reason for no war is the existence of nuclear weapons. The success of nuclear deterrence is that states avoid using force to settle their disputes or conflicts. It has led to a lack of war between two conflicting states. There is no direct war between the US and the Soviet Union cited as an example of the success of the Cold War deterrence. Whether deterrence succeeds or fails in conflict, the determinants are variable, and their changes also depend on conflict situations and deterrence strategies.
Deterrence is related to conflict, but it does not correspond to the resolution of the conflict. Deterrence is only effective if there is an active conflict. It is meaningless to
347 Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1956), 74. 348 Ramsbotham, Miall, and Woodhouse, Contemporary conflict, 38. 141
acquire nuclear weapons without active or potential conflicts, and it will only weaken the deterrence theory. Therefore, when analyzing the success of deterrence, conflict is a variable that must be considered. The severity of a conflict can lead to failure or success of deterrence.349 The lack of war is not necessarily the success of nuclear deterrence, because it is the current state of conflict that enables all parties to the conflict to suppress the escalation of the conflict. This status quo is assessed by the states themselves, and they themselves decide to change the status quo.
Henry Kissinger has aptly stated that “the nuclear age turned strategy into deterrence, and deterrence into an esoteric intellectual exercise. Since deterrence can only be tested negatively, by events that do not take place, and since it is never possible to demonstrate why something has not occurred, it became especially difficult to assess whether the existing policy was the best possible policy or just a barely effective one. Perhaps deterrence even was unnecessary because it was impossible to prove whether the adversary ever intended to attack in the first place”.350
It is also important to assess whether an attack is imminent before analyzing the analysis of deterrence success or failure. Deterring an opponent from the consequences being attacked is a secondary issue because the first question is to assess whether the opponent is planning or thinking about an attack. This level of perception of conflict is related to deterrence. Deterrence “plays an important role in the psychological aspects of policy making of the leaders”.351 The non-violent outcome of conflict is often associated with deterrence success. But this result will never come out in the form of conflict resolution, because it will violate the goal of deterrence. When there is a fierce conflict, a country gains nuclear deterrence, and there is always the possibility that the opponent will launch an attack and there is a relative power difference between the opponents. Nuclear deterrence caters to power differences and establishes overall power balance. This power balance enables the weaker state to at least maintain the status quo. Nuclear deterrence keeps this status quo. If this status quo is disturbed, it may lead to deterrence failure.352
For the defensive analysis of deterrence, the threat to retaliate only works with the rational actor model of decision making. To perceive a threat as effective and real, the
349 Michael Krepon, Interview via email, June 18, 2018. 350 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 608. 351 Michael Krepon, Interview via email, June 18, 2018. 352 Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 194. 142
adversary, who is aggressive, must have the rationality to understand that the aggression would be an expensive step. This also poses a challenge to defending the state, effectively ensuring that the opponent believes it has the ability to make large-scale retaliation in the event of any attack. This defensive approach sounds more likely to be satisfied with the status quo and to maintain it. Similarly, deterrence helps to keep conflicts low, but never allows conflicts to be resolved or changed.
In fact, offensive deterrence aspect where there is inequality in power status but the nuclear weapons produce a relative power balance that avoids war. In this case, when deterrence fails, the conflict can be resolved. This happens when a powerful state successfully lifts a weak state and forces it to succumb to a more favorable settlement. However, this settlement does not lead to the resolution of conflict or the final transformation of conflict. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were superpowers, and their power status was roughly equal. This equality guarantees that war is the least likely because of the threat of massive retaliation and secondary strike capabilities, as well as the strategic depth provided by allies and nuclear modernization. These factors keep the conflict at a low level, but the conflict still exists and nuclear deterrence does not lead to the resolution or transformation of the conflict. Deterrence can only try to avoid violent conflicts that could escalate into a full-blown war.
Concluding Thoughts It can be stated that conflicts occur at all levels, including, individual, national and international. Conflicts can take place over resources, religion, identity etc. It is very important to distinguish between positive and negative conflict. With advancement of peace and conflict research, there are several known approaches to deal with conflicts, which have made progress in settling, managing, resolving conflict. Conflict transformation details the political and social sources of the conflict. As per conflict transformation, conflicts are caused by problems of inequality and injustice. Therefore, conflict transformation has done a lot of work by changing the structures that lead to inequality and injustice. The process of conflict transformation has also improved the relationship between the parties to the conflict. It also promotes a system that encourages justice, empowerment and peace. As far as South Asia is concerned, neither India nor Pakistan has resolved their dispute. However, nuclear deterrence has prevented a full- scale war between the two. The process of conflict transformation goes beyond classic
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conflict resolution. It has a broader scope because it deals with mental images that opponents have about each other, based on their past experiences. Conflict transformation has a larger perspective, including an understanding of past and present rival relationships. Opponents who have experienced painful experiences with each other can lead to hostile behavior. Since the image of the past always plagues this relationship, the prospect of conflict transformation is reduced by the history of hostile relationships.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PROTRACTED CONFLICTS IN SOUTH ASIA UNDER NUCLEAR AMBIT South Asia has been known as a region of mistrust and conflict353 that has unresolved conflicts. The security challenges emanating from these conflicts are diverse and range from traditional to non-traditional in nature. These challenges have weakened the regional strategic stability. Ups and downs of their relationship further complicate and weaken the regional security environment. The security environment of the region is diverse and Indo-Pakistan security policies have evolved and reshaped the regional scenario. There is an inherent difference in size, land, population, military power, and economy of India and Pakistan.354 Pakistan and India are two nations having unique lifestyles and contrasting religious and social norms that have not been able to merge or gel together despite living together for centuries. These religious and social differences have been on the base of natural conflict between the two nations.
On the basis of socio-religious differences that translated into enmity over the years, premature decision for division of subcontinent that resulted in large scale killings during mass migration and the hasty and unjust division of assets between the two new states, and active conflict emanating from these events, is the main cause of Pakistan’s threat perception from India. Pakistan believes that India has never accepted Pakistan as an independent state and has always conspired to destroy its existence.
Both states have fought three wars in 1948, 1965 and 1971 over this issue and in 1999 there was a low intensity conflict. The crises on “Line of Control (LoC)” remain a constant feature of India-Pakistan relations.355 In 1998, South Asian nuclearization further complicated the situation when India conducted its nuclear tests and Pakistan followed suit to maintain the regional balance of power.356 Its acquisition of nuclear weapons is mainly to cater to Indian superiority in conventional forces and to challenge India’s
353 Bhumitra Chakma, “Is a liberal security order emerging in South Asia?” (Paper presented at the 22nd European Conference on South Asian Studies, ISCTE-Lisbon University, July 26, 2012). 354 Takaya Suto, “Prospect of Arms Control and CTBT in South Asia,” Islamabad Policy Research Institute (2004): 209-210. 355 Line of Control, originally known as the Ceasefire Line, is a de-facto border in Kashmir, which separated it into two parts i.e. called Azad Jammu & Kashmir and Jammu & Kashmir. It was renamed as LoC in July 1972 of according to Simla Agreement signed between Pakistan and India. Since then, in accordance with any tension between India and Pakistan relations, the cross border firings came into seen. 356 Hussain, “Nuclearization of South Asia,” 1-6. 145
dominant position in regional and international affairs.357 Therefore, whenever and wherever India tries to change balance of power, Pakistan has to make every possible effort to restore it. India has an advantageous position over Pakistan on the basis of infrastructure for industrial production, military modernization and the development of nuclear technology.
Nuclear deterrence has played a role in shaping the contours of the conflict in the region. It has somehow reduced the possibility of direct war between two rivals. However, it has not reduced the conflict between the two competitors. At the nuclear level, the deterrence has played its role by restricting the escalation of conflict, however, at conventional level, the intensity of conflict has increased with sporadic episodes of border skirmishes and movement of forces near the respective borders. Deterrence has brought about this stability-instability paradox358 where the nuclear deterrent posture maintained by India and Pakistan represented stability on one hand and instability on the other hand. The paradox suggests that “nuclear weapons simultaneously induce stability at level of nuclear war and instability at lower intensity levels of violence.”359 Throughout the Kargil crisis and “2001-2002 military stand-off”, nuclear deterrence prevented two states from indulging in major war. However, the taking place of these standoffs themselves represented instability at conventional level where both the states did not escalate to nuclear level while being encouraged to indulge in the conventional conflict under security of nuclear umbrella.
The nuclear deterrence has managed to de-escalate conflict between India and Pakistan, but could not eliminate the conflict because it has not been able to help in eliminating the causes of conflict which are necessary to resolve the conflict. While the study of deterrence with reference to conflict transformation is done in detail in this study, the broad conclusion is evident that deterrence between India and Pakistan has only been able to manage conflict in which both states have refrained from indulging into direct conflict involving war. But it has failed to head towards conflict resolution owing to the fact that reason for the conflict remains. This chapter is aimed to highlight why
357 A. Z. Hilali, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrence: Political and Strategic Dimensions,” Centre for Strategic Studies (2003): 4, Available at http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/A.Z.-Hilali.pdf. 358 The term stability-instability paradox originated from analysts such as Glenn Snyder and Robert Jervis who tried to explain why in the first nuclear era, superpowers managed to avoid conventional armed conflicts that might lead to nuclear exchange rather than using proxy wars to gain advantage over the other. Feroz Hassan Khan, “The Independence Dependence Paradox Stability Dilemmas in South Asia,” Arms Control Today, (October 2003), Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_10/Khan_10.asp?print 359 Anuj Panday, “The Stability-Instability Paradox: The Case of the Kargil War,” Penn State University Journal of International Affairs 1, no. 1 (2011): 7, Available at https://scholarsphere.psu.edu/downloads/s7526c40b. 146
protracted conflicts between Pakistan and India could not transform through nuclear deterrence? However, before analyzing the issues, the dynamics of conflict in South Asia must be elaborated to provide important context of the situation.
This chapter will discuss the dynamics of India Pakistan rivalry, its basis and how it has evolved over time through development of nuclear weapons and changing patterns of foreign alliances. The nature of relative state behaviors would also be discussed that is the basic research question of the study. Mutual mistrust and security dilemma has led to the development of threat perception which has been reflected in their relative state behaviors. Nuclear deterrence has minimized the chances of war but the technological developments relating to nuclear weapons have increased this threat perception and resulted in more aggressive state behavior.
4.1 Dynamics of India-Pakistan Enmity Since 1947 and even before independence, there has been mutual hostility between India and Pakistan.360 The different behaviors of these two states have historical and religious cultural dissimilarities in the pre-partition two-nation theory. This two- nation theory has transformed into ‘two states’ conflict where the mutual differences have solidified into mistrust and enmity. The Kashmir conflict has been the point of conflict right from the independence of both Pakistan and India. They have fought three wars in 1948, 1965 and 1971 on the same issue whereas Kargil crisis and border dispute over Siachin have been rising time and again. Pakistan, with respect to size, economy, and conventional military power, perceives threat361 from India being the immediate neighbor having hostile behavior towards it. This threat perception has resulted in a security dilemma. The resulting threat perception stems from the security challenges from India.
Pakistan views that India has never been pleased with the formation of Pakistan and it has made every possible effort to weaken Pakistan’s sovereignty and survivability. At the time of partition, the basis for mutual animosity was laid in terms of unequal and hasty division of resources by the British to the two newly formed states. On the issue of cash and military distribution, India was reluctant and after the decision of Arbitration Tribunal and Pakistan’s efforts only 700 million out of 4000 million rupees were paid to
360 Donald Johnson, “India-Pakistan Relations: A 50-Year History,” Asia Society, Available at http://asiasociety.org/countries/conflicts/india-pakistan-relations-50-year-history. 361 Ayesha Siddiqa, “India-Pakistan relations: Confrontation to conciliation,” Centre for Democratic Governance, The Network for Consumer Protection, 2004, Available at http://www.thenetwork.org.pk/Resources/Magazines/PDF/12-8-2011-2-54-59-792-Indo- Pak%20Relations.pdf. 147
Pakistan.362 Similarly “division of military assets proved to be a particularly acute and complex problem”.363 Cheema is of the view that “in Pakistan’s due share of military stores only 4703 tons (3 per cent) out of 165,000 tons of ordnance stores were delivered to it by India. Out of 249 tanks allotted to Pakistan, none was delivered, and out of 40,000 to 60,000 tons of ammunition allocated to Pakistan, nothing was delivered.”364 Issues of allotment of evacuee property, division assets, and the matter of princely states represent setting up of behavior of animosity and bad blood between the two states at all levels including individual level, military establishment level, and government level. This feeling of animosity is deep rooted in the minds and hearts of the people of two states which is consequently represented in the relative state behavior.
Misperception and lack of trust have defined the relationship of Pakistan and India. This misperception has created an enduring rivalry between both states. India has not been able to accept the establishment of Pakistan from heart and has considered the partition as cutting of the baby into two. A Congress President once said, “Neither the Congress nor the nation has given up its claim of united India”.365 Indira Gandhi also shared the same sentiment and few hours prior to 1971 war on the western front, she admitted, “India has never reconciled with the existence of Pakistan.” Indian leaders have always viewed that creation of Pakistan was unjustified and that Pakistani nation does not deserve to exist.366 These are just few instances out of many in which bias, prejudice and hatred for Pakistan’s creation and nation has been expressed. As far as Pakistan’s opinion about India is concerned, that is also not neutral. They also perceived every move of their rivals with mistrust and suspicion.
Alternatively, India believes that Pakistan has been trying to demonize India in world affairs with China. It believes that Pakistan-China relations are threat to its security and interests. India takes partition as the unjust decision imposed upon it because sub- continent represented the great India, and Pakistan is mere dominion of it. India believes itself as a great nation in the world affairs and is a staunch follower of prestige in international arena. Its behavior stems from the very root of this pride and prestige. Pakistan being the challenger to this prestige is never welcomed in the state relations and
362 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Pakistan's Defence Policy 1947-58 (London UK: Macmillan, 1990), 31. 363 Ibid. 364 Ibid., 32. 365 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “ Pakistani Perspective on International Security”, Asian Perspectives on International Security, pp. 135-150 available at: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-349-07036-7_9 . 366 Ibid., 149-150. 148
Indian behavior towards Pakistan has been accordingly little.
The acrimonious state behavior was evident even in the first year of the partition of sub-continent, when both states were engaged in the war of 1948 over Kashmir. In fact, neither can afford the burden of war. So, the United Nations was involved, interestingly by India, to manage conflict between the two states. Although the conflict was managed at that time with the UN Resolution calling for the plebiscite to be held in Kashmir to decide their future accession according to the will of Kashmiris, however, neither this resolution was not honored nor was the conflict resolved. Additionally, the conflict developed into a permanent security threat emanating into a security dilemma. This security dilemma has developed stronger over time with the wars of 1965 and 1971.
Due to their security dilemma, the acquisition of military technology was essential for both states. Accordingly, they are engaged in enhancing their military power. In this regard, external factors also contributed to the escalation of competition in South Asia because of states pursuing their own interests in the region. The US, former Soviet Union, and China significantly changed the status and capabilities of India and Pakistan. During the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, Pakistan joined the Western bloc. India pursued the so-called non-alignment policy with the superpowers; however, it enjoyed close relationship with Soviet Union. To counter Soviet expansionist policies in the region, the United States needed allies in the region. Therefore, through the Vandenberg resolution, the United States established a relationship with Pakistan and had no choice. At the same time, Pakistan needed the United States to provide assistance in many areas. Pakistan has received US assistance in the economic and military fields. Military equipment provided by the United States included hundreds of Patton tanks, Armed Personnel Carriers (APCs), artillery ammunition, howitzers, fighter jets and submarines.
Pakistan joined the defence pacts with the US i.e. the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). However, the US did not itself prove to be a dependable ally of Pakistan during the wars of 1965 and 1971. The US in spite of Pakistan’s supreme ally did not exert its influence to end the war in accordance with Pakistan’s desire. However, sanctions were forced on both the warring parties. Eventually, Pakistan formally left SEATO in 1973.367 However, the alliance continued and when Soviet forces invaded
367 “Milestones: 1953–1960,” Office of the Historian, Available at https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/seato. 149
Afghanistan, the US needed Pakistan’s help again. In the 1980s, Pakistan remained a frontier of the Afghan jihadist group in order to expel the Soviet army and eventually led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Since the realist worldview advocates that one's national interests are always supreme, Pakistan did this for its own supreme national interest because its nuclear program matured during this period and the US, despite having knowledge of Pakistan’s activities, remained silent. However, after the end of the Afghan war, the United States once again abandoned Pakistan.
The 9/11 incident of terrorists’ attacks shocked the United States, brought a dramatic shift in the world order and for US policy to Pakistan as well. This incident of terrorist attack reshaped the US policy in the region as the global war on terrorism started. The United States launched the Global War on Terror (GWOT) against the culprits and sponsor of terrorists’ attacks. Pakistan also joined the war and has been fighting as a frontline state since then. Demands were made to Pakistan to promote the interests of the United States. The hostile environment created by the US-led GWOT has had a strong impact on Pakistan, more than other states of the world. As an ally, Pakistan suffered considerable gains and losses. These gains have emerged in the form of foreign military and economic assistance. The losses include political instability, internal unrest, demise of lives and the subsequent economic drawbacks etc.
According to the then President Pervaiz Musharraf “the tragedy of 9/11 transformed security policies and changed geopolitical calculations”. “Pakistan took a strategic decision, based on the principles of humanity and our national interests, to support the war on terror…. Pakistan will remain in the forefront.”368 In response, Pakistan received US assistance in several areas such as education, health, economy etc. `
India has also benefited economically and militarily from the superpower rivalry. India has been wisely choosing partners to support its national interests. Its relationship with the Soviet Union is as long as Pakistan’s relationship with the United States. The Soviet Union expanded its support for the Indian non-alignment policy during the Cold War owing to the reason of containing US influence in the region and to restrain China as well.369 The Sino-Soviet conflict and the hostile relationship between India and China
368 Shabana Fayyaz, “Post 911: Peace Narrative in Pakistan,” Conflict and Peace Studies 2, no. 1 (2009): 1, Available at www.san-pips.com/download.php?f=145.pdf. 369 Rizwan Naseer and Musarat Amin, "Dynamics of Balance of Power in South Asia: Implications for Regional Peace,” Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences 1, no. 1 (2011): 5. 150
have strengthened relations between India and Russia. Economically and militarily, Russia publicly supported India against China during the 1962 war.370 The Soviet Union transferred a large number of weapons to support India. The Soviet Union sent Soviet weapons to India for the first time in the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict. The Soviet Union established military production and heavy industry in India. According to estimates, “Russia's military assistance to India totaled $35 billion in military equipment from 1960 to 2000.”371 India has also played a role in promoting US goals in the region.372 Dwight D. Eisenhower was the first US President who visited India in 1959 to make good terms with India. President John F. Kennedy (1961-63), considered India as US strategic partner to counter China. In 1962, in Sino-India war, US provided full and open support to India.
The great powers, despite having influence in the regional affairs, did not help to reduce conflict in South Asia. Despite all the sacrifices made by Pakistan in GWOT, US gave priority to India over Pakistan and always put pressure on Pakistan to be friendly with India. US never compelled India to change its aggressive behavior towards Pakistan.373 The great powers have been urging both the states to resolve conflicts through dialogue but never helped the cause because of their discriminative policies in the region.
4.2 Essence of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence South Asian nuclearization in 1998 marked the overt deterrence posture of both India and Pakistan. With the nuclear deterrence, the conflict between two states has undergone new dimension. The old competition was not weakened, but the hostilities of war were reduced to the cold conflict based on mutual deterrence. However, old acrimonious behaviors often disrupt the security situation in the region, and states take actions that undermine deterrence in the region.
4.2.1 Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Drivers and State Behavior The international system is characterized by the struggle for dominance. Realists believe that “the important unit of social life is the collectivity and that in international
370 Ibid., 6. 371 Ibid., 7. 372 K. Alan Kronstadt, “India-US Relations,” Congressional Research Service (2006): 3, Available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/61525.pdf. 373 Asif Haroon Raja, “USA responsible for making Pakistan most dangerous country,” Pakistan Tribune, October 10, 2013, October, Available at http://paktribune.com/articles/USA-responsible-for-making-Pakistan-most-dangerous-country-243131.html 151
politics the only really important collective actor is the state, which recognizes no authority above it”.374 Realism is relevant because there is no single authority at international level which could police the behavior of the states. “Continuing from the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, the intellectual roots of realism have developed and evolved through centuries from the writings of Niccolo Machiavelli, E. H. Carr, George F. Kennan, Hans J. Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Kenneth W. Thompson and Kautilya”375 it is still applicable. The same is true when we analyze the evolution of Indian nuclear policy. The traditional realist paradigm, focuses on power politics and the maintenance of credible force for the defence of the country, is at the core of Indian nuclear policy. To explain the evolution of Indian nuclear policy, it is pertinent to look into the realist explanation of rationale for Indian nuclear development.
4.2.2 Rationale for Nuclear Development Joseph Cirincione has given the rationale concepts of “why states want nuclear weapons and why they don’t”. he has introduced five models, namely, “security model, prestige model, domestic political model, technological model and economic model”.376 These models are analyzed in case of Indian nuclear development as under:
First, the “national security model” argues that “the states seek nuclear weapons to enhance their own security. Nuclear weapons, in this regard, are the ultimate security guarantors and a source of deterrence in state rivalry.” Cirincione points out that “as one state goes nuclear another state is forced to do so, and then another and another.”377 The realism focuses on the security factor for nuclear development and proliferation. India’s nuclearization aptly fits in this model being the core driver for its nuclearization. India was challenged by security concerns owing to Indo-China war and the development of nuclear weapons by China. So it could not have closed its eyes from the growing threat from China. Pak-China growing relations also exacerbated security challenge for India in the longer term. Therefore, India had no choice other than going nuclear.
Second, “prestige model claims that states feel more powerful, relevant, and respected when they possess nuclear weapons”.378 The states are allured that “their status in the international system will increase, and they will enjoy greater negotiating influence
374 Jack Donnelly, “Realism and international relations,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 7. 375 Ibid. 376 Joseph Cirincione, “Why States want Nuclear Weapons and Why They Don’t,” Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 47-83. 377 Ibid. 378 Ibid., 159. 152
at the international level”. Sagan views that “nuclear weapons may serve important symbolic functions – both shaping and reflecting a state’s identity.”379 India claims itself to be a great civilization and proud of its identity. This establishes India's soft power, while nuclear weapons should also make it inconvincible in terms of “hard power”. In addition, Indian eagerness to gain more influence in world politics, and nuclear capabilities could have helped to develop this prestige.
Third, domestic political model posits that, “states acquire nuclear weapons when a set of well-placed bureaucratic actors stimulate the political leaders to acquire them.”380 As such, “the political parties have their basic leanings towards a certain philosophy according to either leftist or rightist ideologies”. The domestic dimension is tremendously important. The realist paradigm asserts that national interests are supreme and when we link national interests with bureaucratic interests and political structure of a state, then national interests or nationalism is exploited by these bureaucracies and political parties. Some analysts have agreed that nuclear weapons bring domestic political benefits for the regime. It is either for their party promotion or for reestablishing the declining credibility of the party in the domestic political structure.
The domestic political system has played a crucial role in India’s nuclear policy dynamics. In the early years after independence, Nehru’s ideas originated from Gandhi’s non-violence ideology, and he therefore emphasized peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, this ideology faded away and the more realist pattern exists in the Indian nuclear policy vis-à-vis political parties. For example, in 1998, the “Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP”) advocated nationalist radical ideology that stemmed from the overt nuclear explosions. In addition, the bureaucracy and political leadership formed a pressure group along with scientists whose pressure was vital for Indian policy. For instance, Shastri was an ideological Gandhi, but Homi Bhabha at the time of course benefited from the geostrategic pattern of the region, putting pressure on Shastri to seek nuclear options. Bhabha had successfully gained public support “by projecting the vitality of nuclear weapons in ensuring national security”.381 Ultimately, Shastri gave up Gandhi and adopt a case of Bhabha under pressure.
Fourth, “if a state has the technological capability to develop nuclear weapons,
379 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security, 21, no. 3 (1997): 73. 380 Cirincione, “Why States want Nuclear Weapons,” 49. 381 “India’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” Available at http:\\www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/indiaFirstBomb.html 153
then it has the option to do so”382 “Despite the cost tagged to the nuclear weapons, states do seek the ultimate source of security attached to the nuclear weapons”. Indian nuclear development was quite evitable due to the fact that it had necessary infrastructure through Atoms for Peace program and “off course the possibility of underground nuclear black market cannot be undermined”.
Fifth, the economic dimension gives us the picture of nuclear weapons as costly affair. The states having serious concerns to the national security may go for the nuclear weapons development option. Alternately, enthusiasts of nuclear weapons contend that guaranteed security at affordable one-time cost of nuclear weapons is cheaper than the management of conventional forces. However, the mere economic resources cannot lure a state into arms race. Contrary to this, the Soviets could not bear the cost of nuclear arms race with United States during the Cold War and it was economic instability that caused USSR to escape out from Cold War. Moreover, the mere nuclear weapons not helped USSR to stand in conflict with the US. It is important that economic conditions cannot alone explain a state’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.383 In the case of India, the need for security is considered to be the need to strengthen nuclear weapons, putting economic considerations aside and using them for weapons developing.
This theory based discussion explains the core aspects of India’s nuclear policy. India’s nuclear policy seems to evolve with development. The Nehru period was the stage for laying the foundations of India’s diplomatic and nuclear policy. Indian nuclear program is significantly based in the ideology of gaining prestige in the world affairs through nuclear weapons. This has been a discrete feature of Indian foreign policy. The Indian nuclear program is very old and its basis was laid by the first Prime Minister of India Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru who introduced the Atomic Energy Act before India's Constituent Assembly to create an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the legal framework for its Operation.”384 Then Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) was established on August 10, 1948, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act.385 At that time Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru made it clear that India would not restrict itself with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and if it is compelled, it would go for nuclear weapon
382 Cirincione, “Why States want Nuclear Weapons,” 70-71. 383 Ibid., 76-77. 384 George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (California: University of California Press, 2002), 17-18. 385 Ibid. 154
option.386
4.2.3 Nehruvian Philosophy Pundit Jawahar Lal Nehru was the first Prime Minister of India and in fact the only person to hold office from 1947 to 1964. He was a staunch nationalist but not a Marxist. It is hard to apply a specific framework of ideology to Nehru. Indira Gandhi has written that “his thoughts were driven from both the East and the West and was at the same time a socialist who had abhorrence for discipline but also a democrat who was anxious to reconcile his faith in civil liberty with the necessity of mitigating economic and social backwardness”.387 He has been accredited as “the founder of Indian foreign policy” at a very fragile time after the independence.
With the rise of bipolar world, Nehru was strong enough to lead the “Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)”. His aspirations were steadfast to lead India as independent state with foreign policy devoid from foreign power influence. The characteristics of his policy represent introvert as well as extrovert trends. “Introvert in a sense that he made India somewhat isolated from the world according to socialist designs while extrovert in a sense that, he had carried forward the slogan of the greater India”. Admittedly, “in view of international relations analysts, the emergence as a major power has made it aspirant of becoming the great power at the world level”.
The Indian nuclear policy also represents this very confusion. Nehru was also a Gandhian follower and initially he was also against nuclear. However, his policy was not in oblivion from usefulness of nuclear technology. “His world view about the nuclear weapons was that it may play a role in the future for national defence if the efforts for the nuclear disarmament fail”.388
Nehru stated, “the revolution caused by discoveries having to do with atomic energy can either destroy human civilization, or take it up to unheard levels.”389 In-spite of being against nuclear weapons, he did not close the option of nuclear weapons for India. In fact, the credit of laying the foundations of nuclear weapons goes to him. The nuclear option was kept alive. He believed that in order to become achieve status of great
386“India's Nuclear Weapons Program: The Beginning: 1944-1960,” March 2001, Available at http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaOrigin.html. 387 Indira Gandhi, “Foreword”, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Vol. I (New Delhi, 1984). 55. 388 Rajesh Rajagopalan, “India’s Nuclear Policy,” Major Power’s Nuclear Policies and International Order in the 21st Century (2009), 95. 389 Ashok Kapur, “Nehru’s Nuclear Policy,” Milton Israel, ED, Nehru and the Twentieth Century (Toronto, 1991), 217-32. 155
power; India must acquire the nuclear weapon. “His worldview about strategic importance of nuclear weapons was attributed with the history of nuclear development”.390 He was in control of foreign office as well as Atomic Energy Department while keeping the secrecy over nuclear program. His team was immune from any public scrutiny regarding the program.
Three Englishmen were behind conceptualization of strategic thinking of Nehru, “Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck, Lt. General Francis Tucker, and Professor P. M. S. Blackett”. During the transition phase of division of Sub-continent and independence of India, he came across these persons while he was Indian interim Prime Minister. He listened to the ideas of two military brains about how useful nuclear technology and nuclear weapons would become in the future security scenario. However, professor Blackett inspired him more with his three tier approach regarding nuclear technology; “the usefulness of nukes, advocacy of disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy”. Nehru liked these themes and laid down the policy to implement them.
He was a nuclear pacifist as he advocated that nukes are only weapons of destruction and should be restricted or abolished. However, he also admitted that atomic bomb had revolutionized warfare, however, these are not war fighting weapons rather they are only “weapons of mass destruction”. Furthermore, he also understood the importance of minimum level of nuclear deterrence which is the part of India’s nuclear policy. He made an assertion that “India needed ‘cheap power’ considering the economic conditions and technological capabilities of India, and a small weapon capability rather than heap of bombs”.391
Like Gandhi, Nehru was also more conscious regarding the Indian image in the world. Being the leader of the NAM and the staunch supporter of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, “as India supported the finalization of Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), Indian reputation at international level would have been damaged if India had gone for the nuclear weapons at that stage, though a statement by Nehru, in 1961 when Zerlina reactor went critical, reveals that India could make the bomb in two years but chose not to do so”.392 Nehru has had a very strong impact on the foreign policy of India.
390 Bharat Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008), 37. 391 Karnad, “India’s Nuclear Policy,” 37-39. 392 Quoted in paper presented by prof. V. Suryanarayan at an international seminar on “Rajiv Gandhi’s Disarmament Initiatives: Global and South Asian Contexts” (Pondicherry University: March 9-11, 2010). 156
K. D. Nicholas, consultant to White House, visited India in 1960 “to discuss plans for building India’s first nuclear reactor, briefed Prime Minister Nehru in the presence of Homi Bhabha”.393 Nicholas narrates that “Nehru turned to Bhabha and asked, can you develop an atomic bomb? Bhabha assured him that he could and in reply to Nehru's next question about time, he estimated that he would need about a year to do it. I was really astounded to be hearing these questions from the one I thought to be one of the world’s most peace-loving leaders. He then asked me if I agreed with Bhabha, and I replied that I knew of no reason why Bhabha could not do it ... He concluded by saying to Bhabha Well, don't do it until I tell you to”.394
India had the wherewithal and resources to develop nuclear weapons during the 1960s but the matter was kept confidential. However, after India's defeat in the Indo- China war of 1962, the first formal demand for the development of nuclear weapons was made in the parliament by the Jana Sangh Party in December 1962.395 The nuclear test of China in 1964 and its help for Pakistan in 1965 war contributed towards the realization that India must have a nuclear deterrent of its own.396
India conducted Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974 and has undergone development of nuclear delivery system since then. The Indian nuclear policy is the achievement of a deterrent which is based on achieving the triad of strategic forces including army, navy, and air force. India has a very dynamic missile program capable of reaching all of Pakistan and the western portion of China.397 India is also developing anti- ballistic missile system in order to achieve second strike capability, a trait that the great powers have struggled to achieve.398 This vision drives the behavior of India as a state in international affairs.
4.2.4 Nuclear Deterrence of Pakistan: Drivers and Behavior The basis of nuclear deterrence of Pakistan rests on the realist paradigm of survival and self-help. Once India had developed nuclear bomb, it became a compulsion
393 Naeem Ahmad Salik, “Regional Dynamics and Deterrence: South Asia (2),” Contemporary Security Policy 25, no.1 (2004): 179- 201. 394 George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (California: University of California Press, 2002), 36. 395“India's Nuclear Weapons Program: On to Weapons Development: 1960-1967,” March 30, 2001, Available at http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaWDevelop.html. 396 Izuyama Marie and Ogawa Shinichi, “The Nuclear Policy of India and Pakistan,” Available at http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/bulletin_e2002_3.pdf 397 Nick Shehle and Nathan Blanton, “An Overview of India’s Nuclear Weapons Program and Proliferation Concerns,” Available at http://www.ne.ncsu.edu/faculty/yim/documents/NE591-S2010/Report/India_rep.pdf. 398 Ibid. 157
for Pakistan to go for nuclearization. Pakistan has been struggling with development of conventional capability against Indian threat due to technological and economic constraints and unwillingness of suppliers. However nuclear deterrence has brought a balance of power with India. Despite all the differences in size, economy, and conventional power, nuclear deterrence gives Pakistan a relative equity of power.399 Pakistan’s security policy approach is India centric. The regional security environment has always compelled Pakistan to react to India’s nuclear developments.
The basis of Pakistan’s nuclear program started in 1972 with the vision of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was Pakistan’s Prime Minister at that time. It was he who “initiated the military nuclear program on priority basis considering the security dilemma posed by the Indian nuclear weapons program”.400 During late 1970s and early 80s India had realized that Pakistan’s nuclear program had matured and was in military control. In addition, the strategic environment indicated that United States had come closer to Pakistan after Afghan war.
The geo-strategic landscape of South Asia shows that the conflict between India and Pakistan escalates and de-escalates with the relative enhancements in the military and nuclear capabilities.401 Whenever the strategic balance created by the nuclear deterrence, is disturbed by one state, there is a resultant disturbance in the regional security situation demanding the balancing act by the adversary. Therefore, when India conducted nuclear tests, Pakistan was compelled to follow suit.402 Pakistan has been working to design advanced nuclear weapons and delivery systems to meet its security needs.403It is undeniable that Pakistan has made challenging and inevitable decisions for its national interests. The nuclear deterrence can only work if it fulfills the pre-requisites of credibility, capability, and communication. Therefore, Pakistan has to maintain the capability, credibility and the effective communication of deterrence in order to deter India. Owing to nuclear weapons there is a power balance in South Asia owing to nuclear deterrence. The conventional difference in important, however, the nuclear deterrence nullifies the extra advantage of numerical value of conventional weapons. Although
399“Timeline: Pakistan's Nuclear Program,” CNN, February 5, 2004, Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/02/04/pakistan.nuclear.timeline.reut/. 400 An ISSI Strategic Dossier, “Pakistan’s nuclear program and imports,” Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks, 15. 401 Kamal Matinuddin, The Nuclearization of South Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 356. 402 Ian Bremmer and Maria Kuusisto, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Command and Control: Perception Matters,” South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI), Research Report 15, May 2008, available at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/99926/RR%20No%2015.pdf 403 Naeem Ahmad Salik (2004) Regional dynamics and deterrence: South Asia (2), Contemporary Security Policy, 25:1, 179-201,. 158
nuclear weapons are the weapons which are not desired for actual use, yet when the conventional limits are reached and sovereignty of state is being compromised, then nuclear deterrence suggests that nuclear use is the only option. But the nuclear policy does not desire to reach that stage when nuclear weapons are required to be used. Rather the nuclear deterrence is successful only if it avoids nuclear use.
4.3 Nuclear Balance of Power in South Asia and Nuclear Doctrines The pre-nuclear era shows the strategic landscape of South Asia as prone to escalation of conflict into war at any time. However, nuclear weapons have significantly changed the strategic balance in South Asia. Nuclear deterrence has settled the problem of power balance in South Asia. Although India is a big country, yet it cannot attack Pakistan because of nuclear deterrence. If India believes that it can use force against Pakistan, then it must ensure that all Pakistani nuclear weapons are taken out in the first attack. On the other hand, Pakistan cannot attack India because a sure first strike that could take out all the enemy forces is very hard to ascertain. If the first strike cannot take out all the strategic targets then a nuclear strike could be suicidal and catastrophic for the whole region and even beyond. Therefore, states desire to pursue a definite nuclear policy and doctrine to communicate the nuclear deterrence effectively as well as to develop fool proof parameters for it keeping in view the requirements of the policy.
A doctrine can be described as a set of principles that are applied and formulated for specific reasons and are devoted to a coveted goal or perspective. Obviously, these principles can be supported and educated as a correct theory for the main part of the general population concerned. Nuclear doctrine subsequently comprises of an arrangement of standards, guidelines and directions for the employment or non- employment of atomic weapons and different frameworks related with these weapons.
India’s nuclear policy has evolved with the region’s changing strategic environment. India’s views on China and the China-Pakistan alliance’s threats convey a realistic view of India’s nuclear policy. Accordingly, a credible minimum deterrence strategy was adopted.404 The Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine was issued in 1998 and was produced by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), a group of non- governmental experts. The 1999 doctrine proposed a nuclear policy based on the unspecified minimum force, but one which would also be credible and survivable. In
404 Ibid., 70. 159
addition, India would not use nuclear weapons first (no-first use of nuclear weapons or NFU) and will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries (Negative Security Assurance or NSA). However, the official nuclear doctrine “announced in 2003 was much briefer than this and showed three major variations from the previous one, namely the notion of massive retaliation was added, and dilution of NFU and NSA”.405 This step was taken upon failure of “Operation Parakaram in 2001-02” when tension increased at border. The nuclear policy since then represents a more proactive stance of India.
Pakistan does not have a declared nuclear doctrine. However, it follows “Minimum Credible Deterrence” aimed at maintaining minimum level of nuclear deterrence to counter the Indian threat. Nuclear policy of Pakistan is based on option of first strike. Alternatively, Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if attacked by India regardless of the possibility that conventional weapons are used for attack.406 Pakistan’s position is different to the general deterrence theory as it is faced with substantial conventional forces imbalance. Pakistan views nuclear weapons as deterrence to invasion by Indian forces, apparently considering that any substantial attack across the border would present an existential threat.407 With his experience in atomic reaction in the United States, Professor Stephen P. Cohen believes that Pakistan would utilize what he calls an 'Option Enhancing Policy' for a conceivable utilization of atomic weapons.408
The doctrine of “Option Enhancing Policy” entails a step-by-step approach in which the atomic risk expands each time it progresses to prevent from being attacked by India. The first step may be open or private warnings, the second step is to show an explosion of a little atomic weapon on its own soil, and the third step is to use some atomic weapons on their own land against the Indian attacking forces. The fourth step will be used to counter the key but pure military power of India from the Pakistani border. It may cause minor collateral damage in areas of sparsely populated areas.409
This may prevent Indians against fighting the urban communities of Pakistan. Some weapon frameworks may be used in counter-value roles in the future. These weapons would be safe from Indian attack, while the ground-based ones are mobile and
405 Rajesh Rajagopalan, “India’s Nuclear Policy,” in Major Power’s Nuclear Policies and International Order in the 21st Century, 99. 406 Naeem Salik, “Minimum Deterrence and India Pakistan Nuclear Dialogue: Case Study on Pakistan,” LNCV South Asia Security Project 1 (2006), 6. 407 John Carlson (Consultant, Nuclear Threat Initiative; Lowy Institute), via interview with author through email, 22 November, 2017. 408 Lt Gen (Retd) Sardar F. S. Lodi, “Pakistan’s Doctrine vis-à-vis its Nuclear Capabilities”, Defence Journal of Pakistan, p.1 available at: http://www.defencejournal.com/apr99/pak-nuclear-doctrine.htm 409 Ibid. 160
could be moved around the country. The doctrines are dynamic as they are not made in a vacuum. They are updated as the circumstances change. Pakistan’s strategic community views that; “the minimum deterrence has and should continue to be the guiding principle of Pakistan’s nuclear pursuit. Of course, the minimum cannot be defined by static numbers. In the absence of an agreement on mutual restraint the size of Pakistan’s arsenal and its deployment has to be adjusted to ward off dangers of pre-emption and interception. Only then can deterrence remain efficacious.”410
Pakistan does not have any official documented doctrine, however, it can be analyzed by the official statements of officials and foreign ministers to help determine Pakistan’s policy line and how Pakistan will change it as regional security patterns change. The main assertions that can be summarized from these statements are: (i) “Pakistan will pursue a minimum credible nuclear deterrence policy”; (ii) “Pakistan will not indulge to any arms race with India”; (iii) “Pakistan will continue to support International Arms Control Regimes, which are non-discriminatory in nature”; (iv) “Pakistan will participate in the Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) negotiations, which is non- discriminatory and involve current stockpiles”; (v) “Pakistan has accepted a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.”411
However, in view of India’s expectations for global status, Pakistan has also reviewed its policy. In addition, Pakistan has expressed its consent to contact with India under the following conditions:
“Non-deployment of Ballistic Missiles;
No operational weaponisation of nuclear capable missiles;
Formalization of the existing understanding on pre-notification on missile flight tests;
Declaration of a moratorium on the development, acquisition or deployment of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems.”412 There is no officially announced nuclear policy of Pakistan, however, the mention of possible use in the official statements gives out the policy that “Pakistan would use nuclear weapons: (i) If India attacks Pakistan and occupies a large part of its territory; (ii)
410 Agha Shahi, Z. A. Khan and A. Sattar, “Responding to Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” Dawn, October 5, 1999. 411 Bhumitra Chakma, “Pakistan Nuclear Doctrine and Command and Control System: Dilemmas of Small Nuclear Forces in the Second Atomic Age,” Security Challenge 2, no. 2 (2006): 115-133. 412 Salik, Genesis of South Asian, 233. 161
If India wipes out large part of its land or air forces; (iii) If India causes the economic strangling of Pakistan; and (iv) If India pushes Pakistan in any situation of political turmoil or it creates a large scale subversion in the political sphere.”413
The phrase “full spectrum deterrence” was used in the statement after the National Command Authority (NCA) meeting of September 5, 2013. It is worth mentioning that the use of the term “full spectrum deterrence” in conjunction with “Credible Minimum Deterrence” indicating that both conveyed different meanings. The obvious difference is that Credible Minimum Deterrence’ refers to the deterrence against the massive attack by the adversary. However, with the addition of “short-range ballistic missiles”, credibility has been added to deterrence, making it ‘full spectrum deterrence’. In other words, Nasr has lowered Pakistan's nuclear threshold, but it has also reduced the possibility of India's choice of a limited war and increased the deterrence stability in the region. Pakistan appears to believe that if it uses nuclear weapons to attack Indian forces on Pakistani territory, this is not a nuclear attack on India so it would not draw nuclear retaliation by India.414 However, India, on other hand considers that any nuclear attack on its forces wherever they are will be treated as an attack on India itself and it would retaliate massively with nuclear weapons.415
Widening conventional arms disparity with India has pushed Islamabad to lower its nuclear threshold. “The volatile regional security situation and discriminatory policies within the non-proliferation regime are the determining factors for Pakistan’s decision to further strengthen its nuclear program despite the country’s economic crisis”.416
4.4 Nuclear Deterrence during the Phases of Covert and Overt Nuclearization Nuclear deterrence during covert phase prevented crisis escalation between Pakistan and India. Post so-called Indian “Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE)”, Pakistan and India reached a crisis point after the extensive Indian military exercise with the code name Brasstacks. This exercise was carried out exactly “twenty miles away from Pakistan’s border.” The reason for exercise was to pressurize Pakistan to stop supporting
413 P. Cotta-Ramusino & M. Martillini, “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan,” Como, Landau Network, January 14, 2002. 414 John Carlson (Consultant, Nuclear Threat Initiative; Lowy Institute), via interview with author through email, 22 November, 2017. 415 Ibid. 416 “NCA stresses full-spectrum deterrence,” Dawn, September 6, 2013, Available at: http://dawn.com/news/1040865/nca-stresses-full- spectrum-deterrence 162
the Sikh uprisings in Eastern Punjab. India had planned to exercise a full-fledged war as around 250,000 troops participated in these exercises but Pakistan also began to mobilize its forces. Consequently, the crisis escalated to dangerous level.
During the crisis, for the first time, nuclear threat was issued from Pakistan. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, acknowledged the country's nuclear capabilities. He stated “nobody can undo Pakistan…… we are here to stay and let it be clear that we shall use the bomb if our existence is threatened.” Whether this interview is authentic or not is still a mystery. However, this statement achieved the purpose of conveying Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities.
Similarly, “overt nuclearization has established a new nuclear equation, raising hopes that it would bring stability to the conflict-prone region.”417 The obvious change has occurred in India-Pakistan relations as nuclear deterrence reduces the escalation of the conflicts because two competitors possess nuclear weapons. The following incidences indicate that nuclear deterrence has prevented two states from indulging in full-fledged war.
4.4.1 Kargil Crisis 1999 The first military crisis was the Kargil conflict of 1999. During this conflict, senior Indian and Pakistani officials and ministers issued nuclear threats indirectly and directly to each other. According to reports, “these threats were not completely empty: nuclear weapons were readied for potential use at short notice”.418 As the then Pakistani Foreign Minister Shamshad Ahmed stated, “Pakistan would not hesitate to use any weapon in [its] arsenal to defend [its] territorial integrity (May 31, 1999)”.419
The nuclear capability-maintained balance between India and Pakistan. Nuclear deterrence served its purpose. Nuclear weapons were seen as guarantor of any possible Indian retaliation. During the crisis, the nuclear threats were also passed from the Indian side. At the time, Admiral Sushil Kumar, then Naval Chief of India, said “the Indian navy could both survive a nuclear attack and launch one in retaliation”.420
417 Yusuf, “Nuclear Stability,” 17. 418 M. V. Ramana, “Eliminating the Nuclear Danger,” SAPANA: South Asian Studies, 7 (2006): 1. 419 Neil Joeck, “The Kargil War and Nuclear Deterrence,” in Nuclear proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behavior and the Bomb, ed. Sumit Ganguly, S. Paul Kapur (New York: Routledge, 2009), 134. 420 Timothy D. Hoyt, “Kargil: the nuclear dimension,” in Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: the Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict, ed. Peter R. Lavoy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 157. 163
4.4.2 Border Confrontation 2001-2002 Another crisis between the two states was in 2001-2002, in which nuclear deterrence enabled India-Pakistan to avoid escalation. India seemed to counter Pakistan on the Line of Control. The crises reached its boiling point when half a million Indian troops moved towards the border. The Indian defence Minister George Fernandez issued a statement saying that the Indian forces were raring to go. In addition, he appraised Pakistan not to even think of nuclear use. This nuclear threat was issued with such a great force to and fro across the border. At that time, Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar said that his worries were increasing rapidly.
Pervaiz Musharraf, former Pakistan President stated, “We went through a period of extreme tension throughout 2002, when Indian troops amassed on our borders during a hair-trigger, eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation. We responded by moving all our forces forward. The standoff lasted ten months. Then the Indians blinked and quite ignominiously agreed to a mutual withdrawal of forces.”421 US intervention seemed to limit the conflict due to the fear of nuclear war in Pakistan and India. Musharraf stated “war with India was averted because of his repeated warnings that if Indian forces crossed the border, Pakistan would not restrict its response to conventional warfare (December 2002)”.422
4.4.3 Mumbai Attacks 2008 Nuclear deterrence not only maintained stability and also sustained balance of power between Pakistan and India. November 26 Mumbai Attack 2008 was carried out by a militant organization, but the Indian government accused Pakistan of planning an attack. In the wake of these terrorist attacks, 163 lives were lost, and all social and commercial activities in Mumbai were suspended for three days. The international community was anxious because nuclear weapon states may initiate new conflict. However, the Indian government did not order its troops to mobilize on the border in reaction to the Mumbai attacks. “This restraining act of Indian government astonished other nations as well”.423 India’s Former Army Chief General Shankar bluntly stated “Pakistan’s threat of nuclear use deterred India from seriously considering conventional military strikes.”424
421 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire (New York: Free Press, 2006), 301. 422 Peter R. Lavoy, “Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries beyond War, ed. Henry D. Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 138. 423 Naseer and Amin, "Dynamics of Balance of Power,” 12. 424 “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Deterred India,” The Hindu, March 10, 2009, Available at http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp- national/pakistans-nuclear-weapons-deterred-india/article328041.ece. 164
Due to the success of the nuclear balance, there was no sign of war despite the terror attacks on the Indian parliament and Taj Hotel. India accused Pakistan of sponsoring these terrorist attacks. The then president, Pervez Musharraf, dismissed all charges against Pakistan and banned several organizations. These organizations include “Lashkar-e-Taiba” and “Jaish-e-Mohammad” and announced that all those involved in terrorist activities in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) or pushing extremism in Pakistan will be punished.
4.5 South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: An Analysis During the Pakistan-India conflict, nuclear weapons helped Pakistan balance the security environment in South Asia. India has an aspiration to become the most dominant power in the world politics. It has begun to strive to maintain its regional hegemony by developing modern and latest missile technology, and Pakistan is not ready to lag behind India. Although Pakistan opposes nuclear proliferation, India’s hegemonic dominance has forced Pakistan to follow India’s steps. Therefore, Pakistan’s nuclear policy clearly indicates that its aim is to protect its security and integrity from its hostile neighbor, India. During Brasstacks 1986-87, Kargil 1999, and 2001-2002 stand-off, due to apprehensions of possible nuclear response from Pakistan, India abandoned the escalation of the conflict with Pakistan. The rapid transformation of war policy of India came about after the 2001- 02 military confrontation. This was a shift from Sundergi Doctrine to Cold Start Doctrine based on the concept of limited war. According to this doctrine, Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) are formulated and placed in the forward positions. These groups are meant to be moving fast in order to mobilize and capture an important part of enemy’s territory before it could react or hit back.425 Through this strategy, the end result is the achievement of desired goal avoiding the conflict situation to escalate to hot war level.
The limited war concept is an old strategy. It originated during the 19th century. It implies that it is possible to implement a regular source to achieve the goal without escalating into a full-scale war. According to Osgood, “a finite war, in which the rivals limit their purpose of fighting to specific, clear goals. The goal does not require the belligerent to be able to carry out maximum military effort and that can be managed through purposeful dialogues to settle the issue. …The limited war is geographically local in nature and waged against particular targets – prioritized as per military value… It does
425 Subhash Kapila, “India’s New "Cold Start” War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed,” South Asian Analysis Group, 4 (2004), Available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper991 165
not seek to disrupt the social, economic, and political existence so that it does not escalate out of control.426
In the South Asian context, Pakistan and India differ in their views regarding definition of “limited war concept”. According to their respective nuclear theories and military stances, the concept of limited warfare is less relevant in the South Asian context. To elaborate limited war further, it is important to examine points of view of India and Pakistan. India’s views about limited war are quite indifferent. After Kargil crisis, in the warm atmosphere and both sides were making aggressive speeches, the then Indian Defense Minister George Fernandez said that “Kargil has established a new dimension in war strategy in South Asia and the limited conventional war is a possibility.”427 He also emphasized that if the limited conventional war escalates, then India is set to retaliate to Pakistan even after absorbing the first strike.428
To counter this narrative of India’s approach, Khurshid Khan while quoting Ramana has stated that such views by India were “a reflection of thinking that had been popularized by the US nuclear strategists (or to put it more bluntly, psychopaths).”429 He has quoted another statement of P.R. Chari stating “limited conventional wars cannot be fought without escalation into a full war. Chari criticizes that the thinking that limited war is a feasible affair, is flawed because it is based on accurate perceptions and complete rationality from other side, neither of which can be relied upon.”430 However, India has been spending multi-fold on conventional arms purchases by clinging on to the notion of possibility of limited war.
Pakistan’s viewpoint on the limited war has been indifferent. This indifference has been represented in the statements of Mr. Abdul Sattar, who was Foreign Minister at that time, stating that “there is no concept of limited war between two rival countries. If a country starts a war on a limited scale, there is no guarantee that it would remain limited. Anything can happen.”431 It shows Pakistan’s dependence on nuclear deterrence. However, the Kargil incident indicates the arrival of the concept of limited war in South
426 Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), 1-2. 427 Miriam Rajkumar, “Limited” War?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 22, 2002. 428 P. R. Chari, “Nuclear Crisis, Escalation Control, and Deterrence in South Asia,” Henry L. Stimson Center, Working Paper no. 1, August 2003. 429 Khurshid Khan, “Limited War under Nuclear Umbrella and its Implications for South Asia,” Stimson Institute (2005), 3. 430 Ibid. 431 Ibid. 166
Asian region.432
India believes that Pakistan has been supporting the Jihadi elements in Kashmir as its proxies and has been conducting such a war under the nuclear umbrella. In addition to that, Pakistan has introduced tactical nuclear weapons in its nuclear policy which has further complicated the scenario of limited war. This complication expands the scope of limited war. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s nuclear policy is centered around nuclear weapons. As the conventional weapons capability is the Achilles’ heel of Pakistan, therefore, it cannot opt for the limited war option in its strategy.
It is hard to calculate dimensions of limited war in the nuclear environment because there are several tangible and intangible factors that need to be involved into the calculation. The psychological factor is very important during conflict especially in terms of intelligence, uncertainty, changes in the nature of domestic politics and crises. As Pakistan faces asymmetry in terms of conventional weapons, it may not have the policy of limited war.433 Moreover, in the presence of such an asymmetry, there are chances of escalation of conflict.
4.6 Second Strike Capability: Nuclear Triad and ABM System “Indian Nuclear Triad” is composed of three major components; “the Strategic Bombers, Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) for the purpose of delivering a nuclear weapon”. “This three-branched capability significantly reduces the likelihood of the destruction of the entire nuclear force of the state in the first nuclear strike by the adversary”. Such type of system “essentially increases the deterrence potential of the state’s nuclear forces”.434 Indian nuclear policy is committed to achieve this triad. India has developed the intermediate to long range ballistic missiles and launched Agni-V with a range of more than 5000 kilometers. “Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO)” of India has declared that “the future variant of Agni missile would be able to carry multiple warheads”. According to a former head of DRDO, it will become a “force multiplier.”435 Agni-V has included India on the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) possessors.
Indian nuclear second-strike capability rests on its naval capabilities and nuclear
432 Shireen Mazari, “Concept & Nature of Conventional & Nuclear Deterrence,” Defense Journal, November 2000. 433 Khan, “Limited War under Nuclear Umbrella,” 12. 434 Ajay Lele and Praveen Bhardwaj, “India’s Nuclear Triad: A Net Assessment,” 11. 435 Hans M. Kristensen, “India’s Missile Modernization Beyond Minimum Deterrence,” Federation of American Scientists, Available at http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/10/indianmirv/ 167
submarines. India has included itself into nuclear submarine operator countries along with the US, UK, France, Russia and China. The development of nuclear submarines adds a third dimension to India's defense capabilities.436 Russian assistance is crucial to the development of these nuclear submarines. The INS Arihant reactor was launched on August 10, 2013, which is indigenously built nuclear submarine of India. Previously, Russia had leased INS Chakra to India for 10 years.
In addition, heavy investments are being made for development of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system. The motive behind the development of the BMD system is: First, it will provide India with space to launch a limited conventional war against Pakistan.437 Second, to develop the technological expertise relating to space and benefit from opportunity of technical and political cooperation with the United States after Bush administration abrogated the ABM Treaty in 2001.438 However, the BMD program is still far from maturation. Notably India's BMD is not a defense-based approach because it gives the impression that it is preparing for the first strike by ensuring the defense of the Indian cities. Considering the views put forward by Jaswant Singh in 2011, and Shyam Saran’s earlier abandonment of the concept of “no first use” and massive retaliation with nuclear weapons against tactical weapons, further raised Pakistan’s threat perceptions.439
4.7 TNW as a Counter for Indian Offensive War Doctrines These developments have had a major impact on the stability of South Asia’s strategy and arms race. These have added to the fragility of deterrence stability in the region. The dynamics of relative security considerations in India and Pakistan are different because Pakistan has to counter the threat perception emanating from India, while India has to consider China’s threat along with maintaining balance of terror with Pakistan. Pakistan’s response to these developments have been limited and India centric.
Pakistan flight tested Hatf-IX, Nasr (Arabic of Victory) on April 19, 2011. Its range is 60 km and it has the capability to carry nuclear warheads with shooting and scoot attributes.440 The development of the short-range ballistic missile Nasr is the embodiment
436 “Indian-built Arihant nuclear submarine activated,” BBC News, 10 August 2013, Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- asia-india-23648310 437 Frank O’ Donnell and Yogesh Joshi, “India’s Missile Defense: Is the Game Worth the Candle?,” The Diplomat, 2 August 2013, Available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/02/indias-missile-defense-is-the-game-worth-the-candle/2/ 438 Ibid. 439 “India will retaliate massively, if Pakistan uses nukes: Shyam Saran,” The News, April 30, 2013, Available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-99008-India-will-retaliate-massively,-if-Pakistan-uses-nukes:-Shyam-Saran- 440 “Pakistan successfully test fires Hatf-IX missile,” The Nation, April 20, 2013, Available at http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan- news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/12-Feb-2013/pakistan-successfully-test-fires-hatf-ix-missile 168
of Pakistan’s credibility. First, it was a response to India's limited war option in the form of a Cold Start Doctrine, second, to cope with the conventional asymmetry of India. Third, to introduce a variant in the nuclear arsenal to address the Indian BMD system, if that matures in future. Three months later, India announced its tactical nuclear missile Prahaar, in respond to Nasr. Although the development of tactical nuclear weapons is attributable to risk prone in terms of command and control, however, history tells that if the command and control remained intact in the Cold War, then it is less likely to fail today.441
The strategic stability of South Asia has become more complicated as a result of non-state actors involved in terrorist activities along the border between Pakistan and India. Arguably, the introduction of TNW, if something like Mumbai attacks happens, the conflict will not escalate beyond the limited conventional conflict. Therefore, it can be considered that the strategic instability caused by the Cold Start has been rectified by TNWs.
Concluding Thoughts South Asia’s location on the world map is unique geo-politically and geo- strategically. Nuclearization of South Asia has made missile development in the region possible. The strengthening of nuclear warheads has helped the two states to limit the various crises in South Asia. Thanks to nuclear deterrence, the Kargil crisis and the 2001- 2002 border confrontation did not escalate. Nuclear weapons have contributed to these conflicts, because the existence of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities has prevented India from escalation of full-fledged conventional confrontation with Pakistan. The nuclear weapons have improved stability on one hand and prevented the conflicts from converting into a full-fledged war on the other. In addition, the interests and role of superpowers have also increased in South Asian politics. They help de-escalation of crisis between Pakistan and India due to nuclear dangers and to support the global nuclear non- proliferation efforts. Nuclear weapons have maintained regional stability. It was the threat of the nuclear weapon use that prevented the 1999 Kargil conflict and the standoff of 2001-02 from escalating beyond limit. Consequently, “the stability argument is based on the reasonable conclusion that nuclear weapons have served an important purpose in the sense that India and Pakistan have not gone to an all-out war during these crises”. Nuclear
441 Ibid. 169
threats from two sides during the crises restrained Pakistan and India from escalation of these conflicts.
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CHAPTER FIVE
NORMALIZING NUCLEAR SOUTH ASIA: EPISTEMOLOGY OF SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE India and Pakistan define South Asian security environment. Both states are the most appropriate examples of state behavior in protracted conflict situations. Their fierce relationship is based on a common history of bloodshed and war. This act of hostility and mistrust is deeply rooted in the nature of two states that span over a history of three wars, adding to the struggle for independence and episode of cruelty at the time of partition of sub-continent. Nuclear deterrence has played a vital role in changing behavior of these states. It is because of deterrence that these states no longer engage in aggression because of nuclear weapons. However, deterrence has brought stability factors in the escalation of the crisis into a hot war. The absence of war for a long time has led to the prospect of peace. Many of the peace initiative’s efforts can succeed between the two states. This chapter intends to explore that how the contemporary approaches of conflict transformation are challenged in the India-Pakistan scenario under nuclear deterrence in South Asia? For that it is important to analyze the relative security preferences, Kashmir dispute, and confidence building measures to see the prospects of conflict resolution or conflict transformation between India and Pakistan.
Just to set the perspective, deterrence and conflict transformation can be defined in the context of South Asian region as under:
India-Pakistan Nuclear deterrence is more of a so called balance of terror as the conventional power difference is so much that Pakistan cannot balance India in conventional military power. Nuclear weapons give a power balancing aspect to South Asian strategic environment. This balance is in place as long as nuclear deterrence remains stable. Any escalation in conflict results in disturbing the deterrence stability.
Conflict transformation in South Asian context is resolution of conflict leading to complete transformation of relative behaviors from negative/enmity to positive/friendship.
This section has three parts. The first part contains an outline of the peace process 171
between Pakistan and India through dialogues and “Confidence Building Measures” (CBMs) amidst continued rivalry is discussed. In the second part, effect of nuclear deterrence on the conflict and peace process are assessed, and in the final part the prospects of conflict transformation based on the theory of conflict transformation are analyzed.
5.1 India Pakistan Peace Process amidst Enduring Rivalry India-Pakistan rivalry has increased South Asian security vulnerability. A preoccupied sense of threat has engulfed the policies of both states. This threat perception is mutual where one state has to compensate for the other’s actions. This has caused a unique sense of competition in terms of nuclear developments. This has complicated the regional security environment. This adversarial relationship has made war imminent in the subcontinent region. Moreover, this probability of war put an extra burden on already precarious economy of Pakistan. This enduring rivalry feature between India and Pakistan also manifested itself in dysfunctional crises learning.
Subsequently during the wars of 1948 and 1965 both sides seemed to be more committed towards the adoption of tougher policies – including the use of threats, ultimatums, mobilization of forces, demonstration of forces and so on. This rivalry based dyadic relation further intensified by the presence of the territorial dispute over Kashmir always remains a bone of contention and strengthen the dysfunctional crisis learning of being tough. They never thought about settling their disputes by adopting a friendly policy to resolve their problems and dissatisfaction. With the passage of time, their attitudes towards each other have become more rigid and hostile. Nuclear deterrence has given this conflict a permanent attribute because it is very difficult for the states to denuclearize once the deterrence is established. In the face of international trends, the political leaderships of Pakistan and India have carried out the process of dialogue to de- escalate conflict situation and normalize the relations. However, these dialogues have never achieved fruitful results due to the lack of willingness to make the process sustainable. The main reason for the failure of the dialogue seems to be the lack of trust between the leaders of the two states and the failure to develop mechanisms to resolve the conflict.
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5.1.1 Kashmir Conflict: A Major Bone of Contention Kashmir conflict emerged with the decline of British colonial raj in subcontinent in 1947. By the time, there were 562 Princely states, which were autonomous in their internal policies; however, “the foreign affairs and defence were taken care of by the British Government”.442 The Partition of India Act of 1947 disposed off the paramountcy of these states.443 While the ruler of Kashmir, Hari Singh, remained indecisive, the mass movement emanating from Poonch region swept the other parts of Kashmir with the assistance of tribesmen, liberated a sizeable part of Kashmir. On October 24, 1947, a parallel Government for the liberated part of the state known as “Azad state of Jammu & Kashmir or Azad Kashmir” was established. On the other hand, “Maharaja Hari Singh signed a conditional accession of the state of Jammu & Kashmir to India on October 26, 1947”,444 which resulted in the first India-Pakistan War on Kashmir.
On the 1st day of January 1949, the cease-fire agreement in Kashmir was accepted by both India and Pakistan.445 Therefore, to establish the working relationship between governments of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir, the Karachi Agreement was signed on April 28, 1949 while Article 370 was applied in Jammu & Kashmir (Indian Occupied Kashmir or IOK) in August 1952.446 The Kashmiris have been demanding the Right to Self- determination since 1948 through peaceful means. However, the Kashmiri youth challenged the status quo in the Valley of Kashmir in 1988. Regarding the resolution of Kashmir conflict, several plans were discussed but could not bridge the space between Indian and Pakistan. India’s vision of Kashmir as its integral territory has always been challenged by Pakistan who considers Kashmir as its “jugular vein”. The mistrust between Pakistan and India is one of the main hurdles in resolving the Kashmir conflict.
Kashmir conflict left many coming generations to suffer and pushed India and Pakistan on a dangerous verge of confrontation. Over the Kashmir issue, Pakistan has looked for support from other influential states to pressurize India for its resolution but India did not accept the third-party intervention and declared Kashmir as its integral part. The difference of position between Pakistan and India has further added complexity to the conflict. Due to the enduring rivalry between two states, the South Asian security
442 H. Singh, The Indian States: A Study of Their Constitutional Position Vol. 64 (Columbia: The Academy of Political Science 1949), 20. 443 Indian Independence Act, 1947. 444 K. S. Bajwa, Jammu and Kashmir War 1947-48: Political and Military Perspective (Har-Anand Publications, 2003), 98. 445 Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War (London: IB Tauris, 2010), 23. 446 Chitkara, Kashmir, 10. 173
environment has been weakening as both are now nuclear weapons states. No matter how long this issue lasts, there would be no progress in their relationship. Both states have sought to accomplish the answers by means of war, multi-lateral exchanges, intercessions and reciprocal transactions; however, they failed to complete any specific matters. Kashmir conflict limits India and Pakistan to agree on issues that may usually be normal. In the past, the two states have solved several problems through third-party intervention and through international organization procedures. For example, the sharing of cross- border streams by the Indus River system in 1960 was sponsored by the World Bank and the settlement of outline of the Rann of Kutch which has remained stable over the years. Currently, the situation regarding Kashmir is no different than as it was in 1948. Furthermore, it does not look too hopeful as well.
It can be reasonably said that conflicts are real or perceived as confrontation with interests, understanding and quality. “It clarifies different parts of social life, such as social differences, irreconcilable situations, and struggles between people, parties and associations.”447 When people, parties or countries have conflicting goals, conflict exists. India and Pakistan have different interests, understanding and quality. India and Pakistan have diverse interests, understandings and qualities to the extent that their behavior has not changed over the years, not even with the nuclear deterrence. Pakistan and India have failed to agree on any bargain or compromise on the territorial disputes including Kashmir. Instead they have tried to achieve a mandatory result with the help of war and coercion.
In order to determine the fate of Kashmir, India-Pakistan faught in 1947 which continued through 1965 war, 1971 war; limited war of Kargil in 1999; and some near war situations in 1987, 1989, 2002 border crisis, and 2008 Mumbai attacks. The purpose behind all these wars and tensions is the same, Kashmir. The international institutionalization process for conflict resolution has not yielded results because they have their own interests to promote. In addition, domestic institutions are conducive to the pursuit of conflicts, which makes it more difficult to resolve conflicts. In the case of India and Pakistan, their military and political governments have a responsibility to continue the conflict because they have a vested interest in it.
447 Bernard Oladosu Omisore, “Organizational Conflicts: Causes, Effects and Remedies,” International Journal of Academic Research in Economics and Management Sciences 3, no. 6 (2014): 118-137. 174
5.1.2 Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) Peace process between Pakistan and India could not continue constantly and when both have participated in bilateral dialogues, questions are raised about the success and continuity of the settlement of disputes. Neither of these countries has the political will to engage in dialogue because their actions are deeply rooted in their policies. Confidence- building measures (CBMs) that support the dialogue process have also historically failed. The basic nature of the states has been fixed and hostile, and public sentiment is based on this. The government cannot seek a peace process against public sentiment and military standing. There is a serious trust deficit between the states, which prevents the prospects of any peace process from continuing to move forward.
According to Hans J. Morgenthau, states have three choices; diplomacy, war, and renunciation of conflict, however, modern technology undermines the notion of rational victory, and mutual negotiations seem to be more rational decision.448 For this reason, both Pakistan and India have tried using discretionary sources to determine resolution of Kashmir issue. Initially, from 1947 to 1971, the United Nations-selected arbitrators tried to find a recognized equation to solve the Kashmir issue, but the efforts of this global foundation failed. In any case, after the 1971 war, the two states formally agreed in Simla accord to settle their issues bilaterally.
India-Pakistan meeting issued a joint dispatch, claiming that both parties are eager to solve the problem, “holding a plebiscite to determine the wishes of the general people” and designating a plebiscite overseer. The two states had relaxed their positions on Kashmir and understood that they need to settle down with their territories rather than control each other's Kashmir region. Pandit Nehru said in a statement “I am willing to accept that the question of the part of Kashmir which is under you (Pakistan) should be settled by demarcating the border on the basis of present ceasefire line. We have no desire to take it by fighting.”449 In 1963, the two states exchanged five rounds, mainly to solve the Kashmir issue. Several discussions took place. Swaran Singh spoke from the Indian side and Z. A. Bhutto from Pakistan. Shockingly, the talks turned out to be a vain activity and both sides rebuked the other for not achieving an answer.
448 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 66. 449 Zaibun Nisa Aziz, “The pursuit of Kashmir,” Herald, June 2, 2016, Available at http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153341/the-pursuit- of-kashmir. 175
The 1965 war ended with the signing of the ceasefire arrangement at Tashkent whereby both agreed that they will withdraw their forces till February 25, 1966, and both parties will pay attention to the truce provisions on the ceasefire line. The former Soviet legislature carried out this activity. There, they reaffirmed their commitment under the UN contract, not by power, but by peaceful resolution of their debates. But again in 1971, the two countries began the war in Bangladesh (then East Pakistan), which was the last major conventional war between them. Soon after, the two states agreed to the Simla arrangement on July 2, 1972, in which they agreed to settle their differences bilaterally. This does not mean that from 1972 onward, both states were at peace but they were busy in various skirmishes. The improvements in these years still have sway on the present India-Pakistan relationship.
In 1984, India landed on a key area of Siachen. India demanded that “the area passing through NJ9842 was unmarked”,450so it did not have any impact on Simla understanding. In response, Pakistan also expanded its area of control and along these lines the troublesome territory of Siachen icy mass was militarized. Since 1986, they have closed multiple rounds of exchange to demilitarize the ice sheet, but no concrete results have emerged. In 1988, in all the restraints, Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto, managed to meet in Islamabad and they were able to sign “the nuclear non-attack agreement that Rajiv Gandhi and General Zia had verbally finished up three years before”.451 Different CBMs were discussed, but overall, the Kashmir issue was avoided in the discourse table.
In 1998, they both explicitly announced themselves as nuclear weapon state, which provided a nuclear perspective for the conflict between the two states. It is now clear that the two states cannot afford to reopen the war on every unimportant issue, but should participate in the discussion at the end of the day. Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Lahore in 1999 and called on Nawaz Sharif. Both counterparts signed the landmark “Lahore Declaration” on February 21, 1999. This agreement marked the resolve to find solution to Kashmir issue. Both states vowed to exercise restraint and curtail risk of “accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and to discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to developing confidence-building measures in the nuclear and conventional
450 V. Sahni, “Technology and conflict resolution,” in Conflicts and Peacemaking in South Asia, ed. P. Sahdevan (New Delhi: Lancers Book, 2001), 238-271. 451 Devin T. Hagerty, “The consequences of nuclear proliferation: Lessons from South Asia,” Political Science Quarterly, 114 (1999): 510-511. 176
fields”.452 Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff, Parvez Musharraf, began with Lahore transport discretion, and the pioneers of the two states met in the “City of Love” Agra; however, nothing positive could progress either.
To facilitate dialogue process between both the countries, the back channel diplomacy has been used to restart the negotiation process. In 2003, Brajesh Mishra and General Musharraf's top political associate held several rounds of talks in London, Dubai and Bangkok to reinvigorate the peace process. A slow process continued in the initial period of Manmohan Singh government. Again, nothing concrete happened regarding India-Pakistan peace process. The heads of two states met several times during multilateral discussions and meetings. Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri expressed that “India and Pakistan had just about come to an acknowledged arrangement on the status of Jammu and Kashmir”.453 He did not delve into the depth of the issue and did not express the possible formulas agreed by the two states. President Musharraf came up with different ideas for addressing and resolving the Kashmir issue, but the Indians did not acknowledge any of his formulas.
In order to transform the nature of the ongoing conflict over Kashmir, in September 2008, an agreement was reached between India and Pakistan for the initiation of cross LoC trade. It was seemed as a good gesture in shape of CBMs to strengthen the relations across LoC. People from both sides of Kashmir are benefiting from this trade. Traders and the business community have encouraged this initiative, and they have been involved in LoC trade since its inception. As the relationship between the two states had become good, leaders were meeting, but on the sidelines of global gatherings, the occurrence in Mumbai; the Samjhauta Express bomb impact was carried out by the Hindu terror group Abhinav Bharat took place after the Mumbai attacks and India accused Pakistan. These incidents prevented the further development of discourse between the two states. Both India and Pakistan expressed concern about these exercises and recorded allegations against each other. After the chaos in Mumbai, there was no dialogue between the two states until 2010. Both foreign secretaries met in New Delhi. The Pakistani Prime Minister was invited to participate in the cricket World Cup semi-final between India and
452 Lahore Declaration, (New York: UN, 1999), Available at http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IN%20PK_990221_The%20Lahore%20Declaration.pdf. 453 Ranjan, “India-Pakistan,” 50-59. 177
Pakistan, again using cricket diplomacy. In July 2011, Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar visited New Delhi for bilateral dialogue.
All peace efforts between India and Pakistan are in vain due to hostility and mistrustful state behavior towards each other. The conflict between the two states is deep rooted in history, and its solutions require major changes of the attitudes and behaviors of the states. Both states have been able to manage conflicts at higher intensity level because of deterrence; however, low-intensity conflicts are plaguing strategic stability in the region. These conflicts have destabilized the region's deterrence and complicate the strategic environment for escalating basic conflicts. A realistic analysis of the actions of India and Pakistan shows that it is relatively difficult to resolve the conflict between the two states because it is rooted in the basic ideology of formation of the two states.
5.2 South Asian Nuclear Deterrence South Asia deterrence represents “a conflict between India and Pakistan controlled by nuclear weapons. The concept of nuclear deterrence in India and Pakistan is based on the history of fierce relations between the two states and their relative mistrust.”454 According to realism, state behavior is profoundly influenced by the nature of the individual in the state, whether it is the leader or the general public. This nature is based on the individual's mutual greed and interest. These trends form a power-oriented state system in which each state strives to obtain maximum power to protect its security and project its power in the region or international system. This argument is most relevant to the India-Pakistan case. They are maximizing their power to protect their sovereignty and security and to project their power in the region and the world.
The quest for security and prestige in the world affairs has encouraged Pakistan and India to achieve nuclear deterrence. The quest is reflected in the relative behaviors of both states towards each other. As long as the conflict persists, the presence of deterrence confirms the actions of the state to prevent each other from taking any action. The conflict itself depends on the behavior of the two states. Therefore, the conclusion of the entire debate is that as long as nuclear deterrence exists between India and Pakistan, the prospect of conflict transformation seems challenging.
454 Misra, India-Pakistan, 9-33. 178
The post-cold-war “regional security complex” demonstrates continuity and predicts transformation of security in South Asia. The trend at the regional level is significant. The competition between India and Pakistan continues to revolve around long-standing problem i.e. Kashmir. Between the two states traditional military competition has escalated due to the increase in relative nuclear and missile capabilities. As explained by the regional security complex, the transformation foreseen in South Asian security dynamics will take the form of internal transformations caused by the collapse of regional polar structures and external transformations caused by fierce competition between India and China. “Pakistan’s internal security, ethnicity and economic situation are weakening its ability to act as the limit of power against India, so the regional security complex is moving in a unipolar direction.”455
South Asian security depends on the stability of deterrence. “As long as there is no hot war between India and Pakistan, deterrence will be stable. According to the definition of deterrence, nuclear weapons have stabilized the deterrent in the region. However, nuclear weapons do not exclude the possibility of conflict or limited war, without involving the actual use of nuclear weapons which causes a stability-instability paradox. This paradox complicates the problem of quantifying the stability component of deterrence. The impact of this deterrent stability on the arms race between Pakistan and India is an interesting point to consider because, on the one hand, it can be seen as a further weapon development as an indicator of an arms race between India and Pakistan, and on the other hand it actually explains the deterrent stability in the region.”456
The security dynamics in South Asia are unique and different from the theoretical interpretation of the concept of the balance of power in the Cold War. To theoretically explain South Asian security, we must consider the uniqueness and complexity of the South Asian strategic environment. The security situation in South Asia is different from the competition of the superpowers in the Cold War because India and Pakistan are not super powers and they are standing at each other’s borders having direct territorial disputes. The situation is different from Cold War because US and USSR were not in direct contiguity rather their allies were. Moreover, the Cold WAR ended in a compromise which certainly became possible due to the fact that USSR could not withstand the economic and strategic compulsions of defending communism.
455 Ibid., 115-122. 456 Ibid. 179
Furthermore, the phenomenon like terrorism and cross border infiltration was not there in Europe which made the end of Cold War possible.
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CHAPTER SIX CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN SOUTH ASIA: PROSPECTS, REALITIES AND STATE BEHAVIOR As discussed in the previous chapters, conflict transformation indicates that changes in the conditional or qualitative nature of conflicts or change of actors can lead to prospects for conflict transformation, through conflict management and conflict resolution processes. This requires a dynamic and reliable dialogue process that is self- sustainable and carries the political will of the leaders. Conflict transformation requires that both sides reach a mutually accepted outcome.457 Negotiations between India and Pakistan are neither methodical nor complementary, leading to the failure of the peace process.
There are four different conditions for a successful negotiation:458
First, if not prepared, the negotiations may be counterproductive and cause the parties to disillusion, further exacerbating the conflict. Ashutosh Misra quoted Richard Hass as saying: “Ripeness will often determine the success of the diplomatic efforts. Whether negotiation will succeed or fail hinges on the shared perception by the disputants that an accord is desirable, the existence of leadership on all sides that is either sufficiently strong to sustain a compromise or so weak that a compromise cannot be avoided, a formula involving some benefits for all participants and a commonly accepted diplomatic process.”459 The lack of such readiness in the India-Pakistan negotiations is based on the fact that neither there is power difference due to nuclear deterrence to induce compromise between the two states nor they are willing to compromise or bargain on any dispute. So they never have been prepared to compromise or bargain anything to enter into negotiations for peace-building.
Second, according to Harold Sanders and Misra, there are three main purposes for pre-negotiation; first, it identifies conflicts; second, it promises an outcome building hope for negotiations, and third, this then leads to the next stage which is to organize the negotiations. Therefore, pre-negotiation is very worthwhile for the pioneers to have the
457 Samir Kumar (Research Associate, India-Pakistan and South Asia Council on Foreign Relations), via interview with author through email, 16 November, 2017. 458Ashutosh Misra, India-Pakistan: Coming to Terms (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2010), 9-33. 459 Ibid. 181
opportunity to investigate how to proceed without actually entering the arrangement. This is also pointed out as an indicative phase, on the grounds that the pioneers of negotiation attempt to analyze the dangers and advantages that would be a possibility after a certain compromise. India and Pakistan have been linked to each other several times at this level, but at the same time they have ignored their exchange. Since 1971, they have been effectively following backstage options. The end result is that the guarantee has never been executed. This unwillingness has brought about the environment of mistrust in the initial phase of negotiations. Additionally, the main difference being on Kashmir issue has also hampered discussions over the other minor issues including trade and tourism. Therefore, the compromises offered in such areas like bus service, Samjhota Express, and free trade agreement are readily withdrawn if conflict escalates.
Third is negotiation, at this stage, all parties concerned discuss all the issues of the disputes premised on the findings and data gathered in the previous session of pre- negotiations. “Negotiation is a process of characterizing and reducing optional positions until a special combination worthy of all parties is reached. The completion of the negotiation process depends on whether it can be turned into a positive situation”460 that benefits everyone before entering the agreement. The variables that influence the outcome of any negotiation are the firmness of the administration, the conditions and perceptions of authority, the composition of the groups concerned and the quality of the self- governance, and the relationship between the groups before reaching the negotiating table. India and Pakistan have failed to reach this stage on core issues, including Kashmir, which is the major reason for the drawback of peace process. The administrations of India and Pakistan have their limitations regarding the public sentiments of people of their countries which are adversarial and it has not been possible even to neutralize these hateful sentiments, let aside the transformation of behaviors.
Fifth is agreement, effective negotiations that last for a long time enter phase in which parties approve the agreement. Certainly, the agreement to achieve a substantive outcome may end or be put on hold for a while. The main understanding of the mutual interests of both India and Pakistan in any case is the 1960 Indus Treaty. No matter what their imperatives are, they reach and “end with the emission of issues. The real problem for Indian and Pakistani arbitrators is that no matter when the two sides meet to discuss
460 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Personal interview with the author, December 5, 2017. 182
the Kashmir issue, they are unprepared and unwilling to trust each other. Other than in 1963, orderly negotiations have never happened.461
The two states cannot coordinate with each other, but insist on competing with each other in a way that exploits. What is more problematic is that there is a huge gap of trust between the two states. At whatever point these two nations politically draw in with each other, they discuss everything important and make different guarantees and exclusive standards. In any case, from the moment they complete the political arrangements, they resume mutual accusations and oppose each other to condemn all inner issues. After the interim process, they politically attract each other and things happen in the same design. Since the 1950s, this cycle has continued because of this behavior, they have neglected to maintain consistency in reciprocal exchanges, and even make decisions on a single issue, Kashmir. At the same time, however, they are unable to prevent themselves from carrying out this activity because they are geographically entangled.
It has been proven that possession of nuclear weapons helped India and Pakistan to deescalate the crisis between the two states but could not enable them to resolve their longstanding hostility over Kashmir.
6.1 Possibility of Conflict Transformation between India and Pakistan Does the possibility of the conflict transformation between both states exist? It is a very intriguing question to analyze. To this end, the factors that lead to the war between Pakistan and India, as well as the intensifiers and suppressors of the conflict can be analyzed. For India-Pakistan situation, the status quo of nuclear deterrence remains intact. It is easy to assume that there is less likelihood of a hot war between the two states because nuclear deterrence is considered to be the most necessary aspect of conflict escalation. However, in spite of this, any difference in the balance of power can lead to deterrence failure and may lead to war. Therefore, the first goal of the conflict transformation mechanism is to eliminate the root causes of war. The most important factor is that India and Pakistan have differing understandings of what the other side means by nuclear deterrence. If both the sides had adopted a sole purpose or no first use approach, it would have reduced the risk of nuclear war. However, “it would be necessary
461 Ibid. 183
to find a way of addressing Pakistan’s concerns about Indian superiority in conventional forces”.462
As the five main reasons for war discussed in the previous chapter; (i) major changes in the balance of power, (ii) will to wage war, (iii) ideological drives, (iv) expectation for success, and (v) credibility of power at stake.
The first step in this regard is to eliminate the factors that contribute to the change in the balance of power between India and Pakistan. Interestingly, there are two options; first, to eliminate the conventional power asymmetry that is difficult to achieve, and second, to maintain power balance through nuclear deterrence and eliminate the factors that undermine the deterrence between the two states. It is also difficult to consider the pattern of arms development and the difference in the numbers of warheads and fissile material stockpiles of both states.
Second, the will to wage war is not that political leaders will change it according to the decisions of the National Assembly. This will to go to war has been nurtured in the social spectrum of both states right from the inception of two states. The feeling of hostility and will to fight each other is the natural teaching and aspiration of the people of the two states. This will to war has formed the relative state behavior of the two states against each other. In order to change this will, it is necessary to change the social behavior of the people of the two states, which is very difficult to achieve.
Third, the ideological drive that Hindus and Muslim ideologies have been suppressed in the region since ancient times has always existed. The very division of the subcontinent was done on the basis that Hindus and Muslims are two independent ideologies, and although they have lived together for so many years, they cannot be integrated. Since the division, this ideological driving force has existed and further increased the effect that ideological hostility led to several community riots based on these religious ideological reasons because culture and religion are the main driving forces of society. Together they represent a nation, a distinct entity which is unique in several ways. This distinct feature formulated the basis of two nation theory in the Subcontinent which led to the formation of India and Pakistan. Hindu and Muslims were two separate nations that had cultural and religious differences such that their relationship
462 Parvez Iqbal Cheema (Dean FCS, National Defence University, Islamabad), in discussion with author, 5 December 2017 184
had to be of enmity. After partition, both nation states developed threat perception for each other based on the mutual animosity developed over the years. This threat perception resulted in nuclear weapons development by both states.
Fourth, both states have fought wars in 1948, 1965 and 1971, and they have been confident on both the occasions that they would succeed. However, no state has achieved complete victory in any war. India and Pakistan believe that they will inevitably succeed in any conflict. This belief makes the possibility of war more imminent.
Finally, the credibility of the power factor is the general cause of war in conflict situations, in which the state cannot abandon the integrity or honor of its state in the conflict and try to wage war with all optional choices. On the one hand, the state will be eager to wage war on its power and prove the credibility of its power. On the other hand, a state would not go for a compromised solution because it would not like to compromise on its power credibility in front of the world or to its own citizens as well. This credibility has always been at the forefront between India and Pakistan in their confrontation history. In order to resolve or change conflicts, states must be willing to compromise to find beneficial solutions for both states, which is another challenge.
6.2 Approaches of Transformation in Case of India-Pakistan The theory of conflict transformation points out that the transformation of conflict involves four different levels of change:
First, the individual level; for India and Pakistan, this change is difficult to achieve because individuals are very familiar with the behavior of other state in a confrontational way. So they are not prepared to accept each other, but they think it is noncompliance with their religion. They are taught this attitude from their childhood. The bloody history of events at the time of partition has always haunted the thinking of people of both the countries. Therefore, the seeds of enmity have grown into a strong tree of hatred over the time. These feelings have never let the skepticism of people to transform into trust regarding each other and with the passage of time this lack of trust has rooted deep into the hearts of the people. In India Pakistan case, the enmity stems from the mistrust as well as the relative behaviors of the people of both the states.
Second is the relational level, changes in this level involving interaction, communication, and interdependence requires that this relationship be normal. Due to
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mutual distrust and fierce behavior, India-Pakistan relations have never been interdependent. Normalization of relations is the key to establishing a stable relationship at the public level; however, India and Pakistan are not ready for this. Both the states have policies which do not favor normalizing of relations because for normalization, mere absence of war is not enough. Mutual interdependence induced through trade and cultural exchanges is essential for achieving normalization. However, trade has not been able to reach such a level of interdependence.
Third implies a change in the hierarchical structure of national decision-making, which can be adapted to the point of conflict and develop the political will to solve the longstanding issues. Pakistan and India have no political will to communicate with each other. Here political will refers to the public sentiments represented and driven by political and military elites in both the countries. The change in structure of decision- making may be able to change the foreign policy; however, this may not be possible due to the fact that different pressure groups within the government establishment and even in society oppose such change in policy. Fourth changes in cultural levels “mean changes in cultural patterns in understanding and responding to conflicts”. Again, the situation in India and Pakistan is difficult because cultural differences were one of the main reasons behind the struggle for Muslim independence in the subcontinent. The response to the conflicts relates to the honor and dignity in the culture of societies of both the states. The cultural integrity, although it has been affected by globalization of media, is difficult to change because these cultural patterns are very deep rooted in the society. In addition to these changes, the following transformations are also prerequisites for the conflict transformation process:
6.2.1 Rule Transformation The rules are limits or areas of relationship between the two parties regarding any issue. Rules differ from problem to problem. For some issues it is easy to compromise and transform the rules of a conflict to gain on any other aspect but for some issues a country cannot change its position. Kashmir issue is the root cause of India-Pakistan enmity and perhaps the most difficult issue to bring about rule transformation. Any change in the rules can dramatically change the entire game. Both states have been dealing with this issue in accordance with the diverse rules: India considers Kashmir as a
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strategic depth to its security and integrity. The strategic location of Kashmir gives it importance in terms of security point of view as well as economic view point as well.
Siachen Glacier is one of the identified areas in the Karakoram mountainous range. It does not just divide Central and South Asia, but also acts as an obstacle for India to prevent Pakistan and China from establishing contacts in Kashmir. Therefore, India expressed serious concern about the partnership between China and Pakistan in the region. It is clear that India’s intention to seize Siachen in 1984 and its subsequent intention to maintain control of the area has been intensified. Second, Kashmir remains a strategically important state due to political and economic ties with China and Central Asia (the main commercial route passes through the region). Now, India is going to play a wider role in the region and beyond, and it needs more energy resources for its fast- growing economy; therefore, Indians are eager to enter Central Asia directly. It is believed that India seeks direct access to hydrocarbon resources in Central Asia. Third, India intends to expand more hydropower to meet its needs. India has built many dams for hydroelectric power generation. By 2050, India has set a futuristic goal of completing about 500 new dams.
For Pakistan, Kashmir is of strategic importance because its snow-capped mountainous chain provides Pakistan with much-needed waters to irrigate fertile plains and generate electricity. As a result, Pakistan has developed the world's largest irrigation system, irrigating more than 16 million hectares of land. Agriculture is the backbone of the Pakistani economy, accounting for about 22% of GDP. In addition to agricultural uses, hydropower is a renewable energy source. Pakistan has built two major hydropower projects (Mangla and Tarbela dams) on the Jhelum River and the Sindh River for power generation and storage. According to the feasibility report, the potential of hydro power only in Azad Kashmir is 8682.45 MW.463Second, Pakistan claims that Kashmir is a disputed region and an unfinished agenda of partition. As a Muslim-majority country, it should be part of Pakistan, which was founded on “two-nation theory” on August 14, 1947.Third, Kashmir is important for Pakistan as its northern border is bounded by Kashmiri territory that connects Pakistan with China. The “China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will connect Gwadar port with Kashgar,” North-Western Chinese city of Xinjiang through a network of railways, highways and pipelines for the transportation
463 Planning & Development Department, “Azad Kashmir at a Glance, Azad Government of the State of Jammu & Kashmir,” 2012, 62. 187
of gas and oil from Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf to China. Pakistan expects that CPEC would be a strategic game changer; hence, Kashmir is important for Pakistan as its northern border is bounded by Kashmiri territory that connects Pakistan with China.
It is evident that since 1947, no rule transformation for Kashmir has been occurred between India and Pakistan. Rather they both are firm on their position over Kashmir. The rule transformation will have great impact towards the resolution of Kashmir dispute, but divergent stances limit them to this approach. The rule transformation for Kashmir may well ease the way for conflict transformation between India and Pakistan.
6.2.2 Issue Transformation Through issue transformation, the main conflicts may be diluted or become less important in order to change the relationship. In this case, the basic conflict is ignored and a process of resolving the conflict can be created. Kashmir is the main inferno in Indo- Pak relationship and the center of the spreading network of crisis that now threatens to destabilize the region.464 Pakistan and India are the main powers of South Asia; “their enmity manifestly defines the regional security environment as both states share a bloody history of enmity towards each other.” India and Pakistan have their dissimilar claims and “tend to see their rivalry as a zero-sum game in Kashmir which is the real obstacle in this conflict resolution.” Due to the demarcation of two sides of Kashmir (in 1949), the people of two sides of the LoC were separated. Similarly, the people in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) migrated to Azad Kashmir in sizeable numbers due to Indian highhandedness and human rights violation in Jammu and Kashmir. The traditional routes connecting the interior Kashmir with rest of the sub-continent were also closed. The people who have migrated from IOK to Azad Kashmir have difficulties to meet their relatives and are compelled to take refuge as a refugee in Azad Kashmir.
It is hard to believe that there will be peace in the region until these two neighbors sit together and talk about a common approach on the viable resolution of Kashmir conflict. For reaching an agreement on Kashmir, it is necessary that two states must initiate form the least issues like trade, education, sports and so on.465 The best example is the initiation of cross-LoC travel and trade like confidence building measures and the direct interaction between the divided families and members of civil societies across the
464 Faziur Rehman, Personal interview with the author, December 7, 2017. 465 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Personal interview with the author, December 5, 2017. 188
LoC through ‘Travel and Trade’. It was initiated in 2005 and 2008 respectively; however, it could not achieve consistency Set aside major issues, India and Pakistan have not been able to transform smaller issues like trade and cultural exchanges.
6.2.3 Actor Transformation Actor transformation refers to changes in the international environment in the parties to the conflict or the introduction of new actors. For the situation in South Asia, this transformation can be done by changing the norms of engagement i.e. by the involvement of a third party for the mediation which could observe the engagement process. The domestic actors change cannot bring about the desired outcome as the political systems in both the countries are run on the basis of this enmity between India and Pakistan. The public sentiment is used and exploited to get into power and then power is maintained through maintaining and exacerbating the relative enmity. So the actor transformation at domestic levels might not be that helpful because they might be following the same line of action. Therefore, involving the third neutral party for transformation of conflict may help managing the conflict in order to transform the state behavior as a long-term objective outcome.
In India-Pakistan case, when a third party was involved, the conflict was brought under control. The Indus River Water Treaty and the Simla Agreement are examples of rule transformation. This transformation is relevant in South Asian case and the conflict can be resolved through this mechanism but it does not guarantee the transformation of conflict.
6.2.4 Structure Transformation The relationship structure of participating states may undergo structural transformation. This follows the conflict resolution step because the relationship can only be changed if there is no active conflict between the states.
In the case of Pakistan and India, the Kashmir issue must be resolved to achieve structural transformation. Since we have a Sino-Indian relationship model, it is expected that the economic phase of the relationship will have a political impact on the India and Pakistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan has invited India to join the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as the economic activity across the LoC and between India and Pakistan and beyond. It will develop the concept of Commonwealth of SAARC economic market
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on the pattern of European Union which will be helpful in developing harmony in tackling the regional disputes including the Kashmir conflict for the greater benefit of people. Through CPEC and with resolution of conflicts, South Asia has the potential to become an important economic zone, because we have an example of the European Union, where regional conflicts are suppressed by economic cooperation.
Concluding Thoughts On the basis of the theoretical interpretation of study, conflict is an integral part of human nature, and all conflict resolution, management and transformation techniques are difficult to apply. In India-Pakistan case, the conflicts have been managed by nuclear deterrence, so it could not be upgraded to a hot war. However, conflict transformation seems challenging in the presence of nuclear deterrence as both states are not ready to talk on the major issue that is Kashmir. Their divergent stances are not allowing transforming the issue or structure of the main problem. There needs to be a process – and the political will on both sides – to resolve their differences. The fundamental issues (a) from Pakistan’s perspective, how to resolve the status of Kashmir, and (b) from India’s perspective, how to ensure that further terrorist attacks from across the border do not occur, would minimize conflict. The second order issues may be resolved through CBMs.466 However, the most important factor remains the political will of both the states to resolve the differences.
Moreover, despite nuclear deterrence, states behavior is the manifestation of historical attitudes that make the context of the conflict more complex. Nuclear deterrence has avoided a full-scale war between India and Pakistan, but it has almost locked all the possibilities of conflict transformation. The deterrence postures of India and Pakistan are mutually restrained and do not take any action against the other side, but the qualitative and quantitative increase in the development of nuclear weapons technology is a challenge for the deterrence stability as well as the arms race stability. The instability of deterrence may lead to the failure of deterrence, which means that conflict escalation may enter nuclear exchange. The deterrence posture of the two sides do not correspond and there is a high risk of calculation – India may not believe that Pakistan will risk massive nuclear retaliation by being the first to use nuclear weapons, albeit within Pakistan, and Pakistan may not believe India would risk massive nuclear retaliation by a nuclear attack
466 James M. Acton (Co-Director, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Via interview with author through email, November 2017. 190
on Pakistan if Pakistan uses nuclear weapons against an Indian invasion.467 Therefore, in order to make deterrence credible.
India and Pakistan are involved in the arms development. This arms development stabilized nuclear deterrence and resulted in a stable conflict. Therefore, as long as there is deterrence between India and Pakistan, conflicts will exist and vice versa. They are in an intractable relationship and need to change their minds, because even after the conflict is resolved, the parties must engage in positive future interactions.
467 Khalid Banuri (Director General, Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, Strategic Plans Division), in discussion with author, November 2017
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CONCLUSION This study presents an extensive work on the theory of conflict transformation, its contours and applicability of its techniques to transform the conflicts. The theory is quite successful in explaining the theoretical techniques; however, its greatest limitation comes out to be that it cannot be generalized to encompass all the conflicts. In case of India- Pakistan conflict which is under the umbrella of nuclear deterrence, the contours of conflict transformation need a revamp in order to be applied to India Pakistan conflict to achieve conflict transformation and address their relative state behaviors. The main conclusions drawn are as follows:
Deterrence, an ancient concept, gained popularity during the Cold War. Numerous studies on this topic have shown that deterrence helps to avoid war. In deterrence, threats are used to manipulate the behaviors of others to prevent any undesired actions. Deterrence has been consistent in stopping wars. The nuclear age has introduced the inherent normative psychological appeal for rationality. The concept of deterrence through retaliation shows that a state has to refrain from initiating an attack. It further believes that neither a pre-emptive attack nor a precise defense determines success in term of cost-benefit analysis. Deterrence aims to prevent war by manipulating the enemy's mind. Therefore, deterrence is a psychological relationship. It is due to the nuclear weapons that idea of retaliation seems convincing. Credibility and stability are two factors that are emphasized by deterrence theory. Credibility means persuasion. According to deterrence theorists, the credibility of the state that caused the damage is not the only factor that makes deterrence work. In fact, the belief of one state is that another state can hurt it, makes deterrence work. Whereas, stability can be defined as ensuring that nuclear weapons are not used in conflicts or that conflicts with warring parties prevent the introduction of nuclear weapons into conflict.
Arms race and the advancement in nuclear weapons can make deterrence strong because the enemy may interpret it as a threat. In the case of protracted conflicts, there is a risk of escalation, so avoiding a full-scale war seems vital. This is even more relevant to South Asian case, because in this case the threat is imminent and ready, and so is the response. In this case, whenever an unstable event occurs, the result is either the opponent's rational reaction to stabilize the deterrence, or a deterrent failure. Both India and Pakistan are involved in long-term conflicts, so any escalation of conflicts can lead to
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a full-scale war with nuclear weapons. There is a difference between deterrence strategy and theory. The role of deterrence is to prevent war, but in order to make deterrence work, the state must prepare for war. It is worth mentioning that global security management depends to some extent on deterrence. At the international level, multilateralism is of great importance to peace and security. This includes not only conflict transformation, but also several other important aspects. It is used to launch a threat of deterrence; it helps to make decisions, authorize the use of force and develop strategies to mobilize troops. During the Cold War, both NATO and Warsaw managed security through the United Nations (UN) and other organizations. After Cold War, the role of such management has increased, and now involves peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention leading to using force.
The great powers use unilateral security management at their regional and global levels. The absence of conflict between great powers does not mean that deterrence has stopped. Deterrence forces exist between great powers, but in the form of implicit deterrence, where threats are not imminent, but threats still exist in the background. However, great power deterrent is different from that of relatively small scale nuclear states of South Asia. Pakistan and India are completely different because they are not the superpowers with blocs. They are members of traditional blocs with different doctrines, nuclear strategies and postures. The nature of the conflict between these states is different from Cold War. Therefore, the methods for conflict resolution, transformation and management are completely different.
Deterrence, which is an old practice in the international relations, has been carefully examined, pondered and contemplated upon but it is still difficult to understand. Deterrence means preserving peace until a confrontation abates. In the international system, deterrence means blocking hostilities from an aggressive state by making them aware of unimaginable damage. Deterrence has more strategies than theories.468 The protagonist or deterer plays a vital role because he must analyze the plan and execution, which is very important. For a deterrent state it is important to convince its rivals that initiating a war means bearing unacceptable damage. After nuclear weapons were used against Japan, nuclear deterrence was popularized and became extremely important in the strategic thinking of the Cold War. Deterrence should be practiced all the time; it was
468 George Perkovich, Interview via email, June 10, 2018. 193
deterrence which prevented a war during the Cold War. Deterrence can be divided into general deterrence or immediate deterrence. Deterrence theory aims to prevent war rather than retaliation.
The only factor that prevented a planned attack during a conflict was deterrence. Deterrence was evident to restrain 1961 Berlin crisis and 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Therefore, it was obvious that the two superpowers were afraid of war. In order to create credible deterrence, the state must be capable of delivering nuclear weapons under all circumstances. Political will and communication should be used in a way that deterrence is reinforced. In the case of mutual deterrence, both states possess nuclear weapons, so deterrence is unstable and depends on rationality. A reliable deterrent depends on the perception of the enemy. If the enemy thinks that he is irresistible, then the deterrent effect of the conventional defence posture may be unsuccessful.
Deterrence gained prominence during the Cold War. Nuclear weapons enabled both states and major powers used deterrence as a strategy to deal with issues of foreign policy. During the Cold War, the bloc system eventually formed a cooperative system to manage security through deterrence. The impact of the military revolution on deterrence is difficult to judge. In the post-cold-war era, conflicts between major powers were prevented because of US hegemony. China is increasing its nuclear capabilities, causing anxiety about conventional and nuclear deterrence. China has not emphasized its deterrence against Russia, but it has adopted a general deterrent attitude towards America. The possession of these weapons by the rouge states may become a problem for the United States if there is a conflict between them. Military intervention in any state with nuclear weapons is almost impossible. It can therefore be concluded that nuclear weapons have deterrent value to their custodians. The cause of nuclear proliferation is based on the deterrent value of the custodians of these weapons to their national security and territorial sovereignty.
The conventional concept of nuclear deterrence is to prevent attacks that threaten the survival of the state concerned. This is usually considered an attack using nuclear weapons - in other words, nuclear weapons are designed to stop nuclear weapons attacks. A state cannot use nuclear weapons because of the possibility of retaliation by an opponent state with nuclear weapons. This situation has given rise to the doctrine of sole purpose - to prevent nuclear attack.
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Pakistan’s position is different from this general deterrence theory. It is faced with substantial imbalance of conventional forces; Pakistan views nuclear weapons as a deterrent to invasion by Indian forces, apparently considering that any substantial attack across the border would present an existential threat. In addition, Pakistan assumes that use of nuclear weapons to attack the Indian forces on Pakistani territory, this is not a nuclear attack on India so it will not draw nuclear retaliation by India.469 On the other hand, India believes that any nuclear attack on its forces anywhere will be seen as an attack on India itself and would result in nuclear retaliation. Therefore, the deterrence postures of the two sides are inconsistent and the risk of miscalculation is high - India believes that Pakistan will not risk massive retaliation by the first use of nuclear weapons.
If both sides felt deterred by the each other, they may expect to seek an end to the arms race, because once the effective deterrent level is reached, it is meaningless to continue to expand the nuclear arsenal (although this is what the United States and the Soviet Union have done.). The fact that neither side has sought to end the arms race shows that both sides believe that there is a mutual deterrence. The situation is complicated because India believes that its real opponent is China, so it believes it is catching up with China instead of Pakistan.
Conflicts are inevitable and exist in every relationship. The focus of debate between the parties to the conflict may be the lack of resources, competitive values and unequal relations. The dynamics of conflicts may change, so these issues may be open for debate after a period of time. The process of conflict transformation requires parties to the conflict to identify their problems, and then appropriate strategies should be adopted to achieve the desired results. Conflict transformation first diminishes negative energy and then let the parties to the conflict to transform their issue. John Paul Ledarch is an advocate of transformation theory. According to Ledarch, conflict transformation is different from conflict resolution and management. Conflict transformation has a deeper understanding of conflicts. Conflict resolution shows that the conflict is terrible and should be removed. Whereas, the term conflict transformation suggests that the adverse situation should be made favorable. It also examines the nature of conflicts, public behavior and the social environment. Conflict transformation is broad and practical because it also involves the mutual relationship of parties of conflict. The transformation
469 John Carlson, Interview via email, November 22, 2017. 195
of conflict shows that the past and present relationship between the two sides will affect the conflict transformation process. The people to people relationship or the relationship between the two is based on their past experiences. These experiences build images in the minds of the individuals and same is the case with states. Therefore, in order to identify conflicts, it is important to highlight the facts, truths and circumstances that led to the conflict. The scope of this conflict transformation depends on whether the two sides have the political will to resolve the differences.
The security environment in South Asia is dominated by mistrust and conflict. Currently, South Asia faces a series of challenges that may trigger war.470 This hostility in South Asian context is due to the enduring conflict over Kashmir between Pakistan and India. The two states have had three wars and many skirmishes over Kashmir. Due to its size and military strength, India has been violating human rights in Kashmir for the past seven decades. On the contrary, Pakistan cannot match the size of Indian land or its economy and population size. Compared with Pakistan, India’s military power is much larger. India has been striving to realize its dream of achieving regional dominance based on industrial advancement, modernization and the development of nuclear warheads. However, Pakistan is not intimidated by India has refused to accept India’s dominance. In 1998, India carried out nuclear tests and Pakistan also conducted tests for maintenance of regional power balance. There are three main reasons for Pakistan to seek nuclear technology: (1) to deal with India's conventional military superiority; (2) to deal with India's huge nuclear potential; and (3) to deal with India's dominant position in the region.
Conflict transformation techniques and India-Pakistan Deterrence
Pakistan and India present a unique example of protracted conflict. The concept of realism dominates the international system, and concept of realism seems convincing given the way states act in the international system. Since their inceptions, the relationship between Pakistan and India has been a tale of mistrust and missed opportunities. India has never been able to digest the reality of Pakistan and has been trying to vilify its existence. The colonial rulers left the legacy of Kashmir, which put the two states in a state of confrontation for a long time. Neither Pakistan nor India has gained anything from this endemic hostile environment. In the process, both Pakistan and
470 Waqar Ahmad, Personal interview with the author, December 10, 2017. 196
India have maintained high levels of defence spending at the cost of social and economic well-being of people.
For regional peace, Pakistan and India must learn from past mistakes. The contours of conflict transformation seem challenging in the region in the presence of nuclear deterrence as both states are not ready to talk on the major issue that is Kashmir. Both parties need to negotiate on their differences. This requires a realistic and compromising attitude, particularly on part of Pakistan to recognize the normative force of the factual, that the clock cannot be turned back 70 years.471 The question then is that what should India do in recognition of a concession that will be very difficult for Pakistan to make – what economic, political, strategic and other benefits is India prepared to provide? To this end, it is indeed extremely important to create an appropriate climate and a favorable atmosphere for some form of communication between two hostile states. It is undeniable that harsh words or tough remarks are also a form of communication that reflects negation, but for constructive methods, it is necessary to create an atmosphere in which both sides feel enough to put their views on the table. Statements with dual goals should be avoided as they may be misunderstood and inject unnecessary obstacles. Another most important prerequisite for solving complex problems is to recognize ground realities.472 Kashmir is a dispute inherited by the two states because the British failed to resolve it before or after leaving the subcontinent. It involves the fate of millions of Kashmiris. Perhaps the most important underlying reality is that Kashmir conflict needs to be set up for negotiation. The complex history of India-Pakistan relations does not advocate the use of any conflict resolution theory on hot issues between the two states, so it may be used to analyze stability and peace in the region. These are the methods of conflict transformation that can be adopted to restore India-Pakistan peace process. Pakistan and India can work to resolve disputed issues through trade, education, and sports. These measures can create an environment conducive to solving core issues such as Kashmir.
In addition to these measures, the rule transformation; issue transformation; actor transformation; and structure transformation are also prerequisites for the conflict transformation process. It is clear that since 1947, there has been no change in the rules
471 Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy (Deputy Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, IPCS, India), Via Interview with author through email, 6 November, 2017 472 George Perkovich, Interview via email, June 10, 2018. 197
for Kashmir between India and Pakistan. Instead, they have a stricter stance on Kashmir. The transformation in rules will have a major impact on the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, but different positions restraint them to this approach. Through issue transformation, major conflicts may be diluted or become less important to change relationships. In this case, the basic conflict is ignored and the process of resolving the conflict can be created. In order to reach an agreement on the Kashmir issue, the two states must initiate negotiation on issues of trade, education, and sports. Both parties must develop and follow bilateral agreements in true words and spirit. However, these agreements require the government's sincerity and commitment. In developing such agreements, it must be ensured that both parties fully understand these terms. Road and rail connections must remain functional and operational with improved facilities. The latest initiatives like initiation of cross LoC travel and trade of the two governments is essential for normalization of relations. It would improve government level as well as people level positive behavior.
Actor transformation means changes in international environment in the scope of conflicting parties or the introduction of new non-conflicting actors. For the case in South Asia, this transformation can be done by changing the norms of engagement i.e. by involving third party for mediation which could observe the engagement process. In India-Pakistan case, when a third party was involved, the conflict was brought under control. The Indus River Water Treaty and the Simla Agreement are examples of rule transformation. If the relationship structure of participating states may endure structural transformation. This follows the conflict resolution step because the relationship can only be changed if there is no active conflict between the states. For the case of Pakistan and India, the Kashmir issue must be resolved to achieve structural transformation. It can be observed that the implementation of the rule transformation, issue transformation and the actors’ transformation has made little progress. Alternatively, a compromise situation is needed at the level of structural transformation, although, all these transformations are interdependent. However, even if followed independently, each transformation will have a direct impact on other transformations. As Pakistan and India have been locked in continuing conflicts for a long while, continuous efforts are needed to build a constructive change in relations that is a precondition for conflict transformation and peaceful coexistence.
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Siddiqa, Ayesha. “India-Pakistan relations: Confrontation to conciliation.” Centre for Democratic Governance, The Network for Consumer Protection, 2004, Available at http://www.thenetwork.org.pk/Resources/Magazines/PDF/12-8-2011-2-54-59-792-Indo- Pak%20Relations.pdf.
Yousafzai, Z. I. “The CPEC Controversy.” Daily Times, August 6, 2015, Available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/06-Aug-2015/the-cpec-controversy
Reports/Briefs
Clements, Kevin P. "John Burton Memorial Lecture 14 September 2015 CRS Conference University of Kent at Canterbury “Tools from the past for a problematic present: How relevant is Burtonian Theory and Practice for 21st century conflict transformation?”."
Conference Report, “Conflict Transformation and South Asian Security Dynamics- Strengthening Role of Civil Society.” jointly organized by the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) and Friedrich Neumann Foundation (FNF) (18 July, 2012).
Cotta-Ramusino, P., & M. Martillini. “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan.” A concise report of a visit by Landau Network – Centro Volta, 2002. Available at https://pugwash.org/2002/01/14/report-on-nuclear-safety-nuclear- stability-and-nuclear-strategy-in-pakistan/
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Heilbroner, Robert. "Is America Falling Behind? An Interview with Paul Kennedy." American Heritage 39 (1988): 94-101.
Hussain, Rifaat. "Nuclear Doctrines in South Asia." South Asia Strategic Stability Unit, University of Bradford, Report 4 (2005).
Shehle, Nick, and Nathan Blanton. “An Overview of India’s Nuclear Weapons Program and Proliferation Concerns.”
Tariq, Sidra. “The India-Pakistan Peace Process.” IRS Regional Brief No. 35 (March- April 2013), Available at http://www.irs.org.pk/brief/rbma13.pdf
Dissertations
Conley, Jerome M. "Indo-Russian military and nuclear cooperation: Implications for US security interests." PhD diss., Monterey, California; Naval Postgraduate School, 1999.
Nandi, Debashis. "Indo US relations in the post-Cold War period 1992-2006." A Synopsis of Ph.D. work in the Department of Political Science, The University of Burdwan, W.B., 2014, Available at http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/21861/1/synopsis.pdf
Reynolds, Julius. “An Empirical Application of Regional Security Complex Theory: The Securitization Discourse in China’s Relations with Central Asia and Russia,” M. A. Dissertation, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, (June 2009), Available at www.etd.ceu.hu/2009/reynolds_julius.pdf
Schirch, L. L. “Ritual Peacebuilding: Creating Contexts Conducive to Conflict Transformation.” Ph.D. diss., George Mason University, 1999.
Websites
“Case Study of Conflict Resolution: Nelson Mandela.” Universal Peace Federation International. Available at https://www.upf.org/peace-education-and-human- development/peace-education-reports/3184-case-study-of-conflict-resolution-nelson- mandela
“India will retaliate massively, if Pakistan uses nukes: Shyam Saran.” The News, 30 April 2013, Available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-99008-India-will-retaliate- massively,-if-Pakistan-uses-nukes:-Shyam-Saran- 231
“India’s Nuclear Weapons Program.” Available at http:\\www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/indiaFirstBomb.html
“Indian-built Arihant nuclear submarine activated.” BBC News, August 10, 2013, Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-23648310
“Oxford online dictionary.” Available at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
“Timeline: Pakistan's Nuclear Program.” CNN, February 5, 2004, Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/02/04/pakistan.nuclear.timeline.reut/.
Bell, L. “The ultimate Nuclear Terrorist Threat to the United States.” Forbes, January 4, 2012.
Cheng, S. W. “China’s New Silk Road: Implications for the US,” Yale Global Online (2015), Available at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china%E2%80%99s-new-silk- road-implications-us
Ferguson, R. James. “Political Realism, Ideology and Power: A Discussion and Critique via Machiavelli, Morgenthau and Sun Tzu.” 2004, Available at http://www.international- relations.com/History/Machiavelli.htm
Johnson, Donald. "India-Pakistan Relations: A 50-Year History." Asia Society (2012), Available at http://asiasociety.org/countries/conflicts/india-pakistan-relations-50-year- history.
Kristensen, Hans M. "India’s Missile Modernization beyond Minimum Deterrence." FAS Strategic Security (2013)
Mondal, Puja. “Social Processes: Elements, Classification, Characteristics.” Your Article Library, Available at http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/society/social-processes- elements-classification-characteristics-sociology/6203/.
Morgan, P. M. "The concept of deterrence and deterrence theory." (2017).
Rehman, Iskander. “India: the next superpower? The military dimensions of India's rise.” London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online, May 2012.
Slantchev, Branislav L. "Introduction to International Relations Lecture 8: Deterrence and Compellence." Lecture, Department of Political Science, University of California–San Diego (2005). 232
Spangler, Brad. "Settlement, resolution, management, and transformation: an explanation of terms." Beyond intractability (2003)
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