IV

SOCIOLOGYAN DPUBLI CPOLICY-MAKIN G ANESSA YO NTH ELIMITE DROL EO F SOCIOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE INSHAPIN GPUBLI CPOLICIE S

B.E.J.C.Lekann edi tDepre z

Essaysi nRura lSociolog y inHonou ro fR.A.J ,va nLie r Departmento fRura lSociolog yo fth eTropic san dsubtropic s AgriculturalUniversity ,Wageningen ,th eNetherlands ,198 1 126

CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION 127

2 HUMAN BEINGS AS DECISION-MAKERS 129

3 INTERLUDE 135

4 SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE NOTION OF POLICY 136 4.1 What is public policy making? 136

4.2 Knowledge and policy: the primacy of politics 141

5 DISCUSSION 147

REFERENCES 149 127-

1 INTRODUCTION

Eversinc eth ecreatio no fth esocia l sciencesa sa distinc torientatio n within the scientific community, the relationbetwee n these sciences -particularl y sociology -an dsocia lchang eha sbee nsubjec tt ocontin ­ uous debate.An d itseem sa sthoug hth ediscussio nabou tth eus eo fso ­ ciologicalknowledg et ohel pchang eth eworl dha sincrease d inscop ean d intensity. Itha sbecom ealmos timpossibl e tokee pu pwit hth einsatiabl e flow of articles and books on thepolicy-relevanc y ofsociolog ydurin g thelas tte nyears .Th ereason sar enumerous . The general underlying attitude seems tob etha tsociolog y isno tonl y applicable to the analysis ofpubli c policy-making,bu tshoul d alsob e applied todecision-makin g inpubli caffairs . At the same time,however , there is a growing awareness that applied studies seldom result inpolicy-recommendations , or inrecommendation s that are simply not used by the public policy-making bodies, thus leadingt oa natmospher e ofreproach ,disappointmen t andestrangement . Most discussions about thisstat eo faffair sdea lwit hth e shortcomings of sociology and public policy-making relations, instead of coming to gripswit h the fundamental issuesa tstake .On eo fth emai nproblem si s the degree of governability of societal processesa sVa nLie r (1980:9) recently put it.Suc h a study could be called thesociolog y ofinter ­ vention and should havea wide rscop etha ni susua li npolic ysciences . Itshoul d look atproblem sconcernin gth elimit so fsteermanshi p ofth e social sciences,especiall y in aperio d ofwidely-fel t recognition of the trouble thatgovernment s run into. It is thisproble m thatraise s thequestio no fth eques tfo rcontro l (VanGunsteren , 1976). However,mos t discussions about the role ofsociolog y inpolicy-makin g centrearoun dtopic ssuc has : thecondition sunde rwhic hpolicy-maker snormall yoperat e the type of researchmetho do rth eselectio no ftheoretica lorien ­ tation by the social researcher (for instance, the debate about knowledge forunderstandin gversu sknowledg e foraction ) the difference in culture,languag ean dfram eo freferenc ebetwee n socialresearcher s andpolicy-maker s deficiencies in the state of art insociolog y (toth eeffec ttha t policy-makers do not attachmuc hprestig e andauthorit yt osocio ­ logicalknowledge ,i ncontras tt oeconomi c analyses forinstance ) thelac ko fa nadequat eorganizationa l structurea sa meetin gplac e ofsocia lscience san dpolicy . - 128-

It is tob e hoped that apart from general reflections more emperical researchi nthes e fieldswil lb econducted .

The object of this essay, however, is to inquire intoth epositio na s such of sociological knowledge, in the decision-making process that policy-making essentially is.M ysuggestio ni stha tth ewidel yaccepte d misconception about theproces s of transformation of applied research into policy-action is largely toblam e forth edisappointin g recordo f the utilization of social sciences inpolicy-making . Ihop et ob eabl e to demonstrate that, in general, sociologists tendt ooverestimat eth e impact of scientific knowledge in shaping public policy and tounder ­ estimate the role ofconsciou so runconsciou s ignorance ando fpolitic s inth ever ysam etransformatio nproces so fknowledg e intoaction .

My analysis will focuso nth eprimordia lquestio no fdelineatin grecep - tiveness ofpubli c policy for social sciences,i.e . sociologicalknow ­ ledge.Thes ereflection swil lb erestricte d toth eimmediat e interaction betweenbot h units,an dwil l leave aside themor e general anddiffus e utilization of sociological research findings that in amor e indirect way influence strategic decision-makers. Ina nopen ,pluralisti c society, these indirect lines of communication between thesource so fne wknow ­ ledgean dth ecentre so fpolicy-makin g arehighl ysignificant .

Decision-making ismainl y studied at the levelo fth eindividua lacto r or small group.Therefore ,t o get somebasi c idea,m yanalysi sbegin s with individual decision-making. This isno t to suggest that therei s a similarity between individual and societal actors (Etzioni, 1968), but ismean t to open the eyest oth eintricacie s ofth eapplicatio no f knowledge and non-knowledge in the decision-making process.Afte rre ­ viewing some of the basic approaches inth e literature ondecision ­ makingstrategie s inpubli cpolicies ,w epresen tou rmai nargumen tabou t the primacy ofpolitic s in the transformation process of sociological knowledge intoaction . 129

2 HUMANBEING SA SDECISION-MAKER S

Humanbeing s asdecision-maker s areinformation-utilizers .A basi cques ­ tion one must askis :Ho wdoe sa nindividua lus eth einformatio n athi s disposal in order to arrive at "adequate" decisions, especially deci­ sions that entail seriousconsequences ?Ar ether ecertai nway so farri ­ ving atth ebes tsolutions ? Probably, most of the work done by social scientists in this field consists of developing normative,prescriptiv e models that startwit h the assumption of the rationality of a person's decisions and then developing procedures according to which researchers think rational persons should make theirdecisions .A ver y fineexampl eo fsuc ha nap ­ proach is to be found in Janis and Mann (1977:11)wh o mention seven "ideal" procedural criteria for attaining the decision maker's ob­ jectives:

The decision maker, to the best ofhi sabilit yan dwithi nhi sin ­ formation-processing capabilities 1. thoroughly canvasses awid e range of alternative courses of action; 2. surveys the full range of objectives tob e fulfilled andth e valuesimplicate db yth echoice ; 3. carefully weighs whatever he knows about thecost san drisk s ofnegativ econsequences ,a swel la sth epositiv econsequences , thatcoul d flow fromeac halternative ; 4. intensively searches for new information relevant tofurthe r evaluationo fth ealternatives ; 5. correctly assimilates andtake s accounto fan yne w information or expert judgment to which he isexposed ,eve nwhe nth ein ­ formationo rjudgmen tdoe sno tsuppor tth ecours eo factio nh e initiallyprefers ; 6. re-examines the positive and negative consequences of all known alternatives, including those originally regarded as unacceptable,befor emakin g afina lchoice ; 7. makes detailed provisions for implementing or executing the chosencours eo faction ,wit hspecia l attentiont ocontingenc y plans that mightb e required ifvarou s known riskswer e to materialize. Janisan dMann' sworkin g assumptioni s "thatfailur et omee tan yo fthes e sevencriteri awhe na perso ni smakin ga fundamenta l decisionconstitute s adefec ti nth edecision-makin gprocess " (p.11) .Deviation so fthi smod ­ elo f "vigilantinformatio nprocesses "ar ecalle dmiscalculation s orde ­ fective decision-making, although the authors state that they seema n not as a cold fishbu ta sa warm-bloode dmammal ,no ta sa rationa lcal ­ culator always wanting towor kou tth ebes tsolutio nbu ta sa reluctan t decision-maker.

Thenex tparagraph s drawheavil y -an d Ihav et oadmi trathe r freely onWagenaa r (1977). - 130-

More andmor e the conviction has gained ground that thisrationa lap ­ proach to human decision-making isbase d on anormativ e intellectual modeltha ti sno twithou theuristi cvalue ,bu ttha tha sscarcel yany ­ thing to say about the real process of decision-making. Anincreasin g flow of empirical research inquiring whatpeopl eactuall yd owhe nthe y make decisions rather thanusin gth eyardstic ko frationalty ,hav ecom e to the conclusion that individuals basically havet oac twithi na con ­ texto flimitations . To beginwith , humanbeing s are onlyabl et oabsor b limitedamount so f information simultaneously. The rational decision-maker also has an impossible task to copewit hinformatio noverload .Bu tapar tfro mthes e sheer limitations of a physical and psychological nature,ther e are other limitations that are atth e core of decision andinformatio na s such.T omentio nonl ytw oaspect so fit : The limited time horizon in decision-making. Theconsequence s ofa de ­ cision and the corresponding activities are incalculable,particularl y on a long-term basis.Th e interconnections betweenth einfinit enumbe r ofvariable s areto ocomplicate d tob e adequately interpretedbeforehand . That is to say, any decision is,t o a considerable extent,a sho ti n thedark . Thenther e isth ecognitiv e complexity involved inan yessentia ldecision . The many aspects of a decision are so intricate interm so fcost san d benefits, of long-term andshort-ter m effects,i nmeasurabl e andimmea ­ surable consequences, in adequacy andinadequac y ofinformatio ntha ti s essentiallyimpossibl et ogathe ral lth evariou s facetsunde ron edenom ­ inator. The selection of alternatives is essentially hampered by the lack of objective standards for appraising differentcourse so factio n ona comparativ ebasis . These are some reasonswh yrationalit y islimite db yth ever ynatur eo f decision-making. For the same reason somepeopl e say that themakin g ofa decisio ni smor eo fa nar ttha na pur ecalculation .

This shortintroductio n intolimite drationalit y alreadyraise sth eques ­ tion: Ifi t is notpur e rationality thatguide shuma ndecision-makers ' behaviour,wha tthe nar eindividual s actuallydoin gwhe nthe ymak edeci ­ sions? Inorde r to solve theproble m of coping with the misery of havingt o makecritica l decisions,peopl ehav ea wid erang eo fpatterns ,procedure s and methods atthei r disposal that are daily applied dependingo nth e situational context. By way of illustration, Iwil l indicate some of these patterns thatpeopl e consciously or - as a rule- unconsciousl y - 131-

use to come toterm swit hdecisiona l conflicts,o r "tricks"a sWagenaa r (1977)call sthe m inhi s fascinatingwor ktha tdeal swit hman ymor epat ­ ternso fdecision-makin gbehaviou r thanca nb ementione dhere .

"Satisficing", aconcep toriginall y introducedb yH.A . Simon,i sou rfirs t illustration. According to themode lo frationa lbehaviour ,selectin ga courseo factio nwit hth ehighes tpay-of frequire sth eestimatio no fth e comparative value of every alternative in terms ofexpecte d costsan d benefits. In the foregoing we have already seenth einsuperabl eburde n of information overload and entanglement of thenumerou svariable sin ­ volved in decisional dilemmas.Simo nha spointe d outtha tpeopl ed ono t generally follow an optimizingo rmaximizin g approach,bu ttr yt oreac h a satisfactory,suboptimizin gsolution ;on ewhich ,consequently ,provide s a relatively satisfactory realization of the actor's values. Inothe r words, he looks fora cours eo factio ntha th econsider s "goodenough" . This satisficing strategy, according to Simon, fits the limited in­ formation-processing capabilities of human beings. It ischaracterize d byth econsideratio no fonl ya limite dnumbe ro fobjective s ando falter ­ nativeroute st oachiev ethes eobjectives ,th etestin go fth ealternative s as it comes toth eactor' s attention,an da roug hestimatio no fminima l cost-benefitratios . A second "trick" to cope with decisional dilemmas with anoverloa do f conflicting information,i srationalization . Ina lo to fcases ,a satis ­ ficing decision is the one thatca nb e best defended (Wagenaar,1977 : 44-49). People oftenmak e decisions on accounto fthei rsubjectiv ees ­ timation of the acceptabilityb yother so fth eargument s involved.Thi s pattern is notnecessaril y atth ecos to fscientifi co rrationa lreaso ­ ning. In fact, almost any decision can - ifneede d -b e supportedb y drawingo ndifferen t facts,bu tmor egenerall yb ygivin gdifferen tinter ­ pretations asa resul to fdifferen ttheorie san dperspectives . This tendency towards choices on thebasi s of tenability ofargument s can takeplac e before of after the actual decision,o rboth .I tpose s no problem to an actor to find in all cases justifications forth e adequacy of thatparticula r decision (which doesno texclud eotherwis e rational calculationsbefor eth edecision) .Unde rth erationa lmodel ,i n order to evaluate theoutcom eo fa decisio non ewoul dnee dt otak eint o consideration all the effects of all the consequences. Inpractice ,a decision-maker gives subjective ratings,tha tar et oa grea texten tso ­ cially induced. A famous example illustrates thisprinciple .Ehrlic h (quoted inWagenaar ,1977 )ha sshow ntha tmos tautomobil e advertisements are read by peoplewh ohav ejus tbough ta ne wcar ,an dno tb ythos ewh o 132

are planning tobu y ane w one.Th e need for information seems tob e greaterafte rth eacquisitio ntha nbefore . But the striving towards justification afterwards affects aperson' s deliberations evenbefor e taking the decision. Ifa nindividua lha sn o dependablewa yo fobjectivel y assessingth esucces so fa cours eo factio n after the decision,ho wca nw eexpec thi m totes tth eimplication so fa specific course of actionbefor eh emake sit ?On ewa yt ocop ewit hthi s dilemma is to take into accountbeforehan d thevariou spath so fjusti ­ fiability ofhi s decisionvi s àvi s other people,eve nbefor e anybody asks for it.H e anticipates and specifies the reactions of others on his decision,eve nwhe nth eevaluator sar ecompletel y imagined."Truth " does not always result in thebes t decision or thebes t solution. It wouldb eal lto oeas yt oclassif ythi spatter no fsocia lbehaviou runde r the heading ofweighin gu pal lknow nalternative s interm so fcost san d risks of negative consequences.I nthi sway ,ever ydecisio nca nb erea ­ soneda sbein g arationa lone .

A final illustrationo fth ewa ypeopl ecop ewit hth edilemm ao fmakin ga vital decision is toavoi dmakin g itb yprocrastinatin g orb y inventing additional reasons for ignoringth eworrisom esituation .Jani san dMan n (1977)cal lthi sreluctan tbehaviou r "defensiveavoidance" .

Looking back at ourargumen ts ofar ,i ti sclea rtha tm ypositio ni st o start from descriptive and explanatory variables in decision-making rather than to start from reducing actors to hunters of alternatives within the means-end calculus. For sociologists, oneproble m isth e claim ofuniversalis m of the different decision-making strategies,in ­ dependento fan ysocio-politica l configuration.On eo fth emai nquestion s is under which socio-political conditions the oneo rothe rstrateg yi s likely toprevail ,independen to fth epersona l aptitudeo fth eindivid ­ ual. A secondconsideratio nconcern sth eemphasi so nknowledg e and information as thevita l variables inth eunderstandin go fth edecision-makin gpro ­ cess. However, it isno t only knowledge that guides humanbehaviour , but also the lacko fknowledg e (Kruithof, 1977). Iwoul d saytha tplai n ignorance is asmuc h adeterminin g factor in human decision-makinga s is information. Reality forces us to recognize thatignoranc e isomni ­ present in the daily affairs of anyhuma nbeing , andapparentl y soi n ourmoder ndifferentiate d society. The significance of ignorancelie si nit srelevanc y forth esocia lcon ­ struction of reality by individuals and groups. Ignorance affects the -13 3

individual's interpretationo fhi ssituation ,h ei sa victi m ofth eexis ­ tence of ignorance as an essential component of social life.Bu tt oa certain extentpeopl e areals oawar eo fth eexistenc eo fignorance ,in ­ cluding their own,whic h they use toorganiz ean dcontro l theirsocia l environmentan dth esocia llif eo fthei rfellow-men . Althoughi ndail ypractic e knowledge andignoranc ear eintensivel yinter ­ woven, individuals and groups generally tend topresen t themselves as peoplewh oknow . The suggestion Iwan t tomak e here is that ignorance is anessentia l variable in human decision behaviour. To study individual actors from the point of view of their ignorance processing capacity aswel l as their ignorance controlling capacityma yb ea svaluabl e asth etraditi ­ onal approaches through informationprocessing . Irefe rher et oth ein ­ teresting, explorative analysis of ignorance and social behaviour by Kruithof (1977),on eo fth efe wstudie si nthi sfield . My argument so far has been that the role of knowledge in thesocia l behaviouro findividua l actors islimited ,a sevidence db ya noverwhelmin g number of experimental findings.Sayin gthi smean stha tdecision-maker s are not only innee d of astrateg yo futilizatio no fknowledge ,bu to f a strategyo futilizatio no fignoranc ea swell . Sociologiststen dt ounderestimat e therol eo fignoranc ei nhuma nbehav ­ iour and inhuma n relations,whic h mightb ea reflectio no fth eintel ­ lectual's position in society. Intellectuals arepreoccupie dwit hknow ­ ledge. Moreover, they are led as arul eb yth eide atha tmankin dmove s towards progress by the diffusion of scientific knowledge (VanLier , 2 1980:4) .Thi s attitude iswel l exemplified bya recen tstatemen tmad e by one of the leading Dutch sociologists: "Modernizatio n as anindis ­ pensable element of thedevelopmen tproces s isaccordin g toa generall y

Itgoe swithou tsayin gtha tth erelationshi pbetwee nsocia lscience s andpolicy-makin gwil lbasicall ydepen do na muc hmor eencompassin g attitude aboutth ebelie fi nprogress .Severa ldecade sag oVa nLie r (1956:10)state d that to him most intellectuals had already lost their certainty ofbelie f inprogres s but continued tobehav ea s if they still believed in the oldconception .Thei rol dbelie fi s replaced by an attitude of hope, sometimes against theirbette r judgement.Withou ta nelemen to fhope ,say sVa nLier ,an ypossibil ­ ityo fimprovin g societyb yplanne d interventionwoul db eabsurd . How this tendency will develop, isuncertain . Since the fifties criticism with regard toth esocia l functiono fscienc eha svastl y increased, including attackso nscienc ea ssuc ha sa nasocia lunder ­ taking (Boers, 1980). Also,th equestio narise swhethe rth emasse s havechange dthei rbelie fo racceptanc eo fprogres sdurin gth elas t decades, which has affected societalconsensu sabou tth ecredibil ­ ityo fscience . 134

accepted definition the systematic applicationo feve rexpandin gscien - 3 tific knowledge to all realms of societal life" (Breman, 1980). I n spite of the fact that nowadays science is under heavy attackwit h respect to its objectivity aswel l as to its "blessings" for society (see, for instance,Boers , 1980), social scientistscontinu et oattac h great value to science as a supplier of knowledge to solve societal problems in a rational way,b e itb y "traditional"type so fsocia lre ­ search orb y renewed, fashionable methods like action-research. Inm y opinion, it would be worthwhile to complement and counterbalance the socialscientists 'perspectiv eo nknowledge ,b y asociolog yo fignorance .

J.C.Brema n atth e seminar on Research inth esocia lscience san d policies fordevelopmen tcooperation .Th eHague ,novembe r1980 . -13 5

3 INTERLUDE

Undoubtedly, there is a certain analogy between the decision-making process of individuals (or small groups)an d of societal actors,e.g . policy-makers.Th edifferences ,however ,ma yb eequall ygreat ,dependen t as decision-makers are onth esituationa lcontext .Accordin gt oEtzion i (1968:252) "macro-decision-makers" differ from individual ones asfol ­ lows: They are internally more differentiated, they canmak e use of larger amountso fknowledg e andmor esophisticate d decision-makingtech ­ nology, and their process of decision-making ismor e institutionalized and organized. This differing social context addsfundamentall y toth e complexityo fpubli cpolicy-making ,whic hca nb eignore dal lto oeasil y. 4 Moreover, as Etzioni suggestsi na provokin gpassag e (1968:139) ,"t oa greater extent than individuals, societal actors can functionfo rlon g periods of time with little empirically valid social knowledge".Th e greater capacity, real orperceived ,t oalte rthei renvironment s ison e of the reasons why the reality-testing ofpubli c decision-makers is particularly limited.

Notal lresearc hi sfull yawar eo fth esignificanc eo fthi sdiffer ­ ence.Fo rinstance ,i n"Decision-making " (1977)Jani san dMan npre ­ sentinterchangeabl e studieso fpsychologica lprocesse s indecision ­ makingtha trefe rt oindividual s aswel lt osocieta lactors . - 136-

4 SCIENTIFICKNOWLEDG EAN DTH ENOTIO NO FPOLIC Y

Inth emeantime ,mutua ldeclaration s of"love "betwee npolicy-maker s and theacademi cworl d areno texceptional .A tfirs tsigh ta clos erelation ­ shipbetwee nthes etw opartie swoul d seemt ob e allbu tpromising :govern ­ ments want tomak e policies that arebase d on scientificknowledg ea s mucha spossible ,an dth esocia lscience swan tt oserv esociety . However,realit yi sdifferen tan dharder .Man yauthor sstudyin gthi sre ­ lationship ascertain that sociological researchha ss ofa rno tcontrib ­ utedver ymuc ht oth emakin go fpubli cpolicies .Undoubtedl y therei sa n element of fashion,o f "bon ton", inthi sdiscussion .Muc happlicatio n of sociology is probably hidden away in the dark,becaus e it isno t being interpreted as havingbee napplie d foron ereaso no ranother ,be ­ cause the effect is of an indirect nature,o rbecaus e policy-makers simply apply sociological knowledge without even knowing, let alone acknowledging that they were applying it, orbecaus e application is piecemeal or intermittent. Complaining about the lack ofpolic yrele ­ vancyappear st ob epar to fth estat eo fth eart si nsociology . Whatever the element of fashion in thediscussion ,ther e isth eunmis ­ takable fact that sociological research findings areno tmad emuc hus e ofi ngovernmen tagencies .An dwhe ni tcome st orea lbusiness ,th emutua l admirationdiminishe s andgive swa yt oth ehars hrealitie so fdail ylife . A striking examplewa s given by a spokesman of theDutc hDirectorate - General for International Cooperation at a seminar on social science researchan dpolicy-makin g indevelopmen tcooperatio nwh o said: "Research is of only amargina l account in our policy-making" and "researchers oughtno tt ooverrat ethei row nrol ei npolicy-making" . Disillusiono rrealism ? Many factors related to this discussion and illustrated inth eintro ­ duction of this essay do not,i nm y opinion, get to the hearto fth e matter.Th e notion ofwha tpolicy-makin g iso rough tt ob ei sessentia l fora nadequat eunderstandin g ofth epotentia l andactua lrol eo fsocia l scienceknowledg e inpubli cpolicie swhic hunevitabl y raisesth equestio n ofth eplac eo fpolitic si npolicy .

4.1 Whati spubli cpolicy-making ?

Generally, and unfortunately, sociologists in their capacity asre ­ searchers areno tfamilia rwit hpolicy-makin g structures andprocesses .

W.M.Floo r atth esam esemina r asmentione dunde r3 . 137

They have no personal or intimate knowledge of the daily affairs of policy-makers, nor do theysufficientl y appreciate theexactin gtas ko f beinga policy-maker ,who mthe yofte nconsider ,no twithou tcontempt ,a s opportunistic shortsighted actors.Bu tlac ko ffamiliarit y isno tlikel y tob e themajo rvariabl e inexplainin gth eunhapp yrelationshi pbetwee n social science and public policy. Themor eimportan tpoin ti swha tth e prevailing notion is about the essence of policy-making. Many a sociologist advocates, often unwittingly, ametho d ofmakin g policy. That is,a s Scott& Shor e (1980:63)state ,whe nthe yspea ko fusin gso ­ ciology inpolicy-makin g toenlighten ,t oprovid eidea s andinformation , or to evaluate or further understanding ofpolic yan ds oon ,the ypre ­ suppose the existence of ametho d forconductin gpubli c affairs,whic h grantthes e functionst osociology . Themos t common idea of sociologists aboutth eproces so fpubli cdeci ­ sion-making is probably the one concerning the rational method. They presuppose acommitmen t to rationality and scientificprocedures .Thi s approach entails a specification of objectives andvalue s as aprere ­ quisite for empirical analyseso fpolic y alternatives.Polic y isdeter ­ minedb ya nanalysi so fmean san dend swhereb y allrelevan talternative s are exhaustively surveyed in a comprehensive way, based on scientific information andexpertise . The approach isbes tillustrate db yth eprocedur eon epresumabl yha st o follow if he iswillin g to implementa programm e rationally, asstate d byScot t& Shor e (1980:70).

Initially, he would want (1) to determine what theproble mis . Anticipating the necessity for using methods and techniques of social science research in this and other facets of thepolicy ­ making process, itwoul d be necessary (2)t o define theproble m clearly andprecisely . The next step would be (3)t oclarif yth e goals,value san dobjective so fth esocia lpolicie st ob edevelope d todea lwit hthi sproblem . One would want (4) to organize these in ahierarchica l fashion reflecting prevailing notions aboutho w to attackth eproble man d howt oarriv ea toveral lpriorities .Next ,th epolic yanalys twoul d (5) list all thepossibl e ways of achieving these goals and (6) make an inventory of the full range of consequences thatmigh t reasonably be expected to follow from eacho fth epossibl ealter ­ nativesh eha sconceived .These ,i nturn ,woul db e (7)ranke dalon g a continuum from the most to the leastpreferre d outcomes(8) . Estimates would thenb emad e of financial and manpower resources likely to be available to accomplish the objectives sought,an d some determination would be made of theprobabl e (9)cost sasso ­ ciated with each of thepossibl e courses of action.A (10)pro ­ cedure would then be instituted to bring all this information together at the time andplac e that adecisio nmus tb e made,s o that the policy-maker would be in apositio nt ocompar eth ecost s and probable consequences ofeac hpropose dpolic ywit hth eoveral l goals and to select themos t realistic and most effectivealter - 138

nativeleadin gt oth epreferre d seto fconsequences . Once agreement was reached, the policy-maker would then draw further on the sociologist's skills for such aids as supplying information necessary for the (11)implementatio n ofpolic y and (12)evaluatin g apolicy' s success.Suc hinformation ,particularl y that gained through evaluation research,woul d then (13)b e fed back into the policy process so that action could be takent o correct unanticipated problems and to improve overall effec­ tiveness.

The ideabehin d thisprocedur e is thati twil llea dt osituation stha t maximizeth epositiv e andminimiz eth enegative . However, empirical evidence has shown that this approach has little reality value and simplycanno tb eimplemented .W erefe rt oth eanalog y about thepositio n ofinformatio n andscientifi c knowledge asonl yver y adequate explanations of individualbehaviour .Ther ei sn odenyin gtha t the approach of the rational method may have unquestionable heuristic value, butpushin g the reduction too farfro mth econtex tha srendere d it ahistorical, asociological andapolitical .Fo rpartl y similarcriti ­ cism on thephenomeno n ofmoder nplannin g in the developing countries seeCaide n& Wildavsk y (1974)an dVa nDusseldor p (1975).

For a more realistic approach that considers the dependency of the relationships with the environmenta sa majo rvariable ,on eha st otur n to the incremental conceptiondevelope db yLindblo m andhi sassociates . This "art ofmuddlin g through" is viewed asbein g commonly followed. The strategy of "incrementalism" which implies thatpolicy-maker s do not follow a comprehensive procedure to arrive at decisions,contain s a number of elements that areclaime d tob emor e relevant forunder ­ standing what is actuallytakin gplac ei npolic ybodies .Basicall yonl y marginal decisions aremad e which only differt oa limite ddegre efro m existingpolicies .Decision-maker s investigateonl ya limite dnumbe ro f alternatives that consider only a limited number of impacts.Onl y a fewmean s are considered and objectives are adjusted to theavailabl e means, rather than adjusting means to goals.Problem s areweighe d ina neverending series of formulation and reformulation; there is no one decision and no final problem solving. Analysis and evaluation are geared to alleviate concrete problematic situations rathertha nt oar ­ rive athithert o unrealized goals.Consensu s aboutal lpossibl evalue s is not actively pursued and often develops only after adecisio n is made; analysis and evaluations are undertaken by all groups concerned whichmean s that the strategy of incrementalism is essentially adis ­ jointedprocess . 139

Among critics of governmentpolicie sthi softe nevoke s imageso foppor ­ tunism and aimlessness.However , these are exactlyth echaracteristic s of incrementalist policies that are actually followed in an effective andworkabl ewa yi npluralisti csocieties .

Etzioni (1968)looke d fora nalternativ emode ltha twoul dchalleng ebot h rationalism and incrementalism and which is supposed tohav ea greate r descriptive, analytical aswel l as normative value. Inorde r toavoi d thepitfall s of utopianismo fth erationalisti cmode lan dth econserva ­ tism of the incrementalistic approach, he designed a "mixed scanning" strategy that is presented as a realistic aswel l as a transforming model.Th eessentia l thesisi nEtzioni' sapproac hi stha tdecision-maker s differentiate fundamental decisions frombi tdecisions .Whe nth eincre - mentalists say that an actor chooses betweendrasti cdecision s andbi t decisions infavou ro fth elas tones ,Etzion i suggeststha t a) most incremental decisions specifyo ranticipat e fundamentaldeci ­ sionsan d b) the cumulative value ofth eincrementalis tdecisio ni sgreatl yaf ­ fectedb yth eunderlyin g fundamentaldecision s (Etzioni,1968:289) . Forthi sstrateg y aprogramm eo finstruction s ispresente d (p.286-288) , whichwil lno tb especifie dhere . It isno tm y intention to discuss the respective meritso fth eratio ­ nalistic, the incrementalistic or themixe d scanning approach. Itre ­ mains an open question whether systematic, empirical evidence is in support of either one or the other of these strategies,whil e recog­ nizing the extreme difficulties of thoroughly evaluatingan dassessin g decision-making processes.Th e dominantsociologica l questionis ,unde r which socio-political conditions taking into account the decision­ maker's societal capacities, may one expect the prevalence or the greatereffectiveness e ofth eon eabov eth eother ? Our concern at themomen t is:Wha t does the notiono fpolic ymea nfo r thepositio no fscientifi c knowledge inpolicy-making ? Inth e rational decision-making approach topubli cpolicy ,a ver ycen ­ tral role is attributed to dependence on scientific information for arriving at rational public decisions. Lack of success in the realm of public policy is primarily relegated to a lack of development or utilization of theories and findings ofmoder n science, including the social sciences. Many a sociologist considers this approach as the appropriate principle, if there is tob e room for sociology inpubli c affairs. Many sociologists explicitly orimplicitl y advocateth eratio ­ nal model, because it provides thebes tprocedure s ofmakin g use of sociologicalknowledge . 140

Theincrementalisti c approachbasicall y limitsth erol eo fsocia lscien ­ tists to aver ygrea textent .Th ereaso nbein gtha ti ti scharacterize d by an endless series of comparisons withth eexistin g situationswhic h hinderth eutilizatio no fscientifi cknowledg e othertha nth e immediately instrumental, and is even active in eliminating orbypassin g available scientific information. Generally, the "muddling through" strategy is denounced by sociologists by saying that it leads to irrational and ad-hoc public policies that create more problems than they solve. Neither does it provide adequate clues to the application ofsocio ­ logical knowledge, nor does it link up with the scientific belief of rationaltheory-formatio nan dfact-findin g insocia lresearc ha ssuch . Etzioni'smixe d scanning strategy follows anintermediat eposition .Al ­ though this eminent social scientist inhi smajo rwor k "TheActiv eSo ­ ciety"doe sno tspel lou tth especifi crol eo fsocia lscienc eknowledge , one can safely say that he attaches substantial value to fundamental criticism and challenge by societal subunitstha tar erelativel yimmun e from societalpressure .Thei rtas k ist orevie wth e "community-of-assump- tions" and challenge them when they arei ndange ro fbecomin gdetache d from reality. In this context,Etzion i shows aparticula r concernfo r the continually growing inequalityo fknowledg ewithi nmoder nsocietie s andbetwee nsocieties .

It is to be expected thatmos t sociologists,whe n becoming acquainted with public policies,wil l findthemselve s insituation s thatver ymuc h resemble the analysis put forward by Lindblome tal .Etzion iwh omain ­ tainstha tth enumbe ran drol eo ffundamenta l decisions aregreate rtha n incrementalists believe, also eagerly admitstha tincrementa l decisions aremor e common.An d even: "Democracies must accept arelativ edegre e ofincrementalis m ....becaus eo fthei rgreate rnee dt ogai nsuppor tfo r new decisions from many andconflictin g sub-societies,a nee dwhic hre ­ ducesthei rcapacit yt o followa long-ru nplan " (Etzioni,1968:294) .

Therei sn ologi ci nexpectin g thatther e issuc ha thin ga sa nimmediat e linkbetwee n scientific knowledgean dit sapplicatio ni nactua lpolicy ­ making,moreover ,i ti sno tver y likelytha tther eeve rwil lbe . Inth e followingparagrap hw ewil lelaborat e onth erol eo fsocia l science knowledge in an incremental decision-making situation, themos tcommo n contextexperience db ysociologist s asw ehav esuggested .Ou r focuswil l beth eessentia lrol eo fpolitic s inpubli cdecison-making . 141-

4.2 Knowledge andpolicy :th eprimac yo fpolitic s

If it is notscientifi c knowledgeo rinformatio n thatgive sth eclu et o themakin go fa publi cdecision ,the nho wwil l itb emade ? Irrationally, atrandom ? Inorde rt oge ta sconcret e anexpositio no fou rargumen ta spossible ,w e borrowa ver y fineexampl e fromScot t& Shor e (1980:136),wher eth efirs t author analyses in detail some of his personal experiences ofpubli c policy-relevant research on the subject ofblindnes s in theU.S.A . In particularw ewil lrefe rt oth eauthor' sstruggl econcernin gth edefini ­ tion of theproblem' s definition. Asw e have seen in a rationalistic approach it is aprerequisit e that a clear definition of theproble m is formulated. However,mos to fth etim ethi si sno twha tactuall yhap ­ pens. Th e situations that confrontpubli c policy-makers aremor eofte n thanno tmultiple , conflicting,an dinherentl y indistinct.Transformin g theinterpretatio no fthes eambiguou s situations intoclea rproble mfor ­ mulations, isno tpurel y a technical activity.Nevertheless ,decision s aremade .

Inthi s context it isworthwhil e quoting Scott's ownword sa tlength , because his analysis of applied social research isexceptionall yaccu ­ rate for an accounto fapplie d socialresearch .Anothe rreaso n forthi s long quotation is that, at first sight,th eproble m ofblindnes sseem s tob e quite simple and should notpresen t insurmountable difficulties formakin g acceptable andworkabl epolic ysolutions .

This part of the study is deliberately limited to theproces so f generation ofpolicies .Ther ei sn oimmediat elin kbetwee ngenera ­ tion and implementation, since itpose squestion s aboutth enatur e of regulations, the obedience of organizations and individuals, thehandlin go fauthorit y andresource s (videVa nGunsteren , 1976). Iti sm y estimation that the role of scientific knowledge inth e interval from generation to implementation is asvulnerabl e asi n thephas eo fpolic yformulation . Therefore,th enotio no f "applied sociology"a si finstan trelevanc e wouldb ederive d fromi tfo rpolic y implementation ist ob econtended . Theter mpolicy-relevan tresearc ho rapplication-oriente d knowledge would be more appropriate. Using the term applied sociologymigh t raise false expectations of getting concrete andworkabl edirect ­ ivesfro mth esocia lsciences . 142-

Several years ago, Scottwa s asked tod oa stud yo nblindnes s andser ­ vicesfo rth eblin d inAmerica nsociety .Th eautho rcontinues :

The purpose of this study was toinvestigat e theeffectivenes so f services for theblin d in theUnite d Stateswit hth eobjectiv eo f making recommendations for changingth esyste mo fdeliver yo fser ­ vices forth eblin d andfo rreallocatin gresource st oth edifferen t typeso fservic eprograms .A majo rdifficult y encountered intryin g to meet this mandatewa st odetermin ewha t "theproblem "o fblind ­ ness is.Th eautho rsoo nlearne dtha twhil esever evisua l impairment isa conditio ntha taffect sa millio no rmor ecitizen s inou rcountr y todayan dtha tmos tagre etha tlac ko fsigh ti sa problem ,th eter m "blindness" itself gives noindicatio no fwha tthi sproble m is.I s the condition ofblindnes s amatte r ofphysica l disability oro f social stigma? Is it ahealt hproble mo ra proble m ofpoverty ?I n view of the fact thatnearl y two-thirds of allpeopl eclasse da s blind are 65year s of age or older, isblindnes s aproble m of visual loss ormerel y aface to fth enorma l agingprocess ? Isi ta physical problem involving an inability to relate to the distant environmentdirectly ? Isi ta psychologica lproble m ofpersonality , or is it a sociological problem of interpersonal interactionbe ­ tweenthos ewh ocanno tse ean dthos ewh ocan ?On eobviou sanswe ri s thati ti sal lo fthes ething san dmore ,bu tthi srespons edoe sno t suffice forth epurpos eo fevaluatin gth eadequac yo fexistin gpro ­ grams and recommending new ones. To approachth esituatio nfro ma planningpoin to fvie w iti snecessar yt okno wclearly ,plainl yan d in advance what "theproblem " is;yet ,thi si sno tsomethin gtha t isinheren ti nth esituatio no rconditio na ssuch .

Without any doubt,th e problem is all of these things simultaneously. Most situations simply lack sufficient clarity ofdefinition .Sociolo ­ gical input cannot "solve"thi sphenomeno n ofmultiplicit y ofinter ­ pretationconcernin g suchproblemati csituations . An equally false illusion, fairly common amongstproblem-oriente d re­ searchers, is the expectation of a solution fromcomprehensive ,inter ­ disciplinary research. An illusion because such a manoeuvre merely pushes theproble m away to ane wforu mtha tha sth esam ehandicap .Th e interdisciplinary approach is knownt ob eplague db yth ever ysam epro ­ blem forwhic h it is supposed tob e designed: findinga commo ngroun d for problem-definition (Lekanne ditDeprez , 1976). Eveni finterdisci ­ plinary research manages tofin dscientifi centrie st opromisin ginter - linkages -whic h is seldom the cause -, itremain s fundamentallyun - suited and incapable of transforming the ambiguities ofpubli c policy dilemmas into neatly delineated scientific networks and viceversa . Endeavours to attack policyproblem swit ha ninterdisciplinar y approach will certainly make for clarification of the several dimensions tob e theoretically tackled ina proble m situation.Thi smigh tprov e tob e a precious advantage,bu t the same actma y increase awareness ofth e distancebetwee nscientifi c activity andpolic ypractice . 143

From the start, the scientific method of public decision-making is severelyhandicappe db yth einheren tlac ko fclarit yo nwha tth eproble m inquestio nis . Ofcourse ,decision-makin gwil lproceed ,bu tno to nth ebasi so fdefinin g theproble m fromscientifi cperspective sonly .

Suppose that the nature of theproble m is agreed upon -whic h inth e incrementalistic view ofpolicy , is not anunconditiona l prerequisite fora decision-makin gprocedur e -the nth enex tstag ei st oarriv e ata n operationalisation of the definition that is efficientan dadministra ­ tively workable.Withou t such a specification, no socio-economic cal­ culations or narrowly defined research canb e done thatwil lconside r theimplication s ofth esevera lalternatives .An d aswit hth edefinitio n of the problem, also in this "stage" in the decision-making process there is no neat,simpl e way oflogicall ydiscoverin gwha ti sth ebes t solution of optimalisation. It is true thatinterdisciplinar y research may incorporate different aspectso fa proble m (sociological,economic , psychological, etc.), it can never represent the different socio­ political interestsinvolved . Scott & Shore (1980:138-140), in aver y precise way, illustrate this phenomenonwit hth ealread ymentione d studyo fblindness .

Many years ago itwa s decided thatbecaus eblin dpeopl emus tpur ­ chase special services and have unusual expenses, some form of pension for theblin d was required. Inorde r tomak epreliminar y decisions about the costs and administration ofsuc ha system ,o r toconside rth epossibl e alternatives,a nestimat eo fth enumbe ro f potential candidateswa snecessary ,yet ,n oaccurat eestimat ecoul d bedevelope dunti lclea rcriteri awer eestablishe d todecid ewhethe r or not aperso nwa s "blind".Thus ,rationalit y dictated thatther e mustb ea nexplicit ,precis edefinitio no fthi sterm . Theproble m inconstructin g aworkabl e administrative definitiono f blindness was the decision as towhos e point of view toadopt ; therewa sn osingl edefinitio ntha twa s "themos taccurate "o r"th e best" one to accept.Th e standard of cost suggested one kind of definition; the standard of adequacy of services a second; the standard ofpractica l administration a third, andth estandar do f personal well-being of recipients of services afourth .Moreover , whatwa s arationa ldefinitio n froman yon eo fthes epoint so fvie w - say that of cost - often appeared tob e irrational fromsom eo r allo fth eothe rpoint so fvie winvolved . The first definition ofblindnes stha twa sconsidere dwa sstrictl y in accordance with the dictionary meaning of that term, i.e.th e total and complete inability to see.Bu t at least two problems would have arisen if this definition had been adopted. First,i t would have excluded from eligibility for service a substantial number of people who are severely visually impaired but who neverthelessposses s somesmal lamoun to fvisio n (...). The second problem wasbrough tabou tb yth efac ttha ttota lblind ­ ness isa rar eeven ti nth eAmerica npopulation ;b ythi sdefinitio n 144

thepopulatio n eligible forblindnes s services wouldprobabl yno t have exceeded 50.000people .Therefore ,i twoul dhav ebee nprohib ­ itively expensive to develop anentir enationa l systemo fservice s forsuc ha smal lpopulatio n (...). Thus, the question arose as towher ealon gth econtinuu m ofsigh t the line should be drawn.Administrativ e considerations dictated that the linemus tb e drawn in such awa y as to ensuretha tth e procedures for determining if someone fell within the definition would be simple to administer. Cost and administrative consider­ ations dictated that itb e drawn insuc ha manne ra st oproduc ea population innee dtha twoul db elarg eenoug ht ojustif ycreatin ga national systemo fservices ,bu tno ts olarg ea st ostrai nseverel y the government's social service budget. Social service consider­ ations dictated a linetha twoul d include allperson s functionally restricted because of visual loss. Although the interests were rational,the ywer esometime s inconflict . Once the decision was made to drawa lin etha tdefine dblindness , a further difficulty developed (...). In thepopulatio n ofpeopl e regarded as "blind" by the adopted legal definition, amajorit y possess a considerable amount of usable vision and experience problems vastly different andofte nles scomple xtha nth eproblem s of those who cannot see at all (...). The dividing linebetwee n thesighte d andth eblin dwa smad elargel y foreconomi c andadminis ­ trativereasons :i twa sbelieve d thatthi sdefinitio nwoul dguaran ­ tee apopulatio n ofpeopl elarg eenoug ht ojustif y federalinvest ­ ment in developing anationa l system ofservices .Yet ,eve rsinc e its adoption, atnationa lconvention s ofworker s forth eblind ,i n professional journals dealing withblindnes s andamon gth egrowin g number ofblin d liberation groups,ther e havebee nrecurren tdis ­ cussions about the absurdity of this definition froma socia lan d psychologicalpoin to fview .

Thisexampl eo fth estud yo nblindnes s showsver yclearl ytha ta problem , neither in its definition nor in itsoperationalisation , isno tgiven , but has tob e constructed. Behind anydefinitio no fa societa lproble m is always the question ofwh o is going tob eserve db ythi sselectio n or combinations of selections of theman yinterpretation s ofa proble m and who are not.Th esaf ean dworkabl e scientificmetho d thatca nlogi ­ callyoffe r solutions andready-mad e alternatives,doe sno texist . Nevertheless, decisions aremad ei npubli cpolic ybodies ,wit ho rwith ­ out social science expertise, and the question arisesa st oho wpolic y decisions are arrived ati fi ti sno tscientifi c inputstha tgiv eulti ­ mateclue st oth esolutio no fa decisiona lconflict . Whati sdecide dan dwh oi sdoin gth edeciding ? Fora nanswer ,w ehav et ostar tb yadmittin gtha ti ndecisiona ldilemma s of importance the freedomo fpolic y alternatives isgreatl yrestricted . Making apolic y isno tjus tscannin ga serie so fopen-ende d alternative courses of action.Th edecisiona l situationi sembedde d ina structura l contexttha tshape sth erealisti cpossibilitie s ofth esevera lpath stha t canb efollowed .Bu tfirs tan dforemost ,ther ei sn osocietal ,no rintra - policy consensus about the ultimate and short-term objectives,whic h - 145-

deniesth epossibilit y ofon eproblem-definin g perspectiveo ron eproblem - solvingoperationalisation . Ifther ei sn osuperio rchoic etha tca nb edefine db ylogica lstandards , what then is an effective choice, or in the wordso fSimo na decisio n thati s "satisficing"? The answer to thisquestio nha salread ybee ngive ni nth eexampl e about blindness asa socia lpolic yproblem : "satisficing" solutionscom eabou t by the interactions of groups and individuals involved inan daffecte d bycertai npolic yareas ,includin gth egovernmenta lpolicy-makin gbodie s themselves within their intra-organizational setting. It is they who deliver the multiple inputso fdefinitions .An dsinc ei ti sexceptiona l to find these differentdefinition scorrespondin gwit heac hother ,con ­ sensus about what the situation is and about the course tob e taken springs fromth eusua lpolitica lmechanisms :th econfrontatio no fpower ­ ful and lesspowerfu lgroups ,th epolitic so fcoalition ,th ecaptur eo f thedefinitio no fth esituatio nan dit simpositio no nother sb ya proces s ofnegotiation , and thelike .I nothe rwords ,conceptio n anddefinitio n of aproble m -an dal lsubsequen tstep snecessar yt oarriv ea ta polic y formulation- reflect swha ti spoliticall y feasablean dworkable . Here we will notfollo wth eman y stepstha thav et ob edevelope dbefor e any concrete policy action canb e started. The above analysis of the different notions ofpolic y -withou t pretending tob e complete -al ­ ready reveals the long and complicated way tob e covered fromproble m operationalisationt opolic y formulation. It will not change the crucial finding of our analysis:Betwee n the results of new oralread y available scientificresearc h andth egenera ­ tionan dformulatio no fpolic ymeasure s alwayslie sa politica ldecision , orrathe r aserie so fintervenin gpolitica ldecisions .A sEtzion i (1968: 303)put s it:a societa ldecision-make rma ychoos et oignor e facts,bu t - by definition -h ecanno tignor epower .Th eargumen tadvance dher ei s of an elementary nature:sociologica l research findingsan dthei rrele ­ vancy forpolic y formulationar ealway ssubjec tt opolitica ldefinitions , whichi na pluralisti c settingi sa give-and-tak eprocess .I tbelong st o 7 thepolicy-makin gproces s assuch ;i ti spar tan dparce lo fit . One can also puti tth eothe rwa y around:i nth epolicy-makin gprocess , sociological research itselfbecome s apolitica l resource,on eamongs t many other inputs.Thi s is sobecaus e of thever yac to ftransferrin g scientificprocedure st oth ereal-lif e situationso fpractica lpolic y

A lot of literature on the utilization of knowledge forpubli c purposes suffers from underexposure ofth edimensio no fpower .Re ­ search-based findings,i fthe yd ono ttak eint oaccoun tth eexistin g relationso fpowe ran dcooperation ,wil lremai nineffective . 146

intervention in a societalcontext .Mos to fth etime ,socia l scientists provide a posteriori insights,whic hleave sth efutur ewid eope ni fon e sticks to avoluntaristi c perspective, thehear to fpolicy-making .Bu t even if a social scientist ismor e predictive,h e will have tomode l his "recommendations" in ceteris-paribus terms,whic h isonl yon epat h inth edail y jungleo fpolicy-making . This feature of knowledge is an element of the nature of the science production system itself.Bu tth eimpac to fscientifi c knowledge inth e political arena doesno t depend exclusively onth eintrinsi cqualitie s ofscience .Th eeffectivenes s ofknowledg e isdetermine dno tonl yb yth e strength of its evidencebu tals ob yth erelativ eprestig eposition so f thedisciplinar y fields involved,th eresource sth esocia lscientis tca n mobilize,th eadviser' spositio nrelativ et oth eacknowledge dknowledge - producing units,th eweigh t of the communicationnetwor ko fth esocia l scientistinvolve d ands oon . It is these considerations thatmak e many a study aboutth eimpac to f policy-oriented research in the social sciences so disappointing (for instance. Vand eVail , 1980). Thereceptivenes s ofpolicy-makin gbodie s to sociological knowledge ismuc h more determined by the termso fth e relationship between the researchers and the otherpartie s involvedi n apolic ydecision ,rathe rtha nb y "paradigms"an dothe rintrinsi cquali ­ tieso fth esocia lresearc hprocess . 147-

5 DISCUSSION

The foregoing analysis may be helpful inunderstandin g theactua llac k ofutilizatio n of social science knowledge inpubli c policies.A tth e same time, the analysis adds to our understanding that this state of affairs is not of a temporary,passin g nature thatonl yrequire smor e intensive andseriou seffort so nth epar to fth esocia l sciencestoward s rationalizing thepolicy-makin gproces s andenvironmen ta sman y asocio ­ logist might think. It is essential in the relations between social sciencean dpolicy .Ther ei sn owa yout . The tenor of this analysis isno t tob e interpreted inth esens etha t social science research oriented towards policy issues is auseles s undertaking, avie w thatwoul d only leadt oruthles spessimism .M yar ­ gument is not to be interpreted asa ple a forad-ho cpolicies .I nthi s respect Id o notendors eLindblom' sposition ,wh omake shi sincrementa - list approach not merely as the more realistic one,bu t also as the rightan dbes tstrateg ytoward ssolvin gpolic yproblem s asthe yarise . The value of our analysis has tob e found ina sharpe rdelineatio no f the problematic relationship between social science and public policy than is generally pursued, in order tob e ablet odefin eth elimit so f the capacity of penetration of social science knowledge.Afte r this delineation, the argument ismor e open -withi n the essentiallimita ­ tions of itspotentia l impact - toreconside r thepossibilitie s ofim ­ proving policy-oriented social scienceresearch .Th elin ei sdrawn ,bu t itremain s amai n responsibility for sociologyt oincrease ,i fno tth e acceptability, the accessibility ofpubli cpolic yi ncontex tan dconse ­ quences for rational discussiontha tlead st oconsciou scommitten t (see VanLier ,1980:19) .Or ,a sEtzion i (1968:300)states ,th emixed-scannin g strategy "generates demands forsom escannin go fth eunfamilia r andfo r occasional reviewso falternative s excludedb yth eprevailin gcommunity - of-assumptions and refuses to sanction adjustment of the ends to the means". Thisattitude ,however ,demand sa lo to fimaginatio n andscrutin yo nth e part of the sociologist, asmuc h inhi scapacit ya sa speakin gcitize n as a social researcher. Moreover, our analysisha sshow ntha tinforma ­ tion on a scientificbasi sma yreduc euncertaintie s concerningspecifi c aspects of a decisional situation,whil e addingt oth esam eproces so f decision-making.

Finally, the argument needs two more briefclarification s thati fela ­ borated may cast new light on the interconnection of social science 148

knowledge inpubli cpolicy . The first clarification referst oth esuggestio ncontaine d inou ranal ­ ysis so far thatpubli c policies mainly and ultimately aret ob econ ­ sidered as aproduc t of thepolitica l configurations to date.A majo r challenge to this view, however, is that government policies areonl y slightly determined by partisan politics in accordancewit hLindblom' s term,bu tprobabl y asmuc ho reve nmor eb yth eprevailin g socio-economic factors (Aquina, 1978). These small margins ofpubli c policy refert o thealmos tphilosophica l questiono fplanne dversu sunplanne d changean d thelimit so fhuma ninterventio n insocieta lprocesses . The notion of utilization is a secondaspec ttha tneed sclarification . Generally, utilization of social science knowledge is seenb y many a sociologista sth edirec tevidenc eo fus ei nactua lpolicy-making . However, if one looksa trelevanc e interm so fpolic ycourse so factio n underth edecisiv e impacto fpolitica l configurations,the nth edeliber ­ ateneglec t orbypassin g of available scientificresearc h findingsfo r political, or any other reasons is equally part of the receptiveness complex as is directutilization .No tusin ginformation ,no tseein gth e relevance of available knowledge,th eimpositio no fignoranc eo nother s and so on is as vital a part of the decision-making process as is "normal" utilization. Non-utilization is not tob e interpreted asre ­ sistance to innovations or recommendations only,bu t aspar t ofth e wholesyste mo fknowledg eprocessing . Unfortunately,mos tsociologist swithdra w fromth escen eth emomen tthe y havepresente d their findingsan drecommendations ,i fany .Th etransfor ­ mationo fthei rwor kint oa politica l resourcedoe snot ,a sa rule ,for m part of the directexperience so fth esocia l scientist.Th esociologis t who sees himself as a "problem solver"migh thav ea distorte d imageo f his position, and consequently of his potential contribution. Inth e samevein ,th econcep to fsocia lengineerin gmigh tb emisleading .

Afters oman y ill-fated socialresearc hprogramme stha twer e supposedt o be policy-relevant, the need for applied sociology as such is tob e questioned. More theory-oriented research is needed aswel l about the transformation conditions and tranformation processes of socialknow ­ ledge intopolicy-making . This essay ismean t tob e acontributio nt o this awareness, in accordancewit hKur tLewin' sadmonitio ntha tnothin g isa spractica l asa goo dtheory . - 149-

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