The Imperatives of Regional Security a Case Study of Pakistan-China Relations in the Post 9/11 Period

THE IMPERATIVES OF REGIONAL SECURITY A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE POST 9/11 PERIOD

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

BY MUHAMMAD MUNIR

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY ISLAMABAD PAKISTAN AUGUST 2016

THE IMPERATIVES OF REGIONAL SECURITY A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE POST 9/11 PERIOD

A thesis submitted to the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

MUHAMMAD MUNIR

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY ISLAMABAD-PAKISTAN AUGUST 2016

ABSTRACT South Asian regional security has been comprehensively transformed in the post 9/11 period with intensification in traditional security threats along with the emergence of non-traditional security challenges. This study encompasses the emerging trends and the imperatives of regional security to investigate various aspects of strategic relations between Pakistan and China which existed in the past and explores whether their relations in the changed political theatre of the post 9/11 period have further enhanced or remained static. The study provides analysis of Pakistan-China relations by taking into account the new variables in post 9/11 era, which have acquired significance and bear on the implications of enhanced bilateral relationship, upon welfare of the people and conclusively for prosperity of the region. The study draws upon the vast literature and unpublished records to build an approach for examining the correlation between imperatives of regional security and enhancement of Pakistan-China strategic cooperation. In addition, the research endeavours to examine the role of China that it can offer to mediate the intricate state of regional affairs and provides the impetus to regional economies. Pakistan-China strategic partnership is crucial to maintain the balance of power in the region as it vouches regional security and stability. Indo-US strategic cooperation in defence and nuclear technology, support for India‟s inclusion into the United Nation Security Council as permanent member and US‟ stern approach of containing China‟s rise poses an aggravating threat to existing balance of power in the region. The study predicts that the future prospects of Pakistan and China‟s cooperation in promoting regional security, stability and cooperation are bright. Both the countries are committed to enhance cooperation at bilateral and multilateral levels by forging a „community of shared destiny‟ with the objective of socio-economic development, for the people of both the countries as well as for the region. Therefore, promoting regional peace by meeting the imperatives of regional security such as eradication of extremism and terrorism, close cooperation for peace and stability in Afghanistan and making joint efforts for regional connectivity in South Asia would be in the common interest of both Pakistan and China, and the region at large.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The completion of this doctoral thesis has drawn together the whole of my previous learning experience in a way no other experience could have. I therefore, humbly offer my thanks to the Almighty Allah, the compassionate and the merciful, who gave me good health, knowledge and the opportunity to complete this study.

I feel particular pleasure in expressing my immeasurable gratitude to my research supervisor Dr. Nazir Hussain, who over the years fought a successful uphill battle to turn me into a confident and independent researcher. I have no words to appreciate his persistence guidance, patience and help in the finalisation of this thesis. His professionalism, intellect, dedication and commitment have been, and always will be, a source of light for me.

I am extremely grateful to Professor Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, former President IPRI for his assiduous support, and above all, his unrivalled kindness during difficult times. He was a constant source of inspiration and encouragement throughout his tenure as President Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI). I would also like to thank Mr. Jehangheer Fayyaz, who diligently reviewed my work with utmost affability, commitment and professional skills. Furthermore, I am proud to say that I had the full support of all my colleagues at IPRI. This study would have not been possible without the generous cooperation and assistance of hundreds of professionals in and out of Pakistan, especially many Chinese scholars. Many of them gave me hours of their valuable time in support of the success of this research study. I am also deeply indebted to each and every one of the respondents, and extend my thanks to all.

My special thanks are also due to my brother Dr. Muhammad Ahsan who always generously helped and guided me during my research. Without his persuasion and input, it would have not been possible for me to complete this dissertation. I do not have suitable words at command to adequately offer my acknowledgement to my family. It was impossible to complete this research without the continued support, encouragement and sacrifices of my wife Fatima. Also, it would be unjust if I do not appreciate the patience of my children who have been deprived of countless numbers of hours of parenthood when I sat behind the

iv closed door. I also pay my respect to my loving father-in-law and mother-in-law for their continued prayers and encouragement. Last but not least at all, I wish to pay a great respect to my mother for her prayers for the success of all my endeavours in my life. I am also indebted to the efforts and dreams of my late father for my education. I pray to Allah for all of them.

Finally, I would like to thank China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR, Beijing, China) for coordinating my visits to China in 2011 and 2015, and arranging a series of discussions with scholars and researchers of various institutes in Beijing and Shanghai. I am also grateful to Mr. Yang Mingjie, Vice President CICIR, Dr. Hu Shushing and Dr. Wang Shida, both Senior Researchers at CICIR, for their interactive session in October 2015. Additionally, my several productive meetings with a number of other Chinese scholars working at various institutes such as China Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS), Beijing, Institute of South Asian Studies, Peking University (PKU), Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), and Pakistan Study Centre, Fudan University (FDU), Shanghai, also helped me in my research.

Muhammad Munir Islamabad August 2016

CONTENTS

Abstract iii Acknowledgement iv List of Tables, Figures and Maps viii Acronyms ix

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 30 1.1 The Core Concept of Security 1.2 Concept of Human Security 31 1.3 Regional Security Perspectives 35 1.4 Regional Security Complex Theory 38 1.5 Economic Interdependence Theory 40 1.6 Balance of Power Theory 45 1.7 An Overview of Theories and their Application 49 1.8 Conceptual Structure of the Study 53

CHAPTER 2: THE IMPERATIVES OF REGIOAL SECURITY 55 2.1 South Asian Regional Security Complexes 55 2.2 Threats to Regional Security 56 2.3 Intra-Regional and Global Security Complexes 75 2.4 South Asian Security Dynamics and Regional Stability 78 2.5 Post 9/11 Developments in the Region 86 2.6 China: A Stability Factor in South Asia 95 2.7 Pakistan-China Common Interests in the Region 99

CHAPTER 3: STRATEGIC INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND CHINA: POST 9/11 IMPERATIVES 101 3.1 Development of Pakistan-China Relations 101 3.2 Geo-strategic Importance of Pakistan for China and Vice Versa 106 3.3 Factors behind Consolidation of Pakistan-China Strategic Cooperation 114 3.4 China‟s Stance on India‟s Permanent Membership of the UNSC 120 3.5 China‟s Role in Promoting Strategic Stability in South Asian Region 122 3.6 China‟s Stance on Kashmir 124 3.7 Post 9/11 Imperatives of Strategic Interdependence 125 3.8 India‟s Emerging Role in Asia-Pacific 131 3.9 India and South Asia 135 3.10 Pakistan-China Nuclear Cooperation 136 3.11 Chinese Interests and Regional Instability in South and Central Asia 137 3.12 Contemporary Situation and Pakistan-China Strategic Cooperation 139

CHAPTER 4: PAKISTAN-CHINA COOPERATION IN DEFENCE AND SECURITY 142 4.1 Military and Defense Cooperation 144 4.2 Nuclear Cooperation 164 4.3 Pakistan-Afghanistan-China Collaboration in Regional Security 4.4 Chinese Political Support for Strengthening Pakistan‟s Security 166 4.5 Pakistan-China Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security Issues 167

CHAPTER 5: PAKISTAN-CHINA ECONOMIC AND TRADE COOPERATION 172 5.1 Bilateral Trade: Pre and Post 9/11 Situation 173 5.2 Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan 180 5.3 Learning from China‟s Development Experience 183 5.4 The Role of Pakistan as an Energy Corridor for China 184 5.5 CPEC: A Win-win Cooperation 195 5.6 Building the Rail-link between Gwadar and Xinjiang 197 5.7 China‟s Economic Interests and their Implications on Afghanistan 201

CHAPTER 6: PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS 208 6.1 Region and Regional Organisations 6.2 China‟s Prospective Role in Futuristic SAARC 209 6.3 China‟s Full Membership of SAARC and its Role in Regional Development 231 6.4 Pakistan-China Cooperation in SCO 236 6.5 China‟s Representation in OIC: Role of Pakistan 242

CHAPTER 7: PAKISTAN AND CHINA’S PROSPECTIVE ROLE IN PROMOTING REGIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION 245 7.1 Pakistan and China‟s Prospective Role in Promoting Regional Security 7.2 Emerging Regional Security Order 258 7.3 Iran‟s Nuclear Deal and its Regional Implications 267 7.4 Pakistan and China‟s Prospective Role in Promoting Regional Cooperation 271 7.5 Pakistan-China Relations: A Futuristic Vision of Regional Security 275

CONCLUSION 278

BIBLIOGRAPHY 291 ANNEXURES 312 I: Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons from China to Pakistan (2005-2012) II: Major Projects being carried out under CPEC

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LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND MAPS

T a b l e s 4.1 History of Chinese Arms Sales to Pakistan: 1970-1990 145 4.2 Historical Overview of China-Pakistan Naval Cooperation 158 5.1 China‟s Investment in Pakistan 181 7.1 Estimated Loss of Pakistan in War on Terrorism (2001-2015) 248

F i g u r e s 1.1 Conceptual Relationship between Theories and their Application to the Imperatives of Regional Security in the Perspective of China-Pakistan Relations 53 5.1 Pakistan‟s Trade with China in Pre 9/11 Era 176 5.2 Pakistan‟s Trade with China in the Post 9/11 Era 177 6.1 Bilateral Trade between China and India (US$ in Billion) 217 7.1 Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2014 247

M a p s 4.1 Gwadar Port as a Regional Hub 163 5.1 Six Economic Corridors under OBOR 186 5.2 Comparative Overview of Distance of CPEC Route and Sea Route to China 188 5.3 China‟s Three Planned Trans-national Corridors Passing through Xinjiang 198

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ACRONYMS ADB Asian Development Bank ADTA Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreements AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank AJK Azad Jammu and Kashmir (Pakistan) AL Awami League (Political Party, Bangladesh) ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations AMF Aircraft Manufacturing Factory ANSF Afghan National Security Forces APC Armoured Personal Carrier APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation APTA Association for the Promotion of Tourism to Africa APTTA Afghan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ATS Agreement on Trade in Services AWACS Air Warning and Control System BCIM-EC Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar Economic Corridor BIT Bilateral Investment Treaty BJP Bahrtiya Janta Party BMD Ballistic Missile Defence BNP Bangladesh Nationalist Party BRICS Brazil-Russia-India-China and South Africa CAIC Chengdu Aircraft Industries Corporation CAI Chengdu Aircraft Industry CARs Central Asian Republics CASA-1000 Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project CATIC China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation CBMs Confidence Building Measures CENTO Central Treaty Organisation (also known as Bagdad Pact) CMSA Collaborative Maritime Security Apparatus

CNNC China National Nuclear Corporation CPEC China Pakistan Economic Corridor CPJIC China-Pakistan Joint Investment Company CPN Communist Party of Nepal CPPCC Chinese People‟s Political Consultative Conference CSTC China Ship Trading Company CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty DTA Double Taxation Agreement DTMB Digital Terrestrial Multimedia Broadcast DTTI Defence Technology Trade Initiative ECO Economic Cooperation Organization EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone ETIM East Turkistan Islamic Movement FATA Federally Administered Tribal Area FDI Foreign Direct Investment FTA Free Trade Agreement FWO Frontier Works Organisation GDP Gross Domestic Products GUSA Gulf-South Asia (Gas Pipeline) HIT Heavy Industries Taxila HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus HRF Heavy Rebuild Factory HRW Human Right Watch IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICT International Criminal Tribunal IJU Islamic Jihad Union IMF International Monetary Fund IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan IOR Indian Ocean Region IPI Iran-Pakistan-India (Gas Pipeline) IPRI Islamabad Policy Research Institute

IS Islamic State (also known as ISIL, ISIS and Daish) ISPR Inter-Services Public Relations (Pakistan) ISSI Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action KARF Kamra Avionics and Radar Factory KKH Karakoram Highway KPK Khyber Pakhtunkhwa KSEW Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works LEAs Law Enforcement Agencies LoC Line of Control LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam MBT Main Battle Tank MD Missile Defence MDG Millennium Development Goals MDA Maritime Domain Awareness MDS Missile Defence System MFN Most Favoured Nation MoU Memorandum of Understanding MW Mega Watts NACTA The National Counter Terrorism Agency (Pakistan) NAP National Action Plan NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NCRB National Crime Records Bureau NDMA National Disaster Management Authority NPT Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group OBOR One Belt One Road OIC Organisation of Islamic Cooperation ONGC Oil and Natural Gas Corporation PAC Pakistan Aeronautical Complex PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission

PAF Pakistan Air Force PIA Pakistan International Airline PMSA Pakistan Maritime Security Agency PSI Proliferation Security Initiative PTA Preferential Trade Agreement PoW Prisoners of War PPP Purchasing Power Parity PPP Pakistan People Party (Political Party) PRC People‟s Republic of China QCG Quadrilateral Contact Group QTTA Quadrilateral Agreement for Traffic in Transit R&D Research and Development RATS Regional Anti-terrorism Structure (SCO) RSC Regional Security Complex RSCT Regional Security Complex Theory SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SAFTA South Asian Free Trade Area SAM Surface-to-Air Missile SAPTA South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation SDF South Asian Development Fund SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SREC Silk Road Economic Belt SSM Surface-to-Surface Missile TAPI Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (Gas Pipeline) TTP Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan UAE United Arab Emirates UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNSC United Nations Security Council

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UK United Kingdom UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNTFHS United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security USA United States of America USD United States dollar WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction WTO World Trade Organization ZEC Zhongyuan Engineering Corporation China

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INTRODUCTION Located at the crossroads of Central Asia, West Asia and Middle East, the region of South Asia covers an area of 5.22 million square kilometres. Nearly, one quarter of the world population lives in this region. The major regional countries are India and Pakistan, while the other regional states include Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. South Asia‟s proximity to Afghanistan, West Asia, Central Asia and China raise the region‟s strategic significance for foreign players, but the lingering political and territorial disputes had been a great hindrance in the region‟s progress. The region faces a plethora of multi-faceted problems having implications for regional peace and security. In addition, some new threats to regional security surfaced in the post 9/11 period. One of the most important threats is the rise of extremism and terrorism. The region has been unable to emerge on the world stage as a unified bloc (such as the ASEAN and the EU). The foreign actors‟ involvement has further exacerbated the regional divide. Pakistan and China are two important players in this part of the world. Their collaboration, particularly in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which in fact is the backbone of the “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) initiative, is a positive development towards regional connectivity.

Geographically, Pakistan is located at a unique junction of South and Central Asia - strategically and geo-politically one of the most sensitive places in the world. The country faces a large number of internal and external security threats which were further aggravated in the post 9/11 era. Due to the continued instability, thousands of innocent civilians and state security personnel have lost their lives; resultantly the overall developmental process in the country has become stagnant with no foreseeable resolution to this situation.

South Asian states confront multi-dimensional security threats, which are traditional as well as non-traditional in nature, these threats are interconnected to each other and can affect the global security environment. There is also involvement of extra regional players such as the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), France and other Western industrialised countries to promote their own strategic interests in this

region. This type of international engagement further perpetuates the complications in the political dynamics of the region. The prevailing intricate state of affairs became even far more complicated due to the US-NATO involvement in the Afghan conflict. The other inter and intrastate challenges include an ongoing stalemate between India and Pakistan, primarily due to the Kashmir issue and the cross-border terrorism, the Sino-Indian border dispute, the rising threat of Hindu extremism in India and terrorism in Pakistan are only few to mention. This situation has adversely affected foreign investment and the overall process of socio-economic development of the region.

Keeping in view the aforementioned challenges, one of the important concerns for the regional security is to promote inter-regional cooperation, which is an essential element for the future development and prosperity of the masses of this region. The sustainability of regional peace is based upon cordial relations among various countries of the region. Some of the important imperatives for regional security include human security, overcoming energy crisis, alleviation of poverty, peaceful resolution of disputes, evolving regional mechanisms to counter transnational threats such as extremism and global terrorism. In order to meet these challenges, China‟s close cooperation with the South Asian countries, especially with Pakistan, is vital for regional security, stability and sustainability. Therefore, China-Pakistan relations at bilateral and multilateral levels are highly desirable and different dimensions of this situation are analysed in this study.

Statement of the Problem In the broader spectrum, by providing a comprehensive analysis of the regional dynamics of the post-Cold War era, the study discusses the imperatives of regional security in the South Asian region. It also attempts to analyse various factors affecting the security of the region by presenting new dimensions to the relationship between Pakistan and China in the transformed strategic scenario of the post 9/11 era. The study goes on to explore and investigate various aspects of strategic interdependence between China and Pakistan, which existed in the past and explores whether their

strategic interdependence in the changed political theatre of the post 9/11 period has further enhanced or remained static. Additionally, the study attempts to analyse the importance of Pakistan-China strategic cooperation in three main areas: i) military and security, ii) economic and trade, and iii) cooperation in the regional organisations.

Significance of the Study The friendship and the depth of relations between China and Pakistan are historic, strategic and exemplary. Since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1951, their relations have continuously deepened. Pakistan‟s defence and strategic ties with China is the quintessence of bilateral relations. In defence, joint production peaked in 2000s and now all three branches of Pakistan armed forces, i.e., Pak Army, Air Force and Navy, are equipped with Chinese weapons systems.

Although, Sino-Pakistan relations have flourished during the post 9/11 period and their relationship has seen greater heights in strategic cooperation. The present high- tech joint defence production such as JF-17s and Frigates, nuclear power generation, and strategic infrastructure building, e.g., Karakoram Highway (KKH) and deep-sea Gwadar Port, and, especially the CPEC will further energise their defence and strategic ties. This shows how much Pakistan is strategically dependent on China. On the other hand, Pakistan is also strategically important for China, as it has played a historic role for this country to get its membership at the UNSC. Pakistan is considered as a bridge between China and the Muslim world. The development of China‟s strategic cooperation with Saudi Arabia is a manifestation of this fact. Pakistan‟s Gwadar port provides China a strategic foothold in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, the strategic location of Pakistan provides China a trade and energy corridor. Also Pakistan continues to play an important role for China with its cooperation and assistance in combating the Uighur‟s Muslim separatist movement in Xinjiang province.

In the post 9/11 scenario, significant developments have taken place in South West and Central Asia. The US-led NATO forces fought a thirteen year long war (October 2001 to December 2014) against terrorism in Afghanistan. Around 9800 US troops are still present in Afghanistan. In this context, it is noteworthy that: i) the so called Islamic State (IS) is trying to expand its influence in Afghanistan, ii) Indo-US strategic cooperation has been rising higher, iii) Pakistan has emerged as a front-line state in the global war on terrorism. In view of these developments, there is a need for a comprehensive study to explore, how do these developments affect strategic partnership between China and Pakistan. The present study is significant as it attempts in filling the gap in the existing body of knowledge relating to Pakistan- China strategic collaboration. This attempt also presents new dimensions of regional cooperation between these two countries in the ever-changing strategic dynamics of the region.

Objectives of the Study In the post 9/11 period, South Asia has acquired more significance in global affairs than it enjoyed in the previous decades. These transformations, which should have coincided with the end of the Cold War as they did in other parts of the world, are being viewed to be more revolutionary in nature with inherent capacity to positively alter the old Cold War geopolitical formation of the region. Most scholars theorise this transformation in terms of the global war on terrorism, ripening US-India strategic partnership, Sino-Indian rapprochement and India‟s emergence as a major regional power. This is an important development in this part of the world, particularly in the context of Pakistan. Keeping in view these developments, following are the main objectives of this study; a) To conduct an overall analysis of the imperatives of South Asian regional security b) To carry out an analysis of Pakistan-China relations covering major dimensions of their strategic cooperation and imperatives of interdependence c) To explore the new parameters added in Pakistan-China relations in the post

9/11 period d) To examine how Pakistan-China strategic cooperation is beneficial for the people of these countries and in what way it can be further helpful in maintaining regional peace and stability.

Relevance of the Study In the post 9/11 scenario, significant developments have taken place in South Asia and adjoining regions. The US forces are still in Afghanistan to train Afghan security forces. In the meantime, India has become a strategic ally of the US. Pakistan as a front-line state in the global war on terrorism suffered huge losses in terms of human lives and economy. The present study is pertinent to the contemporary state of affairs of this region, as it analyses Pakistan-China relations in the changing geo-economic and geo-political dynamics in the post 9/11 era.

Pakistan‟s significance for rising China has increased in the post 9/11 world. Besides, Pakistan‟s role in regional security is also important, particularly in the context of stability in Afghanistan, the CPEC and the issue of countering extremism and terrorism are the important factors for regional security. Although, Pakistan-China relations have flourished during the post 9/11 period, their relationship has seen greater heights in strategic cooperation, e.g., high-tech defence production, deep-sea Gwadar port, cooperation in nuclear energy and the CPEC. These developments reflect two important points, i) from the start, both countries have enjoyed a strong political relationship, which is deeply rooted in their economic and strategic cooperation, and, ii) their bilateral relations have been continuously strengthening with the passage of time. In fact, due to the complex geopolitical and strategic situation of the region, both countries have developed an interdependent connection, which offers a mutually beneficial relationship. In this context, the present study highlights the rationale of generating new knowledge in the ongoing discourse on Pakistan-China relations especially in the context of the security of this region

Literature Review During the survey of respective literature, it was found that there were not enough books written on Pakistan-China strategic relations in the context of regional security. However, there exist a reasonable number of research papers pertaining to bilateral relations of the two countries. Some sources give quite good information on the historical background of their relations.1 Different scholars have presented varying views about the foundation and nature of bilateral relations of the two countries, which is discussed in perspective of; a) India factor, ii) post 9/11 impetus, and, iii) mutually beneficial strategic relations.

As Pakistan and India have a permanent rivalry, mainly over the issue of Kashmir and China has a border dispute with India, a group of scholars consider India as the dominant factor in shaping Pakistan‟s foreign policy in general and its relations with China in particular. Undoubtedly, Pakistan‟s relations with China can be viewed by any dimension that dictates its security needs. By considering India as a common threat to their security, both countries entered into the phase called Entente Cordiale particularly after the experiences of China‟s border war with India in 1962 and Indo- Pak war in 1965. Anwar Hussain Syed has discussed Pakistan-China relations in the light of interactive policy moves of India, China, the US and the former Soviet Union within the framework of South Asian politics and the world at large.2 Similarly, in his study, Rasul Bux Rais emphasised the China‟s significance for Pakistan because of its proximity, geographical location, economic and military power.

Like Anwar Hussain Syed, Rasul Bux Rais also considers India as an important factor in strengthening Pakistan-China relations and his study is based on the general hypothesis that “the dominating passion in Pakistan‟s foreign relations has been security against Indian expansionism.” According to him, it was the deep security concern of Pakistan against Indian hegemonic designs that compelled the former to

1 For further study, see, K. M. Arif, ed., China-Pakistan Relations-Documents: 1947-1979 (Lahore: Vanguard, 1984). 2 Anwar Hussain Syed, China & Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale (University of Massachusetts Press, 1974), 56-58.

join Western security pacts and consolidate its relations with China.3 Samina Yasmin‟s work is an interesting study of bilateral relations of these countries. She argued that the early relations of both countries were not friendly. These were the events of the 1960s4 that paved the way for warmer and cordial relations.5 Latif Ahmed Sherwani has given a Pakistani perspective on India‟s foreign policy with particular reference to Pakistan and China. The author has discussed national interests of India with reference to Pakistan and China.6 On the other hand, Aparna Pande has argued that it was the Indian factor, which strengthened Pakistan-China relations.7

In his research paper, Ghulam Ali argued that the advent of the 1960s radically changed the nature of Pakistan-China relations. During this period, the friendly relations of India and China turned into open hostility, leading to a border war in November 1962. It is a common knowledge that Pakistan-India relations have never been friendly, mainly because of the Kashmir dispute. During the Sino-Indian war, it was a great disappointment for Pakistan to see its Western allies openly supporting and arming its arch rival. This situation led Pakistan and China to come closer to each other and the relations between two counties improved considerably. While discussing the Indian factor in Pakistan-China relations, the author has also analysed that how India has a different approach from China and Pakistan on various issues such as the Afghan conflict, war on terrorism, implication of the Indian missile programme, Indian ambitions for navel hegemony in the Indian Ocean, growing Indo- US relations, China on Kashmir issue, China and the Kargil conflict, and China and Indo-Pak standoff.8

3 Rasul Bux Rais, China and Pakistan: A Political Analysis of Mutual Relations (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1977), 44-48. 4 Two important events happened during this period, i.e., India-China border war in 1962 and Indo- Pak war in 1965. 5 Samina Yasmin, „Pakistan‟s Relations with China, 1947-1979‟ Islamabad Papers 9 (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, 1980), 22-27. 6 Latif Ahmed Sherwani, India, China and Pakistan (Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1967), 12-17. 7 Aparna Pande, Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India (Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 5-6. 8 Ghulam Ali, “Sino-Pakistan Relations: The Indian Factor,” IPRI Journal 3, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 98- 121.

Most of the Indian analysts describe Pakistan-China relations as India-centric and sometimes these relations are projected even negatively. Abanti Battacharya and Swaran Singh‟s edited book is divided into three main parts. The first part of the book entitled, “Mutual Perceptions and Policies,” begins with the evolution of Sino- Pak mutual policies and perception examining their mutual images, interests and attractions. It also covers the deep-rooted strategic and political cultures and their security perceptions, which provided the necessary foundation in the evolution of their strategic cooperation. The second part focuses on “Defence and Strategic Cooperation,” in which the authors highlight their worries about the proliferation of nuclear, missile, defence production and sharing technical knowledge in aerospace, air and naval training, and technologies. The third part of the book covers “Fundamentals of Strategic Engagement.” Here, the authors attempt to prove that Pakistan-China strategic collaboration is purely based on the “India factor.”9 Another book written by Swaran Singh also presents similar views.10

Some scholars are of the view that in the post 9/11 period, Pakistan and China‟s involvement in America‟s war on terrorism changed the nature of their relations with the US. Both countries have also enhanced their cooperation in socio-economic development by specially focusing on eradication of poverty and illiteracy. In his research, Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti argued that the post 9/11 era has witnessed a tremendous increase in Pakistan-China economic and trade relations. Both countries celebrated their 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations in 2001. During his visit to Pakistan in May 2001, Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji announced many big projects, which included Gwadar Port and Lakhra Coal. The author further argued that Pakistan-China relations have gained depth and breadth in view of increasing Indo-US strategic ties. The US decision to supply sophisticated arms and latest nuclear technology knowing well that was not willing to sign the NPT, is clearly a plan of the former to make latter a future superpower. It reflects that the main goal of

9 Abanti Battacharya and Swaran Singh, ed., China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation, India Perspectives, (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2007), 55-59. 10 Swaran Singh, China-South Asia: Issues, Equation, Policies, (New Delhi: Lancer‟s Books, 2003), 17-22.

the United State is to contain China, which is being projected as a threat to its global hegemony.11

Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti further states that the US global strategy relating to Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), announced in May 2001, was a significant element under the Bush administration and within four days, India under the BJP government12 was the first country that welcomed the US stance. The objective of the policy was to neutralise nuclear capability of hostile states. According to some US experts, the policy was devised for China in the pretext of American hostility with Iraq, Iran and North Korea. India was eager to join the BMD in order to eliminate Pakistan‟s nuclear deterrence. Therefore, Pakistan and China went against the policy of the BMD. India‟s cooperation with the US has compelled Pakistan and China to further enhance their strategic ties.13

Kanti Bajpai contributed a chapter in an edited book. It has discussed the developments of Pakistan‟s relations with the United States and China in the wake of 11th September 2001 attacks. Bajpai is of the view that before 9/11 and the war on terrorism; Pakistan‟s relations with the United States were on a downward trajectory. Relations with China were also not ideal. After 9/11, Pakistan resumed its importance in the strategic thinking of both countries. He further adds that the US-Pakistan and Pakistan-China relations after 9/11 have helped stabilised South Asia.14

In his research, Shamshad Ahmad states that 9/11 represented a critical threshold in Pakistan‟s foreign policy. Pakistan‟s importance in the international community enhanced substantively as it assumed its new role as a key player in the global war on

11 Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti, China’s Peaceful Rise and South Asia, (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2008), 57-63. 12 Presently, Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) is the ruling political in India, which won national election held in 2014. Founded in 1980, the party is dominated by hardliner Hindu nationalists. According to Encyclopaedia Britannica, the BJP‟s ideology is to promote Hindu cultural values all over the India and thus it is very critical of secular policies and practices. See, Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP),” http://www.britannica.com/ EBchecked/ topic/ 64033/ Bharatiya-Janata-Party-BJP. 13 Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti, China’s Peaceful Rise, 61. 14 Kanti Bajpai, “Managing Ambivalence Pakistan‟s Relations with the United States and China Since 2001” in Rajshree Jetly ed., Regional and Global Politics, (Abingdon: Rutledge, 2009), 63-97.

terror and made a commitment to eliminate terrorist camps on its territory. According to his analysis, “in the post 9/11 scenario, terrorism-related problems afflicting Pakistan have placed it on the global radar screen, giving it the unenviable distinction of being one of the epochal frontlines of the war on terror.”15

In his work, Akram Zaki has discussed China‟s relations with South Asian countries particularly focusing on Pakistan. He is of the view that the primary objective of China‟s South Asia policy has been to maintain a “Zone of Peace” around China to enable the country to pursue its domestic agenda, especially economic modernisation. While discussing the basis of Pakistan-China relations, he observed that Sino-Indian hostility and Pakistan‟s disappointment with Western allies created a favourable climate of common interests in China and Pakistan to come together. He further adds that being conscious of the fact that the US was making India a global strategic partner, China and Pakistan agreed to strengthen their comprehensive strategic partnership.16 Needless to say that China is in a position to play a key role in supporting the development and prosperity of its neighbours. According to Zhao Gancheng, the security of South Asian region is dependent upon good relations between India and Pakistan and it is an important component of Chinese foreign policy. In this context, the old concepts of geopolitics are being overshadowed by new developments in the region. Therefore, China attempts to keep good relations with its neighbours, which is a basic requirement for maintaining its fast economic growth.17

Zhao Gancheng also warns that in this process new challenges may come up, e.g.: i) China and India‟s perception about each other, ii) perception of each other‟s role in Asia, and, iii) perception of each other‟s role in global affairs. Their concerns are raised because both countries are making rapid growth and thus can be suspicious of

15 Shamshad Ahmad, “Post-9/11 Foreign Policy of Pakistan” Criterion Quarterly 1, no.1 (September 27, 213). 16 Akram Zaki, China of Today and Tomorrow-Dynamics of Relations with Pakistan (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 2010), 34. 17 Zhao Gancheng, “China‟s South Asia Policy: Balancing and Stabilising,” Regional Studies (2005): 120-121.

each other.18 This type of environment is not favourable for the smooth development of their bilateral relations and to promote regional stability in the current environment. Interestingly, while analysing the South Asian strategic situation, some Indian academicians go too far in giving favour to India. For instance, Arpit Rajan argues that a nuclear India can serve the cause of disarmament while any improvement in Chinese nuclear programme would be considered a threat in New Delhi and will cause an imbalance in the equilibrium of a regional power balance.19 During 2006, a paper published by C. Raja Mohan also expresses a similar view.20 An overview of literature shows that such feelings have become more prominent in the post 911 period.

Some American scholars believe that in the early 21st century, the rise of China is posing a major challenge to the US. In their view, China‟s quest for playing a prominent global role, especially in economic and strategic affairs is an attempt to undermine the US influence in the future. In their study published by RAND, Michael D. Swain and Ashly J. Tellis support this view.21 Needless to say that the balance of power in South Asia has been one of the important components of regional security, Judith F. Kornberg and John R. Faust believe that the security alignment in South Asia has become more complex than ever and the 9/11 events have further complicated South Asian regional security. India is concerned about cross border terrorism, while China is concerned about the increased US presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as increasing US-Indian strategic ties. While discussing China‟s interests in South Asia, the authors are of the view that China‟s major interests and key goal in South Asia are regional security and a balance of power aiming at supporting its economic growth.22

18 Ibid. 19 Arpit Rajan, Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia: China, India and Pakistan (Mumbai: Sage Publications, 2005), 416-417. 20 C. Raja Mohan, “India and the Balance of Power,” Foreign Affairs, July-August, 2006. 21 Michael D. Swain and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present and Future, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 2-3. 22 Judith F. Kornberg and John R. Faust, China Worked Politics Policies, Processes, Prospects (New Delhi: Viva Books, 2007), 74-75. Also see, Valérie Niquet, “The Balance of Power in Asia: A Challenge for Europe?” China Perspectives (January-February 2006): 1-7; Emirates Centre for

Some scholars believe that in the post-cold war period in general and in the post 9/11 era in particular, there has been a shift in Pakistan-China relations. They see various challenges in their relations due mainly to China‟s rapprochement with India, which compelled it to adopt a policy of neutrality in the regional and bilateral disputes. They also view Pakistan‟s policy of using its ideology as the strategic tool of the foreign policy pursuit. Pakistan‟s pan-Islamic pursuit not only proved counterproductive in influencing Central Asian Republics (CAR) but also become the cause of irritation in Pakistan-China relations due mainly to Xinjiang factor. Aman Memon has analysed this perspective in detail not only by discussing Pakistan-China relations in their historical background but also examining the new determinants influencing their relations in the post-Cold War era such as the Kashmir issue,23 the Afghan crises, the Indian factor and relations with CAR.24 Muhammad Ijaz Butt also agrees with Memon and in his work he has analysed the roots of Pakistan-China relations in terms of Indo-China border conflicts, Pakistan-China border agreement, China‟s entry into the UN, Indo-Pak wars, Kashmir issue, Gwadar Port and China‟s regional approach. His main argument is that in the current situation, especially in strategic and economic perspectives, both countries are important for each other and further strengthening of their ties will be mutually beneficial for them.25

Some of the Indian scholars believe that the geopolitical situation in India‟s neighbourhood is likely to change significantly due to various developments, such as; uncertain situation of global economy, instability within the border region of Pakistan and Afghanistan, increasing influence of external factors in regional politics, population growth, issues of migration, and adverse implication of climate change.

Strategic Studies and Research, The Balance of Power in South Asia (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, 2000). 23 For the in-depth understanding of Kashmir issue and the stability in South Asia, following two books are particularly useful. Alastair Lamb, Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947, (Oxford: Oxford Books, 1994); Umbreen Javaid, ed., Peace and Security in South Asia: Issues and Challenges (Lahore: University of the Punjab, 2006). 24 Aman Memon, Shift in Sino-Pakistan Relations: A Sequel to Post-Cold War Realities, (Jamshoro: University of Sindh, 2007). 25 Muhammad Ijaz Butt, Focus on China: Relations with Pakistan, Domestic Concerns, (Lahore: Advance Publishers, 2007).

An edited book entitle, India’s Neighbourhood: Challenges in the Next Two Decades, by Rumel Dahiya and Ashok K. Behuri26 argues that due to increasing security challenges, there is a need for regional cooperation. It further emphasises that India has to review its policy approaches to properly deal with emerging realities in the region. It suggests that along with robust defence capabilities, India should also maintain a sustained economic growth by adopting cooperative security approaches in the region.

While presenting the Chinese perspective on the situation of the security of South Asia and its impact on this country, Du Youkang argues that China, Russia and the US have a common ground on the maintenance of stability in this region.27 He believes that there are no contradictory views on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, encountering religious extremism and cracking down on terrorist activities, arms smuggling and drugs trafficking. These views are also supported by Marvin J. Cetron and Owen Davies,28 and Robert G. Sutter.29 Du Youkang concludes that China should effectively prevent the danger brought about by the two „hotspots‟ of regional conflicts, i.e., Kashmir conflict and Afghan issue. He further suggests that China should deal strategically with the triangular relations namely, China-India- Pakistan, China-US-India and China-Russia-India, and actively strive for a secure and stable external environment for its South-West region.30

With regard to Indo-US nuclear deal, Tariq Osman Hayder argues that this agreement is a clear violation of the objective of non-proliferation agreed by the international community. In his view, if India gets the membership of Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), it would have serious and multi-dimensional consequences

26 Rumel Dahiya, Ashok K Behuri, India’s Neighbourhood: Challenges in the Next Two Decades (New Delhi: IDSA, 2012). 27 Du Youkang, “South Asian Security Situation and its Impact on China,” in Yu Xinrian ed., Contemporary World Configuration, (Shanghai: Shanghai Institute for International Studies, 2002), 142-161. 28 Marvin J. Cetron and Owen Davies, 55 Trends Now Shaping the Future of Terrorism 1, no. 2 (February 2008). 29 Robert G. Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia: Promises Prospects and Implications for the United States, Occasional Paper Series (Honolulu: Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies, February 2005). 30 Du Youkang, “South Asian Security Situation.”

for Pakistan as then India would be able to block any NSG decision of cooperation with Pakistan.31 A similar view is also expressed by Shireen M. Mazari and she says that the problem for Pakistan is that the US managed to get NSG waiver for India in terms of transfer of technology despite India‟s questionable proliferation record as a state. Furthermore, from Pakistani perspective, the Missile Defence System (MDS) would be directly significant as India has already been developing this system with the collaboration of Israel and the USA.32

Jian Yang and Rashid Ahmed Siddiqi argue that post 9/11 regional and global developments resulted in some important adjustments in China‟s South Asia policy. Unlike its passive posture during the India-Pakistan crises of the 1990s, China showed an extraordinary interest in South Asian regional security. In this regard, it has expressed greater concerns about the post-9/11 India-Pakistan tensions and has played a positive role to ensure regional security of South Asia. This role was eminent in different post-9/11 crises between India and Pakistan, including the 2001- 02 crises and the Mumbai terrorist attack of 2008. The authors further argue the developments in the region after 9/11 have further enhanced Pakistan‟s strategic value to China. According to them, global war on terrorism, its subsequent involvement in South Asia and adjoining regions and India‟s enhanced defence ties with Japan and the US, have all made Pakistan important in China‟s strategic thinking. Pakistan‟s importance further enhanced as an alternate trade and energy corridor for China.33

Some academicians are of the view that Pakistan‟s efforts in ending the isolation of China, especially its entry in the United Nations and normalisation of relations with the US, enhanced Pakistan‟s importance in China‟s foreign policy. In one of his research papers, Ghulam Ali has analysed Sino-US enmity with respect to the US

31 Tariq Osman Hayder, “Indo-US Nuclear Deal and Pakistan: The Years Ahead,” Policy Perspective 10, no. 2 (2013): 122-137. 32 Shireen M. Mazari, “Emerging Nuclear Scenario: Pakistan‟s Concerns and Approaches,” Policy Perspective 10, no. 2 (2013): 138-155. 33 Jian Yang and Rashid Ahmed Siddiqi, “About an „All-Weather‟ Relationship: Security Foundations of Sino-Pakistan Relations Since 9/11,” Journal of Contemporary China 20, no. 71, 2011.

blockade of China‟s admission into the United Nations. The paper argued that the impact of Pakistan‟s support for entry of China in the UN was very positive for the development of future Pakistan-China relations. In addition, the border agreement between two countries signed in March 1963, gave a new imputes to their relations. Pakistan‟s role in normalisation of Sino-US relations was another important positive contribution to China‟s interests. China appreciated all these efforts and in the following period, it paid back by offering substantial economic, military and political assistance to Pakistan.34

Based in San Francisco, Ahmad Faruqui a defence and energy analyst who reviewed Pakistan‟s traditional ties with China, examined the transformation in Chinese policy and the impact of these transformations on its relationship with Pakistan. He argued that both countries had an excellent relationship during the early sixties. “Till the nineties, the relationship was smooth as silk” but declined to some extent in the later period. The emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the early 1990s, changes in foreign and domestic priorities in China,35 and the increase of separatist activities in Indian controlled Kashmir affected the friendly relationship of the two countries.36 With regard to Chinese Kashmir policy, Ghulam Ali also supports Ahmad Faruqui and further argues that since the beginning, China‟s Kashmir policy has passed through different stages, e.g., from neutral stance to support the right of self- determination of Kashmiri people. He concludes that now China‟s stance on Kashmir is not the same but it depends on its relations with India specially upsurge in its economic and trade cooperation with India.37

In her article entitled, “Deeper than the Indian Ocean? An Analysis of Pakistan-China

34 Ghulam Ali, “China‟s Seat in the United Nations and Analysis of Pakistan‟s Role,” IPRI Journal vol. IV, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 178-192. 35 The changes in domestic and foreign priorities of China are also highlighted in “China: White Paper of the Government,” June 27, 2014, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/index.htm. 36 Ahmadd Faruqui, “The Complex Dynamics of Pakistan‟s Relationship with China,” IPRI Journal vol. 1, no. 1 (Summer 2001): 1-17. 37 Ghulam Ali, “China‟s Kashmir Policy: Back to Neutrality,” IPRI Journal vol. V, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 43-61.

Relations,” Qandeel Siddiqe38 recognises that China‟s image in Pakistan has been very positive both in the government sector as well as in the people. Both countries consolidated their political and defence relations due to their shared geo-strategic interests and a common vision to counter emerging threats to their national security. In order to make their strategic partnership more comprehensive, both countries are now also focusing on enhancing economic cooperation and people-to-people contacts.

In fact, there is a consensus among Pakistani scholars that the Pakistan-China strategic relationship is based on multi-faceted bilateral cooperation in diverse fields and these relations are mutually beneficial. An in-depth analytical overview of the history of Pakistan-China relations reflects that over the years, their close collaboration has been kept on increasing which was in response to the new and emerging regional strategic challenges. This collaboration helped to promote regional peace and security as well as the prosperity of both countries. Some scholars have analysed these relations in a regional context. The recent and continued increase in Pakistan-China relations are due mainly to their strong common interest in regional security and economic development.

In his article entitled, “Pakistan and China: Strategic Partners in the 21st Century,” Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed argues that Pakistan-China relations have acquired strategic dimensions and these relations are not just limited to diplomacy and defence, but new areas of cooperation such as economy, energy, culture, education and counter-terror have been added in their relations. China is Pakistan‟s biggest trading partner and it has helped in the construction of Gwadar Port - a potential energy corridor for landlocked CAR. Joint counterterrorism military exercises between the Pak Army and the Chinese People‟s Liberation Army are also a regular feature. He believes that “the potential for the strategic partnership has become greater in the current scenario with the 21st century being rightly proclaimed as the “Asian Century.” The balance of economic and political power is shifting inexorably

38 Qandeel Siddiqe, “Deeper than the Indian Ocean? An Analysis of China-Pakistan Relations,” SISA Report no. 16, February 27, 2014.

from the West to the East with the peaceful rise of China being perceived by countries like Pakistan as a source of strength and stability for Southwest and Central Asia in particular, and Asia as a whole.”39

In his work entitled, “China‟s Economic Relations with SAARC: Prospects and Hurdles,” Liu Zongyi highlights that rising China with advanced technology and booming economy has a great potential to change the destiny of South Asian region. Therefore, in order to get benefits of globalisation and to achieve the objectives of SAARC, it is an imperative for South Asian countries to grant China a full membership of SAARC. China is very much interested for full membership of SAARC and is making a significant contribution for economic and social development of all South Asian countries.40

It is noteworthy that to attain a balanced sustainable economic growth, especially in the land-locked western region of China which is considerably behind than the rest of the country, China needs a shortest route to sea ports and Pakistan is the best option for this. Maleeha Lodhi is a leading and well respected Pakistani intellectual and she particularly highlights the importance of Pakistan-China economic corridor, which is at the heart of two key aspects, i.e., vision of the revival of historical Silk Road route and the establishment of maritime and land links.41 Similar views have also been expressed by various Chinese scholars and they supported the idea of construction of a regional railway hub in the country to establish overland connectivity between Central and South Asia, and western China. It will facilitate China‟s western regions particularly Xinjiang trade with the Middle East and beyond. In his study, Chinese scholar Chen Jiding, has recommended that in order to actualise this dream, the role of China would be crucial especially in terms of financial and technical support. The proposed project will entail several advantages not only for China and Pakistan, but for the whole region by creating a momentum for regional economic growth and

39 Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed, “Pakistan and China: Strategic Partners in the 21st Century,” The News, May 1, 2012. 40 Liu Zongyi, “China‟s Economic Relations with SAARC: Prospects and Hurdles,” China Institute of International Studies, December 1, 2014. 41 Maleeha Lodhi, “China‟s Regional Strategy,” The News, April 1, 2014.

mutual transportation development.42 These activities will enhance economic interdependence of the countries of this region, which will strengthen their political relations leading to promote stability in this sensitive part of the world.

In his article (entitled: “China‟s Changing Policy towards Pakistan and Afghanistan under the New Leadership”) Wang Xu says that China‟s foreign policy emphasises on the need of strengthening its economic and security cooperation with Afghanistan and Pakistan. It reflects the increasing strategic importance of this region for China. “During Premier Li‟s visit to Islamabad in May 2013, China and Pakistan agreed on a long-term plan for an economic corridor to connect central and western parts of China with Pakistan. This idea combines China‟s existing plans for expanding its domestic demand and developing its western regions along with Pakistan‟s plan for developing its domestic economy. The plan carries great strategic significance in maintaining peace and improving livelihoods in China, Pakistan, South Asia and even the whole of Asia.”43

Counter-terrorism is an important area in which for over a decade, China and Pakistan have been collaborating with each other. In this regard, they are further strengthening their ties with the short and long term objectives including combating religious extremism and separatism. China helps Pakistan and appreciates its efforts to fight terrorism. This help has been provided in the form of diplomatic, economic and military support. In his paper, Rashid Ahmad Khan has discussed some important issues, e.g., counter-terrorism strategies being followed by China and Pakistan, implication of their cooperation in counter-terrorism for regional economic integration and a way forward to make these strategies fruitful, efficient and result oriented. He has rightly observed that there were number of ways to make the Pakistan-China counter terrorism cooperation more useful. As the relations between the two countries were free from any tension with full trust on each other, their

42 Chen Jiding, “Regional Railway Hub in Pakistan and China‟s Role,” Policy Perspective 10, no. 2 (2013). 43 Wang Xu, “China‟s Changing Policy Towards Pakistan and Afghanistan Under the New Leadership,” RUSI, January 2, 2014.

cooperation would not raise any suspicion and bitterness as has been seen in the case of the Pakistan-US cooperation against terrorism.44

Syed Shahbaz Hussain 45 has produced a joint paper with Massarrat Abid, Pirzada Sami UllahSabri and Iffat Batool. The paper entitled, “Pakistan China Strategic Engagement in the Regional Stability Syndrome of South Asia,” has highlighted the post 9/11 challenges faced by both countries. To overcome these challenges, both the countries focused their cooperation in economic, political and military spheres. The study identifies energy and counter terrorism as emerging areas of future cooperation between China and Pakistan.

A book entitled, You and Us: Stories of China and Pakistan 46 edited by H.E. Lu Shulin, a former Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan; is a very useful primary source of information on Pakistan-China relations. In this book, several Chinese and Pakistani diplomats have written their experiences and interesting stories of their times. While narrating his story, H.E. Zhang Chunxian states that during his tenure as Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan, an attack on Chinese engineers took place in Gwadar on May 3, 2004, when a truck exploded near a van carrying Chinese engineers resulted in killing of three engineers while injuring nine other. It was sad news for him but what he stated at that time shows his commitment to Pakistan-China relations. In his comments, “My Story about Pakistan,” he says that: “China-Pakistan traditional friendship will not be affected by this incident. The two countries‟ governments and people will continue working in partnership to ensure that the construction of the Gwadar Port project is completed on the schedule.”47 The book contains a statement of Mamnoon Husain, the President of Pakistan that described Pakistan-China relations as: “On the strategic front, our two countries have come even closer by the

44 Rashid Ahmad Khan, “Pakistan and China: Cooperation in Counter Terrorism,” Strategic Studies, November 2013. 45 Syed Shahbaz Hussain et al., “Pakistan China Strategic Engagement in the Regional Stability Syndrome of South Asia,” Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan -JRSP 51, no. 2 (July- December, 2014): 129-147. 46 Lu Shulin, You and Us: Stories of China and Pakistan (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2015). 47 Zhang Chunxian, „My Story about Pakistan‟ in You and Us: Stories of China and Pakistan, (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2015): 231.

launch of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. This landmark corridor will re-set the tone our future engagements - it is a clarion call of our two sides‟ commitment to mutually benefit from each other‟s advantages and to take the meaning of bilateral trade and commerce to new heights.”48

One of the important imperatives of regional security is to promote regional integrating of all those countries keen for regional peace and harmony, based on mutual respect and sovereignty. In his research entitled, “Chinas Economic and Strategic Interests in Afghanistan,” Raja Muhammad Khan49 postulates that in the post 2014 scenario, “constructive engagement with Afghanistan will serve Chinese strategic, economic and security interests.” According to him, China‟s major interests in stabilising Afghanistan are to ensure security and development of its Xinjiang province. In his view, China has “sufficient resources for making long-term investments in Afghanistan. There is a strong will of the determined Chinese leadership to strengthen communication, coordination and collaboration in dealing with major international and regional issues. … Apart from its own interest for stabilisation and reconstruction of Afghanistan, there is acceptability for China‟s increased role in Afghanistan amongst the masses and leadership alike.”50

In her work on the future of South Asian Security, Mahin Karim has analysed the prospects for non-traditional regional security mechanism. She highlights that South Asia is a difficult region with difficult relationships. It faces critical threats both at traditional and non-traditional levels. Although, the tense relations between India and Pakistan on long-standing traditional security disputes have historically limited the effectiveness of regional institutions in South Asia, the prospects are not entirely bleak for a stable South Asia. The non-traditional mechanism will not only promote security but will also encourage growth and stability. She believes that in such a

48 Statement by Mamnoon Husain, President of Pakistan in Lu Shulin ed., You and Us: Stories of China and Pakistan, (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2015), 4. 49 Raja Muhammad Khan, “China‟s Economic and Strategic Interests in Afghanistan,” FWU Journal of Social Sciences 1, no.1 (Summer 2015). 50 Ibid.

scenario, the non-traditional regional security threats will compel all the South Asian countries for regional cooperation.51

While discussing the problems and prospects of the security of South Asia, Yang Xiaoping highlights three main dimensions: i) the power dimension, ii) the mechanism dimension, and, iii) the idea dimension. According to him, the main feature of the South Asian security structure is the dominance of India in the region. The different degrees of economic dependency on India result in fragmentation of regional economic integration and thus form the „India-Eastward Camp‟ and “the Pakistan-Westward Camp.‟ “On the other hand, China has adopted a grand Western Development Strategy. If China‟s Western style development could become East Asia‟s Westward expanding tendency, it will be a way out for both India-China relations as well as India-Pakistan relations. The key to Western expansion is to link the industrial shift from East Asia to South Asia and foster the East Asian independent regional market with South Asia‟s industrialisation process to realise inclusive economic development and human development at the same time.” 52

In his article entitled, “Pakistan, China, Iran and the Remaking of Regional Security,” M. K. Bahadrakumar 53 explains that the South Asian regional Security as well as the security of neighbouring regions is on the brink of an intense change. The three main changes highlighted by him include: i) Iran‟s nuclear deal with the US enabling it to restore relations with the international community as an important player in regional and global affairs; ii) the recent enhancement of cooperation between Russia and China since the New Cold War tendencies began to appear; and, iii) “significant shift in the foreign-policy priorities of Pakistan, a genuinely „pivotal‟ state in the politics of

51 Mahin Karim, “The Future of South Asian Security: Prospects for a Non-traditional Regional Security Architecture, the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) Project Report, April 2013. 52 Yang Xiaoping, “The Security Architecture of South Asia: Problems and Prospects,” India-China Institute, March 2013. 53 M. K. Bahadrakumar, “Pakistan, China, Iran and the Remaking of Regional Security,” Asia Times, April 18, 2015.

South Asia, given its highly strategic geographic location in the South Asian region, from where it impacts regional security in Central Asia and West Asia.”54

In the above context, the work of Shahzad Akhtar is also worth mentioning here. In his research (entitled: Sino-Pakistani Relations: An Assessment), he argues that China‟s improved relations with India will not have a negative impact on Pakistan- China relations. There is no doubt that in the past the Indian factor had played a role in strengthening Pakistan‟s relations with China, though other forces were also of immense importance in bringing the two countries closer to each other. In future, their relations are likely to continue to grow as well, quite independent of the India factor. The other factors influencing the nature and dynamics of Pakistan-China relations include internal developments in the two countries, Pakistan‟s relations with India, developments taking place in the region, war on terror and the role of external actors, particularly the US involvement in the region.55

A well-known British writer Andrew Small in his book entitled, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics argues that Pakistan-China relations developed on the basis of their shared mistrust with India. The relations between the two countries are very important for the emerging geopolitical order in Asia involving the issues ranging from the rise of India to post-US drawdown in Afghanistan and from nuclear danger of terrorism to exploration of natural resources in the region and building of ports and pipelines. The book discusses the recent developments in Pakistan-China relations in the context of Indo-US strategic cooperation and stability in Afghanistan. The study also covers sensitive areas of cooperation between China and Pakistan including Pakistan‟s nuclear programme, the Taliban issue and the presence of East Turkestan Islamic Movement in North Waziristan. It describes a relationship increasingly shaped by Pakistan‟s internal strife, and the dilemmas China faces between the need for regional stability and the imperative for strategic competition with India and the USA. Pakistan lies at the heart of China‟s geostrategic ambitions,

54 Ibid. 55 Shahzad Akhtar, “Sino-Pakistani Relations: An Assessment,” Strategic Studies XXIX, no. 2 and 3 (Summer and Autumn 2009): 69-85.

from its take-off as a global naval power to its grand plans for a new silk road connecting the energy fields of the Middle East and the markets of Europe to the mega-cities of East Asia.56

Sometimes common questions are asked by various people, such as what are the implications of a rising China for Pakistan? Also, to what extent will China‟s relations with India influence its relationship with Pakistan? It is commonly considered that China as a rising power would look at the world through the prism of its own global interests. Similar to Shahzad Akhtar, 57 Kashif Ali also argues that unlike the Cold War confrontation, China‟s relationship with India will not affect its relationship with Pakistan and that is because of the nature of its deep-rooted longstanding relationship as well as its political, economic and strategic interests in Pakistan. In spite of China‟s growing relations with India, there are at least three main reasons, which will continue to engage China and Pakistan in friendly relations. Firstly, China‟s long-lasting friendship with Pakistan is based on the importance of Pakistan in providing an energy and trade corridor to China through Gwadar Port. Secondly, China was highly sensitive about the regional stability in the post 2014 Afghanistan, especially in the backdrop of any abrupt drawdown of the coalition forces from this country. Both countries want stability and peace in Afghanistan and in this context, China particularly recognises Pakistan‟s constructive role in facilitating the peace process in Afghan, which should be Afghan led and Afghan own. In the same token, Pakistan also considers China‟s involvement in the region as a stabilising factor. Thirdly, making Pakistan a strong country is in China‟s own interest because a strong and prosperous Pakistan would be in a better position to fight religious extremism and terrorism.58 Needless to say that Kashif Ali‟s arguments are strong and reflect the depth of the relations of these two countries.

56 Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). It is noteworthy that in the recent military operation in North Waziristan, the members of East Turkistan Islamic Movement have been driven out by Pak Army. 57 Shahzad Akhtar, “Sino-Pakistani Relations: An Assessment.” 58 Kashif Ali, “Will China-India Relations Dent Pak-China Relations?” Express Tribune, December 4, 2012.

The above overview of literature reflects that several academicians believe that rivalry between Pakistan and India is the main factor in shaping Pakistan-China strategic relations. They argue that Pakistan is particularly concerned about Indian ambitions of expansionism and establishing its regional hegemony. Other scholars argue that the bilateral relations of these neighbouring countries have become far stronger in the post 9/11 period which is mainly due to their collaboration in the war on terrorism and encountering religious extremism. Similarly, both countries have also realised the importance of fighting poverty and illiteracy that contribute to insecurity and terrorism. Additionally, there are some other arguments presented in this regard, e.g., i) the US considers China a threat to its interests due to which it wants to reduce its influence in global and regional affairs, ii) Sino-Indian hostility and their border dispute, and, iii) China‟s rapid economic growth needs an energy corridor through Pakistan.

The advocators of these views maintain that these factors have also contributed to strengthen Pakistan-China relations. This study argues that in addition to these factors, the strong strategic relations of these countries are mutually beneficial and the post 9/11 situation has further supported to bring them closer. Pakistan considers China‟s involvement in the regional affairs as a stabilising factor. Similarly, while Pakistan needs Chinese assistance in its development, a strong and prosperous Pakistan is also in China‟s own interest as it would be in a better position to fight religious extremism and terrorism, which is a major challenge for China.

Hypothesis The above discussion clearly directs to construct a specific hypothesis for this study that Pakistan-China strategic interdependence has increased manifold in the post 9/11 world due to convergence of their interests pertaining to developments in regional security. There are various variables, which define the parameters of this study. The imperative of regional security in the light of Pakistan-China relations has been taken as a dependent variable. The independent variables are the US-India strategic cooperation and the geo-strategic importance of Pakistan. The intervening variables

include Pakistan as a trade and energy corridor for China, Indian factor, Xinjiang issue, the Afghan problem, the US-led war on terrorism, Indo-US nuclear deal, the US presence in the region and Pakistan‟s entry in the SCO and China‟s entry into SAARC.

Research Questions In the light of its objectives, hypothesis and variable, this research raises several questions. For instance, what are the major imperatives of regional security in the context of Pakistan-China relations? How the post 9/11 situation has affected Pakistan-China strategic cooperation in three main areas, i.e.; i) military and security, ii) economic and trade, and iii) cooperation in the regional organisations. Also, since the 9/11, whether the strategic cooperation between the two countries has increased or decreased? What are the imperatives of interdependence between China and Pakistan, along with China‟s importance in strategic scenario of South Asia, coupled with Indian efforts for strategic superiority. What are the regional alliances and geopolitical imbalances? How does the US and Indian factor affect Pakistan-China relations? What are the future prospects of Pakistan-China relations in promoting regional security and cooperation particularly in the context of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, counter terrorism, emerging regional security order, security of CPEC, situation in Afghanistan and Iran‟s nuclear deal and its impact on the region? In the context of the present research, these are only a few of the important questions – although, there are many more which can be raised in this regard.

Methodology This study is primarily based on the concept of regional security, which is discussed in detail in the next chapter. The study is mainly empirical in nature and deals with the complex prevailing situation in the South Asian region with its main focus on Pakistan-China relations.

This research is based on a variety of sources of data. In the broader context, these sources can be divided into two groups, i.e., primary sources of information and

secondary sources of information. Primary sources are an important component of the analysis of this study and for this purpose several open interviews and one to one discussions were arranged with relevant professionals and academics. Respondents were selected both vertically and horizontally from the systems of interest. Different selection techniques were used to identify respondents. In most cases, the researcher directly approached the respondents. These people were identified through document analysis, recommended by knowledgeable informants as well as the information already available to the researcher. A snowball technique was also used where interviewees recommended other respondents. Interviews focused on the dimensions of regional security with particular reference to Pakistan-China relations in the post 9/11 era.

Secondary sources, which include all types of published material (e.g., books, research journals, various reports published by a variety of organisations, magazines, newspapers, and electronic sources) were the other important part of data collection method for this study. Due to the shortage of creditable academic published material in Pakistan, it is not always easy to acquire specific relevant information. Furthermore, in this research process, the scarcity of the most relevant and reliable academic publications was not the only problem; on a number of occasions, the information available from various sources was insufficient and incompatible to other sources. Some of the documents only explained the purpose without discussing the related conceptual and theoretical issues. However, in spite of all these challenges, the analysis of the acquired information proceeded simultaneously with the data collection in a continuous and interactive process.

While conducting interview, the Active Research method is used. The aim of the Active Research is to review a particular situation, policy or scenario in order to change or improve it. Further, this research encourages the researchers to collaborate with experts and practitioners as their input help facilitate in overcoming problems

and limitation of research design and implementation process.59

The research design of this study is based mainly on the qualitative approach; therefore, this study will be different from the studies base on purely quantitative research leading to hypothesis-testing research. As this study mainly based on the qualitative approach, therefore, it leads to hypothesis-generating research. “Qualitative hypothesis-generating research involves collecting interview data from research participants concerning a phenomenon of interest, and then using what they say in order to develop hypotheses. It uses the two principles of (1) questioning rather than measuring and (2) generating hypotheses using theoretical coding…Because the method involves developing hypotheses after the data is collected, it is called hypothesis-generating research rather than hypothesis-testing research.”60

As this study follows the qualitative methods of analysis, therefore, the collated research material both from primary and secondary sources of information is used to reach a definitive conclusion for the research. In the case of secondary sources, the thesis attempts to examine the findings of other researchers and academics in order to undertake a cross comparison analysis of the material under review. In fact, the use of both primary and secondary approaches helped in strengthening the originality and consistency in the analysis of the research. This multi-dimensional type of methodology, on the one hand helped to find the correlation between problems and prospects and on the other, presented a broader picture of the situation based upon an in-depth analysis. This type of methodology was adopted due to the particular nature of this problem where several factors were inter-linked internally and externally and resultantly created a complex situation of regional security in this troubled and sensitive part of the world.

59 Lisa Harrison and Theresa Callan, Key Research Concepts in Politics and International Relations (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2 013). 60 C. F. Auerbach and L. B. Silverstein, Qualitative Data: An Introduction to Coding and Analysis (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 7-8.

Division of the Study The present study consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 covers the theoretical framework of the study and discusses various conceptual dimensions of regional security, e.g., human (in)security, regional complex theory, economic interdependence, critique on interdependency theory, balance of power theory and its critique, etc. The chapter highlights that in conjunction with the theories of human security, economic inter-dependence and balance of power; regional complex theory is an appropriate tool to analyse various dimension of the situation.

Chapter 2 discusses in detail the imperatives of regional security in terms of South Asian regional security complexes. The important imperatives of regional security include exploration and possibility of resolving issues between Pakistan and India, the Afghan issue and regional stability, promoting regional economic integration, energy security and strategic stability. To meet these imperatives, the role of China as a strategic partner of Pakistan has been analysed in this chapter. A further attempt is made to explore China‟s increasing influence in the region especially its relations with Pakistan and its impact in promoting regional stability.

Chapter 3 discusses the evolution of strategic partnership between Pakistan and China and examines the factors and environment that led to the consolidation of their strategic inter-dependence. The main argument made in the chapter is that the strategic interdependence between the two countries has strengthened in the post 9/11 period. Furthermore, it highlights that the origin of the strategic cooperation between the two countries was India-centric but with the passage of time new dimensions have been added in their strategic cooperation in the post 9/11 period.

Chapter 4 focuses on Pakistan-China military and security cooperation. It presents an analytical overview of cooperation between all three armed forces, i.e., Army, Navy and Air Force. This can be considered as the first component of their strategic partnership. The chapter also explores various dimensions of Chinese political

support in strengthening Pakistan‟s security and augmenting space and maritime cooperation. Furthermore, the analysis also covers cooperation in non-traditional security issues such as combating religious extremism, terrorism, natural disasters, and promoting stability in Afghanistan, which is an essential element to promote and maintain stability in South and Central Asian regions. The core point of this chapter is that in the post 9/11 period, the defence and security cooperation between Pakistan and China has been enhanced.

Chapter 5 focuses on the second component of the strategic partnership between Pakistan and China, i.e., trade and economic ties. It analyses the future potential and scope of bilateral trade and economic cooperation especially in the light of their trade and investment agreements. The last part of the chapter discusses the avenues for future cooperation such as the establishment of a railway link, development of an energy corridor, establishment of a transit and trade corridor by using the Karakoram Highway (KKH) as an alternate trade route, and cooperation in major infrastructure projects. Most of these projects are parts and parcel of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. The discussion highlights that the volume of trade and investment has shown very positive trends in the post 9/11 period.

Chapter 6 focuses on a third indicator of a strategic partnership between Pakistan and China, i.e., mutual cooperation in regional organisations. It probes into China‟s role as an observer in the SAARC and Pakistan‟s role as full membership in the SCO. It also explores benefits for both countries in supporting each other in international organisations. Chapter 7 discusses future prospects of Pakistan-China relations in promoting regional security and cooperation. It also analyses the impact of Pakistan- China relations on regional security. The concluding part presents a brief overview of the study, the main findings and recommendations for further improving the security of this important region of the world.

CHAPTER - 1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK In academic research, it is important to provide theoretical framework as a foundation of the study. In analysing Pakistan-China strategic relations in the context of regional security in the post 9/11 period, there is no single specific theory which can fully cover the objectives of the present study. Therefore, a combination of various theories has been used to explore the diverse empirical dimensions of this research project. In the context of the objectives of this research, the present chapter mainly discusses the five most relevant theories, i.e.: i) human security, ii) regional security, iii) regional security complex, iv) economic interdependence, and, v) the balance of power. It is understood that the security of a state or region provides a solid foundation for human security. Thus, regional security, regional security complex, economic interdependence and the balance of power theories are closely interlinked and also associated with the notion of human security.

1.1. The Core Concept of Security Historically, military security has been an important component of international relations and has been viewed in the perspective of “international security.” This is a more traditional approach adopted by realists and later by neo-realist.1 Here, the concept of security is taken in its positive form or in other words an absence of threat. In such a situation, the emphasis is laid on the prevention or minimising the risk of potential threats for which sometimes regional or global alliances are made for this purpose.2 An in-depth study of the concept of security reflects its various dimensions, e.g., it can be a security of an individual such as human security of a person, or it can go up to the level of national, regional or global security, which is mainly a neo-realist approach.

1 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 58-115. Also see: John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Powers (New York: Norton, 2003); Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith and James D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2003). 2 Czesław Mesjasz, “Security as a Property of Social System,” paper presented at the ISA Convention, Montreal, March 17-20, 2004.

In the broader spectrum, security reflects the relations between objects and its environment. A careful thinking of this situation reflects that security is an emotionally oriented normative. While keeping in view the evolution of this concept, the term security can be used at least in the following four perspectives.3 i) Traditional Meaning: In the perspective of military conflict, it is an attribute of state, or in other words the “military security.” ii) International Relations: It refers to the phenomena taking place in international relations, or specific relations between two states. iii) Public Good: It refers to any specific aspect(s) of security related to general public. iv) Human Security: The notion of human security is also linked with the „public good‟ and it has universal dimensions. In Bhagavan‟s view, “human security means ensuring that people‟s basic needs are met, which at least, is about access to secure and adequate livelihoods and income.”4 However, the spectrum of Bhagavan‟s definition is quite limited as it fails to encircle a broader concept of human security.

Keeping in view the objectives of the study, three different but interlinked concepts of security are discussed below, i.e., human security, regional security and regional security complex.

1.2. Concept of Human Security In 1994, a comprehensive notion of human security was presented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which in fact is a prerequisite for “human development.”5 It states;

3 For further study, see: M.R. Bhagavan, “Knowledge and Research in a Radically Changed World,” in Development Cooperation in the 21st Century, SIDA (Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 1997); UNDP, Human Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 4 M.R. Bhagavan, “Knowledge and Research in a Radically Changed World,” in Development Cooperation in the 21st Century, SIDA (Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 1997), 99-116. 5 In its first issue of Human Development Report 1990, UNDP says “Human development is a process of enlarging people‟s choices. The most critical of these wide-ranging choices are to live a long and healthy life, to be educated and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living. Additional

“For too long the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict between states. For too long, security has been equated with the threats to a country‟s borders. For too long, nations have sought arms to protect their security. For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world events. Job security, income security, environmental security, and security from crime – these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world.”6

The UNDP further argued that “the world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives. Future conflicts may often be within nations rather than between them – with their origins buried deep in growing socio-economic deprivation and disparities. The search for security in such a milieu lies in development, not in arms.”7 According to Kofi Annan, the former Secretary General of the United Nations: “Human security can no longer be understood in purely military terms. Rather it must encompass economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratisation, disarmament, respect for human rights and the rule of law. ... Moreover, these pillars are interrelated; progress in one area generates progress in another.”8 Amitav Acharya supports the UNDP and Kofi Annan by arguing that: “In its broader sense, human security is distinguished by three elements: i) it focuses on people as the referent object of security, ii) its multidimensional nature, and, iii) its universal or global scope, applying to states and societies of the North as well as the South.”9

In 2003, the UN Commission on Human Security defined the concept as “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human

choices include political freedom, guaranteed human rights and personal self-respect.” UNDP, Human Development Report 1990 (New York: Oxford University Press), 1. It further argues that “The concept of human development is much broader than the conventional theories of economic development. Economic growth models deal with expanding GNP rather than enhancing the quality of human lives. ...Human development, by contrast, brings together the production and distribution of commodities and the expansion and use of human capabilities. ...It thus focuses on enlarging human choices – and it applies equally to developing and industrial counties.” UNDP, Human Development Report 1995 (New York: Oxford University Press), 11-12. 6 UNDP, Human Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 3. 7 Ibid., 1. 8 Kofi Annan, “Towards the Culture of Peace,” available at http://www.unesco.org accessed on May 10, 2015. 9 Amitav Acharya, “Human Security,” in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 482.

fulfilments.”10 It reflects that this definition is aligned with the UNDP‟s approach and also supported by United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS),11 Yu-tai Tsai,12 Sabina Alkire,13 Fukuda-Parr and Carol Messineo.14 An in-depth consideration of the UNDP and the UNTFHS‟s definitions shows that Bhagavan‟s emphasis is only on the basic need approach, while in contrast the UNDP‟s approach is much broader and also supported by its Millennium Development Goals (MDG),15 i.e.: a) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. b) Achieve universal primary education. c) Promote gender equality and empower women. d) Reduce child morality. e) Improve maternal health. f) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. g) Ensure environmental sustainability. h) Develop global partnership for development.

An in-depth thinking of these goals reflects that the first seven are more related to human security while the last goal is somewhat linked with the theory of economic interdependence which is discussed in the coming pages. It is noteworthy that the spectrum of UNDP‟s concept of human security is much wider because: a) Human security is a universal concern (both for developed and developing countries).

10 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now (New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003), 4. 11 United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, Human Security in Theory and Practice (New York: United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2009), 6-8. 12 Yu-tai Tsai, “The Emergence of Human Security: A Constructivist View,” International Journal of Peace Studies 14, no. 2 (Autumn/Winter 2009): 19-33. 13 Sabina Alkire, A Conceptual Framework for Human Security (Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Inequality, University of Oxford, Working Paper No. 2: 2003). 14 Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Carol Messineo, Human Security: A Critical Review of Literature (Leuven: Centre for Research on Peace and Development, CRPD Working Paper no. 11: 2012). 15 The United Nations, MDG Gap Task Force Report 2013: Global Partnership for Development - Challenge We Face: Millennium Development Goal 8 (New York: The United Nations, 2013), ix. Also see: UNDP, Promoting the Millennium Development Goals in Asia and the Pacific (New York: The United Nations, 2003); Government of Pakistan and UNDP, Pakistan’s Millennium Development Goals: Report 2013 (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan and UNDP); Peoples Republic of China and the United Nations System in China, China’s Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals: Report 2010.

b) When the security of people in any particular region of the world is challenged, it also affects the security of people in other regions of the world. c) Human security is people-centred as it is concerned with the daily lives of the general population. d) It also means security from hunger, disease, repression and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life. e) Human security is not a substitute of the broader concept of human development presented by the UNDP in 1990, rather a precondition of it.16 f) While considering the situation of Pakistan, China and South Asian region as a whole, the above points indicate the validity and relevance with the current circumstances.

In spite of UNDP‟s broader approach to human security, the definition ignores a range of factors, e.g., as argued by Barry Buzan, the deepening economic interdependence between the regional countries is directly and indirectly linked with the military security of the respective region.17 This argument is also supported by Mohammad Ayoob as in his view; the military threat to national security is one of many that governments have to address. He says: “The term [security] as it has been traditionally used in international relations literature is based on two major assumptions: one that threats to a state‟s security principally arise from outside its borders, and two, that these threats are primarily, if not exclusively, military in nature and usually need a military response if the security of the target state is to be preserved.”18

16 UNDP, Human Development Report 1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 1; UNDP, Human Development Report 2001 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 9. 17 For further study, see: Lester R. Brown, Redefining National Security - Worldwatch Paper 14 (Washington, DC: World Watch Institute, October 1997), 5, 7-8; David A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies 13-3 (December 1997), 5-26; Hakan Wiberg, “(Re-) Conceptualising Security,” Arms Control 13-3 (December 1992): 478-492; Bjorn Moller, Common Security and Non-offensive Defence: A Neo-Realist Perspective (London: Brassy‟s, 1999), 64-70; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, “Redefining Security,” Foreign Affairs 68-2 (1999), 171-177; Ronnie D. Lipchitz, ed., On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, ed., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (London: UCL Press, 1997). 18 Mohammad Ayoob, “International Security and the Third World,” in W.C. Olson, ed., Theory and Practice of International Relations (Eaglewood Cliff: Prentice Hall, 1994), 224-241.

In the view of Baldwin and Wolfers, the definition of security can be established through the specification of two factors. The first factor to be specified is a referent object – the actor(s) whose security is under discussion. It can be a society, ethnic or religious group, nation state, region or even an international system. Secondly, it is necessary to specify the values to be protected, such as political autonomy, territorial integrity, or continuity of state‟s identity. However, in the age of globalisation and global terrorism, it may not be possible to draw a specific line between “local”, “national”, “regional”, and “global” factors.19 In the context of redefining human security, the former US President Clinton said: “There is no longer a division between what is foreign and what is domestic; the world economy, the world environment, the world AIDS crises, the world arms race - they have all become global in nature and reach.”20

The above discussion highlights the importance of “human security” in the context of national and regional security. Its nature and scope is multidimensional, due to which it has universal implications. It addresses several non-traditional threats such as poverty, socio-economic challenges and environmental issues. Its main emphasis is to protect masses from hunger, diseases and repression, including sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of day-to-day life. It emphasises that the world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives.

1.3. Regional Security Perspectives As the term itself indicates, the concept of regional security is composed of two elements, region and security. This combination form a state of affair which encompasses self-help behaviour under anarchical conditions and also some collective arrangements those move away from such a manner. Both concepts are very complex and no commonly accepted definition exists on each. In the world of politics, the term „region‟ has become most closely associated with the different continents of the world: Africa, the Americas, Asia, Oceania and Europe. Subcontinents (e.g., South Asia) and the areas surrounding seas (e.g., Baltic and the Caspian seas) are sometimes also referred to as regions. Further

19 D. A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies 23:1 (1997): 5-26. 20 J. T. Mathews, “Redefining Security,” Foreign Affairs 68:2 (2003): 171-177.

distinction can also be made between regions and sub-regions where the sub-regions can be considered as specific geographic areas of respective continents. However, sometimes these two terms are also used interchangeably due to which their difference become blurred.

Wu Chunsi argues that similar to other counties, Chinese foreign policy focuses on national development and this objective can only be achieved when there is a peace in the region. Therefore, while collaborating with its neighbours, China always attempts to promote regional peace and stability. There are three key elements of this policy, i.e.: i) strengthening multilateralism and regional cooperation, ii) the enhancement of interdependence and contributing to reduction in insecurity; and, iii) putting efforts on the Asian way in dealing with regional disputes. In Chunsi‟s view, these three elements are in fact the “new concepts on maintaining regional peace.”21 Regarding supporting multilateralism and regional cooperation, China has changed its passive attitude towards international system and now its involvement with international organisations has increased tremendously.22 Chinese regional security approach is mainly based on collective security. Its best example is Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) established by five regional countries which have border disputes. In July 2015, by joining Pakistan and India, this organisation is expanded and is playing a vital role in encountering separatists and extremist.

Wu Chunsi also believes that conceptual element of enhancement of interdependence for the promotion of regional security is linked with the notion of globalisation which reflects that the concept of security is much bigger than military security. She argues that China‟s concerns have been transferred from military security issues to economic development and social stability, because now it views the world through a different prism as compared to Cold War era. This is because in the contemporary process of

21 Wu Chunsi, “China: Driving Force for Regional Peace and Stability,” in Strategic Implications of Rise of China: Proceedings of One-Day International Seminar (Jamshoro: Area Study Centre, University of Sindh, 13th November, 2008), 70-85. 22 For further study, see: Jiang Jiuzhai, “Motivations for Chin‟s Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Region,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 1 (2006): 28-42; Liu Changming and Pang Chunen, “From Bilateralism to Multilateralism: A New Model of Relations between China and East Asian Countries,” Journal of Shandong University 5 (2007): 5-17.

globalisation, the sources of threats have also diversified and a multi-dimensional approach is required to address the new challenges. The Chinese government understands that the military approach to deal with the regional issue will further damage the interests of regional countries. Therefore, the best approach would be to focus on the promotion of economic, social and cultural ties which would be helpful to resolve the issues in a non- military way and this approach will promote regional security.23

The Chinese approach to dealing with regional issues in Asian ways is interesting and important. China clearly knows that unlike its historic approach, it cannot keep itself isolated in the contemporary globalised world. To protect and promote its national interests, it has to play an important role in the global affairs. However, similarly to the US, Russia and other super powers, as still it is not fully equipped to play a leading role in the world; thus it mainly focuses on Asia-Pacific region. Needless to say that the importance of Asia-Pacific region is increasing in the global affairs and within this circle, China considers itself an Asian power. For this reason, China is an important player in resolving regional issues in Asian ways. China believes that Asian countries are attempting to play a greater role in global affairs where the US and European powers have upper hand. In China‟s view, Asian countries need to clearly define their national and regional interests and proceed confidently to promote them.24

The concept of regional security is also discussed by AJK Bailes and Andrew Cottey and their focal point is “cooperation.” They argue that there are at least four components of regional security, i.e., alliance, collective security, security regime and, security community.25 In the history of international cooperation, alliances can be considered the oldest form of cooperation. In the perspective of neo-realism, the „alliances‟ are made for defensive and offensive purposes. This is to deal with threats which can be internal or

23 Wu Chunsi, “China: Driving Force for Regional Peace and Stability”. 24 Ibid. 25 Alyson J.K. Bailes and Andrew Cottey, “Regional Security Cooperation in the Early 21st Century,” in Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, SIPRI Yearbook 2006 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2006), chapter: 4.

external. The “collective security approach”26 emerged during 1920s and is associated with the traditional approach of balance of power politics and alliance. This approach was used in the League of Nations and then in the United Nations with the aim to give a collective response to avoid further wars.27 According to Frank Spear, this concept was wrongly twisted to justify the US-led war on terrorism due to which they obtained the approval of UN Security Council to intervene in Iraq and Afghanistan.28

According to Bailes and Cottey, the “security regime” is the third important component of regional security cooperation. Security regimes are mainly non-military in nature and focus on socio-economic development through international trade and communication. Similarly, a “security community” is a group of states to ensure that the members of this community will not fight with each other and will resolve their issues through peaceful means.29 This situation reflects various dimensions of the notion of regional security cooperation. It shows that its first two components (i.e., alliance and collective security) are mainly linked with military security while the security regime and security community focus on the maintenance of human security and human development.

1.4. Regional Security Complex Theory The “Regional Security Complex Theory” (RSCT) was presented by Bary Buzan and Ole Waver. In their view: “The central idea in RSCT is that, since most threats travel more easily over short distances than long ones, security interdependence is normally into regionally based clusters: security complexes. … Process of securitization and thus the degree of security interdependence are more intense between actors inside such

30 The term “collective security” can be described as a security arrangement in which all states cooperate collectively to provide security for all by the actions of all against any states within the groups which might challenge the existing order by using force. 27 Gunnar Skirbekk, Nils Gilje, A History of Western Thought: From Ancient Greece to the Twentieth Century (London: Rutledge, 2001), 160. Also see I.L. Claude, Jr., “The Management of Power in the Changing United Nations,” International Organization 15 (Spring 1961), 222. 28 Personal interview with Frank Spear, November 21, 2014. Based in England, Frank Spear is a political activist and social worker. 29 Alyson J.K. Bailes and Andrew Cottey, “Regional Security Cooperation in the Early 21st Century,” in Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, SIPRI Yearbook 2006 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2006), chapter: 4.

complexes than they are between actors inside the complex and outside of it.”30 This situation reflects that there is a tendency of regional security related collaboration between neighbours than among countries situated in other regions of the world. Therefore, regionally based cluster(s) play important role in the security and balance of power in the respective region(s) of the world.

Buzan and Waver also argue that within the framework of “regional security complex” (RSC), a group of countries possesses a degree of security interdependence which provides a base for their collaboration. It indicates that the RSC is an analytical concept constructed and practiced by the actors and their actions in the respective region. It also indicates that the RSCT is what regional actors make it and in academic research, it is for the researcher to map these practices for adequate analysis. It is noteworthy that the RSCs are durable patterns not the constant factors. This situation also highlights that the RSCT provides a framework for empirical analysis of the dimensions of respective regional security.31 In relation to the objectives of the present study, there are at least three important elements of the RSCT, i.e., relations between regional states, relations between neighbouring regions and the role of major global players in the respective regions.

It needs not to be emphasised that the RSCT is a comprehensive concept which also encompass notion of sub-complexes which can be considered as a “half-level” within the regional framework. Although, it has the same definition as the RSCs - the only difference is that a sub-complex is a part and parcel of a larger RSC. In the words of Buzan and Waever, “Sub-complexes represent distinctive pattern of security interdependence that are nonetheless caught up in a wider pattern that defines the RSC as a whole.”32 Sub-complexes are not essential part of each and every RSC; however, depending upon the regional situation, sometimes their existence plays an important role in mapping the RSC. For instance, if we include China in the South Asian region and

30 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 4. 31 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers, 47-51. Also see: Marko Kovacevic, “The Influence of State-Building on Security Dynamics within the Framework of Regional Security Complex Theory,” Scientific Review (Western Balkan Security Observer: Globalisation and State-Building), 351, no. 21 (August 2011): 52-63. 32 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers, 47-51.

consider it “expanded South Asia”; the role of Pakistan-China relations is a key factor in shaping the RSC of South Asia.

In the empirical context, the RSCT is an important theory as it provides an effective conceptual skeleton to deal with the contemporary situation of regional and sub-regional security. Moreover, theory-based scenarios can also be established and analysed by adding some alternate variables to RSCs. In the words of Buzan and Waver: “RSCs are defined by durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of sub-global, geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence.”33 In the broader spectrum, the RSCT is an important academic tool to analyse the empirical situation of a specific region or a sub-region. This is because it provides a solid framework to explore the fabrics of polarity and interplay of regional dynamics in relations to the actions as well as interactions of major global players.

1.5. Economic Interdependence Theory When analysing the issue of regional security particularly in the perspective of Pakistan- China strategic relations, there are two other important theories, which are also linked with the objectives of this study, i.e., the economic interdependence theory and balance of power theory. Additionally, both theories have connections with the above discussed theories and they are mutually supportive. It is noteworthy that the Cold War was a period of intense international politics and its end gave birth to the emergence of the culture of interdependence. This happened both in an economic perspective as well as regional and global security. One of the important transformations that took place was a considerable shift in global affairs from geo-politics to geo-economics where economic power got priority over military power.

Liberalists believe that a high level of economic interdependence brings about economic gains, increases the cost of war, and improves the communication between nations. As a

33 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers, 45. Also; see: Julius D. A. Reynalds, “An Empirical Application of Regional Security Complex Theory: The Securitization in China‟s Relations with Central Asia and Russia,” MA Thesis (Budapest: Central European University, 2009), 7-22; Tuva Kahrs, “Regional Security Complex Theory and Chinese Policy towards North Korea,” East Asia: An International Quarterly 21, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 64-82.

result, it promotes cooperation and reduces the opportunities of conflicts. The advocators of the economic interdependence theory argue that with the passage of time, the use of military force is decreasing (although remained important); the complexities of interdependence and transnational connections between states and societies are increasing day by day. This argument is quite relevant for the post-Cold War period.34 However, in the post 9/11 period, along with economic interdependence, there has been an increase in strategic interdependence between states due mainly to globalisation of terrorism. The big powers developed strategic partnerships even with developing countries. There has been re-alignments and adjustment in relations among the big powers on one hand and the big powers and smaller powers on the other.

Richard Cooper‟s work particularly promoted the notion of “economic interdependence.” With regard to the complexities of interdependence especially in the context of political realism, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye specifically analysed how interdependence transformed the international politics.35 While analysing the role of power in politics and the relations between international actors, they highlighted the difference between interdependence and dependence. Interdependence theorists are of the view that complex global links which are mainly of economic in nature, are growing while at the same time, exercise of military force and power balancing are decreasing - although still important. Furthermore, they argued that as a policy tool, with the decline of the possibility of the use of military force and the increase in economic and various other forms of interdependence, the possibility of collaboration among states would increase. The framework of complex interdependence is basically an effort to put together the elements

34 For further study, see: Erik Gartzke, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer, “Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict,” International Organization, 55-2 (Spring 2001): 391-438; P.R. Goldstone, “Pax Mercatoria: Does Economic Interdependence Bring Peace?,” Audit of the Conventional Wisdom (Cambridge MA: MIT Centre for International Studies, August 2007), 7-12; Mark J. C. Crescenzi, Economic Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2005); Emiel Awad, “Economic Interdependence, Trade, and War: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,” MA Thesis, Erasmus University, Rotterdam (2013); Lauren VanHook, China in the Balance: Can Economic Interdependence Bring Stability to South Asia, Morehead State University, Morehead, KY; Ashley J. Tellis, “Trade, Interdependence and Security in Asia,” Strategic Asia 2006–07 (Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2007); Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins, ed., Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2003). 35 G.T. Grane and A. Amawi, The Theoretical Evolution of International Political Economy: A Reader (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 107-109.

of realist and liberal thoughts. In order to meet the challenge of relative gains and deception highlighted by realists, interdependence theorists introduced the idea of “regimes” to alleviate anarchy and facilitate cooperation.36

The work of Keohane and Nye appeared during 1970s and has become a major challenge for theory of realism in international politics. Their work supported the basis of liberalism, neo-liberalism and liberal institutionalism. Traditional criticisms on liberalism are often set alongside the criticism on political realism, especially since both ignore the social nature of the relationships between states and the social fabric of international society. In fact, institutionalists, liberals, and neo-liberal theories persistently influenced international politics by competing with political realism. Therefore, while elaborating the relationship between economic interdependence and, peace and stability, the liberalists highlight three main factors. First, the basic objective of states is to advance economic prosperity and preserve global and regional peace that can be ascertained through economic cooperation and mutual interdependence. Second, if there is economic interdependence between states, these states would not go to war as the costs of wars will increase due to bilateral economic interdependence. Third, with the increase in economic relations, international trade and interdependence; international conflicts will cause much harm to most of the states and thus they will try to avoid any conflict.37

A careful consideration of the above discussion reflects that the complex interdependence is described by at least three characteristics: i) the use of multiple channels of relations between states, ii) focus on economic cooperation to promote and strengthen development programmes, and, iii) the outcome of these two will decrease the chances of the use of military force in international relations. In accordance with commercial liberalism, interdependence caused by international trade is in fact a major force for peace. This is a simple logic which shows that the level of interdependence and a nation‟s

36 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2003), 23. 37 Dale C. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War,” in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, Theories of War and Peace (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998), 467-468. Also see: Chen-Yuan Tung, “The Impact of Bilateral Economic Interdependence on US-China Relations,” last modified July 25, 2013, available at www.nccu.edu.tw accessed on July 25, 2013.

well-being depends on the well-being of other nation(s). Therefore, this situation generates common interests. In the words of Richard Rosecrance: “It is nonetheless true that interpenetration of investment in industrial economies provides a mutual stake in each other‟s success that did not exist in the nineteenth century or before World War I.”38

Kenneth Waltz is a prominent neorealist and he argues that the players in the domestic politics have not much concern on the dependence that exists in the particular areas. This is the anarchic structure of international politics which makes states to worry about, because in such a situation, states feel vulnerable and thus they try to lessen the extent of their dependency.39 In the view of John Mearsheimer, countries which depend on others for crucial economic supplies, will remain fearful of blackmail because these supplies might be cut-off in case of war or a crisis. As a result, they may try to consolidate their political control to the source of supply, giving rise to conflict with the source or with its other customers. Interdependence, thus, may result in greater security competition.40

The theory highlights that the high level of interdependence and positive expectations of future trade will promote peace. Here, the liberal logic applies, whereby the positive benefits of trade give the dependent state the incentive not to upset a profitable peace. If, however, expectations of future trade go down, then realist concerns about the drawback of interdependence. In that case, the costs of being cut off will clearly increase the chances of the dependent state to start war. Importantly, the decision for war does not depend on what the present trade levels are; rather, it is leaders‟ expectations for the future that impel whether the expected value of trade is encouraging and peace-inducing or it is pessimistic and war-inducing.41

38 Richard Rosecrance quoted in Keith L. Shimko, International Relations: Perspectives and Controversies (Boston MA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2010), 46. 39 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), 106. 40 John J. Mearsheimer, “Disorder Restored,” in Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton eds., Rethinking America's Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), 22. 41 Dale C. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War,” in Theories of War and Peace, Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998), 467-468.

In the above discussion, the influence of economic interdependence on security has been discussed with varied perspectives. In modern history, especially after the end of the Cold War, new concepts such as “economic liberalisation”, “regionalisation”, and “globalisation” have also emerged. In the light of these concepts, several experts and policy makers are of the view that the enhancement of economic interdependence would not only increase efficiency and economic welfare, but would also have positive impact on human security. However, is it practically happening in the post-Cold War and post 9/11 eras?42 In fact, the linkage between economic interdependence and security has generated considerable debate in history. Mainly after the Cold War, both externally and internally, economies have become extremely interdependent in trade, capital flow and international migration.

It is also important that in various regions of the world, the power relations are still increasingly unstable and traditional security dilemmas have not been changed much by economic interdependence. Rather, economic interdependence has expanded the spectrum of security challenges from military security to economic instability, terrorism, and highly infectious diseases.43 Therefore, with the expansion of the process of globalisation as well as economic liberalisation, many traditional security issues in the world such as military build-ups and the arms race problems have remained unresolved. In this context, the critics are of the view that an increase in economic interdependence does not always and necessarily strengthen the overall process of regional security.44 However, in spite of these criticisms, when considering the strategic relations of states, the importance of this theory cannot be denied. An in-depth thinking of this situation reflects that on the one hand this theory is linked with the theories of human security, regional security and regional security complexes, while on the other it also has connections with the balance of power theory.

42 Ibid. 43 Rong-I Wu, Chyuan-Jenq Shiau and Chi-Chen Chiang, “Economic Interdependence and Security in the Asia Pacific,” paper presented at the conference entitled: Does Trade Deliver What it Promises? Assessing the Critique of Globalisation, Honolulu: 19-21 February 2005. 44 Jon C. Pevehouse, “Interdependence Theory and the Measurement of International Conflict,” Journal of Politics 66, no. 1 (February 2004): 247-263.

1.6. Balance of Power Theory According to James E. Dougherty and Robert L Pfaltzgraff Jr: “The confusion with balance of power is not that it has no meaning, but that it has too many meanings.”45 In their view, the spectrum of the balance of power is very broad as it covers a range of dimensions, e.g., distribution of power, stability and peace, hegemony, war, instability power politics, universal law of history, and overall equilibrium in the system, etc. It reflects that the concept of the balance of power is complex and sometimes it is a challenge to analyse its various dimensions.

However, in spite of its complexities, it is appropriate to consider this concept in four different ways. First; it can be examined as a condition or a prevailing situation which requires objective arrangements and in this type of situation, the distribution of power provides a considerable level of satisfaction. Second; it can be visualised as a universal tendency which describes the likelihood of a power apparently depends upon the establishment of hegemony in international affairs through the encountering coalition. Third; as a policy guide, the balance of power provides a direction to statesmen to act rationally with the aim to maintain alertness and be prepared to put in order a countervailing coalition against other state(s) which can disturb the equilibrium. Finally; as a system, it also refers to a heterogeneous multinational global community in which all important actors protect their identity, dignity, independence and integrity through the process of balancing.46

When considering the above perspectives, some of the important purposes of balance of power include: i) checking the establishment of a universal hegemony, ii) ensuring stability and mutual security in the international system, and, iii) strengthening and prolonging the peace by deterring war with the formation of a counter alliance. The conventional method of continuance or re-establishing the balance of power may include: i) the policy of divide and rule, ii) territorial compensations after a war, iii) creation of

45 James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations, (Cambridge: Pearson, 2000), 24. 46 Georg F. Kennan, “History and Diplomacy as Viewed by a Diplomat,” Review of Politics XVIII (April 1956): 173.

buffer states, iv) the formation of alliances, v) widening the spheres of influence, vi) intervention, vii) diplomatic bargaining, viii) legal and peaceful settlement of dispute, ix) reduction of armaments, x) race for armaments; and, xi) war itself.

In fact, the concept of a balance of power is as old as the history of international relations and it has also been used continuously. In academic literature, a balance of power is considered as the organisation of relationships between various states so that no single state should be in a position to attain an absolute hegemony within the system. Although, since the early colonial period, the balance of power has been a crucial factor in global politics, the situation changed considerably after the end of Cold War. When the world entered from bi-polar to unipolar era, the United States attained the status of sole superpower and the institutions supported by this country became very influential in the world. As a result, many scholars were of the view that the significance of balance of power theory was reduced in the post-Cold War period.47 However, in recent years, with rise of China and resurgence of Russia, balance of power politics has regained its momentum in regional and international affairs, as well as in strategic relations among states.

It is noteworthy that in international relations, the balance of power theory is mainly based on the principle of power politics. This is because international relations are commonly considered as the struggle for power and thus the attainment of power is linked to the enhancement of security in the anarchic world. As the name of this theory indicates, it predicts that states will balance their power against the power of other states. For the prevention of the dominance of other state or alliance, states form counter alliance. Although, it can be argued that individual states do not always aim for strategic balance, but the theory advocates that the balance of power is likely to be formed whether few or all states intentionally want it or it may just happen.48 A balance of power operates both at a global and regional level and plays an important role in formulating and maintaining strategic relations among nations.

47 T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann, eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (California: Stanford University Press, 2004), 32-38. 48 Keith L. Shimko, International Relations: Perspectives and Controversies (Andover: Cengage Learning, 2009), 38.

The proponents of this theory say that to overcome the situation of insecurity, states focus on their balance of power through the precise calculation of the cost and benefit of their specific policies related to their process of balancing of power. All states in the system are continuously making choices to increase their own capabilities and to undermine the capabilities of others, and in this way the balance of power is maintained. When the balance of power is at stake, the nature of insecurity automatically directs the states to adopt policies to encounter the situation of insecurity.49 In fact, the balance of power among states is a way in which they manage their insecurity in a specific region or sub- region. In South Asia for example, a balance of power works to maintain peace between India and Pakistan. Realist theories assert that the balance of power is the most important technique for managing insecurity.50

It is human nature as well as the nature of a state to protect self-interest through maintaining the balance of power in relation to others. If a state intends to further its interest and dominates through military power or in other words through offensive actions, then in the perspective of balance-of-power system, the war can be considered acceptable. In the view of Karen A. Mingset, if all states act in this way then the balance of power can be sustained. However, she also highlights the limitations of this theory and says that balance of power approach is not fully capable to adequately address the security threats during the period of basic changes in the system. For instance, changes occurred at the end of Cold War, e.g., demise of Soviet Union and the end of Warsaw Pact led the world from bi-polar to unipolar system. How adequately this change was addressed? Did it help to promote regional and global security? The evidence reflects that the balance of power approach is mainly supportive in maintaining status quo.51

49 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace (Columbus, OH: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 161-215. 50 Rizwan Naseer and Musarat Amin, “Balance of Power: A Theoretical explanation and Its Relevance in Contemporary Era,” Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences 1, no. 10 (2011): 39-54; T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann, ed., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 138-39. 51 Karen A. Mingst, Essentials of International Relations (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 161.

In the post-Cold War period, the concept of balance-of-power has become more prominent at the regional level. During the Cold War period, the US had a direct role in balancing the Soviet power. Now in the post-Cold War period, it has been suggested that Soviet power can be balanced at the regional level without direct US involvement.52 In fact, hostile powers are checkmated through the logic of balance of power. For instance, being the rising regional powers, China and India have attracted enormous consideration in the US policy making circles which enabled this country to exploit the situation to further its own interest in the region. In the American version of a regional balance of power, China is encountered or in other words balanced by supporting India. In contrast, Pakistan is supported by China to balance India. This is a difficult as well as complicated geo-politico-strategic situation in which so far India has played its cards well. The country has been quite successful in using all available opportunities to promote its security interests.53

Similar to other theories, the balance of power theory has also encountered much criticism. This is because sometimes due to contradictions between the theory and its applications, the states are interested only in imbalance which is in their favour. Hans Morgenthau finds the balance of power deficient on several grounds. In his view, it has failed on a number of occasions since the end of the eighteenth century to preserve the independent existence of states.54 Kenneth Waltz is the main proponent of the theory of

52 For further study, see: Bruce Russett, International Regions and the International System (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967); David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Andrew Hurrell, “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics,” Review of International Studies 21, no.4 (October 1995): 334; Barry Buzan, People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 186; David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, “The New Regionalism in Security Affairs,” in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan ed., Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 11; John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Vintage Books, 1993); Javier Solana, “A New Alliance for a New Era,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs IV, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 1997): 73-85; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 5-41. 53 Rajpal Budania, “The Emerging International Security System: Threats, Challenges and Opportunities for India,” Strategic Analysis 27, no. 1 (January-March 2003): 79-93. 54 Hans J. Morgenthau, “International Law and International Politics: An Easy Partnership,” Proceedings of the Annual Meetings of the American Society of International Law (Washington: American Society of International Law, 1974), 331–334; Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Intellectual, Political, and Moral Roots of U. S. Failure in Vietnam,” in Analysing International Relations: A Multimethod Introduction, eds. William D. Coplin and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., (New York: Praeger, 1975), 133-157.

balance of power and he criticises the critics of this notion by arguing that they have been unable to understand the essence of this concept. He argues that every theory must begin with some assumptions and his main assumption is that states are unitary actors that try their best to preserve themselves and to dominate others if possible. He further says that states endeavour to achieve their objectives through internal and external efforts. Internal efforts particularly include increasing capabilities while the main external efforts are strengthening their own alliance and weakening opponents.55

The above discussion reflects that one of the important purposes of “balance of power” is to ensure stability and mutual security in the international system. It argues that to overcome the situation of insecurity, states focus on their balance of power through the precise calculation of the cost and benefit of their specific policies related to their process of balancing of power. All states in the system are continuously making choices to increase their own capabilities and to undermine the capabilities of others, and in this way, the balance of power is maintained at regional and global levels.

1.7. An Overview of Theories and their Application In the above discussion, various theories, which are relevant to the objectives of this research have been highlighted while the present section focuses to briefly review their essence and reflections on several respective dimensions. As the name itself indicates, the main focus of the concept of “regional security” is the security of a particular region in the perspective of anarchical conditions due to which joint engagement is required to encounter the respective challenges. The element of “joint engagement” supports collective security, multilateralism, alliance and regional cooperation. These are vast, flexible and complex areas which support the state to promote human security - a much broader approach. While considering the region, the present research focuses on the security of China and South Asian Sub-continent. Due to the geo-strategic location of

55 Jack S. Levy, “What do Great Powers Balance Against and When?” in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, eds. T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 29-48; Also see: Mihaela Neacsu, Hans J. Morgenthau’s Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment and Re-Enchantment (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 178-199; William E. Scheuerman, “Realism and the Left: The Case of Hans J. Morgenthau,” Review of International Studies 34-6 (2008): 29–51.

Pakistan, China fully understands that its development is linked to the security of this region in general and of Pakistan in particular. This objective cannot be achieved without promoting regional collaboration, interdependence and multilateralism.

Cooperation between Pakistan and China in regional organisations can best be explained by utilising “regional complex theory.” According to this theory, the regional level of security has become more autonomous and relative autonomy of regional security constitutes a specific pattern of international security relations. At the regional level, there are at least two important organisations, i.e., the SCO and the SAARC which have the potential to play a crucial role to promote security. Pakistan and India are in the process of getting full membership of SCO while China is an observer in SAARC which in future can qualify for full membership in this organisation. It is noteworthy that over the years, China has changed itself by moving from closed system to opening its doors for outside world as well as by enhancing its role in international organisations. With regard to promoting mutual security collaboration, SCO is a good example because China is the founding member of this organisation. This situation also reflects that in reality, the spectrum of the concept of regional security is much broader than military security. No doubt, military security is important, but it is only a mean, not an end. The ultimate objective of every state is to provide human security to its people. The change in Chinese system clearly reflects this situation, while presently Pakistan is struggling to achieve this objective.

A careful thinking reflects that the roots of RSCT can be traced in regional security theory. According to the RSCT, the threats can easily cover a short distance and regional based clusters are made by the respective states to tackle such challenges. It means that there is more security collaboration within the regional based security complexes than the distant states. There are three main characteristics of the RSCT, i.e., relations between the states of a region, relations between neighbouring regions, and the role of major powers in that region. This situation highlights that RSCT is an important academic tool which provides adequate framework for empirical analysis of various dimensions of regional security. Therefore, the imperatives of regional security in terms of South Asian regional

security complexes can best be analyse by using the parameters of the RSCT. The major regional security complexes include; Indo-Pak relations, the Afghan issue, regional economic integration, energy security and strategic stability. To resolve these complexes, role of China as a regional power and as a strategic partner of Pakistan can better be explained in the context of “intra-regional security complex.”

A state is in a better position to deal with threats to its security when it is also economically strong. International trade and economic collaboration promote economic growth as well as economic interdependence among the respective countries. With the passage of time, global system has been shifting from geo-politics to geo-economics. A further shift has occurred in the post 9/11 period where the strategic interdependence has also joined hands with economic interdependence with its main focus to counter the threat of global terrorism. Therefore, major global players have developed strong strategic partnerships with developing countries. This is a very complex process which is based on the use of multiple channels of relations between states. The main possible outcomes of such interdependence are that it enhances economic growth and reduces the chances of using the military force in international relations.

The discussion also highlights that “economic interdependence theory” explores the impact of economic cooperation on building peace and security. The enhancement of economic interdependence would not only increase efficiency and economic welfare, but would also have positive impact on national and international security. If the expected value of trade is encouraging, it would be peace-inducing. The avenues for future economic and trade cooperation between Pakistan and China, the development of China- Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and collaboration in major infrastructure projects such as the development of coal mining for producing energy and construction of big dams, etc., show the huge potential and prospects of Pakistan-China relations. The enhancement of their economic interdependence will not only strengthen the process of human security but will also promote regional security.

This situation reflects that economic and strategic interdependence also supports the “theory of balance of power” which in fact is a very broad concept. The notion is mainly based on the principle of power politics with its aim to ensure stability and mutual security in regional and international system. States attempts to achieve this objective by strengthening the process of peace and by deterring war with the formation of a counter alliance. In South Asia, for example, a balance of power works to maintain peace between India and Pakistan on the one hand and China and India on the other. Realist theories assert that the balance of power is the most important technique for managing insecurity. The following two assumption can best be explained in the backdrop of balance of power theory: i) the US‟ strategic cooperation with India to contain China would invoke China‟s strategic cooperation with Pakistan to balance India; and, ii) defence and security partnership between Pakistan and China has been further consolidated in the post 9/11 period. The discussions in coming chapters explore various dimensions of Chinese political support in strengthening Pakistan‟s security and the strengthening of space and maritime cooperation. The core point is that in the post 9/11 period, the defence and security cooperation between Pakistan and China has been enhanced tremendously. In this perspective, both countries have diversified their defence trade into joint defence production especially in the most advanced weapons systems.

It needs not to be emphasised that the objective of every state is to ensure the human security of its people which is a prerequisite for human development. The UNDP argues that human security is a universal concern which means that all the necessary requirements of life are met and people are living in an environment of physical and mental peace. The objectives of present study mentioned earlier, highlight that this research is an attempt to analyse the imperatives of regional security particularly in the light of Pakistan-China relations. It also endeavours to explore various dimensions of the relations of these countries in the post 9/11 era and how these relations can be beneficial for the people of these states. Additionally, how their relations can be supportive to promote peace and stability in this sensitive region of the world. A careful consideration of these objectives reflects that the above theories provide a solid foundation for the empirical analysis of relevant issues discussed in the coming chapters. The following

figure highlights the inter-relationship between these theories and their use to analyse the issue. Figure: 1.1. Conceptual Relationship between Theories and their Application to the Imperatives of Regional Security in the Perspective of Pakistan-China Relations

Imperatives of Regional Security

Regional Regional Security Security Theory Complex

Theory Imperatives Security of Regional

Pakistan-China Strategic Relations (Post 9/11 Era)

Human Economic Inter- Security dependence Theory Imperatives of Regional of Security Imperatives Theory Balance of Power Theory

Imperatives of Regional Security

1.8. Conceptual Structure of the Study Pakistan is situated in one of the most volatile regions of the world which is also the home of two nuclear arch-rivals. Being one of the global powers and with its fast growing economy, China is also a major player in this region. Both countries need regional

security which is a prerequisite for the promotion of human security. As the region has passed and is passing through fast changes, Pakistan-China strategic cooperation is vital to promote regional security. This multidimensional issue is extremely complex and the present study attempts to present its comprehensive analysis.

Keeping in view the main focus of this study, the present chapter has discussed five main theories which provide the base for discussions made in the coming chapters, i.e., human security theory, regional security theory, regional security complex theory, economic interdependence theory and balance of power theory. It goes without saying that the study of theories and their application in the respective empirical situation can never be a simple and straightforward activity. In the light of the above, the coming chapters present the detailed analyses of a range of relevant issues, .e.g., imperatives of various dimensions of regional security, Pakistan-China strategic and security cooperation, economic ties, and regional organisations.

CHAPTER - 2 THE IMPERATIVES OF REGIONAL SECURITY 2.1. South Asian Regional Security Complexes

The security of South Asia is a complex phenomenon and the discussion made in the previous chapter highlights that “regional level” is an appropriate level of analysis to explain domestic as well as the global level of security. Regional security is affected by both domestic and global factors. In the contemporary era of globalisation, a local or national issue can have ramifications for both regional and global security. Domestic security situation, therefore, must be taken into consideration in any discussion of regional security. However, before discussing the imperatives of regional security, it is important to specify the region and explain its security environment. The regional security in this dissertation means the security of South Asia plus China. South Asia is a region of eight countries with a combined population of 1.7 billion (as per World Bank data 2015)1, which is second only to that of East Asia (two billion people), and with great diversity in size and circumstances. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka have large populations, i.e., 1.31 billion, 188 million, 166 million, and 20 million respectively, and are diverse economies. Bhutan and the Maldives, on the other hand, are very small nations comprising only 0.77 million and 0.36 million people, respectively, and have relatively focused economies. The remaining two nations are Nepal and Afghanistan2, each having a population of 28 million and 32 million.3 Both of them are landlocked economies with low level of diversification.4

China, though not a part of South Asia, is an important factor in regional security, largely due to its geographic proximity to the region. It has an observer status in the SAARC and

1 World Bank, 2017, http://data.worldbank.org/region/south-asia. 2 Due to its geographic location, Afghanistan is also considered the part of Central Asia. However, in this research, it is incorporated with South Asia because of being close neighbour of Pakistan and a member of the SAARC. 3 According to Worldometers the latest figures of population estimates are: India (1.34 billion), Pakistan (196 million), Bangladesh (164 million), Afghanistan (34 million), Nepal (29 million), Sri Lanka (20.9 million), Bhutan (0.79 million) and Maldives (0.37 million). 4 The World Bank, “World Bank South Asia‟s Economic Update 2010: Moving Up, Looking East,” available at www.worldbank.org accessed on April 20, 2015.

shares a long border with Pakistan, India, Nepal and Bhutan. Due to this geographic contiguity, China enjoys significant influence over the security dynamics of South Asia. As China‟s economic and political clout has grown in recent years, it has deepened its engagement with all South Asian countries, including India; emerging as one of the major economic partners in the region.5 According to Hussain H Zaidi: “China accounts for 10 per cent of the total South Asian trade, while its trade with South Asia makes up only two per cent of China‟s global trade. This shows a great potential for increase in Sino-South Asia trade.”6

The security of South Asia is very important, as it has become a region of great interest not only for regional powers such as China and Russia, but also for global players, e.g., the US and the European Union (EU). According to the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), the security of a region can be analysed at four levels: i) domestic or local level, ii) interstate level, iii) intra-regional level, and, iv) the global level. With reference to the context of the present study, the important context of security analysis is the regional level where security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters. It is easier for a security threat to spread within a region than throughout the globe. The security of South Asia is the product of various factors operating at domestic, regional, intra-regional and global levels. According to Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, the standard form of the regional security complex is in fact a pattern of rivalry, balance of power, and the alliance between states within the region. The involvement of external powers to this pattern makes the regional situation even more complex.7

2.2. Threats to Regional Security In the post 9/11 period, the main challenges to regional security in South Asia includes the rise of terrorism and non-state actors, internal dynamics of regional states and its impact on their relation with each other, economic instability, and differences and

5 C. Raja Mohan, “South Asia and East Asia: More than Economics,” in Socio-political and Economic Challenges in South Asia, Institute of South Asian Studies, Tan Tai Yong ed., (New Delhi: Sage Publication, 2009), 42-43. 6 Hussain H. Zaidi, “Enter the Dragon,” News International, September 26, 2014. 7 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 47.

conflicts between the regional states especially between Pakistan and India. Afghanistan is geographically connected with Pakistan and China, and the continuous deteriorating situation in this country, instability in Central Asian and the issue of Kashmir are the problems, which are related to security of the region. However, countries, which are having superiority or edge over the issues, are not always willing to resolve these problems bilaterally through the process of give and take. If it happens, there will be very few problems left in the region.8 For better understanding of the nature of threats to regional security, it would be appropriate to briefly review the overall situation of complexities of domestic, regional, intra-regional and global security.

2.2.1. Domestic Security Complexes The main challenge for South Asian countries at the domestic level is to ensure human security. The region remains stuck in poverty, deprivation, underdevelopment, and resource scarcity. These problems have been aggravated by the recent economic crisis, which has resulted in reduced exports, drying up of foreign direct investment (FDI), and rising unemployment. Social and human development indicators also are much lower as compared to many countries of the world. A major part of the population does not have access to clean drinking water and a large number of people do not have a permanent roof over their heads and education is available only to the more fortunate.9 This state of affairs provides a fertile ground for intolerance and extremism, which in turn promote conflict and violence in these countries. As a result, the region has developed a culture of intolerance, ranging from ethnic to religion and communal to sectarian. The growing religious violence, extremism, militancy and terrorism are some of the manifestations of this culture. The use of religion for political and other material gains has become widespread. The spill-over effects of the war in Afghanistan and the precarious domestic situation of various regional states can create more instability and insecurity.

8 Institute of Policy Studies, “Pak-China Relations in the 21st Century: Regional Situation, Security, Economic & Trade Cooperation,” Policy Perspectives 1, no.1 (April 2004). 7 UNDP, Human Development Report 2014 (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2014), the World Bank, World Development Report 2015 (Washington DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development).

In the perspective of human (in-)security, most South Asian nations are facing a variety of serious challenges emerged from within due to bad governance, intrastate insurgencies, sectarian and ethnic strife. The internal security threats have intensified in South Asia in the post-Cold War period.10 A brief description of internal threats to South Asian countries is discussed hereunder.

2.2.1.1. Afghanistan Afghanistan has been in turmoil since the former Soviet intervention in 1979 and then an era of civil war started in 1989, i.e., the withdrawal of its forces. Since 2001, the country has been the main theatre of the US war on terrorism, which has destabilised most of the region. The prolonged conflict in Afghanistan has destroyed much of the country‟s infrastructure, aggravated poverty and forced millions of Afghans to leave their homeland to seek refuge in neighbouring countries, especially in Pakistan.11 All efforts towards state building at various junctures of Afghanistan‟s history failed largely due to the conservative and tribal nature of the society and its unfamiliarity with benefits that statehood entails. Therefore, the main challenge in contemporary Afghanistan is the lack of government‟s effective writ at provincial and district levels where Taliban and the tribal hierarchy are actively engaged to promote their own interests.12

2.2.1.2. Bangladesh Bangladesh is a victim of rivalry and conflict between its two main political parties, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Bangladesh Awami League (AL). Since 2002, Bangladesh has been facing violence and terrorism, including bomb blasts, possibly in response to its actions against the religious extremists in the post 9/11 situation. The country has also confronted the ethnic issue in its tribal areas, resulting in violence and displacement of a large number of people. Since 2013, it has been experiencing

10 Arshi Saleem Hashmi, “Internal Conflicts and Regional Security in South Asia,” in Pentagon’s South Asia Defence and Strategic Year Book, 2013, Hatjeet Singh ed., (New Delhi: Pentagon Press), 38-44. 11 Liaquat Ali Ameri, “Afghanistan and its Neighbours: Creating Stability through Joint Endeavours” in Maqsudul Hasan, Muhammad Munir and Aftab Hussain ed., Stabilising Afghanistan: Regional Perspectives and Prospects, (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2010), 90. 12 Saifullah Ahmadzai, “Securing Afghanistan: A Roadmap towards Successful Stat Building,” in Maqsudul Hasan, Muhammad Munir and Aftab Hussain ed., Stabilising Afghanistan: Regional Perspectives and Prospects, (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2010), 82-97.

worsening political violence with more than 500 already dead. The violence has disturbed the key garment industry and stained the image of the country. The unrest was triggered by events including an on-going controversial war crimes trial and a disputed election held in January 2014. But it has played out against the backdrop of rising religious tensions.13 The International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) was set up by the Awami League‟s government in 2010 to conduct trials of Jamat-i-Islami‟s activists and BNP members for alleged war crimes in 1971.14 The Awami League‟s government is running a propaganda campaign that 195 Pakistan army personnel suspected of war crimes in 1971 should also be tried in absentia by the ICT. In view of the Human Rights Watch (HRW), these trials are “deeply problematic riddled with questions about the independence and impartiality of judges and the fairness of the legal process.”15 This violates the Tripartite Agreement signed in New Delhi in April 1974 between India, Bangladesh and Pakistan for normalisation of relations in the Subcontinent. In accordance with this agreement, 195 Pakistani army personnel were repatriated to Pakistan along with other prisoners of war (POWs) but the Awami League has never been happy with this situation.16

2.2.1.3. India Being a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, India has roughly 2000 castes, eight main religions, 15-odd languages of various dialects in 22 states, nine union territories and a large number of tribes and sects. India with its vast territory and rising economy is facing multi-dimensional threats due to ethno-religious clashes, separatist movements and terrorist incidents. The nationalist movements in India are persistently gaining strength in Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura. The conflict in Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura is of ethnic nature, whereas the issue in Punjab is of both religious and ethnic nature. The Hindu-Muslim conflict is mainly a religious conflict.17

13 Annie Gowen, “Bangladesh‟s Political Unrest Threatens Economic Gains, Democracy,” Washington Post, March 22, 2014. 14 Farooq Hameed Khan, “Bangladesh: Justice or Revenge?” Global Issues and World Politics, February 18, 2013. 15 Ibid. 16 Ahmer Bilal Soofi (Guest Speaker), “Strained Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations,” Islamabad: IPRI Conference Hall, June 5, 2014. 17 Varshney Ashutosh, “Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in India,” Cultural Survival, Inc., February 11, 2010.

The political conflicts in India can be categorised as ethnic issues, regional tendencies, and separatist movements including Kashmir issue. The cause of conflict is different for each category. The factors behind ethnic conflicts include: unequal development, poverty, bad governance and political corruption. Separatist and regional tendencies sometimes result in the formation of groups which wanted to create their own independent states. Regions like Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, and Tripura are few of those who have demanded their state representatives or total secession. Kashmir issue has been very old yet very challenging and sensitive issue in India so far. Since the partition of Subcontinent, Kashmir has been a bone of contention between the two countries and they had already fought three wars over it.18

Several human rights organisations have reported an increase in communal violence during the Indian general elections of 2014, which has heightened up-to 30 percent in communal violence as compared to 2012.19 In year 2013, the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs has reported 823 incidents of communal violence, in which 133 people died and over 2,000 were injured.20 In the following year, a total of 644 communal incidents were reported which have escalated to 650 in 2015.21 But, according to the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), there were 1,227 communal incidents in the year 2014.22 The rise in Hindu extremism in India has serious implications not only for internal security of India but it may also create a threat to regional security.

2. 2.1.4. Nepal This ethnically diverse country has failed to adequately address its socio-cultural problems resulted in taking over of power by Maoist insurgents. The Communist Party of Nepal (CPN), i.e., the representative of Maoist which won elections after a continued insurgency started in 1996. The government of Nepal preferred a military solution instead

18 Jyotsna Gandhi, “National Issues of India,” Proud 2B Indian, February 13, 2014. 19 S. M. Hali, “Plight of Minorities in India,” Daily Times, March 10, 2015. 20 Ibid. 21 Indian Express, “650 Cases of Communal Violence in India Till October 2015: Government,” December 22, 2015. 22 Indian Express, “Communal Incidents: Home Ministry Probes Why its Data is Different from NCRB Tally,” December 3, 2015.

of a political one which in fact provided an opportunity to Maoists to increase their popularity. After attaining a military impasse, the CPN changed its strategy from using the military to a more political approach by utilising the split between the parliamentary parties and the monarchy. The main factor for the Maoist victory was its capability to activate frustrated classes and ethnic groups. The government of Nepal was unable to gain or maintain the support of the people because of political upheaval, repressive tactics, and failure to solve social issues among the different groups.23

2.2.1.5. Sri Lanka Sri Lanka has passed through an extremely violent conflict in the region. The separatist movement by Tamils became a violent conflict mainly due to some policies of Sri Lankan government, e.g., settlement of Sinhalese in Tamil dominated area.24 In the initial years of civil war, Indian involvement in the conflict was eminent as in early 1980s, the government of Tamil Nadu and the central government under Indira Gandhi helped Tamil rebel groups through military assistance and training. However, after the assassination of Indira Gandhi, her son Rajiv adopted a neutral policy and stopped the military assistance to Tamil rebels fighting in Sri Lanka and tried to reconcile between the conflicting parties. The mediation failed resulting in escalation of violence in Sri Lanka. In 1987, India intervened by airlifting supplies to the Jaffna Peninsula in the North of the island against the blockade of Sri Lankan government. It was a clear violation of Sri Lanka‟s sovereignty. Consequently secret talks between the two countries led to the signing of the Indo‐Sri Lanka Agreement (ISLA). Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was deployed in the North and the East of the island to monitor the ceasefire and disarming the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Even after the three years of involvement, IPKF failed to restore peace. Later on, the incident of the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by a suicide bomber in Tamil Nadu in May 1991 changed Indian policy and LTTE was declared a terrorist organisation. In the last years of civil war, i.e., from 2003- 2007, India remained sensitive for the fate of Sri Lankan Tamils but in 2007, due to

23 “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal and US Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” Small Wars Journal, 2009. 24 Declan Obriain, “Sri Lanka, Ethnic Conflict, and the Rise of a Violent Secessionist Movement,” International Relations Students, November 28 2012.

various factors especially due to growing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka, India started supporting Sri Lanka government in order to have some leverage on Sri Lankan affairs.25

Another important element is that Sinhala Buddhists and the Muslims in Sri Lanka are at odds with each other and the religious conflict between these two communities has created turmoil in the country. The Muslims business community came under violent attacks on March 28, 2013 led by a mob by monks in Pepiliyana, only a stone‟s throw away from Colombo. These attacks and hate campaigns are the continuation of attacks carried on Muslim sacred places and against the other religious minority groups in the country.26

2.2.1.6. Pakistan Since its inception, Pakistan has been facing security dilemma due to internal and external threats. Due to its multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-lingual society, the country enjoys a rich cultural heritage while the same social features also pose a huge challenge to its governance and security. The lack of political stability and absence of good governance have created various internal security threats that included ethnicity, sectarianism, terrorism, an economic downfall, food and power shortages, etc.27 The security structures require improvement and capacity building to tackle these emerging internal security threats. Pakistan‟s internal security patterns have changed due to spill- over effects of the global war on terrorism and continued conflict in Afghanistan. Since the initiation of the US-led war on terrorism, Pakistan has offered huge sacrifices in terms of human and economic loss. The economic loss has been around 100 billion US dollars and the human loss includes the killing of numerous citizens. It is estimated that during 2002-15, there have been 440 suicide bombings in the country in which over 6000 citizens died and another 16,000 seriously injured. Due to continued violence in this period, on total 44,000 people lost their lives out of which 12,000 belong to security

25 Sandra Destradi, “India and the Civil War in Sri Lanka: On the Failures of Regional Conflict Management in South Asia,” GIGA Working Paper154, December 2010. 26 Gulbin Sultana, “Religious Tensions in Sri Lanka,” IDSA Comment, April 22, 2013. 27 Stephen P. Cohen, The Future of Pakistan: South Asia Initiative (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, January 2011), 20.

forces.28 This state of internal instability has adversely affected the overall process of human security, human development, regional peace, and interfaith harmony. The outcome of this situation caused a complicated network of challenges for the country.

2.2.1.7. China In spite of achieving higher economic growth, China is confronting multiple challenges. It has to sustain its economic development to provide more jobs, to ensure environment protection and providing better social equity. There is a disparity in urban and rural areas. This disparity is increasing as the urban citizens are economically much stronger than those in rural areas. Due to this rising inequality, the rural population is migrating to cities causing social instability in the country. The sudden rise in violence in the first half of 2009 was shocking for Beijing. Political instability in Tibet and the security problems in Xinjiang have been a challenge and a cause of concern for China. World powers have listed the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organisation. The ETIM and some other Uyghur separatist group in Xinjiang were trained in Afghanistan. Separatist Uyghurs have been behind attacks on police, citizens and on various public installations across the Xinjiang province.29

From the above discussion, it is clear that the internal conflicts in the South Asian countries are multi-dimensional in nature. Some of these intra-state conflicts are due to unresolved inter-states disputes such as the Kashmir dispute. These conflicts have long been hindering the development and prosperity of the region. The security situation of South Asia has been very uncertain as two of the world nuclear powers are neighbours and have tense relations due to unresolved disputes. It is discouraging to see that Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Bangladesh are facing various socio-economic problems because of constant inter and intra-state conflicts.30

2.2.2. Bilateral Security Complexes

28 Pakistan Body Count, “Suicide Bombing,” March 20, 2015, available at http://pakistanbodycount.org 29 Jian Yang, “China‟s Security Challenges: Priorities and Policy Implications,” available at www.nids.go.jp accessed on May 2, 2015. 30 Arshi Saleem Hashmi, “Internal Conflicts and Regional Security in South Asia.”

As the term itself indicates, bilateral security complex mainly focuses on relations between two countries in the perspective of their as well as the security of the region. Therefore, the following discussion attempts to explore the nature of Pakistan‟s relations with its neighbours and their dimensions with regard to security.

2.2.2.1. India-Pakistan Relations: A Core Issue of Regional Security Complex South Asia carries its own distinctive historical baggage. India-Pakistan relations have been at the core of South Asian Regional Security Complex (RSC) that emerged as a “conflict formation” after their independence in 1947. In fact, both countries came into existence as a result of a political struggle which was based on separate religious identities, and was led by the All India Muslim League and the Indian National Congress. In the post-independence period, these religious identities led to military and political confrontation between Pakistan as a Muslim state and India as a notionally secular but practically a Hindu state. This religiously-inspired political rivalry was in fact a continuation of pre-existing patterns in South Asia. The rivalry between India and Pakistan formed the core of the RSC both at a regional as well as at a domestic level. Barry Buzan has convincingly made this point. “Before independence, the process of securitisation was based on Muslim claims for politico-cultural autonomy. Afterwards, it was partly based on rival claims to territory (especially Kashmir) by the new states, partly on status and balance of power issues, partly on claims of mutual interference in domestic instabilities, and partly on the rival principles of legitimacy embedded in their constitutions. ... The rivalry generated three wars (1947-8, 1965, 1971), several serious crisis in which war looked a possibility (1984, 1987, 1990, 1999, 2002) and numerous lesser military incidents.”31

Both states have been accusing each other of supporting their separatists and promoting intra-state conflicts. Since 1998, when Pakistan also became a nuclear power, the nuclear dimension has become predominant in the discourse of regional security and strategic stability. In the view of Maleeha Lodhi, by adopting nefarious nuclear designs, India is the main destabilising factor in South Asian region and the world should try to understand Pakistan‟s concern about the hostile acts of this country. In her view, seeing

31 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers, 102.

Pakistan‟s past experience with India, there seems no hope for peace in near future. India came up with a determined and aggressive nuclear doctrine immediately a year after conducting nuclear tests. It also increased its defence expenditure by 28 percent. Purchasing of sophisticated weapons from international market, it appears that the country is practically working to execute its strategic doctrine.32

Maleeha Lodhi further argues that India has adopted an aggressive nuclear policy which is associated with the enhanced and progressive traditional war capability. Such attitude has created apprehensions across the states of the region. India has updated its defence system with a fast pace. Whereas, Pakistan‟s efforts to change and enhance its defence system was hampered by US sanctions. It is noted that historically, the United States was the major armed supplier to Pakistan. But today, the US tilt towards India has created an imbalance between India and Pakistan. In order to neutralise this imbalance with India, Pakistan started depending on its strategic nuclear capability with a policy of minimum nuclear deterrence to ensure effective defence of the country.33

The Kashmir issue remains a flash-point of conflict between the South Asian nuclear powers. Pakistani and Indian armies continue to clash each other on the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir.34 In the mid-1980s, Indian aggression in Siachin glacier and the similar violations in the form of border incursions such as Qamar, Chorbat-la and the Neelam valley tempted the conflict of Kargil. The Kargil conflict highlighted the importance of resolving the Kashmir dispute through peaceful means as the military solution failed. Pakistan‟s policy approach towards Kashmir is to resolve the issue by attaining aspirations of the Kashmiri people as per the UNSC resolution whereas Indian policy is to maintain status quo without giving any regard to the aspirations of the disputed territory. The struggle for the right of self-determination in Kashmir cannot be

32 Maleeha Lodhi, “Security Challenges in South Asia” The Non-Proliferation Review (2001), 118-124. 33 Ibid. 34 Khalid Iqbal, Non-Resident Consultant, Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), personal interview, March 25, 2016.

equated with terrorism as India tried to depict it. In this situation, the future prospects of South Asian security are not much encouraging.35

2.2.2.2. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations Pakistan and Afghanistan share a 2640 kilometres (1640 miles) long border. Afghan provinces of Kunar, Nuristan, Khost, Nangrahar, Paktia, Paktika, Zabul, Kandahar, Helmand, Nimruz, and Badakhshan share border with Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Pak-Afghan border is porous due to which there is frequent cross border movements. One reason for this massive cross border movement is the rough terrain of the border which makes it difficult to monitor and another reason is the common ethnicity shared by the people on both sides of the border. Major border crossings between the two countries are in Torkham, between Peshawar and Jalalabad and in Spinboldak between Kandahar and Quetta.

Traditionally, Pakistan‟s relations with Afghanistan have been very critical as any development in Afghanistan has a spill over effect for Pakistan. For the last thirty-five years, Afghanistan has been facing multifarious internal and external conflicts. The instability in Afghanistan has created many problems for Pakistan ranging from cross border militant movements to Afghan refugees and from drug trafficking to smuggling of arms. The cross border movement of the Taliban from Afghanistan to Pakistan and vice versa has created a trust deficit between the two countries. In this situation of trust deficit, both countries were unable to devise a joint policy to counter trans-border terrorism and resolving other issues relating to Pakistani-Afghan border security.36 Undoubtedly, the good relations between the two countries will help in eliminating the menace of extremism and terrorism not only from Pakistan and Afghanistan but also from the whole region. Having cultural and religious similarities, both countries can enhance cooperation

35 Ibid. 36 Khalid Chandio, “Pak-Afghan Relations in Post-2014,” Pakistan Observer, July 27, 2014.

in socio-cultural and politico-economic spheres. On economic front, Pakistan remains the largest trading partner of Afghanistan and bilateral trade reached to $2 billion in 2014. 37

There were hopes that coming to power of the new government in Afghanistan would transform Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. Initially, Afghan government tried to address Pakistan‟s concerns regarding Indian role in Afghanistan and sought Pakistan‟s help to initiate dialogue process with Taliban.38 Afghanistan‟s fragile power structure, uncertain political future and leanings towards India are the major restraining factors in Pakistan- Afghanistan relations. Safe havens on both sides of the border have strengthened militants and weakened the two states.39 Recent cross border firing and killing of troops on both sides gave rise to blame game. Pakistan is sceptical of US motives in the region and its growing strategic ties with India.40 Pakistan sincere efforts in the Quadrilateral Contact Group (QCG) lost momentum with the killing Mullah Mansoor in Noshki in a US drone strike.

Pakistan‟s role is important in finding a sustainable solution of Afghanistan. Western countries have made a mistake by ignoring Pakistan‟s role during last several years. Pakistan could have played an effective role for internal political stability of Afghanistan through facilitation in the reconciliation process. Any chaos or instability in Afghanistan is not in the interest of Pakistan. The regional imperatives compel Pakistan to have cordial and close relation with Afghanistan. The first such imperative is to get economic benefits of opening trade with Central Asian Republics (CAR).41 There is a need for confidence-building measures between the two countries and in this context, their cooperation for getting benefits of regional connectivity such as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will be mutually beneficial.

2.2.2.3. Pakistan–Sri Lanka Relations

37 Saman Zulfqar, “Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations,” IPRI Review, October 7, 2015. 38 Ibid. 39 Talat Masood, “Managing relations with Afghanistan,” The Express Tribune, May 17, 2016. 40 Ibid. 41 Khalid Chandio, “Pak-Afghan Relations in Post-2014.”

Being the members of SAARC, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have good relations. Pakistan supported the Government of Sri Lanka against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by giving high-tech military hardware to the Sri Lankan army in the civil war. S.C. Kohli explains Pakistan‟s role in defeating LTTE in Sri Lanka. According to his analysis: “Pakistan‟s large supply of defence equipment to Sri Lanka started on a grand scale in 1999 which became triple by the year 2009. This played a significant role in defeating LTTE by the Sri Lankan forces. Pakistan‟s supply of high tech weaponry on regular basis was one of major factors of LTTE's defeat.”42 Additionally, China as a common friend of Pakistan and Sri Lanka, maintains a strong mutual interest in the economic and military development of both countries. It is noteworthy that in the South Asian Sub-continent, Pakistan is the second largest trading partner of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka was the first country to sign a Free Trade Agreement with Pakistan, which became operational from June 2005.43 The end of civil war also resulted the enhancement in defence cooperation, including supply of armament; army, naval and air force trainings to Sri Lankan defence personnel in Pakistani Military academies. The visits of Pakistan naval ships and visits of high level Pakistani military delegations is still in force, which of course, is a matter of concern to India. Both countries give particular importance to their defence cooperation and have shown resilience in the fight against terrorism for bringing peace and stability in the region.44

2.2.2.4. Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations Pakistan-Bangladesh relations have seen many ups and downs since 1971 when this country was created. There are some misperceptions which are creating problems in the smooth and friendly ties between the two countries. There is a desire on both sides to shed away historical baggage and move forward to develop sustainable and friendly relations.45 In keeping with the Tripartite Agreement of 1974, both Pakistan and Bangladesh need to look forward to moving on instead of living in the past. At the

42 S.C. Kohli, “Pakistan-Sri Lanka Relations: Their long distance amiability, September 25, 2914, available at http://www.merinews.com 43 “Pakistan Offers Credit Facility to Sri Lanka,” Dawn, January 10, 2011. 44 “Defence Cooperation Central to Pakistan‟s Relationship with Sri Lanka: Gen. Raheel,” Express Tribune, June 7, 2015. 45 Saman Zulfqar, “Revisiting Pakistan-Bangladesh Rlations,” Daily Times, April 12, 2014.

moment, it is discouraging to see that even after the passing four and half decades, emotionalism still dominates the discourse on their relations. To ensure sustainable relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh, the political leadership on both sides needs to eliminate this emotionalism with realism and pragmatism. Development of close relations between the two countries will not only promote regional stability but would equally be important for the socio-economic development of both countries.46

2.2.2.5. Pakistan-Nepal Relations Pakistan and Nepal enjoy friendly relations. In spite of geographical distance; both countries have close relations. Both share a border with India, therefore, their relations are important for India as well.47 Pakistan established relation with Nepal in March 1960 and developed economic ties by 1964. Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) helped the Nepal Airlines by offering training services to its staff. Similarly, Pakistan offers various short and long term courses to Nepalese Army officials. Nepali students are getting several scholarships for studying in Pakistani universities. Both countries have great economic opportunities to exploit for their national interest. Nepal can export tea, cardamom, hides and skin, agricultural goods and herbal medicines to Pakistan. Similarly, there are number of products such as cotton-yarn, textile products, synthetic yarn, surgical instruments, ceramic products, mangos, etc., which Pakistan can export to Nepal. It reflects that there is a further scope for both countries to enhance their economic cooperation.48 It is also noteworthy that Pakistan and Nepal have played a significant role in developing South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Both countries are dedicated in enhancing the living standard of the peoples of South Asia, advancing peaceful and stable environment in the region, expediting pace of economic development and increasing combined self-sufficiency under the umbrella of the SAARC.49

2.2.2.6. Pakistan-Maldives Relations

46 Sajad Shaukat, “Journalist‟s Anti-Pakistan Connections,” Shoah, January 22, 2015, available at www.shoah.org.uk 47 S. C. Kohli, “Pakistan-Nepal Relations: India‟s Worriment,” Merinews, September 10, 2014. 48 Embassy of Nepal, “Nepal-Pakistan Relations in Brief,” July 17, 2015. 49 Ibid.

Pakistan had always been supportive of cordial relations with Maldives. Islamabad supports the Minicoy Island as being part of Maldives and rejected Indian territorial claims over the island. The Maldives supports Pakistan‟s stance on Kashmir issue, i.e., it should be resolved peacefully in accordance with the wishes of Kashmiri people. Pakistan support the Maldives on regional and international forums. The Maldives showed keen interest in the area of training and believes that Pakistan has some of the best Armed Forces Training Institutes in the world. Both countries can expand their bilateral relations through trade, communication and manpower training. There is also a vast scope for Pakistan to export vegetable, fruit and other products to the Maldives.50

2.2.3. Regional Security Complexes The South Asian Regional Security Complex is primarily unipolar in nature mainly due to the dominance of India with its vast material capabilities. The factors responsible for this tilt of the Regional Security Complex towards India include the massive military spending, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and above all, the 75 percent of the region‟s population with Indian origin. However, India has always lagged behind in improving its political dominance by employing the material lead for its advantage to acquire the hegemony in political avenue. The fact cannot be brush aside that political rift between India and Pakistan apparently gives an impression of a bipolar Regional Security Complex order, in terms of its vulnerability for crisis eruption. Thus it is entirely incomprehensible to construe that distribution of power will ascertain the balance in unipolar disposition of Regional Security Complex in South Asia, mainly because of the India‟s incapability to use the material superiority for regional integration and the apathetic approach by smaller South Asian states to play their part on this end. However, this reality cannot be totally ruled out that despite India‟s material superiority, Pakistan‟s capability is disproportionately stiff in-comparison to other South Asian states.51

50 “Pakistan, Maldives to Expand Trade and Economic Relations,” Maldives Live (blog), November 10, 2011, http://maldiveslive.blogspot.com 51 Melanie Hanif, “Indian Involvement in Afghanistan in the Context of the South Asian Security System,” Journal of Strategic Security 3, no. 2 (2010): 13-26.

In addition, the nuclearisation episode in South Asia has provided synergy to Pakistan‟s claim to hold the status of challenger to India. Therefore, in South Asian Regional Security Complex, there are two possible openings of conflict theatres; one is the devastatingly hostile military conflict between India and Pakistan and the other one is the Indian possible military conflict with smaller South Asian states. The South Asian Regional Security Complex revolves around the critical unipolar security order, where India exhibits the hegemonic disposition and dwarfs the smaller South Asian states.52 The regional security complexes of South Asia are based on two main factors; firstly, the hegemonic disposition of India exhibiting non-cooperative attitude towards smaller regional countries, and secondly, the incapability of the SAARC towards regional economic integration mainly due to Indo-Pak rivalry.

2.2.3.1. Hegemonic Designs The quest of hegemony by one state over its neighbours creates regional instability and insecurity. The existing uneven power of India in terms of its strategic and military forces as compared to its smaller neighbours is a built-in factor for insecurity. It has been intensified by the Indian design to control the region. Whether these designs would succeed or not is another question but certainly such attempts are not helpful in promoting regional security rather they are creating threats to it.53 India‟s nuclear explosions in May 1998 were mainly status-driven. In reaction, Pakistan was impelled to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent of its own to ensure its security against India‟s nuclear and conventional capabilities. “Pakistan is the only South Asian country, which has so far challenged India‟s desire to dominate the subcontinent. Therefore, India considers Pakistan a „regional destabilise‟ that has challenged New Delhi‟s desire to control the entire Subcontinent as a single unit.”54

To ensure regional security, it is an imperative that all countries in South Asia respect each other‟s sovereignty and freedom. However, in contrast India‟s attitude towards its

52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Zulfqar Khan, “India-Pakistan Nuclear Rivalry: Perceptions, Misperceptions, and Mutual Deterrence,” IPRI Paper no. 9 (January 2005).

small neighbours has continuously been hegemonic. Even today, India is engaged in building up its arms - although its planning appears to be aimed at Pakistan, the fact is that they are not only “Pakistan specific” but also China centric. In addition, India‟s approach towards its other neighbours shows its dominant position. In the presence of hegemonic designs of India, it is not possible for smaller neighbours to ensure peace and stability in the region until India changes its hegemonic attitude.55

The inherent disparity between India, Pakistan and other smaller states in South Asia‟s regional system has created contrasting policy objectives. In order to limit India‟s predominance; the smaller South Asian states have adopted multilateral diplomacy and engaged external powers in their bilateral disputes with India. On the other hand, India remained committed to its grand strategy of perusing its regional and global interests. This situation is rightly pointed out by Kishore Dash, as according to him, India‟s grand strategy divides Indian external relations in the following three categories;  Immediate Neighbours: This category includes countries bordering India. India wants to attained dominance and would not accept external powers influence.  Extended Neighbourhood: This category includes other countries in Asia and in Indian Ocean rim where India is competing with other powers through balancing to safeguard its own interests.  Global Circle: At the global level India has been trying to gain its place as one the great powers and major factor in the international politics.56

Kishore Dash‟s argument clearly reflects that South Asian regional security faces a great challenge from India‟s regional policy that includes its discriminatory attitude towards its smaller neighbouring countries and its approach of seeing itself beyond the region. The hegemonic designs of India compelled many South Asian states to align themselves with

55 Ibid. 56 Kishore Dash, Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures (New York: Routledge, 2008), 76.

China. Since the end of Cold War, the region is witnessing a process of realignment that has further intensified in the post 9/11 period.

2.2.3.2. Regional Economic Integration It can be argued that SAARC has the potential to play a critical role in regional economic integration. The organisation has contributed in confidence-building process in South Asia. The creation of the South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) and South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) has raised some hopes on the prospective role of SAARC in regional economic interdependence. There is no doubt that regional cooperation in South Asia has been hostage of Indo-Pak rivalry. Indian policy towards Kashmir is to maintain status quo and to reflect Pakistan as an irrelevant power in Kashmir dispute. During the Cold War period, both India and Pakistan got external support from Soviet Union and USA, respectively, in the military and economic spheres. Owing to their strong positions, governments on both sides were less willing to listening to each other. However, the end of Cold War brought new opportunities for India to review its policy posture in the region. India enhanced its cooperation with the US and its perception on US involvement in regional affairs also changed. With the USA‟s support, India is trying to establish a South Asian regional security architecture where it could have a dominant role in deciding issues in its favour.57

The regional imperatives of South Asia were different from that of the post-Cold War period. The end of Cold War changed the scenario for Pakistan. There were more challenges than opportunities available to Pakistan. These new challenges compelled Pakistan to review its foreign relations. As compared to Pakistan, India got more opportunities in the post-Cold war period. Since the 1990s, there was a clear shift in the US policy towards South Asia. India had been receiving extensive support from the US as compared to Pakistan. Due to the US tilt towards India, Pakistan started looking towards the Gulf countries and Central Asian Republics for economic and diplomatic

57 Ramesh Trivedi, ed., India’s Relations with Her Neighbours (Delhi: Isha Books, 2008), 36-38.

support. With China‟s rapprochement and enhanced economic cooperation with India, Pakistan will no longer be assured of China‟s support in any future conflict with India. Pakistan‟s efforts in dealing with non-traditional security threats of increasing ethnic conflicts, drug trafficking, and the interstate terrorism would not succeed without having trans-border cooperation with its neighbours especially with India.58

Like India, Pakistan also needs new markets for its exports. But so far it has achieved only limited access to the markets of Japan, North America and Western Europe, mainly because of their protectionist policies. As a result, Pakistan has taken initiatives to form the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) to boost its exports and improve intra- regional trade with the Central Asian Republics (CAR).59 However, Pakistan‟s efforts to seek new markets in these countries are likely to achieve limited success, given the competition of the developed countries to capture their markets. In meeting the needs of CAR, Pakistan‟s capital and technology is no match to what Western Europe, the US, Japan, and even Russia has to offer. Growing recession in the Gulf countries has put further limitation on Pakistan‟s exports to these markets. Consequently, Pakistan can no longer ignore the South Asian markets, where, next to India, it enjoys some comparative advantage.60

Regional cooperation in South Asia is in the interest of Pakistan. This fact has been recognised by policy makers in Pakistan. They understand that any tension in the region will prevent investors and it would not be in the economic interests of Pakistan. Regional stability and intra-regional trade is not only in the interest of Pakistan, but it is also in the interest of whole South Asian region. There is a need to enhance direct trade between India and Pakistan as most of their trade is through third countries. Trade between these countries in various items such as steel, aluminium, textile machinery, chemical products, and dry fruits is currently being done via third countries. If this trade is done directly, it

58 Ibid. 59 Kishore C. Dash, Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures (London and New York: Rutledge, 2008), 158. 60 Ibid.

will benefit both the countries substantially in terms of price, quality, and time.61 This situation reflects that there is a need to develop a dynamic strategy to enhance economic cooperation among South Asian countries. One of the important components of this strategy should be to advance intra-regional trade by lowering tariffs without disengaging from extra-regional and global economic relations.

2.4. Intra-Regional and Global Security Complexes The above discussion also indicates that regional developments in South Asia have implications for global security, including security in adjoining regions. In this process, the role of US and other global players in regional security of South Asia is critical. The US‟ asymmetrical approach in South Asia could destabilise the regional balance. The US is already tilted towards India to balance China while China has signed agreements with Pakistan to gain access to Arabian Sea for its western province.62 The US design of strengthening India as a counterbalance to China is a destabilising factor for the region having implications for the US global agenda.

The US South Asian policy is based on balance of power approach. Instead of having partnership with South Asia as a whole, it has developed close relations with India. Indo- US strategic cooperation especially in nuclear and missile defence has serious implication for regional security. These developments in the region further complicate the security scenario of South Asia particularly by discouraging the efforts of limiting the nuclear build up and developing a regional mechanism for nuclear risk reduction. If the US would have been interested in establishing regional stability, it would never have played games of creating defence pacts such as the SEATO and the CENTO or it would have not played one regional state against the other. In the view of Najam Rafiq, America has no long term strategic interest in the region. Its interest in South Asia is defined by short

61 Manan Dwivedi. South Asia Security (Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2009), 312. 62 Shabir Ahmad Khan, Assistant Professor, Area Study Centre University of Peshawar, personal interview, August 27, 2014.

term tactical goals such as to stop the advancement of communism and now the war on terror.63

It is difficult to say that the role of global powers in South Asia has always been conducive for regional stability. On some occasions, they played cards by carrying forward proxy wars in the region. Some global powers made the situation even more complicated, like what happened in Cold War period. Any such effort in future would lead to disorders in South Asia. However, some other powers such as China and European Union have played a role that was conducive for economic integration, and people to people contacts. The international community is increasingly concerned about the security in the South Asian region because of three factors: i) nuclearisation, ii) geographical proximity to the Indian Ocean, South East Asia and Middle East, and, iii) increasing involvement of China. In this situation, China is keen to promote regional security in South Asia through the establishment of trade, commercial and cultural links with all the countries of the region, including India.64

Academicians like Wang Shida argue that countries out of the region should respect the endeavour of regional countries in maintaining security and outside powers should not dictate their terms to regional countries imposing them to do things which they do not want do.65 There is no doubt that role of external powers has remained a crucial factor in regional power politics.66 The explanations vary on the question whether the role of external powers is a stabilising or a destabilising factor. A large number of scholars believe that the role of external powers such as USA had in fact been a destabilising factor.67 In this context, one of the important factors relating to South Asian security is

63 Najam Rafiq, Director (America), Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, personal interview, June 19, 2014. 64 Hu Shisheng, Senior Researcher, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Beijing, personal interview, July 28, 2014. 65 Wang Shida, Senior Researcher, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Beijing, personal interview, July 30, 2014. 66 Zhu Zhongbo, Senior Researcher, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, China, Beijing, personal interview, August 29, 2014. 67 Adil Sultan, Director Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Islamabad, personal interview, August 20, 2014.

the nature of relations of regional states with external countries especially in the neighbouring regions and in this perspective, the following five issues are vital; a) Situation in Afghanistan: The stability in Afghanistan would be beneficial both for Pakistan and India. Afghanistan can act as trade and energy corridor for Central Asian. b) Persian Gulf / Middle East Region: Regional stability of South Asia is closely linked with the stability of Pakistan. The domination of any extremist and conservative group is not in the favour of regional stability. Peace and stability in Middle East is critically important for Pakistan and China. Stable and strong Pakistan free from extremism is vital for peace and stability of the Middle East. This is particularly true in the prevailing situation when the region is passing through a critical stage of turbulence and violence. c) Sino-Indian Relations: China and India are regional powers and share a history of hostility towards each other but now they are trying to bring their relations to normality. However, any offset in their relations could subvert security environment of South Asia resulting in an arms race both in nuclear and conventional weapons. Normalisation of China‟s relation with India would definitely enhance the regional security in South Asia.68 d) Volatile Central Asia: Central Asia has always been attracted by the global powers for its rich energy resources but balance of power between the US and the former USSR in the Cold War period brought peace in this region. After the disintegration of the former USSR, the Central Asian republics became independent. Although, there had not been any direct conflict between regional and global powers for causing situation for gaining control of these resources but their inordinate interest for dominance has created instability in the region. This factor has contributed to deteriorate and complicate the situation in Afghanistan.69 e) Religious Extremism and Terrorism: Nowadays, extremism and terrorism are burning issues all over the world. As it is not confined to any particular

68 Subrata Mitra, “Sino-Indian Relations: An Escalating Rivalry?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 10, 2012. 69 Ibid.

region(s); it has become a sensitive issue. South Asia is one of the most affected regions mainly because of on-going instability in Afghanistan. The policies adopted by global powers in the region were to secure their own interests without having any regards for regional security. The creation of armed groups had detrimental consequences as these groups irrespective of their enemies went beyond their limits to promote their own specific agendas. Even today, these underground armed groups are not only posing a great threat to regional security but also a threat to global security.70

2.5. South Asian Security Dynamics and Regional Stability China and Pakistan are located in a region of great geo-strategic importance which hosts nearly half of the world population. Along with the human resources, region is also rich in natural resources. The fact that three of the seven declared nuclear states in the world are here, and a second nuclear state - Russia has special interests in South Asia as it is a region which is adjacent to Central Asia. This factor has further elevated the importance of the region.71 The United States‟ increasing engagement in South Asia specially its interest in Pakistan and India also reflects the important of this region. Since 1971, there were four major crises between Pakistan and India when the US played an important role, i.e., Brasstacks crisis of 1986-87, the Compound crisis of 1990, the Kargil conflict 1999, and the border confrontation crisis of 2001-02.72

The security dynamics of South Asia saw a great transformation in the post 9/11 period mainly due to the US war on terror in Afghanistan and its spill over effects on the region especially on Pakistan, initiation of Pakistan-India peace process, and emergence of non- traditional security threats such as energy security, terrorism and extremism, etc. It is impossible to visualise any normalisation of relations between Pakistan and India given the notion of historical baggage both the adversaries have on their shoulder. None of them is willing to make any compromise. No doubt, any normalisation of relations

70 Muhammad Nadeem Shah, “Evolution of Sectarianism in Pakistan: A Threat to the State and Society,” South Asian Studies 29, no. 2 (July - December 2014): 441-459. 71 Ibid. 72 P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007).

between India and Pakistan would be of tremendous benefit not for the concerned countries but also for the lager region particularly for the SAARC, which is today hostage to the hostility of India and Pakistan and it has failed to realise its full potential as compared to other regional organisation such as the ASEAN and the ARF. The emerging dynamics should be based on common approach to fight terrorism. Given the differences between regional states, there is a need to develop a strategy based on common interests. There has been a failure to devise a consensus based and coherent regional strategy on the part of regional states.73

2.5.1. Spill over Effects of Afghanistan’s Situation Afghanistan is in the state of war and conflicts for over three decades. The long history of this country is also full of twists and turns. The geo-political proximity of Afghanistan has always had an influence on the domestic development of the countries of South and Central Asian countries. In 1979, when there was a military intervention by the Soviets in Afghanistan, which provoked a situation of turmoil and armed hostility which brought forth censorious changes in the geo-political setting of Afghanistan. The Soviet interference was imputed by many forces, which included local Afghans, regional and international forces. The activation of these new forces and the trans-national functional linkages that enabled them to operate was to have a transformative impact on the whole region. The US military intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 has again set into motion a new cycle of war and instability which is impacting the geo political environment and security of the bordering states in complex ways.74

After September 2001, with Pakistan fearing to lose its strategic depth in Afghanistan due to increased Indian involvement in reconstructing and rebuilding the war-torn country, Pakistan endeavoured to limit India‟s role in Afghanistan, whilst India tried to pressurise Pakistan by establishing an ever stronger foothold in Afghanistan. As major regional players and parts of the conflict, Iran, Uzbekistan and Russia also supported different

73 Najam Rafiq, Director (America), Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, personal interview, June 19, 2014. 74 Simbal Khan, “Afghanistan and Its Geo-political Environment: Opportunities and Challenges,” a paper presented in ISSI seminar, “2011: China-Pakistan Friendship Year,” Islamabad, January 11-12, 2011.

warring factions in Afghanistan.75 Due to this geo-strategic scenario, stabilisation of Afghanistan remains a major challenge to date. There is the general perception that the United States and its allies lack a coherent strategy and that current policies do not pay adequate attention to the overall political and economic development of the region. Over the years, attempts to solve the problems of the region have been made during the Afghanistan conferences held in London in late January and in Kabul in July 2010.76 The international community has shown its willingness of keeping their engagement in Afghanistan for a longer period of time. Several agreements took place for this purpose, which include; 2001 Bonn Agreement, the 2002 Tokyo Declaration, the 2006 Afghanistan Compact, the 2008 Paris Declaration, and The Hague Declaration of 2009.77 Then international community has asserted solemnly to maintain their support for implementation of related UNSC‟s resolutions, safeguarding the security, peace and development of Afghanistan, and in paying due attention to the role of other stakeholders in Afghanistan‟s immediate neighbourhood.78

Clearly, Afghanistan remains the missing link, which is thwarting the realisation of the region‟s full potential. Prospects of a peaceful Afghanistan offer huge opportunities for regional cooperation. In this context, China and Pakistan appear to be natural partners. China has the economic resources, technical expertise, and ability to undertake large infrastructural projects, energy and transport corridors traversing Afghanistan. Pakistan in turn is geo-politically the most feasible route, both land and sea, for transporting Afghan and central Asian energy and natural resources to Chinese mainland avoiding congested sea lanes in the Strait of Malacca.79

75 Concept Paper, IPRI-HSF International Seminar, “Stabilizing Afghanistan: Regional Perspectives and Prospect,” Islamabad, August 3-4, 2010. 76 Kabul: International Conference on Afghanistan, “Kabul Conference Communiqué Signed” July 20, 2010, available at https://www.unodc.org 77 Rhoda Margesson, “United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background and Policy Issues,” July 30, 2009, available at www.slideshare.net 78 Zhao Lijian, “China‟s Constructive Role in Asia Pacific.” IPRI-HSF International Conference on “Emerging Security Order in Asia Pacific and its Impact on South Asia” held in Islamabad on 17-18 November 2015. 79 Simbal Khan, “Afghanistan and its Geopolitical Environment: Opportunities and Challenges,” Strategic Studies, no. 3 & 4 (Autumn and winter, 2010).

Chinese investment in Afghanistan, especially the US$ 3.5 billion investments in Aynak Copper field in Logar province, can serve as a model for future investments. The plan for the Aynak copper field includes the construction of planned freight train network linking to Pakistan‟s railway system as well as Tajikistan along with the setting up of a power generation plant.80 This model demonstrates how the development of natural resources can be simultaneously linked to regional transport and trade networks. In the end, it is vital to remember that the China-Pakistan partnership in the region can serve as a pivot around which a framework for peace and stability in Afghanistan can be structured.81

A remarkable difference can be observed in the policies of regional countries before and after the 9/11 incident about regional security. The policy approaches of neighbouring countries of Afghanistan especially Pakistan and India saw a major shift. The international community also enhanced its focus on Afghanistan. In this scenario, being the immediate neighbour of this country, Pakistan‟s importance is very high. Besides Pakistan, other countries such as Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and China also share borders with Afghanistan. Additionally, other countries which although do not have any common border with Afghanistan, yet they have interests in Afghanistan. India is a type of country that wanted to have influence in Afghanistan to undermine the position of Pakistan. Before the 9/11 incident, the problems of Afghanistan were addressed by regional powers and they were playing the major role. However, with the tragedy of 9/11, this role has been reduced and the US along with coalition partners started enhancing its interests. The situation of post 2014 Afghanistan, i.e., after the withdrawal of the US/NATO forces is different and the role of regional countries has increase to stabilise this country.

2.5.2. Security Issues between Pakistan and India The Kashmir dispute is the root cause of all other issues between Pakistan and India since their independence in 1947. Due to Kashmir dispute, both countries have fought three wars. The people of Kashmir started their freedom struggle by using peaceful political

80 Embassy of Afghanistan, New Delhi, “10 Reasons to Invest in Afghanistan‟s Mining Sector,” January 16, 2014. 81 Simbal Khan, “Afghanistan and its Geopolitical Environment.”

engagements with the main objective to exercise their right of self-determination, but due to Indian lack of interest, it turned into an armed resistance movement. The tension between Pakistan and India would continue until they find an amicable solution of this dispute.82 Now, Indo-Pak relations are passing through a critical stage of transformation where both challenges and opportunities exist.83 A series of composite dialogue between two countries has comprised of eight main issues: a. Peace and Security including CBMs b. Jammu and Kashmir c. Siachin glacier d. Sir Creek e. Wullar Barrage f. Terrorism and Drug Trafficking g. Economic and Commercial Cooperation h. Promoting Friendly Exchanges in Various Fields84

The Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between two countries are good steps towards normalisation of relations but for attainment of sustainable peace in the region, the settlement of all issues especially the core issue of Kashmir is essential. The dialogue would be more meaningful if the progress on Kashmir issue be persuaded parallel to the CBMs. There is a lot of scope for economic and commercial cooperation between the two countries.85 It is encouraging to see that there is a feeling on both sides that the prosperity of both countries greatly depends upon their good relations. The leadership in Pakistan and India often talk to settle their disputes and efforts have been made to find solutions of these issues. It is imperative that for the sake of human development, that both countries should continue their dialogue. The first and foremost step is to leave behind the predilections of past and develop a working environment of mutual trust. South Asia is one of the most deprived regions of the world where human security is grossly neglected. Both India and Pakistan are facing serious challenges of poverty, illiteracy and economic

82 “A Brief History of the Kashmir Conflict,” Telegraph, September 24, 2001. 83 Muhammad Munir, “Resolving Kashmir Issue Peacefully,” Pakistan Observer, Islamabad, May 27, 2006. 84 Noor ul Haq, “Pakistan-India Peace Process, IPRI Factfile, March 2007. 85 Ibid.

slowdown. In order to counter these problems, there is a dire need for resolving Kashmir issue peacefully that is a pre-requisite for regional cooperation and understanding.86 China and the US can play a positive role in resolving issues between India and Pakistan.

An overview of Indo-Pak relations reflects that it is hard for both countries to forget their past. Pre-partition mind-set, legacy of bitter past experiences and the historical baggage of deep rooted ideological rivalry and trust deficit dominated the discourse. Stalemate over Kashmir dispute continued to remain a source of tension between the two countries. The right of self-determination of the Kashmiri people granted through the UNSC resolutions has continuously been ignored by India. Furthermore, gross violations human rights by Indian security forces in Kashmir have increased manifold over the years. Another issue linked with Kashmir dispute is water dispute. Since long, India has been constructing dams having negative impact on flow of water to Pakistan. In most of the cases, India is violating the Indus Water Treaty (IWT).87 Legal battle over water between the two countries at various international forums also shows lack of trust between the two neighbours.88

Increasing interests of extra regional powers in Pakistan‟s neighbourhood especially in Afghanistan has been one of many reasons that affected Pakistan‟s peace process with India. After the 9/11, Pakistan‟s image was tarnished and it was seen as a part of the problem relating to terrorism and security issues. While taking advantage of post 9/11 developments, India was able to equate legitimate freedom movement of Kashmiri people with global terrorism. The US‟s overwhelming support to India in the context of nuclear agreement and backing of its aspirations to get the UNSC seat made India an arrogant power. Pakistan came under unnecessary pressure to settle the issues with India from a weak position.89 In this whole process, the main issue is sustainability of the bilateral peace process. Lack of political will and historic mistrustful legacy of societal mind-set

86 Ibid. 87 Arshad Abbasi, “Indus Water Treaty between Pakistan and India,” PILDAT, January 2012. 88 Islamabad Policy Research Institute, “Indo-Pak Relations: The Peace Process,” IPRI Review, no.10, June 2016. 89 Ibid.

on both sides are the major hurdles. Without concerted effort and tenacity from both sides, Indo-Pak peace process is at best likely to remain patchy and bumpy. 2.5.3. South Asia’s Quest for Energy Security Energy has become an important prerequisite for the economic development of a country. On one hand, it is used for the industrial and agricultural purposes and on the other; it is required for domestic use of the citizens. Natural gas is the fastest growing primary energy source.90 Global consumption of natural gas is projected to increase by nearly 70 percent between 2002 and 2025, with the most vigorous growth in demand expected among the emerging economies. Consumption of natural gas worldwide increases in the forecast by an average of 2.3 percent annually from 2002 to 2025, compared with projected annual growth rates of 1.9 percent for oil consumption and 2.0 percent for coal consumption. The electric power sector accounts for almost one-half of the total incremental growth in worldwide natural gas demand over the forecast period.91 South Asia is important to world energy markets because it contains 1.4 billion people and is experiencing rapid energy demand growth. After India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are the next largest South Asian countries in these categories. Economic and population growth in South Asia have resulted in rapid increases in energy consumption in recent years. The major energy issues facing South Asian nations today are keeping up with rapidly rising energy demand.92

In the prevailing circumstances, an increased trade among neighbours would definitely help their economies. One example of this is the possibility of a larger regional energy ring trade that might bring large regional benefits. Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka all have a demand for energy that is in excess of their domestic capacity to varying degrees, and the gap will only become larger with future growth. Conversely, Bhutan and Nepal in the region; Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran in the Middle East; Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan the Central Asia region, and Myanmar in the East Asian region; all have natural resource endowments, considerably surplus to their domestic demand. The tapping of this potential with regional energy links by some estimates could

90 Muhammad Munir, “Pakistan's Quest for Energy Security,” Pakistan Observer, May 20, 2006. 91 Noor ul Haq, ed., “Energy Crisis in Pakistan”, IPRI Factfile, July 2008. 92 Ibid.

generate benefits valued at US$ 12-15 billion annually. However, this potential would only be exploited with improved regional security and international cooperation, including.93

In view of its geo-strategic location, Pakistan has the potential to become a hub for trade and energy cooperation in the region. The gas pipelines such as the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) and Qatar to Pakistan and India, the Gulf-South Asia Pipeline (GUSA) if completed in their stipulated time period, would definitely enhance economic development leading to regional security. Therefore, trade and energy cooperation is the key to regional development. In this context, with the development of Gwadar Port, Pakistan is now in the capacity to provide the trade and energy corridor for the whole region especially to China. The rebuilding of KKH will further enhance the capacity of China to ship its energy supplies from the Middle East to western China. This alternative energy supply route will reduce Beijing‟s dependence on the Malacca Strait. Pakistan also intends to set up a crude transit route through Gwadar Port for Beijing‟s energy shipments from Iran and Africa. China has agreed to help Pakistan with its plans for the development of its oil and gas industry.

The Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project would support around 4000 MW power generation capacity and it is anticipated to subside if not end the deepening energy crisis in Pakistan. The project‟s positive externalities would also benefit poverty-hit remote areas of Baluchistan and Sindh. In case of future extension to India and China the project has the potential to earn substantial transit fee for Pakistan. “The successful completion of Iran- Pakistan gas-pipeline and allied energy projects along with an optimally operational Gwadar Port could change the destiny of Pakistan”, said an ambitious bureaucrat of the country.94 This is extremely important after the nuclear deal among major powers and Iran when the international sanctions are being removed step by step.95

93 The World Bank, “South Asia Overview.” June 22, 2015, available at www.worldbank.org 94 Afzal Bajwa, “UK Supports Pakistan Energy Quest,” Pakistan Observer, March 13, 2013. 95 Iran has been under three types of international sanctions regarding its pursuit of nuclear activities. One set of sanctions was UN sponsored sanctions and the other US backed sanctions which had full support from European Union. Apart from complying with US sanctions, EU itself had imposed sanctions on Iran.

Earlier on, while trying to discourage Pakistan to pursue Iran-Pakistan pipeline project, the US offered Pakistan alternate pipeline project, i.e., Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI) that is not going to be materialized in the near future due to precarious security situation in Afghanistan. The second option related to electricity import through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan also seems a dream due to regional instability. The US has granted exemptions to many states that are cooperating with Iran in the energy field. South Korea, Japan, South Africa, China and India are among these states that continue energy trade with Iran. However, Pakistan was not given any wavier. The two main challenges due to which Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline could not be completed were the US pressure and insecurity in Baluchistan. However, now after the finalisation of the US nuclear deal with Iran and improved security in Baluchistan, the prospects of Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline are bright.

2.6. Post 9/11 Developments in the Region Prior to 9/11 period, the security dynamics of South Asia were based on the inter-regional interaction, wherein at times, the outside international players played important role in meandering the regional policies. Throughout cold war era, South Asian security has been fluctuating around the Indo-Pak and Sino-Indian relations with major focus on nuclear proliferation. In post 9/11era, a major change affecting the South Asian security paradigm came about in the form of ever increasing influence of the outside players in US sponsored war on terrorism. Although, the US declares itself the victor in war against terrorism, but the triumph of its victory has huge spill-over effects and destabilising impact on several parts of Asia. Pakistan extended its full support to US in war on terror and became the frontline state and an important allay. Pakistan‟s alliance with the US became the matter of opinion within Pakistan affecting the state-society affairs in the FATA along-side the border of Afghanistan. Pakistan army mobilised its forces into tribal belt to hunt down the foreign anti-state elements and their hideouts, such

See: Sakib Sherani, “Pipeline Economics,” Dawn, March 22, 2013; Aleena Khan, “IPI Pipeline and its Implications on Pakistan,” Strategic Studies vol. XXXII, no. 2 & 3 (Summer & Autumn 2012).

supplementary military operation along the war on terror left certain long term implications on foreign and domestic policies of the country.96 It is noteworthy that with regard to post 9/11 period, Pakistani and Chinese scholars have almost similar views on the imperatives of regional security in South Asia. According to Najam Rafiq, a senior scholar at Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (ISSI), the main imperative of regional security is to devise a consensus regarding coherent regional strategy to address various challenges the region is facing in the post 9/11 period. Some of these challenges include: rise of terrorism and non-state actors, economic instability, internal dynamics of regional states and its impact on their relation with each other, and differences and conflicts between the regional states especially between Pakistan and India. 97

In the view of Rashid Ahmad Khan, the main imperatives of regional security in South Asia are: eradication of terrorism, economic development, poverty alleviations, regional connectivity and the keen interest shown by international community in forging trade and economic links with South Asian countries in view of its vast consumer market and potential for development. There is a need to balance the growing linkages between China and India on one hand and between the US and India on the other, particularly after the establishment of hardliner BJP government in India. In this scenario, Pakistan should not be ignored as any disturbance of balance in South Asia would lead to regional instability.98According to Adil Sultan, the main imperative of regional security will depend on strategic realignment of major powers, especially the US policy to contain China.99

From the Chinese perspective, the main imperative of regional security include: stability of Afghanistan, giving hope to youngsters in South Asia by providing better education and training, job opportunities, free movement among different regions and ethnic

96 Shireen M. Mazari and Fazlur Rahman, “South Asian Security: International Context,” Policy Perspectives 3, no.1 (January-June 2006): 13-23. 97 Najam Rafiq, Director (America), Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, personal interview, June 19, 2014. 98 Rashid Ahmad Khan, Professor and Chairman, Department of International Relations and Political Science, University of Sargodha, personal interview, August 2, 2014. 99 Adil Sultan, Director SPD, personal interview, August 20, 2014.

communities, preventing severe strategic imbalance occurred between India and Pakistan, especially in non-conventional weapon systems, and initiating a security dialogue or architecture among South Asian countries - similar to ARF in the ASEAN region. For stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan border, there is a need to fight terrorism. Stability of Afghanistan will depend upon political reconciliation, the ANSF‟s capacity in tackling the resurgences and terrorists, the economic dynamics, and international community‟s continued economic and military assistance to Afghanistan.100

In the view of Riaz Mohammed Khan, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan: “The 9/11 has moved terrorism, violent extremism and militancy to the centre stage of worldwide concerns. People feel vulnerable to random acts of violence that are disruptive even if these do not pose any existential threat. By that token, in the region, conflict in Afghanistan and instability in Pakistan are major challenges. Therefore, the imperatives in addressing these are regional security, political stability, and human development. Human security is the key to human development. China can definitely help Pakistan in this process. China‟s strong and stable political relations with Pakistan and strategic understanding and cooperation between the two countries contribute to maintain a balance in the region.”101 In the same context, Chinese scholar Zhu Zhongbo argues that: “There are three main imperatives of regional security: a) building counter-terrorism cooperation, b) coordination on the issue of Afghanistan, and, c) monitoring America‟s expansion of influence in South Asia as well as in Central Asia.”102 No doubt, these are important points and demand due consideration.

Discussion made in chapter one also reflects that the imperatives of regional security are multi-dimensional covering economic, political and military issues. These aspects of security order are often inter-related and bolster up each other at one time and spell problems at other. Holistically, there is always ambivalence in terms of the outcome of

100 Hu Sheshing, Director, Institute of South & Southeast Asian and Oceanian Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations( CICIR), Beijing, personal interview. 101 Riaz Mohammad Khan, Former Foreign Secretary, personal interview, April 5, 2016. 102 Zhu Zhongbo, Senior Researcher, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, China, personal interview, August 26, 2014. Also see Shabir Ahmad Khan, Assistant Professor, Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, personal interview, August 27, 2014.

such security order, wherein the conflicting approaches ensure certain opportunities and give birth to threats as well. Amalgamation and segregation of different aspects overlap each-other in such security order, thus creating a disintegrated regional system.103 Integration and exclusion coexist apprehensively side by side in all domains and aspects of the security order. This is an order that is regional but not integrated. In this perspective, while keeping in view security as a multi-dimensional concept, the imperatives of regional security can be divided into three main categories, i.e., i) politico-military imperatives, ii) socio-economic imperatives, and, iii) human security and human development imperatives. A brief analytical overview of these three categories is discussed in the following pages.

2.6.1. Politico-Military Imperatives The political challenges confronting the South Asian countries at national level include issues relating to governance, rule of law, political instability, media and civil society. All these challenges have implications for regional security. There is a need that all these challenges be addressed on priority basis through reforms, capacity building and strengthening political institutions. There are several unresolved political disputes and conflicts in South Asian region. Asymmetric warfare, in the form of terrorism, is a harsh reality in the region where Pakistan and Afghanistan, along with emerging terror trails in India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bhutan are hotbeds of transnational terrorism.104 In South Asia, Pakistan is facing two major security challenges, first; it has become victim of terrorism due to spill-over effect of the US/NATO intervention in Afghanistan and second; it faces security challenges from India. The growth of Indian conventional military capabilities and overwhelming nuclear support that India is receiving from the US and western countries has resulted in asymmetric form of regional conventional military balance and nuclear strategic stability.

It is also noteworthy that the South Asian security matrix is based upon the abysmal relationship between India and Pakistan conjoined by Chinese presence in the region. The

103 Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden, “Development Financing 2000,” available at www.gci.org.uk 104 Ibid.

standoffs between India-China and India-Pakistan have ripple effects over the security dynamics of the region. Pragmatically, it seems plausible to consider India and China becoming rivals in future, both in economic and political avenues, given the on-going unresolved border dispute over the Arunachal Pardesh. Although there was a dispute on the status of Sikkim but the issue was resolved when China finally recognised Indian sovereignty over Sikkim in 2003. China and India are showing great interest in forging relationship with Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar; and the question of such all at once interest cannot be evaded. Certainly, Tibet and Kashmir are intrinsically important for security concerns of the region.105 The political imperatives and military imperatives in South Asia are co-related.

To ensure regional security, the first option is that all the regional countries need to resolve their political issues as the lingering political disputes have the potential for military conflicts. In the view of Rumel Dahiya and Ashok K Behuri, India‟s neighbours have been experiencing domestic turmoil, political instability and worsening security situation. India‟s concern is that continuation of such turbulence and volatile environment in its neighbourhood would be less attractive for foreign investors who are looking at India as a new investment destination. This would leave an adverse impact on India‟s economic growth and aspiration for global leadership. Thus, with wide-spread instability and uncertainty in the neighbourhood, India has no choice but to actively engage in security arrangements with its neighbours to bring peace and stability in the region.106 Thus, the Indian desire to promote regional stability by addressing threat perceptions of its South Asian neighbours is the first imperative for regional cooperation.

According to a Chinese scholar, Hu Sheshing; the second option is that: “Military confrontations and conflicts can be avoided through balance of power and through deterrence. As the regional security of South Asia greatly depends upon the relations between India and Pakistan, it can be hoped that both governments would make rational

105 Ankit Panda, “Geography's Curse: India's Vulnerable Chicken‟s Neck,” The Diplomat, November 8, 2013. 106 Rumel Dahiya and Ashok K Behuri, India’s Neighbourhood: Challenges in the Next Two Decades (New Delhi: IDSA, 2012).

decisions for the development of the people of this region.”107 Similar views have also been expressed by Wang Shida108 and Rashid Ahmad Khan.109 The enormous economic, military and humanitarian cost of managing conflicts in South Asia provides the second imperative for regional and even multilateral security cooperation. In their efforts to bring stability and peace to the region, Indian policy makers have began to realise that it is no longer possible and even desirable to prevent the involvement of major powers in the region‟s security affairs. The cost of peace, the need for India‟s defence modernisation and India‟s strategic goals of a major global power require India to pursue, in words of C. Raja Mohan “a policy of Security multilateralism.”110 This policy tolerates inclusion rather than exclusion of major powers in managing South Asia‟s security related issues. In a post Cold War era, security multilateralism is in India‟s interest and remains a realistic option for India to secure its global objective.111

It is noteworthy that there is a growing sense of amity at people to people level against the apathetic attitude of governments to cooperate with each other in resolving the range of issues. Such awareness is also helpful in putting pressure on their governments to sit together and find solution to common challenges, e.g., corruption, poverty and bad governance. Certainly, there are a number of ways to increase such motive for cordial inter-state relations and cooperation, such as, through the flexible visa regimes for the exchange of cultural art and cinema; which can create a favourable ambience to interchange positive ideas.

2.6.2. Socio-Economic Imperatives One of the important imperatives of regional security is the need to uplift the socio- economic development in South Asia. There is a need to develop strategies to reduce poverty and promote shared prosperity. According to the World Bank, this can be

107 Hu Sheshing, Director , Institute of South & Southeast Asian and Oceanian Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations( CICIR), Beijing, personal interview, July 28, 2014. 108 Wang Shida, Senior Researcher, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Beijing, personal interview, July 30, 2014. 109 Rashid Ahmad Khan, Professor and Chairman, Department of International Relations and Political Science, University of Sargodha, personal interview, August 2, 2014. 110 C. Raja Mohan, “A new multilateralism,” Indian Express, September 21, 2015. 111 Kishore C. Dash, Regionalism in South Asia, 177.

achieved through “enhanced job opportunities, human development, social welfare, strengthening governance and accountability, reducing weather, disaster and food vulnerability. The key asset of South Asia is its people. Building human capital by ensuring that the people of South Asia have access to education, health care, and social safety nets should be core of the strategy. Regional economic cooperation holds the potential for considerable gains in growth and increased security for South Asia region.”112

Another report of the World Bank says that; “South Asia has experienced a long period of robust economic growth, averaging six percent a year over the past 20 years. This strong growth has translated into declining poverty and impressive improvements. However, South Asia remains home to the most number of people living in extreme poverty and many challenges remain.”113 The World Bank‟s point is valid because this region is the home of 399 million whose daily income is less than $1.25. These people constitute 40 percent of the world‟s poor. More than 200 million people live in slums, and half a billion people survive without electricity.114 Therefore, human development in the region will be a key to meeting global poverty and prosperity goals. To ensure socio- economic development, it is an imperative for South Asian countries to increase their economic growth through regional economic and trade cooperation by resolving political disputes. Kishore C. Dash argues that energy security and energy transition are the two avenues, which provide the promising future to South Asian economies to cooperate and increase their partnership.115

Currently, South Asian states confront two-fold challenges in energy sector; the rapidly growing demand of energy and the transnational energy trade. There is already long hour‟s blackout owing to low and costly supply and high demand of electricity. It is encouraging to see that regional governments are keen in increasing their level of cooperation in power sector on account of deteriorating economies and the anticipated

112 The World Bank Report, “World Development Indicators 2013,” www.worldbank.org accessed on June 18, 2015. 113 The World Bank, “South Asia Overview,” www.worldbank.org May 29, 2015. 114 Ibid. 115 Kishore C. Dash, Regionalism in South Asia, 106.

repercussion due to the power shortages. There is a challenge ahead for South Asian states to meet the short supply and growing demand of energy, the certain key areas related to energy sector needs reformation to attract the foreign development investment for energy infrastructure - privatisation of energy resources to produce sufficient energy, expansion of national grid and, the accretion of regional trade and investment in this sector.116

The SAARC countries can promote regional security by reducing tension between Pakistan and India and providing an economic direction through combined effort both within the region and beyond. The explanations vary on the relevance of economic and trade cooperation between India and Pakistan for political normalisation. Some analysts are of the view that economic and trade cooperation will lead to political normalisation between India and Pakistan.117 They believe that it is the only way to achieve regional socio-economic development. Many scholars hope that economic cooperation will facilitate the process of resolving political issues.118 Although, in this process, the Kashmir issue would always be a big obstacle;119 simultaneous political and economic cooperation is the need of the day120 for smooth relations between the two countries.121 Therefore, trade is an important CBM122 and progress in this sector will reduce the trust deficit between Pakistan and India.123

2.6.3. Human Security and Human Development Imperatives Human development in South Asia is another area which has not progressed so far, as compared to the rest of the world. UNTFHS argues that the concept of human security

116 Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, “Energy Resources: Will They Be the Last Frontier in South Asia?,” in South Asia: Integrating & looking east?, SAARC Working Paper 2006/10, September 25–26, 2006. 117 Noshina Saleem, et al., “Indo-Pakistan Trade Relations: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Daily Dawn,” South Asian Studies 29, no. 1 (January – July 2014): 309-320. 118 Zhu Zhongbo, Senior Researcher, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, China, Beijing, personal interview, August 29, 2014. 119 Wang Shida, Senior Researcher, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Beijing, personal interview, July 30, 2014. 120 Adil Sultan, Director SPD, personal interview, August 20, 2014. 121 Shabir Ahmad Khan, Assistant Professor, Area Study Centre University of Peshawar, personal interview, August 27, 2014. 122 Ishrat Husain, “India–Pakistan Trade: Recent Developments, Future Prospects and Risks,” Criterion Quarterly 8, no. 1 (January-March 2013). 123 Hu Sheshing, personal interview, July 28, 2014.

should be used to deal with today‟s security challenges as it can help in analysing “increasingly diverse, less visible and less predictable non-traditional security threats.”124 South Asia confronts the gigantic challenges in fulfilling basic needs of its people such as shelter, food, water, energy, healthcare, education and access to justice. In this respect, all the SAARC countries are facing two major challenges - human development and economic betterment of its people. The imperatives of human development can be met by raising personal incomes and public revenues, building quality institutions and enhancing government capacity to address these challenges.125 To overcome human under- development, the SARRC countries need to allocate more resources for this purpose. In this regard, Mahin Karim says that; “The nature of the non-traditional security challenges faced by South Asia may offer opportunities to change the regional security agenda and could even subsume traditional security concerns. For example, the region could witness a shift from national security to human security and from state-centric to people-centric approach.”126

Human development is based on human security. Therefore, while building multi- dimensional security in South Asia, there is a need to give priority to human security and human development to ensure socio-economic and socio-political development in this region. A development in this area will also strengthen their capacity to meet the external threats. This situation also reflects that without strengthening socio-economic and human dimensions of security, the politico-military security cannot be strengthened. However, some scholars are of the view that in developing countries, such as South Asian countries and China, a weak government would lead to a chaotic society. For them the politico- military dimension of security is more important. Some others emphasise that socio- economic dimension of security should be given priority.127

124 United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, “Human Security in Theory and Practice,” UN Security Unit Report, 2009, available at www.un.org 125 Moazzam Husain, “The Last Chance,” Dawn, June 2, 2014. 126 Mahin Karim, “The Future of South Asian Security Prospects for a Non-traditional Regional Security Architecture,” NBR Report, The National Bureau of Asian Research, April 2013. 127 This discussion is based on personal interviews of several Pakistani and Chinese intellectuals.

The above is an ongoing debate but one thing is clear that so far, the SAARC has played a little role in improving regional security128 and this view is also supported by several scholars.129 The SAARC should focus on the promotion of regional connectivity in the physical, economic and cultural domains. It might be helpful, if the SAARC‟s Regional Security Forum is established to deal with the respective issues.130 This forum should particularly address the political issues that over shadows regional cooperation.131 The SAARC countries should play their role to reduce the tension between Pakistan and India and a combined effort is required to set their human security and human development direction within the region.132 No doubt such joint attempt would be a panacea to many regional ills.133

2.7. China: A Stability Factor in South Asia Most SAARC countries consider China‟s involvement in South Asia as stability factor. Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan played an important role in making China the observer member of the SAARC. China‟s involvement is crucial for regional connectivity in South Asia particularly in terms of its investment in various mega infrastructural projects such as the CPEC and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM)134 in South Asia. China is also an important investor in infrastructure development in Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.

2.7.1. Chinese Foreign Policy Trends Economic interdependence brought massive changes in Chinese policies by taking on- board various actors in its foreign and trade sectors. In the wake of complex globalising

128 Wang Shida, Senior Researcher, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Beijing, personal interview, July 30, 2014. 129 Zhu Zhongbo, Senior Researcher, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, China, Beijing, personal interview, August 29, 2014. 130 Hu Sheshing, Director, Institute of South & Southeast Asian and Oceanian Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations( CICIR),Beijing, personal interview, July 28, 2014. 131 Adil Sultan, Director SPD, personal interview, August 20, 2014. 132 Najam Rafiq, Director (America), Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, personal interview, June 19, 2014. 133 Shabir Ahmad Khan, Assistant Professor, Area Study Centre University of Peshawar, personal interview, August 27, 2014. 134 As the name indicates, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Forum for Regional Cooperation (BCIM) is an organisation established by these countries with the aim to promote regional trade and development. BCIM Economic Corridor is mainly an expressway which will pass through these countries.

international regimes, China incorporated the new sets of bureaucratic models and modified domestic policies, keeping in view the changing elite perspectives and skills as well as the public opinion.135 The striking development in the contemporary process of globalisation led China to align its foreign policy in-line with various aspects of globalisation - the decentralisation and pluralisation have restructured the whole spectrum of its policies. Such changes improved Chinese economic diplomacy and simultaneously brought considerable advancement in its military sphere.136 Zhao Lijian, Political Counsellor of Chinese Embassy in Pakistan, explained China‟s Neighbourhood Policy. He said that; “China is always a facilitator, rather than a trouble-maker in South Asia. An old Chinese saying goes, a close neighbour is better than a distant relative. China always attaches great importance to an amicable neighbourhood. Over the decades, China has gradually put together a full- fledged, mature and multi-dimensional foreign policy towards its neighbouring countries. This neighbourhood policy is guided by important principles such as amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness. It is geared towards building amicable ties and partnerships with neighbours and advancing good neighbourliness, security and prosperity in the region. It is underpinned by the concept of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. It is inspired by a long-term vision of building an Asia-Pacific where countries live together in peace, pursue win-win cooperation and work together to forge a partnership and eventually create a community of common destiny. China has worked actively to strengthen regional security dialogue and cooperation.”137

At the onset of 21st century, China anchored its foreign relations on the new course of cooperation and participation in the regional affairs of South Asia. Such changes in Chinese interaction with other states could be witnessed first time in the history - the redefined and reorganised relationship is significantly important for both sides, albeit some negative impediments still prevails. Mixed public sentiments were expressed over the China-South Asia bonding; clamour and commendation can equally be seen in certain

135 Amna Yusaf Khokhar, “Sino-Indian Relations Implications for Pakistan,” a paper presented in ISSI seminar on “2011: China-Pakistan Friendship Year” held in Islamabad, January 11-12, 2011. 136 D. M. Lamton, „The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform 1978-2000 (Chicago: Chicago Distribution Centre, 2001), 28. 137 Speech by Zhao Lijian, DCM & Political Counsellor of Chinese Embassy in Pakistan on “China‟s Constructive Role in Asia Pacific” at IPRI-HSF International Conference on “Emerging Security Order in Asia Pacific and its Impact on South Asia” held in Islamabad, November 17-18, 2015.

quarters. It is the brazen reality that Chinese role in the regional dynamics has been prominent and has far-reaching implications for South Asia.138

The US strategic presence in the region is to counter terrorism and to encircle China; the US attempted to marginalise Pakistan and build cordial relationship with India, and in the same instance dictated Pakistan to express acquiescent approach over the strategic arrangement of the US. Such policies by the US could not yield an absolute allegiance from Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan‟s growing military ties with China is the natural outcome of such apathetic approach extended by the US. However, in certain other domains; the US‟s presence has far-reaching impacts on regional security dynamics.139

2.7.2. Implications of China’s Involvement in South Asia An increased involvement of China will be helpful for the stability in the region in the sense that China has good relation with Pakistan and also it is an important trade partner of India. China needs to expand economic and cultural cooperation with the countries in South Asia that in turn it would be in a position to bring regional rivals together to promote regional security and prosperity.140 Most of the Chinese scholars see China‟s involvement in South Asia as a stabilising factor. According to Hu Sheshing, a Chinese scholar, it will depend upon what China wants. If China wants to be integrated with South Asia in term of development, China‟s involvement would be a stabilising factor. But If China dominates South Asian affairs by playing one card against another, especially playing Pakistan against India, so then China‟s involvement could a destabilising factor. Due to the fact that China wants to focus upon strategic struggles in west-pacific regions, China has no reason to stir up chaotic in South Asia. The enhanced China-South Asia engagement will be a positive contribution to peace, security and prosperity in South Asia.141

138 Ye Hailin, “China and South Asian Relations in a new Perspective” a paper presented in ISSI seminar on “2011: China-Pakistan Friendship Year” held in Islamabad, January 11-12, 2011. 139 Ibid. 140 Najam Rafiq, Director (America), Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, personal interview, June 19, 2014. 141 Hu Sheshing, Director , Institute of South & Southeast Asian and Oceanian Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Beijing, personal interview, July 28, 2014.

No doubt, China is a major player in the region and there is a general consensus among many scholars that China‟s involvement in South Asia will be a stabilising factor. The country has a clear potential to play a constructive role in ensuring regional security and stability in South Asia.142 This can be achieved by: i) maintaining good and solid relations with all countries in South Asia, especially with India and Pakistan, ii) vigorously pushing forward connectivity between China and South Asia, especially by making the BCIM and the CPEC successful achievements, iii) making commitments and tangible progress in settling the border disputes through political means, and, iv) carrying forward more military-to-military engagement between China and the South Asian countries.143 China has already become an important stake holder in maintaining peace and security in South Asia on the basis of expansion of its economic and trade relations with the countries of the region. In the view if Rashid Ahmad Khan, China would further expand its role in promoting regional security in South Asia by focusing on the enhancement of its trade and economic relations and by lending its support to Pakistan- India peace process.144

Within the framework of international organisations and multilateral coordination, China can work with other parties to work together to deal with the issue of Afghanistan and contain the impending spread of terrorism. For instance, China can participate in the UN peacekeeping efforts in Afghanistan by extending its full support to the UN to promote peace and development in Afghanistan. By inviting Pakistan and other South Asian countries to be a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation organisation (SCO), China can then intensify the anti-terrorism coordination within the framework of the SCO. In addition, China and its neighbouring countries should tighten their border control and intensify cooperation and coordination on the issue of Afghanistan with stakeholders like the US, Russia, and Central Asian countries.145 China is already playing constructive role

142 Najam Rafiq, Director (America), Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, personal interview, June 19, 2014. 143 Hu Sheshing, Director , Institute of South & Southeast Asian and Oceanian Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations( CICIR), Beijing, personal interview, July 28, 2014. 144 Rashid Ahmad Khan, Professor and Chairman, Department of International Relations and Political Science, University of Sargodha, personal interview, August 2, 2014. 145 Zhu Zhongbo, Senior Researcher, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, China, Beijing, personal interview, August 29, 2014.

in the region by engaging India due to its own interests.146 China‟s internal dynamics, i.e., to pacify and develop western region and sustain the pace of economic development will determine its policy towards South Asia and for that reasons China as a regional state, having stakes in regional stability, can play a further role in strengthening regional security.147

2.8. Pakistan-China Common Interests in the Region The China-Pakistan economic and trade cooperation is highly complementary with huge development potentials. They have in recent years established and developed a free trade area. Pakistan‟s bilateral trade grew rapidly. Large investment programs such as Zong CMPak Ltd., Haier-Ruba Economic Zone, and the China-Pakistan Joint Investment Company were successfully inaugurated. The two countries have conducted close cooperation on programmes such as hydro-power stations, port, road, energy exploration and others. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China has been licensed to set up branches in Islamabad and Karachi. The industrial, economic and trade cooperation is mutually beneficial which, apart from returns, also allows Chinese firms, to obtain experience in developing international market and in the meantime contributes to Pakistan‟s economic and social development as it brings about tangible benefits to the local population.148

China considers CPEC as an important component of “One Belt One Road” (OBOR). Similarly, the creation of Silk Road Fund by China and its utilisation for the CPEC related projects is also highly appreciated by Pakistan. According to a joint statement issued in April 2015: “The two sides agreed to promote a 1+4 pattern of economic cooperation featuring a leading role of the CPEC and four key areas including the Gwadar Port, energy, transportation infrastructure and industrial cooperation. The two sides will actively facilitate the important cooperation projects including the Karakoram Highway (Phase II) upgrading and reconstruction, the Gwadar Port, the Karachi-Lahore

146 Adil Sultan, Director SPD, Personal interview, August 20, 2014. 147 Shabir Ahmad Khan, Assistant Professor, Area Study Centre University of Peshawar, personal interview, August 27, 2014. 148 Ambassador Liu Jian, “China-Pakistan Relations 2011: Year of Friendship,” a Speech delivered in ISSI seminar on January 11, 2011: China-Pakistan Friendship Year” held in Islamabad, January 11-12, 2011.

Motorway (Multan-Sukkur section), the Lahore Metro Orange Line, the Haier-Ruba Economic Zone, the Suki Kinari Hydropower Project, the China-Pakistan Cross-border Fibre Optic Cable, as well as a number of other energy, infrastructure and power generation projects.”149

This chapter reviewed the overall situation of complexities of domestic, regional, intra- regional and global security in the context of South Asian region. Here, the role of China as a strategic partner of Pakistan has been analysed in the context of imperatives of regional security such as resolving political disputes between Pakistan and India, stabilising Afghanistan, promoting regional economic integration, energy security and strategic stability. It also explored China‟s increasing influence in the region especially its relations with Pakistan and its impact in promoting regional stability.

The next chapter discusses the evolution of Pakistan-China strategic relations by examining various factors and environment that consolidated their strategic interdependence. It highlights that the strategic cooperation between the two countries was further strengthened in the post 9/11 period. Further, it argues that the origin of the strategic cooperation between the two countries had been India-centric but with the passage of time, in addition to India, some new dimensions have also been added in their strategic cooperation especially in the post 9/11 period.

149 Press Information Department Press Release No. 190, „Joint Statement Between The Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the People‟s Republic of China on Establishing the All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership‟ Islamabad, Press Information Department, April 20, 2015.

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CHAPTER - 3 STRATEGIC INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND CHINA POST 9/11 IMPERATIVES In the previous chapter, the imperatives of regional security with a specific reference to Pakistan and China have been discussed. The important imperatives of regional security identified were; resolving issues between Pakistan and India, resolving the Afghan issue for regional stability, promoting regional economic integration, energy security, and strategic stability. To meet these imperatives, the role of China as a strategic partner of Pakistan was analysed. China‟s increasing influence in the region, especially its relations with Pakistan, was projected as a factor of stability in regional security.

To understand Pakistan-China relations, it is necessary to discuss the development of their bilateral relations, geo-strategic importance for one another and evolving of their strategic partnership including factors and the environment that led to consolidation of their strategic interdependence. The two countries initiated their bilateral relations by forging diplomatic ties and moved on to become strategic partners and further engaged in the interdependent strategic relationship. This chapter analyses the different phases of Pakistan and China‟s relationship, the imperatives of interdependence between them, along with China‟s importance in strategic scenario of South Asia, coupled with India‟s efforts for strategic superiority and its partnerships with major powers including the U.S, France, Russia, Israel and Canada. On the whole, this chapter mainly explores the dimensions of the post 9/11 Pakistan-China strategic cooperation.

3.1. Development of Pakistan-China Relations Pakistan-China relations can best be described as a promising success story with much potential, meeting the requirements of changing situations. The development of relations between the two countries is generally explained by “Two Alls” and “Four Goods.” The “Two Alls” are “all-weather friendship” and “all round cooperation.” The “Four Goods” include; good neighbours, good friends, good partners, and good brothers. This shows an up-gradation in the development of their relations with the passage of time. Based on a glorious past, Pakistan-China relations have their own dynamics and are poised to

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continue to grow. Both countries are strategically important for each other. In the past, they have played a crucial role for each other during the difficult times. In order to better understanding the process of development of their relations, it would be appropriate to divide this historical period into four phases.

3.1.1. First Phase: 1950 to 1962 In this initial phase, Pakistan and China attempted to evolve their relations. Pakistan was among the first countries of the world that recognised the People‟s Republic of China in 1950 and established diplomatic relations with it in May 1951. In 1956, during the premiership of Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy, Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-Lai paid a visit to Pakistan. “Although Pakistan established diplomatic relations with China in 1951, the actual consolidation of relations started in the early 1960s, when Pakistan changed its previous stance and supported China‟s seating in the UN in 1961.”1 The 1962 Sino-Indian War provided an opportunity to Pakistan and China in developing their relations based on common interests.2

3.1.2. Second Phase: 1963 to 1988 During this period, both countries consolidated their relations and attained the status of good friends and good partners. In 1963, both countries signed three important agreements - border agreement, air service agreement and trade agreement. Pakistan played a critical role in ending the isolation of China by signing the air service agreement that enabled Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) service in 1964 to facilitate travel of Chinese leaders to Europe and Africa via Karachi. Pakistan also provided a link to China with the Muslim countries.3 In February 1964, Chinese Prime Minister, Chou Enlai came Pakistan and then in December same year, General Ayub Khan, the President of Pakistan visited China.

1 Fazal-ur-Rehman, “Pakistan‟s Evolving Relations with China, Russia and Central Asia,” in Akihiro, Eager Eyes Fixed on Eurasia (Sapporo: Slavic Research Centre, 2007), 212. 2 Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty, “China‟s Peaceful Rise and South Asia,” IPRI Paper 13 (August 2008). 3 Ibid.

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Pakistan played an important role in the early 1970s for Sino-US normalisation of relations by assisting “secret interactions between the US and China that resulted in Henry Kissinger‟s secret visit to China followed by President Richard Nixon‟s famous visit. Sino-US normalisation of relations was not taken well in India and in [the former] Soviet Union.” 4 On its part, China supported Pakistan against India in critical times during and after 1965 and 1971 wars by providing military and economic assistance. The Indian nuclear explosion of 1974 gave further impetus to Pakistan-China defence cooperation.

In 1980, General Zia ul Haq, the President of Pakistan visited China and Chinese President Li Xiannian visited Pakistan in1984. “In 1986, China concluded a comprehensive nuclear cooperation agreement with Pakistan. Since then, China has supplied Pakistan with a variety of nuclear products and services, ranging from uranium enrichment technology to research and power reactors.”5 During the Afghan war (1979- 88), China supported Pakistan.

3.1.3. Third Phase: 1989 to 2001 This is the post Cold War period in which the importance of Pakistan‟s cooperation with China enhanced due to sanctions on Pakistan imposed by the US and its western allies. Due to these sanctions, economic assistance and transfer of technology to Pakistan was banned. This period witnessed exchange of high-level visits and some specific developments in defence production. Pakistan‟s Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited China in 1989 and later in the year, Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng reciprocated the visit. To further strengthening bilateral ties, Chinese President Yang Shangkun visited Pakistan in 1991. Chinese President Jiang Zemin came to Pakistan in 1996 and both countries decided to expand and strengthen bilateral relations.

In 1999, China helped Pakistan in building 300MW Chashma nuclear power plant. During the mid-2001, Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji visited Pakistan and then in

4 Rehman, “Pakistan‟s Evolving Relations with China,” 212. 5 Centre for Non-proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, “China‟s Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Pakistan,” August 1999.

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December, General Pervez Musharraf, the President of Pakistan went to China. Also, during this year, the Al-Khalid tank was jointly manufactured in Pakistan by the two countries. The relations between the two countries were reinforced by increased cooperation in the areas of defence production and space technology. China became the most reliable source of defence equipment for Pakistan.

3.1.4. Fourth Phase: Post 9/11 This is the prevailing phase of Pakistan-China relations in which both countries have attained the status of “strategic partners‟ and “good brothers.” Pakistan-China strategic interdependence increased manifold mainly due to the US presence in Afghanistan and the enhancement of Indo-US strategic cooperation. The salient developments of this phase include exchange of high level visits, signing of the “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighbourly relations”, construction of JF-17 Thunder, and cooperation in building of Gwadar Port and starting work on Pakistan-China Economic Corridor.

Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan went on an official visit to China in May2003 Later in November, General Pervez Musharraf, the former President of Pakistan went to China and held talks with President Hu Jintao in Beijing. The Prime Minister of Pakistan Shaukat Aziz visited Beijing in 2004. On April 5, 2005, Pakistan and China signed landmark “treaty of friendship, cooperation and good neighbourly relations.” The two countries agreed that both will refrain from joining “any alliance or bloc, which infringes upon the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of either nation, while simultaneously positing that both parties would not conclude treaties of this nature with any 3rd party.”6

With major investment from China, the construction of the deep sea port at Gwadar started in 2002. The construction of JF-17 Thunder (a multi-role fighter aircraft) was concluded in 2007. In 2008, both countries signed a free trade agreement and also agreed

6 “China, Pakistan Sign treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-neighbourly Relations,” People’s Daily, April 5, 2005.

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to construct a railway line linking the Gwadar port to Western China through the Karakoram Range. In the same year, a Chinese-built frigate was also handed over to the Pakistan Navy. China donated a huge amount of money and sent four rescue helicopters to help the Pakistani people affected by the flood in 2010. Additionally, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Pakistan and several agreements were signed between the two countries.

In November 2011 when NATO forces attacked border areas of Pakistan, killing 26 Pakistan army personnel, China reacted aggressively. According to a Chinese government official, “any threat to Pakistan will be taken as a direct threat to China.”7 The administration of Pakistan‟s Gwadar port was given to a Chinese company in 2013. Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang also visited Pakistan and several agreements were signed. An important development of this year was the approval of Pakistan-China Economic Corridor linking Gwadar Port to Xinjiang province of China.8 At the end of this year, China also agreed to construct a major nuclear power plant in Karachi, which will have the capacity of producing 2200MW. “China National Nuclear Cooperation (CNNC) […] promised to grant a loan of at least US$ 6.5 billion to finance the project, which will have two reactors with a capacity of 1,100 megawatts each.”9

In 2014, China announced to invest over US$ 31 billion in the development of the energy sector, infrastructure and expansion of Gwadar Port. In addition, both countries also signed an agreement on a project to start a metro train service in Lahore. In April 2014 when Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif visited China to attend the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA), he said that Pakistan was ready to further strategic cooperation with China. He noted that the relationship with China had been the “cornerstone” of Pakistan‟s diplomacy.10 Nawaz Sharif visited China again in November 2014 to attend the Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Meeting. On the sidelines of the meeting, he also met with Chinese President Xi Jinping having assured him that Pakistan would continue

7 Paul Joseph Watson and Yi Han, “Chinese Government Official: US Threat to Pakistan is Threat to China,” Infowars, December 1, 2011. 8 “Li Keqiang Urges Development of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” Reuters, May 23, 2013. 9 “China Commits $ 6.5 Billion Loan for N-power Plants in Karachi,” Dawn, December 25, 2013. 10 “China Seeks to Plan on Economic Corridor with Pakistan,” Xinhuanet, April 10, 2014.

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to resolutely fight the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) terrorist forces. Further, Pakistan will increase its coordination with China on Afghanistan too, so as to “jointly maintain regional peace and stability.”11

In April 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping paid his historic visit to Pakistan during which several agreements were signed. The most important characteristic of this visit was the agreement on the building of CPEC which was a landmark in the history of relationship of both countries.

3.2. Geo-strategic Importance of Pakistan for China and Vice Versa Strategic partnership is always considered a long-term commitment by two or more countries in which they establish a close relationship in their core policies.12 In strategic partnership, their long-term engagement is vital to promote common objectives, which are placed as the top priorities in their policies. Strategic partnerships are interdependent in nature and all the parties further each other‟s interests in one way or the other - the reciprocity is the basis of such partnership.13 While explaining the geo-strategic interdependence, Tarique Niazi expounds; “Challenges remain in the 21st century in China-Pakistan friendship. However, the strategic interdependence of the two countries is compelling each to bond with the other. China is taking the lead to employ economic and public diplomacy with Pakistan to broaden its strategic state-to-state partnership into people-to-people bonds. With increasing trade and investment, China is helping a turnaround in the Pakistani economy. Parallel to economic relations, it also is expanding cultural linkages through education, civic society, and media to strengthen the tree of Sino- Pak friendship to weather unanticipated hailstorms.”14

Today, Pakistan has become strategically significant for China due to various reasons. Pakistan can provide a safe outlet to China for the development of its western regions and in this respect, the development of Gwadar Port is crucial for both countries. China has

11 “Pakistan Says will Help China Fight Xinjiang Militants,” Reuters, November 8, 2014. 12 Fraser Cameron and Zheng Yongnian, “Key Elements of Strategic Partnership,” in Crossick Stanley et al., China-EU Common Future (World Scientific Publishing, 2008), 3-14. 13 The Compassion Capital Fund (CCF), Partnerships: Frameworks for Working Together, US Department of Health and Human Services, 2010. 14 Tarique Niazi, “New Challenges in Sino-Pakistan Relations,” China Brief, V, no.14, June 21, 2005.

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been confronting many challenges in the South China Sea that were further increased after US President Barak Obama announced that the Asia-Pacific would be a top priority of his foreign policy.15 Pakistan‟s potential in peace building in Afghanistan is also recognised by China; hence, a close cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad is the need of the time. The longer presence of American forces in Afghanistan is viewed with suspicion in China and thus, it is aware of the role which Pakistan can play in stabilising the country. China believes that instability in Afghanistan is the reason for unrest in its Xinjiang region.16 The detailed strategic importance of Pakistan for China is discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

3.2.1. Importance of Pakistan for China Despite its various problems, Pakistan is a country of immense geo-strategic importance. According to Stephen P. Cohen, “While history has been unkind with Pakistan, its geography has been its greatest benefit.”17 There are many factors that make Pakistan a strategically significant country. These factors include; proximity of great powers, gateway to the Central Asia, significance as a transit route for trade and energy, important link in the chain of Muslim countries, the only Muslim country with nuclear capability, China‟s link to the Middle East and Africa via Gwadar Port to reduce Indian hegemony in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.18 Further, Pakistan is important for China due to four other main reasons. First; Pakistan played a role in helping China in its difficult times such as; support for China‟s membership not only in the United Nations (UN) but also as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Pakistan‟s role in countering the Indian threat and its critical and historical role in ending China‟s isolation by developing Beijing‟s relations with the Muslim world and rapprochement with the US.

15 “Barack Obama Says Asia-Pacific is Top US priority,” BBC News, November 17, 2011. 16 Zhang Li, “Implications of a Stable Afghanistan for China: Opportunities and Challenges,” in Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, Muhammad Munir and Aftab Hussain ed., Stabilising Afghanistan: Regional Perspectives and Prospects, (Islamabad: IPRI, 2011): 37. 17 Mirza Muhammad Saleem, “Pakistan's Geo-strategic Position,” The World Times, April 10, 2010. 18 Ahmad Shaheen, “Pakistan: A Geographical Battlefield,” Pak Tribune, December 22, 2011.

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The second reason that makes Pakistan important for China is its geo-strategic location. Pakistan is a bridge between South Asia, South West Asia and Central Asia. Pakistan can provide China a transit trade route for West Asia, energy corridor to import oil from the Central Asian Republics and Gulf, naval facilities on Arabian Sea coast, and to protect its energy supply lines from the Middle East. In order to attain a more balanced economic growth, China has initiated the development of its landlocked western regions. However, the pace of development to its eastern and coastal areas has decelerated owing to the concentrated efforts on the western regions.19 Pakistan through Gwadar Port provides China the shortest route from Middle East to Xinjiang, i.e., 2500 miles as compared to 9500 miles from the Middle East to Shanghai.

China is importing most of its oil through the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Strait. In the event of a conflict or a terrorist attack, the present routes for Chinese oil imports could be disrupted; choking Beijing‟s energy supply, especially at the vulnerable Malacca Strait. China has a territorial dispute with Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Brunei in the South China Sea, which further accentuates concerns about China‟s energy security.20 Maleeha Lodhi, in her article entitled, “China‟s Regional Strategy”, explains the importance of China-Pakistan economic corridor being at the heart of two key aspects of China‟s Silk Road vision: maritime and land links. “With Gwadar providing China the shortest land route to the sea for commercial traffic, connectivity with Pakistan is central to China‟s regional economic strategy.”21 On his visit to Pakistan in May 2013, Prime Minister Li Keqiang proposed the establishment of an economic corridor between the two countries, connecting China‟s western Xinjiang region to Pakistan‟s Gwadar Port. This envisages greater connectivity and expansion of trade through a network of road, rail, fibre optic cables, and energy pipelines.22 The MoU on

19 “Pak Opportunity: Build Back Better: Why Pakistan is Most Critical to US Agenda,” The Burbank Digest, August 29, 2010. 20 “Pakistan as an Energy Corridor for China,” IPRI Review 4/2012; Also see, Kim Nødskov, The Long march to Power: The New Historic Mission of the People’s Liberation Army (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House, 2009). 21 Maleeha Lodhi, “China‟s regional strategy,” The News, April 01, 2014. 22 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a landmark initiative under the umbrella of One Belt One Road and this Economic Corridor will connect the nodes of growth centres, falling between Kashgar and Gwadar. CPEC envisages connectivity and expansion of trade and investment through a network of roads,

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this also provides for the creation of industrial parks, trade centres, special economic zones, and development of energy and technical cooperation.23 This is the most concrete manifestation of an evolving joint strategy that aims to align China‟s plans to develop its western region to Pakistan‟s efforts to revive and develop its economy.24 This planned economic corridor will incorporate a 2,000 km transport link between Kashgar and Gwadar which later on will also include a railway line and oil pipeline.25

China‟s economic investment in Pakistan will stabilise the country and an economically strong Pakistan would be in a better position to counter religious extremism and terrorism in its tribal areas and will prevent spill-over effects in China‟s western regions. Furthermore, the economic corridor will help China in developing its Xinjiang region.26 China‟s trade through Gwadar would save around twenty-two day‟s journey and considerable amount of freight charges. So, it will be a win-win situation for Pakistan and China.27 It is noteworthy that China fulfils fifty percent of its oil demand from the Middle East, from where the supply line to China, involving 14,500 kilometres through the Dubai-Shanghai-Urumqi route comes from. On the contrary, the crude oil processed and refined at the Gwadar oil refinery could be exported to China through the shortest possible route, i.e., Dubai-Gwadar-Urumqi - spanning about 3,500 km.28 The corridor from Gwadar Port to the Xinjiang province would secure Chinese energy supplies through the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf and would allow China to diversify its energy routes by by-passing the US and Indian influence in the Indian Ocean and the South China sea. The corridor will connect China with Karachi and Gwadar. The goods

rail, fiber optic cables, and energy pipelines. See, Mian Arshad, “Pakistan Offers SCO Trade Access to Arabian via CPEC,” Pakistan Observer, September 17, 2015. 23 “CPEC: Pakistan‟s Vision 2025 Seeks to Position Itself from a Lower Middle Country to High Middle,” Business Recorder, March 25, 2015. 24 Maleeha Lodhi “China‟s Regional Strategy.” 25 Lucy Woods, “China to Invest US$ 20 Billion in Pakistan Energy Infrastructure”, February 21, 2014, available at www.pv-tech.org 26 Muhammad Munir, “Rising China: Implications for Pakistan,” IPRI Insight 1, no. 2, 3 (2014). 27 Shabbir Ahmad, “Pakistan as Trade and Energy Corridor vis-à-vis SCO” in SCO’s Role in Regional Stability: Prospects of its Expansion, (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2014), 172. 28 Sohail Amin et al. ed., Major Powers’ Interests in Indian Ocean: Challenges and Options for Pakistan (Islamabad: IPRI, 2015).

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manufactured in Xinjiang and other western areas of China would reach South Asia, Middle East and Central Asia in much lesser time and lower cost than any other route.29

The third reason of Pakistan‟s importance for China is the convergence of Beijing‟s interests with Pakistan for regional stability. The recent upswing in their relations is due to strong convergence of interests in regional stability. Both countries have great stakes in the stability of Afghanistan through enhanced regional cooperation. Significantly, China recognises Pakistan‟s constructive role in facilitating an Afghan-led peace process. Pakistan considers China‟s involvement in the region a stability factor.30

The fourth reason is Pakistan‟s critical role in countering terrorism and extremism. Pakistan and China are reinforcing their close cooperation with both short term and long term objectives by giving top priority to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism. China supports and appreciates Pakistan‟s efforts to fight terrorism; and has provided assistance to help Pakistan in its war against militancy.31 This help has been in the form of diplomatic, economic and military support. Chinese Defence Minister General Chang Wanquan, who visited Pakistan and met with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in February 2014, said that China and Pakistan shared mutual concerns, i.e. terrorism and internal instability. The Chinese have great interest in how Pakistan handles its internal problems of extremism and terrorism because of the links that groups, based in Pakistan, have with other extremist groups in Xinjiang province that has long been an area of unrest. With the Afghan conflict that entered a new phase at the end of 2014 and the withdrawal of US and other foreign troops by 2017, China will be viewing with considerable concern the prospect of “leakage” of conflict into its own territories. How Pakistan addresses its internal difficulties is, thus, of keen interest to the Chinese, with the expectation that their economic partner will address the problems of militancy as enthusiastically as it has

29 Inaugural Address by Sartaj Aziz at China-Pakistan Think Tank Seminar on “Building China-Pakistan Community of Shared Destiny in the New Era” jointly organised by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan and the Embassy of People‟s Republic of China in Pakistan on August 5-6, 2014, at China-Pakistan Friendship Centre, Islamabad. 30 Muhammad Munir, “Rising China: Implications for Pakistan.” 31 Ibid.

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addressed the expansion of bilateral trade. Pakistan awaits such developments with great interest as, no doubt, do the Chinese.32

3.2.2. Importance of China for Pakistan China is important for Pakistan in many ways - it is a time tested and reliable friend of Pakistan which helped in strengthening the security of Pakistan. Furthermore, it helped Pakistan to counter Indian efforts to become a regional power. By issuing stern warnings to India, China also played an important role in its support to Pakistan in achieving a ceasefire in the Indo-Pak war of 1965. Following the war, in an attempt to compensate for war losses, China supported Pakistan with military equipment including tanks and fighter aircraft.33

In the early 1970s, Pakistan played an important role in facilitating secret communications between the US and China that resulted in Henry Kissinger‟s secret visit to China followed by President Richard Nixon‟s historic visit to China. Sino-US normalisation of relations was perceived in Indian strategic thinking as the emergence of a US-Pakistan-China strategic triangle, which prompted India to sign a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union.34 This development introduced a new dimension to the region, especially if seen in the context of the Cold War that enhanced Pakistan‟s importance for China. Indo-Pak war of 1971 was another development that motivated China to increase its military and economic assistance to Pakistan. Later, on the issue of the Bangladesh‟s application for membership to the UN, China, on Pakistan‟s request, exercised its veto power for the first time to stall the move, which helped Pakistan to secure in a bargain the release of its Prisoners of War (PoWs) and the return of troops to their pre-war positions.35

The two important events at the end of the 1970s impacted the whole region; first, the Iranian Islamic Revolution in February 1979 and second, the invasion of Afghanistan by

32 “The China connection,” Editorial, The Express Tribune, March 2, 2014. 33 Fazal-ur-Rehman, “Pakistan‟s Evolving Relations with China.” 34 S. M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, 2nd ed. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990). 35 Fazal-ur-Rahman, “Pakistan‟s Evolving Relations with China.”

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the former Soviet Union in the later part of the same year. The first event resulted in hostility between Iran and the US. The second event resulted in Pakistan‟s hostile relation with India and Afghanistan, having negative implication for regional security. At this crucial juncture, China supported Pakistan and opposed the invasion of Afghanistan, terming it a hegemonic action. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed a threat to peace and stability not only for the region, but also for the entire world. Pakistan and China worked together to deal with the Afghan situation. China not only extended political support to Pakistan at international level, but also contributed military supplies worth US$ 200 million annually to the Afghan resistance groups.36

Earlier on, the Indian nuclear explosion of 1974 introduced a new dimension to the strategic balance in the region. It created a security dilemma for Pakistan and enhanced China‟s strategic value for Pakistan to counter the Indian move. In order to enhance Pakistan‟s strength in the South Asian strategic balance, China expanded its defence cooperation with Pakistan and transferred equipment and technology relating to its nuclear and missile programs throughout the 1980s and 1990s.37 In September 1986, China and Pakistan signed an agreement for peaceful cooperation in Nuclear Energy. Provision of nuclear energy to Pakistan is considered as one of the major contributions of China in ensuring Pakistan‟s security. Two 300 MW nuclear power plants were built by China in Chashma and two more are under construction. Both countries have agreed to build two “state-of-the-art nuclear power plants with the capacity of 1100 MW each. Pakistan intends to add more power-plants to get about 8900 MW electricity under its cooperation with China.38 Some countries like India, the US and others in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) oppose this position. China‟s position on the issue is very much clear and it maintained that its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan predated China‟s membership in the NSG and the cooperation is under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).39

36 Ibid. 37 Lisa Curtis, “China‟s Military and Security Relationship with Pakistan,” (Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 20, 2009), available at www.uscc.gov 38 “Pakistan Plans to Produce 8,900 MW Nuclear Power by 2030,” The Economic Times, January 2, 2014. 39 M. Akram Zaki, “The Evolution in Global Power Balance and Pak-China Relations,” Policy Perspective, 11, no. 2, (2014): 3-15.

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Realising Pakistan‟s energy crisis and its implications for economic development, Chinese experts are helping Pakistan in diversifying its energy mix. They suggested that in addition to hydro-electric projects, Pakistan should also look for alternative means of energy production. Pakistan has a great potential in wind, solar, coal and nuclear energy. Chinese investors are taking much interest in the energy sector and has been continuously assisting Pakistan in the nuclear power generation.40 To meet the growing energy demands of the country and also accounting for additional energy required for industrial zones and building of infrastructure for CPEC, both countries have recognised the importance of energy projects. Therefore, the most important component of the CPEC is the energy sector development in Pakistan. Energy sector projects encompass 20,000 MW in IPP mode, 10 power plants at Gadani 660 MW each amounting to 6600 MW, 1320 MW coal-fired power plant each in Sahiwal, Muzaffargarh, Rahim Yar Khan and Faisalabad, 1000 MW in Bahawalpur Solar Park, 660 MW Port Qasim power plant, 660 MW coal-fired project in Thar, 250 MW wind power project in Gharo and 220 MW renewable solar energy project near Karachi.41

In November 2014, the Chinese government announced it would build several energy and infrastructure projects in Pakistan as part of CPEC. According to Reuters, China has promised to invest around US$ 33.8 billion in various energy projects and US$ 11.8 billion in infrastructure projects to be completed by 2017 at the most. The deal includes US$ 622 million for Gwadar port and US$ 15.5 billion worth of coal, wind, solar and hydro-electric projects will add 10,400 megawatts of energy to the national grid of Pakistan.42 Further, “Pakistan has signed a US$ 6.5 billion „concessionary loan‟ agreement with China for projects under civil nuclear cooperation, including development of two power plants near Karachi of 2,200 MW.43 Some of the major infrastructure projects would include as under;44

40 “China-Pakistan Relations,” IPRI Review 5, March 26, 2014. 41 Humayun Zafar, “The Corridor of Hope,” Daily Times, July 25, 2014. 42 Sana Asghar, “Pak-China Economic Corridor a „Fate Changer‟ for Pakistan,” Daily Times, December 3, 2014. 43 “China to Give $ 6.5 bn Concessional Loan for N-plants,” Dawn, February 1, 2014. 44 “Transport and Communications,” Pakistan Economic Survey 2013-14, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan.

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a. Gwadar-Khunjerab Highway (2,395 km) b. Karachi-Lahore Motorway (1,186 km) c. Muzaffarabad-Mirpur Expressway (196 km) d. Gwadar-Khunjrab Freight Trains: Ministry of Railways in cooperation with Chinese Consortium will establish Gwadar-Khunjrab Rail Link at an estimated cost of over US$ 2.3 billion. e. Gwadar Airport and hospitals. f. Improving communication infrastructure between Xinjiang and Rawalpindi includes a plan for a fibre optic link of 820 km. g. Oil and gas pipe lines.

Mega projects in several fields like energy, infrastructure and connectivity would revitalise Pakistan‟s economy and would help in overcoming the power shortage in the country.45 It will also expand the job market within Pakistan. According Muhammad Hanif: “A fully developed Gwadar Port and related infrastructure will provide full impetus to international trade passing through this port to and from Pakistan, China, Central Asia and Russia providing substantial trade transit revenues to Pakistan, which will facilitate its economic development.” 46

3.3. Factors behind Consolidation of Pakistan-China Strategic Cooperation China and Pakistan‟s strategic cooperation is considered an ever-lasting relationship in the region. This cooperation is continuously growing with the passage of time and getting stronger day by day especially in an era that is witnessing several changes at the regional and international levels. There are some specific factors responsible for the consolidation of their strategic cooperation in the Cold War, post-Cold War and in the post 9/11 era.

45 Humayun Zafar, “The Corridor of Hope.” 46 Muhammad Hanif, “Gwadar Handing Over: Strategic and Economic Advantages”, The Frontier Post, April 1, 2013.

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3.3.1. Cold War Period During the Cold War period, India was the dominant factor for consolidation of relations between Pakistan and China. These relations were developed in the early 1960s, when Pakistan decided to support China‟s seat in the UN in 1961. In spite of having signed two important agreements with the US i.e SEATO and CENTO on September 8, 1954 and September 23, 1955 respectively, Pakistan's relations with the US started deteriorating in early 1960s due to several reasons. For instance, Senator John F. Kennedy who assumed the office of President started applying his pro-India policy. He facilitated India in getting $ 2225 million World Bank aid for two years 1961-63 that included US share of $ 1045 million as well. Further, the US refused to help Pakistan against “Soviet Union supported Afghanistan‟s demand for self- determination for Pathans in Pakistan.”47 During the Sino-Indian border war in 1962, Pakistan was disappointed from the US as it provided military assistance to India. Although, Pakistan did not move out of the Western alliance48 but being an ally of the US, it showed concerns. This situation created a commonality of interests between Pakistan and China. Realising each other‟s importance to neutralise the Indian threat, Pakistan and China became strategic partners. This geo- strategic environment facilitated them in negotiating and signing an agreement on the demarcation of their common border in March 1963. The agreement was a win-win situation for both countries.49

Later in August 1963, Pakistan signed a civil aviation agreement with China. Under this agreement, Pakistani planes were allowed to land in Canton and Shanghai and Pakistan gave permission to Chinese jets for use of the Dacca airport. The United States Government was not happy over this development. The US State Department expressed that this agreement was “an unfortunate breach of the free world solidarity and

47 Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi, “US Foreign Policy Shift towards Pakistan between 1965 and 1971 Pak-India Wars,” South Asian Studies 25, no. 1, January-June 2010, pp. 21-37. 48 After Indian military intervention in 1971, Pakistan left SEATO in November 1972 and following the fall of the shah of Iran in 1979, Iran withdrew, and CENTO was dissolved. 49 Manzoor Khan Afridi and Abdul Zahoor Khan, “Pak-China Boundary Agreement: Factors and Indian Reactions,” International Journal of Social Science Studies 4, no.2 (December 16, 2015).

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postponed, subsequently, the granting of a loan of US$ 4.3 million for further improvements of the Dacca airport.”50

Pakistan played an important role in ending China‟s isolation by signing an air-transport agreement and helping it to maintain contact with a number of countries, especially the Muslim countries. Similarly, China played a valuable role in its support of Pakistan in achieving a ceasefire in the 1965 Indo-Pak war by issuing strict warnings to India. Following the war, China, also helped Pakistan with military equipment including tanks and aircraft. Pakistan‟s efforts of early 1970s for rapprochement between the US and China were not liked in India and the former USSR. The US-Pakistan-China strategic triangle prompted India to sign a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation with the former Soviet Union. It could be termed as a kind of a security treaty, because, Article IX of the treaty stipulated that in “the event of either party being subject to an attack or threat thereof, the high contracting parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security of their countries.”51

The end of the 1970s witnessed international developments of immense consequences that continued to impact on the entire region throughout the following decades. These were the Iranian Islamic Revolution in February 1979, the declared hostility of the new Iranian leadership towards the US, and the invasion of Afghanistan by the former Soviet Union. During the Cold War period, China continued its assistance to Pakistan in many fields including its nuclear programme. China provided equipment, and technology to Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, China also helped Pakistan in the development of its ballistic missile programmes, which enhanced its strength in the South Asian strategic balance.52

50 G.J Lerski, “The Pakistan-American Alliance: A Re-evaluation of the Past Decade,” Asian Survey 8, no. 5 (1968): 400-415, cited in Manzoor Khan Afridi and Abdul Zahoor Khan, “Pak-China Boundary Agreement: Factors and Indian Reactions.” International Journal of Social Science Studies 4, no. 2; (February 2016 ): 4. 51 Dr Suresh Chandra ,China-Pakistan Relations: Implications for India, (New Delhi: Alpha Editions,2016). 52 Lisa Curtis, “China‟s Military and Security Relationship with Pakistan.”

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3.3.2. Post-Cold War Dimensions The Cold War was an intense period of international politics and its demise culminated in the emergence of the culture of interdependence in security and economy. One of the important transformations that took place was shifting of world affairs from geo-politics to geo-economics where economic power got priority over military power. Liberalists argue that high level of economic interdependence brings about economic gains, increases the cost of war, and improves the communication between nations. Thus, it promotes cooperation and reduces the opportunities of conflicts. The proponents of the interdependence theory believe that in the prevailing complex globalised world, transnational connections, inter-state and inter-societies dependencies are increasing, while the use of military force and power balancing are decreasing but remain important. This argument is relevant for the post-Cold war period.53

During 1980s, Pakistan-China relations continued to grow and Pakistan did not maintain any reservations upon growing Sino-Indian relations.54 Rather, the improvement of China‟s relations with India was taken positively in Pakistan and there was no such impression that it would detriment the Pakistan-China friendship. Albeit, the Chinese position on Kashmir issue overtly wobbled, but Pakistani intelligentsia perceived such growing ties between China-India; an optimistic change that would fetter the escalating Indian intrusion in Kashmir. Pakistan always extended its full support to China over such issues, which are vital to Chinese national interests, whether it was the issue of sovereignty over Tibet, Hong Kong or Taiwan, or issues pertaining to human rights and democracy. China always acknowledged and relied on Pakistan‟s support as time-tested friend and supporter over such issues at international level. 55

To help Pakistan counter Indian efforts to become a regional power were somewhat curtailed by the Pakistan-China strategic cooperation. Strategic scenario between China, India and Pakistan maintains strategic balance in the whole region, since all three are

53 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Power and Interdependence Revisited,” International Organization 41, no. 4 (autumn, 1987): 725-753. 54 Riaz Mohammad Khan, Former Foreign Secretary, personal interview, April 5, 2016. 55 Fazal-ur-Rahman, “Pakistan‟s Evolving Relations with China, Russia and Central Asia,” 213.

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nuclear weapon states. India is trying hard to get a strategic upper hand over Pakistan and China to emerge as regional power and in this regard, New Delhi is aided by major global players. Despite all Indian efforts, China is a key player not only in the South Asia but also in the Central Asia.

3.3.3. Post 9/11 Factors In the post 9/11 period, along with economic interdependence, there has been an increase in strategic interdependence between states due to globalisation of terrorism. The major global players developed strategic partnerships even with developing countries. There have been re-alignments and re-adjustments in bi and multilateral relations among the major global players on the one hand while on the other, major global players and developing countries. In this whole situation, Pakistan‟s relationship with China is of paramount importance for both countries. This is particularly true in the perspective that the 1990s proved to be an era of turbulent events impacting South Asia‟s geo-political affairs; 1998 nuclearisation episode of India and Pakistan, Kargil encounter between the two countries, war on terrorism in reaction to 9/11 attacks promoting US occupation in Afghanistan, and the 2002-03 military stand-off between India and Pakistan.56

As a result of such progression in geo-political affairs of the region, the prevalent strategic alignments were also revised. Pakistan received a status of non-NATO allay for its participation in the US-sponsored war on terrorism as a frontline state; India and the US aligned to cooperate in tandem in extra-regional affairs; Sino-Indian partnership witnessed sanguine prospects in both at political and trade level, and Indo-Pak tensed relationship once again surged owing to terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Holistically, the emergence of such events shifted the conceptual geographical paradigm of South Asia.57 Pakistan‟s security matrix confronted enormous problems in the post 9/11 regional developments which engulfed the sovereignty of state and its territorial integrity.58 In this difficult situation, both countries not only supported each other, but also further

56 Fazal-ur-Rahman, “Traditional and Emerging Areas of strategic Cooperation between Pakistan and China,” available at http://pcc.org.pk accessed on September 8, 2015. 57 Shamshad Ahmad, “Post-9/11 Foreign Policy of Pakistan,” Criterion Quarterly 1, no.1 (September 27, 213). 58 Ibid.

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progressed in advancing their bilateral strategic cooperation in the field of economic and defence.59 However, in spite of these substantial developments, there are some areas such as anti-terrorism, Afghanistan and energy security, in which both counties can even further strengthen their strategic partnership in the future.60 As mentioned in the Introduction, some scholars argue that the origin of the strategic cooperation between the two countries was mainly India-centric, but it is also a fact that with the passage of time, various new dimensions have also been added in their relationship. Some of the new variables added in post 9/11 scenario are;  Emergence of China as rising power and Indo-US strategic alliance to contain China‟s influence  Xinjiang factor in Pakistan-China relations both in terms of China‟s western province development policy and fighting extremism  Indo-Pak military standoff in 2001  Nuclearisation of South Asia and China‟s role in providing strategic stability in the region  Geo-strategic importance of Pakistan as energy corridor for the region  Stabilising Afghanistan: significance of Pakistan-China cooperation specially after exit of US/NATO forces  China and Pakistan‟s role in regional organisations, e.g., SAARC and SCO.

A breakthrough negotiation in the field of mutual cooperation and amicable neighbourly terms took place between Pakistan and China in the form of Treaty of Friendship signed on April 5, 2005. The milestone achievement of such treaty was the consensual agreement between two countries to keep-off such alliance with any country, which can be detrimental to the integrity, sovereignty and security of either nation.61 According to Hu Shisheng, Senior Researcher at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations; the Pakistan-China strategic cooperation has witnessed some tangible changes, from the Cold-War mentality, which revolved around confrontation, power-balance and

59 Huma Sattar, “China and Pakistan‟s All-Weather Friendship,” The Diplomat, March 12, 2015. 60 Fazal-ur-Rahman, “Traditional and Emerging Areas of strategic Cooperation.” 61 Paul Joseph Watson and Yi Han, “Chinese Government Official: „US Threat to Pakistan is Threat to China‟” Infowars.com, December 1, 201.

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mutual-checking, to post Cold-War thinking, which focused on common development, shared destiny and appreciation of responsibilities. The most important components of Pakistan-China‟s strategic cooperation in the post 9/11 period are: how to stabilise this region, how to fight against all kinds of terrorists, how to get rid of various kinds of extremist ideologies, how to improve the situation of human security and how to improve the overall state of human development in the region.62

China believes that the instability in Afghanistan is the main reason for unrest in its Xinjiang region. Many in China believe that there is a tangible correlation between the formidable terrorist threat in the region and the “three evil forces” (namely: separatism, extremism, and terrorism) operating in Xinjiang63. China is also working with Pakistan for an intra-Afghan reconciliation and recognises its potential in peace building in Afghanistan. Hence, a close cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad is a need of the time.64 Both countries would continue to have a bright future in all areas, including in jointly tackling the terrorist threats. Although, India will be an important factor in their relations, but not in typical geo-strategic meaning, rather more in a geo-economic significance. China would like to see the South Asia to be a united and connected community for peace and stability, so that in this way, it would have peaceful borders and the western regions. This will help the country to have a prosperous South Asia market to relocate its production-bases and production-chains in the region which would have wider regional benefits. The economic integration of South Asia greatly depends upon the normalisation of Indo-Pak relations and in this perspective; China believes that its good relations with both India and Pakistan would benefit all countries of the region.65

3.4. China’s Stance on India’s Permanent Membership of the UNSC India has sought popular support for the approval of its proposal to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It has been very persuasive on international forum to acquire permanent membership at the UNSC. It claims that the

62 Hu Shisheng, Senior Researcher, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), personal interview, Beijing, July 28, 2014. 63 Zhang Li, “Implications of a Stable Afghanistan for China: Opportunities and Challenges,” 37. 64 Khalid Iqbal, “Challenges to China-Pakistan Cooperation,” IPRI, April 27, 2015. 65 Hu , Senior Researcher, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.

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UN, being international body, should reflect the shift in power and incorporate the developing countries, irrespective of relative importance.66 In result of such lobbying, four veto countries; France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States had expressed consent and endorsed the resolution for India‟s membership of the UNSC in the year 2010. It was only China, which vetoed this resolution blocking such inclusion owing to certain concerns.

China extended affirmative response to the US President Barack Obama‟s statement for inclusion of India as permanent member in the UNSC. Enunciating its point of view, China reiterated that Indian aspiration to act in leading role at UN is comprehensible to China and there is goodwill on part of Chinese leadership to amend the world body after consultation. In a media briefing, the spokesman for Chinese Foreign Ministry Hong Lei, said: “China values India‟s status in the international affairs and understands India‟s aspirations to play a greater role in the United Nations and is ready to keep contact and consultations with India and other member states on the issues of Security Council reform.”67

China has also voted for India‟s candidature to the non-permanent seat at the UNSC. “We welcome a more positive and important role by India in the United Nations,”68 Huang Huaguang, an official of the international department of the Communist Party of China, said on November 20, 2012 in an interaction with Indian think tank, Observer Research Foundation. He also said that China would not pursue a policy to obstruct or oppose India‟s efforts to get a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.69 During 3rd BRICS summit in China in April 2011, besides the assessment of prevalent global political and economic trends, the Sanya Declaration was endorsed by the BRICS leaders to support the India‟s inclusion in UN.70 The Declaration also emphasised upon the significance of

66 A. K. Bhattacharya, “China, Russia Endorse India‟s Place in UN Security Council,” Business Standard, April 15, 2911. 67 “US Reaches Out to Other UNSC Members over Backing India‟s Bid,” Hindustan Times, November 9, 2015. 68 Mussarat Jabeen, “Indian Aspiration of Permanent Membership in the UN Security Council and American Stance,” South Asian Studies, vol. 25, no. 2 (July-December 2010): 237-253. 69 “China Will not Oppose India‟s UN Seat Bid,” News Report, November 28, 2012. 70 “Sanya Declaration: BRICS Leaders Meeting,” 14 April 2011, available at www.bibliotecapleyades.net

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reformation of UNSC and observed that Russia and China considers the great potential of Brazil, South Africa and India to exert influential role in international affairs and play leading role in the UN.71

Most of the scholars believe that China may choose not to support Indian permanent membership in the UNSC and its membership in the NSG. According to Shabir Ahmad Khan, if China decided to take any step in this respect, it would take Pakistan into confidence; however, with so much at stake in the shape of Gwadar and CPEC, China will not take that step.72 Adil Sultan is of the opinion that due to its own interests, China would not be supportive of Indian aspirations for permanent membership in the UNSC and membership in the NSG.73 In the view of Zhu Zhongbo, Indo-US strategic cooperation, particularly their nuclear deal and support for Indian membership of UNSC and NSG, is not a good news for China and Pakistan, but not a bad news for the development of Pakistan-China relations.74 Such cooperation between India and the US would provide a strong reason for Pakistan and China to have more civilian nuclear energy cooperation.75

3.5. China’s Role in Promoting Strategic Stability in South Asian Region China has been playing a balancing role in South Asian region by promoting strategic stability.76 It does not want to see any conflict in its neighbourhood, as it would have a negative effect on its economic development.77 Keeping in view its strategic and security interests in the region, China has strengthened its relationship with South Asian countries. Out of the eight countries of SAARC, five are directly bordering with China, i.e., India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, and Afghanistan. As for China, the remaining three countries, i.e., Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives are more geographically apart, with no

71 “BRICS: China, Russia Call for Brazil, India and South Africa to be Given Permanent Seats on UN Security Council,” Peripheral Revision, April 14, 2011. 72 Shabir Ahmad Khan, personal interview. 73 Adil Sultan, Director, SPD, personal interview, Islamabad, August 20, 2014. 74 Zhu Zhongbo, Senior Researcher, personal interview. 75 Hu Shisheng, Senior Researcher, personal interview. 76 David Scott, “South Asia in China‟s Strategic Calculus,” in Handbook of China’s International Relations, ed., Shaun Breslin (London: Routledge International, 2010), 209-218. 77 Mali Jiali, “China-South Asia Strategic Engagements - China‟s Strategic-Security Interests in South Asia,” ISAS Working Paper no. 153 (14 August 2012).

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territorial disputes. With regard to border disputes between India and China, the Indian side controls most of controversial areas in the eastern border, and the disputed area China controls in the western border is Aksai Chin, while the two sides have disputes in the middle of the border region, which is approximately 2000 square km.78 Although, several rounds of talks have been held to resolve border dispute, the problem is still there and possibly this is one of the main reasons that brought India and US closer to each other.79

The main focus of China‟s foreign policy in South Asia is to adequately handle its relationship with India and Pakistan - the same is also true of other regional countries, e.g., Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Afghanistan. Although, China has not established diplomatic relations with Bhutan, it is exploring various options to develop bilateral relations with this country. China wants to increase its cooperation with all members of the SAARC to promote regional cooperation and to try to exclude or weaken the intervention efforts of the extra-territorial powers.80

In fact, the distinctive aspect of Sino-Indian relations is trade and economic cooperation, which is important given the ascendance of geo-economics in the post-Cold War era. However, this should not be seen as being at the cost of Pakistan-China relations, which have their own history, and trajectory that can develop independent of Sino-Indian relations.81 The upsurge in Indo-China relations would not have any significant impact on China‟s relations with Pakistan. China will continue engaging India with the objective that India does not openly cross over to America and openly become a tool for furthering anti-China pursuits by America - especially its activities in Asia-Pacific, South China and East China Seas. China has reasonable leverage over all South Asian countries, except India. However, main destabilising agent in South Asia is India; so the dilemma would

78 “India-China Border Dispute,” Global Security, September 27, 2014. 79 Ibid. 80 Ma Jiali, “China-South Asia Strategic Engagements.” 81 Riaz Mohammad Khan, Former Foreign Secretary, personal interview, April 5, 2016.

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continue. SAARC and SCO provide institutional support to China for playing whatever limited role it could.82

Needless to say that China‟s role in promoting regional security is vital and it can work with other parties within the framework of multilateral coordination. For instance, it can participate in the UN peacekeeping efforts in Afghanistan and can provide the UN with full support to promote peace and development in Afghanistan. China can intensify the anti-terrorism coordination by inviting Pakistan and other South Asian countries, within the framework of SCO. In addition, China and its neighbouring countries should tighten their border control and intensify coordination on the issue of Afghanistan with stakeholders like the US, Russia, and Central Asian countries.83

3.6. China’s Stance on Kashmir There were four significant periods in aligning the China‟s stance over Kashmir issue. Initially, during 1950s, China adopted a neutral posture over Kashmir, however, during 1960s to the end of 1970s; China had changed its stance from neutrality to supporting Pakistan‟s perspective in the wake of aggravating Sino-Indian relations. During 1980s, the Sino-Indian relations proceeded towards stabilisation; Beijing once again opted to project neutral posture to secure good ties with both Pakistan and India. Since the early 1990s, China adopted a definitive position over Kashmir issue and advocated the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir conflict.84

In 2010, India expressed its concern over China‟s stance to tripartite deal with Kashmir conflict taking into account the concerns of all three actors.85 It altered the Beijing‟s stance from advocacy of dealing Kashmir issue within bilateral parameters. During 2011, BRICS summit,86 the two countries declared to reinstate their cooperation in defence -

82 Khalid Iqbal, Non-Resident Consultant, Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), personal interview, March 25, 2016. 83 Zhu Zhongbo, Senior Researcher, personal interview. 84 Jingdong Yuan, “China‟s Kashmir Policy,” The Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 5 no.19 (December 31, 1969). 85 “India Sees Shift in China‟s Policy on Kashmir,” Greater Kashmir, October 14, 2010. 86 “China Hints at Scrapping Stapled Visa for Jammu and Kashmir People,” Economic Times, April 13, 2011.

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China extended an approach to deal the Kashmiri people under stapled visa regime.87 Such actions by China were later ceased, leading to progressive defence ties incorporating joint military exercises.

Pakistan hails the statement released by Chinese Foreign Office on July 29, 2014 stating to admit the presence of Chinese personnel in Azad Jammu Kashmir involved in “cooperative activities” for the welfare of local residents. Besides, China‟s stance over Kashmir issue to find peaceful resolution through use of bilateral diplomatic channel also became clear in the same press release.88 The statement further clarified that China‟s position was clear and consistent on Kashmir issue. It was an issue left over from history between India and Pakistan and should be properly resolved through dialogue and consultations.

3.7. Post 9/11 Imperatives of Strategic Interdependence Earlier discussions highlight the close historical relations between China and Pakistan. These relations have further strengthened in the post 9/11 period due to which strategic interdependence between them has increased. There are several factors which influenced on the enhancement of this interdependence, e.g., shift in external alliance, Indo-US and Indo-Israel strategic partnerships, nuclear issue, and Indian strategic partnership with major global players. In the following pages, an analytical overview of these factors is briefly presented.

For Pakistan the importance of China is obvious at all levels, political, strategic and economic. China is the largest potential source of investment in Pakistan as well as the main source of technology. Pakistan is a nuclear power and it should proceed with a degree of confidence in regard to its security concerns. What it lacks is economic and technological prowess which rests on internal political stability, sound education and good governance. In the field of economics, technology and education and its knowledge base, India is considerably ahead of Pakistan and that is what gives it an advantage

87 “India, China to Restore Defence Co-operation,” India Today, April 13, 2013. 88 “China: Personnel in PoK Involved in Livelihood Issues,” The Pioneer, July 30, 2014.

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globally in developing relations not only with the US, Japan, France, Russia and Israel but also with China.89

3.7.1. Re-alignments and Adjustment: Shifting Alliance and Relationships Contemporary equilibrium of military balance between India and Pakistan also shifted in the wake of regional alliances. India pondered at Pakistan security spectrum from an angle of Pakistan‟s alliance with the US during the Cold War era and its growing friendship with China. Pakistan also maintained in its threat perception the relationship between former Soviet Union and India and the military assistance received by India from Soviet military. In the second half of 1990s, the arms transfer relationship reinstated between India and Russia, prior to that there was a brief suspension in arms trade between India and former Soviet Union. Pakistan‟s relations with the US crumbled and reached to lowest ebb during 1990s, owing to the dissonance over Pakistan clandestine nuclear program and ballistic missile programme.90

In the wake of US sponsored global war on terrorism, the post 9/11 era facilitated the military cooperation between the US and Pakistan. However, the overall relations between two countries have also affected by the close relations between India and the US. India‟s potential capability to strengthen itself as regional player and its cooperative demeanour led the US to increase interest in security parameters of India.91 Hence, there is likelihood of technology transfer from US to India by marginalising Pakistan. Although, now Pakistan-China friendship is ever more strengthen; China and India are also on the track of securing more well-balanced bilateral relationship, evolving more constructive negotiations in different areas; such as resolving the lingering border dispute between two countries, increasing the trade volume by signing different MoUs, and minimising mutual hostility.92

89 Riaz Mohammad Khan, Former Foreign Secretary, personal interview, April 5, 2016. 90 Rodney W. Jones, “Nuclear Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia: Structural Factors” Washington DC., Stimson Centre, 2004. 91 Umbreen Javaid and Qamar Fatima, “US Foreign Policy Parameters towards Pakistan and India (2001- 2008), Journal of Political Studies 19, no. 2, 2012, 21:40. 92 Rodney W. Jones, “Nuclear Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia.”

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The enhancement of Indo-US defence cooperation provided an edge to Indian military, thus resulting in the reigniting of conventional imbalance between India and Pakistan. However, in the past, the US attempted to balance its regional interests, acknowledging Pakistan‟s complimentary support in war against terrorism. Any reversal of US previous policy of seeking cordial relationship with India as well as Pakistan, can be detrimental to its regional agenda. In the years to come, there is great probability of strong cooperation between the US and India in different field of strategic interest, likewise diminishing the share of same kind of relationship with Pakistan.93 Needless to say that the post 9/11 era has seen major shift and adjustment in relations among big powers. In the context of South Asia; India developed relations with most of major powers especially with the US, Japan and Australia, resulting in enhancement of Pakistan‟s relation with China.

3.7.2. Indo-US Strategic Cooperation One of the important developments in India‟s relation with the US was the New Framework for US-India defence relationship signed by the defence ministers of two countries in Washington on June 28, 2005.94 Ten-year military agreement between the US and India was a clear indication of the US tilt towards India. The fallout of this agreement for Pakistan can be evaluated by taking into account various aspects of their defence cooperation. The most important is cooperation on missile defence having implications for nuclear deterrence in South Asia. It undermined Pakistan‟s doctrine of minimum deterrence and nuclear restraint. Indo-US strategic cooperation is not only disturbing the strategic stability in South Asia but also in the East Asia region. This instability was further enhanced when India was made a partner in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). It gives power to members of the coalition to stop traffic on the high seas and in international airspace on a mere hint of suspicion of transportation of WMD material or components.95

93 Ibid. 94 Muhammad Ishaque Fani, “The Indo-US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for Pakistan,” Pakistan Vision 10, no.2 (2009). 95 Amelia Gentleman, “New Era on Defense for India and US,” International Herald Tribune, June 30, 2005.

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The Obama Administration is keen to work closely with India to pursue the US policy of strategic balance in Asia Pacific region, thus increasing the defence ties between two countries. It was reiterated by incumbent US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta, on his visit to Asia Pacific in November 2012. He emphasised that the current US Defence Policy has larger focus on this region.96 Press release in November 2010, after the joint press conference between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Barack Obama, stressed on the need to have maritime security, unhampered trade and navigational freedom. The two leaders emphatically extended a similar gesture in pursuing the more strengthen defence pacts including the transfer of technology, commencement of security dialogue, launching of joint military exercises, and elevating the level of trade. A notable development in Indo-US defence cooperation during last few years moved up to the level of mutual collaboration in tackling the humanitarian challenges and the containment of terrorism and piracy.97

In October 2008, the Indo-US nuclear deal was given final approval by the US Congress and this also got approval from NSG.98 Since then the weapons sales from the US to India had gone to eight billion dollars. While taking note of India‟s growing partnership with the United States, China has also enhanced cooperation with South Asian countries. Only two days after the signing of agreement between New Delhi and Washington, China signed a deal with Pakistan for building two new nuclear reactors. The timing of the deal was seen in India as a larger strategic design on part of China to use its all-weather ally, i.e., Pakistan to contain the rise of India, and turns the spotlight firmly on Beijing‟s determination to defy global rules, if necessary, to create a counter-balance to New Delhi in South Asia.99 India and US nuclear cooperation is seen by Islamabad as an attempt to destabilise the strategic balance of the region on one hand and initiate a new arms race on the other. Views from Beijing are also not so favourable about it. China considers this

96 Leon E. Panetta, “America‟s Pacific Rebalance,” Project Syndicate, December 31, 2013. 97 The White House Press Office, “Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh of India,” of November 8, 2010, available at www.whitehouse.gov 98 Sabir Shah, “Chronology of US-India Civil Nuclear Pact,” The News, January 27, 2015. 99 “Why China struck N-deal with Pak 4 days after Indo-US deal.”

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cooperation as an attempt to encircle it by using allies like South Korea and Japan.100 The Indo-US deal has broader implication for Pakistan-India relations. The nuclear treaty gives India recognition as a nuclear power.

3.7.3. Indo-Israel Politico-Strategic Cooperation Over the past two decades, successive Indian governments have managed to develop increasingly extensive ties with Israel without damaging their relations with the Arab states. The recent domestic political changes in India that culminated in the BJP‟s electoral victory and the formation of a government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi appears to favour the continued and accelerated development of Indo-Israeli strategic cooperation. Given the persistence of the Pakistani threat, Indo-Chinese rivalry, and the growth of an Indian middle class that seeks business opportunities and tends to look to the West, it is likely that Indo-Israeli cooperation will continue to advance, even in the face of intense Arab criticism.101

India is ambitious to become a global power. The US and Israel are supporting India to neutralise threats to their national interests. An all emerging and powerful China is a potential threat to the US interests in the globe, while the Arab countries are considered a potential threat to Israel. India for the sake of its own national interests and power projection is seeking support from these two countries. Strategic achievements of India reflect upon the fact that Indian ambitions are no longer to remain a regional power but to become a global power. In India‟s quest to become a major player, Pakistan and China are two major hurdles.

Since the US-Israel-India nexus aims to change the regional balance of power, the situation enhances the importance of Pakistan for China and the nexus provides an opportunity to both the countries to further strengthen their strategic interdependence by promoting their cooperation at bilateral and multilateral levels. In this scenario, it is

100 Neha Kumar, “Political Implications of India-US Cooperation on Missile Defense,” Mainstream VI, no. 16 (April 5, 2008). 101 Jacob Abadi, “India‟s National Security Imperatives and Indo-Israeli Strategic Cooperation,” MEI, September, 18, 2014.

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expected that Pakistan-China strategic cooperation would not only continue to grow in future, it will rather further expand by embracing new dimensions, such as cooperation in energy, industry, agriculture and infrastructure development. The growth in US-India strategic cooperation would also induce Pakistan and China to forge further closer links in the area of defence and security.102

3.7.4. Indian Strategic Cooperation with other Major Global Players The history of strategic cooperation between Russia and India dates backs since the days of Cold War. India became the first strategic partner of the Soviet Union in South Asian region. After the disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991, the newly emerged Russian Federation continued its partnership with India; still most of the Indian military inventory is of Russian origin. More recently, India has decided to shift its defence market from Russia to the US. The Indo-US cooperation has affected its strategic partnership with Russia. However, the joint projects still continue and it is not the end of it. In December 2010, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev visited Indian in which both the countries agreed on a series of nuclear and defence deals potentially worth billions of dollars.103 India is also obtaining aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov from Russia. Both countries have discussed the training of Indian navy for the operation of aircraft carrier.104

India‟s relations with France have remained friendly throughout its history. France supplied India with Anti-tank missiles, AXM light tanks, Alfa Jet training aircrafts and most importantly MIRAGE 2000 aircrafts. MIRAGE 2000 is capable of nuclear attack. “Besides AMX-13 light tanks and Mirage jets, France‟s popular ATGM is also prized by the Indian military. In the mid-2000s India partnered with France for the acquisition of half a dozen Scorpene-class diesel-electric submarines.”105 However, since the nuclearisation of India, the pace of Indo-France defence cooperation grew with a visible pace. Not only France is a strategic partner for India but Paris intends to enhance India‟s

102 Rashid Ahmad Khan, Professor and Chairman, Department of International Relations and Political Science, University of Sargodha, personal interview, Islamabad, August 2, 2014. 103 “India, Russia Sign Fighter Jet Deal,” Space War, December 21, 2010. 104 “India, Russia Discuss Admiral Gorshkov, Piracy Threat,” January 18, 2010, available at www.brahmand.com 105 “These Incredible Weapons Are Made In India,” October 26, 2015, available at www.21stcenturyasianarmsrace.com

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role in the region by backing its membership in the UNSC, despite the fact that the strategic scenario does not suitable for this. While discussing India‟s strategic ties with France, Raghvenda Pratap Singh expounds; “Although, France signed the NPT in 1992, it did not affected Indo- French bilateral relations. In 2006, France signed an agreement expressing its desire for civil nuclear cooperation with India and finally in September 2008, France became the first country to sign a civil nuclear agreement with India, even before the United States Senate had approved US-India civil nuclear agreement. In June 2011, when NSG declared that it would not supply enrichment and reprocessing technology to countries that are non-signatories to the NPT, France declared that it would not affect its bilateral nuclear cooperation with India.”106

In April 2015, on the invitation of French President, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid an official visit to France. According to the joint statement issued during the visit, both sides agreed to: reaffirmed their commitment to the strategic partnership, further strengthen their bilateral ties, intensify their cooperation regarding counter terrorism, commence bilateral dialogue to explore the ways and means to enhancing cooperation in the maritime domain particularly in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), conduct joint military exercises and lay down foundation for the future civil nuclear cooperation, including a wide range of subjects.107 This situation reflects Indian ambitions and their far reaching impacts on regional security as well as balance of power in this sensitive part of the world.

3.8. India’s Emerging Role in Asia-Pacific India‟s “Act East Policy” and the US “Re-balancing” are in connivance with each other. Both are targeted at a potential challenger - a rapidly rising China. US Defence Secretary, Leon Panetta said: “Defence cooperation with India is a linchpin in US new Asia Pacific strategy.” India-US strategic partnership, maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean

106 Raghvenda Pratap Singh, “The Indo-French Strategic Ties,” European Academic Research II, no.11, February 2015. 107 Ministry of Eternal Affairs of India, “India-France Joint Statement during the visit of Prime Minister to France, April 9-11, 2015,” April 10, 2015, http://www.mea.gov.in/.

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region, including the Strait of Malacca and the sea lanes in the South China Sea are to downplay China‟s influence.108

Whilst addressing the Indian parliament in 2010, the US president Barack Obama emphatically stated that partnership between India and US is a milestone in Indo-US relations in 21st century.109 Although, there exists certain impediments to surmount and questions to be dealt on both sides; United States anticipates Indian role on world stage to be more of an advocate of world‟s peace and stability; that unobstructed trade market of India would be a promising avenue for world‟s prosperity, India‟s accomplishments in science and technology would serve the humanity and disseminate knowledge everywhere, India‟s exuberant democracy will be a quintessential inspiration for other nations. Obama‟s administration extended its full support to India‟s “look east efforts” by providing a discursive forum for trilateral dialogue taking on board India and Japan, and imputed India‟s mainstay role in more politically integrated and economically independent South and Central Asia.110

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh‟s visit to Tokyo in 2008 and earlier visit by the incumbent Indian Defence Minister Parnab Mukharjee in 2006, led to joint statement on defence and security cooperation between India and Japan. Later in 2009, incumbent Indian Defence Minster A K Anthony exchanged views with his Japanese counterpart Toshimi Kitazawa to boost-up the cooperation to eliminate worldwide menace of terrorism.111 There was mutual consent on both sides to devise defence action plan, as conceived by both premiers at the time of their meeting in October 2008. Acknowledging the importance of maritime communication and security, the two leaders supported the idea to enhance cooperation in these fields and commence the dialogue between Japan

108 Amna Ejaz Rafi, “US Tilt towards Asia Pacific,” IPRI, November 26, 2015. 109 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “America's Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy Magazine, October 11, 2011, and “India Linchpin in US Strategy in Asia-Pacific: Clinton,” Outlook India, October 13, 2011. 110 Ibid. 111 Muhammad Munir, “Advancing Defence Cooperation in Asia Pacific: India‟s Emerging Role,” IPRI Journal (Summer 2013).

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and India on maritime security. The need to strengthen the exchanges in military connections and conducting joint exercises was also exhorted during the same meeting.112

The 2nd India-Japan 2+2 Dialogue was held in Tokyo in October 2012. The Indian delegation was led by Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai and Defence Secretary Shashi Kant Sharma, while Deputy Foreign Minister Akitaka Saiki and Administrative Vice Defence Minister Hironori Kanazawa led Japanese delegation. Besides, the exchange of view on regional and international security spectrum, both sides stressed the need to enhance the partnership in maritime security as well as the cyber and outer space security. Owing to adversarial relations with China, the Japanese Premier Shinzo Abe highlighted the role of Japan to strengthen the security cooperation with the US, India and Australia.113 Japan has long been indulged in securing the similar cooperation with Australia and the US. Japanese leadership envisioned to revive the regional power balance.114 On June 14, 2012, a media snippet highlighted that India aspires to take lead in IOR and in this regard, during a sailing mission in South China Sea, India has manoeuvred several Indian ships and vessels near the Chinese ports. India has deployed the INS Tabar on escort and counter piracy mission in Gulf of Aden, besides under the IOR mission. Additionally, India has been navigating its ships in Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles. It is also increasing its influence in South China Sea and North West Pacific by increasing more vessels‟ deployment. Prior to that, India and Japan conducted joint maritime exercise under the codename JIMEX-12 to commemorate the sexagenarian period of Indo-Japan diplomatic relations.115

After many years of negotiations, India and Japan have signed a memorandum on cooperating in nuclear energy. However, certain technical and legal issues need to be resolved before a final agreement can be signed. The memorandum outlining the broad areas for cooperation was signed on 12 December, 2015 in Delhi by Japanese Prime

112 Pranmita Baruah, “Changing Contours of the Japan-India Defense Relations,” Global Politician, April 3, 2010. 113 “India, Japan Hold Talks to Increase Cooperation in Key Areas,” DNA India, October 22, 2012. 114“Japan Eyes Security Ties with Australia,” News, December 29, 2012. 115 “Indian Navy Expanding Presence in Indian Ocean,” Outlook India, June 13, 2012.

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Minister Shinzo Abe and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Negotiations between the two countries for a civil nuclear deal began in 2010.116

In an attempt to encircle China and contain its growing influence, United States is pursuing the policy of increasing its presence in Afghanistan, Japan and in South Pacific. US has built strong relationship with India to oppose Chinese presence, which has aggravated the US-Pakistan relationship, compelling Pakistan to lean on Chinese side to revive decade‟s long friendship. Since, the announcement to end the embargo on Australian Uranium trade to India, a gradual degeneration in Australia‟s position concerning Pakistan and China has also been witnessed.117 Australia‟s declared policy regarding trade of uranium is to refrain from having any trade with non-signatories to nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but Australian sale of uranium to India is an exception that proves the rule of growing Indian standing in international community. Pakistan called it a discriminatory treatment against Pakistan on the basis of both countries being the non-signatories to NPT and that Pakistan should also be given the leverage to procure Australian uranium. Besides, all at once readiness to have uranium trade with India gives birth to certain scepticism in Pakistan.118

The ASEAN Indian summit of December 2012 in Delhi concluded on the consensual note to champion the strategic cooperation in the areas of maritime security and freedom of navigation. This was a move on the part of India to contain the China‟s growing influence in South China Sea.119 Contrary to Chinese objection over the Indian involvement in Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) within Vietnam‟s jurisdiction, India has adopted a defiance posture to pursue the exploration for hydrocarbon awarded to its Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC). On his visit to India, President of Vietnam Truong Tan Sang, signed certain MoUs with Indian counterpart for the continuance of exploration activities in South China Sea, besides the commencement of strategic

116 “India, Japan Reach Agreement on Nuclear Cooperation,” World Nuclear News, December 14, 2015. 117 “The US Asia-Pacific Strategy and Australia,” Politact, December 11, 2011. 118 Ibid. 119 “India and ASEAN to Strengthen Cooperation in Maritime Security,” Brahmand, December 21, 2012.

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dialogue. Chinese leadership raised certain objections over such exploration activity, calling it the violation in indisputable zone.120

3.9. India and South Asia In South Asia, India is trying to improve its relations with Bhutan, Bangladesh, Burma, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. In spite of demonstration in Tamil Nadu against training to Lankan defence personnel, India and Sri Lanka have held discussions on the advancement of their defence cooperation during the visit of Sri Lankan Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa to India.121 One of the important steps that Narendra Modi government has taken is its neighbourhood policy. Modi and his Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj chose several Asian countries for their initial bilateral visits. He visited Bhutan and Nepal within the first one-hundred days of his government. In August 2014, Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Nepal in seventeen years. Afterward, he visited Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal twice.122

India‟s approach in making good relations with South Asian countries is not consistent. India-Pakistan relations are passing through a difficult phase. The comprehensive dialogue could not be resumed. From the previous records, there seems to be no optimism for good friendly relations between two neighbours. Their relations are currently dominated by deep tensions and mutual mistrust.123 India has always stated its plans to continue to invest and play a role in Afghanistan which is seen with suspicions in Pakistan. It is noteworthy that since beginning, while formulating its policy towards its South Asian neighbours, India has adopted different approaches. Historical approach, whose most prominent exponent was the country‟s first Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru who had compared the position of India in South Asia to that of the US in the Western Hemisphere; and it was for this reason that in the years close to the departure of the British from India, he had proposed a sort of Munroe Doctrine for the region, which

120 Joshy M.Paul, “Asian Powers Scrambling for Regional Space,” Japan Times, October 24, 2011. 121 “India, Lanka Hold Parleys on Furthering Defence Cooperation,” Business Standards, October 25, 2012. 122 Teresita C. Schaffer, “India and Its South Asian Neighbors: Where Does the United States Fit In?,” Brookings, January 2015. 123 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, “India‟s Neighbourhood Policy in the First Year of the Modi Government,” Talk at IISS, Washington DC., US, April 14, 2015.

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stretched from Suez to Malacca Strait. Nehru claimed that both history and geography demanded of India to play a special role in this vast region, which had been under the British control for about two centuries.124

In establishing its relations with its South Asian neighbours at bilateral as well as at multi-lateral levels, Indian policy was guided by its approach to put aside the issues of bilateral disputes with countries like Pakistan, Nepal and even Sri Lanka. Contrary to the Indian approach, the smaller countries of the region had hoped that the development of bilateral relations with India and cooperation for regional development within the SAARC framework would facilitate the resolution of bilateral disputes with their big neighbours. The Indian approach to expand bilateral relations with its neighbours without resolving the bilateral disputes; and its insistence on keeping the contentious bilateral issues out of the SAARC framework, has neither led to strengthening of India‟s bilateral relations with its neighbours, nor it has enabled the SAARC process of regional cooperation move ahead.125

3.10. Pakistan-China Nuclear Cooperation Pakistan and China signed an agreement for the Chashma-3 and Chashma-4 twin projects on October 15, 2008. Both countries signed a contract for the project on November 20, 2008. Another fuel supply guarantee agreement was signed September 30, 2009. After firming up various facets of the deal over two years, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), China Zhongyuan Engineering Corporation (ZEC) and China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) signed an agreement on March 31, 2010, for the validation of contract for the 340 MW Chashma Nuclear Power Plant‟s twin units C-3 and C-4.126

In June 2015, the Sindh Environmental Protection Agency granted approval for the construction of new nuclear reactors to continue at Paradise Point, west of Karachi. The

124 Rashid Ahmad Khan, “Domestic Determinants of Indian Foreign Policy: Impact on Relations with Neighbouring Countries,” paper presented at IPRI-HSF International Conference on Policy Approaches of South Asian Countries and their Impact on the Region, held in Islamabad on June 2-3, 2014. 125 Ibid. 126 “Why China Struck N-deal with Pak 4 Days after Indo-US Deal.”

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project will see two reactors built alongside the existing Karachi Nuclear Power Plant, which is a 137 MW Canadian deuterium uranium design from the 1970s. The new reactors, named K-2 and K-3, are of Chinese origin and are expected to contribute a much needed 2200 MW of power output.127

China is constructing its own ACP 1000 in Fujian province, and Pakistan is the first importer of the technology. Beijing will be keen to demonstrate the design‟s safety and efficiency in order to acquire more foreign orders. Pakistan has been offered generous financial terms by the Chinese suppliers; any risks associated with the maturity of the technology are reportedly being offset by soft loans of US$ 6.5 billion. The provision of cutting edge technology at reduced cost is appealing for a Pakistani population which suffers frequent blackouts. Clearly, Pakistan desperately needs to deal with frequent power shortages. China is providing a welcome solution in the form of its new Hualong-1 reactor technology.128

3.11. Chinese Interests and Regional Instability in South and Central Asia Among the prevailing conflicts in the region, the one which makes China a stakeholder is the conflict in Afghanistan. China wants peace in Afghanistan mainly due to its interests in Central Asian Republics. Central Asian region holds a greater potential in terms of natural resources, trade and investment. Presence of the US forces in the country is another major concern for China. Some of the observers in Beijing warn that among American hidden objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan are threats to China‟s borders, to obstruct Beijing‟s strategic partnership with Pakistan, and enable India to strengthen military capability and geopolitical position vis-à-vis China and, hence, Beijing has no reason to undermine its own security by submitting to any American dictation.129 China on several occasions has called for a multilateral regional arrangement of the Afghan conflict and prefers geo-economics over geo-strategic solutions. Some observers notice that China has launched several major infrastructural projects along its western border

127 Matthew Cottee, “Sino-Pakistan Civil Nuclear Cooperation: A Growing Challenge to the Global Nuclear Order,” The Interpreter, July 9, 2015. 128 Ibid. 129 Han Dongping, “Say No to NATO Use of the Wakhan Corridor,” China Daily (Beijing), January 15, 2010.

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since 2009, and see that as a sign of Beijing‟s shifting mindset for greater participation in addressing Afghanistan and regional security.130

During 2015, China initiated the implementation of Xi‟s grand strategy of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road for the 21st Century, briefly termed as, the “One Belt One Road” initiative. China actively engaged with other countries along the routes for making joint contribution and sharing benefits. In this respect, it has signed Belt and Road cooperation agreements with more than 20 countries. In view of global economic crisis, the Belt and Road initiative is considered critical for Eurasian and global economy. China and Russia have signed agreements on coordinating development of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Eurasian Economic Union by utilising platform of SCO. Two economic corridors out of the total six corridors, China is building are in South Asia. First is the CPEC which has already been launched. The initial progress on the second corridor- Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM) has been made. 131

While addressing the 70th session of UN General Assembly in September 2015, President Xi explained the Chinese vision of foreign relations. In his view, nowadays all countries have interdependence on each other and share together each other‟s weal and woe. Therefore, while following the UN Charter, all countries should build a new type of international relations with win-win cooperation to form a community of shared destiny for all humankind. In this regard, he outlined four principles: i) all countries should uphold mutual respect and equal treatment, ii) adhere to win-win cooperation and common development, iii) achieve common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, and, iv) stick to inclusiveness, mutual accommodation, mutual learning and borrowing between different civilisations.132

130 “US Media Guess China‟s Intention of Developing the Wakhan Corridor,” Global Times (Beijing), January 11, 2010. 131 Wang Yi, “2015: A year of Flying Colours Pursuing Major-Country Diplomacy and Distinctive Chinese Features,” China International Studies, no.56, January-February 2016. 132 Ruan Zongze, “Forging Community of Shared Destiny for Mankind: The Global Dream of China,” China, International Studies, no.56, January-February 2016, 20-37.

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3.12. Contemporary Situation and Pakistan-China Strategic Cooperation In Pakistani circles, there are concerns about US discriminatory policies in South Asia. The US President Barack Obama visited India from 25 to 27 January 2015. It was second time that he visited India without visiting Pakistan. It was a comprehensive visit in which a series of bilateral agreements were concluded with India.133 Both sides pledged closer cooperation on defence, economic and civilian nuclear issues, and US repeatedly endorsed India‟s bid for a permanent United Nations Security Council seat.134

Pakistan has expressed its concerns on the increasing strategic cooperation between India and the US. As Pakistan has historical relations with the US, it considered unfair on the part of Obama that in spite of great tragedy of Peshawar school in which 141 people including 132 school children lost their lives due to the terrorists attacks, he did not bother to visit Pakistan to show solidarity with the people of this country. (Why? explain) This is in spite of the fact that it is a non-NATO alley and during its war on terrorism, thousands of Pakistani civilians have lost their lives. There is no doubt that Pakistan has always regarded its relations with the US and supported its war on terrorism – in return expecting that it would also play a constructive role for strategic stability and balance of power in South Asia.135 The way Obama showed extraordinary diplomatic outreach towards India, Pakistan expressed it disappointment with US for its selectivity and discrimination. Obama‟s strong strategic embrace of India could make Indian hardliner Prime Minister more arrogant towards Pakistan that may result in distracting its armed forces attention from counter terrorism military operation in the FATA.136

Prior to President Obama‟s visit to India, US Secretary of State John Kerry visited India and Pakistan. During his visit to Pakistan from 12-13 January 2015, Kerry held meetings with members of the political and military leadership. His visit to Pakistan was considered as a positive development for Pakistan-US relation. In the backdrop of his visit, Pakistan has been taking some critical steps in countering extremism in Pakistan. In

133 Muhammad Munir, “Obama‟s Visit Raises Concerns in Pakistan”, Pakistan Observer, January 31, 2015. 134 Ibid. 135 Aamir Latif, “Pakistan opposes US-India Civil Nuclear Deal”, Turkish Press, January 28, 2015. 136 Ibid.

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order to sustain these efforts, there were high hopes in Pakistan that President Obama during his visit to India would not undermine Pakistan‟s interest; however, it did not happen. Sartaj Aziz, Advisor to the Prime Minister told reporters that during Kerry‟s visit to Pakistan, he was apprised of Pakistan‟s reservations on various issues including Indian aggression along the Line of Control (LoC). Pakistan was expecting that President Barrack Obama‟s visit to India would help reduce tension in South Asia. Pakistan was disappointed with the US for not raising the issue of unprovoked firing by Indian forces along the LoC and working boundary. Many experts expected that Obama would impel India to resume the stalled peace process with Pakistan but that did not happen either.

In a statement on January 23, 2015, the Deputy National Security Adviser of the US, Ben Rhodes had clarified that United States‟ relations with Pakistan and India were not at expense of the other. He argued that it was better for the region that Washington maintained close ties with both Islamabad and New Delhi. There was no doubt that US was not interested in spoiling its relations with Pakistan due to its strategic value for regional stability and in view of its role in countering extremism and terrorism. However, in order to contain China, the US is giving primacy to its relations with India. Both countries looked their relationships through the prism of the strategic changes in the larger Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean region. This premise would marginalise Pakistan and that would not be helpful to promote regional security.

The other issue that bothered Pakistan includes increasing US defence and nuclear cooperation with India. Indo-US nuclear deal has been in delay for six years amid concerns over the liability for any nuclear accident. This deal has been reactivated with Obama using his executive powers to roll back the condition that US authorities be allowed to monitor the use of nuclear material purchased by India even from third countries and the US agreeing to India‟s proposal to build a risk-management insurance pool of US$ 24 million to provide cover to suppliers who shunned the civil nuclear agreement because it made them liable to pay compensation in the event of a nuclear accident - a great leap forward has been made.137 In contrast to India, Pakistan has made

137 Harsh V. Pant, “New Phase in India-US Ties”, Japan Times, January 30, 2015.

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huge sacrifices in countering extremism and terrorism. However, by ignoring this, during 2012-14, the US supplied India with weapons worth US$ 5.4 billion - for the first time surpassing Russia, which supplied US$ 4.2 billion in military products.138 Will this situation create a strategic balance in Pakistan-India relations? And, will the US preference of India at the cost of Pakistan help regional peace and stability?

This chapter has attempted to analyse the basis of strategic interdependence between Pakistan and China. The outcome of discussion reflects that new factors have been added in their relations in the post 9/11 period. The next three chapters focus on the bilateral cooperation in three main areas, i.e.: i) defence and security, ii) economy and trade, and, iii) regional cooperation at SAARC and the SCO.

138 Ibid.

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CHAPTER - 4 PAKISTAN-CHINA COOPERATION IN DEFENCE AND SECURITY In the previous chapter, the evolution and development of the Pakistan-China relationship has been discussed. It has also examined the strategic importance of China and Pakistan for each other. Additionally, it analysed various factors behind the consolidation of their relations in the Cold War, the post-Cold War and the post 9/11 periods. It has also covered China‟s role in promoting strategic stability in South Asia, its stance on Kashmir and India‟s attempts to acquire permanent membership of UNSC. Furthermore, it discussed the post 9/11 imperatives of strategic interdependence between Pakistan and China in the context of India‟s strategic cooperation with the US and other major global payers. The outcome of the analysis reflects that Pakistan-China relations saw new heights in the post 9/11 period due to convergence of their interests pertaining to developments in regional security

The present chapter focuses on the analysis of the situation of cooperation in defence and security between the two countries. While discussing bilateral defence and military cooperation, it covers cooperation between the ground, air and naval forces of two countries. Regarding ground forces cooperation, it discusses salient features of military to military relations, supply of arms, joint ventures and joint military exercises. It also covers China‟s role in building military infrastructure in Pakistan and its cooperation in procurement, R & D technology transfer, and defence production especially Al-Khalid tank and cooperation in missile system. In addition to this, it also explores various dimensions of nuclear cooperation between two countries, cooperation in non-traditional security issues such as combating extremism, terrorism and separatism, natural disaster management, collaboration with Afghanistan to promote regional security, and China‟s political support in strengthening Pakistan‟s security in the global arena.

China has strengthened defence cooperation with its neighbours; especially with Pakistan. Both countries have developed multi-dimensional military cooperation. China is Pakistan‟s most important defence partner and the security relations between the two

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countries are longstanding and highly successful.1 This association reflects an exceptional friendship, underpinned by close strategic interdependence and common interests that have evolved over the last six decades. In addition to various other factors as discussed in the previous chapter, the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971 significantly contributed to flourish the Pakistan-China security relations. The term “common strategy” - as consented by a number of Chinese writers, evolved after these two wars, specifically in the latter half of 1970s. The former USSR‟s invasion into Afghanistan further aggrandised the “common strategy.”2

Presently, both the countries are further strengthening their cooperation not only in the regional security issues but also in matters related to their national security. A testimony to this is that in January 2012, the different agreements were signed between the two countries.3 China assured Pakistan that it will continue its support in terms of political, military and economic cooperation. Both countries also focused on exploring the ways and means for enhancing cooperation in curbing terrorism. Measures, such as joint military exercises involving all the three forces of both countries were discussed with the main focus to learn from each other‟s experiences.

In past, the main focus of Pakistan-China cooperation has been to counter the Indian hegemony in South Asia. The aims of this bilateral cooperation have been changing in accordance with the changing circumstances. With the emergence of extremism and terrorism in the region, now both countries also focus on mutual cooperation to counter terrorism. China‟s concern regarding terrorism and extremism is because of three main reasons. Firstly, it feels direct threat to its national unity and territorial integrity from the Uighur separatist elements in the Xinjiang province. According to China‟s perspective, these elements have links with militants in tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan has done as much as possible to prevent the use of its soil against China. These measures include the banning of various religious organisations having links with the

1 “China‟s National Defence in 2010,” China Daily, December 31, 2011. 2 Srikanth Kondpalli, “Pakistan in China‟s Security Perception,” in Swaran Singh ed., China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation-Indian Perspective, (New Delhi: Monohar Publishers & Distributors, 2007), 60. 3 “Pakistan, China to Support Each Other‟s Core Interests: Wen Jiabao,” Dawn, January 5, 2012.

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separatist elements of China and handing over of wanted Uighur activists to China. There is a consensus among all the political and religious parties not to support any separatist group in China.

Secondly, China is very much concerned about the law and order situation in Pakistan. The problem of terrorism in Pakistan is harmful to China‟s economic and trade cooperation with it. In the past years, Pakistan and China have made a number of agreements but the progress on ground has been slow because of the unsuitable working environment for the Chinese. Thirdly, terror-free South Asia serves the strategic interests of China; thus, it is interested in promoting regional cooperation to counter the menace of terrorism.4 China played a vital role in India-Pakistan talks in 2004 mainly because this kind of regional cooperation was inevitable to fight extremism and terrorism.5 Thus, the joint resolve and mechanism for fighting extremism and terrorism has added new dimension to the security cooperation between China and Pakistan. At the same time, China is also trying to ensure strategic stability in South Asia.

4.1. Military and Defence Cooperation It is noteworthy that in contrast to the US, China has always been a reliable arms supplier to Pakistan. For instance, during 1966-1980, Pakistan fulfilled one-third of its arms requirements from China which was much more than any other suppliers to the country. Even after the cold war, when the arms transfers witnessed a declining trend, China still exported arms to Pakistan. Accordance to a defence source, until the mid-2010, China had supplied Pakistan with over 1,600 main battle tanks, 400 combat aircraft and around 40 naval vessels.6

4 Ibid. 5 Shahzad Akhtar, “Sino-Pakistani Relations: An Assessment,” ISSI, (June 2014). 6 “Chinese Military Assistance to Pakistan and Implications for India,” Pakistan Defence, August 24, 2010.

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Table: 4.1. History of Chinese Arms Sales to Pakistan: (1970-1990) Aircraft Battle Tank Missiles Gunboats Type Type Guns Type Type Type 120 Jian-7M 1,300 T-59 (T- 200 T-59 (130 Red Arrow 4 Huangfen (Osa) (F-7M Airguard) 54) main battle nun) field guns (Sagger) anti-tank missile boats fighter aircraft tanks missiles 24 Jian-6 (MIG- 200 T-69 (T -55 200 T-60 (122 4 Hegu (Komar) HN-5 anti-aircraft 19) fighter modified) main nun) field guns missile boats missiles Aircraft battle tanks HY-2 (CSS-2 14 Qiang-5 (A-5) 500 YW-531 200 T-56 (85 4 Huchuan Silkworm) attack aircraft armoured nun) field guns torpedo boats surface-to-surface personnel carriers missiles T-55 (37 mm) 40 Jian Jiang-5 BN-2 (Atoll) and and T-59 4 Hanyan (FT-5) combat PL-5 air-to-air  (57mm) anti- gunboats trainer aircraft missiles aircraft guns T-52 (75 mm) 8 Shanghai    anti-tank guns Gunboats

Source: “Military Cooperation with Middle East,” JPRS Report China, JPRS-CAR-92-021, April 16, 1992, p. 36.

Note: The transfer of major conventional weapons from China to Pakistan from 1990 onward are mentioned in the Annexure -1.

Being the main source of military hardware and technical knowhow, China provided missile technology and military assistance during 1980‟s and 1990‟s - a time when Pakistan was under economic and military sanctions by the West, particularly the US.7 Besides, JF-17 aircraft, small arms and ammunition, Pakistan is procuring military assistance from China for JF-17 production facility, K-8 trainer‟s jet, F-22P frigates with helicopters and F-85 tanks.8 There is a perspective in the West that China has established a manufacturing complex for “turnkey ballistic missile” in Rawalpindi and has assisted Pakistan in producing the 750km range Shaheen-I ballistic missile.9 In addition, both the

7 Amna Javed, “Pak-China Defence Collaboration Since 1947 Till 2014,” China-Pakistan Institute, November 19, 2014. 8 Franz-Stefan Gady, “China will Supply Pakistan with 110 New JF-17s,” The Diplomat, April 28, 2015. 9 Rashid Ahmad Khan, “The China-Pakistan Strategic Partnership,” China Organization, May 20, 2011.

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countries are also working closely on new projects to further strengthen cooperation in defence.10

In 2015, Pakistan purchased arms of $565 million from China with 70 per cent increase from the previous year (2014) when it imported arms worth $394 million. It is interesting to note that US arms sale to Pakistan decreased from $189 million in 2014 to $66 million in 2015.11 In its study on the world arms trade from 2011 to 2015, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute found that Pakistan has bought 35 percent of China‟s arms exports during the past five years making it China‟s one of the biggest importer of arms.12

4.1.1. Cooperation Among Ground Forces Pakistan enjoys close military relations with China. The salient features of Pakistan- China military cooperation are: i) China has always provided military hardware to Pakistan in times when its western allies have imposed embargoes on it - especially; during Indo-Pak wars, ii) the aim of providing weapons and equipment was not to increase Pakistan‟s dependence on Beijing but to encourage self-reliance and indigenous production - this includes supply of spare parts, setting up local overhauling facilities, license production and joint ventures, iii) continued supply of arms from China played a significant role in strengthening Pakistan‟s defence posture, especially because it instigated other suppliers to provide arms to Pakistan in order to contain the increasing Chinese influence, iv) the military relationship between the two countries has been smooth as they could keep the details of their defence cooperation agreements secret and announce them only when convenient, and, v) the absence of a strong domestic industrial, scientific and technological base coupled with the unaffordable costs of modern military technology compelled Pakistan to build a special relationship with the China.13

10 Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty, “The Security Dimension of China-Pakistan Relations,” in Proceedings of International Seminar on Pakistan – China Relations in Changing Regional and Global Scenario, September 29, 2005, Area Study Centre (For East and South East Asia, University of Sindh, Jamshoro). 11 “Pakistan spent $735 million on arms imports in 2015,” The Express Tribune, February 22, 2016. 12 “China Arms Exports Continue to Surge,” Financial Times, February 22, 2016. 13 Faisal Zahid Malik, “Pak-China Friendship on the Rise,” Pakistan Observer, May 15, 2011.

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This relationship between two adjoining Asian countries is significant in the world‟s geo- strategic alliances. Since 1962, China has been a stable source of military equipment for Pakistan Army. It helped Pakistan in establishing ammunitions factories, provided technological assistance and modernised existing facilities.14 The border settlement pact of March 3, 1963, was the first step of both countries against Indian interests.15 China emerged as Pakistan‟s single most trusted and enduring military ally. This was because of their mutually shared objectives. Pakistan provided an anti-India nexus, a market for China‟s lower quality weapons and access to western technologies present in Pakistan. China in turn provided Pakistan with cheap yet extensive, good quality technologies and also the required political and moral support.

The first formal step towards Pakistan-China defence cooperation was taken soon after 1965 war. China had not only sided with Pakistan in its war against India but its forces on the Indian border were set on high alert and even threatened India of dire consequences.16 China has provided significant assistance to Pakistan in the following key areas:  Missile Technology: Pakistan‟s Shaheen missile series is comprised of both medium and short range ballistic missiles, specialists opine that these missiles are the modified Chinese missile systems.  Aviation Technology: At present, Pakistan has a joint venture with China in production of JF-17 Thunder multi-role air craft and K-8 Karakorum light attack aircraft. Pakistan‟s air fleet comprises the Chinese interceptor and advanced trainer aircraft, as well as the jet detection radar system and airborne early warning system.17  Nuclear Technology: Many in the west speculate that Pakistan acquired blueprint for its nuclear bomb from China and still getting assistance in nuclear technology.18

14 Jamal Afridi, “China-Pakistan Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 6, 2010. 15 Shahzad Akhtar, “Sino-Pakistani relations: An Assessment.” 16 Paul M. McGarr, The Cold War in South Asia: Britain, the United States and the Indian Subcontinent, 1945–1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 330–331. 17 Syed Fazl-e-Haider, “Pakistan and China Prove Powerful Combination in Aviation,” The National Business, November 25, 2013. 18 Rashid Ahmad Khan, “The China-Pakistan Strategic Partnership.”

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The strong defence ties between China and Pakistan are primarily to promote mutual interests in the region. In recent years, security relations have been further strengthened. On June 22, 2011, the first formal meeting between the representatives of Chinese and Pakistan armed forces was held at Joint Staff Headquarter Chaklala. The focal point of the meeting was to accentuate the mutual cooperation in the multi-dimensional field of defence, encompassing the sharing of training and technology in countering terrorism and defence procurement respectively. The talks concluded on signing two significant agreements to further enhance the partnership between two countries.19

The Chinese Defence Minister Chang Wanquan visited Pakistan in February 2014. He held meetings with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif, Chief of Army Staff Gen Raheel Sharif, and the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Asif Sandila. During the visit, he affirmed that China would continue its cooperation with Pakistan in the field of defence and security. 20 Both the countries consider their defence cooperation a critical factor of peace and stability in the region. Pakistan and Chinese defence delegations also held a session of talks where matters of defence production and Chinese help in achieving self-reliance in defence production were broadly discussed. Matters of maritime cooperation, joint-exercises, defence and security cooperation were also discussed.21 In fact, both countries are already engaged in several joint projects to enhance military and weaponry systems including joint military exercises.

4.1.1.1. Building Infrastructure China assisted Pakistan in setting up facilities such as the Heavy Rebuild Factory (HRF), now known as Heavy Industrial Complex at Taxila for overhauling of Chinese Type-59 MBTs and to start upgrading the critical components of these tanks.22 The fire control systems, thermal sight and electronic systems of the tanks are upgraded in the facility. In addition, a protocol was signed between China and Pakistan to set up facilities for the license production of Chinese Type-69 II BMTs. All parts were manufactured in Pakistan

19 “Pakistan China to Extend Military Cooperation,” Pakistan Defence and Military Forum, June 23, 2011. 20 “Chinese Defence Minister Meets PM, Naval chief,” Dawn, February 28, 2014. 21 Mehmood Ul Hassan Khan, “Pakistan-China Defence Cooperation,” Overseas Pakistani Friends, March 6, 2014. 22 “Al Khalid MBT-2000/Type 2000 Main Battle Tank,” Pak Tribune (Online Magazine), July 9, 2007.

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with Chinese technical advice except the ARV hulls, which were imported from China along with armour plates. China‟s Norinco has also helped Pakistan in the production of Chinese T-69, T-85 II MBTs and M-113 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC).23 The military cooperation between two countries operated under the provisions of the Sino-Pak Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in June 1990.24 The MoU provided for ten-year cooperation in procurement, R & D technology transfer and co-production. This time period was extended after the US enforcement of Pressler Amendment.25

4.1.1.2. Al-Khalid Tank / MBT-2000 Pakistan began to develop MBT-2000 Al-Khalid in 1988.26 In January 1990, both countries agreed to design, develop and manufacture MBT-2000 Al-Khalid jointly. The design is an upgrade of the original T902M. Initial prototypes were produced in China and fielded for trials in August 1991. Development efforts have mainly focused on improving the design for Pakistan‟s terrain and high temperatures since 1992 - the year of establishment of the Heavy Mechanical Complex at Taxila.27 Two of the major components - T902M engine with 1200hp 6TD Ukrainian engine and upgraded thermal vision system were replaced to perk-up the nocturnal operating capability. Within eight years of production time period of Al-Khalid Tanks, the budgetary expense went up to US$ 20 million.28 As of early 2002, Pakistan had about twenty Al-Khalid tanks in service. It had received its first consignment of 15 Al-Khalid MBTs in July 2001. In 2004 Pakistan army had total number of 90 fully operational Al-Khalid tanks which increased to 220 tanks in 2008 and by the end of 2015; the target of planned 600 Al-Khalid tanks was achieved.29

23 Ibid. 24 James Lamont and Farhan Bokhari, “China and Pakistan: An alliance is Built,” Financial Times, June 30, 2011. 25 Senate, “The Pressler Amendment and Pakistan‟s Nuclear Weapons Program,” FAS, July 31, 1992. 26 “Al Khalid MBT-2000 Type 2000 Main Battle Tank.” 27 Ikram Sehgal, “A Tank Factory For All Seasons,” Defence Journal, July 1998. 28 “Al Khalid MBT-2000/Type 2000 Main Battle Tank.” 29 “Al Khalid MBT-2000 / Type 2000 Main Battle Tank,” Global Security, April 11, 2013.

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4.1.1.3. Missiles Pakistan-China missile collaboration began in 1986 when Pakistan started to assemble the RBS-70 Mk 1 and Mk 2 air defence missile systems.30 Cooperation between the two countries in long range missiles began when Pakistan started financing their M-9 and M- 11 missile programs. After his visit to Beijing in 1987, General Mirza Aslam Beg, told the press that China‟s Red Arrows were better than US TOW-11.31 It is speculated that China helped Pakistan in its successful tests of Hatf II missile in early 1989.32 Having a range of 300km, this missile is believed to be the outcome of French Eridan sounding rocket technology mixed with the Chinese expertise. This area of their collaboration has lately become controversial following reports of the US intelligence agencies that China has transferred about 30 or more of its intermediate range M-11 missiles to Pakistan.33 However, both China and Pakistan have repeatedly declined the allegations. In an interview with the Global Times newspaper (November 10, 2010), Rao Qamar Suleman, former Air Chief Marshal of the Pakistan Air Force confirmed the country is interest to purchase three to four SAM systems. One of the systems considered as such was HQ-18 surface-to-air missile system.34 In the mid-2015, Pakistan Army inducted Chinese SHORAD missile system.35

4.1.2. Air Defence Cooperation Collaboration in the aviation industry became exemplary at the on-set of new era. Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) is one of those establishments which bear testimony to Pak-China friendship. PAC provides services in assembling and manufacturing of fighters as well as trainer aircrafts. China assisted in building the PAC for regeneration of aircrafts in Pakistan Air Force fleet, which comprised of Henyang F-6 (now retired), Nanchang A-5, F-7 combat aircraft, and Shenyang FT-5, FT-6 Jet trainer

30 Muhammad Rajil Irshad Khan, “Sino-Pak Military Ties and Future,” Hilal, October 2013. 31 Faisal Zahid Malik, “Pak-China Friendship on the Rise.” 32 “Pakistan Derives its First Hatf Missiles from Foreign Space Rockets,” Winsonsin Project 1, no.8 (October 1995): 4. 33 Ibid. 34 “Pakistan Air Force to Purchase 4 Chinese SAM Systems,” Pakistan Defence and Military Forum, November 18, 2010. 35 “Pakistan Inducts Chinese SHORAD Missile Systems,” Defence Update, May 11, 2015.

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aircraft.36 The PAC is the third largest assembly plant in the world, which also accommodates the Kamra Avionics and Radar Factory (KARF) that manufactures the ground-based radar system, as well as the avionics and electronics. In 1980, the PAC broadened its working spectrum and built the Aircraft Manufacturing Factory (AMF). The AMF received acknowledgements at regional level upon its partnered endeavour with Hongdu Aviation Industry Group China to manufacture the K-8 advanced trainer‟s jet. Flagship project and the manufacture of JF-17 Thunder are Sino-Pak joint projects at the AMF. The AMF manufactures JF-17 Thunder in collaboration with Chengdu Aircraft Industry (CAI).37

China and Pakistan have strong collaboration in the field of research ranging from the field of nuclear weapons to aerospace technologies. China has helped Pakistan establish a better aerospace infrastructure. China has supported Pakistan in variety of fields from joint ventures in fighter aircrafts, setting up of aircraft factories and aircraft engine design and production. It has also helped Pakistan in the supply of various electronic warfare, radar and unmanned platforms and has also promised to continue this collaboration in addition to the access to its assets. One such example of advance level collaboration can be seen in the form of the successful flight test of a fourth generation aircraft J-11.38 The major joint projects undertaken between the Pakistan and Chinese Air Forces are described in the following pages.

4.1.2.1. Karakoram-8 Trainer / Fighter Karakoram-8 (K-8), the modern jet trainer is the outcome of joint venture by AMF, PAC Kamra and China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC). These trainer aircrafts are used for delivering basic training exercise to newly admitted pilots at PAF Academy Risalpur.39 The aircraft was engineered by the PAC and took its maiden flight in November 1990; however the production of the aircraft was initiated in

36 Muhammad Rajil Irshad Khan, “Sino-Pak Military Ties and Future.” 37 “J-10 and Submarines: China-Pakistan Great Wall of Joint Defence,” Pakistan Think Tank, March 2, 2011. 38 M. Methes Waran, “Air and Aerospace Partnership (Chapter 10)”, in, China Pakistan Strategic Cooperation Indian Perspective, ed. Sawaran Singh (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2007). 39 “K-8 Jet Trainer,” Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, Kamra, September 22, 2015.

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early 1992. The first block of 24 aircraft became operational in 1992, of which Chinese acquired 18 planes whilst six K-8 aircrafts were handed over to Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in year 1994, prior to that, four prototypes of such aircraft were built. In year 1995, PAF planned a purchase order of 75 more K-8 aircraft. In 2010, the accumulated number of K8 aircrafts in the PAF was 40.40 Acceding to PAF Falcons; “Pakistan Air Force currently operates 60 K-8 aircraft (12 K-8s and 48 K- 8Ps), which serve as Intermediate jet trainers with the No. 1 Fighter Conversion Unit (FCU), Mianwali and as basic jet trainers with the Pakistan Air Force Academy, Risalpur. Another 32 K-8Ps are on order as of January 2012. K-8P Karakorum is Pakistan-specific variant with new avionics, glass cockpit. The emergency cockpit-escape system comprises two Martin-Baker MK-10L rocket-aided ejection seats…The K8 can climb at a rate of 30m/s. The maximum speed is 800km/h. The range and service ceiling of the aircraft are 2,140km and 13,600m respectively.” 41

Karakorum-8 has replaced all the ageing Cessna T-37 Tweet jet trainers which were in service with the Pakistan Air Force.42

4.1.2.2. Super-7 Fighter In early 1980s, Pakistan‟s quest for finding the substitute for existent F-6 jet fighter was finally accomplished by the initiation of Super-7 programme. The project, Sabre-II, was started by PAF to bring certain improvements in Chengdu F-7M, such as the upgrade version of engine and avionics. In 1987, several arms manufacturing companies contended a bid for the provision of engine and avionics, but the contract was awarded to Grumman Aerospace the US. By the year 1989, the project had become capital intensive for the PAF to continue, owing to sky-high cost of the project. On the other hand, the Tiananmen Square protest had intensified the China‟s relationship with Western bloc, leading to abort Sabre-II project. Chengdu manufacturer added few improvements in F- 7M airframe by modifying the air intake system on the sides of fuselage, etc. Finally, after the addition of certain improvements, the aircraft was named Super-7.43

40 Muhammad Rajil Irshad Khan, “Sino-Pak Military Ties and Future.” 41 “K-8P Karakorum Subalbum,” PAF Falcons, July 31, 2016. 42 „K-8P Aircraft Replace FT-5 Fighters at PAF Mianwali Base‟ The News, January 06, 2012. 43 “JF-17 Thunder,” Pak-Akhbar (Online Magazine), July 20, 2010.

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The PAC and the CATIC jointly signed a contract to revamp the project in year 1992 and from then, the production of the aircraft has continued. Another joint venture agreement was signed between the two countries in June 1999, and that was to jointly produce the FC-1 aircraft.44 In the initial stages the development was steady; however, in year 2001, the PAF separated the advancement of platform and avionics system, thus leading to speedy progression in production. At present, PAF fleet is comprised of 120 F-7P and 60 F-7PG, thus making it the largest Chinese operator of F-7 aircraft outside of China. In 2015, PAF decided to replace the entire F-7P batch with the advanced multirole JF-17 jet fighters.45

4.1.2.3. JF-17 Thunder JF-17 Thunder is the most advanced aircraft - due to light-weight single jet engine and multi-role combat capability, the fighter is jointly designed and built by Chengdu Aircraft Industries Corporation (CAIC), the PAF and the PAC. PAF was in need of an aircraft with multirole combat agility, keeping in view the low production cost to replace the fleet of Mirage III/5 fighters, Chengdu F-7 interceptors and Nanchang A-5 bombers. The JF- 17 Thunder primarily met all the requirements and a suitable alternative to exorbitant western made fighters.46

The “Thunder Program” to produce JF-17 jet fighter, started back in year 1999. Its primary objective was to decrease the reliance on the Western jet-fighters manufacturers. PAF formally commissioned the JF-17 air-squad No. 26 Squadron Black Spiders on February 18, 2010 with 14 jet-fighters. The per-unit cost of JF-17 is around US$ 20 to 25 million, which is economical cost in comparison to US$ 80 million per-unit of F16 - US manufactured jet fighter, still in use of PAF. The PAF has placed purchase-order for 150 JF-17 aircraft, which is anticipated to rise to 250.47

44 “Technology of JF-17 Thunder aircrafts has Pulled Russia and Pakistan Closer in Defence production,” Dispatch News Desk of Eurasia, December 21, 2015. 45 Ibid. 46 “FC-1 / JF-17 Multirole Fighter Aircraft,” Sino Defence, July 17, 2015. 47 “JF-17 Thunders: Pakistan to Get 50 Chinese Jets in Six Months,” Express Tribune, May 21, 2011.

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The fourth generation JF-17 fighter has agile manoeuvrability, an advantage over speed for dominance during combat. Pakistan and China have also agreed upon developing the fifth generation advanced version of JF-17. The latest fifth generation aircraft has aerial superiority during combat, owing to its stealth features. At present, under certain arrangements, PAF will procure only first fifty fourth generation JF-17 fighter, afterward the fifth generation version would be inducted in the fleet.48 Pakistan‟s former Air Chief Marshal Rao Qamar Suleman announced on December 21, 2010, that Pakistan has built its own radar manufacturing facility for JF-17 aircrafts.49 He further briefed that JF-17 Thunder would be equipped with this radar system, which is the modified version of Chinese CETC/NRIET KLJ-7 to be indigenously produced in Pakistan.50

Some sources opine that the PAF has acquired the second squadron of JF-17 warplanes, but the total number of these newly inducted fifth generation aircrafts has not been ascertain yet via any viable source. The JF-17 Thunders are under regular technical updates. This warplane is compartmentalised into two categories - Block 1 and Block 2, whereby Block-2 JF-17 Thunder fighters are considered to be better equipped with advanced avionics and mechanised weapons system and material.51 The head of Pakistan PAC, Air Marshal Javed Ahmed announced on December 2, 2014 that 50 indigenously developed JF-17 warplanes were inducted in PAF and five more were to be supplied in December 2014.52

In Beijing, whilst briefing to People’s Daily on April 25, 2015, the Head of Chinese Aircraft Industry stated that Pakistan will procure fifty more JF-17 warplanes within three years‟ time period. As per the agreement between two countries, the total number of 110 JF-17 warplanes will be delivered to Pakistan. The JF-17 Thunder symbolises the Pakistan-China friendship. On April 20, 2015, while Chinese President Xi Jinping state visit to Pakistan, the eight JF-17 Thunder performed the escort duty as the president‟s

48 “PAF Wants to Buy Chinese Stealth Aircraft: Minister,” Dawn, November 22, 2014. 49 “Pakistan to Build Radar for JF-17 Thunder Fighter Jet,” Asian Defence News, December 2010. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 “50 Pakistan-assembled JF-17 fighter Jets Inducted into PAF: PAC Chief,” Express Tribune, December 2, 2014.

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plane entered Pakistan air space.53 JF-17 Thunder is the innovation of joint venture between the CAIC of China and PAC of Pakistan.54 The plane has decisive advantage over the adversary aircrafts of same class due to its excellent avionics, mechanised weapon system with air to air and air to surface combat capability, and computerised flight control system. Besides, the aircraft‟s impressive combat manoeuvrability at any altitude and agile combat survivability and its precision effective firepower, this plane is on top of others and desirous for any air-force.55 For this reason, some developing countries have expressed their interest in purchasing these aircraft from Pakistan, while some others have already their placed orders.56

4.1.2.4. J-10 Fighter The J-10 aircraft is one of those advanced level weapons in Chinese arsenal that makes Chinese confident of their defence. However, Chinese have extended amicable gesture to sell 36 J-10 B warplanes to Pakistan, thus making Pakistan to be first ever recipient of these jet fighters.57 Once the PAF acquires 36 such fighter jets, the formation of two new squadrons will come into existence to further bolster up the combat and defence capability of PAF. Chinese average arms export is worth US$ 2 billion a year, 70 percent of which will come from the J-10 deal.58 During a visit to China by Pakistan Army‟s Chief of General Staff, Lt. Gen. Waheed Arshad, it was announced by Chinese leadership that China is attempting to strengthen the defence of its strategic ally by providing a squadron of J10-B advanced, all-weather, multi-role aircrafts.59

53 Peer Muhammad, “JF-17s Thunderous Welcome for Xi,” Express Tribune, April 21, 2015. 54 “JF-17 Planes „Open New Doors‟ for Pakistan China Friendship,” Express Tribune, December 18, 2013. 55 Muhammad Arif, “China to Deliver 5o more JF-17 Thunder Fighters to Pakistan in Next Three Years,” Nihao Salam, April 25, 2015. 56 Tarique Niazi, “J-10: The New Cornerstone of Sino-Pakistani Defence Cooperation, China,” Jamestown Brief , Volume: 9 Issue: 25, December 16, 2009. 57 “China to Give squadron of J-10B Fighters to Pakistan,” July 31, 2011, available at www.china-defense- mashup.com 58 Richard A. Bitzinger, “China‟s Re-emergence As an Arms Dealer: The Return of the King?” The Jamestown Foundation, July 9, 2009. 59 “China to Give Squadron of J-10B Fighters to Pakistan.”

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4.1.2.5. Karakoram Eagle Airborne Warning and Control System PAF has inducted a Chinese-built Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). The Karakoram Eagle can detect aerial and sea-surface enemy targets, prior to ground-based radar detection regardless of the height. The Premier 4 Squadron will endorse this system, thus making the Pakistan‟s air defence invincible. Air Chief Marshal Tahir Rafique announced that: “The induction of Karakoram Eagle AWACS would revolutionise PAF‟s operational concepts. With its induction, [the] PAF is transforming into a modern versatile and capability based force.”60

4.1.2.6. Cooperation in Space Technology Space technology is another area of mutual cooperation between China and Pakistan. Both countries are extending the amicable gestures to enhance their partnership in joint Research and Development (R & D) programmes for intelligence gathering from Space.61 In October 2008, an agreement was signed between the Space agency of Pakistan SUPARCO and China Great Wall Industry Corporation in Beijing, to replace the Pakistan‟s communication satellite PAKSAT-1.62 Another agreement regarding the satellite‟s ground control system was ratified during Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani‟s visit to Beijing in October 2009.63 An agreement to finance the project “Framework Loan Agreement” was ratified by both the governments in June 2010.64 Under the arrangement, Pakistan will procure RMB 86.5 million loan on concessional basis from Chinese government to initiate the work on ground control system. Militaries of both countries have already validated the project. Specialist from ground, naval and air forces of both countries participated during the initial R & D phases and the on-ground commencement of the project.65

60 “PAF Inducts Chinese-built Aerial Warfare”, Express Tribune, February 27, 2015. 61 Ghulam Ali, “China-Pakistan Space Technology Cooperation,” East Asia Forum, September 9, 2011. 62 “Satellite Loan Agreement Signed with China,” Dawn, October 30, 2010. 63 “PM Reduces Length of China Visit,” The Nation, October 11, 2009. 64 Ibid. 65 Azhar Masood, “Pakistan, China to Boost Cooperation in Space Technology,” Arab News, October 29, 2010.

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4.1.3. Naval and Maritime Cooperation Pakistan-China naval cooperation started in early 1970s when the former Admiral Muzaffar Hassan Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Navy led a delegation to China in September 1971.66 This was the first ever visit by a Pakistani Naval Chief to China. He met Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai during his visit. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai expressed his concern over the East Pakistan situation. He was of the view that the slogan of autonomy could get out of hand and would affect the security of both countries. Zhou Enlai showed his generosity by advising Chinese navy commander in chief to let Pakistan have, whatever could be supplied. He noted: “Helping friends couldn‟t be measured in terms of money, in any case selling military equipment was imperialist ploy abhorred by the People‟s Republic.”67 In order to counter unrest in East- Pakistan, China agreed to transfer small petrol craft to the Pakistan navy without any clauses regarding the cost or schedule of payments. However, these vessels could not be delivered until the creation of Bangladesh as an aftermath of Indo-Pak war in 1971.

In 1980s, the collaboration between Pakistan and China was focused on military cooperation that included transfer of military technology and arms production. In 1985, both countries began to explore the possibility of sale including transfer of technology of F22 frigates. In 1992, US$ 700-800 million were approved by the Pakistani government for the purchase of four Chinese origin Jiangwei-II frigates vessels.68 A formal agreement between China and Pakistan was signed in 2004 for the supply of four Chinese F-22P frigates.69 The detail of Pakistan‟s naval acquisition during 1990-2006 is given hereunder.

66 Thomas Kane, Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power (London: Frank Cass, 2002). 67 Vijay Shakuja, “Naval Cooperation,” in Sawaran Singh ed., China Pakistan Strategic Cooperation Indian Perspective, (New Dehli: Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2007), 22. 68 “First F-22P Frigate Handed over to Pakistan,” Embassy of PRC Islamabad, August 30, 2009. 69 “China to Transfer Technology: F-22P Frigates,” Dawn, April 7, 2005.

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Table: 4.2. Historical Overview of Pakistan-China Naval Cooperation No. Platform / Description Delivery Delivered Weapon Time 12 Shanghai Class PC 1972-73 4 Huchuan Class Hydo Folic 1973 4 Hainam Class PC 1976-80 4 Hegu Class FAC 1981 8 Hia Ying-2 Missile 1981 4 Hia Ying -2 Launcher 1981 16 Hia Ying -2 Missile 1984 4 Hia Ying -2 Launcher 1984 4 Huang Feng Class FAC 1984 1 Fquing Class Support Ship 1985 4 Type P58A Patrol Craft 1989-90 6 LY-60 Launchers 1997 96 LY-60 Missiles 1997 4 TYPE-347G Fire Control Radar 1998 4 C-801/802 Missile System 1998 32 C-801/802 Missiles 1998 3 C-801/802 Missile System 1999 4 TYPE-347G Fire Control Radar 1999 24 C-801/802 Missiles 1999 3 TYPE-347G Fire Control Radar 2000 24 C-801/802 Missiles 2000 4 Jiangwei-II Class Frigates 2003-06

Source: Sawaran Singh ed., China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation: Indian Perspective (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2007), 83-84, 92.

4.1.3.1. Chinese Frigates for the Pakistan Navy Pakistan and China are now cooperating in building submarines and bigger war ships. Both countries worked out a US$ 750 million loan to help Pakistan build four F-22P frigates. Pakistan had been striving for getting these frigates since the late 1990s. In 2004, Pakistan negotiated this non-commercial loan, i.e., low-cost, with China for the joint manufacture of naval ships.70 The real breakthrough came when they signed a contract on April 4, 2006 by finalising issues related to finance and transfer of technology. As per agreement, the first three were to be constructed at the Hudong Zhonghua Shipyard in Shanghai China, while the fourth one was to be built in Pakistan by Karachi Shipyard and

70 Baqir Sajjad Syed, “China to Build Four Submarines in Karachi,” Dawn, October 7, 2015.

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Engineering Works (KSEW).71 The implementation of the contract has been very successful. The four frigates were provided to Pakistan;  PNS Zulfiqar: The first Chinese-built F-22 frigate was operationalised on April 5, 2008 and was handed over to Pakistan Navy on 30th July 2009.72 After a month, the frigate was officially inducted in naval fleet of Pakistan. Subsequently, PNS Zulfiqar demonstrated its full potential during the “Pakistan‟s Navy Sea Spark” exercise.73  PNS Shamsheer: It was operationalised on October 31, 2008 and was commissioned in the Pakistan Navy on December 19, 2009.74  PNS Saif: The launching of PNS Saif was conducted on May 28, 2009 and the ship was officially commissioned on September 15, 2010 in Pakistan Navy.75  PNS Aslat: It was handed over to Pakistan Navy in June 2011.76

Pakistan and China have also agreed to increase their cooperation in the manufacturing the eight F-22P frigates77 and for this purpose both countries are utilising the expertise of Hudong Zhonghua shipyard (Shanghai) and KSEW. The estimated cost to build each frigate exceeds around US$ 175 million; the aggregate cost of eight F22P frigates is almost US$ 1.4 billion.78 The dominating factor of F22P frigate in the battle field is that it‟s mechanised ability to fire surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and long range surface-to- surface missiles (SSM). Besides, the advanced 76mm guns, torpedoes, depth charges and close-in-weapons-system, the F22P frigates has the capability to conduct electronic warfare with high-tech command and control system, which has earned itself the prideful

71 Ibid. 72 “Pakistan Navy Commissions Fourth F-22P Frigate,” Naval-Technology (Online Magazine), April 19, 2013. 73 “Naval, PAF Chiefs Witness Exercise Sea Spark,” Dawn, November 10, 2015. 74 “Armed Forces to be Fully Equipped: PM,” Nation, February 9, 2010. 75 Ibid. 76 Usman Khan, “PNS Aslat Induction in Pak Navy to Boost Maritime Security,” News Tribe, September 3, 2013. 77 F22P frigate is the modified version of Chinese 053H3 Frigate. 78 “J-10: The New Cornerstone of Sino-Pakistani Defense Cooperation,” The Jamestown Foundation, December 16, 2009.

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name of “sword-ship” in Pakistan Navy.79 The displacement volume of ship is 3000 tons and it carries Z9EC anti-submarine helicopter. Although, Sea-King helicopters are a part of Pakistan naval force to counter submarine operations, but after the provision of Chinese made Z9EC helicopters, the anti-submarine operational capability will be further intensified.80

Upon accomplishment of building three F22P frigates in China, the Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Noman Bashir lauded the Pakistan-China cooperation in the construction of submarine and further identified the construction of bigger mechanised warships, and acquisition of advanced technology to build modern weapon based submarines.81 He further briefed that in coming times, both countries are determined to build bigger ships then the current F22P frigates.82

4.1.3.2. Joint Naval Exercises The first joint naval exercise between Pakistan and China took place on October 21, 2003.83 This was also China‟s first naval exercise with any foreign country. Pakistan marked this exercise as a landmark in the strong bilateral cooperation between two countries in defence sector. During his visit to China in May 2004, Admiral Shahid Karim Ullah, Chief of Naval Staff (Pakistan Navy), called on Defence Minister General Caogaugchuan, Vice Admiral Zhang Dingfa (Commander People‟s Liberation Navy) and Lieutenant General Li Jinai (Head of General Armament Department).84 During the discussion, both sides agreed to continue joint naval exercises and cooperation in the non- traditional security fields in order to strengthen defence capability and enhancement of professional skills. A consensus was also reached to enhance long term cooperation through joint naval exercises and by exchange of high level visits.

79 “Pakistan Navy Chronology of Important Event from 1947 to June 2012,” Pakistan Navy, http://www.paknavy.gov.pk 80 Ibid. 81 “Pakistan and China Cooperation in Building Submarines, Bigger War Ships Identified,” Pakistan Daily, September 21, 2010. 82 Ibid. 83 “Sino-Pakistiani Joint Navy Exercise,” China-daily, October 22, 2003. 84 “Pakistan Navy Chronology of Important Event.”

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The strategic ties between Beijing and Islamabad have strengthened the cooperation among two countries that surrounds almost all fields of economy, energy, industry and infrastructure. However, the nuclear and military cooperation lays down the foundation of the said cooperation. The bilateral cooperation is visible both at political and military levels. A major part of Pakistan‟s defence equipment is of Chinese origin which is a clear projection of strong military cooperation among both countries. Such relations are the basis of Pakistan‟s foreign Policy.85 However, their relationships are also shaped by the shared perception about neighbouring countries - particularly the hegemonic ambitions of India.

4.1.3.3. Maritime Cooperation China has its legitimate interest in Indian Ocean due to the fact of being an emerging power and the second largest consumer of energy in the world. It is estimated that with an annual growth rate of seven percent, the amount of China‟s trade passes through Indian Ocean is around US$ 100 billion.86 The main worry of Chinese planners responsible to keep the sea lines secure has increased by realising the fact that China‟s oil consumption will be doubled in the next 25 years. Many Chinese scholars assert that their country‟s role should be more influential in the maritime domain and so do many regional states would like for China, in order to counter the balance and influence of the US in the region. However, China has no such plans to get more influential in the greater Indian Ocean. It is more focused towards its energies in East Asia. China‟s unthreatening posture in the Indian Ocean is only concerned about security of its sea lines communication and to contribute to international humanitarian and law enforcement efforts.87

In April 2015, Pakistan‟s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif approved a deal to buy eight submarines from China. A former senior Pakistan Navy officer with knowledge of the negotiations told the Financial Times the contract could be worth of US$ 4 billion to US$ 5 billion. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said, China and Pakistan

85 Ayesha Siddiqua Agha, “In Search of Policy,” 159. 86 Brahma Chellaney, “China‟s Indian Ocean Strategy,” Japan Times, June 23, 2015. 87 Ibid.

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were friendly neighbours and that the two sides had normal military exchanges. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), during 2010-14, China was top supplier of weapons with almost half of Pakistan‟s defence inventory was Chinese supplied weaponry.88 In July 2015, both countries agreed to sign a multi-billion dollar deal that would enable Beijing to provide eight submarines to Pakistan Navy - the agreement has been termed by several analysts as the largest-ever defence deal that China has agreed to pursue with any country.89 During the same period, both countries also signed an agreement for construction of six patrol vessels for the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (PMSA). The agreement was signed by China Ship Trading Company (CSTC) and the Pakistan‟s Ministry of Defence Production. According to the agreement, four ships would be built in China while the remaining two will be built at Karachi Shipyard under a transfer of technology agreement.90

4.1.3.4. Gwadar Port China is the biggest lender of finance in the development of Gwadar Deep Sea Port, located at the strategic location on Strait of Hormuz. The port enables China to have strategic influence in Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. However, India and the US are not comfortable with Chinese presence being stationed at the parallel of Strait of Hormuz - the important maritime juncture which holds sway of around 80 percent of world‟s energy trade. Interestingly, Chinese presence in Gwadar provides the country a monitoring capability over the Persian Gulf‟s shipments. Chinese strategic presence in Indian Ocean further bolsters the escalating Chinese influence vis-à-vis Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka, which raises the Indians concerns to further strengthen their naval defence.91 It is viewed sceptically by both America and India as a possible launch-pad for Chinese naval operations in the Indian Ocean.92

88 Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman, “Trends in International Arms Transfers 2014,” SIPRI, March 13, 2015. 89 Shahbaz Rana, “Defence Cooperation: Pakistan to Buy eight Submarines from China,” Express Tribune, July 24, 2015. 90 Shahbaz Rana, “Defence cooperation.” 91 “Gwadar, Pakistan - The Most Important City You‟ve Never Heard of,” Newyork Post, October 16, 2010. 92 Ibid.

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The development and operationalisation of Gwadar deep sea port can play an important role in the security and prosperity of both China and Pakistan. In the prevailing geopolitical and maritime environment, joint strategy by both countries in making this port as energy and trade hub will be helpful for peace and prosperity of the region. The establishment of a strategic Pakistan-China block with the likeminded countries can be helpful in countering the existing influence of US and its allies. The Indian Ocean has its immense importance regionally and internationally mainly due to its vast resources and economic potentialities. In order to promote peace in the region, both US and China needs to balance their influence in the region. China and Pakistan can play a key role in the future framework of the Indian Ocean region.93 Map: 4.1. Gwadar Port as a Regional Hub

93 Azhar Ahmad, “Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean Region,” ISSI proceedings of two-day seminar on China-Pakistan Relations 2011: Year of Friendship, January 11-12, 2011.

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Source: “How will Gwadar port deal between Pakistan and China affect India?” December 22, 2015, available at www.quora.com

4.2. Nuclear Cooperation In the earlier stages of Pakistan‟s nuclear program, the country had to face arduous export constraints from western countries in acquisition of nuclear related equipment and material. China stood by Pakistan during those difficult times and extended its assistance in developing Pakistan‟s nuclear infrastructure. It was the result of Chinese cooperation that Pakistan built its first plutonium producing nuclear reactor at Khushab.94 Pakistan acquired 5,000 ring magnets - a high speed rotational component of centrifuge, from China National Nuclear Corporation which further amplified the Pakistan‟s uranium enrichment facility. In the mid-1990s, during the development of Chasma Nuclear Power Complex and plutonium-reprocessing facility, Pakistan received considerable technical and material assistance from China to accomplish the project.95 It is also perceived in certain quarters that Pakistan may have acquired nuclear technology from China to attain the status of “nuclear state” with over a hundred nukes in its strategic arsenal, as of 2011.96

4.3. Pakistan-Afghanistan-China Collaboration in Regional Security There is a clear affinity between Chinese and Pakistan‟s point of view on the matter of regional security. Both countries show keen interest in the stability, security, and rehabilitation of Afghanistan, and at the same time they are also the biggest exporters to this country. There is close partnership between Pakistan and China specifically in the field of mineral resources and energy sector. China and Pakistan have also extended their interest in exploring the potential energy resources in Afghanistan. Pakistan is beneficiary to “Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India” (TAPI) gas pipeline project, proceeding with the assistance of Asian Development Bank (ADB). China has already demonstrated

94 “Pakistan Nuclear Weapons: A Brief History of Pakistan's Nuclear Program,” Federation of American Scientists, December 11, 2002. 95 Ibid. 96 “Pakistan Doubles its Nuclear Arsenal,” Washington Post, January 31, 2011.

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its avidness to be a party in regional development projects, such as TAPI and IPI gas pipelines projects.97

Over the years, China has substantially contributed in the reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, albeit its bilateral aid volume to Afghanistan has been flickering. Besides the construction of various roads, China has contributed in building major public hospitals in Kandahar and Kabul, along with the restoration of irrigation project in Parwan Province.98 Under the lately signed agreement, Pakistan is expected to import electricity from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan through Afghanistan. In Pakistan‟s perspective, the rising Chinese involvement in Afghanistan will be proved prosperous for the regional stability as it will bring the positive change in the war-ravaged Afghanistan. In the long-term strategic perspective, it will benefit all three countries. China has multi- dimensional strategic interest in Afghanistan. Chinese declared stance in strengthening relations with Afghanistan is conditional to the stability of the war-torn Afghanistan. In spite of the presence of NATO and US forces in Afghanistan, the security situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating every passing day. The instability in Afghanistan will have a spill over effect on the neighboring countries including China. Being an important neighbour of Afghanistan China has stakes in the stability and peace of Afghanistan.

Clearly, Afghanistan remains the missing link which is thwarting the realisation of the region‟s full potential. Prospects of a peaceful Afghanistan offer huge opportunities for regional cooperation. In this context, China and Pakistan appear to be natural partners. China has the economic and technical resources to undertake large infrastructural projects and energy and transport corridors traversing Afghanistan. Pakistan in turn is geo- politically the most feasible route, both land and sea for transporting Afghan and Central Asian energy and natural resources to Chinese mainland avoiding congested sea lanes in the Strait of Malacca.99

97 Fazal-ur-Rahman, “Traditional and Emerging Areas of Strategic Cooperation between Pakistan and China,” Strategic Studies, January 9, 2011. 98 Farid Behbud and Manan Arghand, “China-built Hospital Helps Afghan War Victims in Kandahar,” Xinhuanet, February 1, 2013. 99 Simbal Khan, “Afghanistan and its Geopolitical Environment: Opportunities and Challenges,” Strategic Studies, no. 3 & 4. (Autumn and Winter, 2010), 38.

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4.4. Chinese Political Support for Strengthening Pakistan’s Security China has always been supportive towards Pakistan, not only economically and militarily, but also politically. China maintains high level exchanges with different political parties of Pakistan to strengthen communication level between the two countries. Similarly, Pakistan considers importance of Chinese political support at high level. The Chairman of the Chinese People‟s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) has categorised relationship between China and Pakistan solid as rock as well as harmonious, trustful and friendly. Both sides take this relationship as a model of relationship between two countries having different cultural backgrounds.100 China has many times assured Pakistan of its continuous support to safeguard its national security and to promote its economic development. Chinese government promised to encourage development in Pakistan. This friendship is based on trust, mutual understanding and respect.101

China has been a strong ally for Pakistan when it comes to the support of Pakistani stance at international arena. One such recent example is when China called on international community to support Pakistan regardless of the increasing criticism on the country‟s effort to tackle the terrorism following the Osama Bin Laden‟s killing near a military academy.102 At the time when majority of law makers of congress were of the view that the policy of financial aid to Pakistan should be reconsidered, China stood up for its all- weather friend and neighbour, defending it by calling it a fore-front ally in international counter terrorism efforts. China has shown its trust and satisfaction over Pakistan‟s policies and efforts to fight terrorism keeping in view its own national situation. China has shown its concern over US intensions to block the aid towards Pakistan, and clearly stated that “it could be harmful to Pakistani efforts for countering terrorism”.103 In fact, throughout the history of these countries, China has always proved that it is Pakistan‟s most reliable and a true friend – it always tried to help Pakistan when US imposed

100 Salman Masood, “Pakistan President to Visit China, a Valued Ally,” New York Times, October 12, 2008. 101 “China‟s Top Political Advisor Meets Head of Pakistan‟s Opposition Party,” Xinhua News, April 20, 2011. 102 Ibid. 103 Ananth Krishnan, “China for Global Support to Pakistan,” Hindu, May 6, 2011.

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sanctions on it and India attempted to isolate it internationally. China stood up against all odds and came to rescue the image of Pakistan and tried to highlight the real picture of the country which had suffered more than 35,000 lives since the launch of war against terrorism.104

4.5. Pakistan-China Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security Issues Non-traditional security refers the issues of low-politics which includes terrorism, drug trafficking, human smuggling, environmental pollution, and natural disasters. Cooperation in non-traditional security challenges need to be carried out on the basis of equality, non- interference and mutual respect. In the post 9/11 era, the religious extremism and terrorism have become major worldwide threats and these are interwoven with several conventional, non-conventional and regional security issues. In the prevailing situation, it is crucial to enhance security cooperation to curb terrorism which poses a major non-traditional security threat to many countries. China and Pakistan are cooperating in meeting the emerging non-traditional security threats such as religious extremism, terrorism and natural disasters.

4.5.1. Combating Extremism, Terrorism and Separatism Pakistan-China friendship has been exemplary throughout the times - both the countries have supported each other in almost all fields of life. One of the most important aspects of this cooperation also includes collaboration against terrorism, extremism and separatism. Security delegations from both countries are attempting to enhance the sanguine prospect of bilateral cooperation to eliminate terrorism and extremism. The Indian and global media created hype to characterised Pakistan over the incidence of terrorism in Kashgar region of China.105 They attempted to label Pakistan as the patronage state for terrorism in Kashgar region of China, to which Pakistan issued a statement denouncing terrorism and separatist movement in China. Pakistan construed the stable China a vital ingredient for Pakistan‟s strength within the region.106

104 S.M. Hali, “China‟s Lone Voice of Sanity,” Nation, May 11, 2011. 105 Carrie Gracie, “Xinjiang: Has China‟s Crackdown on „Terrorism‟ Worked?” BBC News, January 2, 2015. 106 “Mushahid for Cooperation with China on War against Terrorism,” Daily Times, August 6, 2011.

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Islamabad has assured full support to Beijing against terrorists who were involved in deadly attacks in the Kashgar city of Xingjian province. Pakistan‟s Foreign Office as well as Director General Intelligence expressed their solidarity with China in order to cooperate and support the Government of China. The perception was propagated particularly by India that Pakistan was involved in this terrorist activity, this was renounced by China‟s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ma Zhauxu that: “Pakistan is an important frontline state in the international fight against terrorism and has made an outstanding contribution to battling terrorism. China and Pakistan are friendly neighbours and we have developed healthy cooperation in the anti-terror area.”107 Pakistan in the past has handed over the suspects whenever China provided the information and those perpetrators were eliminated so that Pakistani soil cannot be used to carry out any activities against China. On the other hand, China has also supported Pakistan at all levels.108

The security cooperation among both countries is vast - the recent terrorist incidents that took place in Kasghar province in China resulted in the agreement of both countries to strengthen intelligence cooperation. Pakistan has assured China of providing full intelligence cooperation on East Turkistan Islamic movement which is said to be working for the separation of Xingjian from China by means of violence and terror. This assurance was conveyed to Chinese officials by Director General Intelligence Bureau Javaid Noor during his visit to China.109 China has acknowledged Pakistan‟s role in ensuring regional stability as well as in fighting militancy extremism and separatism. China considers Pakistan as its important strategic partner this statement was endorsed by Chinese state councillor Liu Yan Dong and the similar sentiments were also reported from the Pakistani side.110

107 Ayaana Malik, “Pak-China Ties and Terrorism,” Pakistan Observer, August 8, 2011. 108 Mohammad Jamil, “Kashgar Not to Affect Pak-China Ties,” Pakistan Observer, August 9, 2011. 109 “Pakistan, China Agree to Strengthen Intelligence Cooperation,” Dawn, June 7, 2011. 110 “China Acknowledges Pakistan‟s Role in Regional Security, Fighting Terrorism,” APP, May 18, 2011.

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On the Osama Bin Laden operation, carried out by the US forces; Pakistan was monitored on the global stage. However, China officially showed its support for Islamabad‟s efforts in the war on terror, highlighting the fact that Pakistan‟s territorial sovereignty should be respected.111 China acknowledges the fact that terrorism, separatism and extremism is a serious threat to regional peace stability and security. Pakistan has assured China that it will never allow its territory to be used for attacking any country. Similarly, on a number of occasions China has also showed a firm determination on policy of pursuing friendly ties with Pakistan. As a reaction, Pakistan also claims that friendship with China is bedrock of Pakistan‟s foreign policy.112

Joint cooperation among two countries to eradicate terrorism included Pakistan-China joint military exercises which were aimed at providing opportunities from each other‟s expertise that will help fortify the defence of two countries. The Chinese deputy chief of general also categorised terrorism as a common enemy of both countries. He added that joint military exercises would be beneficial for combating terrorism. In this context, in order to fight against terrorism, China has offered military aid to Pakistan. Pakistan has purchased military equipment from China to strengthen its efforts against militants and separatists.113

4.5.2. Cooperation in Natural Disaster Management Pakistan-China friendship and cooperation has always served the interest of both countries contributing towards the peace, stability and development in the region.114 China has always helped Pakistan in the time of difficulty at every channel, especially when facing natural disasters. During the October 2005 earth-quake, China helped Pakistan with US$ 20.5 million in aid. It also donated US$ 0.5 million at the UN donor‟s

111 “China Vows to Fight Terrorism with Pakistan,” China Daily, May 20, 2011. 112 “China Throws Weight behind Pakistan,” Express Tribune, May 20, 2011. 113 Ibid. 114 Joint Statement between the People‟s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, December 19, 2010, available at www.mofa.gov.pk

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conference in Geneva. Chinese rescue workers were arduously involved in providing help to the victims in affected areas.115

In the flood of 2010, China helped Pakistan a lot. It provided 320 million Yuan (US$ 247 million) of humanitarian supplies to Pakistan. Additionally, Chinese Premier Wan Jia Bao also promised to give US$ 200 million in the four batches.116 China announced that it will provide further emergency aid worth of 10 million Yuan (1.48 million US$).117 Beside this, Chinese People‟s Liberation Army donated 10 million Yuan118 while Red Cross China gave US$ 0.5 to Pakistan. On August 13, 2010, China announced more humanitarian aid in the shape of 50 million Yuan (7.35 US$).119 A Chinese rescue and research team helped many people in the cities of Thatta in Sindh Province. On September 2, 2010, China provided its four helicopters for search and rescue operations in the flood affected areas of Pakistan.120 On September 6, 2010, China announced big aid package worth of 200 million Yuan. Chinese government also helped Pakistan in the flood of 2011 and announced to give US$ 4.7 million aid assistance for the victims.121

On his visit to the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Chinese Premier Wan Jia Bao said that China will continue to help Pakistan in the post disaster phase and will provide all the resources and technology that is required in the times of disasters.122 PAK SAT-IR is another symbol of Pakistan-China cooperation. The satellite has expanded Pakistan‟s capabilities with regard to weather forecast, disaster prevention and management.123

115 “Chinese Govt. Official Web Portal,” Xinhua, October 30, 2005. 116 “Pakistan China Pledges More Cash for Pakistan Flood Victims,” Agence France-Presser, September 23, 2010. 117 “China May Increase Aid to Pakistan as UN Appeals for $ 460 Million Donation,” Bloomberg News, August 12, 2010. 118 Ibid. 119 “China Offers New Aid To Flood-Hit Pakistan,” Malaysian News Agency (BERNAMA), August 13, 2010. 120 “Pak Flood Relief: China Offers Additional 30 mn US dollars, More Troops and Choppers,” ANI, July 7, 2011. 121 “Heavy Rains, Floods Kill 233, Affect 5.5 million in Pakistan,” CNN, September 14, 2011. 122 “Pakistan, China Cement Enduring Ties,” The Daily Mail, December 20, 2010. 123 Masood Khan, “PakSat-IR symbol of Pak-China Cooperation in Space Science & Technology:” Nation, August 8, 2011.

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The discussion presented in this chapter surmises that with the dawn of new era, China and Pakistan have broadened their defence sharing into joint venture defence production. There is a strong collaboration between two countries in defence production, a testimony to which is the advanced weapon system based JF-17 Thunder aircraft and F22P-Frigates, this partnership will further provide Pakistan with the technological transfer of J-10 aircraft. China acknowledges the prospect of high-tech defence industry in Pakistan, owing to availability of vast human capital resources and is thus willing to invest in joint defence production. China and Pakistan anticipate lucrative markets for their defence export in Middle East, Asia and Africa. Pakistan‟s traditional military doctrine - to prefer ground forces over aerial and naval forces, has witnessed a significant shift owing to growing cooperation between the two countries in aviation and naval defence system. The contemporary regional environment based on changing security parameters has led both countries to recognise the importance of invincible aerial and naval defence system. The growing partnership between Pakistan and China in the field of aviation and naval defence system exemplify this acknowledgement.124

Although traditionally both countries gave priority to their diplomatic and defence cooperation, with the dawn of 21st century, both countries have also realised the importance of trade and economic cooperation to boost up their strategic partnership. The next chapter gives an analytical overview of Pakistan-China bilateral trade, Free Trade Agreement, Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan and prospects of CPEC under China‟s OBOR initiative. Furthermore, it examines the role of economic cooperation in promoting regional stability in the context of Chinese investment in Afghanistan with the objective of building Pakistan-Afghanistan-China trilateral cooperation.

124 Tarique Niazi, “J-10: The New Cornerstone of Sino-Pakistani Defence Cooperation,” China Brief 9, Issue 25, December 16, 2009.

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CHAPTER - 5 PAKISTAN-CHINA ECONOMIC AND TRADE COOPERATION Economic interdependence provides a solid base for the development of relations between various countries, especially among the neighbouring countries. In an age of globalisation, economic development has become an important imperative for national and regional security. In order to meet this imperative, Pakistan needs to further enhance economic cooperation with China. There is a lot of potential and scope for both countries to benefit from mutual trade and by undertaking projects relating energy and infrastructure development.

Rising China has the potential to help Pakistan, through trade and investment. China‟s economy is full of vigour and is going to become the world‟s largest economy in the coming decade. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China‟s GDP surpassed the US in 2014, in term of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), making China the world‟s largest economy.1 It is expected that the Chinese economy could be twice that of the US by 2030.2 China has become the world‟s leading exporter; it also surpassed the US as the world‟s biggest trading nation in 2012. China‟s global investment is projected to reach as much as one to two trillion dollars by 2020.3 China has over 1.3 billion population, roughly a fifth of the global population known as the most populous country of the world.4

China is focusing to increase its trade and investment with South Asian countries. The existing strategic partnership between China and Pakistan can be further consolidated by enhancing trade and economic cooperation between the two countries. The new Chinese leadership is interested in helping Pakistan through trade and investment. China is on the top of the list of countries, providing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Pakistan.5

1 Ryan Gorman, “China Overtakes the US as World‟s Largest Economy,” December 4, 2014 available at www.aol.com 2 Jon R. Taylor, “Learning to Be Number Two. Is America Ready to Lose its Primacy in the Global Arena?,” Beijing Review, no. 51 (December 19, 2013). 3 Heriberto Arujo and Juan Pablo Cardena, “China‟s Economic Empire,” New York Times, June 1, 2013. 4 “China: Total Population from 2010 to 2020,” The Statistics Portal. 5 “Pakistan Ranks 62nd in FDI-friendly Countries,” Dawn, October 2, 2014.

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The economic and trade cooperation has been given a special status in bilateral relationship of China and Pakistan in the post 9/11 period. The economic and trade cooperation has seen an upward trend. China played a very important role in developing infrastructure in Pakistan. During Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi‟s visit to Pakistan in February 2015, both countries agreed to step up a new mechanism for a comprehensive counter terrorism cooperation to ensure safety of their peoples and the promotion of trade. Within the framework of CPEC, both countries also agreed for the early completion of energy and infrastructure projects. The Chinese Foreign Minister termed the CPEC as a flagship strategic cooperation programme.6

The idea of building the CPEC was announced by Chinese Prime Minister during his visit to Pakistan in May 2013.7 The corridor project has four main pillars: i) the Gwadar Port, ii) energy projects iii) transport infrastructure, and, iv) industrial parks. The network of roads and establishment of industrial parks would provide a huge opportunity for trade and business between the two countries. The corridor would not only be beneficial for China and Pakistan but also for the whole region.

5.1. Bilateral Trade: Pre and Post 9/11 Situation Since the dawn of 21st century, the process of economic globalisation and regionalisation has intensified the changes in the international economic field, mostly because of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Economic diplomacy and search of business opportunities abroad became an important policy approach by many countries. Free trade and investment agreements are the tools used for enhancing trade and economic cooperation. According to Sardar Aminullah Khan: “Trade is regarded as a major source of economic revenue, investment and modern technology. Pakistan and China are two friendly countries and partners in international trade and investment. Consistent growth in economic relations amplifies the strength of their relationship.”8

6 “Chinese Foreign Minister‟s Visit to Pakistan,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs Islamabad, Pakistan, February 13, 2015. 7 “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” Progress, August 2015. 8 Sardar Aminullah Khan, “Pak-China Economic Relations,” February 20, 2009, available at www.cssforum.com.pk

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The prevalent trade model between China and Pakistan has not been of much advantageous for Pakistan. There is a growing dependency on Chinese merchandise in Pakistani market. The overall experience of trade between the two countries has been par- excellence owing to the practices of readily accessible measures in trade. In Pakistan, China has emerged as one of the biggest importer in recent times due to the bulk of merchandise imported in Pakistani markets. China has been exporting machinery, chemicals, garments and other textile products, stationery and construction materials. The largest chunk of imported goods to Pakistan is mainly comprised of electrical appliances and machinery.

Trade between the two countries generated seven billion dollars in the year 2011 alone.9 However, much of this trade alignment has been propitious for China owing to the exports from Pakistan at small-scale. There is an understanding between the two countries to amend such discrepancies in trade.10 Pakistan‟s export such as agriculture, textile and leather products along with mineral and chemicals to China, has been quite profiteering for Pakistan. Several Pakistani products are commercially successful owing to their indigenous and adequate production; these include fruits, oil seeds, perfumery, base metals and plastic goods. China has a constructive and favourable position vi's-à-vi's its exports to Pakistan, which includes from machinery to transport equipment, and from precious instruments to precious pearls and stones. China has comparative advantage in man-made filaments for aircraft and spacecraft.11

Since the signing of Free Trade Agreement with China in 2007, Pakistan‟s trade volume with China enhanced substantively. During the fiscal year 2014-15, China emerged as the largest trading partner of Pakistan. The trade volume between the two countries reached to US$ 17 billion in November 2015 showing an increase of 19 per cent of trade volume of the previous year.12 In his interview that appeared in the Press on May 22, 2016,

9 Masood Khan, “China-Pakistan Business Relations,” Nation, April 17, 2012. 10 Mansoor Ahmed, “Pakistan Can Export Thousands of Products to China at Zero-duty: Afridi,” News, February 24, 2015. 11 Sardar Aminullah Khan, “Pak-China Economic Relations.” 12 Chinese Embassy in Pakistan, “Remarks by Ambassador Sun Weidong at the Opening Ceremony of Pakistan China Business Friendship Conference,” Januaty18, 2016, http://pk.chineseembassy.org.

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Chinese Ambassador H.E. Sun Weidong stated that Pakistan-China bilateral trade has reached to around US$ 18.9 billion.13 The mutual cooperation between the two countries opens wide vistas of opportunities in the field of information technology, telecom, engineering goods, textile machinery and textile products, automobiles, chemicals, polymers, fertilizer and electronics.14 Besides, the agro-based industry including processing and packaging of food and fruits, livestock, oil and gas, power sector industry, mining and dairy farming are also to take advantage in the result of growing mutual cooperation as China is Pakistan‟s largest trade partner at the bilateral level.15

The strategic relations between China and Pakistan have increased a lot in the post 9/11 area. The same situation can also be seen in their bilateral trade which in fact is an important component of the overall strategic partnership of these two countries. During the early period, the total volume of bilateral trade between China and Pakistan was very low. For instance in 1960, Pakistan‟s export to China was merely four million dollars and the amount of its import from this country was worth nineteen million dollars. In the year 2000, the total volume of their trade reached to US$ 822 million, in which the share of Pakistan‟s imports was US$ 337 million while the imports from China were worth US$ 485 million (Figure: 5.1). Although, during these 40 years, the volume of their bilateral trade became 43 times bigger, it was still not much when considering: i) the size of their economies, ii) their close friendly relations, iii) their geographical connection to each other, iv) having a diversity of domestic production and consumption, and, v) enjoying comparative advantages of producing diverse commodities.

13 “Sino-Pak Bilateral Trade Reaches dollar 18.9 billion,” The Nation, May 22, 2016. 14 Mansoor Ahmed, “Pakistan Can Export Thousands of Products.” 15 Muhammad Asif, “China-Pakistan Relations,” CSS Career Forum, December 24, 2013.

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Figure: 5.1 Pakistan's Trade with China in the Pre 9/11 Era 900 800 700 600

500 Total Trade

in million in 400 Export 300

US$ Import 200 100 0 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Y e a r s

Source: ICT, "Trade Maps," July 23, 2014, http://www. trademap.org/Index.aspx.

Pakistan‟s economic interdependence with China has grown rapidly in the post 9/11 period. For instance, in 2014, China was Pakistan‟s largest source of imports and it was second largest market for Pakistan‟s exports. Pakistan‟s exports to China grew rapidly following the signing of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2006. Therefore, during 2007- 14, with the figure of US$12.7 billion, the volume of bilateral trade became double. However, whether it is the pre 9/11 or the post 9/11 period, in spite of continuous and tremendous increase in the total volume of bilateral trade, the gap between export and import is constantly increasing. Undoubtedly, Pakistan‟s exports to China have largelt increased; the increase of import from this country is far higher than the import and this gap is widening day by day (Figure: 5.1 and 5.2). It shows that the balance of trade is clearly in favour of China‟s interests. In order to address the trade imbalance, both the countries agreed on various steps, e.g.: i) Harvest Programme of the Free Trade Agreement (2005), ii) Free Trade Agreement (2006), iii) Agreement on Trade in Services (2009), and, iv) Second Phase Negotiations of Free Trade Agreement (2015).

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Figure: 5.2. Pakistan's Trade with China in the Post 9/11 Era

14 Total Trade 12

8 Export 6

US$ in US$ in billion 4 Import 2 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Y e a r s Sources: (1) ICT, “Trade Maps” September 13, 2015, http://www.trademap.org/Index.aspx. (2) National Bureau of Statistics, China Monthly Statistics, Beijing Vol.2, 2015. (3) Ministry of Commerce, “Pakistan Trade Statistics,” October, 22, 2015, www.commerce.gov.pk/wp-content/.../July_September_2015.html. (4) Global EDGE, Global Business Knowledge, October 22, 2015, http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/pakistan/tradestats

 Agreement on Early Harvest Programme of the Free Trade Agreement: It was signed in Islamabad on 5th April 2005. It also included Annexes relating to tariff concessions and the time schedule for reduction of tariffs. It becomes operational with effect from January 1, 2006.16  Free Trade Agreement: Negotiations on “Trade in Goods” and “Investment” were concluded and the agreement was signed in Islamabad on November 24, 2006.17 It was enforced with effect from July 1, 2007. The Early Harvest Programme was merged into FTA. In addition to Trade in Goods, the first phase of FTA included several items, e.g., investments in cotton fabrics, bed-linen, home textiles, leather articles, marble and other tiles, sports goods, citrus, mangoes, other fruits and vegetables, engineering goods, iron and steel products. China adheres to have 50 percent cuts in its tariff on fishery and dairy products, and orange juice, besides

16 “China, Pakistan Sign „Early Harvest‟ Agreement,” China.org.cn, December 9, 2005. 17 “Agreement-PCFTA,” Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.

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goods made up of plastic, rubber and leather, woven garments and knitwear. Pakistan has granted market access to China along with fruits and vegetables, raw material for several industrial sector, engineering, machinery and chemicals.18  The Agreement on Trade in Services: In accordance with Article 83 of the bilateral FTA, negotiations on “Agreement on Trade in Services” were initiated and the agreement was finalised on December 3, 2008, and signed in Wuhan (China) on February 21, 2009.19 In accordance with this agreement, Pakistan enjoys a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with China covering “Trade in Goods, Investments and Trade in Services.”20 The negotiations focused on: i) integration of Pakistan and China economies, ii) establishing investment regime in the Services Sectors, and, iii) promoting joint ventures to build the capacity of domestic service suppliers, transfer of technology and creation of new jobs in Pakistan. Phase I of the FTA ended in December 2012 and negotiations for Phase II began in July 2013. The agreement fixed US$ 15 billion target for bilateral trade of between Pakistan and China at the end of Phase II.21  Second Phase Negotiations of Free Trade Agreement: The third meeting of the Second phase of China-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement was held in Islamabad on January 6-7, 2015.22 Both sides agreed to soften up the requirements for establishment of branches of banks in each other‟s countries. Asset requirement would be reduced to US$ 15 billion from US$ 20 billion. Habib Bank Limited, United Bank Limited and National Bank of Pakistan were working to open their branches in China.23 Chinese investment for CPEC will be channelized through Pakistani banks. It will help to curtail the current account deficit. Information on modalities of establishing customs electronic data exchange was shared by the Working Group on Customs. The group will hold further meetings with their

18 Samina Shabir and Reema Kazmi, “Economic Effects of the Recently Signed Pak-China Free Trade Agreement,” The Lahore Journal of Economics, Lahore School of Economics, no. 3 (2007), 173. 19 “China-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement on Services to be in Effect Soon,” People’s Daily Online, February 23, 2009. 20 “Minutes of Third meeting of Second Phase Negotiations of China-Pakistan FTA, held in Islamabad on January 6-8, 2015,” Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan. 21 Ibid. 22 “Pakistan, China Finalise Free Trade Agreement in Banking Sector,” Custom Today Report, April 3, 2015. 23 Mehtab Haider, “Pakistan, China Agree to Open Bank Branches,” The News, January 9, 2015.

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counter parts in China to develop an online system for exchange of custom date to be launched sometime in 2016.24

Pakistan had certain reservations about the inadequate provision of services in the FTA, whereby few areas of trade were solely yielding the results, thus, Islamabad has broaden the export regime to China, taking into account multiple sectors. There is also an agreement between China and Pakistan upon the measures to restrict the exceeding quota of any particular import from either country. In addition, the tariff concession in the second phase has increased to 90 per cent items, which was previously 35 per cent.25 Currently, more than 80 per cent of Pakistan‟s export to China consists of just few products. To get maximum benefit from the Chinese market, the country needs to diversify its exports to China. Presently, there are good chances of developing the balance of trade under the Second Phase of Free Trade Agreement that would enable Islamabad to accrue more benefits, which were previously not possible. Also, the second phase of the agreement is unconditional to the implementation of first phase that was not much advantageous for Pakistan. There is an understanding between two countries to devise five working groups to revise the agreement.26

The main products being exported to China are cotton yarn, cotton fabric, leather tanned, and fish.27 Pakistan enjoys a huge export potential to China due to advantages in agriculture, mineral, chemical, textile and leather products. Besides, Pakistan has comparative advantage in oil seeds, fruits, base metals, plastic goods and perfumery, etc. China has a static advantage over Pakistan in machinery, transport equipment, chemical products, precious instruments, stone and plastic articles, home appliances, pearls, precious and semi-precious stones, etc. Man-made filaments, space crafts and aircrafts also provide a dynamic comparative advantage to China.28

24 “Minutes of Third Meeting,” Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 “Introduction to China,” Trade Development Authority of Pakistan, http://www.tdap.gov.pk 28 Muhammad Asif, “China-Pakistan Relations.”

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The cordial and durable relations between China and Pakistan have enhanced the economic cooperation resulting in the endorsement of several bilateral agreements, like China-Pakistan Joint Investment Company (CPJIC), Free Trade Agreement (FTA), customs related agreements and procedures, Double Taxation Agreements (DTA), several MoUs and other agreements in many fields.29 Lately, both countries have concurred on all-inclusive understanding on trade in services. Thus, the increase in technical and financial assistance will take place after the successful implementation of this agreement.

5.2. Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan In recent times, there has been gradual increment in mutual investments between China and Pakistan. China has made huge investment in Pakistan and several Chinese companies are actively engaged in their business in the country.30 The major companies providing services to Pakistan are Metallurgical Construction Corporation of China in mining sector, ZTE, Huawei Technologies and Machinery Imp/Exp Corporation in IT, Telecom and automobiles sector respectively. Similarly, under certain MoUs China International Water and Electric Corporation and China Petroleum are working for development in the oil and gas and power generation sectors.

It is worth mentioning that during 2015, China invested in 39 projects and its total investment in Pakistan was US$ 18.9 billion. The data show that in spite of some variations, China‟s investment in Pakistan has continuously been rising during 2003-2015 (table: 5.1). It may be mentioned here that similarly to other aspects of their bilateral relations, the real economic engagements between China and Pakistan started in November 2003 with the signing of bilateral Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), which was converted into Free Trade Agreement in 2006. The China-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement covers trade in goods as well as investment. Later, in 2013 a multi-billion dollar contract for construction and operation of Gwadar Port between the two

29 Masood Khan, “China-Pakistan Business Relations.” 30 Shannon Tiezzi, “Can China‟s Investments Bring Peace to Pakistan?,” The Diplomat, April 21, 2015.

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governments attracted enormous Chinese investment in the country, particularly in highways and mining sectors.31

Table: 5.1. China’s Investment in Pakistan Year No. Of US$ Year No. Of US$ Projects in billion Projects in billion 2015 39 18.9 2008 28 6.9 2014 28 7.6 2007 28 4.8 2013 25 3.1 2006 27 4.0 2012 17 4.1 2005 57 8.3 2011 31 2.3 2004 19 2.3 2010 18 1.3 2003 24 2.8 2009 34 4.4   

Source: Courtney Fingar, “Pakistan‟s FDI: Fuelled by China,” Financial Times, March 11, 2016.

In 2013, after the announcement of Investment Policy of Pakistan,32 Chinese investors have started joint projects with Pakistani companies, which substantially increased China‟s investment in the country. China has gradually started its investment in various sectors of Pakistan since 2006. Chinese FDI in fruits, vegetables, seafood and livestock products, electrical and non-electrical machinery, electronics, automobiles, textile and engineering has not only created thousands of jobs in the Pakistan but also increased revenues for the government.33 The telecom sector has been the largest private sector where Chinese investors are investing their capital as well as technological expertise. Currently, China is the largest foreign direct investor in Pakistan and has superseded the US in this regard.34

However, in spite of above positive dimensions, there are also some serious challenges for both countries. Chinese investors have various concerns such as security of life as well as security of their investment. There are only 140 policemen deployed in Chaghi

31 Syed Irfan Raza, “China Given Contract to Operate Gwadar Port,” Dawn, February 18, 2013. 32 Board of Investment, Investment of Policy 2013 (Islamabad: Board of Investment), 2013, 6. 33 Khurram Abbas, “Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Trade Liberalization Policies in Pakistan,” IPRI, January 30, 2015. 34 “Pakistan Receives $ 119.3 million in FDI, Higher by 7.5%,” Express Tribune, September 16, 2015.

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where several foreigners are working.35 In this fragile environment, any FDI is at risk. Moreover, unstable economic policies and unintentional procedural delays are also a factor behind low investment in the country. These concerns have limited private Chinese investors in Punjab, Urban Sindh and partially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Baluchistan. Therefore, there is a dire need that government should provide appropriate security to Chinese investors in order to retain their confidence. Moreover, promotional activities are also required in order to attract more Chinese investors particularly in agricultural sector, which is the lowest recipient of Chinese investment in Pakistan.36

Keeping in view the power shortages in Pakistan, Chinese analysts have opined that Pakistan needs to decrease dependence on hydel projects for electricity generation and must enhance the means for alternative energy resources.37 Pakistan‟s untapped resources for energy production such as coal, wind and nuclear energy have been appealing to Chinese investors for launching of multiple energy production projects. This cooperation will be further reinforced on account of technological transfer for development of nuclear reactor for energy production in Pakistan.38 China‟s commitment to invest US$ 20 billion in energy sector in Pakistan will be promising for the development of hydel, solar and coal power plants. Under the agreed civil nuclear deal, Pakistan will acquire concessionary loan of US$ 6.5 billion from China to develop two nuclear power plants 2,200 MW in Karachi.39

With the signing of numerous new agreements, Pakistan has become the top destination for Chinese investment in South Asia. Nearly 200 projects of varying size are in place today, while work is underway on 12 hydel power projects with Chinese assistance.40 Already, there are 10,000 Chinese nationals working on different projects in Pakistan. As mentioned above, the security of Chinese workers has, however, emerged as a challenge,

35 “Baloch Ire Prompts Security Fears for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” Express Tribune, April 21, 2015. 36 “Board of Investment (BOI), 2014 Annual Report,” www.boi.gov.pk 37 Musa Khan Durani, “Solar, Nuclear, Hydel? Pakistan‟s Best Power Solution is...,” Dawn, November 9, 2015. 38 “China-Pakistan Relations,” IPRI Review: Document no. 5, 2015. 39 “China to Give $6.5 bn Concessional Loan for N-plants,” Dawn, February 1, 2014. 40 Zafar Bhutta, “China Firm Offers $ 50 b for Hydro Projects,” Express Tribune, July 3, 2015.

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which Islamabad must address to accelerate different projects, some of which are designated as “early harvest” ones.41 Simultaneously, they have been participating actively in regional as well as multilateral organisations and supported the reforms for regional and multilateral liberalisation and expansion of trade. Both maintain good cooperative relations and play active role in multilateral contexts in capacity of members of important international and regional economic clubs like, the SAARC, the SCO, etc.

5.3. Learning from China’s Development Experience Over the passage of two decades, China‟s exceptional achievements in alleviating its economy have distinguished it from those of other conventional economies. The crucial and focal point of its economy has been the development of economic zones, social safety nets, forex reserves management, disaster management, regional development, agriculture development, and encouragement of FDI.42 There is considerable similitude in poor-rich and urban-rural split and economy related parameters in Pakistan and China, hence, Pakistan can benefit from Chinese expertise to alleviate its economy. There are several challenges to overcome in the process, such as exchange of information, communication and coordination, understanding of global trends, corroboration on informal trade, prompt processing of visa related issues and decisions, and the expansion of trade avenues.43 Besides, the internal security together with exercise of efficient policies and political stability play crucial role in economic alleviation.

The rapid increase in trade and economic investment is gravely obstructed by the aforementioned factors. These factors can be transformed into promising possibilities through comprehensive and strategic joint efforts. The recommendations that may improve the existing policy framework to achieve the desired results include the creation of enabling environment for timely implementation of the agreements. Moreover, the prompt operationalisation of the Transit Trade Agreement will boost the confidence of potential investor, which is indispensable for long-term sustainable economic relations.

41 Maleeha Lodhi, “China‟s Regional Strategy.” 42 Majyd Aziz, “What Can Pakistan Learn from China?” Friday Times, September 20-26. 43 Firdous Ashiq Awan, “Pakistan Development – Existential Challenges Ahead,” Nation, January 12, 2015.

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Pakistan has heavily relied on China as its crucial economic partner. China‟s swift economic growth and subsequent regional dynamics have raised the demand level for cross-country processing and production of raw materials, components and exchange of parts and products. Such Chinese context is also beneficial for the natural resources of Pakistan, enabling the increase in trade through investment to substitute the diversification risk in policy frame-work and further enhancing of cooperation across the board for mutual benefits.

Pakistan‟s economy is deeply interlinked with Chinese economy. Pakistan hails the Chinese cooperation and assistance in the development of infrastructure for various projects. The development and information sharing must be aligned forthwith to facilitate the investors for productive results on reciprocity basis. They need to very actively and forcefully promote and facilitate economic co-operation with high zeal and spirit. The measures undertaken include the aggressive economic diplomacy. Many companies have signed agreements and MoUs worth millions of dollars to cooperate and undertake joint ventures in various sectors, such as infrastructure, mass transit, communication network, finances, chemical, fertiliser, automobile energy, and agro-based industries.44 It is encouraging to see that the prospects of further consolidation of bilateral economic relations are bright as the two sides have a lot of potential for further developments in a number of fields. Moreover, as active supporters of regional economic integration, both countries can help establish an open and integrated regional market also through regional economic fora.45

5.4. Role of Pakistan as an Energy Corridor for China The surge in energy demand is the major factor concerning the development of China, an area where Pakistan can extend its assistance as an energy corridor. Currently, most of the oil import to China comes via the maritime routes of Malacca Strait and the Indian Ocean. The downside of these routes is the vulnerability in case of any terrorist attack, inhibiting the energy supply to China; specifically the Malacca Strait is more prone to

44 Sardar Aminullah Khan, “Pakistan and Leadership Transition in China,” Business Recorder, May 23, 2013. 45 Masood Khan, “China-Pakistan Business Relations.”

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any terrorist attack. In the words of Chinese President Hu Jintao, “this vulnerability and heavy reliance on the Malacca route for energy trade is the biggest weak-spot that enemy can exploit as he termed it “Malacca Dilemma.”46 Besides Malacca Strait‟s vulnerability, China‟s energy security is also facing serious concerns owing to the territorial conflicts with the countries located at littoral zone of South China Sea, which includes Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines, and Taiwan.47

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a developmental project to link Gwadar Port with Xinjiang region of China through network of highways and number of infrastructure projects such as pipelines and railways for swift transportation of oil, gas and other trade.48 The CPEC is considered critical for the future development of Pakistan- China relations. The project is so significant that China has included it in its 13th Five- Year Plan (2016-2020).49 The CPEC is a part of Chinese President Xi‟s grand strategic concept of “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) comprising of six international economic cooperation corridors identified as:  The New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic Corridor also known as Second Eurasia Land Bridge  The China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor  China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor  China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor  China-Pakistan Economic Corridor  Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC).50

46 Ian Storey, “China‟s Malacca Dilemma,” The Jamestown Foundation, April 12, 2006. 47 “Pakistan as an Energy Corridor for China,” IPRI Review 4/2012. 48 Ibid. 49 “CPEC Made Part of China‟s 13th 5-year Development Plan: Weidong,” Pakistan Today, November 23, 2016. 50“The Belt and Road Initiative,” Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKTDC), January 21, 2016.

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Map: 5.1. Six Economic Corridors under OBOR

Source: “The Belt and Road Initiative” Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKTDC), January 21, 2016.

The idea of building the CPEC was announced by Chinese Prime Minister during his visit to Pakistan in May 2013. Since then, there has been intense consultation between the two countries. The MoU on the project was signed during Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif‟s visit to China in July 2013, whereas CPEC Secretariat was inaugurated in Islamabad on August 27, 2013.51 In November 2014, Chinese government announced that it will finance Chinese companies to build US$ 45.6 billion worth of energy and infrastructure projects in Pakistan to be completed by 2017 as part of the CPEC with the allocation of US$ 33.8 billion for energy projects and US$ 11.8 billion infrastructure projects.52

A noteworthy agreement was signed between Pakistan and China on 20th April 2015, to initiate development project worth US$ 46 billion that is about 20% of annual GDP of Pakistan. Besides, under the ambit of this agreement, around US$ 28 billion will be allocated for infrastructure projects and the rest will be invested in pipeline project along with the installation of optical fibre worth US$ 44 million.53 The deal will further

51 Khalid Mehmood, “Nawaz‟s Beijing Visit: Trade Corridor Tops MoU Bonanza,” Express Tribune, July 6, 2013. 52 “All CPEC Projects to be Completed on Time,” Express Tribune, September 18, 2015. 53 Ibid.

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increase Pakistan‟s energy production by adding 10,400 MW to national grid through renewable, coal, and nuclear projects. Over the years, the dynamics of Pakistan-China strategic cooperation have become more influential. There is profound understanding between two governments on formulation of policy framework for CPEC. Both sides have formed consensus during the second meeting for cooperation on the CPEC, to expedite several projects of infrastructure, energy and the development of economic zones.54

5.4.1. Main Pillars of CPEC The corridor project has four main components: i) Gwadar Port, ii) energy projects, iii) transport and communication infrastructure, and, iv) industrial parks. The network of roads and establishment of industrial parks would provide a huge opportunity of further expansion of trade and business between the two countries. The corridor would not only be beneficial for China and Pakistan but also for the whole region. A brief description of each component of the CPEC is given in the following pages.

5.4.1.1. Gwadar Port: A Gateway to CPEC Baluchistan is an important and resource rich province of Pakistan. It shares border with Iran on south-west and with Afghanistan on its west. Gwadar is one of the important districts of Baluchistan. It is located at the crucial world‟s trading route and strategic entrance to Strait of Hormuz. Arabian Sea links Iran and Oman with Gwadar, which are 72 and 32 km away, respectively. In the year 1958, Pakistan acquired Gwadar from Oman on exchange of payment and declared it as a port in year 1964.55 The commencement of first phase of construction work at Gwadar Port started in year 2001 with the assistance of China and the foundation of the Gwadar Port was laid in year 2002 by the Chinese Premier Wu Bangguo.56

54 “China Offers Pakistan All-out Help to Resolve Energy Crisis,” Daily Times, May 10, 2014. 55 “Gwadar Port: Harbinger of Prosperity for Baloch People,” The News, December 7, 2015. 56 Jafar Riaz Kataria, “China-Pakistan Social and Economic Relations,” South Asian Studies, A Research Journal of South Asian Studies vol. 29, no.2 (July - December 2014): 395-410.

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On March 22, 2002, whilst emphasising the importance of Gwadar Port, President Pervez Musharraf said; “If we see this whole region, it is like a funnel. The top of the funnel is this wide area of Central Asia and also China‟s western region. And this funnel gets narrowed on through Afghanistan and Pakistan and the end of this funnel is Gwadar Port. So this funnel, futuristically, is the economic funnel of this whole region.”57 The road linkage between Gwadar and Saindak, offers the shortest trade route to Central Asian States. Gwadar Port provides fairway access to those of landlocked Central Asian Republics (CARs) and Afghanistan to deep water. It shortens the distance between Afghanistan, Pakistan, CARs and China. Due to the accessible connectivity feature, the port is also named as the regional hub because of its close geographical proximity with the neighbouring regions and countries of Pakistan.58 This deep sea port was officially inaugurated on March 15, 2008, thus rendering the job opportunities and alleviating the livelihood of the people of Baluchistan at large.59 The CPEC route is the shortest route as shown in the map below; Map: 5.2 Comparative Overview of Distances of CPEC Route and Sea Route to China

57 Ibid. 58 Aymen Ijaz, “Significance of Gwadar Port,” Pakistan Observer, August 18, 2015. 59 Jafar Riaz Kataria, “China-Pakistan Social and Economic Relations.”

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Source: Zofeen T Ebrahim, “China‟s new silk road: What‟s in it for Pakistan?” China Dialogue, April 22, 2015.

China‟s investment in the development of this deep sea port is commendable. The total cost of first phase of development was US$ 1.6 billion in which the Chinese contribution is US$ 198 million. Three multipurpose ship berths were constructed in the first phase.60 The second phase included the network of highways to link Gwadar Port with Karachi Port, estimated cost of which is about US$ 200 million, solely financed by China.61 Besides nine more ship berths and storage terminal will also be financed by China in the second phase of development of the port. It is expected to have the capability of handling up to 19 million tons of crude oil per year which will be refined at the port itself and then sent to China through the Gwadar-Kashgar pipeline that is on the drawing board.62

Gwadar deep sea port provides a convenient shipping access to the rest of the world. Pakistan has passed on the operational control of the port to “Chinese Overseas Port Holdings Ltd.”63 In addition, US$ 200 million will be contributed by China for further development of the port; project plan also includes the construction of railways, pipelines and roads to connect Gwadar with China. The port will be a productive export zone for Chinese finished goods. The industrial potential of Western China will accrue substantial benefits via the Xinjiang to Gwadar trade route. In time to come, Gwadar will certainly be the strategic propulsion for China in global affairs.64 Development of the port will bring a tremendous change to local areas, including two million employment opportunities in the coming eight to ten years. According to predictions made by the Gwadar Development Authority, the next three decades will see an influx of a total of 1.7 million economic migrants into Gwadar.

60 Sattar Alvi, “Gwadar‟s String of Perils,” Express Tribune, September 19, 2015. 61 “Work on Second Phase of Gwadar Port to Begin by Year-end,” Dawn, October 26, 2007. 62 Zafar Bhutta, “Gwadar Port: Pakistan, China all set to Develop Master Plan,” Express Tribune, February 15, 2015. 63 Ankit Panda, “Chinese State Firm Takes Control of Strategically Vital Gwadar Port,” The Diplomat, November 13, 2015. 64 Jafar Riaz Kataria, “China-Pakistan Social and Economic Relations.”

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Pakistan and China agreed that the development of economic and energy corridor by construction of wide network of railways and road link provide an impetus to accelerate the pace of development of the port that is earnestly required for its complete functional capabilities. The management and operational control of the post has been handed over to Chinese company and both countries agreed to develop the corridor and commence the work in due course.65 However, a major hurdle in the way of development has been the insurgency in Baluchistan that adversely affected the Chinese investment. It also construes that development is interlinked with security and political stability of the region. However, the recent visit to Gwadar by the officials of “China Overseas Port Holding Company” indicates China‟s growing interest in the development project and early completion of the port.66 China and Pakistan have commenced the development project which includes the construction of an airport along the extension of the port.67 Overall, nine projects are to be undertaken worth US$ 1.8 billion. Some Chinese companies are willing to invest in development of oil and gas refineries in Gwadar.

Various projects related to port will cost US$ 793 million which are being carried out under CPEC. These include Eastbay expressway, an international airport, construction of breakwaters, digging of berths and channels, infrastructure for free zone and export processing zones related industries, necessary facilities of fresh water treatment and supply, hospital and vocational institute.68 The work on various projects has been expedited in 2016. According to government officials, the 2016 would be the take-off year for the CPEC and Gwadar Port, with a 100 percent increase in cargo-handling and start of the free economic zone. Presently, the port is partially operative. During the past three years, besides handling limited government subsidised imports of urea, for the first time the Gwadar Port started containerised export from May 2015. The full utilisation of the port will depend on completion of railroad connectivity, availability of fresh water,

65 Khalid Mehmood, “Nawaz‟s Beijing visit: Trade Corridor Tops MoU Bonanza.” 66 “Slow Progress on Gwadar,” Dawn, March 15, 2014. 67 “Gwadar to have Country‟s Biggest Airport,” Nation, November 12, 2015. 68 Ministry of Planning, Development & Reform, Government of Pakistan, “CPEC Projects,” www.pc.gov.pk

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power and gas resources, and provision of commercial and industrial facilities in Gwadar.69

In order to connect the port with the M-8 motorway70 and N-85 highway71, the contraction work on Gwadar East Bay Expressway is in progress. This will directly link Gwadar with Ratodero / Sukkur and Quetta through Turbat, Panjgur and Surab. The Gwadar Port Authority has signed sister-port relationship memorandums of understanding with the Qingdao and Zhuhai ports of China and with the Chabahar Port of Iran. Presently, the work on finalising the free zone master plan is being carried out and efforts are being made to complete it as soon as possible.72 It is noteworthy that after the completion of port, Pakistan will emerge as a regional hub linking the landlocked Afghanistan and Central Asian countries to deep sea port and providing China the shortest sea-route to the Gulf and Iran‟s oil reservoirs.73 In term of pecuniary benefits, Pakistan will be able to grow its economy and in result ameliorating the livelihood of millions of people, specifically in Baluchistan. The interlinked connectivity will also be enhanced between South and East Asia.74 China has recognised the need to involve local workers for building of the economic corridor. Further to ensure security of the projects, the socio-cultural aspects of local population would be addressed.

5.4.1.2. Energy Projects: A Pre-requisite for CPEC To meet the growing energy demands of the country, both countries have rightly recognised the importance of energy projects. Therefore, another important component of the corridor is the energy sector development in Pakistan. According to government

69 Riazul Haq, “Govt Sees 2016 as Take-off Year for CPEC Project,” The Express Tribune, January 25, 2016. 70 M-8 motorway starts from Ratodero in Sindh Province and enter Balochistan Province passing near the towns of Khuzdar, Awaran, Hoshab, Turbat before joining the Makran Coastal Highway just east of the port city of Gwadar. 71 N-85 highway is under-construction. It is 487 km long running running from town of Surab in Kalat District to the town of Hoshab via Panjgur, Nag and Basima in Baluchistan, and then connects to M8 motorway. 72 Riazul Haq, “Govt Sees 2016 as Take-off Year for CPEC Project.” 73 Amanullah Khan, “Linkage of Gwadar Port with Karakorum Highway will Multiply Pakistan Exports to China,” Pakistan Observer, September 24, 2013. 74 Muhammad Munir, “Rise of China: Implications for Pakistan,” IPRI Insight, vol. 1, no. 2, 3 (November 2013- June 2014): 10-27.

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sources, US$ 33.8 billion were allocated for 24 power projects of 17045 MW out of which 16 projects of 10400 MW are priority projects and eight projects of 6645MW are actively promoted projects. Out of the 16 priority project, there are five coal power projects of 7560 MW, i.e., 1320MW each at Port Qasim, Sahiwal, Thar Block-1, Thar Block-2 and Rahim Yar Khan. The other two projects of 300MW and 660 MW at Gwadar and Hub, respectively. The remaining nine priority projects include: one Solar Park 1000 MW project at Bahawalpur, four wind farm projects (two projects of 50 MW each at Jhimpir, one project of 100 MW also at Jhimpir and one project of 50MW at Bhambor), two hydro projects of 870 MW and 720MW at Suki Kinari Hydropower Station (KPK) and one at Karot Hydropower Station in AJK, and two projects of transmission lines: one from Matiari to Lahore and second from Matiari to Faisalabad.

Additionally, the nine actively promoted projects include: 1320 MW Gaddani Power Park, 660 MW Coal Power Plant at Hub Balochistan, 1100 MW Kohala Hydel Project in AJK, 100 MW Pakistan Wind Farm at Jhanpir (Thatta), 1320 MW Thar Mine Mouth Oracle, 300 MW Salt Range Mine Mouth Power Project and 1320 MW Muzaffargarh Coal Power Project.75 Chinese companies involved in the projects are working hard to complete all energy projects by December 2017.76 It can be hoped that the enhancement in energy supply will positively impact on the overall process of socio-economic development in the country. In addition, China also intends to construct an oil refinery and oil storage facility at Gwadar Port which will be linked with Uighur (Xinjiang) by pipeline and a network of roads to transportation oil.77

75 Ministry of Planning, Development & Reform, Pakistan, “CPEC Projects.” October 13 2015, www.pc.gov.pk 76 “First phase of CPEC to be completed by 2017,” The Express Tribune, March 7, 2016. 77 Maqsood Ahmad Naz, “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),” Business Recorder, October 1, 2015.

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5.4.1.3. Transport and Communication Infrastructure The third important component of the CPEC is development of transport and communication infrastructure in Pakistan. Some of the major infrastructure projects are as under;78  Roads : KKH Phase II ( Railkot-Islamabad Section) of 440 km with estimated cost of US$ 3.5 billion.  Moterway : Peshawar-Karachi Moterway (Multan-Sukkur Section of 392 km) with estimated cost of US$ 2.6 billion.  Rail Sector Projects: i) Expasion and reconstruction of existing Line ML-1 of 1736 km with estimated cost 3.65 billion, and, ii) Havelian Dry Port (450M.Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units) with estimated cost of US $ 40 million.  Optical Fiber Cable: Cross Border Optical Fiber Cable of 820 km and DTMB79 with estmated cost US $ 44 million.

No doubt, these projects will initiate a new era of development in Pakistan‟s history. The creation of millions of new jobs and businesses by these projects will also help to improve the security and stability of the country. As the security and FDI always go hand in hand, it can be hoped the outcome of these projects will be helpfull to attract further investment in the country.

5.4.1.4. Industrial Parks and Gwadar Free Zone A special plan to build tax-exempted economic zones within every 200 miles distance of 2400 km long economic corridor is underway, making headway for infrastructure in Gilgit-Baltistan area and AJK. The corridor will include the areas of Turbat, Khuzdar, D.G. Khan, Mianwali, Islamabad, Abbottabad and Mansehra.80

78 Ministry of Planning, Development & Reform, Pakistan, “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” October 22, 2015, www.pc.gov.pk 79 Digital Terrestrial Multimedia Broadcast (DTMB) is a specific system of TV standard for mobile along with its fixed terminals. 80 Ibid.

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Gwadar port is envisioned to be built on the impeccable model of “Shanghai Free Trade Zone.” A delegation of Chinese business class has expressed deep interest to acquire land within the locality of “Gawadar Port Fee Zone” to build-up the industrial park.81 Thus, it would be beneficial for pervasive natural resources of Baluchistan comprising gold reserves, marble, gemstone, Copper, oil and gas to be explored and exploited by the indigenous manpower after imparting them professional training, along with the availability of economic impetus in the form of soft loan schemes. Potential sites are being identified in all provinces from Khunjrab to Gwadar to establish Special Economic Zones alongside the corridor. Each zone will target specific products and services based on the availability of local raw material, work force and other such factors. Establishment of these zones will attract local and foreign investments and generate huge employment. The following twenty seven sites82 for establishment of Special Economic Zones along CPEC have been identified by Pakistan.  Seven sites for Industrial Estate identified in Balochistan include Gwadar (3000 Acres), Lasbella (1290 acres), Turbat (1000 Acre), Dera Murad Jamali Industrial & Trading Estate (50 Acres), Winder Industrial & Trading Estate (230 Acres), Mini Industrial Estate Khuzdar (50 Acres), and Bostan Industrial Estate (1000 Acres).  In KPK, eight sites have been identified: Mansehra (80 acres), Nowshera (1000 acres), expansion of IE Zone Hattar, Phase-VII (424 acres), expansion IE Zone Nowshera (106 acre), Ghazi Hattar-II (90 acres), D. I. Khan (188 acres), Kohat and Karak (400 acre).  The sites identified in Punjab include: Multan (667 acres), Rahim Yar Khan (450 acres), Bhalwal (400 acres), D.G. Khan (3815 Acres), Mianwali Industrial Estate (600 Acres), Rawalpindi Industrial Estate (200 Acres), and Pind Dadan Khan Industrial City (10,000 Acres).  Gilgit-Baltistan: Muqpoon Dass, District Gilgit (250 Acres)  Islamabad Capital Territory: Model SEZ - ICT (50 Acre)

81 “China to Invest $ 50 bn in Development Projects in Pakistan,” Business Recorder, September 11, 2014. 82 Pakistan Board of Investment, "China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)," January 13, 2016, www.boi.gov.pk

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5.5. CPEC: A Win-Win Cooperation In the words of the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, CPEC is a win-win cooperation opportunity which is based on the spirit of openness between the two countries. He quoted an old Chinese proverb that: “A journey of a thousand miles begins with the first step.” He further emphasised the point that the CPEC will ensure the overall wellbeing of people of Pakistan.83 Also, in a broader spectrum, when considering the regional security and strategic partnership between China and Pakistan, it clearly indicates that both countries have a shared destiny and the CPEC can be supportive in making the dream of the Asian century, a true reality. In this perspective, it is also noteworthy that as long as there is interdependence in Pakistan-China relations, it would be mutually beneficial for both and would counterbalance other regional alignments. The CPEC would make China critically dependent on Pakistan and guarding Pakistan‟s territorial integrity would become Chinese core national interest.84

5.5.1. Benefits for China China‟s economic investment in Pakistan will be helpful to promote stability and security of this country. Economically strong Pakistan would be in a better position to counter extremism and terrorism in its tribal areas and will prevent spill-over effects in China‟s western regions. Furthermore, the economic corridor will help China in developing its Xinjiang region. It will enable China to seek the shortest access to the main maritime routes for its trade. Road distance from Gwadar to Khunjrab (via Ratodero, Dera Ghazi Khan, Peshawar, Abbottabad, Gilgit) is only 2627 km. Approximately, half of Chinese oil requisition is accomplished from Middle East via the supply-line of 14,500 km involving the Dubai-Shanghai-Urumqi route.85 Whereas, the raw petroleum refined at Gwadar oil refinery will provide the shortest and feasible route (i.e., Dubai-Gwadar- Urumqi rout is around 3,500 km long). Gwadar Port will expedite Chinese trade by 22

83 “CPEC: A Win-win Opportunity,” The Express Tribune, November 18, 2015. 84 Khalid Iqbal, Non-Resident Consultant, Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), personal interview, March 25, 2016. 85 Zafar Bhutta, “Gwadar Port: Pakistan, China all Set to Develop Master Plan,” Express Tribune, February 15, 2015.

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days‟ time period and will also save substantial freight charges.86 Thus, it will benefit China in improving its foreign exchange reserve structure, creating investment opportunity for Chinese firms and building new links between inner land China and Indian Ocean.87 Strategically, the CPEC will also provide China with vantage point to curtail the US and Indian influence in Indian Ocean and South-China sea, by providing it with alternate route for its energy supply from Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf to Xinjiang province.88

5.5.2. Benefits for Pakistan CPEC would be a game changer for Pakistan.89 The number of mega projects in several fields, e.g., energy, infrastructure and connectivity would revitalise Pakistan‟s economy and would help in overcoming the power shortage in the country. A variety of projects such as KKH, Karachi-Lahore Motorway, Peshawar Karachi Railway Line and Gwadar Port will mark beginning of a new era of development in Pakistan, which will create millions of jobs and contribute towards promoting new business opportunities. Moody‟s Investors Service has described the project as a “credit positive” for Pakistan.90 The corridor will transform the region and act as a catalyst for economic integration by linking south, central and western Asia.

The CPEC is not a project of just one road but it is a network of multiple roads, which will go from Gwadar to Khunjerab. Its western route passes through Gwadar up to Quetta, Quetta to Qilla Saifullah, Zhob, Dera Ismail Khan and Peshawar. The second route will be Gwadar to Ratodero, Sukkur and the Indus Highway. The third route will be Gwadar to Sukkur, Sukkur to Karachi and Lahore-Peshawar motorway.91 This situation reflects that a major benefit of CPEC is that it offers opportunities to all provinces of the

86 “Major Powers‟ Interests in Indian Ocean: Challenges and Options for Pakistan,” IPRI Conference Report, March 2, 2015. 87 “Pak-China Economic Corridor Project to Benefit Entire Region: Ahsan,” Pakistan Observer, September 25, 2014. 88 Amanullah Khan, “Linkage of Gwadar Port with Karakorum.” 89 Afshan Subohi, “China-Pakistan Corridor: Visibility of the Game Changer,” Dawn, April 27, 2015. 90 “Xi‟s Visit may Usher in Massive Development,” News, April 21, 2015. 91 Mirza Khurram Shazad, “Sound Bytes: Economic Corridor will have Multiple Routes,” Dawn, March 8, 2015.

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country and that would help in addressing the problem of economic disparities within the country. No doubt, security is a core element in the sustenance and success of every project. Chinese security concerns have been addressed by Pakistan. The military operation, i.e., Zarb-e-Azb has been very successful in enhancing peace and security in the country (section 7.1.2.).

5.5.3. Benefits for the Region The CPEC is not only a bilateral project but has the potential of transforming the wider Asian region. Since Pakistan is virtually a bridge between South Asia and Central Asia; the CPEC can benefit the three billion people of the region by promoting regional trade, security and stability.92 It can safely be argued that in addition to becoming a game changer for Pakistan; the CPEC will tremendously benefit to countries situated in this region. Pakistan can play a key role in promoting inter-regional and intra-regional trade both within the SCO, between the SCO member states, and other countries of the region and beyond.

5.6. Building the Rail-link between Gwadar and Xinjiang The planned railway line will not only be used for transporting goods but will also be helpful to build a trade and industrial belt alongside it and KKH. The railway line will pass through Hunza-Nagar (Gilgit-Baltistan) to Xinjiang.93 According to a preliminary research study conducted in June 2014, China has authorised to establish trans-national railway link to Pakistan. According to Zhang Chunlin, the head of Xinjiang‟s Regional Development and Reform Commission, the planned 1,800 km Pakistan-China railway will also pass through Islamabad and Karachi. He further emphasised upon the strategic significance of transport infrastructure as highly contributing to CPEC, once it is accomplished.94

Pakistani authorities have come to realise that the age old British-made railway system needs to be upgraded. They began to think of various development projects and sought

92 “CPEC to Benefit Entire Region, Say Analysts,” Dawn, August 31, 2015. 93 “China Tables Railway Project Linking to Pakistan,” Dawn, June 30, 2014. 94 Ibid.

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collaboration with China in this sector. In 2001, China provided US$ 250 million to improve the railway infrastructure in Pakistan. To meet China‟s vision of a global power, in 2004 it began to examine strategic implications of three ambitious railway links of which two are transnational, proposed to be connected with Pakistan and Myanmar. In this context, it spent 500 million dollars on various projects. During the same time, China also began to invest funds and technical expertise in the construction of deep water port at Gwadar. Chinese growing interest in communication infrastructure of Pakistan is evident through initiation of such projects, which at times, would enable the linkage to Chinese western regions.95 Map: 5.3. China’s Three Planned Trans-national Corridors Passing through Xinjiang

Source: “Strategic China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” South Asia Investor Review, May 23, 2013.

95 Debasish Chaudhuri, “China-Pakistan Railway Project,” VFI, October 14, 2015, http://www.vifindia.org

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It was during President Musharraf‟s visit to China in February 2006 that he repeatedly mentioned about the construction of an energy corridor between China and Pakistan.96 It appears that successful construction of the Qinghai-Tibet railway line97 gave impetus to proceed with the plan of building Pakistan-China rail-link. During his following visit to China in April 2008, President Musharraf discussed the plan of constructing a rail link between Kashgar in Xinjiang and Gwadar port.98 Along with this, it was also proposed that an oil pipe line be constructed between the Middle East countries and Pakistan. The proposed railway will follow KKH, which passes through Gilgit-Baltistan. On Pakistan‟s side (Hawalian-Khunjerab section), the total length of the line will be around 700 km while on Chinese side; it will be over 300 km long.99 The railway line will cross China‟s border at Khunjerab pass, which is situated 4700 meters above the sea level.100

It is noteworthy that the proposed railway line would not be a substitute of oil and gas pipe lines and electric cables. It will also help China‟s military industry, because Pakistan is a huge market for this country. In the perspective of their relations, it is a win-win situation for both. Pakistan imports around one billion dollar of arms and ammunitions every year and this trade further enhanced in 2015.101 Planning work is also underway to construct the railway link between Pakistani administered Azad Kashmir and Xinjiang. A feasibility report has already been carried out to build an 1100 km railway line between Havelian (Pakistan) and Kashgar (China).102 Additionally, this track will be connected with the Gwadar oil storage and oil refinery.103 According to a report based on an interview with Pan Zhiping, an eminent scholar of Xinjiang‟s Academy of Social

96 Ibid. 97 The Qinghai-Tibet railway (also called Qinghai-Xizang railway) is a highest-elevation railway in the world and its length is 1,956 km. 98 Nirupama Subramanian, “All Eyes on Musharraf‟s China Visit,” Hindu, April 8, 2008, 99 On the Chinese side, the forecasted construction time period of the track is around 10 years owing to the mountainous terrain, which necessitate the construction of mountainside tunnels, In addition, the swamp condition of soil would involve the rugged concrete work. Many experts opine that the construction cost of this rail-track would be far higher than that of Qinghai-Tibet railway which was of five million dollars per/km, which implies the accumulated cost of the rail-track project will go up to sky-high cost of five billion dollars. See: Kausar Takrim and Mustafa Afeef, “Prospects of Gwadar Port as a Hub Port,” Journal of Managerial Sciences, vol. IX, no. 1 (January-June 2015). 100 Debasish Chaudhuri, “China-Pakistan Railway Project.” 101 “Pakistan Largest Importer of Chinese Arms: Study,” Dawn, March 16, 2015. 102 Ibid. 103 Tousif Ali Yousaf, „Is Gwadar Port an Economic Haven for Balochistan and Pakistan?‟ Master‟s Thesis (Sweden: School of Economic Management, Lund University, June 2012).

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Sciences, this railway will help China to abandon the Malacca Strait, the only sea route through which Chinese vessels bring in more than 80 per cent of its required petroleum from Middle East and Africa.104 Since China does not have any hold over the Malacca strait, it is worried of being cut off from these oil exporting countries, if any war breaks out. This is what the Chinese call the “Malacca dilemma.”

India is in consultation with Pakistan and some other neighbouring countries to undertake rail-link projects to connect with resource-rich region of Middle East. The involvement of Pakistan is cardinal for any plans of linking India with central western Asia. India is also constructing a rail-line to connect with China via Myanmar. Indian link with Myanmar, via Kohima state of Nagaland, is termed as China‟s “eastern trans-national corridor.”105 This rail-link will enable India to connect with Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, as well as with the Chinese south eastern region and Russia.106 Likewise, Deputy Commerce Minister of Iran, Sadegh Mofatteh announced on his visit to Pakistan, in December 2006, that Iran was ready to provide transit facilities through land route to Pakistan.107 However, Iran is also looking to receive Pakistan‟s approval to be allowed to have access through KKH trade route with China. Both countries may extend the reciprocal approbation to use their land routes.108

A careful consideration of this whole situation reflects that the rail link will ensure steady and secure flow of oil and gas from the Middle East to the centres of economic activities in the eastern part of China. This will also help Pakistan and Iran to acquire materials, capitals and substantial military and strategic support from China. Furthermore, it will strengthen China‟s bargain position with Russia in the areas of oil and gas. This rail link will also serve as a huge artery of economic activities and transportation line of strategic materials. According to this point of view, India might be able to see the opportunities in

104 Philip McCrum, “China and the Arabian Sea,” Middle East Research and Information Project, MERIP 256, Fall 2010. 105 Atul Aneja, “Corridor will Provide Access to Sea for North-eastern States,” Hindu, June 26, 2015. 106 Rajat Arora, “New Silk Route? China Plans Kunming-Kolkata Railway Link,” The Economic Times, Jun 18, 2015. 107 Iftikhar A. Khan, “Tehran Offers Trade Corridor to Islamabad: Transit Facility for Exports to China Sought,” Dawn, December 20, 2006. 108 Ibid.

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the Pakistan-China oil cooperation and join in this economic venture, and by doing this it will not completely tilt towards the US. It can be hoped that this situation will be helpful to promote regional stability.

5.7. China’s Economic Interests and their Implications on Afghanistan China believes that the prevalent political instability in Afghanistan will foster the separatist faction in the western province of Xinjiang. There are also some brazen evidences of Uighur separatist group ETIM, being trained and harboured by Al-Qaeda and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).109 In addition, Beijing has grave concerns of potential terrorist attacks by ETIM through Sino-Afghan border and incursion into its Xinjiang region. Consequently, the economic investment strategy of China is solely dependent upon the stability in Afghanistan. Albeit, the incessant requests by the NATO countries, China has been disinclined to contribute militarily in Afghanistan. However, after the complete withdrawal of the ISAF forces in the region, China may have to realign its precautionary defence strategies.110

China has expressed its readiness to enhance the economic cooperation and to promote the political reconciliation in Afghanistan. China considers Afghanistan as a crucial link for enhanced economic influence with Central Asia and is predetermined to connect with Middle East and Europe through Central Asia via the Silk Road Economic Belt.111 The commencement of Silk-Road would increase the current Chinese economic investment in Afghanistan‟s mining and raw material industries. Sun Yuxi, the special envoy for Afghanistan announced that in future, Chinese assistance for this country would consist of two main categories; one for the government and the other for competitive enterprises.112 Although, China upholds that its participation in the development of Afghanistan is not to replenish the US presence; its delegation of special envoy for Afghan affairs does reflect the Chinese interests for strategic cooperation with this

109 Zia ur Rehman, “ETIM‟s Presence in Pakistan and China‟s Growing Pressure,” NOREF Report, August 2014, available at www.peacebuilding.no 110 Rabia Akhtar and Jayita Sarkar, “Pakistan, India, and China after the US Drawdown from Afghanistan,” International Relations and Security New Work (ISN), January 20, 2015. 111 Joseph Catanzaro et al., “Silk Road Initiative Connects Countries on Path of Prosperity,” Telegraph, July 3, 2015. 112 Ibid.

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country and the region as a whole. Currently, China‟s assistance to Afghanistan is US$ 260 million for commercial projects. In future, along with a large number of bilateral initiatives; China has expressed its interest in development of electrical power network and development of mineral resources.113

There has been long established and mutually beneficial trade and economic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. At present, the worth of enormous volume of bilateral trade between two countries is around US$ 2.4 billion, which is expected to rise in times to come. In the year 2010, both countries signed an agreement known as “Afghan- Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA)” whereby, Afghan trucks would be allowed to transit Afghan products to reach Karachi and Gwadar ports and then to be exported to India and China.114 The two countries are also negotiating to enhance trade projects, such as; a) Inception of hydroelectric dam at Kunnar River. b) “Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA- 1000)” whereby, Pakistan and Afghanistan would be able to import electricity from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the main beneficiary of this energy export project is Pakistan.115 c) The Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India (TAPI) pipeline project.116 d) Expansion of road network, connecting Pakistan‟s motorway with Afghanistan via Peshawar to Jalalabad and Chaman to Spin-Boldak.117 e) Asian Highway Network project, with the assistance of the EU to enhance trade, thus interconnecting 32 countries.118 China has promised to invest in rail infrastructure and motorways connecting Afghanistan and Pakistan.119

113 Ibid. 114 Muhammad Arshad, “PAJCCI Demands Expansion of Af-Pak Transit Trade Agreement,” Customs Today (Online Magazine), October 13, 2014. 115 Khaleeq Kiani, “Casa-1000 Breakthrough,” Dawn, April 27, 2015. 116 “Peace in the Pipeline,” Hindu, December 16, 2015. 117 “Routes to Central Asia being Constructed, Says Nawaz,” Dawn, June 16, 2015. 118 Ibid. 119 Tridivesh Singh Maini, “China-Pakistan-India Economic Trilateral: A Realistic Proposition or Pipe Dream?” South Asian Voices, March 20, 2015.

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China‟s Afghanistan policy can be seen as multifaceted proposition that would hedge its presence against putative risks and increase its economies of scale. If one looks at the map of Afghanistan, metaphorically now showcased as the “Heart of Asia”, then China is the only big power that has direct geographical access to Afghanistan and its energy and mineral resources. The rebuilding of post-2014 Afghanistan is largely harboured on China‟s financial muscle that it can deploy in harnessing these resources generating sufficient revenue for the Afghan state.120 China maintains amicable relationship with Afghanistan and is one of the largest investors in this country.121

5.7.1. Role of Economic Cooperation in Promoting Regional Stability In February 2012, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated his government‟s stance that China is contented to play the mediatory role in peace negotiations with Afghan Taliban. In his words: “We will support the Afghan government in realising reconciliation with various political factions including the Taliban.”122 Ahmed Saedi, an analyst on Afghanistan affairs opined that China‟s growing interest in Afghanistan peace process is owing to the need to safeguard its current and future investment. During recent times, along with economic investment, China has also escalated its aid and assistance in Afghanistan. “China has huge economic interests in a safe Afghanistan, as some Chinese companies have signed big contracts with the Afghan government. Beijing is worried about the faith of these contracts as international troops leave Afghanistan,” Saedi said.123

During the last four years, a steady increase in Chinese aid and economic investment can be observed. One of the megaprojects is signed between the Chinese Metallurgical Corporation and the Afghan government to exploit and develop the copper mines at Aynak, the aggregate cost of the project is US$ 3.5 billion. However, the company has not yet commenced the project due to the major impediment of insecurity to Chinese within Afghanistan. No doubt, a peaceful Afghanistan would contribute significantly to

120 Ambrish Dhaka, “Factoring Central Asia into China‟s Afghanistan Policy,” Journal of Eurasian Studies, vol. 5, issue 1 (January 2014): 97-106. 121 Andrew Scobell et al., “China‟s Strategy toward South and Central Asia: An Empty Fortress,” RAND Corporation, 2014. 122 “Big Mediator: China Offers to Broker Stalled Afghan Talks with Taliban,” RT, February 13, 2015. 123 Masood Saifullah, “Can China Help with Afghanistan‟s Peace Process?” DW, February 2, 2015.

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regional peace. China‟s relation with Afghanistan is based on the geo-political dynamics of the region, specifically its strategic relationship with Pakistan. China regards Pakistan as a strategic counterbalance to economic, political and military might of India. Any development in Sino-Afghan relations will also impact Sino-Pak relationship.

China views Afghanistan to be a great strategic partner in future. The stabilised Afghanistan is in the interest of the entire region. There are huge reserves of natural resources in Afghanistan which need to be explored and exploited, e.g., marble, copper, iron and a variety of other minerals. Afghanistan also has a potential for drilling of oil and thus, in near future it can become a commercial outlet for finished goods and imports from China.124 The following few points are particularly important in this whole process.  Oil Fields: In December 2011, Chinese state owned National Petroleum Corporation secured a deal with Afghanistan to explore and refine petrochemical reserves of the country for the stipulated 25 years of time-period.125 The oil refinery is likely to be built in one of two provinces, Sari Pul or Faryab province.  Oil and Gas Pipelines: The prospective trans-Afghan natural gas pipeline will be a valuable reinforcement for China‟s economy, originating from Turkmenistan and culminating in China.  Mineral Deposits: Chinese enormous investment in copper mining at Aynak via two Chinese companies, China Metallurgical Construction Company and Jiangxi Copper, has been one of the biggest FDIs in Afghanistan by any foreign country.126 Under the ambit of Aynak mining projects, a rail-line will be built to link the Aynak mine with the rest of the country.  Economics of Greater Central Asia Region: The untapped energy resources of Central Asia, such as; Mineral deposits and oil fields, provides promising prosperity for commercial trade in the region.127 The ensured security from

124 Michael Wines, “China Willing to Spend Big on Afghan Commerce,” New York Times, December 29, 2009. 125 Tom A. Peter, “China Wins $ 700 million Afghan Oil and Gas Deal. Why didn‟t the US Bid?” The Christian Science Monitor, December 28, 2011. 126 Ron Synovitz, “Afghanistan: China's Winning Bid for Copper Rights Includes Power Plant, Railroad,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, November 24, 2007. 127 Zehra Akbar, “Central Asia: The New Great Game,” Spear Hear Research, November 5, 2012.

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regional countries especially Afghanistan can augment the prospects of economic growth and enhance trade. China tends to benefit from such economic developments. Therefore, the old Silk Road has the potential to become a new Silk Road.128 Once again, China purview its relations with Afghanistan as one component in the broad clockwork taking into account the Central Asian economic potential.

5.7.2. Strategic Trilateral Dialogue between China, Pakistan and Afghanistan A stable and secure Afghanistan is the focal point of China‟s security agenda. China has certain scepticism vis-a-vis the internal security situation of Afghanistan. The deteriorated internal security of the country could be conducive to insurgent factions for smuggling of narcotics from Afghanistan into China and to provide refuge to associates of Uighur‟s ETIM separatists that exhibit threat to Chinese internal security.129 In this perspective, the first round of recent strategic trilateral dialogue between China, Pakistan and Afghanistan held on February 10, 2015 in Kabul. The meeting mainly focused on the Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process for which both Pakistan and China have expressed their full support.130 What lies besides this is important for India. From the year 2012, when the first Afghanistan-Pakistan-China trilateral dialogue was held in Beijing, to 2015‟s meeting, a lot of changes can be identified in the Chinese approach towards Afghanistan.131

In 2012, Chinese interest in Afghanistan was limited to supporting Pakistan to increase its influence in the country. However, slowly and strategically, China has increased its role in the economic and political scenarios of this country through its intensified diplomacy. In the above mentioned meeting held in February 2015, three sides agreed to accelerate cooperation in the fields of counter-terrorism and security.132 It can be argued that

128 Joseph Catanzaro et al., “Silk Road Initiative Connects Countries.” 129 Scott Devary, “The Approaching Xinjiang Crisis Point,” The Diplomat, October 2, 2014. 130 Anuradha Ra, “China Silently Making its Way To Afghanistan – Analysis,” South Asia Monitor, March 5, 2015. 131 “Trilateral Meeting: China Backs Pak-Afghan Appeal for Peace Talks,” Express Tribune, November 30, 2012. 132 “Countering Terror: Islamabad, Beijing and Kabul Agree to Deepen Security Cooperation,” Express Tribune, February 10, 2015.

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China‟s increased involvement in Afghanistan is in view to fill the power vacuum created in the aftermath of the US and the NATO troops‟ withdrawal with increasing apprehension that it could lead to Al-Qaeda and Taliban‟s comeback.133 China has already beefed up security along Azad Kashmir and Afghanistan to prevent the infiltration of militants supportive to the ETIM.

However, these developments in which China has extended support to build a hydro-dam and improve railway and highway connectivity between Pakistan and Afghanistan, prove that it is no more going to keep a low profile as it seeks to play a larger role in the war- torn country‟s stability and progress. Furthermore, bilateral meetings were also held between Afghanistan and China to discuss the greater role it could play in Afghanistan. In this context, a delegation of Afghan Taliban has also visited China, where it held talks with Chinese officials, but few details were made available to media by either side. In fact, China‟s increasing interest in Afghanistan could be understood as a part of its efforts to enhance its politico-strategic influence in South and Central Asia. In the recent past, China has built strong inroads in Sri-Lanka, Nepal and Myanmar. India considers these developments a challenge for its regional and global hegemonic ambitions. However, in this changing regional power dynamics, the main aim of China is to exploit the mineral deposits of Afghanistan. There are also considerations to build a railway from Kabul to Xinjiang, in parallel to similar projects prepared for Pakistan.”134

This chapter discussed the trade and economic relations between Pakistan and China. It also attempted to explore the avenues for future cooperation such as the development of an energy corridor, establishment of a transit and trade corridor by using the Karakoram Highway (KKH) as an alternate trade route, and cooperation in major infrastructure projects such as the development of coal mining for producing energy, construction of big dams, and establishment of a railway link, etc. Most of these projects are part and parcel of CPEC. The discussion highlights that the volume of trade and investment has shown very positive trends in the post 9/11 period. The next chapter analyses Pakistan-

133 Ibid. 134 “Can China Bring Peace to Afghanistan?,” BBC News, December 1, 2014.

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China relations in the context of regional organisations (i.e., SAARC and SCO). It examines the potential of SAARC and the SCO in strengthening peace and cooperation in the region, and the prospective role of China in SAARC, if it becomes a permanent member of the organisation. Furthermore, the role of SCO in promoting regional stability has also been analysed in the context of its expansion.

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CHAPTER - 6 PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS 6.1. Region and Regional Organisations One of the important imperatives of regional security is to promote regional cooperation through connectivity and economic cooperation. The role of regional organisations has become very critical in this respect. The two regional organisations, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), are pertinent for Pakistan-China relations in the post 9/11 period. The rising economy of China has the potential to invest in regional connectivity and trade in South Asia and Central Asia. The role of Pakistan in promoting regional cooperation due to its geo-strategic location is significant as trade and energy corridors for Central Asia and South Asia. Therefore, Pakistan-China relations in the regional organisations such as SAARC and SCO is an important component of their strategic cooperation. Both countries have a common interest in promoting inter-regional and intra-regional cooperation.

This chapter focuses on the potential role of SAARC and the SCO in regional peace and security. The first part of the chapter highlights the importance of China for the SAARC in the case it becomes a permanent member of the organisation, and Pakistan-China cooperation at SAARC level, specifically Pakistan‟s efforts in making China a member of SAARC. The second part of the chapter covers the role of the SCO in promoting regional stability and prospects of its expansion. The importance of Pakistan as a permanent member of the SCO has been highlighted in the context of regional security.

The pattern of cooperation and regional integration is weak between South and Central Asian states. The current phase of the 21st century is giving birth to the threats, which are trans-national in nature, consequently impacting the regional and global spectrum of security. The scourge of terrorism is one of such pervasive threats that has intensified and

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is deeply germane to both the regions.1 During Chinese President Xi Jinping‟s visit to Pakistan in April 2015, both countries agreed to strengthen coordination and cooperation on international and regional issues of common interest, and maintain close communication and coordination within international and regional mechanisms such as the UN, SCO, and the SAARC. With the active support of China, Pakistan joined SCO in July 2005 as an observer and later the process of granting Pakistan full membership of SCO was initiated at the SCO Summit held in July 2015 in Ufa, Russia.2 China played a vital role in Pakistan‟s full membership of SCO. Pakistan strongly supports China‟s case for full membership in SAARC. The resource rich China can provide financial as well as technical expertise to resource-deficient countries of the South Asia. China has already substantive economic relations with South Asia, but after acquiring the full membership of the SAARC, it will be in a position to play a decisive role for the integration, economic development and decision making mechanism of the SAARC.3

6.2. China’s Prospective Role in Futuristic SAARC During the Cold War era, countries around the globe practically faced the consequences of ideological differences and divisions. Defeat of communism led to specifically focus on promoting capitalism which is mainly based on the ideology of globalisation. The world has realised that now the success and power is embedded in the elements of globalisation, cooperation, communication, free trade and foreign investment, etc.4 In December 1985, the SAARC was constituted, initially with seven member countries: Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. In year 2007, Afghanistan joined as an eighth member state. Since the time of its origin, SAARC envisioned setting an example by the pursuit of enhanced regional cooperation, peaceful coexistence and collective self-reliance, but there have been number of impediments in achieving these goals, which have flared-up from political deadlocks and mistrust

1 Thomas Renord, “Strategic Prudence: The European Union and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation” in Mushir Anwar ed., SCO’s Role in Regional Stability and Prospects of its Expansion, (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2013), 43. 2 Zafar Bhutta, “SCO Membership: A Potential Trump Card for Pakistan,” Express Tribune, September 28, 2015. 3 Muhammad Hanif, “China should be in SAARC,” Pakistan Observer, May 12, 2012. 4 Khalid Rahman, “Regional Cooperation, Global Changes, SAARC and China,” Policy Perspectives 9, no. 1, (2012): 5-14.

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amongst states.5 In May 1997, the Ninth SAARC summit held in Maldives, which resulted in complete consensus amongst the heads of states to formulate a process, whereby informal political consultation would be able to yield fruitful outcomes for the promotion of peace, amity, regional stability, and enhanced socio-economic regional cooperation.6

The main objectives of the SAARC as given in its charter include: i) to enhance cooperation in economic, social and cultural fields, ii) to promote the welfare of people and improve their living standard, and, iii) to promote cooperation among member states on international and regional forums regarding to mutual interests.7 In its comparison with other regional organisations around the world, SAARC is the only regional body to confront the formidable task of providing a platform for cooperation amongst the contrasting agglomeration of nations, which are different from each other in respect of national identity, religion, economic prosperity and potential, historical narratives and governance structures. One of the prominent factors inhibiting the SAARC‟s decision- making capacity has been the longstanding Indo-Pak rivalry, particularly on Kashmir.8 There is no doubt that regional organisations play an important role in creating economic interdependence and mutual harmony among the member states. However, SAARC has not been able to use its full potential in this respect. Regional disputes have caused lack of political will which is hindering it to achieve its objectives.

One of the main reasons that cross-border production networks have not developed and people do not feel connected to South Asia is the lack of connectivity - not just in terms of physical infrastructure but also in terms of systems and services that enable cross border movement.9 China is emerging as an economic power and has the capacity to enhance the economic development and cooperation in the region. China‟s cooperation with SAARC is increasing with the passage of time. Therefore, its involvement in

5 Amanda Cats-Baril, “SAARC and the Regional Promotion of the Rule of Law and Constitutionalism in South Asia,” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2014. 6 “South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC),” NTI, April 2007. 7 Aleena Javaid, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Islamabad: COMSAT, 2010), 4. 8 Amanda Cats-Baril, “SAARC and the Regional Promotion.” 9 Deepak Dobhal, “Ahead of SAARC Summit, Subdued Expectations,” VOA News, November 24, 2014.

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SAARC has raised hopes for regional cooperation in South Asia.10 According to the figure of 2013, the trade volume of China has reached to US$ 4.16 trillion, overtaking the US trade (US$ 3.91 trillion) to become the world‟s largest trading nation.11 China‟s growing economic power also possesses significance for South Asia. It shares border, with most of South Asian countries that highlight the importance and dependency among China and South Asian nations. As China has a booming economy, it could be highly beneficial for the South Asian region which is still an underdeveloped part of the world.12

The globalisation has emerged as an important tool to attain success through peaceful means. South Asian countries are facing common issues of poverty, lack of infrastructure, threats of terrorism and extremism. This situation demands for building a common alliance against these threats by adopting cooperative approaches in the age of globalisation. For this purpose, the SAARC is an important platform. Rising China with advanced technology and booming economy has a great potential to change the destiny of South Asian region. Presently, China has an observer status in SAARC, but in order to get maximum benefits of globalisation and to achieve the full objectives of this organisation, it is an imperative for South Asian countries to grant China a full membership of SAARC.13 No doubt, the country is making a significant contribution for the economic development of South Asian countries and is also very much interested for the attainment of full membership of this organisation.14

The trade volume of China with South Asian states has surged up from US$ 35 billion in 2006 to around US$ 100 billion in 2013 - yet there is a trade deficit that these countries have with China.15 This trade imbalance can be overcome if South Asian economies open up the potentially high value added industries such as machinery, mining, software, tourism, education and medical treatment. The Executive Director of the Pakistan

10 Khalid Rahman, “Regional Cooperation.” 11 “Top 10 Trading Partners of the Chinese Mainland,” China Daily, February 19, 2014. 12 World Trade Organisation, “International Trade Statistics 2011,” available at www.wto.org 13 Liu Zongyi, “China‟s Economic Relations with SAARC: Prospects and Hurdles,” China Institute of International Studies, December 1, 2014. 14 Khondaker Golam Moazzem, “Economic Cooperation Recent Trends, Opportunities and Challenges,” Policy Perspectives (Special Issue on China and SAARC), 9 (2012): 66-67. 15 “Trade Potential: Businessmen Urged to Participate in China Fair,” Express Tribune, January 24, 2014.

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Council on China, Fazal ur Rahman, remarked that China‟s role has been highly important in assisting South Asian economies by providing them with opportunities for economic development.16

6.2.1. China’s Relations with SAARC Countries in the Post 9/11 Strategic Context The geopolitical dynamics in South Asia have substantially changed, with China becoming a leading regional power. Such escalating influence of China in South Asian regional affairs provides a beckoning opportunity to developing countries of the region. However, there are some barriers which extend or restrains China‟s role in the region. The exercise of political influence varies from ensuring social security and development to presenting an apotheosis of political pattern. Nevertheless, China‟s emergence, usually overlooked as an important figure in South Asia encourages the subtlety incomprehensible US policy of “Asia Pivot” towards South Asia.17China‟s relations with SAARC countries in the geo-strategic environment of post 9/11 are discussed in the following pages.

6.2.1.1. China’s Relations with Pakistan Earlier discussions made in previous chapters clearly highlight that China and Pakistan have developed strong relations in multifarious fields that have been further solidified with the passage of time. Emergence of regional forums such as SAARC provides them an opportunity to further escalate their mutual cooperation at multilateral level. Currently, major investment of China in the field of energy, infrastructure, metro-railways, mass- transit, and dams‟ projects are leading both countries towards the path of success.

Gwadar port, building of network of roads and railways connecting Pakistan and China via Karakorum Highway, mobile telephones communication technology, hydro and thermal power, mining, electronics and nuclear energy are the areas where China is making huge investment. These areas possess lot of opportunities for win-win

16 “China, Southern Neighbours Seek Trade Balance,” China Daily, June 9, 2014. 17 Ataur Rahman, “The Challenge of Competitive Cooperation,” The Daily Star, March 8, 2015.

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cooperation.18 Gwadar Port, due to its geo strategic location, is the gateway for trade and energy supplies not only for China but for the whole region, especially, for Central Asia and Afghanistan.19

As Pakistan is facing development challenges in Baluchistan, the port contains opportunity to meet up the grievances of local people and resolve the unemployment issues not just in Baluchistan but it would also provide an impetus to other provinces of the country. In the context of China, its booming economy greatly dependent on Gulf oil and the shipment of oil for which China has to go through a long and expensive route but Pakistan provides it a short route from Gwadar to Kashghar via Karakorum highway. China has not only provided major portion of investment on these projects but it is also assisting in providing training to Pakistani workers and engineers as well. The Gwadar has all the potentials to become equivalent to other developed port cities such as Dubai and Singapore.20

6.2.1.2. China’s Relations with Afghanistan China and Afghanistan have several things in common and most importantly both are close neighbours and facing the challenge of violent threats to their security. Therefore, any cooperation between the two countries will definitely promote regional security. For this reason, China is assisting Afghanistan especially by providing technical training, infrastructure building and mining development.21 In 2014, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi paid an unexpected visit to Kabul and expressed Chinese concern that Uyghur separatists have taken shelter in Afghanistan. Since then, China has engaged itself explicitly in extending the cooperation to deal the security matters in Afghanistan. Beijing considers the governmental policies of both Kabul and Islamabad very important in countering terrorism and regards it as the major policy affecting the Chinese ability to have check on terrorists in Xinjiang. Therefore, the then Foreign Minister of Afghanistan,

18 Li Qiaoyi, “China Aims to Promote Win-Win Cooperation in Africa, Not Western-style Exploitation,” Global Times, March 12, 2015. 19 Syed Abbaa, “Global Strategic & Economic Importance of Gwader Port for Pakistan & China‟s Security,” Uqaab Pakistan Think Tank, May 16, 2013. 20 Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan in Talks to Hand Port to China,” Financial Times, August 30, 2012. 21 Nishchal N. Pandey, “A Growing Economic Partnership,” in China and SAARC, 92.

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Zarar Moqbel assured his Chinese counterpart that his country will never let ETIM to use Afghan territory and conduct violent activities in China.22

In the above context, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani also paid a state visit to China in October 2014.23 Both sides declared to form deeper strategic partnership and paved the way for more enhanced and stable relationship between two countries. In the future, both China and Afghanistan are committed to extend mutual cooperation in the field of politics, culture, security and economics.24 Afghanistan has extended its cooperation to China in counter-terrorism measures. Afghan armed forces arrested a number of Muslim ETIM militants in February 2015 and handed over to Chinese authorities. The relationship between two countries is developing significantly after the formation of Ashraf Ghani‟s government in Kabul. Presently, in partnership with Pakistan, China is engaged in setting a path for the reconciliatory talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government. The trilateral cooperation between Pakistan, Afghanistan and China is gaining a new momentum.25

On February 9, 2015, three countries initiated the trilateral round of strategic talks that took place in Kabul. Although, the focal point of the dialogue was the security situation; the meeting also focused on the economic cooperation - the area where China can play a very productive role. China pledged to develop the hydro-electric dam on River Kunar and assist Afghanistan and Pakistan in developing the road and railway link.26 The Kunar Dam will be built in Afghanistan on the border of Pakistan which will be an apt source of electric supply to both countries. The founding idea of the dialogue session was to form a thriving Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation, supported by China. The Afghanistan‟s

22 Ankit Panda, “Afghanistan Transfers Captured Uyghur Militants to China,” The Diplomat, February 24, 2015. 23 Zhao Huasheng, “What is Behind China‟s Growing Attention to Afghanistan?,” Carnegie Endowment, March 8, 2015. 24 Ibid. 25 Ankit Panda, “Afghanistan Transfers Captured Uyghur Militants to China.” 26 “China Expands its Role in Afghanistan, Pakistan,” Dawn, February 10, 2015.

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Deputy Foreign Minister specifically requested China to play an active role in promoting Pak-Afghan relations.27

The stability of the Afghanistan is the determining factor for the cooperation between China and Afghanistan, taking into account the major threat posed by Taliban. In this context, Beijing played an important role in organising talk between Taliban and Afghan government in November 2014. The main focus of this talk was to mediate the mutual concerns between two parties; undoubtedly this step has emboldened the Beijing‟s role in political side of Afghan development.28 It is noteworthy that the diplomatic efforts extended by China have been intensified over the last few years mainly to assist the rebuilding process in Afghanistan. China has hosted several regional meetings in this regard and the Chinese leadership is committed to enhancing the bilateral relationship with Kabul.

In 2011, an international forum named as “Istanbul Process” was established to promote the cooperation and coordination amongst the regional countries for the rebuilding process of Afghanistan. In the same context, Beijing hosted the fourth foreign ministers‟ meeting in October 2014.29 The “Heart of Asia” summit held in Islamabad on December 10, 2015 is another strategic step taken in regards.30 China has participated in a number of bilateral and trilateral meetings between the regional countries and Afghanistan. The first round of the trilateral strategic dialogue between China, Afghanistan and Pakistan took place in Kabul in the month of February 2015, following the three earlier such session. Prior to that, in year 2014, talks between China, India and Russia was transpired followed by another round of talk between Iran and China.31

27 Shannon Tiezzi, “The Pakistan-China Alliance: The Key to Afghan Stability?” The Diplomat, February 11, 2015. 28 Shannon Tiezzi, “China Hosted Afghan Taliban for Talks: Report,” The Diplomat, January 7, 2015. 29 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People‟s Republic of China, “The Fourth Foreign Ministerial Conference of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan Held in Beijing,” November 1, 2014. 30 Abdul Manan, “Heart of Asia Conference: Islamabad to Push for Dialogue, Resolving Issues,” Express Tribune, December 6, 2015. 31 Zhao Huasheng, “What is Behind China‟s Growing Attention to Afghanistan?”

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China has increased its economic assistance to Afghanistan. From year 2001 to 2013, the total of US$ 240 million was provided to Afghanistan in economic aid. However, in year 2014, China increased its aid and provided US$ 80 million only in one year and further pledged to extend US$ 240 million within the next three years.32 Moreover, in the next five years plan, China has announced to offer 500 scholarships to Afghan students to get the professional education in China and will impart training to 3,000 Afghan personnel in the field of counter-terrorism, anti-narcotics and agriculture.33 In the contemporary geopolitical dynamics of South Asia, China has a significant role to play, specifically in promoting the security situation in Afghanistan. China can also play a role of coordinating the other regional countries with Afghanistan and to form a consensus between the regional actors that would certainly ensure the stability in this volatile country. In this context, the SCO is an important forum comprising the regional countries - most of these are Afghanistan‟s immediate neighbours.34

6.2.1.3. China’s Relations with India In the last few years the relations between India and China have seen a gradual upsurge. The recent warmth in their relations indicates revival of 1950s, described as Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai.35 Since 1950, the relationship between two countries was inimical and the missing affability found its way back in the relationship paradigm upon the demonstration of more affable disposition by the new Chinese leaders towards their Indian counterpart. The significance of relationship was indicated in several visits by the leaders of both countries. In May 2013, Premier Li Keqiang deliberately preferred to visit India as his first overseas official visit.36 The cooperation between China and India is crucial for both countries. In this context, two points are particularly important: i) the mutually formed “strategic partnership” in 2005 is beneficial for the region, and, ii) the mutual trust amongst leadership on both sides is steadily increasing.37 China is a major trade partner of India and the volume of their trade is also on the rise. The figures show

32 Shannon Tiezzi, “China Hosted Afghan Taliban for Talks.” 33 Zhao Huasheng “What is Behind China‟s Growing Attention to Afghanistan?” 34 “China Expands its Role in Afghanistan, Pakistan,” Pakistan Defence, February 10, 2015. 35 “Hindi-Cheeni Bhai Bhai,” Netapedia, June 6, 2015. 36 P. Stobdan, “India-China Relations: Scenario 2014,” IDSA Comment, December 30, 2013. 37 Ibid.

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that during the year 2009-10, their total volume of trade was US$ 42.43 billion which increased to US$ 72.34 billion in 2014-15. Similar to other regional countries, Chinese export to India is far more than its import from this country and this gap has been widening over the years. It clearly reflects that the balance of this bilateral trade in the favour of China.

Figure: 6.1 Bilateral Trade between China and India (US$ in Billion) 70 60 China's 50 Export to 40 India 30 20

US$ in Billion in US$ China's 10 Import from 0 India 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15

Source: Embassy of India in Beijing, "India-China Bilateral Relations - Economic and Trade Relations," March 12, 2016, http:// www.indianembassy.org.cn

The shift in China‟s policy in forging enhanced bilateral relations with India is evident in China‟s articulation of India as “strategic choice” and to settle the boundary issue through dialogue.38 Chinese President Jinping termed the mutual “dreams” of China and India as integrated and compatible policy. Indian leadership also reciprocated with equally affable approach by rejecting the policy of “containment” to support the idea of “cooperation” that would be more productive. The official visits by the leaders of both countries and the keenness of their interaction at BRICS summit demonstrated a shift in their policies.39 The growing mutual interaction in economic affairs and security is evident of the ameliorating bilateral ties between two countries. Both countries have enhanced their consultations on the matters of defence and security. Albeit, India reluctantly suspended the exchange of military mission with China in year 2009 upon the Chinese provision of

38 Tanvi Madan, “India‟s Relations with China: The Good, the Bad and the (Potentially) Ugly,” The Brookings Institute, October 2013. 39 Ibid.

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stapled visas to the citizen of Indian held Kashmir; however, both sides consensually resolved the issue in the Fifth Round of Defence and Security meeting held in January 2013. In the same context, both countries have also increased the maritime interaction.40 Mohan Malik in his analysis has rightly noted that: New Delhi would prefer to avoid any formal alignment with Washington partly because of concern that such an alignment will prompt the Chinese to tighten their embrace of India‟s smaller neighbours, which, in turn, will exacerbate India‟s security dilemma.41 While discussing the reasons why China is not worried on expanding US-India ties, Walter Andersen has argued that: The change is likely rooted in New Delhi‟s recent moves toward equidistance between Beijing and Washington. First of all, India‟s categorical refusal of the U.S. suggestion of joint patrols in the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific seems to be a critically important step that allayed Chinese concerns about India teaming up with the United States. Second, the high-profile exchanges between China and India during Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval‟s visits to Beijing (which came between Carter‟s stopover in New Delhi and Modi‟s trip to the U.S.) seem to have succeeded in mutual trust-building. Chinese media accentuated that bilateral ties are improving and that India does not have hostile feelings against China. Third, a communique issued by Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj and her Chinese and Russian counterparts in April 2016, among other things, takes a stand against the internationalization of the South China Sea disputes and advocates that the issue should be solved by the involved parties. This argument shows a striking parallel with the Chinese point of view related to the situation in that area.42

Earlier, in April 2010, to enhance the bilateral, dispel the misunderstandings at critical times and prevent the crisis escalation, two sides also agreed to establish a hotline between the premiers of both countries.43 In this perspective, now they are in harmony to initiate dialogue on the Tibetan issue to eliminate hostility inherited from the history.44 On the eve of their Sixth Round of Consultation on Anti-terrorism held in Beijing in 2014, both sides have gradually progressed in negotiating the strategic security issues to reduce the trust deficit.45 On May 5, 2013, prior to Indian Foreign Minister‟s visit to

40 Lan Jianxue, “Sino-Indian Relations: New Way of Thinking and Rebalancing,” CIIS, August 23, 2013. 41 Mohan Malik, “Balancing Act: The China-India-U.S. Triangle,” World Affairs, spring 2016, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/balancing-act-china-india-us-triangle. 42 Walter Andersen and Dániel Balázs, “Why China Isn‟t Too Worried by Expanding US-India Ties,” The Diplomat, June 17, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/why-china-isnt-too-worried-by-expanding-us- india-ties/.

43 Tanvi Madan, “India‟s Relations with China.” 44 Ibid. 45 M. N. Sarin, “Sino-Indian Convergence: Bilateral and Global,” in Mending Fences, Cross Infiltration and Conflict Challenges Line of Actual Control, ed. M. N. Sarin (New Delhi: Gaurav Book Centre Pvt. Ltd., 2015), 218.

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China, the two countries defused their three-week long military standoff of troops in Ladakh region, Aksai Chin and at Line of Actual Control. China withdrew its troops in an agreement with India that the “live in bunkers” in disputed Chumar sector will be demolished by India at once.46 Indian military officers expressed that: “India has agreed to a Chinese demand to demolish bunkers near their de facto border in the Himalayas, as part of a deal to end a stand-off that threatened to scupper slowly improving relations”.47 On May 18, 2013, the Prime Minister of China Li Keqiang paid first official trip to India to settle the boundary issues and encourage the strengthening of economic relations.48

The bilateral cooperation in tackling global issues between China and India has been quite significant, such as their partnership has addressed the issues related to global finance and trade, sustainable development, advocating the rights of developing and emerging nations, and introducing the reforms in existing international economic order. The G20 Summit, BRICS and East Asia Summits are important platform for the interaction between the leadership of both countries in negotiating the matters related to sustainable development of bilateral ties. On July 15, 2014, another positive development took place when the China invited India to participate in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.49 On the side-line meeting at BRICS, President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi discussed several matters pertaining to boundary issues in quite an affable ambience.50

Amidst these developments, it is noteworthy that one of the major hurdles impacting the development of the region is the prevalent border disputes between China and India, as both countries are the strong economies in the region and their inimical bilateral cooperation has certain disadvantages for the whole region.51 However, with the passage of time both countries have come to realise the importance of mutual cooperation in the

46 “India Says China Agrees Retreat to De Facto Border in Faceoff Deal,” Reuters, May 6, 2013. 47 “India Destroyed Bunkers in Chumar to Resolve Ladakh Row,” Defence News, May 8, 2013. 48 “China Premier Li Keqiang in India for First Foreign Trip,” BBC News, May 19, 2013. 49 Ankit Panda, “Is India‟s APEC Membership on the Table at this Year‟s Summit?” The Diplomat, September 8, 2015. 50 “PM Modi Meets Chinese President Xi Jinping ahead of BRICS Summit,” Times of India, July 15, 2014. 51 Anil K. Gupta and Haiyan Wang, “China and India: Greater Economic Integration.”

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fields of politics, trade, economics and infrastructure.52 During his visit to India in September 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced to invest US$ 20 billion in India in next five years.53 Similarly, during the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visit to China in May 2015, China and India signed 26 business deals worth more than US$ 22 billion in areas covering renewable energy, ports, financing and industrial parks.54

The two important visits, US President Obama‟s visit to India in January 2015 and Chinese President Xi Jinping‟s visit to Pakistan in April 2015, have drawn a clear line about the real postures of India and China in the region. With Obama‟s visit to India, Prime Minister Modi was convinced that the US was India‟s principal strategic partner in the world. In order to contain China‟s influence India is not only giving priority to its neighbourhood but it has also expanded engagement with many of the countries in China‟s periphery, including Japan, South Korea Mongolia and Vietnam. China is not comfortable with the Indo-US alliance on Asia Pacific and thus has raised objections to inclusion of India in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) against President Obama‟s supporting of Indian case. President Jinping‟s visit to Pakistan in April 2015 was very important for setting future direction of Pakistan-China relations especially in the context of building 46 billion dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.55

The outcome of this discussion reflects that in spite of various challenges, the significance for both countries and their potential for future success if they collaborate on the forum of the SAARC is an established fact. China with a status of an observer holds strong relations with SAARC member countries and it would be unwise to create hurdles in the way of China attaining the full membership of the organisation, as above mentioned realities present a clear picture of China‟s worth for the regional development

52 Nishchal N. Pandey, “A Growing Economic Partnership”, in China and SAARC, 92-93. 53 Muhammad Munir, “Outcome of Modi‟s Visits to China,” Pakistan Observer, May 24, 2015. 54 “India‟s Trade Deficit with China Rose to $37.8 billion in 2014,” The Economic Times, January 13, 2015. 55 Muhammad Munir, “ Outcome of Modi‟s Visit to China,”

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and its eagerness to extend the cooperation with the spirit of parity and mutual trust for the member states of the SAARC.56

6.2.1.4. China’s Relations with Sri Lanka China enjoys cordial relations with Sri Lanka and is also investing in its several projects. Sri Lanka is particularly enhancing cooperation with China in industrial sector such as rubber, mineral and fish. Trade between the two countries reached more than US$ 3.6 billion in 2013, with Sri Lanka exports to China accounting for only about US$ 100 million.57 Sri Lanka‟s ability to reap benefits from fast-growing China was significantly enhanced in 2009, when Sri Lanka became a dialogue partner of SCO of which China is a key member.58 China‟s recent move to open up its borders to Sri Lankan could also bring numerous benefits to Sri Lankan exporters. Another industry that has potential and market in China is gems and jewellery. Sri Lanka played a critical role for China‟s entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO), obtaining observer status to SAARC and dialogue partner status in the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC).59

China views Sri Lanka as “an important hub on the Maritime Silk Road.”60 Currently, China is providing Sri Lanka with effective diplomatic support on several issues and is assisting in infrastructure development, oil exploration, economic aid, investment and trade. China‟s rising interest in the development of infrastructure in Sri Lanka has drawn substantial Indian vigilance. Some of the significant infrastructure development projects that China has executed in Sri Lanka include Norochcholai Coal Project, Katunayake- Colombo Expressway, Hambantota port, and 661-rooms Shangri La hotel, Colombo South Harbour Expansion Project, Mathala Airport and Arts Centre in Colombo.61 The

56 Nihal Rodrigo, “Chapter 14: Replacing Conflict with Peace in South Asia” in Mushir Anwar ed., Towards an Asian Century: Future of Economic Cooperation in SAARC Countries, (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2014), 240-56. 57 Ibid. 58 Saman Kelegama, “China - Sri Lanka Economic Relations: An Overview,” China Report 2014, Institute of Chinese Studies, (Mumbai: Sage Publications, 2014), 38. 59 Ibid. 60 Liu Cigui, “Reflections on Maritime Partnership: Building the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” China Institute of International Studies, September 15, 2014. 61 Ibid.

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renowned project of all is the development of Hambantota port, with the development cost of US$ 360 million for the first phase, concluded in 2010 by China Harbour Engineering Co. Ltd. In the first phase, project includes a passenger terminal, bunkering, provisioning, maintenance and repair, warehousing, cargo handling, medical supplies and customs clearing facilities.62 Although, Sri Lankan government tries to portray that the Chinese interest in the Hambantota port is purely commercial, but the strategic location of the harbour makes it clear that the port could be used as a stopover for Chinese cargo vessels from Middle East and Africa as well as for any military fleet.63

The funding for the development of infrastructure in Sri Lanka by the Chinese companies is based on the Chinese loan finance system. Most of these construction companies sidestep the government tender process and corporate sector - either Sri Lankan or other foreign investors. The development cost of the projects from US$ 3 billion to US$ 6 billion or more includes the construction of international airports, major sea-ports, expressways, power stations, railways, highways and telecommunication sector.64 China is the largest investor and foreign lender in Sri Lanka. China provided substantial amount of US$ 1.2 billion in year 2009 to Sri Lanka, which accounts for more than 54 percent of foreign loan in 2009, again in the next year the amount of US$ 821 million was provisioned, which amounts to 25 percent of foreign loan.65 In June 2011, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka announced that the Chinese national currency “Yuan” would also be used in international transactions. Whereas, India being the largest partner in trade and one of the important investors in Sri Lanka, has not been able to acquire the same privilege for its national currency.

When the new government of Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena decided to review every Chinese investment approved by the previous President Mahinda Rajapakse‟s government - including the Colombo Port Expansion Project (CPEP) - many

62 N. Manohran, “Beijing and India-Sri Lanka Relations,” IPCS, Issue Brief, no. 217 (May 2013): 27. 63 Ibid. 64 “2014 Investment Climate Statement Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs,” US State Department Report, June 2014. 65 N. Manohran, “Beijing and India-Sri Lanka Relations.”

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believed this would lay the groundwork for Sri Lanka‟s China policy.66 Indian observers keenly monitored developments to see if the CPEP would be approved, as a disapproval of the project would lead to closer relations with India. Much to India‟s dismay, the Sri Lankan government approved the US$ 1.4 billion project in April 2015, indicating that Sirisena‟s foreign policy was going to be rather China-friendly. The Sri Lankan government knows that India would not have the required investment capability to match or outbid the Chinese capacity.67

6.2.1.5. China’s Relations with Bangladesh The reason for China-Bangladesh relations being so important to China‟s overall South Asia perspective lies in the fact that Bangladesh is third major member in South Asia‟s security system.68 For last few decades, the economic cooperation and interdependence has been the prominent feature of the bilateral relations between China and Bangladesh. China aptly views Bangladesh as a trade-partner and a “bridge between South and Southeast Asia.”69 China‟s extraordinary economic growth with its huge reserves of foreign exchange makes it the second largest economy in the world. The bilateral trade relationship between China and Bangladesh has been developing steadily. The six-fold increase in trade volume has been witnessed within the one decade time period, reaching to US$ 10 billion mark-up in 2013- 2014, albeit, the imbalance in overall trade favouring China has been quite eminent. Despite the zero tariffs wavier given by China on around 4762 products to Bangladesh, the trade imbalance still remains a huge concern.70

China is quite enthusiastic in moving its major enterprises to this country and thus, it has acquired land from government of Bangladesh to develop economic free zones for Chinese companies.71 As a matter of fact, within the next five years the surge in the trajectory of bilateral relations between China and Bangladesh is expected to rise to a

66 Liu Cigui, “Reflections on Maritime Partnership.” 67 Roshni Thomas, “China-Sri Lanka: Maritime Infrastructure and India‟s Security,” IPCS, no. 4874, May 18, 2015. 68 Sawaran Singh, China-South Asia: Issues, Equations Politics (New Delhi: Lancer‟s books, 2003). 69 Ganeshan Wignaraja et al., “The Case for Connecting South Asia and Southeast Asia,” Asia Pathways, May 25, 2015. 70 Ibid. 71 “Bangladesh to Build Economic Zone for Chinese Investors,” News Bangladesh, September 16, 2015.

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new height, as China is planning to bring huge investment in Bangladesh for the development of energy, infrastructure and manufacturing sectors.72 China has made major investments in Bangladesh‟s service and infrastructure sectors, including six China-Bangladesh friendship bridges and important amongst them is 4.8 km long Mukhterpur Bridge over the river Dhaleswari.73 Meanwhile, the constructions of two more such Chinese aided bridges are in-progress including one at Madaripur. China is also contemplating to invest in Bangladesh‟s energy and sea-port sectors and has already invested in twenty companies at different export processing zones of this country.74

Bangladesh‟s foreign policy of “Look East” would reduce its long term dependence on India, which has facilitated China to open up a number of avenues to increase its trade and economic cooperation with Bangladesh. China‟s growing economic and trade relations with Bangladesh, is a matter of concern for India as it is losing ground to China in this field. Bangladesh‟s dependence on China has increased many folds in the recent past which resulted into increase Chinese leverage over relations between the two countries. Primarily, China‟s interest in Bangladesh appear economic but given the China‟s strategic interests in South Asian region, relations may develop to the extent of causing concern to India, especially keeping in view of Chinese maritime “Sting Pearls Policy” in the region.75

In addition to infrastructure and energy related projects, China is also assisting Bangladesh in coal mining, industrial plants, telecommunication, disaster prevention and management, flood control, irrigation and water resources utilisation. During the time period of 2009, bilateral trade raised US$ 4.58 billion, made China as Bangladesh‟s largest formal trade partner.76 Under the leadership of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajid, the foreign policy of Bangladesh seems to be more focused on “East” and in- particular more inclined towards China, rather than forging such relationship with the

72 Ataur Rahman “The Challenge of Competitive Cooperation.” 73 S.C. Kholi, “Bangladesh‟s Sprouting Bilateral Relations with China: An overview,” Merinews, February 28, 2015. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Nishchal N.Pandey, “A Growing Economic Partnership”, in China and SAARC, no. 9 (2012): 89.

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West. The Chinese companies are working to build a number of mega projects in Bangladesh, including the Ganges barrage and the Padma Bridge.77

China‟s influence in the security dynamics of Bangladesh is certainly very important and incomparable in terms of bilateral cooperation. Bangladesh counted on the Chinese assistance to enhance its defence capabilities at the time when neither US nor India extended any militarily support. Both China and Bangladesh are involved in bilateral defence cooperation since the development of their bilateral relations in 1976. Since then, the regular contacts in negotiating the weapons transfer and inspection of military facilities have been frequently held between two countries.78 Bangladeshi armed forces have utilised the Chinese technical expertise in making operational the Chinese military equipment. In year 1976, the Chief of general staff of China‟s People Liberation Army (PLA) paid five days visit to Bangladesh as a gesture of goodwill. Currently, the Bangladesh is fulfilling 70 percent of its defence procurement with Chinese assistance. China has supplied fighter aircrafts, tanks, coastal patrol boats and frigates to Bangladesh armed forces.79 Bangladesh Air Forces rely heavily on Chinese aviation industry for the supply of aircrafts and training. The Bangladesh‟s aviation inventory includes Chinese version of MiG 19 and 21, Chinese F6/7 and A5s fighter aircrafts supplied by China.80

The Bangladesh army has also incorporated the recently built Chinese tanks into its military arsenal. Bangladesh has become one of the major buyers of the Chinese made weapons. In year 2008, Bangladesh developed the launch pad for anti-ship missile near Chittagong port, the project was completed with Chinese assistance.81 The successful test-fire of an anti-ship missile with the range of 120 km was carried out by Bangladesh Navy from BNS Osman in the Island of Kutubdia at Bay of Bengal.82 Although the current regime led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajis has close ties with India, the

77 Ibid. 78 Shannon Tiezzi, “China, Bangladesh Pledge Deeper Military Cooperation,” The Diplomat, December 4, 2015. 79 “BAF to Get Modern Helicopters, Planes, Says PM,” Guangming Online, December 11, 2014. 80 Ataur Rahman “The Challenge of Competitive Cooperation.” 81 Sumit Sen, “Bangladesh Building Missile Arsenal,” Times of India, September 12, 2008. 82 Zahid F. Sarder Saddi, “Bangladesh-China Cooperation: The Security Dimensions of the Bay of Bengal, under Sk Hasina‟s Regime,” First Bangladesh 24, February 4, 2015.

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policy of having defence cooperation with Chinese government is going on as usual. The Bangladesh Navy is attempting to pursue the set-target of acquiring two submarines, two landing craft utility, large patrol aircraft, a number of frigates, salvage vessel, missile boats and hydro-graphic unit within the next five years.83

The hallmark of the Bangladesh-China relations is the continuity and mutual aspiration of enhancing the spectrum of bilateral relations. The two countries have experienced many changes in regimes but there bilateral relations have not been affected. In year 2009, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajid paid a five-day state visit to China, as prime minister and this was her maiden visit to this country.84 The policy of “comprehensive partnership” as envisioned by the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajid was the focal point of her talks with Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in Beijing.85 On June 6, 2014, during her second visit to China, the leadership of both sides discussed several significant issues. The Prime Minister of Bangladesh had meeting with many influential personnel including President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang, and „Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People‟s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Yu Zhengsheng.86 During the meetings with Chinese leadership, the economic issues remained the primary agenda, particularly the Chinese financial support for mega projects in Bangladesh.

China considers the Bay of Bengal a pivotal point for maritime connectivity and a trade link for energy import from Indian Ocean as well as a crucial base for security landscape. China gives such importance to Bay of Bengal owing to its utility for the strategic, security and commercial imperatives.87 No doubt, both countries are committed in developing “a positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship” that will ascend to a new height in the future. Ipso facto, Bangladesh is at tremendous advantage in having relations with China. Many experts opine that the significance of Bangladesh‟s economic

83 Sumit Sen, “Bangladesh Building Missile Arsenal.” 84 “Bangladesh Prime Minister in Five-day Visit to China,” China Daily, March 20, 2010. 85 Ibid. 86 “China, Bangladesh Pledge to Build Economic Corridor,” China.org, June 10, 2014. 87 Ataur Rahman “The Challenge of Competitive Cooperation.”

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partnership with China will catalyse the growth trajectory of the former as a manufacturing and trading nation.88

6.2.1.6. China’s Relations with Nepal China and Nepal have always enjoyed friendly trade relations.89 Since becoming a democratic republic in 2006, Nepal has further improved its relations with China concurrent with its economic emergence and ambitious leading role in regional affairs.90 Simultaneously, a large number of middle class Chinese travel to Nepal - making it one of the largest foreign travellers to this. These Chinese travellers make expedition to Nepal, in order to visit different tourist places including the Buddha‟s birthplace and beyond Himalaya‟s valleys.91 In the recent past, China-Nepal economic and trade relations have witnessed a rapid growth. In 2013, for the first time their bilateral trade has surpassed the figure of US$ 2.0 billion. After the India, China‟s role as the second largest trade partner of Nepal has been consolidated and it has become an important source of investment for this country. Over the years, China has provided assistance for economic and social development of Nepal, and due to which with the International Convention Centre and the Nepal Highway have become the symbols of China-Nepal friendship.92

Chinese enterprises have actively taken part in Nepal‟s infrastructure construction including transportation and electric power, by providing the engineering and contracting expertise, playing a positive role in Nepal‟s economic development and improving the livelihood of indigenous people. In the perspective of prevailing regional situation, China will make joint efforts with Nepal, make full use of the role of the economic and trade joint committee, actively and efficiently promote the major cooperative affairs of both concerns, in order to promote bilateral economic and trade relations to a new level. Nepal pays high attention to cooperation with China in economic and trade fields, and is willing to promote the building of the “Silk Road Economic Belt” together with China and

88 Ibid. 89 Nishchal N.Pandey, “A Growing Economic Partnership,” in China and SAARC, 90. 90 Ashok Gurung et al., “Is China Building up Soft Power by Aiding Nepal?" China File, April 29, 2015. 91 Tsering Shakya, and Ashok Gurung, “Was Nepal a Soft Power Victory for China?” Foreign Policy, May 1, 2015. 92 “11th Session of China-Nepal Economic and Trade Joint Committee Held in Beijing,” Ministry of Commerce of People’s Republic of China, December 19, 2014.

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actively participated in the preparations for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).93

On the eve of official visit by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Nepal from December 25-27, 2014, the increment in the grant assistance given by China to Nepal was announced, which was elevated from 150 million Yuan to 800 million Yuan.94 The officials from both countries signed the deal in Kathmandu. Wang Yi expressed the Chinese commendation to Nepal on firmly adhering to one-China policy and the Nepalese opposition to anti-China forces to carry out insurgency against China by using Nepal‟s territories. He further mentioned that Chinese government acknowledges the Nepal‟s goodwill and believe that Nepal will continue to stand by China in ensuring the effective and proactive measures for common security of both countries.95

6.2.1.7. China’s Relations with Bhutan The relations between China and Bhutan have not developed into a formal diplomatic relationship yet, but both countries are concentrating on traditional, cultural, historical and economic forum. The formal amicable relationship of both countries could be witnessed in the sphere of trade. There is a deficit of improvement of relationship in other areas at the moment; however, the trade partnership between both countries is expected to provide impetus for betterment of relations in other areas of bilateral interest. At present, the volume of trade between Chain and Bhutan is low which is mainly due to Indian influence on this country. China is exporting farming and telecommunication equipment to Bhutan and has also offered assistance to develop Bhutan‟s of health and education sectors.96

93 Ibid (Note: Presently, 57 countries are the members of AIIB, out of which 37 are regional while 20 non- regional countries). 94 “Keeping Nepal in Priority, China Foreign Minister Wang Arrives,” Kathmandu Post, December 25, 2014. 95 “China, Nepal Vow to Upgrade Links to New Level,” NBC News, March 19, 2015. 96 UK Essays, “Why A Study Of Indo Bhutan Relations History Essay,” March 23, 2015, available at www.ukessays.com

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In the past, the China-Bhutan relationship was caught up in lock-horns owing to border dispute between both countries.97

Interestingly China in 2012 offered Bhutan a border resolution through exchange of land- China will give 900 sq km in north Bhutan to Bhutan and in exchange will get 400sqkm of territory in west Bhutan. There is a possibility that democratic government in Bhutan may accept Chinese proposal. In case the issue is resolved with China, Bhutan may close India Military Training Team (IMTRAT) headquarters located in Ha district adjoining the strategic Chumbi Valle. The military team is only responsible for training the Bhutanese Army but it is also keeping a watch on PLA activities nearby. Chumbi Valley in Tibet under Chinese control forms a narrow wedge between Indian State Sikkim and Bhutan, leads to India‟s Siliguri corridor, a vital tri-junction between Bhutan, Bangladesh and Nepal, which is a narrow (30km in width) hub of rail, road and air passage called the „Chicken neck.‟ The latter being the only land route to India‟s north-eastern states is strategically and militarily important for India. Once China acquired 400sqkm in west Bhutan, it will widen the shoulders of its Chumbi Valley to facilitate military manoeuvres, and with IMTRAT gone from Bhutan, the Chinese threat to the Siliguri corridor would enhance. 98 In response, India has always supported Bhutan both in terms of aid and military assistance to rebuff possible military intrusion from China in the disputed border areas. However, the future relationship between China and Bhutan are crucial. The increasing US involvement in the South China Sea and the geostrategic location of Bhutan for military base is not without critical deliberations for China. The two countries need to resolve the border issue and Bhutan can benefit from China‟s economic capabilities. It is noteworthy that Bhutan is the part of China‟s silk route connectivity programme.99

97 Matthew F. Ferraro, “The Case for Stronger Bhutanese-American Ties,” The Diplomat, December 22, 2014. 98 Pravin Sawhney, “Dragon Moves:With growing Chinese Belligerence, India Should Reassess its Relations with the US,” Force Newsmagazine, 2013, http://www.forceindia.net/Dragon_Moves.aspx. 99 Ibid.

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6.2.1.8. China’s Relations with Maldives Since 1972 when both countries established their diplomatic relations, China has been assisting in economic and social development of the Maldives.100 Both countries have signed various agreements, e.g., mutual exemptions of visas and visa fee, education and cultural cooperation and promotion of tourism.101 Chinese President Xi Jinping‟s visit to Maldives in September 2014 took relations between two countries to new heights. Maldives was the first country President Jinping chose to visit during his trip to South Asia.102 The main areas which have lot of potential for cooperation include: tourism, infrastructure projects, and maritime cooperation. In the year 2015, Maldives received 343,259 tourists from China which makes around 31 percent of all tourists - the highest number as compared to any other country‟s tourists.103

In September 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping paid his first official visit to Maldives during which several agreements were signed between the two countries. The major infrastructure projects included the development of housing, road projects, airport and a bridge linking Male to Hulhule, as the Male International Airport is situated on this island.104 The first meeting of China-Maldives Joint Committee on Economic and Trade Cooperation was held on December 16, 2014 in Beijing.105 Both sides made progress on their bilateral economic and trade relations, and other issues such as the 21st century Maritime Silk Road.106 China considers Maldives as its good friend and has shown increasing interest in the enhancement of its investment. China is keen to join hands with Maldives to build the 21st century Maritime Silk Road, to further promote their bilateral

100 Embassy of People‟s Republic of China in the Republic of Maldives, “The First Meeting of China- Maldives Joint Committee on Economic and Trade Cooperation Held in Beijing,” December 18, 2014, http://mv.chineseembassy.org 101 Nishchal N.Pandey, “A Growing Economic Partnership,” in China and SAARC, 91-92. 102 Fathimath Aruma, “China-Maldives Relations on New Upward Trajectory,” Haveeru, September 14, 2014. 103 Republic of Maldives, Ministry of Tourism, February 22, 2016, “Monthly Updates,” www.tourism.gov.mv 104 Darshana M. Baruah, “Modi's Trip and China‟s Islands: The Battle for the Indian Ocean,” The Diplomat, March 11, 2016. 105 Atul Aneja, “Maldives Set to Formally Endorse Maritime Silk Route,” Hindu, December 17, 2014. 106 Embassy of People‟s Republic of China in the Republic of Maldives, “The First Meeting of China- Maldives Joint Committee.”

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trade.107 In this context, both sides have also signed an MoU. 108 In the words of Maldives‟ President Abdulla Yameen: “The Maldives has also become one of the first partners in the Chinese „Maritime Silk Route‟ initiative and a founding member of the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).”109

6.3. China’s Full Membership of SAARC and its Role in Regional Development It is certainly a privilege for a country to be a part of an international regional organisation. China‟s entry in SAARC to attain the full membership is due to its avid policies towards the regional countries that are based on the promotion of mutual cooperation, regional security and win-win situation. As “rising China” has the capacity to play influential role in regional connectivity and economic cooperation. In addition, China has very cordial relations with almost all the member states of the SAARC. With the intensification of the process of globalisation, it becomes more evident that prosperity is embedded in the layers of Globalisation, by focusing on these aspects; China has intended to focus on its neighbouring region.

It is evident from the past experience that the bond of China with most of the SAARC member states helped it in securing the observer status in 2005; although, it was not a much comfortable development for India due to its rivalry on border dispute.110 India always wanted that there should not be any involvement of extra regional countries and believes that the prosperity of the SAARC countries can be attained through mutual cooperation of the SAARC member states which possess common issues and interests. However, the contemporary trends of globalisation are contradictory to the Indian perception.111 The booming economy of China has the potential to bring prosperity in South-Asian region through trade and investment. Even being an observer at the SAARC, China is contributing towards the well-being of the people of the region. For instance, under a UNDP, China dragged out 300 million people out of poverty in a short span of

107 Ibid. 108 Augusto Soto, “China‟s Silk Road Goes Global: From Dream to Reality,” Strategic Culture Foundation, August 22, 2015. 109 Ahmed Naish, “Sino-Maldives Relations at „An All-time High,‟ Says President Yameen,” Minivan News, June 13, 2015. 110 Liu Zongyi, “China‟s Economic Relations with SAARC.” 111Abanti Bhattacharya, “China‟s „Observer‟ Status: Implications for SAARC,” IPCS, November 21, 2005.

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time.112 If being an observer, China can achieve such a big target in a short time frame, then it would not be difficult to predict that with full member status, it can play even more productive role for the development of the region.

The South Asian countries can take further advantages from the China‟s economic potential on its becoming the full member of the SAARC. However, this important milestone can be accomplished within the stipulated time period by the formation of unilateral consensus amongst South Asian countries to render full membership of the SAARC to China, for which the unconditional Indian involvement is mandatory. Besides, mutual economic gains from trade and investment for development, China‟s status as a full member of the SAARC will improve the political status of South Asia at international level and the South Asian economic interaction will be enhanced around the world.113

The 18th Summit of the SAARC ended on November 26, 2014 in Kathmandu, Nepal. The executive heads from eight South Asian countries urged to boost regional peace, cooperation and development. Although, the theme of two-day summit was “Deeper Integration for Peace and Prosperity;” the Indo-Pakistan conflict dominated the agenda of the meeting.114 Pakistan has always stood by China as time-tested friend. The Pakistani delegation advocated to grant the full membership of the SAARC to China and expressed that China‟s status from „observer‟ to full member should be raised, but India unequivocally opposed this proposal. The Indian establishment has certain reservations regarding the full membership of China at the SAARC - they have apprehension that Pakistan through Chinese support would be able to dominate the other SAARC member states. In 2005, Pakistan supported the China‟s entry into SAARC as an observer state, whereas, India supported Australia and Japan to be observer state at SAARC, India did so to counterweight the China‟s presence.115

112 Nihal Rodrigo, “South Asia, SAARC and the world,” Himal South Asian, April 2007. 113 “China & SAARC: Possibility of Economic Integration,” Frontier Post, May 20, 2012. 114 Muhammad Arif, “China‟s Full Membership of SAARC to Unleash Benefits for Entire South Asia,” Niho-Salam, November 28, 2014. 115 Ibid.

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Chinese President Xi Jinping on his visit to India in September 2014 encouraged Prime Minister Narendra Modi to change India‟s policy of opposing China‟s bid to enter into SAARC as a full member state.116 He also offered China‟s support to India‟s bid to become a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and requested Prime Minister Modi to reciprocate the gesture by backing Beijing‟s attempt to enter the SAARC. The Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Liu Zhenmin representing China at 18th SAARC summit expressed that China was ready to enhance economic cooperation with SAARC region. Since it became an observer member in 2006, it has already strengthened its cooperation in promoting regional trade, investment and agriculture. It envisioned SAARC-China forum to strengthen the ties.117

China has made several attempts to address India‟s concerns over its rise and growing influence in the region, but India is still reluctant to accept China as a full member. If China becomes full member of SAARC, nine south Asian countries can work together to promote regional stability and development. It has potential to lead the regional peace and progress. China has envisioned several win-win cooperation projects for the region such as; the revival of old Silk Road, CPEC, the Maritime Silk Road, the Silk Road Economic Belt and the AIIB that could unleash benefits for all SAARC countries including India and Pakistan.118 It is the right time to let China to obtain full membership of SAARC to pave way for regional economic integration and to materialise the dream of “Asian Century” bringing benefits of development, progress and prosperity for all. Media is a powerful tool for any kind of revolution and for the victory and destruction as well. It has potential to influence and make the perceptions of masses. There is a need to have media exchange programme between the SAARC countries and China for better understanding of each other. Pakistan along with other countries should make further attempts to develop a consensus for full membership of China in the SAARC. In current scenario, the media and various policy research institutes in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan

116 “China‟s Xi Jinping Signs Landmark Deals on India Visit,” BBC News, September 18, 2014. 117 Ibid. 118 Nicholas Borroz and Hunter Marston, “Asia‟s Infrastructure Investment Battle,” The Diplomat, June 11, 2015.

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and Bangladesh can play an active role for projecting China‟s role in South Asia as a stabilising factor.119

Since 1979, China has developed its economic sector at fast pace. On June 24, 2011, the Congressional Research Service Report for the US Congress reported that, within the last three decades China has developed its GDP on an average of 10 percent annually with 13 times advancement in its economy and has alleviated the millions of people from downright indigence.120 In year 2010, China emerged as the second largest economy in the world after US as on date the China‟s GDP was US$ 10 trillion with US$ 7,600 per- capita income and three trillion dollars in foreign exchange reserve.121 At present, China is at number one as recipient foreign exchange assets and the largest exporter of produce, second largest importer and recipient of FDI, and also the largest consumer of steel and energy. It has invested huge sum in the US Treasury Bonds and holds 22 percent of public debt of the US. It is anticipated that China will be the biggest economy in the world in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) by the year 2017.122

There are mega projects such as; construction of water reservoirs, power projects and mining, building of communication infrastructure, transnational power transmission lines and oil and gas pipelines - the completion of these projects would assist China in expanding job-market and diminishing the poverty rate while at the same time it would help in elevating the living standards of the masses. China has potential to open new opportunities on the trade forum by leading them on international trade forum.123 Chinese discourse on South Asia mostly comprises three levels of China‟s engagement in this region. Firstly; China attempts to institutionalise China-South Asia network, secondly; China wants to strengthen bilateral ties with individual countries of South Asia and

119 Lv Xiao Hong, “Promoting Understanding through Media” in China and SAARC, 149-150. 120 Wayne M. Morrison, “China‟s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States,” Congressional Research Service, October 21, 2015. 121 “China Overtakes Japan as World‟s Second-largest Economy,” The Guardian, August 16, 2010. 122 Muhammad Hanif, “China should be in SAARC.” 123 Ibid.

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thirdly; China explores possibility of cooperation on infrastructure and energy sectors, i.e., cooperation that ensures investments by Chinese enterprise.124

It has been almost 30 years since the founding of the SAARC, which convened its summit meeting in 2014 in Kathmandu-Nepal on the theme “Deeper Regional Integration for Peace and Prosperity.” The nine observers in the group now outnumber the member states. There are voices calling for expansion of the SAARC, to take it out of its present limbo. China, has voiced its enthusiasm for becoming a full member state and the case has been supported by other member states, such as; Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.125 However, India, which currently accounts for 70 per cent of the land mass and population of the bloc, is apprehensive that China‟s entry will undermine its political and economic clout in the grouping.126

India‟s biggest concern is that once China enters the grouping, its dominance in the region would be shaken, and also that smaller countries in the grouping will find a countervailing force in China and settle scores with India. China borders five of the SAARC nations and has become the largest trading partner, largest export market and an important source of investment in most of these including India. In 2013 China‟s trade with South Asia reached US$ 96.3 billion.127 From an energy security perspective, the SAARC also needs Chinese capital and technology. A shortage of oil and gas resources in the SAARC region makes it highly dependent on imports. China could join SAARC nations in building joint pipelines and integrated power grids, which could also be connected to the grids in Chinese provinces bordering SAARC. It is a pity that the policy initiated by India and China in this direction a couple of years back, has long been abandoned. As for the strategic security issues, China has a critical impotence for the SAARC countries. Security issues in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region may get precedence over China‟s economic interests. Although there are differences between

124 Asiya Mahar “China‟s Relations with South Asian Countries,” IPRI Review Meeting, September 11, 2014. 125 B. R. Deepak, “South Asian Bloc Needs to Add China‟s Growing Economic Clout,” Global Times, December 2, 2014. 126 Liu Zongyi, “China‟s Economic Relations with SAARC.” 127 B. R. Deepak, “South Asian Bloc.”

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India and China on the issue of cross-border terrorism, China‟s entry will provide a new platform for dialogue on terrorism, especially in the wake of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.128

China as observer of the SAARC has established a very close relationship with SAARC countries be it in security, trade or investment. India is gradually attracting Chinese investment in infrastructure and manufacturing sector, and the Maldives in the field of fisheries and tourism. In addition, Sri Lanka has gradually become a favourite destination for multifaceted investment, Nepal has become a bridge between China and SAARC, and Afghanistan is looking to Chinese mining investment. Under such circumstances, not letting China become a full member of the under-developed South Asian grouping is not in the interests of the region. The SAARC needs to expand its perspectives and effectively bring change with the flowing race of globe.129

6.4. Pakistan-China Cooperation in SCO The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was established in 2001. The full and original member states of the SCO are China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Whereas, its observer states are Pakistan, India, Iran, and Mongolia. The charted out objectives of the SCO are:  Strengthen mutual trust and confidence among member states.  Promoting cooperation in the field of economy, politics, and cultural, etc.  Promotion of peace and stability in the region, fight against terrorism, separatism, and extremism elements.130

Keeping in view importance of regional peace and security, the process of accepting Pakistan and India as full membership of the organisation was initiated in SCO summit held in Ufa (Russia) in July 2015. China has always supported Pakistan‟s entry into SCO, first as observer in 2005 and later its acceptance as full member. The importance of

128 Muhammad Hanif, “China should be in SAARC.” 129 “SAARC: Building Bridges Beyond,” Institute of Policy Studies Islamabad, vol. 9, 2012. 130 “Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, January 7, 2004.

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Pakistan for SCO and vice versa including implications of Pakistan‟s full membership in the SCO for regional security are briefly discussed below.

6.4.1. Pakistan’s Importance for SCO Pakistan‟s credential to claim the full membership of SCO was strong, especially in the context of owing to its positive role in Afghanistan and its commitment in fight against terrorism and extremism. Furthermore, Pakistan‟s capacity to facilitate the energy and trade corridor, its cultural and historical bonding with CARs, its strategic relations with China and growing ties with Russia, provides an ample support to embolden Pakistan‟s credential.131

The expansion of this organisation can provide a constructive reinforcement for South Asia. There is an obvious harmony between the SCO‟s policies and Pakistan‟s objectives, such as: the sustenance of peace and stability within the region, resistance against the evil forces and terrorism and good-fellowship with other regional countries to encourage stronger relationship for future. Political analysts look at the SCO to play an important role in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of ISAF, when the security vacuum has been so critical in the country. Pakistan has already expressed its point of view for post withdrawal Afghanistan - no favourites and no interference policy. Pakistan‟s perspective emphasise on the need to understand that all the regional countries should follow the policy to refrain from interference in power vacuumed Afghanistan, only then the Afghanistan would be able to have “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned” rebuilding process.132

The great support that SCO gleans is through its attractive principles; encouraging the mutual trust, respect for the sovereignty and equality, opposition to hegemonic and coercive policies in international affairs and focus on rights of member state. The linking of resource rich Central Asia with resource deficient South Asia is a critical challenge for SCO. In the future, SCO‟s potential role could provide adjunct synergy in tackling the

131 “Year of Pak-China Friendship (2015): Pakistan‟s Participation in SCO to be a Milestone,” Business Recorder, March 12, 2015. 132 “Pakistan Committed to Afghan-led Peace Process, Says Nawaz,” Dawn, February 13, 2014.

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issues of arms and drugs trafficking, extremism, terrorism, separatism and organised crime.133

The primary objectives of the SCO are enhancing the mutual trust among member states; encouraging the ambience of cooperation in the fields of trade, economic, scientific, political, cultural, education, tourism, energy, technology, transport, environmental protection, security, stability, and peace in the region; upholding the democratic norms, justice and economic system, etc. Albeit, SCO lacks any military wing of its own and the military component has been debated to counter-terrorism at the forum; it still upholds the belief to bring peace, stability and security in the region.134 The prospects of regional cooperation in South Asia are interesting in the context of SCO and SAARC. However, the abilities of these regional organisations have not been fully employed so far to bring harmony and peace in the precarious and unstable regional ambience of South Asia. Besides, it appears that there is no possibility for abrupt fundamental reforms in the near future.

6.4.2. SCO’s Importance for Pakistan Pakistan has great interest in SCO‟s activities relating to regional security and promoting economic cooperation among the member states. Pakistan was the first country to apply for an observer status in the SCO. The convergence of interests between Pakistan and SCO members on the global war against terrorism enabled Pakistan‟s entry into SCO. In their meetings held in Astana, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of SCO and the Council of Heads of States Meeting held on June 2005 and July 2005, respectively, approved with joint consensus granting Pakistan an observer status in the organisation.135

Since becoming an observer state at the SCO, Pakistan has been actively involved in its various events and conferences.136 After years of discussion on Pakistan‟s application for

133 Sohail Amin and Muhammad Munir, “Introduction” in Mushir Anwar (ed.), SCO‘s Role in Regional Stability and Prospects of its Expansion (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2013), 3. 134 “SCO Comes of Age,” Nation, July 13, 2015. 135 Zahid Ali Khan, “Pakistan and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” IPRI Journal XIII, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 57-76. 136 “Pakistan Joins SCO as Observer,” Dawn, July 6, 2005.

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permanent membership of the organisation, during Dushanbe summit (September 2014), the SCO members signed protocols for expanding its membership.137 As a follow up, the process of granting Pakistan and India full membership of SCO was initiated at the SCO Summit held in July 2015 in Ufa, Russia. The Council of the Heads of States of SCO members on July 10, 2015 approved the full membership for Pakistan and India in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation after fulfilling certain statutory and legal requirements. It is expected that this process will be completed during 2016 and then both Pakistan and India would become permanent members of SCO.138

The expansion of SCO has been instrumental in promoting peace, political stability and economic prosperity in the entire region. Pakistan‟s active and friendly cooperation with all the members of the organisation remained critical for the progress and prosperity of the region. The geographical contiguity of the SCO members with Pakistan and shared cultural and historical bonds provided an impetus for greater cooperation. Pakistan and SCO are working together to combat the increasing threat of terrorism. Pakistan‟s permanent membership of the SCO is important in terms of its relations with Central Asian countries and Russia. SCO‟s Regional Anti-terrorism Structure (RATS) provides Pakistan an institutionalised anti-terrorism cooperation mechanism with the SCO member states.

Furthermore, after the operationalisation of CPEC, Pakistan can act as a trade and energy corridor for the western regions of China, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. From the port of Gwadar, goods can be transported via land routes to Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan as well as deeper into Central Asia. To make this possible, plans are being made to construct road and railway networks to link Gwadar to Afghanistan and Iran. Pakistan and India‟s permanent membership of SCO will help them in improving their relations. It will provide an opportunity for the two countries to resolve their problems and to work for the promotion of good neighbourly relations and

137Zafar Bhutta, “SCO membership – a potential trump card for Pakistan,” The Express Tribune, September 28, 2015. 138 “SCO as a dominant regional player and its impacts on Pakistan-India bilateral Relations, Voice of Journalists, August 21, 2015.

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cooperation. The frequent visits of the Heads of the State and Foreign Ministers of the two countries at SCO platform will help them to remove the trust deficit.139

Pakistan growing ties with China and Russia will further abate the economic and security dependence on Western bloc, specifically on US financial aid. At present, it is brazenly evident that US is applying the policy of “carrot and stick” by giving financial aid and simultaneously threatening to carry out drone attack, using its media outlets to blame and defame Pakistan by propagating the false allegation for harbouring terrorism.140 Pakistan‟s admission as a full member state in SCO will initiate a new phase of cooperation for the regional development in the sphere of energy, transport and information. This will ultimately improve the economy and security of the country and will enhance the regional standings of Pakistan. It is equally important for Pakistan to demonstrate the real commitment in abiding by the principles of SCO to combat terrorism and extremism, tackling the drugs trafficking and its role in Afghanistan‟s rebuilding process.141

The geostrategic location and geopolitical standing of Pakistan and its potential as a trade and energy corridor provides it with an opportunity to inter-link the regional landlocked countries of the SCO, which was a significant factor for Pakistan‟s entry into SCO. In this regard, the Chinese extraordinary assistance in developing CPEC is the major step to promote the objectives of SCO especially by establishing trans-national overland connectivity.142 Pakistan considers that the full membership of SCO will render the diversification in country‟s foreign policy and will catalyse the Pakistan‟s potential to play more constructive role in bringing stability in the region.143

139 Zahid Ali Khan, “Pakistan and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.” 140 Farooq Yousaf, “China and Russia Can Free Us of the US,” The Express Tribune, June 4, 2012. 141 Ibid. 142 Sohail Amin and Muhammad Munir, “Introduction.” 143 Mushir Anwar at el., eds., SCO‘s Role in Regional Stability: Prospects of its Expansion (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2013).

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6.4.3. Pakistan’s Full Membership of SCO: Implications for Pakistan-China Relations and Regional Security Pakistan‟s full membership in the SCO entails several opportunities for this country to further improve its relations not only with China but also with other member states especially with Russia and CARs. Another important implication of Pakistan‟s full membership of SCO is for regional security. It is believed that the inclusion of Pakistan and India in SCO as full members would push them to develop friendly relations with each in order to build cooperative regional security architecture. It is important for Pakistan to prepare itself well to avail the opportunities offered by the SCO mechanisms of conflict resolution and the conflict prevention.144

Pakistan desires to play a dynamic role in all activities of the SCO, particularly its activities related to the development of infrastructure, transport, connectivity, energy resources, banking and telecommunication. It is keen to work as a catalyst for regional economic integration.145 However, in order to play its effective role in the SCO process for economic integration, Pakistan would have to follow the legal and regulatory structures which are mandatory for the mutually beneficial partnership of corporate sector. With plans under way to connect the Silk Road Economic Belt with the Eurasian Economic Union, CPEC creates tremendous economic opportunities for Pakistan as well as SCO members. Once the CPEC starts functioning, it will connect China, Pakistan, Central Asia, Caucasus and Russia. Pakistan‟s entry into SCO would have not been possible without the consistent support of China. Now China‟s efforts to make Pakistan a trade and energy corridor for Central Asia would further enhance its impotence in the organisation. This will help Pakistan to contribute constructively in combating the menace of terrorism and extremism.146

In the SCO meeting held in China on September 17, 2015; Federal Commerce Minister Khurram Dastgir Khan, offered member countries to use Pakistan‟s ports once the CPEC is completed. He said Pakistan‟s trade strategy focused on developing linkages with

144 Saadat Hussain, “The SCO: Opportunities for Pakistan,” Daily Times, July 13, 2015. 145 Masood Khan, “SCO Ballast for Regional Peace, Stability,” Pakistan Today, June 3, 2012. 146 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “SCO Membership: Potentials for Pakistan,” The Hilal Magazine, August 2015.

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neighbours, leveraging the country‟s geographical location and capitalising on regional connectivity initiatives. Cross-border land trade is especially important for landlocked countries and Pakistan and SCO members will benefit substantially from greater integration through energy, commerce and transit trade. He further added that CPEC will be a landmark initiative under the umbrella of “One Belt One Road” and it envisaged connectivity and expansion of trade and investment through a network of roads, rail, fibre optic cables and energy pipelines.147 Pakistan has undertaken several initiatives which include rebooting of Quadrilateral Agreement for Traffic in Transit (QTTA) between China, Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan and Pakistan. The QTTA provides Pakistan a gateway to landlocked Central Asia and access to Pakistani seaports.148 On December 15, 2015, the 14th SCO Prime Ministers‟ summit was held in Zhengzhou, China. It supported China‟s Silk Road Economic Belt plan and hoped that this initiative will promote human development and security in the region.149

6.5. China’s Representation in OIC: Role of Pakistan After the UN, with its 57 members, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) stands as the second largest international organisation in the world. These countries are situated in different regions around the world including South and Southeast Asia, North Africa, Middle East, Europe and Africa.150 China, which has a large Muslim population, is seeking to become an observer member of OIC.151 Being an important Muslim country, Pakistan can play a significant role for China‟s entry in OIC as observer member and that can take both China and the Muslim world to new heights. Currently, Pakistan as the only Muslim country with nuclear power and second most populated country in the hub of OIC holds a significant position and has the privilege to represent China‟s stance in the organisation.152 It is noteworthy that China‟s relation with Muslim world has never faced any upheaval and such peace-loving relationships are supportive to regional and global security. Islam was first introduced in China during the Tang Dynasty around 1,300 years

147 Zafar Bhutta, “SCO Membership – a Potential Trump Card for Pakistan.” 148 “Pakistan Offers its Ports for Trade to SCO Countries, Pakistan Today, September 17, 2015. 149 The State Council of the People's Republic of China, “SCO Stresses Regional Economic Growth, Backs Chinese Proposals,” December15, 2015. 150 Abdul Ghafour, “Call to Promote China-Muslim Ties,” Arab News, July 6, 2012. 151 “Wen Jiabao Meets with OIC Secretary General,” Nihao-Salam, January 15, 2012. 152 “A Role for the OIC?,” Dawn, April 1, 2015.

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ago and it has rich heritage in China.153 The spectrum of relationship between China and the Muslim world has been outshining since very long time in the history.

China has always extended great support to Pakistan and Pakistan-China friendship is one of the strongest bonds that have vastly contributed for the peace and stability of regional as well as the international political relations. Pakistan avowed China regarding neutrality of the OIC in passing any denunciation about the China‟s run „strike hard‟ movement against Uighur Muslim minority. Pakistan has always facilitated China in embellishing the Chinese influence across Muslim community.

Geographically, Muslim countries are located in the most sensitive parts of the world, which are in control of the strategic transport hub of land and of sea. However, due to the limitation of their economic, political and military power, these important geographical and energy resources have not been adequately used by them. Chinese vision of “One Belt and One Road” would provide greater opportunities to the Muslim World in capitalising their geo-economic potentials. It will offer an opportunity for building a community of common fate and common interest for China and Muslim countries. Today, the world has three major economic zones: North America, European Union and East Asia. However, with the development and prosperity of the economic belt of the Silk Road, China and Muslim countries along the Economic Belt will become the world‟s biggest economic zone. The 57 Muslim countries along One Belt and One Road account for one fifth of the world population, producing 70 percent of the world‟s energy and half of the natural resources.154

The above discussion reflects that Pakistan and China cooperation in the regional organisations such as SAARC and SCO can lead to regional security. In this context, Pakistan and India‟s full membership of SCO would provide them an additional forum for talks, easing tensions and paving the way for regional cooperation. China‟s full membership at SAARC has massive potential to offer resources for building

153 Abdul Ghafour, “Call to Promote China-Muslim Ties.” 154 Li Xiguang, “The Silk Road Economic Belt and the Islamic World,” Keynote Speech, Special Session of the 6th Think Tanks Forum of Islamic Countries held in Islamabad, March 7, 2015.

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infrastructure required for regional connectivity. In view of China‟s cordial relations in political and economic fields with almost all the SAARC countries, it can be a stabilising factor in promotion of regional stability. Therefore, Pakistan-China cooperation in regional organisations is not only beneficial for these two countries, but is equally productive for the whole region.

This chapter focused on analysing Pakistan and China‟s relations in the context of two major regional organisations, i.e., SCO and SAARC. This discussion reflects the role of both countries in promoting regional security by being the member of these international organisations. The next chapter covers the future prospects of Pakistan-China relations in promoting regional security and cooperation. It also discusses the impact of Pakistan- China relations on regional security.

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CHAPTER - 7 PAKISTAN AND CHINA’S PROSPECTIVE ROLE IN PROMOTING REGIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION In the previous chapters, the conceptual dimensions of regional security, its imperatives, strategic interdependence between China and Pakistan in the post 9/11 era, bilateral cooperation in defence and security, their economic cooperation, and the role of regional organisations are discussed. The discussions reflect that the relations between China and Pakistan are exceptionally strong in all these spheres. This chapter discusses the joint efforts of both countries to meet the major imperatives of regional security, such as countering terrorism, emerging security order in South Asia, and Pakistan and China‟s prospective role in promoting regional cooperation. The chapter also discusses the imperatives of regional cooperation, in the context of regional connectivity such as importance of Iran‟s nuclear deal and prospective role of CPEC in promoting regional cooperation. Additionally, it also attempts to examine the policy approaches of the US and China to pursue Pakistan and India regarding the deescalating of their mutual tension. In this context, the main focus of the chapter is to present reflections on the future prospects of Pakistan and China cooperation in promoting regional security and cooperation.

7.1. Pakistan and China’s Prospective Role in Promoting Regional Security As discussed in previous chapters, the imperatives of regional security demands close cooperation between China and Pakistan on the issues of ensuring peace and security in the region and promoting regional cooperation in economic development and connectivity. In order to create conducive environment for regional security, a strong cooperation between China and Pakistan in countering terrorism, extremism and bringing peace and stability in Afghanistan is mandatory. Moreover, the emerging security orders in South Asia, especially in the context of the US efforts to use India as a linchpin of the US pivot policy for the containment of China - it would be necessary for Pakistan and China to work in cooperative security in order to counter any negative implications. In this respect, China‟s investment in Pakistan for the development of CPEC is a right step

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towards regional economic cooperation. Furthermore, Pakistan and China‟s good relation with India would further strengthen their efforts for ensuring regional security.

In this perspective, it is important to note that the present leadership, both in China and Pakistan, is determined to enhance cooperation at bilateral and multilateral levels by forging “China-Pakistan Community of Shared Destiny” with the objective of socio- economic development for the people of both countries. Therefore, promoting regional peace by meeting the imperatives of regional security, such as; eradicating terrorism and extremism, close cooperation for peace and stability in Afghanistan and making efforts for better relations with India would be in the common interest of Pakistan and China.

7.1.1. Pakistan’s Role in Countering Terrorism Strategically, Pakistan is situated in one of the most sensitive regions of the world. It is the junction point of South and Central Asia and the Middle East. Being an important Muslim country, a nuclear power, gateway to Central Asia and China, Pakistan is in a position of encountering Indian hegemonic ambitions in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. However, this strategic importance has also created several complicated challenges for this country. One of the biggest challenges the country faces is encountering the waves of violence and terrorism created by a variety of insurgent groups, such as the Taliban and Bloch separatists who are also funded and supported by external powers.1 Although, the incidents of violence are not new in Pakistan - the difference is that in the post 9/11 era, these have particularly created a major threat to national security. It is estimated that since the 9/11 to early 2015, there have been around 440 suicide bombings in the country in which over 6000 citizens have died and another 16,000 seriously injured.2 The year 2009 was the worst in Pakistan‟s history concerning terrorism, when TTP occupied the tourist city of Swat. A military action “Operation Rah-e-Rast” was carried out and the area was cleared of insurgents. Sadly, the nation paid a heavy price for this and numerous people were killed and injured during this period (figure: 7.1.1).

1 “Meeting India‟s Angry Spy Surjeet Singh,” BBC News, July 4, 2012. 2 Pakistan Body Count, “Suicide Bombing,” March 20, 2015, available at www.pakistanbodycount.org

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Figure: 7.1. Fatalities in Terroist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2014

14000

12000

Total 10000 Civilian 8000

6000 Security

Forces F a t a l i t i e s e tli i t a a F 4000 Terrorists 2000

2010 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014

Y e a r s

Sourse: Derived from: Fatalities in Terrorist Violence, Satp.org., April 12, 2015, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ countries/pakistan/database/casualities.htm.

It is worth noting that in addition to severe losses of human lives, terrorism has also caused huge economic losses to the nation. According to a report presented in the National Assembly on 6th December 2014, Pakistan has suffered a loss of almost 80 billion dollars, including the loss of 50,000 precious lives of civilians and law enforcement agencies in the war against terrorism during the period from 2003 to 2013.3 The government estimates published in Pakistan Economic Survey 2014-15 reveal that during the past 14 years, the country had incurred US$ 107 billion (Rs. 8.7 trillion) direct and indirect costs owing to terrorism.4 This cost was twice of the next year‟s proposed total budget of Rs. 4.2 trillion. According to the same official document, the country sustained US$ 4.53 billion direct and indirect losses from terrorism in fiscal year 2014- 15, US$ 2.1 billion (32%) less than US$ 6.63 billion sustained in fiscal year 2013-14. The cost of lost export opportunities, increased from US$ 530 million to US$ 730 million in an outgoing fiscal year. The expenditure overruns due to war on terrorism have been

3 “Pakistan Suffers $ 80 billion Loss in War on Terror, NA,” News, December 5, 2015. 4 Shahbaz Rana, “Economic Survey 2014-15: Losses due to War on Terror Down by a Third to $ 4.5b,” Express Tribune, June 4, 2015.

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estimated at US$ 620 million, against US$ 290 million in the previous fiscal year.5 The economic cost of the war on terrorism was prepared by an inter-ministerial committee, comprising representatives of Ministries of Finance, Interior, Foreign Affairs and a Joint Ministerial Group. Table: 7.1. Estimated Loss of Pakistan in War on Terrorism (2001-2015) Year US$ in Rs. In Billion Change (%) Billion 2001-02 2.67 163.90 - 2002-03 2.75 160.80 3.0 2003-04 2.93 168.80 6.7 2004-05 3.41 202.40 16.3 2005-06 3.99 238.66 16.9 2006-07 4.67 283.20 17.2 2007-08 6.94 434.10 48.6 2008-09 9.18 720.60 32.3 2009-10 13.56 1136.40 47.7 2010-11 23.77 2037.33 75.3 2011-12 11.98 1052.77 -49.6 2012-13 9.97 964.24 -16.8 2013-14 6.63 684.68 -33.5 2014-15 4.53 457.55 -31.7 Total 106.98 8702.75 - Source: Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Economic Survey 2014-15 (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, 2015), 280.

Fiscal year 2014-15 was the consecutive fourth year, when there was a reduction in economic losses suffered from terrorism over the preceding year, shown under a section of the Economic Survey. The quantum of loss of human lives is also declining due to implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP) after the Peshawar tragedy, in addition to efforts in Karachi and the Operation Zarb-e-Azb. The US drone attacks have drastically reduced, which also helped lowering the direct losses to the infrastructure and human lives, according to the defence experts.6

5 Ibid. 6 Ibid.

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7.1.2. Operation Zarb-e-Azb: A Game Changer for Regional Security Pakistan has played a very significant role in countering terrorism not only for the sake of its internal peace within the country, but it has also contributed in promoting regional peace and security. On June 15, 2014, Pakistan army initiated a military operation named “Zarb-e-Azb” against the terrorist factions and their hideouts in the North Waziristan tribal area of Pakistan.7 The operation is still going on. The primary goal to achieve through the operation is to insure peace and stability and the elimination of terrorist factions and their hideouts indiscriminately. Whilst briefing the objectives of the operation, the Director General of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) expressed that the North Waziristan has long been used as a terrorist base by the miscreants to create instability and destruction in Pakistan. The terrorism in Pakistan has afflicted the national life in terms of mammoth loss of life and property and disruption in the socio-economic and foreign development investment indicators.8

In addition, the terrorist elements using their terrorising tactics have also gravely stricken the indigenous population of the North Waziristan - characterised as the peaceful and patriotic people.9 On June 16, 2014, the National Assembly of Pakistan unanimously passed a resolution to express the determination and consent to empower the government‟s decision to initiate a military operation by the Pakistan Army against the insurgents in the tribal areas.10 The militants have been pursuing their nefarious agenda on Pakistani soil, by carrying out violent attacks on the armed forces and innocent civilian population resulting in the horrifying casualties and enormous economic loss. In addition, the resolution emphasised the perseverance to support the armed forces of Pakistan till the complete annihilation of terrorist factions. It further provides a sanguine hope about prospects of peace and prosperity to the indigenous tribal populace, once the operation comes to its end.11

7 “Operation Zarb-e-Azb is Delivering Decisive Results: Army Chief,” Pakistan Times, June 13, 2015. 8 . Khurram Ali Khan, “Zarb-e-Azb: A Tale of Valiant Army Against Terrorism,” Hilal Magazine, September 2015. 9 Muhammad Munir, “Zarb-e-Azb for Peace,” Pakistan Observer, June 28, 2014. 10 “National Assembly Resolution,” The Nation, June 16, 2014. 11 Muhammad Munir, “Zarb-e-Azb for Peace.”

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Whilst addressing the parliament session, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif exposited his government‟s stance to resort towards peace oriented dialogue process earlier and later towards initiating the military operation, the persistent bloodshed and violence by terrorists became the reason for his “go ahead.”12 He stressed that the operation and dialogue along with terrorism could not go simultaneously.13 It reflects that the government solemnly wanted to settle the issue through peace dialogue for four and half month time period, but it did not work. Therefore, the government opting for last resort had to get down towards military means and launched the operation. Operation Zarb-e- Azb is unfolding as per the military plan and seems to be continued till the elimination of all terrorists and extremists. In addition to the operations in far-flung areas, Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) are also nabbing terrorists hiding in the settled areas. Such policy of targeting all militant organisations without any discrimination, including those who were exempted under certain agreement with Army in the past, certainly carries some sort of pros and cons with it. The army spokesperson reported that Pakistan Army has launched a “comprehensive operation against foreign and local terrorists who are hiding in sanctuaries in North Waziristan”.14 Some positive points about the operation are;  The pursuit of such all-inclusive approach in elimination of terrorism accomplishes Pakistan‟s primary goal of ensuring the safety of civilian‟s life from terrorist attacks.  It holds validation from international community in favour of continuance of military operation.  It enables Pakistan to benefit from “Carl Levin National Defence Authorization Act for 2015” whereby US$ 300 million will be released out of US$ 900 million of the Coalition Support Funds.15  This strategy will embellish the distorted image of Pakistan, for patronising some militant groups like Haqqani network in the past.

12 Earlier on, a series of dialogue held between TTP and the government backed politico-religious leaders. However, TTP was not willing to abandon its violent approach and thus this process failed. 13 Azam Khan, “PM Calls on Nation to Support Army,” Express Tribune, June 17, 2014. 14 Jon Boone, “Pakistan Begins Long-awaited Offensive to Root out Militants from Border Region,” The Guardian, June 15, 2014. 15 Anwar Iqbal, “US Congress Links Aid to Military Operations,” Dawn, June 12, 2014.

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 Pertaining to Chinese concerns, the operation has also hunted down some of the ETIM terrorists and their affiliates in North Waziristan.  As top commanders of various militant groups, such as TTP and Haqani network, have fled to Afghanistan, Pakistan now has justification to urge Afghan government and the US to undertake essential steps to eliminate those elements.16

However, in spite of these positive dimensions, this all-inclusive strategy also created various challenges. For instance, the combat operation without any discrimination against terrorist groups might ignite the element of commiseration amongst these militant groups thus increasing the level of unity amongst them.17 Secondly, Pakistan might lose a reconciliatory agent in the form of Haqani network that could be an intermediary in reconciliation with Afghanistan.18 Thirdly, those militants who have fled to Afghanistan would remain a potential threat to Pakistan, owing to the lack of essential action by the NATO and Afghan forces.19 Fourthly, since the global standing vis-à-vis threat from al- Qaeda has depreciated in the wake of execution of top commanders, and as a talking point the terrorism in the region has become a regional matter now, hence, it is unlikely that such transformation of perspective will enable Pakistan to garner much support from international community for the pervasive economic losses and the resettlement of IDPs of North Waziristan.20

It is noteworthy that after the army achieved major successes in action against national and international terror networks and outlawed groups in a year, Zarb-e-Azb has now shifted the action towards the involvement of various other non-state actors and external involvement. The security forces are now actively taking steps to counter terrorism in Sindh and Balochistan.21 The Operation Zarb-e-Azb has been quite successful in building Pakistan‟s image. With the operation in North Waziristan, the propaganda against Pakistan that it deliberately avoided operation in that area has died down in the Western

16 Muhammad Munir, “Zarb-e-Azb for Peace.” 17 Ansar Abbasi, “Only Surrender will Save Militants as all Agreements Stand Terminated,” The News, June 17, 2014. 18 Michael Kugelman, “The Haqqani Threat to the US-Pakistan Détente,” The Diplomat, July 31, 2014. 19 “Obama Says Terrorism is Not an Existential Threat,” Schnier on Security, February 3, 2015. 20 Muhammad Munir, “Zarb-e-Azb for Peace.” 21 “Sindh, Balochistan to Combat Terrorism Together,” The News, February 13, 2015.

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world.22 Presently, around 90 percent area has been cleared from various groups such as Haqqani network, TTP and al-Qaeda – resultantly, there has been a major decline in suicide bombings in the country. Pakistan‟s relations with Afghanistan are important for the success in war against terrorism. The relations between two countries have somewhat improved after Ashraf Ghani became president of Afghanistan. It is in the interest of both countries to strengthen their cooperation in countering terrorism.23 At present, the major challenges that Pakistan is facing due to the on-going Operation Zarb-e-Azb includes;  The rehabilitation and settlement of large number of displaced people.  The reopening of educational institutions and building of roads, houses and hospitals - it would require constant attention by the political leadership.24  The fear of backlash of these militant groups at a time of their choice especially activities of marginalised group associated with IS.

No doubt, these are very serious challenges and, therefore, it is essential to strengthen coordination between central and provincial governments, as well as between the governments and armed forces of the country. In the same context, the role of civil society and media for the rehabilitation of IDPs is also equally important.25 It is pertinent to acknowledge that Zarb-e-Azb, as an operation for peace, is not only for Pakistan but also for the region and the world as whole. Although, the international community acknowledges the sacrifices offered by Pakistan in Operation Zarb-e-Azb, but still there exists a tinge of scepticism within certain quarters that Pakistan is not taking significant measures against some militant groups such as Jamat-ud-Dawa.26

As mentioned above, the Operation Zarb-e-Azb is bringing about the positive outcomes and resultantly, there has been substantial decline in the number of suicide blasts in the last two years.27 Militants have lost their hideouts and sanctuaries where they used to plan

22 Mazhar Abbas, “Zarb-e-Azb: Challenges a Year After,” The News, June 28, 2015. 23 Aymen Ijaz, “Post Operation Zarb-e-Azb: Security and Rehabilitation Challenges,” IPRI Review, September 21, 2015. 24 Mazhar Abbas, “Zarb-e-Azb.” 25 Muhammad Munir, “Zarb-e-Azb for Peace.” 26 Bruce Riedel, “For Prudent Crisis Planning on Terror,” The Brookings Institute Research, January 21, 2015. 27 “Pakistan Assessment 2014,” South-Asia Terrorism Portal, December 22, 2014.

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and execute terrorist attacks across the country. However, for establishing the long-term peaceful environment during and after the major military offense, Pakistan has to address various internal and external challenges, which are needed to be aligned and coordinated. Moreover, to eliminate the menace of terrorism and extremism, there is a need to launch anti-radicalisation awareness campaigns through religious and community leaders for promoting interfaith harmony and culture of tolerance. Cover of terrorism is also coming handy for those wishing to disrupt the progress on the CPEC. Terrorism confronted by Pakistan is being sponsored by many sources, both external and internal, each having its own objectives. Pakistan cannot follow a cut and dry approach made of cobbled pieces from here and there to counter it. There is a need to evolve country specific counter terrorism policy right from concept to implementation level. Communities and LEAs need to work together to achieve the end objective - Pakistan free from the fear of terrorism.28

7.1.3. Pakistan-China Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Pakistan and China have similar views on the issue of terrorism - both countries regard it a common threat to regional peace and stability. On October 23, 2015, the government of Pakistan took significant measures to proscribe three of the international militant organisations which were previously involved in carrying out terrorist activities in the Chinese western region of Xinjiang, these include: Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).29 A large number of insurgents belonging to these organisations have been killed during the military operation in North Waziristan and in other parts of tribal area.

China has always lauded the Pakistan‟s effort in elimination of terrorism during its war on terrorism. China has expressed great deal of validation upon the devised strategy and its implementation by Pakistan to combat terrorism and assures Pakistan of its continued cooperation in enhancing the counter-terrorism capacity of Pakistan.30 Being on the close proximity with Afghanistan, both China and Pakistan desire a politically stable,

28 Ibid. 29 “Pakistan Bans Three Extremist Outfits, On Orders from China,” Express Tribune, October 23, 2013. 30 “China Stands by Pakistan in War on Terror: Xi,” News, April 21, 2015.

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administratively peaceful and economically prosperous Afghanistan in the post- drawdown of the ISAF and the US Forces.31 China and Pakistan have expressed their willingness to support peace and reconciliation process, headed and endorsed by Afghanistan and have urged the global community to play its role in assuring peace and stability in this war torn country.32 One of the factors that Pakistan started Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan is to address the Chinese concerns over ETIM‟s presence in North Waziristan. Currently, ETIM has been eliminated from Mirali, Miranshah, Boya and Degan – over a hundred ETIM members have been killed and 66 were arrested and handed over to China.33 The most wanted offender of Chinese government - Saudi based ETIM leader Zakria, has been arrested by Pakistani intelligence agencies, ten more ETIM members have been arrested in United Arab Emirates (UAE) with the efforts of Pakistani intelligence agencies.34

Pakistan has taken steps for the security of Chinese nationals in working in the country. It is estimated that 32,000 security personnel will guard over 14,321 Chinese workers engaged in some 210 small and mega projects in Pakistan.35 The National Counter Terrorism Agency (NACTA) and Chinese Embassy in Islamabad are coordinating on various security issues including issuance of visa to Chinese students. Around 660 students from China are studying in various disciplines of International Islamic University Islamabad.36 In addition, some Chinese Muslim students are also studying in Madrasas in Pakistan.37 China was also assisting in completing „Safe City‟ project in Islamabad and under this project; more than 12000 CCTVs would be installed in the

31 Najam Rafique, “Afghanistan post-2014: Policy Responses of the Major Stakeholders,” August 29, 2014. 32 Raja Muhammad Khan, “China-Pakistan Relations: Economic Corridor and Beyond,” Pakistan Observer, January 20, 2014. 33 Aymen Ijaz, “Zarb-e-Azb: Strengthening Pak- China Relations,” IPRI News Paper Article, November 3 2015. 34 “Almost all Uighur Militants in Pakistan Eliminated,” Dawn, September 3, 2015. 35 Zahid Gishkori, “Economic Corridor: Pakistan, China Agree on Four-layer Security,” Express Tribune, November 1, 2015. 36 “IIU: China-Pakistan Centre Launch Youlin,” The News, February 16, 2012. 37 Jackie Armijo, “Islamic Education in China,” Imam Reza Network, November 16, 2015.

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capital. The cost of the project is 1.2 million dollars, which would be assisted by Huwavi Company of China.38

7.1.4. Stabilising Afghanistan: An Imperative of Regional Security In July 2013, in a joint statement released following the meeting between Chinese premier Li Keqiang and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, exposited that the contemporary developing state of affairs in Afghanistan has certain spill over effects on the stability and security of the entire region. Both leaders evinced on the need to have all inclusive reconciliatory process as a significant step forward in bringing peace, stability and unity in Afghanistan.39 Both China and Pakistan regards the security of Afghanistan as one of the most important imperatives for the regional security of South and Central Asia, and emphasise on the “Afghan-owned and Afghan led” reconciliatory process.40 Besides, the two sides expressed the mutual consent to work with international community as well as regional countries to assist Afghanistan to establish the ambience of security, peace and stability.41 A peaceful and stable Afghanistan is in the interest of both countries. The security of the CPEC is also linked with Afghanistan‟s stability. Therefore, it has been a priority of both countries to help Afghanistan in post 2014 challenges.

Chinese foreign policy has three main objectives; peace, development, and international cooperation. For regional stability, China believes in combating the three main threats facing the region in the form of terrorism, extremism, and separatism. Chinese support in terms of aid and resources for reconstruction and economic development of Afghanistan shows her interest in a stable Afghanistan. Chinese companies had undertaken a number of infrastructure projects in Afghanistan.42 Chinese policy towards Pakistan and Afghanistan has been evolving from non-interference to one of creative involvement. For

38 Shakeel Anjum, “Islamabad Safe City Project Launched to Ensure Protection of Citizens,” The News, June 17, 2015. 39 “PM Sharif Talks Business on China Visit, Meets Chinese President,” Dawn, July 4, 2013. 40 “China backs „Afghan-led, Afghan-owned‟ Reconciliation Process,” Daily Times, December 28, 2015. 41 “Pakistan, China Vow to Promote Policies for Regional Peace, Cooperation,” The News, July 5, 2013. 42 “As US Exits, China Takes on Afghanistan Role,” The Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2015.

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regional stability, the Chinese government is playing an important role in strengthening cordial relations and mutual understanding between Pakistan and Afghanistan.43

It is important to note that Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has rightly stated that negotiations with Taliban are the only way out to put an end to the on-going bloodshed in Afghanistan and he has appreciated Pakistan‟s efforts in bringing the Taliban and Afghan government, face to face at negotiating table in Murree, which could turn into a harbinger of peace in Afghanistan.44 This was a significant step to promote regional security.45 Pakistan has also involved China and the US in the reconciliatory process, so that its sincerity is proved and to counter the propaganda in the international media that Islamabad was using Taliban to keep Afghan government under pressure. The previously held talks indicate that the two sides are serious in efforts to bring an end to more than thirty years of bloodshed and next round was expected to begin on July 30, 2015 in Urumqi – China. However, the released news of Mullah Omer‟s death stalled the process of negotiation for the time being; it does not construe the complete closure of the chapter, still there are serious efforts going on to continue the talks-process from where it was left.46 It is hoped that after the normalisation of conditions, the international community would support Afghanistan in its reconstruction so that its people could enjoy the fruit of peace and stability.47

Pakistan‟s commitment to assure peace in Afghanistan can be analysed by the statements given by its leadership. During a meeting with the Special Assistant to Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs Tariq Fatemi at the Department of State in Washington on July 20, 2015, the US Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken has lauded Pakistan‟s efforts in Afghan peace process.48 Fatemi reiterated Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif‟s desire to have cordial

43 “Islamabad Trilateral Dialogue: China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Day II - Monday, October 20th, 2014,” Pakistan China Institute, October 20, 2014. 44 “Ghani Rightly Welcomes Talks with Taliban,” Pakistan Observer, July 21, 2015. 45 “Afghan Reconciliation: Mullah Omar‟s Aide Likely to Join Peace Talks,” Express Tribune, July 17, 2015. 46 Barnett Rubin, “What Could Mullah Mohammad Omar‟s Death Mean for the Taliban Talks?” The New Yorker, July 29, 2015. 47 “Ghani Rightly Welcomes Talk with Taliban.” 48 “US Lauds Pakistan for Facilitating Talks between Afghan Govt., Taliban,” Daily Times, July 21, 2015.

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relations with all countries, including its neighbours. Blinken reassured Pakistan the US would play its role in maintaining peace in Afghanistan. The Army Chief General Raheel Sharif while presiding over a meeting of the corps commanders at the GHQ in Rawalpindi on August 4, 2015 said that: “The Pakistan-brokered peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban is the only „credible‟ way to restore lasting peace in the war-torn country.”49 This was the first formal reaction from the Pakistan Army on the nascent Afghan peace process, whose fate hangs in the balance following the confirmation of death of Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar and the subsequent rifts in the ranks of the ultraorthodox militia. The second round of talks, which was scheduled to take place on July 31 in Pakistan, was postponed at the request of the Afghan government and the Taliban leadership.50

The announcement of Mullah Omar‟s death has created leadership crisis, giving rise to uncertainties regarding the fate of the Afghan Taliban and prospects of peace in Afghanistan. Keeping Mullah Omar‟s death secret was a deliberate move on the part of Mullah Mansoor to maintain his grip on the Taliban and prevent the possibility of dissensions in the second tier leadership at a critical time.51 It also betrays lack of confidence on the part of Mullah Mansoor. He presumed that orders issued on behalf of Mullah Omar would be complied with and will not be challenged. As the concealed information about the death of Mullah Omer has been unveiled, it caused implications for unity among Taliban groups. In this sitation, some groups led by Mullah Zakir shown their inclination to dissociate or disown the leadership of Mullah Mansoor.52 The danger is that these groups may join the IS or al Qaeda; although, Afghan tradition and its past insurgencies indicate that Afghans have been very consistent in opposing the hegemony of any outside group. Whether they will show the same proclivity when it comes to the IS is not certain yet.

49 Kamran Yousaf, “Murree Talks only Credible Way to Peace: Gen. Raheel,” Express Tribune, August 5, 2015. 50 Ibid. 51 Talat Masood, “Mullah Omar‟s Demise: Opportunities and Risks,” Express Tribune, August 5, 2015. 52 Ibid.

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The meteoric rise and popularity of the Middle Eastern terrorist group the Islamic State (IS) has, in one way or the other, inspired militant groups in Pakistan. However, academic analyses, policy debates and political opinions in Pakistan differ widely over the nature and scale of IS penetration in the country. So far, only three splinter groups of the outlawed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), namely the Tehreek-e-Khilafat, Jandullah and the Shahidullah Shahid faction have pledged allegiance to the IS.53 On January 27, 2015, the IS spokesperson Abu Muhammad Al-Adnani‟s announcement regarding the group‟s expansion to Afghanistan and Pakistan described as “the Khurasan province” further rang alarm bells about the increasing influence of the IS in the region.54 Security analysts are of the view that the decision by IMU to abandon the Afghan Taliban and join hands with IS would come as a serious blow to the military might of the Afghan militia given the fact that there are over 5,000 Uzbek fighters who are equipped with more advanced weaponry including night vision goggles and a high level of training, and that‟s why the IMU has been largely considered to be the key to the Afghan Taliban‟s strength and resilience in Afghanistan.55 This situation highlights that promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan is an extremely complex issue due to which further integrated efforts are required by the regional countries as well as by major global players.

7.2. Emerging Regional Security Order A regional security order is a complex mixture of a variety of factors. Geo-strategically, Pakistan holds an important position with regard to international trade between South and Central Asia and, East and West Asia. However, regional peace is a key factor to promote and strengthen the process of human development in the countries situated in the respective region. Pakistan‟s efforts to promote regional security have been contributing significantly to form a new security model in the region. In this perspective, the following discussion mainly focuses on China‟s relations with India and Pakistan, US policy

53 Rob Crilly and Saleem Mehsud, “Pakistani Terror Group Swears Allegiance to Islamic State,” The Telegraph, July 9, 2014. 54 Abdul Basit , “Is IS a Threat to Pakistan?” Express Tribune, February 28, 2015. 55 “Uzbek Group in Afghanistan Pledge Allegiance to Islamic State,” World Affairs, March 30, 2015.

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approaches towards India and Pakistan, the SCO‟s implications for Indo-Pak relations and the security of the CPEC.

7.2.1. China’s Relations with India and Pakistan According to Walter Andersen and Zhong Zhenming, India‟s agenda of socio-economic development is identical to Chinese agenda of “shared development.”56 Hence, Indo- China economic relations would likely to improve in years to come. Moreover, their economic cooperation may lead both countries to a favourable and stable border security. The present leaderships in India and China are attempting to explore further avenues to improve their economic collaboration.57 Nonetheless, India and China are engaged in a complex hedging strategy regarding security issues that also includes the US and Japan. India appears to be moving incrementally closer to the US and Japan to create a multi- centred balance of power in Asia. China for its part will probably seek to build closer economic links with India to counter these moves.

There is a big difference of China‟s relation with India and China‟s relations with Pakistan. Pakistan has edge on India in relations with China. India has border disputes with China and in near future India is not prepared to solve these disputes. Moreover, there is lack of trust between both countries on strategic and security affairs. Strategic spheres of both countries are a source of suspicion for each other. Although, China and India have signed various economic agreements, there is no mega project under consideration between the two countries. At global level, China-India relations are based on common interest especially at BRICS, G20 and SCO level.58 However, in regional security issue, both countries may remain competitors for years to come. Pakistan‟s prominence in the view of Chinese policy making circle is rising rapidly owing to the steady occurrence of terrorist‟s activities in the western Chinese region of Xinjiang. Pakistan is playing ample role in war against terrorism and there is a deep sense of recognition amongst the Chinese leadership that terrorism will certainly be the biggest

56 Walter Andersen and Zhong Zhenming, “Watch Out for Modi‟s Robust Engagement with China,” Rediff News, May 11, 2015. 57 Ibid. 58 Mu Chunshan, “China‟s Choice: India or Pakistan?” The Diplomat, September 27, 2014.

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impediment in the way of development in its western region. Consequently, China has formed an alliance with the countries of SCO to eliminate terrorism and also it has emboldened its cooperation with Pakistan.59

China and Pakistan have pledge to strengthen their comprehensive strategic engagement and closer cooperation for the peace and security in Afghanistan.60 The bilateral partnership between China and Pakistan has attained the integral importance in the contemporary changing dynamics of regional and international relations. The two sides have accorded to elevate the strategic relationship to the next level to advance the exchange of strategic communication and negotiation on the agreements for free trade, inception of Pak-China joint energy group for development of energy sector including renewable and non-renewable energy resources, development of the road-links for swift connectivity via KKH and various other transportation infrastructure including expansion of air-routes, expediting the development work on CPEC, enhancing the cooperation on counter terrorism and maritime security to jointly combat the threats and secure the international sea-routes as well as the joint cooperation for regional and international fora.61 Furthermore, there is a mutual understanding between two countries to enhance the strategic cooperation primarily in eight sectors between Beijing and Islamabad, which includes: i) cooperation on regional and international issues, ii) defence and security partnership, iii) maritime security, iv) aviation and aerospace, v) economy and trade, vi) political relations, vii) connectivity, viii) and people to people exchanges.62

The contemporary time period in international relation is marked by the interdependence and collective efforts to ensure the global peace and security. As far as the traditional and non-traditional threats are concerned, the Indian Ocean region will remain in a crucial state of affairs to confront the escalating security challenges. Pakistan has a distinctive status in the region. As per its national policies, Pakistan‟s naval force has a crucial role to contribute in the assurance of maritime security and stability within the region. The

59 Ibid. 60 “Chinese Premier in Pakistan, Praises Ties,” Dawn, May 22, 2013. 61 Irfan Haider, “Details of Agreements Signed during Xi‟s Visit to Pakistan,” Dawn, April 20, 2015. 62 Baqir Sajjad Syed, “China Praises Pak strategy against Terror,” Dawn, May 24, 2013.

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formation of Collaborative Maritime Security Apparatus (CMSA) is an important step in countering the challenges of maritime security.63 However, prerequisite in achieving the pragmatic progress vis-à-vis maritime security is first to resolve the lingering issues and disagreements between the regional countries through a proactive dialogue and political peace process. The viability of such measures will embolden the confidence building and garner the trust between the regional states, extending to promote the exigent cooperation in elimination of maritime threats and strengthen the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).64

7.2.2. US Policy Approaches towards India and Pakistan The US policy to deal with India and Pakistan is based on two-tier approach. However, when it comes to deal with various issues at hand, the cordiality is the common factor found in both of these approaches but still the element of consensus is rarely visible amongst three of these countries - Pakistan-India and the US. The US polices regarding South Asia are formed under the ambit of global perspective. Pakistan‟s policy is generally regional and mostly indo-centric in its disposition. However, India has regional as well as global policy agenda. In terms of regional outlook, India attempts to exert great deal of influence on regional countries of South Asia to align their foreign policies in such a manner that do not affect the primacy, diplomacy and security interests of India. Pakistan strongly rebuffs such claim made by India to exercise primacy in South Asia.65

India maintains its standing at global stage, with staunch ambition to exercise its influence as a global power by securing a permanent membership in the UNSC. Such a tendency was reflected in the speech, given by Prime Minister Modi‟s at the UNGA on September 27, 2014, where he expounded a depiction of himself as a leader with global vision to truckle the peace and elevate the human development in the world and introduce improvements in the environmental issues.66 He exhibited a cold-shoulder to Pakistani

63 Muhammad Zarrar Haider, “Pakistan‟s Role in Multilateral Security Cooperation in Indian Ocean Region,” Defence Journal Pakistan (June 2014): 138. 64 Ibid. 65 Hasan Askari Rizvi, “The United States, India and Pakistan,” Express Tribune, October 5, 2014. 66 Jonathan Allen, “India‟s Modi Jabs at Pakistan, Encourages Yoga in UN Address,” Reuters, September 27, 2014.

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Prime Minister to deliberately sidestep the lingering Kashmir issue that was the focal point of the speech delivered by Pakistani Prime Minister a day earlier at the UNGA. Modi‟s response to the Kashmir issue was issued in a prudent manner to evade the issue by quoting reference to terrorism and allude towards the keenness of India towards global affairs.67

There is a favour and disfavour attached with the two-track policy applied by the US in South Asia. The amicable working partnership with both countries to resolve certain issue can be termed as a positive side or a favour that the US is having vis-à-vis its relations in South Asia region.68 Albeit, the US is more inclined towards the role as a fire- fighter between Pakistan and India to inhibit the occurrence of war. Currently, it has minimal interest in resolving issues pertaining to Pakistan-India relations. There could be the possibility of limited sphere of influence that US exercises in both countries. The disadvantage of the good working relationship with Pakistan and India is that, although the US has several times made it clear that the tracks of relationship with two countries are different, but both countries sceptically keep an eye on the activities that the US is pursuing with the other party. There is stern wave of criticism that comes out of either India or Pakistan that the US has to face every time it extends its military or economic assistance to either of the two countries.69

Some scholars are of the opinion that the US has been the single most important external factor affecting Asian integration; however, in today‟s world politics, there is transformation from unipolar to a multi-polar system where regional powers would be on a driving seat with competing interests vis-a-vis the US in the future.70 As far as South Asia is concerned, it still confronts a variety of security threats ranging from territorial disputes, terrorism, extremism and the threat of nuclear warfare, etc. The regional security is still fragile, especially with regard to relations between the two nuclear powers - Pakistan and India. There is no doubt that the US has vital interest in the regional

67 Hasan Askari Rizvi, “The United States, India and Pakistan.” 68 Marvin C. Ott, “The Imperative for an American Strategy for Southeast Asia,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, September 2013. 69 Hasan Askari Rizvi, “The United States, India and Pakistan.” 70 Marvin C. Ott, “The Imperative for an American Strategy for Southeast Asia.”

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stability, any new US approach to South Asian regional security should handle the affairs pragmatically. But in recent years, the US‟ tilt has been witnessed towards India and its efforts to re-design the Asia Pacific security order would not serve its interests and interests of other regional states until a cooperative security approach is adopted. This is due to the fact that China, an emerging super-power, is being involved in the US policy of “Asia Pivot.” China will not compromise on its territorial integrity and national interests unlike some other smaller client states.71

In the context of the drawdown of ISAF troops from Afghanistan, a report entitled, Reorienting US’ Pakistan Strategy: From Af-Pak to Asia, authored by Daniel S. Markey, proposed the US government to regard Pakistan not exclusive or even inclusive with respect to US-Afghanistan policy, but preferably to realign the spectrum of relations with Pakistan keeping in view the developing security paradigm in Asia, “a US strategy for Asia that does not contemplate Pakistan‟s role is incomplete, and a US strategy for Pakistan that primarily considers its role in the context of Afghanistan is short-sighted.”72 The report further advocated a two-pronged strategy for the US with regard to its policy for Pakistan in future which adumbrated; a strong security against all sort of threats to country‟s defence, and assist Pakistan in economic growth and in securing normal relations with neighbouring countries. The US should lead fresh diplomatic negotiations with India, Pakistan and China to diminish the possibilities of tensed and aggressive policies and encourage these countries to sign trade deals, besides, US should assist the development of trade and transit facilities in Pakistan and incorporate Pakistan in formulation of US-East Asia and US-South Asia policy.73 The US approach to regional security would only work well if it takes into consideration the ground realities. Therefore, the US role in shaping regional security should not disturb the existing power structure and any approach to regional security should be consensus-based.74

71 Khalid Chandio, “The US Approach to Regional Security,” OpEdNews USA, April 23, 2014. 72Daniel S. Markey, “Reorienting US Pakistan Strategy: From Af-Pak to Asia,” CFR Special Report no. 68, January 2014. 73 Ibid. 74 Khalid Chandio, “The US Approach to Regional Security.”

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7.2.3. Expansion of SCO and its Implication for Pakistan-India Relations Pakistan is in a position to fulfil the requisite credentials such as given its role in general interest of Afghanistan, its commitment in fight against terrorism and other anarchic forces of extremism and separatism, as a bridge in overland connectivity for energy and trade within the region, its cultural and historical affinity with CARs, its strategic relationship with China, and developing relationship with Russia - that have previously lent its support to Pakistan in securing full membership at the SCO.75 The membership of the SCO will further oblige both India and Pakistan to observe the „Shanghai spirit‟ and it is anticipated that such an expansion will bring positive changes in the structure of the SCO that will yield a more dynamic and constructive output in South Asia.76

The geo-strategic location of Pakistan vis-à-vis landlocked countries of the region provides Pakistan with a vantage point to emerge as a corridor for energy and trade with regional countries of the SCO. The importance that Pakistan relates to SCO implies the potential role of the Pakistan as a bridge for trade with CARs and the Chinese western region of Xinjiang. The ideal geographical location of Pakistan renders it a significant role to play as a regional economic merger for trade with the member states of the SCO. China is providing its assistance in development of the CPEC; special economic zones at Gwadar Port and Kashgar, up-gradation of KKH to link the Gwadar Port with CARs via Kashgar, are some of the development projects undertaken in accordance with the principles of SCO to implement the model for “trans-continental overland connectivity” in the region.77 Scholars such as Nasurullah Brohi see the SCO as a bridge between India and Pakistan which can be helpful in diluting historical hostilities of two archrivals. As a result, this situation can promote regional stability and development which may change the lives of millions of people.78

75 “Russia, China Support Pakistan‟s Permanent Membership Status at SCO,” Pakistan Times, March 6, 2015. 76 Saadat Hassan, “The SCO: Opportunities for Pakistan,” Daily Times, July 13, 2015. 77 Ibid. 78 Nasurullah Brohi, “Strategic Alignments at SCO: Prospects for India-Pakistan Bilateral Relations,” Modern Diplomacy, November 17, 2015.

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7.2.4. Security of CPEC With aiming at grand regional connectivity that entails multiple infrastructure and energy resource development projects, the CPEC is a major strategic move at regional level. The CPEC and its allied projects are discussed in detail in chapter five – the present section only highlights its security issue. India has objections on the establishment of CPEC and has asked China to address its concerns in this regard. However, Chinese government has dismissed Indian‟s concern pertaining to CPEC.79 In this situation, the aggressive policies of Indian government under Prime Minister Modi to destabilise Pakistan through sub- conventional activities combined with already prevailing terrorist threats in the country have raised concerns both in Pakistan and China. In the light of these threats, Pakistan has been taking security measures not only to ensure overall security environment in Pakistan but it is also actively engaged in promoting regional peace with the help of China and the United States. Similarly, China also desires peaceful neighbourhood and the regional connectivity for economic prosperity of the countries satiated in South and Central Asia. However, India considers China as a competitor in South Asia and is not comfortable with Chinese investment and friendly relations with Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka.80

India considers CPEC a threat to its hegemonic design in South Asia as well as in the Indian Ocean region. Therefore, Pakistan needs to take special care in this regard. Needless to say that the progress on the CPEC will depend on the security and safety of the workforce involved in the development of various projects. In the view of the prevailing regional situation and Indian concerns on the CPEC, it is mandatory to provide fool-proof security arrangements to Chinese engineers and workers. In this regards, restricting the activities of the ETIM and its terrorist partners have been taken as a key challenge in Pakistan‟s counter terrorism operations including Operation Zarb-i-Azb. The establishment of nine army battalions and six wings of the civil armed forces in a special

79 Riaz Haq, “Pak Army Builds Over Half of CPEC Western Route in Record Time,” Haq’s Musings, July 31, 2015. 80 Muhammad Mushtaq Abbasi, Director, Ministry of Defense, personal interview, July 15, 2015.

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consignment to protect Chinese manpower along with the length of the CPEC would certainly be able to address the security issues.81

The measures taken by Pakistan‟s government to provide fool-proof security to CPEC project includes; the establishment of a special security division consisting of more than 8,000 military personnel (nine army battalions) that has been trained and will guard key projects linked from Hyderabad to Karachi and Gwadar through N-10 East Bay Expressway along the coastal line. Moreover, an estimated 32,000 security personnel comprising Rangers, Levies, police, scouts (making up six wings) will assist the military to guard more than 15,000 Chinese workers on this route and a major-general-ranked officer will command the entire unit. Apart from guarding the CPEC, around 8,000 security officials have already been deployed for the security of more than 8,112 Chinese workers executing 210 projects in Pakistan. An official of the Ministry of Interior revealed that the security layer around the Gwadar International Airport has been doubled following recent threats.82 A similar security has also been provided to protects China- Pakistan Friendship Hospital and Pak-China Technical and Vocational Institute falling under the jurisdiction of Baluchistan‟s provincial government.83

It is noteworthy that a high level meeting of the Sindh police officials, chaired by Inspector General of Police, was held on 31st July 2015.84 The meeting decided to depute 1,000 police commandos for the security of Chinese nationals already working on different projects and those likely to come here in connection with the CPEC. It was also decided to recruit 2,000 retired soldiers on a contract basis to overcome the shortage of policemen in the province.85 On the 6th of August 2015, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif approved the Pur-Aman Balochistan (Peaceful Balochistan) plan aimed at bringing the Baloch separatists back to the national mainstream.86 The concerned authorities were

81 Ibid. 82 Zahid Gishkori, “Economic Corridor: Pakistan, China Agree on Four-layer Security,” Express Tribune, November 1, 2015. 83 Ibid. 84 “Sindh Police to Establish Witness Protection Unit,” Express Tribune, September 24, 2015. 85 “1,000 Policemen to Protect Chinese Working on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Projects,” Dawn, August 1, 2015. 86 “PM Sharif Approves „Pur Aman Balochistan‟ Plan,” Samaa Tv, August 6, 2015.

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asked to reach out these people in an attempt to make them partners in the development process.87 It can be hoped that these measures will be helpful to promote security and development process in the country.

7.3. Iran’s Nuclear Deal and its Regional Implications After years of intense diplomatic efforts and multiple deadline extensions, the negotiations between Iran and P5+188 have finally resulted in a long-term Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on July 14, 2015, in Vienna.89 The key steps as stipulated in the plan include: i) Iran is allowed to continue its nuclear program for nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and will at no time seek, develop or acquire nuclear weapons, ii) removal of all UNSC sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions on Iran, iii) the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will monitor and verify voluntary nuclear related measures of JCPOA, and Iran to provide managed access to the IAEA of its military sites, iv) Iran to cut back its uranium centrifuges by two third in 10 years, and, v) Iran‟s arms embargo will be lifted, replaced with some restrictions to be removed in five years.90 Ban on ballistic missile technology will remain in place for eight years while and Iran‟s access to trade, technology, financial and energy will be facilitated.91 In return for Iran‟s actions, an instalment of US$ 15 billion from its frozen assets estimated at US$ 100 billion will be released along with US$ 4.2 billion in oil revenue.92 Sanctions against Iran were lifted in January 16, 2016 after compliance with nuclear deal. Furthermore, Iran is allowed to develop trade relations with other countries by using international banking system. The UNSC has also unanimously endorsed the P5+1-Iran nuclear deal.93

Iran nuclear deal will have far-reaching regional impact as it would enable the country to play a proactive role in defining the contours of emerging order in the Middle East by

87 Muhammad Saleh Zaafir, “Angry Baloch to be Won Over: PM,” The News, August 7, 2015. 88 The P5+1 refers to the UNSC‟s five permanent members and Germany. 89 “Iran Nuclear Deal: Full Text of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” The Guardian, July 14, 2015. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid. 92 Carol E. Lee and Jay Solomon, “US Suggests Compromise on Iran Sanctions,” The Wall Street Journal, April 17, 2015. 93 Khalid Iqbal, “The Millennium Deal: Myth and Reality,” Pakistan Observer, July 22, 2015.

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reducing sectarian divide in the region, and exerting influence on Assad regime to resolve Syrian conflict. In this regard, to allay the concerns of Gulf States Iranian diplomacy is at work as Iranian foreign minister has been visiting these states.94 Apart from reshaping the strategic relations within Middle East, Iranian deal would give Iran strategic leverage in negotiating the post-withdrawal transition process in Afghanistan and would enhance trade and transit opportunities for regional states. Pakistan and Iran, the two neighbouring states of Afghanistan have been hosting millions of Afghan refugees for decades, both countries have stakes in the peace and stability of Afghanistan, these two states should develop a consensus on “Afghan-led and Afghan owned” political framework.95

Pakistan‟s response on nuclear deal between Iran and the world powers was very positive. On July 14, 2015, the spokesman for the Foreign Office hoped that the agreement would bring peace to the region.96 The Prime Minister‟s Advisor on Foreign Affairs and National Security, Sartaj Aziz said that Pakistan was always in favour of resolving Iran‟s nuclear issue through the dialogue and the agreement will lead to economic growth along with an increase in trade between the two countries. He further hoped that the Iran-Pakistan pipeline project would also begin soon.97 Iran‟s natural gas reserves make it attractive for its neighbouring countries to form profound relations with Iran. Despite of all the political strings attached to the outcome of this deal, Iran would benefit on all fronts in terms of economic growth as well as the geostrategic influence that comes with it.98 Pakistan is keen to meet its energy needs and strengthen its economy through the completion of the Iran-Pakistan Pipeline Project.99 India is also ready to reap the benefits of this deal for cheaper energy and a passage to the Central Asian states. Iran is an essential partner for curbing terrorism in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of coalition forces from this country. China has always maintained strategic ties with Iran for decades, despite the overbearing effect of America‟s influence upon the sanctions,

94 “Iran Launches Charm Offensive among Wary Gulf Arabs,” Express Tribune, July 26, 2015. 95 Saman Zulfqar, “Iran Nuclear Deal and the Prospects for Regional Stability,” Daily Times, December 15, 2015. 96 “Pakistan Welcomes Iran Nuclear deal: FO,” News, July 14, 2015. 97 Ibid. 98 Faysal Namver, “Iranian Nuke deal: Geostrategic Implications,” Pakistan Today, August 1, 2015. 99 Khalid Iqbal, “TAPI and IP: Life Lines for our Economy,” Criterion Quarterly, September 18, 2013.

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which has revolved around an exchange of roughly US$ 60 billion worth of trade, and the gigantic amount of oil imported by China from Iran over the years.100

It is noteworthy that in March 2013, Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, worth US$ 7.5 billion, was commenced officially with great felicity, but this celebration was ephemeral and eventually project had to meet the derelictions that came in the manifestation of imposed international sanctions on Iran, which left Pakistan in the doldrums to garner the requisite economic impetus on its own and develop the pipeline on its side.101 Pakistan‟s Federal Minister for Petroleum and Natural Resources Shahid Khaqan Abbasi expressed that Iran‟s nuclear deal with the US will permit Islamabad to continue the development work on pipeline in order to purchase and import Iranian gas.102 Iran has built the long 1800 km pipeline on its side before the expected time, which will connect the gas-fields located in South Pars Iran with the Nawabshah city in Pakistan.

It may be mentioned here that under the CPEC agreement, which intends to connect the western Chinese region of Xinjiang with the countries in Middle East via Pakistan, the Beijing has started the construction work to accomplish the pipeline project prior to 2018 general elections to link the Nawabshah city with the Gwadar port that is located in close proximity with Iran.103 According to an official government source, it is anticipated that the project may get an extension to link the northeast region with China.104 Iran has completed most of its part of the pipeline, but still needs to construct around 200 km long pipeline. Pakistan will complete 80 km Gwadar-Iran section within six months and in this way, the entire 800km of the pipeline in Pakistan will be completed in around 30 months, with Chinese help.105 The pipeline could then become part of the CPEC. It is also noteworthy that India, on the other hand, has immense economic gains from the Iran‟s nuclear deal, and is ready to capture more benefits by building strategic ties with this country. India is fully aware of Iran‟s growing influence in the geopolitical scenario and

100 Ibid. 101 “Construction of TAPI Gas pipeline Project to Begin in December,” Dawn, August 4, 2015. 102 Ibid. 103 Syed Fazl-e-Haider, “China‟s Entry into Pipeline Politics,” Express Tribune, July 1, 2015. 104 “Iran Deal Fuels Tussle for Gas Pipelines in Pakistan,” Dawn, July 23, 2015. 105 Ibid.

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its regional importance. The project of Chabahar port is an integral part of the equation.106

Pakistan plans to revitalise its economic cooperation with Iran while strengthening security ties, and curbing cross-border terrorism. The key to the successful completion of this entire deal on all geographical fronts is curbing cross-border terrorism and maintaining stability within the region. All these countries are bound by geographical ties even if they do not like it, that‟s why they need to cooperate with each other and put an end to terrorism. The volatile borders should not be a hindrance to regional economic growth.107 In the same context, the recent Yemen crisis and Pakistan‟s decision to remain away from the crisis has made it clear to Saudi Arabia and Iran that Pakistan is not willing to indulge in the sectarian division of the Muslim world and would rather prefer to contribute towards conflict resolution.108

The nuclear deal takes place at a critical time when Afghanistan is passing through a fateful era. The drawdown of ISAF troops is underway to mark an end to the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan, while the newly elected President Ashraf Ghani struggles to create balance between the regional powers and enact an agreement with the Taliban‟s commanders, for which he expects mediatory assistance from Pakistan. The deal may ultimately provide an encouragement to India and Iran to maximise their cooperation in developing the deep-water port at Chabahar. The strategically important location of Chabahar is critical for establishment of transit point to facilitate trade not only with India, Afghanistan and Iran, but it also provides a vantage point to connect with Central Asia and Europe, through the “International North South Transport Corridor” (INSTC), the statistic show a difference of 30 and 40 per cent descend in terms of cost and duration respectively to transit from this route than that of “Red Sea-Suez Canal-Mediterranean route.” India also deems Chabahar to be a necessary bypass to Pakistan, in terms of its

106 Faysal Namver, “Iranian Nuke Deal: Geostrategic Implications.” 107 Ibid. 108 Bahadar Ali Khan, “Iran nuclear deal,” Express Tribune, July 22, 2015.

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trade with Afghanistan. India has already built 200 km road connecting the town of Delrum Afghanistan with Zarjang Iran.109

7.4. Pakistan and China’s Prospective Role in Promoting Regional Cooperation The 21st century, which is sometimes described as the Asian Century, is being shaped by the post-Cold War dynamics with ascendency of geo-economics and the phenomenon of globalisation spurred by information and technological revolutions and manifest in unprecedented global interaction. In this context, the most distinctive feature is regional cooperation for accelerated trade and economic development. As a consequence, imperatives of geo-economics appear to override geo-political tensions. In the changed global environment of today, unlike in the past, territorial concerns need not necessarily be placed in the straitjacket of sovereignty. Innovative solutions are possible based on joint management that can become game changers and sound underpinnings for regional peace and development; thus problems can be turned into opportunities. What is needed is not generosity of spirit on the part of any of the protagonists, but openness to ideas and reasonableness.110

7.4.1. Pakistan’s Role in Regional Cooperation In the recent times, Pakistan and Afghanistan simplified procedures for overland transit trade by removing encumbrances and providing better facilitation. As for Pakistan and India, trade has often mixed with political considerations. India faults Pakistan‟s ambivalence over MFN treatment.111 Pakistan on the other hand finds Indian tariff structures and procedures no less than non-tariff barrier to its trade. At a bilateral level, but in pursuance of the SAARC decision to enforce South-Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), Pakistan and India have had discussions and reached framework agreements for rationalising custom procedure, harmonising standards and establishing banking facilities. Again, progress on follow up is just typically slow. Pakistan‟s proposal for

109 Rohan Joshi, “How an Iran Nuclear Deal Would Benefit India,” The Diplomat, April 6, 2015. 110 Riaz Mohammad Khan, “Inaugural Address,” in Towards an Asian Century: Future of Economic Cooperation in SAARC Countries, IPRI Seminar Book, (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2014), 38. 111 Huma Sattar, “India-Pakistan: The Curious Case of the MFN Status,” The Diplomat, February 14, 2015.

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reducing peak tariff to zero to five percent by 2020, excluding about 100 tariff lines on sensitive list, deserves serious consideration.112

There has been a clear shift in Pakistan‟s foreign policy as there is now more focus on economic diplomacy. On internal front, fighting terrorism in the form of Operation Zarb- e-Azb has been a game changer. These two priorities will help in meeting the imperatives of regional security. Federal Minister for Planning, Reforms and Development, Ahsan Iqbal stressed upon the need to elevate economic diplomacy to increase the influx of FDI in Pakistan.113 The government has introduced business friendly policies and in result the economy has shown the signs of improvements. Whilst admitting the terrorism as the biggest impediment in attracting the investment from abroad, the Federal Minister remarked: “The government has launched a decisive military operation against the extremists, who are confined only to some remote areas. That day is not very far when we will defeat the monster of terrorism completely from Pakistan and restore complete peace in the country.”114

Through the NAP, Pakistan‟s government has taken major steps to develop counter narrative against terrorism. The new paradigm of foreign policy has increased emphasis on regional connectivity and better relations with neighbouring countries, particularly with Afghanistan. Three draft negotiations to improve regional connectivity were evaluated during the 18th SAARC summit, which includes agreement on intra-regional movement of motor vehicles, energy cooperation and railways.115 The SAARC states signed the agreement on energy cooperation but owing to certain technical deficiencies, the agreements on the railways and motor vehicles could not be concluded.116 Pakistan envisions and supports the regional connectivity amongst the regional countries. It has proposed to inaugurate the development of two motorways and a connectivity project to link Pakistan with the countries in Central Asia. Whilst briefing the National Assembly,

112 Riaz Mohammad Khan “Inaugural Address.” 113 “Economic Diplomacy,” Dawn, August 18, 2015. 114 “Economic Diplomacy will Increase Foreign Investment in the Country,” Planning Commission of Pakistan, January 29, 2015. 115 Sharmadha Srinivasan, “SAARC Summit Debriefing,” The Diplomat, December 2, 2014. 116 Ibid.

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the Prime minister said that the Gwadar-Termez motorway will link the Gwadar port with Central Asia, as the Termez is situated at the central point between the Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.117 The 650 km road connecting Gwadar with Chamman will be completed by the end of 2016. The road-link from Termez will connect with Mazar-i-Sharif via the Chaman to Khandhar. The province of Baluchistan will be linked to the adjacent areas through the completion of these projects; in addition the city of Quetta will be connected to other parts of the country and further with Central Asian States via this road link. The construction of another motorway connecting Peshawar with Torkham and further leading to Jalalabad is also underway.

Having institutional arrangements in place, SAARC should have been an important platform to acts as a facilitator in speeding up regional economic cooperation. Some scholars believe that one of the impediments in regional cooperation is the variance in degree of economic development of member states which brings in the factor of incompatibility. Member states do not have the capacity to provide necessary support to economies of the less developed partners. Competition within South Asia is, therefore, the common practice. It does not, therefore, seem unusual that instead of benefitting from SAFTA, preference is given by member states to bilateral Free Trade Agreements.118 A realisation by both Pakistan and India that in enhancement of economic cooperation not only lays the key to resolving their long standing issues, but also the opportunity for realising their true economic potential. The stark reality is, only the developed Pakistan and developed India can provide the better future to their citizens that they deserve but have been deprived of yet.119

7.4.2. China’s Role in Regional Connectivity Although, the China-SAARC economic relations have developed steadily within past one decade, the prevalent economic integration is insufficient between China and SAARC, in comparison to other organisations of the region. At present, the SAARC requires some

117 “Routes to Central Asia being Constructed, Says Nawaz,” Dawn, June 16, 2015. 118 Sohail Amin, “Welcome Address”, in Towards an Asian Century: Future of Economic Cooperation in SAARC Countries, IPRI Seminar Book, (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2014), 12. 119 Kamal Monnoo, “Regional Trade: Driver for Economic Growth,” Nation, November 28, 2013.

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extrinsic dynamics to ascertain its integration. China as a common neighbour joined by the mountainous borders with other SAARC member states and owing to its thriving economy, it could provide a better incentive to other South Asian states for the development and integration of the SAARC. Chinese government has announced several development plans to enhance Sino-SAARC cooperation; these includes BCIM-EC, CPEC and the SREB.120 Now the domestic politics of the South Asian countries is becoming an impediment in the implementation of such projects. The need of the hour for economic and social progression, and the comprehensive integration of the SAARC is to build consensus by the political leaders in domestic reforms and allow the possibilities for development, besides the security and stability within and with other countries specifically the Sino-Indian relation are of the paramount importance in the implementation of integration plan of SAARC.121

To some extent, new set of trends and innovations have been witnessed in the foreign policy of China after the President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqing took the rein of the country. Amidst these changes, two spheres are associated with Sino-SAARC relations, e.g., Chinese dream of the stable and peaceful ambience vis-à-vis international and regional relations. Chinese leadership anticipates amicable relationship based on the reciprocity with every country in the world. Chinese wishes to pursue its interests with focus on strengthening amicable relations with neighbouring states and those of the developing countries.122 For this reason, Chinese leaders have put forward plans of the SREB, BCIM-EC and the CPEC to enhance Sino-SAARC cooperation.123 The main obstacles on this path are from SAARC and South Asian countries domestically. In order to realise economic and social development, and SAARC integration, SAARC leaders need to reach consensus: i) on their own domestic reform and opening-up, ii) achieve

120 Joseph Catanzaro et al., “Silk Road Initiative Connects Countries on Path of Prosperity,” The Telegraph, July 3, 2015. 121 Liu Zongyi, “Chapter 6: China‟s Growing Economic Relations with South Asia: A Positive Development” in Towards an Asian Century: Future of Economic Cooperation in SAARC Countries, IPRI Seminar Book, (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2014). 122 Ibid. 123 Asif Ezd, “Regional Dynamics of the Economic Corridor,” News, May 4, 2015.

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security and stability in the region and in each country, iii) maintain good relations among all countries, and iv) further improving Sino-Indian relations.124

7.5. Pakistan-China Relations: A Futuristic Vision of Regional Security One of the important questions relating to regional security of South-Asia is to what extent Pakistan-China relations would impact the regional security paradigm? In this context, the main areas of cooperation between China and Pakistan include; counter- terrorism, peace and stability in Afghanistan, socio-economic development through regional connectivity, strategic stability in triangular relations between Pakistan-China and India and Pakistan-China cooperation in regional organisations. If the political and territorial disputes are settled or at least diluted, then borders become a source of flow and rather than obstruction.

China desires peace in Afghanistan and in this context it would like to contain Pakistan- India hostility for regional peace in general and peace in Afghanistan in particular. Pakistan and India are competing in enhancing their influence in Afghanistan while China being a neutral player in Afghanistan could play a significant role in Afghan reconciliation process and minimising negative fallout of Pakistan-India hostile relations. Security threats of various militant groups combined with increasing activities of the IS are providing a major rallying point for regional players, e.g., Central and South Asian countries, Russia and China. Creating peaceful regional environment is in the interest of all the regional countries especially for the success of regional connectivity and economic cooperation. In this regards, the success of the CPEC also greatly depends on the peaceful regional environment involving all stake holders including India.

In order to enhance its influence in the region, India would like to ingress in Afghanistan and capitalise on benefits from trade with Central Asian markets. But this would be possible once Pakistan and India improve their bilateral interactions by initiating a meaningful and result oriented dialogue to resolve all the political issues including

124 Liu Zongyi, “Chapter 6: China‟s Growing Economic Relations with South Asia: A Positive Development” in Towards an Asian Century: Future of Economic Cooperation in SAARC Countries (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2014), 129.

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Kashmir. To create such conducive environment, both India and Pakistan should focus first to put their own houses in order and then restore peace at their borders, avoid proxies and cooperate in regional security issues such as countering terrorism and supporting peace initiatives in Afghanistan. In this context; India may revisit its hostile policy towards Pakistan as in the longer term, the interests of both countries would be best served by normalising their relationship and not by deteriorating it further.125 Instead of objecting Gwadar-Kashgar corridor, India should support this initiative as in addition to Pakistan, China and Central Asian countries, the corridor would also be beneficial not only for India itself but also for other South Asian countries such as; Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, to secure a win-win situation for all.126

Connectivity and mobility are essential contributors towards prosperity and wellbeing of the people. Pakistan is well on its way for improving intra-city and inter-city connectivity; and mobility within the country as well as with its neighbouring countries. A number of time-bound mega projects are at various stages of planning and implementation. Completion of trans-border projects shall ensures Pakistan‟s high quality all weather connectivity to Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and Central Asia, ensuring speedy movement of personnel, goods and services between these countries. This coupled with the alignments of CPEC would result in the up-gradation of Pakistan‟s land connectivity related infrastructure. Connectivity projects and associated economic development ventures are expected to generate millions of direct and indirect jobs. As results, within a decade or so, there would be significant change in the patterns of personnel and goods movement, quality of services would improve significantly, new trade flow patterns and economic profiles would emerge and glimpses of peoples‟ prosperity will be in a sight.127

According to a Joint Statement on Common Vision for Deepening Pakistan-China Strategic Cooperative Partnership in the New Era, issued on 5th July 2013 during the visit of Prime Minister Nawzaz Sharif, China re-affirmed that its relationship with Pakistan

125 Talat Masood, “Managing a Difficult relationship,” Express Tribune, November 25, 2014. 126 Syed Noor ul Haq and Muhammad Mustansar Billah Hussain, “Silk Road Economic Belt,” IPRI Insight, vol. 2, no.1,2 (July 2014-February 2015): 5. 127 Khalid Iqbal, “Pakistan‟s Connectivity Ventures.”

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was always a matter of highest priority in its foreign policy, and it would continue to strengthen this strategic partnership. China also appreciated Pakistan‟s long-term, staunch support on issues concerning China‟s core interests. China would continue to extend its full support to Pakistan in the latter‟s efforts to uphold its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, while respecting the development path chosen by the people according to its national priority, and support Pakistan in maintaining social stability and economic development.128

In February 2014, Pakistan‟s President Mamnoon Hussain visited China and both sides evinced the contentment over the ever growing relations of two countries. They expressed that their bilateral relationship has surmounted the regional and global importance. As time-tested strategic partners, China and Pakistan would continue to forge more amicable political relations, enhanced economic ties, improved security cooperation and frequent people-to-people connectivity, and jointly progress towards attaining the objectives of “the Pakistan-China Community of Shared Destiny.”129 Ambassador of China in Pakistan Sun Weidong has rightly said at the inauguration of Port Qasim Thermal Power Project that: “Together we will build a community of common connection, a community of common development, and a community of common prosperity, and then a Pakistan-China „community of shared destiny‟ will be forged.”130 This situation reflects that the future of the Pakistan-China strategic partnership is bright. With the primary objective of the development of their countries as well as the whole region, both countries are determined to enhance cooperation at bilateral and multilateral levels. Therefore, promoting regional peace by meeting the imperatives of regional security such as eradication of terrorism and extremism, close cooperation for peace and stability in Afghanistan and making efforts for better relations with India, would be in the common interests of everyone.

128 Muhammad Munir, “Pak-China Shared Destiny,” Pakistan Observer, April 30, 2015. 129 Ibid. 130 “Port Qasim Power Project is 1st of Early-harvest Plants: Weidong,” Nation, May 12, 2014.

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CONCLUSION South Asia is a complex region comprising countries with diverse cultures, traditions, faiths, civilisations and ethnic identities. The region lacks cohesion due to insufficient reciprocity of interests among the states it comprises. Almost all the states are confronted with multi-dimensional challenges in the politico-military and socio-economic fields. Most of these challenges are often either the source or the result of inter-state conflicts and lack of mutual trust. The policy approaches of the extra regional players and their alliances in the region have further intensified the complexities of these challenges.

Historically, South Asian region has been the focus of international attention in view of several factors, e.g., US alliances of SEATO and CENTO, the Sino-Indian war of 1962, US involvement in Afghan war against the Soviet invasion, disintegration of Soviet Union and the emergence of US as the sole super power, nuclearisation of South Asia in 1998, and the tragedy of 9/11. The post 9/11 developments reflected a great change not only in the global scenario but also in the regional affairs of South Asia. A large number of US/NATO forces remained engaged in various combat operations against terrorism in Afghanistan till their drawdown in 2014 leaving just 9800 troops behind to train Afghan security forces. Pakistan as a front-line state in the global war on terrorism has suffered huge losses in terms of human lives and economy. In the meantime, a new phase started in the Indo-US strategic cooperation with signing of a nuclear agreement. The US considered India a linchpin of its Asia pivot strategy of containing China‟s rise and its influence.

Pakistan and other South Asian countries see an opportunity in the rise of China and its involvement in the region is considered as a stabilising factor for regional security. Although, since the early 1960s, Pakistan has held utility to China mainly because of its reliability and cost-effective mean to balance India - now it also serves as trade and energy corridor for this country. It suits well in China‟s plan to develop its western region. Further, in the post 9/11 period, the concept of security has also undergone a profound transformation. The global war on terrorism specially war on terror in Afghanistan and its spill over effects on Pakistan and China, enhancement of US strategic

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cooperation with India coupled with upsurge in China‟s economic relations with India and many other regional developments in Asia-Pacific have deeply impacted on Pakistan- China relations.

In the context of post 9/11 developments, the main purpose of the study was to analyse the imperatives of South Asian regional security particularly in the context of strategic relations of China and Pakistan. It also attempted to explore the major dimensions of their strategic cooperation, imperatives of interdependence and the new parameters added to their relations in the post 9/11 period. In the overall perspective, this analysis led to examine how Pakistan-China strategic cooperation is beneficial for the people of these countries and in what way it can be further helpful in maintaining regional peace and stability. The following diagram highlights the structure of the study and the links between its various components. Regional Security and Pakistan-China Strategic Relations in the Post 9/11 Period

Imperatives of regional security

Chapter - 1: Chapter - 2 & 3: Conceptual framework of Regional security and

Imperatives of r the study strategic interdependence

Chapter - 4: China-Pakistan Chapter – 5: Cooperation Economic

egional security egional security egional strategic relations in defence and trade (post 9/11 period) and security cooperation

Chapter - 6: Chapter - 7:

r of Imperatives Role of regional Future prospective of organisations regional security

Imperatives of regional security

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The post 9/11 period has seen parallel developments of geo-strategic and geo-economic nature both at regional and global levels. The process of complex interdependence got momentum in the geo-strategic policies. Methodologies were redesigned with a view to provide more importance to geo-economic deliberations with the end of bi-polar system of the world. Regional security has gained more importance in terms of constructing regional collaborative structures and agendas that focus on common security, defence, economic cohesion and shared growth. In this situation, Pakistan has attempted to create a new strategic structure in which besides military cooperation, economic collaboration and bilateral trade are given prime importance to further reinforce the Pakistan-China cooperation. It is noteworthy that in the perspective of regional security complex, the relations between these two countries are based upon dependent and independent variables. Here, the dependent variables are imperatives of regional security and Pakistan-China relations in the post 9/11period. The independent variables can be categorised into three groups, i.e., domestic, regional and international. The following diagram shows different variables and their link with the core theme of the study. The salient outcomes of the study are discussed in the following pages.

Relationship between Dependent and Independent Variables

Dependent Variable Imperatives of regional security and China-Pakistan strategic relations in the post 9/11period

Independent Variables: IindePost 9/11 Developments

International Variables: Domestic Variables: Political, economic and IndependentRegional Variable Variable: s The nature of world social factors including Interstate, bilateral order and policies of religious extremism and and multilateral the extra regional

violence as well as relations including global powers and their alliances in the policy approaches of the role of regional states to enhance their powers and regional region

national power organisations

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South Asian Regional Security Complexes and Pakistan-China Partnership The study finds out that the South Asian Regional Security Complex is primarily unipolar in its nature due to the dominance of India with its vast material capabilities. The factors responsible for this tilt of the Regional Security Complex towards India include its massive military spending. In fact, the regional security complexes of South Asia are based on two main factors; i) the hegemonic disposition of India exhibiting non- cooperative attitude towards smaller regional countries, and, ii) the incapability of the SAARC towards regional economic integration mainly due to India-Pakistan rivalry. The imperatives of regional cooperation will depend on the Indian policy approaches towards its neighbours. To counter the Chinese influence in South Asia, there seems a policy shift in Indian approaches in the region. At least at the declared level, India now desires to promote regional stability by addressing threat perceptions of its South Asian neighbours. The nuclearisation of South Asia has resulted in “stability-instability paradox.”

South Asia is one of the least integrated regions in the world facing multifarious challenges, e.g., the rising poverty, energy crises, menace of extremism and terrorism. These are pervasive issues of regional security matrix. In addition, the spill-over effects of Afghan war has worsened the overall equilibrium of regional imperatives. In view of these challenges, the study identifies various imperatives of regional security such as the socio-economic development, the politico-military relations and the human security development. After the tragedy of 9/11, a major shift affecting the South Asian security paradigm came about in the form of ever increasing influence of the outside players, such as the US, EU, NATO. Despite more than a decade long war, the US could not achieve its desired objective in the war on terrorism, especially in Afghanistan.

The primary factor that drew global attention towards the volatile region was the risk presented by the nuclear rivals, India and Pakistan. The second important factor was the rising economic power of India and the US interest to forge deeper ties with India to encircle China in the region. The US‟ Asia pivot policy seems unattainable to the US leadership without the partnership of India due to which it is strengthening its diplomatic

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relations with India. The Chinese leadership is cognisant of this extra regional involvement; hence it is attempting to strengthen its bilateral ties with each country in South Asia. Geo-strategically, South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular is the most feasible accessibility passage for Central Asia for trade.

The main imperatives of regional security depend on strategic realignment of major powers, especially the US policy of enhancing strategic cooperation with India in defence and nuclear fields in the post 9/11 period with the aim to contain China. To maintain the balance of power in the region and efficiently counter Indo-US strategic partnership, Pakistan and China have taken their mutual relationship to the new heights. Most of the SAARC countries consider China as a facilitator and a stability factor, rather than a trouble-maker in South Asia. Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan played an important role in making China the observer member of the SAARC. China‟s involvement is crucial for regional connectivity in South Asia in terms of China‟s investment in various infrastructure projects such as the CPEC and the BCIM in South Asia. China is also an important investor in infrastructure development in Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.

Pakistan-China Strategic Interdependence Pakistan and China are strategically important for each other. There has been interdependence between the two countries throughout the history of their relationship. Both countries played a crucial role for each other at difficult times. At present, strategic partnership with Pakistan is important for China mainly because of four reasons: i) Pakistan provides a new opening to the world for China - the development of Gwadar Port is an outlet for this connectivity, ii) China is already facing problems in South China Sea and the looming threat are even more intensified for it as the Asia-Pacific region is considered one of the top priority in the US foreign policy, iii) China‟s apprehension of being encircled has increased manifold and in such a situation, Pakistan provides a safe outlet to China, iv) China is aware of the role which Pakistan can play in stabilising and peace building in Afghanistan especially after the withdrawal of the US forces.

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China is also trying to refurbish its ties with India to shun it from becoming a partner in the US grand design of China‟s containment. China sees multiple advantages in cooperation with India, apart from the strategic advantage in keeping it away from the US influence. There are huge incentives for China‟s export to the Indian market, which is the largest trade market among South Asian countries and provides vast commercial benefits. In the context of emerging security order in South Asia with reference to US efforts to use India as a linchpin of the US pivot to Asia policy for the containment of China, the study suggests that Pakistan and China‟s close cooperation in building a cooperative security order is desirable in countering negative implications of Asia-pivot policy. China would not halt its unrelenting efforts to support Pakistan-India peace process. Peace in South Asia ultimately favours China‟s socio-economic development.

The outcome of earlier analysis highlights that the strategic interdependence between Pakistan and China has increased in view of regional developments in the post 9/11 era. The imperatives of regional security have added new dimensions in Pakistan-China relations. Albeit, India remains an important factor in their relations, but it is not the only factor; there are various other factors contributed in strengthening Pakistan-China strategic cooperation. The post 9/11 period has seen a transformation in relations not only within South Asia, but also in the pattern of involvement of big powers in the region. The concept of security has also undergone a profound transformation. It has now evolved into a multi-dimensional phenomenon covering both traditional and non-traditional threats. The global war on terrorism, especially, the war on terror in Afghanistan and its spill-over effects on Pakistan and China, enhancement of the US strategic cooperation with India coupled with upsurge in China‟s economic relations with India and many other regional developments in the Asia-Pacific have deeply impacted Pakistan-China relations. China has already become an important stakeholder in maintaining peace and security in South Asia owning to the expansion of its economic and trade relations with the countries of the region.

In the post 9/11 perspective, it can safely be said that that several new factors have also contributed to the recent visible change in the nature and significance of Pakistan-China

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strategic relations. For instance: i) emergence of China as a rising power and Indo-US strategic alliance to contain China‟s influence, ii) Xinjiang factor in Pakistan-China relations both in terms of China‟s western regions development policy and fighting religious extremism, iii) Pakistan-India military standoff in 2001, iv) nuclear factor of South Asia and China‟s role in providing strategic stability in the region, vi) geo-strategic importance of Pakistan as the energy corridor for the region, vii) stabilising Afghanistan and significance of the Pakistan-China cooperation specially after the exit of US-NATO forces, and; viii) China and Pakistan‟s role in regional organisations - SAARC and the SCO.

The study suggests that China may deter Indian permanent membership in the UNSC and NSG. The reason is obvious that China is wary of its strategic partnership with Pakistan and may not under-rate ties with Islamabad by letting Indian entrance to the world‟s strongest diplomatic body (i.e., the UNSC). Even, if China considers taking any step in this respect, it would take Pakistan into confidence. However, it can be argued that with so much at stake in the form of Gwadar Port and CPEC, China will not take that step. Further to say that since India has strongly clubbed itself with Japan, China would not support Indian permanent membership in the UNSC. But as for China‟s support for Indian membership in the NSG is concerned, China will not support Indian membership until it does not meet the criteria, i.e., signing CTBT, NPT, etc.

Indo-US strategic cooperation (with special reference to Indo-US nuclear deal and US support for Indian membership of the UNSC and the NSG) directly undermines Pakistan and China‟s strategic interests. Such cooperation between India and the US would provide a strong reason for Pakistan and China to have more civilian nuclear energy cooperation. The objectives of China‟s current policies are: i) the affirmation of good and solid relations with all countries in South Asia - especially with Pakistan and India, ii) the efforts for vigorously pushing forward connectivity between China and South Asia to make the CPEC and BCIM successful achievements, iii) the commitments and tangible progress in settling the border disputes through political means, and; iv) the carrying forward more military-to-military engagement between China and South Asian countries

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with the aim to promote regional security and stability. In the same context, it is also noteworthy that the US-India nexus has enhanced the importance of Pakistan for China and vice versa. This situation has provided an opportunity to both countries to further strengthen their strategic interdependence by promoting their cooperation at bilateral and multilateral level. This whole scenario reflects that Pakistan-China strategic cooperation would not only continue in the years to come, but will rather expand by embracing new dimensions, such as cooperation in energy, agriculture, industry and infrastructure development.

Post 9/11 Effects on Pakistan-China Strategic Cooperation China foresees the prospect of high-tech defence industry in Pakistan, owing to the availability of vast human capital and is thus willing to invest in joint defence production. Both countries anticipate lucrative markets for their defence export in Middle East, Asia and Africa. Pakistan‟s traditional military doctrine to prefer ground forces over aerial and naval forces, has witnessed a shift owing to growing cooperation between the two countries in aviation and naval defence system. Contemporary regional environment based on changing security parameters has also led both countries to recognise the importance of invincible aerial and naval defence system.

Pakistan is and has been facing multifarious traditional and non-traditional security challenges. Some of the major challenges include terrorism, under-development, and the energy crisis. Rising China has the potential to help Pakistan through trade and investment. The CPEC is a win-win cooperation between the two countries and it has the potential to turn Pakistan into a hub of economic activity within the region and beyond. It will help Pakistan to enhance infrastructure, increase the employment opportunities and promote industrialisation. The pronounced benefit for China through the CPEC is that it reduces the transportation time of goods and energy from the oil rich Persian Gulf. At present, transportation from the Middle East, via the Strait of Malacca takes around 45 days, which could be reduced to less than 10 days via the Gwadar Port. In the event of a conflict among major powers, the existing sea routes for Chinese oil imports could be

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disrupted, choking Beijing‟s energy supply, especially at the vulnerable Malacca Straits. During such turbulent times, the CPEC will act as an alternate route.

Another benefit that China considers important in investing in the CPEC is the expected increase in economic activities in the Xingjian region, which has remained under- developed and troublesome owing to separatist movements for a long time. The mega- project of developing the CPEC has certain key challenges to address, such as the timely implementation of the project, the management of finances in a transparent manner and the execution of work in a proper manner as envisioned in the proposal of the project. Therefore, in order to further enhance Pakistan-China strategic partnership there is a need to expedite work on the planning and development of the CPEC including building of major projects in energy, infrastructure and industrial zones.

China has made several attempts to address India‟s concerns over its rise and growing influence in the region, but India has rejected all proposals to give full membership of SAARC to China. If China becomes a full member of SAARC, it can act as a balancing factor in the region where nine South Asian countries can work together to contribute to regional stability and development. China has the potential to lead the regional peace and progress, and it has envisioned several win-win cooperation projects for the region such as CPEC, BCIM Corridor and the AIIB that could unleash benefits for all SAARC countries including India and Pakistan. It is the right time to make China a full member of SAARC as it will pave the way for regional economic integration and that will be helpful to materialise the dream of Asian Century bringing benefits of development, progress and prosperity for all.

Pakistan and China have common interests in promoting regional peace and security. The stability in Afghanistan is viewed as an important objective of both countries. No doubt, the establishment of peace and stability in Afghanistan is an important imperative for regional security and both China and Pakistan are committed to support the reconciliation process between the Afghan government and the Taliban. China considers Pakistan an important factor in assuring the stability in Afghanistan and supports the „Afghan led‟

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and „Afghan owned‟ peace process through dialogue. The „Heart of Asia‟ - Istanbul process held in Islamabad in December 2015 also emphasised for an Afghan led and Afghan owned peace process. China considers that terrorism prone Afghanistan is vulnerable to rising threat of the IS. The stability of Pakistan and Afghanistan is interlinked and indispensable for regional and global interests.

In the post 9/11 period, the rising waves of terrorism have posed a major threat to the security of both countries. China is providing military assistance to Pakistan to counter terrorism. The joint efforts of both countries to counter terrorism and extremism will also curb the menace in the region. Pakistan‟s efforts to eradicate terrorism and the launch of military operation Zarb-e-Azb are appreciated by the Chinese leadership. In this perspective, there is a credible intelligence sharing between the two countries and it has helped a lot in the extermination of terrorist organisations, such as the TTP and the ETIM. For China and Pakistan, the extermination of terrorism in all forms and all manifestation is regarded as an important imperative for regional security. China has always extended the motivational and practical support to Pakistan in almost every domain of defence and security. Pakistan earnestly supports one China policy and has equivocally made it clear in letter and spirit that it will not allow its soil to be used to launch or plan any hostile activity against China.

In the post NATO drawdown from Afghanistan, the regional dynamics in South Asia depends upon the situation in Afghanistan. The total withdrawal of the US forces from Afghanistan will affect the regional dynamics of South Asia. The possibility of the breakout of the civil war in Afghanistan and the resurgence of terrorist groups may pose a bigger threat to all countries in the region. This concern is increasing anxieties in all stakeholders due to lack of consensus on various regional issues. The emerging dynamics should be based on a common approach to fight terrorism. Given the differences between regional states, there is a need to develop a strategy based on common interests. There has been a failure to devise a consensus based and coherent regional strategy on the part of regional states.

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The Main Lessons Learned from the Study In the perspectives of regional security in South Asia and Pakistan-China strategic relations, particularly in the post 9/11 period; the present study is an attempt to analyse various dimensions of the situation. One of the main outcomes of the study is that in order to create a conducive environment for regional security, a strong cooperation between China and Pakistan in countering terrorism, extremism and bringing peace and stability in Afghanistan is mandatory. Moreover, in the perspective of the emerging security orders in South Asia, especially in the context of the US efforts to use India as a linchpin of the US pivot to Asia policy for the containment of China; it would be essential for Pakistan and China to work for cooperative security in order to counter any negative implications. In this respect, China‟s investment in Pakistan for the development of the CPEC is a right step towards regional economic cooperation. Furthermore, Pakistan and China‟s good relation with India would further strengthen their efforts for promoting regional security. It is also noteworthy that the post 9/11 developments in the regional security entail both challenges and opportunities for South Asian countries.

China and Pakistan are determined to enhance cooperation at bilateral and multilateral levels by forging „Pakistan-China Community of Shared Destiny‟ with the objective of socio-economic development for the people of both countries as well as for the region. Therefore, promoting regional peace by meeting the imperatives of regional security such as eradication of terrorism and extremism, close cooperation for peace and stability in Afghanistan and making efforts for better relations with India would be in the common interest of both China and Pakistan. The essence of this research and its reflection on various dimensions on the respective issues are summarised in the following table. This self-explanatory matrix highlights the post 9/11 developments in the region, their impacts on Pakistan-China strategic cooperation and regional security, future prospects and convergence of interests.

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Post 9/11 Developments in the Perspective of Regional Security and their Impact on Pakistan-China Strategic Cooperation Post 9/11 Impact on Impact Developmets Pakistan- on Regional Future Convergence in regional China Security Prospects of Interests security Strategic Cooperation Joint security Will promote Joint A common threat War on cooperation regional cooperation to the security of Terrorism enhanced security against ETIM both countries and TTP Balance of Pakistan-China JF-17, frigates, Indo-US nexus vs Power and defence Essential for submarines Pakistan-China Strategic cooperation Regional and nuclear relations Stability strengthened Peace cooperation Upsurge in Will not have Positive Not much Common interest China-India any negative impact on bright because of China and Cooperation impact on regional of pro-US Pakistan to have Pakistan-China security Indian policies good relations with relations India Enhancement Enhancement Result in arm India considers Pakistan-China‟s in Indo-US of Pakistan- race - US as its common interest to Strategic China strategic negative natural ally counter Indo-US Partnership cooperation implications and uses it to hegemonic design for regional contain China security Enhancement Would be Energy Economic of bilateral beneficial for projects, Building Pakistan- Cooperation trade and regional transport China community and Regional economic prosperity infrastructure of shared destiny Connectivity cooperation - and and industrial CPEC very development parks important Both countries are Peace in Strategic Will ensure China and facing spill over Afghanistan Importance of regional Pakistan‟s role effect of Afghan Pakistan for peace and in conflict - hindrance China security reconciliation in regional enhanced process connectivity Economic Regional Importance of inter- Development Beneficial for the Economic Pakistan-China dependence of Gwadar Port socio-economic Cooperation relations will promote as regional development in enhanced regional economic hub both countries security

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South Asia is an under-developed and volatile region of the world and thus the people of this region deserve peace and development. As of now, possibly the major players of South Asia would have realised the need to develop a dynamic strategy to enhance economic cooperation among the regional countries; one of the important components of this strategy should be to advance intra-regional trade by lowering tariffs without disengaging from extra-regional and global economic scenario. Furthermore, there is a need to create a South Asian Development Fund (SDF) for financial support of various regional projects. Generally, scholars in the region are of the opinion that progress in economic and trade cooperation would not be sustainable along-side the lingering unresolved political issues. In addition, the imperatives of human security and human development can be met by raising incomes and revenues of the regional states, building quality institutions and enhancing government capacity to address these challenges.

To overcome human under-development and human in-security, the SARRC countries need to allocate more financial resources for this purpose. Without strengthening socio- economic and human dimensions of security, the politico-military security cannot be achieved. Energy security and energy transition are the two avenues, which provide a promising future of South Asian economies by cooperating and increasing their partnerships. The cooperation in energy sector will enhance the cross-border interaction between states and the concept of absolute restrained borders will be diluted to a great extent. The cross border movement of resources and capital to strengthen the economic ties will enhance transnational cooperation leading to trans-Atlantic cooperation.

This research is an analysis of strategic relations of two neighbouring countries situated in one of the most volatile regions of the world where a large number of population lives under the state of human in-security. However, in spite of a number of challenges, there should be no room for pessimism. The world has many examples of countries and region which within a short span of time totally transformed themselves. However, for this purpose, strategies have to be developed nationally and regionally, based on concrete research covering all related aspects of the issue under study.

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312

ANNEXURE-I Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons from China to Pakistan (2005-2012)

No. Weapon Weapon Year of Year (s) No. Comm- Ordered Design Description License Deliveries Delivered ents /order Pakistani 21350 Red Arrow-8 Anti-tank 1989 1990- designation: - missile 2012 Baktar- Shikan QW-1 Portable 1994- Pakistani 1650 Vanguard SAM 1993 2012 designation - Anza-2 MBT-2000 Type 90/2 500 (Al Khalid or MBT-2000 1998 2012 298 - P-90) version JF-17 FGA 2007- 150 Thunder Aircraft 1999 2012 61 - / FC-1 3 ($500-750 4 F-22 Frigate 2005 2009- m deal) and - 2010 1 produced in Pakistan in 2013 Trainer / K-8 2009- 27 27 combat (Karakorum- 2005 2010 (K-8P - aircraft 8) version) 36 A-100 A-100 2008 2010- 36 - 300mm 300mm 2012 2 Azmat FAC 2010 2012 2 -

n.a. 6 Type- Submarine 2011 n.a. n.a. - 041/Yuan Panther 2009- Z-9EC 6 AS-565SA ASW 2005 2010 6 version helicopter 70 C-802 / Anti-ship 2005 2009- 50 F-22P CSS-N-8 missile 2011 frigates 100 R-440 SAM 2005 2009- 80 F-22P Crotale 2012 Frigates

600 PL-12 / BVRAAM 2006 2010- 225 For JF-17 SD-10 2012 900 PL-5E SRAAM 2006 2009- 510 For JF-17 2012 50 C-802 / Anti-ship 2008 2012 10 For JF-17 CSS-N-8 missile

313

750 LS-3 Guided 2008 2010- 250 For JF-17 bomb 2012 750 LS-6-500 Guided 2008 2010- 550 For JF-17 bomb 2012 750 LT-2 Guided 2008 2010- 250 For JF-17 bomb 2012 Arty locating For use 2 SLC-2 radar 2008 2010 2 with A- 100 MRL 100 WMD-7 Aircraft EO 2008 2009- 70 For JF-17 system 2012 4 ZDK-03 AEW&C 2008 2011- 2 $278 m aircraft 2012 deal 50 FN-6 Portable 2009 2010 50 - SAM C-802/CSS- Anti-ship For 30 N-8 missile 2010 2012 15 Azmat FAC CM- Anti-ship For 50 400AKG missile 2010 2012 10 JF-17 Thunder

Source: SIPRI, “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database” March 14, 2013.

314

ANNEXURE-II Major Projects being Carried Out under CPEC

A. Energy Projects 16 X Energy Priority Projects

Sr. Estimated No. Title of the Project MW Cost Status / Date of (US$ in Completion millions) June 2017 1 Port Qasim Electric Company Coal 1320 1,980 (First Plant) Fired , 2X660, Sindh. April 2018 (Second plant)

2 Sahiwal 2X660MW Coal-fired 1320 1,600 December 25,2017 Power Plant, Punjab.

i) Engro Thar 4X330MW Coal-fired, 2,000 3 Thar, Sindh. 1320 June 2019 ii) Surface mine in BlockII of Thar 1470 Coal field, 6.5 mtpa, Thar, Sindh. Excluded from the 4 Gwadar Coal Power Project, plan. A feasibility Gwadar. 300 360 study is underway for RLNG-based three plants with capacity of 100 MW each. 5 HUBCO Coal Power Plant, 660 970 2018 Hub, Balochistan.

6 Rahimyar Khan Coal Power Project, 1320 1,600 First phase 250 MW to Punjab. be completed in 2018 7 i) SSR Thar Coal Block1-6.5 mpta, 1,300 Thar, Sindh 1320 2018 ii) SSRL 2X660 MW Mine Mouth 2,000 Power Plant, Sindh. 8 Quaid-e-Azam 1000MW Solar Park, 1000 1,350 2017 Bahawalpur, Punjab.

Achieved financial 9 Dawood 50MW Wind Farm, 50 125 close and to be Bhambore, Sindh completed by the 2018 10. UEP 100MW Wind Farm, Jhimpir, 100 250 2018 Sindh.

11 Sacha 50lMW Wind Farm, Jhimpir, 50 134 2018 Sindh.

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12 Sunnec 50MW Wind Farm, Sindh 50 125 2018

13 Suki Kinari Hydro Power Station, 870 1,802 2020 KPK

14 Karot Hydropower Station, 720 1,420 2020 AJK & Punjab. 15 Matiari to Lahore Transmission Line n.a. 1,500 2018

16 Matiari to Faisalabad Transmission n.a. 1,500 2018 Line - Total 10400 - 21,486

8 X Energy Actively Promoted Projects

17 Gaddani Power Park Project The project had been i) 2X660 1320 3,960 put on the back ii) Jettty+Infrastructure 1,200 burner due to change in priority Financial close in 18 HUBCO Coal Power plant, Hub, 660 970 June 2016. Balochistan Project to be completed in 2020

19 Salt Range Mine Mout Power Project 300 800 Feasibility study including mining, Punjab completed.

Contract awarded. 20 Kohala Hydel Project, AJK 1100 2,397 Scheduled for commissioning in 2023 21 Pakistan Wind FormII (2x50) 100 150 2018 Jhampir,Thata, Sindh.

22 Thar mine mouth Oracle, 1320 1,300 2018 Thar, Sindh.

23 Muzaffargarh Coal Power Project, 1320 1,600 2017 Punjab

24 Gas Power Plant 525MW, 525 550 n.a. Sindh

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- Total ( Actively Promoted ) 6645 12,927 - Total Priority Project 10400 21,486 Total Energy Projects 17045 34,413

B. CPEC-Transport Infrastructure

Sr. Project Length Estimated Status / Date No. Cost (US$ of Completion in millions) 1 KKH Phase II 486 3,500 2017 Raikot-Islamabad Section 2 Peshawar-Karachi Motorway 375 2,600 2017 Multan-Sukkur

Rail Sector Projects

1 Expansion and reconstruction of existing 1763 3,650 2017 Line mL-1 (Karachi-Peshawar) 2 Orange Line Project - 1,600 2016

3 Havelian Dry port (450M,Twenty-Foot - 40 2017 Equivalent Units) - Total - 9,790 -

C. CPEC- Gwadar Port Related Projects

1 East Expressway (18.9 Km) 140 2017

2 Gwadar International Airport 230 2017

3 Construction of Breakwaters 123 2017

4 Dredging of berthing areas & channels 27 -

5 Infrastructure for Free Zone and EPZs port related 32 Phase I-2020 industries Phase II-2025 Phase III-2030 6 Necessary facilities of fresh water treatment and 130 2017 supply 7 Hospital at Gwadar 100 2017

8 Technical and Vocational Institute at Gwadar 10 2017

- Total Gwadar Port Projects 793 -

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D. Other Projects

- i) Cross Border Optical Fibre Cable. (820 KM) 44 - ii) Feasibility study of the Digital Terrestrial Multimedia Broadcast (DTMB)

Sources:

Daily Times, “CM Review Progress on 1,320MW Coal Power Plant,” February 3, 2016.

Dunya News, “PM Inspects 1320 MW Power Project at Port Qasim,” December 28, 2015.

Energy News Corporation, “Required: PQA Demands Textile City’s Land for LNG Power Plants,” April 1, 2016.

Javed Mirza, “Nepra Grants Tariff for 1,320MW Coal Power Plants,” The News, “February 14, 2016.

Kiani, Khaleeq, “6,600MW Gadani Power Project Put on Back Burner, Dawn, February 4, 2015.

--- “Govt Seeks Special Tariff for $2.1bn Matiari-Lahore Transmission Line, Dawn, March 10, 2016.

Mian, Bakhtawar, “NHA Approves Purchase of Land for CPEC’s Western Route, Dawn, February 11, 2016.

Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform, “CPEC Projects,” January 15, 2016.

The News, “Thar Coal Field’s Block-II Achieves Financial Close,” January 3, 2016.

--- “Wind Projects of 3,500MW to be Set Up by 2018,” November 20, 2015.

318